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Chapter 6

Corridors into the countryside

Encapsulation and the expansion of a government-controlled migrant mobilities regime

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Introduction

‘Special migrant transport’ reads a sticker on the front window of the DAMRI\(^74\) bus that transports migrant workers from the airport to the migrant terminal. When all passengers are on board, the 20-minute ride to Terminal 4 can start. The bus leaves the airport grounds via exit M1, but instead of entering the public road to Tangerang, the driver turns right onto a small road and immediately stops in front of a fence guarded by two officers. On the fence a paper note reads: ‘Entry forbidden except for DAMRI buses’. The officers open the gate and the bus continues via a small road on a strip of land bordered by a canal on the left and the airport’s runway fences on the right. Suddenly the bus brakes to make room for a local farmer pushing a cart loaded with rice. Officially, the road is accessible for migrant buses only, but because the migrant terminal was built amidst rice fields and next to a village, locals use the road too. For this reason, a second fence was built around the special migrant terminal and all entrances to the premises are guarded by security officers. After passing this second checkpoint, the bus parks in front of the terminal building to drop off the migrants and return to the airport for the next load.

While on board the bus, have the migrants crossed the Indonesian border and left the airport space, or are they still in transit space? The migrant terminal does not officially belong to Soekarno-Hatta Airport. At the same time, however, the building is located within the airport domain (PT Angkasa Pura 2008). The ground the building stands on is the property of airport operator Angkasa Pura II, who leases the ground to the National Agency, the government agency that manages the return process of migrant workers\(^75\). At the point the migrants wait for the bus to transport them from the migrant lane at the airport to the migrant terminal, they have already passed the immigration check and in that sense have entered Indonesia\(^76\).

\(^74\) DAMRI (Djawatan Angkoetan Motor Repoeblick Indonesia) is a state company.

\(^75\) One NGO claims that the main reason for the move from Terminal 3 to Terminal 4 has not been the need for improvement, but the fact that the Ministry of Manpower’s contract with airport operator PT Angkasa Pura ended (Palupi & Buntoro 2005). To accommodate the growing number of domestic air travellers, the airport operator wanted to build a new domestic terminal on the site of the migrant terminal and this terminal, opened in 2009, is now called Terminal 3. This shows how Soekarno-Hatta Airport as a space has its own hierarchical logic: the migrant terminal was relocated to a new building five kilometres from international Terminal 2, so that the new general domestic terminal 3 could be built close to the existing two terminals.

\(^76\) It is unclear to what extent the migrants have finished all airport procedures by this point. The migrants have passed the immigration check, but most have not had their goods checked by Customs. Their luggage has therefore never officially entered Indonesia and will also not be checked in the migrant building. There are only random checks in arrivals hall 2.
At the same time, they still find themselves in a restricted area of the airport, and are not free to leave. In fact, until their arrival in their home villages the migrants will remain in the confined spaces of buses, the migrant terminal, and roadside restaurants, mostly out of view of others, but under state surveillance.

The ride to the terminal illustrates how returning migrant workers encounter not only state actors such as the National Agency and DAMRI on their way home, but also bus drivers, security officers, and local people. In addition, the ride shows how a corridor, an extended restricted space, has been created to transport migrants safely between the airport and the migrant terminal. Moreover, it points to a way of regulating mobilities in which migrants, and the spaces they travel through, are guarded and kept under surveillance. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the practices of regulating migrant mobilities by identifying the different actors that are involved, and by exploring where and when regulation takes place. Although on an analytical level the same themes discussed in Chapter 4 reappear, this chapter argues that the mobilities regime for labour migration is characterized by a different mode of regulation.

I) The circuit of labour migration from Indonesia: regulating, controlling, and protecting migrant mobilities

The mobilities regime for returning migrant workers at Soekarno-Hatta Airport is part of a wider circuit of unskilled labour migration, mostly of domestic workers, from Indonesia to other parts of Asia and to the Middle East. What happens during the return process cannot be understood without taking into account the wider political-economic system of labour migration of (largely female) domestic workers. These migrant mobilities are controlled and regulated, not only during the return journey as we have seen in Chapter 5, but during all stages of the labour migration process, from recruitment, to working abroad, to returning home. Hence, before turning to the analysis of the return journey, this chapter first discusses the way migrant workers make the circuit of labour migration, from the recruitment and training phase in Indonesia to their departure from Soekarno-Hatta Airport, their work period abroad, and their journey home by airplane.
Departures: gender, debt, and control over mobility

How do migrants move from their home villages in Indonesia to a workplace in another country? In the literature on labour migration, there are a few studies that focus on the facilitation and regulation of transnational labour migration from Indonesia, or on what Johan Lindquist (2010, p. 117) calls the ‘infrastructure’ that makes transnational mobility possible (see Lindquist et al. 2012; Lindquist 2010; Killias 2009; Rudnyckyj 2004). In recent years, migration via official channels seems to be on the rise (Killias 2009; Lindquist 2010), and Lindquist even argues that we are witnessing a historical shift across Asia towards a ‘government-regulated market of circular migration’ (Lindquist et al. 2012, p. 9). The formal procedures require a prospective migrant worker to register at a local government office and go abroad via a private recruitment agency that has a license from the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration.77

A female migrant worker usually needs the consent of a male relative if she wants to travel (Williams 2007, pp. 57-58; Lindquist 2010). Moreover, as part of the formal procedures for labour migration, all female migrant workers need a letter of permission from either the husband or the father to acquire a visa and passport (Lindquist 2010, p. 124). Several authors have noted the crucial role of brokers in the recruitment process (Lindquist 2012; Palmer 2010; Hugo 1995; Spaan 1994). Female migrant workers in particular rely on brokers, or ‘sponsors’ as the migrant workers themselves call these middlemen, that bring them into contact with recruitment agencies. A broker gets a commission for each prospective migrant worker he delivers at the recruitment agency. In many cases the migrant worker does not have the money to pay for transport to Jakarta or for identity documents, so the broker gives her a loan. By providing contacts and by lending money to migrants for transport and paperwork, the brokers ‘move [the migrants] from one place to another’ and

77 The Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration (Kementerian Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi) has licensed around 500 recruitment agencies. Indonesia also sends workers abroad via government-to-government agreements, as is the case for Indonesian nurses migrating to Japan.
78 Several studies show the difficulty of distinguishing the legal and the illegal (Jones 2000; Lindquist 2012). For example, even though a migrant goes abroad via a legal agency, her documents may still be legally invalid if the agency has falsified the migrant’s age in order to make her old enough for working in Saudi Arabia. A second example is that a male migrant worker may be sent abroad by an illegal agency but enter Malaysia on a (legal) temporary visa. The fact that migrants leave via the formal channel therefore does not automatically imply that they have legal travel documents to make the journey abroad, or legal work permits.
79 It is illegal for recruitment agencies to approach potential migrants directly, and therefore the agencies rely on brokers. Potential migrant workers too prefer to use the services of brokers instead of going to a recruitment agency directly (see Palmer 2010).
80 The majority of brokers are men, although female brokers also exist, for example women who have worked abroad before and who can use their previous experience and contacts to recruit new migrants.
at the same time this system puts the women in a debt relationship with a broker (Lindquist 2010, pp. 117-118). The consent of males and the services of brokers thus not only enable female migrant workers to move, but also put the women’s mobility under supervision via a debt relationship.

Having left their home villages, most women go to a training centre in the city – often Jakarta – where they get trained for the job and wait for the necessary work and travel documents to be arranged. The maximum time a migrant worker spends in such a centre is officially three months, but in practice she may have to wait longer if there is no job order from an overseas agency yet. The recruitment agency advances the capital needed for the migrant’s training, documents and air travel, and this subsequently binds the migrant to the agency in a debt relationship (Rudnyckyj 2004) that is often contractually defined (Killias 2009). During the training phase, the recruitment agency puts restrictions on the migrant’s physical mobility to ensure that the migrant worker does not change her mind about going abroad. Women are often not allowed to visit their home villages or to receive visits from family members while they are in training. In many cases women are not even allowed to leave the premises of the training centre (see Rudnyckyj 2004; Killias 2009). Recruitment agencies may legitimize these practices by referring to their ‘responsibility’ to guard the women and their sexuality, but as Killias notes, ‘the patriarchal discourses legitimising these practices and revolving around the good morals of young rural women aptly disguise the fact that for the agency involved, there is an economic rationale behind the women’s incarceration: agencies have invested in the recruitment of these women, they have paid brokers important commissions, and now they want to make sure their investments don’t “run away”’ (Killias 2009, p. 163). Hence, female (rather than male) migrant workers become tied to others because it is easier to control the movement of women, especially

81 See Lindquist 2010 for a description of the characteristics of what he calls ‘gendered regimes of debt’ in the recruitment of migrant workers from Indonesia.
82 The training may include language courses, cooking lessons, learning how to operate household appliances, and learning how to take care of children and elderly persons. For a detailed description of a training see Rudnyckyj 2004.
83 Killias notes how for labour migration to Malaysia, recruitment agencies contractually define the debt the migrant has with the agency. Upon acceptance of the migrant worker by a Malaysian employer, the debt is usually transferred to the employer. The employer withholds wages for six months as a way for the migrant to repay the debt (Killias 2009, p. 151).
84 Killias (2009) argues that the motivation behind confinement is partly to prevent prospective migrant workers from learning about conditions at other training centres, and if they are dissatisfied with their own circumstances, deciding to leave or to shift to another agency.
the mobility of those who will work in the confined space of the household85 (Killias 2009, p. 153; Lindquist 2010, p. 130).

‘It’s like going abroad via a travel agency!’: organization and control of the outward journey
Most recruitment agencies send workers abroad in groups and arrange the complete journey. This begins with providing transport from the training centre to Soekarno-Hatta Airport86. In the airport’s departures hall, groups of migrant workers are easy to recognize, because they often wear a ‘company uniform’. For female migrant workers to the Middle East the outfit consists of a tunic and trousers with a matching headscarf. Women who will work in factories in the Asia-Pacific region sometimes get a very short ‘practical’ haircut and wear a track suit. Some migrant workers wear passes carrying their photograph and name on a key cord. Migrant workers are also recognizable by their special passports. A migrant worker passport has fewer pages than a regular passport, and is valid for only three years. This makes it a cheaper passport, but according to government officials in the terminal the limited validity also causes many migrants to overstay87. The thinness of the passport makes a person immediately recognizable as a migrant worker when she is holding her documents ready for inspection, and passports sometimes even have a sticker from the recruitment agency on the cover with the company’s details, or the photograph and name of the migrant worker. Most migrant workers do not carry their own travel documents, except at checkpoints. Workers with forged documents sometimes go via Soekarno-Hatta Airport too, but they try not to draw attention to themselves; they keep silent or pretend to be asleep (Wahyudi 2002).

Recruitment agency staff help migrant workers to check in, to go through immigration procedures, and to find the right gate. The check-in areas at Soekarno-Hatta Airport are not a public space, but many agents possess an airport pass which allows them to enter the restricted part of the airport to escort the migrants. An owner of a recruitment agency proudly described his services as a ‘five-plus service’88. His staff even wait in front of the immigration desks (imigrasi) until the flight has departed to make sure all workers are on

85 For men, on the other hand, ‘debt becomes localised through social relationships in the village, thus binding him to fellow villagers and family members, rather than the sponsor or labour recruitment agency’ (Lindquist 2010, p. 130). Lindquist therefore talks about ‘gendered regimes of debt’.
86 Here I only discuss outbound travel of migrants via Soekarno-Hatta Airport. Documented and undocumented migration of course also takes place by airplane via other airports in Indonesia, by sea, and over land (from Indonesian Kalimantan to Malaysian Borneo).
87 The official employment contract is for two years, but in practice migrants may stay for a longer period, for example if they switch employers.
88 By using the term ‘five-plus service’, the owner meant a an excellent service.
board. This all happens with the consent of the airport authorities, he explained: ‘Almost eighty percent of migrant workers did not get education past 6th grade. They don’t know how to check in, or how to queue. So, our staff queue so that the workers can sit down. It’s like going abroad via a travel agency!’

The journeys of migrant workers thereby resemble another organized way of travel from Indonesia: the pilgrimage to Mecca – *hajj* or *umroh*. Rudnyckyj, in his ethnography of a migrant training centre in Jakarta, notes that both labour migration and pilgrimage represent a lucrative traffic in human beings between the Middle East and Indonesia (Rudnyckyj 2004, p. 408) and that the present patterns of migrant mobility are ‘superimposed over similar historical circuits’ (idem; see also Spaan 1994). The organization and regulation of hajj and labour migration show many parallels and even some overlapping. Both labour migration and pilgrimage are regulated by the government, with both migrant workers and pilgrims relying on the services of brokers who take care of documents and travel arrangements (Spaan 1994). Moreover, it is not uncommon for people to combine pilgrimage and labour migration by entering Saudi Arabia on an *umroh* visa and then overstaying in order to work, instead of returning to Indonesia after having performed the pilgrimage.

At the airport too, there are parallels in the procedures and services for pilgrims and migrant workers. Just like migrant workers, pilgrims have their own separate terminal at Soekarno-Hatta Airport – the so-called Hajj Terminal. This pilgrim terminal provides the necessary extra space to accommodate the increase in passengers during the hajj season each year. Still, one can also find pilgrims in Soekarno-Hatta’s regular terminals. Tour operators send pilgrims who have booked a luxurious pilgrimage to Terminal 2, where national airline Garuda is based, and the same happens for pilgrimage outside the hajj season, so-called *umroh*. At first sight, migrants and *umroh* travellers resemble each other. Just like migrant workers, *umroh* travellers sometimes wear a special outfit that is provided by the travel agent, and an identity card on a key cord. Groups of pilgrims, however, are less homogeneous in composition, consisting of both male and female travellers, and elderly

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89 Hajj is the pilgrimage to Mecca, *umroh* is a pilgrimage to Mecca outside the hajj season whereby some of the rituals are omitted (Kamus Indonesia-Inggris, third edition).
90 In Rudnyckyj’s case study, the family who owns the training centre used to be involved in the business of sending pilgrims to Mecca, and the training complex itself originally was a dormitory where travellers from all over Indonesia assembled before embarking on a steamship to Mecca.
91 These *umroh* visas are usually obtained via a broker. The administrative procedures to obtain an *umroh* visa are faster than those for a work visa and the costs are less. Indonesians are not allowed to work on an *umroh* visa, and the visa is valid for three months only. This means that migrant workers who enter Saudi Arabia on an *umroh* visa will later become illegal (ILO & SP 2007).
92 The Indonesian government has monopolized the organization of hajj and has appointed a small number of airports, among them Soekarno-Hatta Airport, as hajj embarkation places.
people as well as families. The crucial difference lies in their status: as pilgrims they are respected travellers, and they are treated accordingly. Umroh travel agents have taken over their own waiting area in the crowded departures terminal. In front of the Garuda sales office and next to the musholla\footnote{A musholla is a small building or room set aside in a public place for performance of religious duties (Kamus Indonesia-Inggris, third edition).}, they have put carpets on the floor for pilgrims to sit on, and they even use their own catering and sound equipment. Because umroh travellers are valuable customers, and almost always fly on Garuda, the personnel at the Garuda office tolerate the noise and excitement in front of their door.

Similar ‘status’ differences between migrant and pilgrim travel are most noticeable during the hajj season, when the interests of migrant recruitment agencies and hajj travel agents regularly clash, to the disadvantage of the recruitment agencies. For flights to Saudi Arabia, agents buy tickets at a discount at a Garuda sales office that specializes in tickets to the Middle East. Whereas migrant workers always travel on a one-way ticket, pilgrims need a return ticket and the airline prefers to sell return tickets. The effect of such ‘airline discrimination’, as a recruitment agent called it, is that recruitment agencies are unable to send workers abroad in the hajj season because the tickets are sold out or too expensive. Outside this season, however, Garuda relies heavily on migrant workers to fill their airplanes to the Arabian Peninsula. According to a Garuda manager, on some Garuda flights to the Middle East around 90% of the passengers are migrant workers. The airline even uses different 747 airplanes to the Middle East that are designed to carry 480 passengers instead of the regular 380, so that the flight is cheaper.

Hence, the journeys of migrant workers are arranged and controlled by recruitment agencies in such a way that at first sight some of these services surprisingly resemble those for tourists, pilgrims, or elite travellers\footnote{The fast lanes at immigration, for example, are used not only for fast-tracking the elite through immigration, but sometimes also for migrants.}. However, the motivation behind offering such services to migrants is that they are unable to arrange their travel and passage through the airport themselves\footnote{Some migrant workers indeed need help, but others may be more experienced. As noted in Chapter 2, domestic air travel is becoming more common among Indonesia’s lower classes, and some migrant workers may have experience in flying internationally because they have worked abroad before.}, a rationale similar to the one underlying the organization of the return journey.
Working abroad: mobility and incarceration in the household

Although this chapter focuses on the return process, some attention needs to be paid to the two-year period migrants typically spend working abroad, because in the workplace too, migrant workers’ physical mobility is regulated and controlled. Brenda Yeoh and Shirlena Huang (2010) have noted how employers attempt to regulate the ‘postures’ and ‘time-spaces’ of migrant workers’ bodies, for example by rules about whether and when the domestic worker is allowed to enter specific spaces, or whether and when she is allowed to leave the house. In many Asian countries, women receive no salary (or only part of it) during the first few months of their contract in order to repay their debts. In Malaysia, for example, the debt a migrant had at the recruitment agency is usually transferred to the Malaysian employer, who withholds the migrant’s salary during the first six months (Killias 2009, p. 151). Killias explains that it is a common practice for Malaysian employers to incarcerate migrant workers, and that the fees employers have to pay for their domestic workers are often referred to as a legitimization for such practices. Furthermore, restricting migrant workers’ mobility may be encouraged by formal procedures, such as the right of Malaysian employers to hold a migrant worker’s passport. Although for countries in the Middle East no fees are deducted from the salary, and debt bondage in that sense does not play a role, confinement of migrant workers is a common practice. In Saudi Arabia most household workers are kept inside, since women are not allowed to leave the house without a male escort. Also, Saudi employers pay a fee of USD 1,500 to acquire a migrant worker and are advised by the agency to keep the maid inside (Vlieger 2009). The experiences of migrant workers in the destination countries have received considerable attention from scholars as well as non-governmental organizations. In recent years, extensive media coverage of cases of severe abuse in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia resulted in a public outcry about the fate of migrant workers in the two countries, and disputes between the countries about the regulation and protection of Indonesian migrant workers. In 2009, the Indonesian government announced a moratorium on sending migrant workers to Malaysia that lasted

96 In addition, in Malaysia, employers are held responsible and can get fined if a migrant worker runs away (Killias 2010).

97 Several women I interviewed who had worked in Saudi Arabia mentioned they sometimes joined their employers visiting other households and met other domestic workers from Indonesia on such occasions. In Asian receiving countries women usually have more freedom to go outside and to meet friends (see Constable 2007 and Purwani Williams 2007 on domestic workers in Hong Kong, and Anggraeni 2006 on domestic workers in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia).
for two years. In 2011, after the beheading of an Indonesian maid who had allegedly killed her employer, the Indonesian government stopped sending migrant workers to Saudi Arabia.

**Going home: departure and transit**

The final phase of the circuit of labour migration is the return journey to Indonesia. These journeys are usually arranged by the employer, who buys the migrant worker an airplane ticket back to Indonesia, takes her to the airport, and sometimes helps her with procedures. On their flight home, many travellers meet fellow migrant workers with whom they group together for transit and arrival at Soekarno-Hatta Airport. In this way, less experienced travellers are better able to find their way at the airport. Regular travellers sometimes complain that migrant workers lack knowledge of procedures. Some friends told me how they helped migrant workers who lost their way at the airport. In an Indonesian novel about backpacking (Trinity 2007), the stereotypical description of travelling on an airplane together with migrant workers who do not know how to fasten their seatbelts, do not speak English, engage in loud conversation, and do not know how to use the airport toilet may be considered funny by readers, but does reveal the social distance some travellers may feel towards migrant workers, who are seen as not yet having acquired an ‘airport habitus’ (Chu 2010, p. 148).

Making the circuit of labour migration, Indonesian migrant workers thus ‘become both valuable commodities to be controlled by agencies and employers and later workers to be regulated and citizens to be protected by state actors’ (Lindquist 2010, p. 118). In the next section, we go back to discussing the return journey. I provide a short history of the return process and explain how over the years the regulation of migrant mobilities has come to encompass ever larger parts of the migrant’s return journey. Next, I unpack the current government monopoly and examine the range of actors involved in regulating migrant mobilities.

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98 Activists claim the moratorium on sending migrant workers to Malaysia only increased illegal labour migration and did not improve the position of migrant workers because labour laws remain unchanged (Ong 2010). The moratorium was lifted in December 2011.

99 A different type of return travel is that of migrant workers who are deported, usually with help from the foreign or Indonesian government, because their stay abroad has become illegal. Sometimes these migrants travel on regular flights, like the migrant worker who recounted how he and other deportees were separated from the other passengers and were the last to board the plane. There are even special deportee flights from Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. In August 2009, for example, a Garuda airplane from the Middle East with 400 ‘overstayers’ arrived at Soekarno-Hatta Airport.
II) Expansion of government control over the return journey

Having special arrangements for returning migrant workers, including separate spaces for them to move through, goes back more than 25 years. Before 1986, there was no distinction between migrant workers and other travellers and migrants could travel home as they liked, using public transport or being picked up by family members. In 1986, private recruitment agencies started to take migrant workers from the airport to a transit place in the city of Jakarta, and arrange transport from there to the home villages. Soon it became clear that this supervised return process didn’t succeed in stopping exploitative practices, corruption, and harassment of migrant workers on their way home (Wahyudi 2002). From that time on, the regulation of the return process has shifted hands between various authorities, government agencies as well as private companies, almost every one or two years, but the problems never disappeared.

In 1999 the Minister of Manpower issued a decree and opened a special terminal for return services for migrant workers at Soekarno-Hatta Airport – Terminal 3. With the establishment of Terminal 3 at the airport, a systematic and government-controlled procedure for (spatially) separating migrant workers from other travellers was introduced. Terminal 3 was situated approximately 500 metres from the international Terminal 2 (Silvey 2007) in a building that had previously been used as an exhibition space for an air show (Palupi & Buntoro 2005). Migrant workers arrived together with other passengers at Terminal 2 and were subsequently taken by bus to Terminal 3. At Terminal 3 they could choose to travel home by government-licensed transport or to be picked up by a family member. Over time, however, Terminal 3 acquired a bad reputation. Indonesian media often criticized the lack of facilities in Terminal 3, for example by noting the absence of air-conditioning (The Jakarta Post, 09-01-1999). Having only ceiling fans in the terminal was said to reinforce the social stereotype that lower-class Indonesians do not yet need air-conditioning (Van Leeuwen 2005). Newspapers also repeatedly reported on cases of extortion and sexual harassment of migrant workers in Terminal 3, and portrayed the government as unable to protect the migrants. Government officials were even accused of taking part in the extortion of migrant workers. Again, every one or two years, new regulatory teams replaced old ones and responsibility for the return process shifted back and forth between large coordinating teams that consisted of representatives from several ministries, and single bodies such as the national police.

100 See Lizzy van Leeuwen 2005 on the role of air-conditioning in the modernization of Indonesia.
In 2007 a special government agency directly under the Indonesian president’s authority became responsible for the return process, the National Agency for Placement and Protection of Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI, hereafter referred to as the National Agency). A year later a physical move took place with the opening of a new building on the outskirts of the airport. The government presented the move as a physical and organizational improvement of the return process (The Jakarta Post, 16-03-2008). The new building got its own name: Building for the Registration of the Return of Indonesian Migrant Workers, symbolizing a break with the malpractices that took place in Terminal 3, although journalists and NGOs often call it Terminal 4 to indicate continuation.

Extending the regulation of migrant mobilities: from the airport to the home village

To protect migrants from ‘exploitation by irresponsible people’ (Peraturan 01/KA/SU/1/2008), the Indonesian government over the years gradually closed off the special migrant building from public view. Inside the airplane and in the airport’s international arrivals hall, migrant workers are still mixed with other travellers, but after baggage claim the route of migrants is hidden from the view of other travellers. The migrant lounge, where migrants assemble to be transported to the migrant terminal, is situated in a remote part of the airport; regular travellers may never notice it. The migrant terminal itself is even more hidden from view. To some extent this is the result of conditions in and around the former migrant terminal 3. Terminal 3 was situated close to the international Terminal 2 and visitors could follow signposts to ‘terminal tki’ along the airport roads. Family members and recruitment agencies were allowed to pick up migrants at Terminal 3 and the parking space outside the terminal was often crowded with people, including local people who sold food and drinks to the waiting families (Wahyudi 2002). Migrants who were not picked up could travel home by government-licensed transport. To prevent ‘unauthorized’ persons from offering ‘illegal’ transport to migrants, only close family members (husband or wife, parents, siblings, and children) were allowed to pick up migrants. Each person needed to produce documents that proved their relationship to the migrant before the migrant’s name would be called inside the terminal and she was allowed to leave the building. The regulations on paper,

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101 BNP2TKI (Badan National Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia) was set up in 2006 with the issuing of a Presidential Regulation (Perpres RI 81 2006). It is a non-departmental governmental institution that falls under the president and it consists of representatives of different ministries. Its goal is to implement policies concerning placement and protection of Indonesian migrant workers.

102 Gedung Pendataan Kepulangan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia or GPKTKI.

103 In my text I also refer to the building as Terminal 4, because that is how most of my respondents called it.
however, were not always observed in practice. Private taxi and minibus operators waited outside the terminal for migrants who managed to slip through the formal procedures, and some drivers had subcontracts with licensed transport companies to take migrants to more remote locations (Silvey 2007).

In May 2005, the Minister of Manpower prohibited all persons from meeting migrant workers at Terminal 3 and established a government monopoly on transport services. The new policy was announced in a letter to governors and mayors throughout Indonesia, who were asked to pass on the information to the people. From then on, only licensed transport companies were allowed to provide transport services and they were held responsible for migrants’ well-being and safety. The move to the new migrant building in 2008 meant the migrant return process was closed off even more from public view. The new migrant building is several miles away from the airport and there are no road signs indicating how to get there. The building and its parking space are fenced off completely: only licensed minibuses can enter the parking space and the entrances are guarded by security personnel. The aim of the government monopoly on transport is to put migrant mobility under state surveillance until the migrants reach their home villages. This includes stops at designated roadside restaurants, where migrants are counted on arrival and departure, and a ‘migrant worker receipt notice’ to be signed by a family member when the migrant arrives at the home address. The regulation of migrant mobilities was thereby extended to the home villages.

Unpacking the government monopoly

The turbulent history of the migrant terminal at Soekarno-Hatta Airport, characterized by shifts in the location of the building as well as in the responsibility for and authority over the return process of migrant workers, shows the contested nature of the regulation of migrant mobilities. Yet the fact that there is now a government monopoly does not necessarily mean that the government acts as a single actor or even that it shows a single face to the public. There are 17 different government agencies involved in migration regulation, and for the return process the National Agency is assisted by a coordinating team composed

104 See Surat Menteri Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi RI nomor B. 221/MEN/TKLM/IV/2005. Chapter 5 showed that transport by government-licensed bus is no guarantee for a trouble-free journey home.

105 The fact that the building is fenced off does not mean that no one can enter. Several interviewees, such as personnel from recruitment agencies and NGOs, mentioned that they and others could get in through personal contacts.
of members of 12 agencies\textsuperscript{106}. The large number and variety of government bodies gives a sense of how varied the interests are in regulating migration (see also Silvey 2007). Moreover, the implementation of the current law that regulates the deployment of Indonesian labour abroad\textsuperscript{107} is characterized by a lack of collaboration between the Ministry of Manpower and the National Agency, because the law does not explicitly state the responsibilities of the different government bodies. This has resulted in power struggles and controversies between the two authorities (IOM 2010). In 2007, the establishment of the National Agency as one of the measures to reform the Indonesian system of ‘placement and protection of migrant workers’ also meant the end of the Ministry of Manpower’s authority over the return process of migrant workers at Soekarno-Hatta Airport. Since this shift, the Ministry of Manpower has attempted to reinstate control over the regulation of migrant mobility in several ways. In early 2009, the Minister of Manpower put the placement of migrant workers back in the hands of his own ministry via a Ministerial Regulation\textsuperscript{108}. For the return process the Ministry of Manpower attempted to reinstate the previous constellation of actors via a decree\textsuperscript{109}. The decree lists a management team consisting of people from the Ministry of Manpower and recruitment agency associations – two actors that are currently absent from Terminal 4. The decree would also terminate the National Agency’s monopoly on transport to the villages, and make private recruitment agencies responsible for arranging transport. Very soon, the media were replete with stories about the upcoming changes and about conflicts between the two government bodies. A few months later the Supreme Court annulled the decree, judging it unlawful, but this did not put a halt to the problematic relationship between the two bodies and the next conflict was on the way. In January 2010 the Minister of Manpower announced via the media that the special migrant terminal would soon be abolished (Pos Kota, 18-01-2010). As part of the ‘first 100 days agenda’ of President Yudhoyono’s second term, the Ministry of Manpower announced plans to introduce a new program whereby migrant workers would move through the regular Terminal 2, where a special desk would be set up for migrants to report problems they had experienced abroad. The Minister of Manpower argued that abolishing the special migrant terminal would reduce extortion of

\textsuperscript{106} The Directorate General of Civil Aviation, the Directorate General of Land Transportation, the Directorate General of Medical Services, the Directorate General of Treasury, the State Ministry of Women’s Empowerment, National and Regional Police, Soekarno-Hatta Airport’s Immigration Office, Customs Office, and Administrative Office, and airport operator Angkasa Pura II.

\textsuperscript{107} Undang-Undang No. 39/2004 Concerning the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers.

\textsuperscript{108} Peraturan Menteri Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi No. 22/MEN/XII/2008.

\textsuperscript{109} Keputusan Direktur Jenderal Pembinaan dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja No Kep 60/PPTK/I/2009.
migrants on their way home; the National Agency, reacting with surprise to this plan, said it could not guarantee the safety of migrants returning via the regular terminal (BNP2TKI, 19-01-2010). In October 2010, new regulations were put in place in an attempt to divide the jurisdiction between the National Agency and the Ministry of Manpower, but a few months later the regulations had not yet had the intended effects (IOM 2010).

Besides such disputes between government actors at the central level, local government actors have challenged the centralized channelling of migrant workers via Jakarta. In March 2009 at Adi Sumarmo Airport in Surakarta in Central Java, a new terminal that includes a special migrant lane was opened (The Jakarta Post, 07-03-2009). With the new terminal, the airport hopes to attract direct flights from and to the Middle East, so it can cater for pilgrims and migrant workers. Other local governments have tried to get access to the migrant workers at Soekarno-Hatta Airport, but these plans meet resistance at central level. The local government of Indramayu, for example, wants to open a counter at Soekarno-Hatta Airport and arrange its own transport home, similar to the way the local government arranges hajj return journeys from the airport in Jakarta to the home districts.

The current government monopoly over the return process does not entail the complete absence of private actors. Inside the lounge and the terminal there are a number of businesses such as shops, money changers, and transport companies. These private actors operate under the authority of the National Agency, which means the National Agency monitors and sanctions their activities. For example, the National Agency decides how many buses the different transport companies are allowed to operate, and (temporarily) withdraws licenses of companies whose drivers are known to engage in extortion practices.

In the international arrivals hall, a public–private partnership between national airline Garuda Indonesia and the National Agency provides a corridor for migrants who want to transit to a domestic flight. Migrants who arrive from abroad and who already have a connecting flight with Garuda or who want to buy a Garuda ticket for that day do not have to go to the special migrant lane and terminal110, but can walk to a special Garuda counter instead. Still located in the airport’s restricted area, the migrants report at a small National Agency desk where an official registers their data and opens a locked door in the glass barrier between the international and domestic parts of the terminal. On the domestic side, the migrants can immediately check in at a special Garuda counter and have their

110 In migrant terminal 4 migrants can also buy boat or airplane tickets if their home region is too far away for travelling by minibus. The airlines then arrange transport back from the migrant terminal to the domestic departures terminal, where migrants join the regular domestic travellers.
Corridors into the countryside

baggage checked. A Garuda employee will take the migrants via the restricted area to waiting rooms in the departures terminal. The establishment of a special counter reinforces the perception that the public part of the airport is unsafe for migrant workers because of the presence of ticket brokers and thugs. Obviously, there are also economic motives behind opening this counter. Since many migrant workers who want to travel by airplane do not have a connecting flight yet, Garuda tries to pull them towards the counter where, unlike at the travel counter in the migrant lounge, Garuda does not have to compete with low-cost airlines. Other facilities and services with which Garuda aims to attract migrant workers include the extra baggage allowance that is also valid on connecting flights.

Another group of private actors, the recruitment agencies, are no longer allowed access to the migrant terminal. In the past, recruitment agencies did play a large role in the return process, and the agencies argue that even according to the current law, they are responsible for the migrants up until their return home. Prior to the establishment of Terminal 3, when migrants still returned via a transit place in Jakarta, an association of recruitment agencies managed the return process for six years, under government supervision. After Terminal 3 opened, managed by the Ministry of Manpower, recruitment agencies, just like family members, were allowed to pick up migrants at Terminal 3, and even after the 2005 ban the recruitment agencies could still enter the terminal. In line with procedures for handling ‘migrants with problems’ and ill migrants, government officials inside Terminal 3 called the recruitment agency who had placed the migrant worker abroad to come to the terminal and assist the worker with legal or insurance matters, and arrange her journey home. The National Agency put an end to that practice. According to the head of the Return Service Unit in Terminal 4, the presence of recruitment agencies was harmful to these ‘problem cases’, because some recruitment agencies forced migrants to pay off debts resulting from the breach of contract. Also, migrant workers ran the risk of being ‘recycled’, which means they were immediately – and often illegally – sent abroad again for a new work period. For recruitment agencies the current situation is problematic, especially because the data the National Agency collects in the terminal is not shared with the agencies. This means it is

111 Other actors who collaborate in offering this ‘bypass’ are Customs, Immigration, and the airport operator.

112 The airline has raised the baggage limit for travellers from the Middle East to 40 kilos, which allows pilgrims to bring home holy water (zamzam), and migrant workers to bring presents for their family. On other Garuda flights, only 30 kilos is allowed.

113 Paragraph 75 of law 39/2004 states that the return home of migrant workers from the destination country until arrival in their home region is the responsibility of the party that placed the migrant abroad (the recruitment agency), but the same paragraph also states that the government can regulate the return process.
hard for recruitment agencies to keep track of the workers who have returned\textsuperscript{114} and to identify ‘problem cases’ for whom they might make an insurance claim.

NGOs also play a role in the return process. Inside the migrant terminal, a legal aid agency helps migrant workers with insurance claims, and another NGO has offered training sessions for National Agency staff to create awareness of human trafficking. Other NGOs are no longer allowed access to the terminal, but in their home villages they help returned migrants with insurance claims or with filing complaints. As Rudnyckyj (2004, p. 424) has argued, most Indonesian NGOs concerned with labour issues do not seek to abolish transnational labour migration, but to increase government oversight and legal safeguards for migrant workers. Similarly, the NGOs that are active in monitoring migrants’ return journeys are not necessarily opposed to government surveillance of the return process and agree that protection is necessary. However, they criticize the specific way the government understands protection (perlindungan) and safety (keamanan), and an often-heard argument against the current procedure is that migrants should not be compelled to go home via the migrant terminal, but should be able to choose between going home by themselves or under government supervision.

This shows how many different actors have the aspiration to care for and protect migrant workers on their way home. Nevertheless, others seemed quite worried about being associated with the migrant return process. A terminal manager working for airport operator Angkasa Pura II recalled the problems surrounding the former migrant terminal 3: ‘It gave Soekarno-Hatta Airport a bad name, because the newspapers reported that migrant workers were maltreated at Soekarno-Hatta, although we had nothing to do with that!’ The large number of actors with different stakes already complicates the regulation of the return journeys, but the fact that offering return services to migrants is a way to earn money adds to the complexity. Many actors presented themselves as the ‘good shepherd’, while presenting others as the ‘bad shepherd’ whose main concern it is to earn money instead of taking care of migrant workers. In practice, however, good shepherds and bad shepherds are not easily distinguishable, as legitimate practices of providing return services are intertwined with illegitimate practices of extorting migrant workers.

\textsuperscript{114} Migrant workers are required to report at the recruitment agency when they return, but in practice they hardly ever do so.
Lucrative journeys: the business of managing migrant mobilities

Rudnyckyj’s remark about labour migration as lucrative traffic in human beings (Rudnyckyj 2004) is an apt one. The Indonesian Department of Manpower estimates that in 2006 there were 2.7 million Indonesian citizens working abroad legally (IOM 2010), though the National Agency on its website mentions a total of 6 million\(^{115}\). These workers make an important contribution to the Indonesian economy by sending home remittances (Ananta 2009). The World Bank reports that remittances to Indonesia for 2009 amounted to USD 6.8 billion\(^{116}\). Although the level of remittances is small relative to Indonesia’s total GDP – 1.26% for 2009 – the inflows may be highly significant in a local context (World Bank Office Jakarta 2008). An official of the Manpower Service in the West Javanese region of Indramayu, for example, estimated that two thirds of the regional income consisted of remittances from migrant workers.

Remittances are not the only economic aspect of labour migration. Aris Ananta argues that ‘[t]he whole process of recruiting potential Indonesian overseas workers, training them, placing them abroad, and bringing them back home has been a coming and lucrative industry’. This ‘business’, as he calls it, has made migrants dependent on the services and ‘help’ it provides. Ananta is the first scholar to attempt to calculate the value of Indonesia’s migrant industry and has estimated the value of the formal business of sending workers abroad at USD 0.7 billion for 2007\(^{117}\). The business aspect of labour migration, however, is not confined to the sending abroad of migrant workers. Palupi and Buntoro (2005, p. 58) quote a migrant terminal employee confessing, ‘Here everyone, including myself, seems busy managing migrant workers. But actually they are busy managing their own business’\(^{118}\).

In regulating the return process, many parties profit from offering return services to migrant workers. It is no surprise that when migrants are welcomed home as ‘foreign revenue

\(^{115}\) http://www.bnp2tki.go.id accessed 18 January 2011. This figure of 6 million might include people who work abroad illegally.


\(^{117}\) Ananta mentions that his calculations are still preliminary and are a rough estimate of the value of the ‘formal’ business only. The value of the business takes account of months without salary (when migrants pay back their debts), composition of the workers according to official reports, and average monthly salary in receiving countries. Ananta says it is a conservative estimate because many factors, including the extralegal and illegal fees that migrants pay during all stages of the process, are not taken into account.

\(^{118}\) ‘Di sini semua orang, termasuk saya, tampaknya sibuk mengurus TKI. Tapi sebenarnya mereka ini sibuk mengurus bisnis sendiri.’
heroes’, many people will assume the migrants are rich and will try to get access to the flows of migrants and their money.

Migrants pay relatively high prices for products and services in the migrant lane and the migrant terminal. Although in itself this is not much different from the situation in the other airport terminals\(^{119}\), the migrant return process seems to be contaminated by the same profit-seeking motives that characterizes the recruitment and sending process. In the migrant ‘lounge’ in Terminal 2, for example, migrant workers can buy mobile phone SIM cards and credit. For a credit of 50,000 rupiahs migrants pay 70,000, whereas in regular shops the charge is 51,000. In 2007, the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission\(^{120}\) concluded that the bus tickets in former migrant terminal 3 were more expensive than those for similar transport outside the terminal (KPK 2007). Migrants also reported that they pay high prices for the food at roadside restaurants, but these restaurants are also commercial sites in a different sense. ‘Traders of things like Arabic music cassettes and prayer rugs, they all came when the migrants arrived, they were suddenly there,’ a migrant worker from the Sukabumi region recalled a few days after her journey. Although migrants need particular products and services during their travel and the businesses that sell them are legal, the businesses profit from their monopolistic position in the return process.

While the Ministry of Manpower was still regulating the return process via Terminal 3, each successful migrant was asked to pay an ‘administrative fee’ of Rp 25,000. Currently, under the National Agency, all services are officially paid from the national budget. Yet some of the free services the National Agency offers are paid for by others, or paid for at a later stage. For the DAMRI bus ride from the airport to the migrant terminal, for example, migrants do not need to pay anything. Instead, the National Agency requires the minibus transport companies to pay a fee of Rp 10,000 for each migrant they transport to the home village to cover the costs of the DAMRI service. Moreover, Chapter 5 showed how migrants with problems who are supposed to travel home on a free ticket, are still required by the driver to pay when they arrive at their home village. The regulations on the return services include a section that prohibits staff in the terminal and bus drivers from demanding tips from migrant workers, ‘collaborating with oknum\(^{121}\), and carrying out actions that harm migrant workers’ (Peraturan 01/KA/SU/I/2008), but in reality ‘tipping’ is a routine practice.

\(^{119}\) Like other travellers moving through airports, migrants are not just approached as travellers, but also as consumers. Some of the commercial facilities and services one finds at Soekarno-Hatta Airport’s regular terminals can be found in the migrant terminal too. Inside Terminal 4 there are money-changing offices, government bank branches, travel agencies, two cafes and a few small shops.

\(^{120}\) Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi.

\(^{121}\) Oknum means a person in a certain capacity, and has a negative connotation (Kamus Indonesia-Inggris, third edition).
At the airport and inside Terminal 4, migrants regularly pay for free services, such as the porter service, and there is often little difference between forced and voluntary tips.

The previous chapter showed how migrants in the minibuses also pay extra charges for ‘arriving home safely’. This tip money does not stay in the pockets of the drivers, but turns out to be a lubricant for literally keeping the buses in motion when they enter local areas. Transport companies are required to deliver each migrant to the doorstep and to have a family member sign a form that the migrant indeed has arrived. This means that the buses have to travel on small roads into villages or hamlets. The manager of a transport company explained how his drivers need to buy access to local roads from thugs who await the easily recognizable migrant buses and block their passage by barring the road. ‘Sometimes we pay up to 200,000 rupiahs, sometimes 50,000, but then further ahead there will be other thugs. Basically every time we enter a new road there will be a thug, it’s not just once.’ Whereas for some particularly dangerous areas like the Cianjur region this company has arranged protection from the police, such protection requires payment too. The manager said that his company survives only because of the tips they get from migrant workers. In this company, receiving tip money had become an institutionalized practice. At the office, a note on the wall with the company’s by-laws read: ‘Drivers are not allowed to accept more than Rp 100,000 of tip money from migrant workers, not even when migrant workers give it voluntarily (ikhlas)\textsuperscript{122}. ‘If the government does not give us money to guarantee the safety of the migrant workers, we need to ask the migrant workers themselves,’ the manager explained. As the previous chapter showed, drivers employ a strategy in which they ask for tips in a subtle and polite way, to make it look like the tips are given voluntarily. This discourages migrant workers from phoning the National Agency’s complaint line to report malpractices\textsuperscript{123}.

Similar to the obstruction of journeys by road barriers at the present time, in the early 2000s the stops at particular roadside restaurants represented dangerous immobilities in the migrants’ journeys. A criminal organization had started illegal money-changing facilities at these restaurants, and worked together with transport companies and corrupt officials to channel migrants through these places. Migrants were forced to exchange their foreign currency or cheques at unfavourable exchange rates, sometimes losing large amounts of

\textsuperscript{122} The original note read: ‘Pengemudi tidak diperbolehkan menerima uang tambahan dari TKI lebih dari Rp 100.000 walaupun TKI ikhlas memberikannya.’

\textsuperscript{123} The National Agency issues permits and distributes the quota among the 29 transport companies (with a total of 368 minibuses) that provide migrant transport services, and it can decide to apply sanctions to those companies they consider to have failed in guaranteeing the well-being and safety of migrant workers by withdrawing permits and redistributing the quota.
money. The profits from these extortion practices subsequently circulated among different actors in the mobilities regime (see Wahyudi 2002 for a description of the criminal network). At present these illegal activities seem to have declined, probably because the government monitors the return journeys better and also because a growing number of migrant workers send remittances home via a bank instead of carrying money with them. Nevertheless, offering various ‘return services’ still allows legitimate and illegitimate ‘service providers’ to get a share of the migrant’s success abroad.

III) The migrant return process as a mobilities regime of encapsulation

I argue that the regulation of the return journeys of Indonesian migrant workers can be viewed as a mobilities regime of encapsulation. In a study on labour migration in East Asia, Biao Xiang has claimed that metaphors of flow cannot adequately describe the strictly governed nature of labour migration in this region: ‘Instead of “flowing” from one place to another, migrant workers are “transplanted” from their hometowns to overseas workplaces where they are subsequently encapsulated in tightly guarded spaces’ (Xiang 2008, p.175). In Xiang’s work, transplanting thus refers to movement from one point to the next, whereas encapsulation refers to confinement and is mainly camp-based. Transplanting, however, may have the connotation of effortless movement, whereas it is precisely the efforts of regulating migrant mobilities that I want to understand. In trying to understand the mode of regulation in this mobilities regime, I therefore borrow Xiang’s metaphor of encapsulation, but interpret it differently. Instead of using it to mean confinement in specific spaces (and its twin concept of transplanting to mean movement), I see encapsulation in terms of mobility. Encapsulation is a particular mode of regulating mobilities, just like the selective immobilization discussed in previous chapters. The term encapsulation evokes an image of a protective but at the same time enclosing or confining ‘layer’ around the mobility of migrants. In my interpretation encapsulation does not stop or block migrants from moving; in fact, the goal of encapsulation is to make migrants move, or more precisely, to make them move in a controlled way. Encapsulation thus refers to the guarded ways, or in other words the regulated, controlled, and protected ways, in which unskilled female migrants in

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124 Johan Lindquist uses Xiang’s concepts in his analysis of the recruitment system (Lindquist 2010).
125 An example of how the metaphor of encapsulation can be linked to mobility is how a space capsule confines astronauts to a particular space but at the same time enables the astronauts to move at an incredible speed.
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particular make the circuit of international labour migration from recruitment, to working abroad, to returning home. It is a mode of regulation whose goal is to make people move in a controlled and thereby restricted way. As such it has parallels with the Indonesian government’s control over the arrangements for the hajj pilgrimage, which includes the issuing of special hajj passports and the provision of travel services, accommodation, and food.

Similar to the mobilities regime for drug smuggling, the migrant mobilities regime extends in space and time, consists of different actors, and is contested, but in different ways. First, whereas the pre-emptive anti-drugs regime extends to the Caribbean and to the stage of departure, and even to future journeys, the migrant return regime extends to home localities and to the stage of arrival there. Encapsulation of migrant workers has expanded geographically to the home villages, since the central government has prohibited families, recruitment agencies and local governments from picking up migrants at the airport, and arranges and monitors the return journey until migrants arrive at their home destinations. Temporally, the regime extends to the moment of arrival, but the strict government supervision also increases the duration of the journey. Most migrant buses to Sukabumi and Indramayu travelled during the night and arrived the next morning or afternoon. Migrants complained that the journeys by government bus took longer than similar journeys by public transport, because each migrant has to be delivered to her doorstep. While the control and surveillance of migrant mobilities up to their arrival in their home villages may seem an extraordinary way of regulating movement, I argue it is necessary to view it in the wider context of the organization and regulation of labour migration in which the migrants’ movements are controlled, and travel plans and arrangements taken care of by others. Yet the extension of the migrant mobilities regime does not go uncontested: the authority of the state is challenged as soon as migrants leave the terminal, when it becomes clear that the situation in the ‘field’ differs from that in the ‘transparent’ migrant terminal.

Second, the migrant mobilities regime turns out to be an unstable constellation of actors, in which authority over the return process often shifts hands, different actors blame each other for malpractices, and some actors attempt to use the ambiguities of the regulatory framework to their own advantage. Since the 1980s, many different state and private parties have played a role in regulating migrant mobility, but since the National Agency became responsible in 2007, the return process is largely state-controlled. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Manpower recently challenged the current monopoly by the National Agency, and some local governments have opened their own migrant lane at their airport or have
plans to arrange locally based transport services for migrants originating from their district. Given that different government bodies and government actors at local and central levels do not necessarily collaborate in the mobilities regime, it is necessary to approach the state as a set of actors rather than as a single actor. In addition, the current government monopoly does not mean that non-state actors are absent. Similar to what we have seen in the anti-drug-smuggling regime, private actors who facilitate journeys, such as transport companies and airlines, engage in regulating mobilities, in this case by offering special services for migrants. Garuda Indonesia has even created its own corridor for migrant workers. Roadside restaurants have become not only places where migrants eat and drink, but also places of surveillance where they are counted and recounted. Vaughan-Williams’ (2008) argument that citizens become engaged in ‘borderwork’ in this mobilities regime has a parallel in the incorporation of family members in the regime, who by signing the migrant worker receipt declare that the migrant is back under the authority of her parents or husband.

Third, the legitimacy of this mobilities regimes is contested, because in practice legitimate practices of providing return services are intertwined with illegitimate practices of extorting migrant workers. As Chapter 5 explained, the government directive that forms the policy basis of the regime is a detailed document that for each phase of the return process, from embarkation at the airport until arrival in the home villages, describes the procedures and tasks that different actors are to carry out. It also explicitly states what actors in the regime are not allowed to do, for example asking for tips (meminta uang), acting inappropriately (berlaku tidak sopan), or forcing migrant workers to buy products such as mobile phone vouchers (memaksanya TKI membeli dagangan seperti voucher dll). This chapter made clear that the detailed nature of this document can only be understood when we take into account the specific way the government defines ‘return services’ in practice. NGOs have criticized the mobilities regime by arguing that the return services that are meant to protect migrants are in fact dominated by a ‘business logic’. It turns out that both official (those actors mentioned in the directive, such as porters, drivers, restaurant owners) and unofficial service providers (souvenir vendors and the like) can make profits from facilitating and securing migrants’ journeys. In addition, new rules and regulations may allow for new ways to make money. Wahyudi (2002), for example, describes how at the previous Terminal 3, a rule was introduced that allowed no one but family members to pick up migrants. An unintended consequence of this rule was that outside the terminal a new ‘service’, the Jasa Perantara Penjemputan, emerged in which brokers helped family members who came to the terminal without the right documents to still meet their relative.
There are also more violent strategies, such as those of *oknum* and *preman*\(^{126}\) who confiscate mobility spaces and declare them local territory. Such immobilities are threatening to migrants. During the stops at roadside restaurants, migrants are anxious about the safety of their belongings because of criminal activities in the past. Drivers sometimes intentionally create delays by pretending their minibus has broken down, and then request from migrants a contribution to repair it (Wahyudi 2002). The government and Garuda Indonesia frame the public part of the airport as unsafe for migrant workers, and drivers may similarly warn their migrant passengers about thugs, drunks, and robbers along the road. In such hostile environments, the migrants’ overseas earnings become ‘exchange’ for a safe passage (Peters 2006). At times, the migrants’ money seems to serve as a lubricant for the wheels of the mobilities regime: without circulation of tip money, migrants’ safety and actual movements are at risk. In a study of the regulation of transnational mobility, local practices such as the blocking of a road with tree trunks may at first sight seem insignificant, but they have important effects on how migrants get home, and what it costs them to do so.

Hence, practices that could be marked as criminal, for example extortion and illegal money changing, often take place under the pretence of helping migrants and easing their return home (see Wahyudi 2002). The offenders themselves may legitimize their involvement in extortion practices in several ways, for example by the need for money to pay others, or simply by the need to make a living because their salary is insufficient. This shows how actions that are explicitly forbidden on paper may in practice be seen as legitimate.

### IV) Conclusions

This chapter traced where and when regulatory practices for migrant workers take place, and the actors that play a role in these regulatory practices. It showed how, since the implementation of ‘return services’ for migrants in the 1980s, various state and private actors have played a role in the mobilities regime, and how the regime has come to extend in time and space beyond arrival at the airport. While Chapter 4 argued that a mobilities regime can consist of both state and private actors, this chapter, by unpacking the current government monopoly, adds that ‘the state’ consists of a set of several different government bodies. Moreover, the interests of different actors in a mobilities regime do not necessarily overlap but may also diverge, and collaboration between the various stakeholders is not

\(^{126}\) Petty criminals.
self-evident. The mobilities regime has expanded from encompassing a transit place in the city of Jakarta, and later a designated terminal at the airport, to a regime that extends to the interior of Indonesia, and to the final moment of arrival home, when migrants are delivered to their doorstep and handed over to their families. This shows that a mobilities regime may extend not only to spaces outside the territory of a nation-state to pre-empt arrival at the border, but also to the interior of a nation-state to continue regulating the movement of travellers even after their arrival at the border. Tracing the times, spaces, and actors in this chapter revealed that crossing borders in order to find work and send home remittances is not the only profitable aspect of labour migration: the organization and regulation of these international mobilities can be lucrative too. The intermingling of legitimate and illegitimate ‘services’ continues to harm migrant workers.

I argued that it is useful to view the regulation of the return journeys as a mobilities regime of encapsulation, in which care, control, and extortion are intertwined. Similar to the selective immobilization of potential drug smugglers, the encapsulation of migrant workers is a mode of regulation in which the facilitating and restricting of mobilities work in tandem. In this regime too, movement itself, instead of merely the crossing of the border, is the object of regulation. It is the journeys of migrant workers that are supervised by the government, and the routes of minibuses and their passengers that are monitored by counting migrants at roadside restaurants and by having receipts signed by family members.

Having examined the regulation of migrant mobilities in Chapters 5 and 6, we can conclude that on an analytical level, there are parallels with the anti-drug-smuggling regime discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The final chapter of this thesis asks what the two mobilities regimes can tell us about the regulation of movement in a mobile world, and seeks to map contemporary mobilities regimes.