«A sanguine bunch». Regional identification in Habsburg Bukovina, 1774-1919
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2 Theoretical framework

The subtitle of this work ‘Regional Identification in Habsburg Bukovina’ requires some explanation, not so much the notion of ‘Habsburg Bukovina’, which has already been addressed, but primarily the concept of ‘regional identification’. Why ‘identification’ instead of the more common ‘identity’? Then the ‘regional’: what is understood by ‘regional’ here and how has ‘regionalism’ been approached in scholarly work?

‘Identification’ instead of ‘Identity’

The concept of ‘identity’ has been under attack, mainly because of over-satiation. Social scientists Roger Brubaker and Frederick Cooper argue that ‘identity’ tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity). If identity is everywhere, they conclude, it is nowhere. Furthermore, they object to the use of the term ‘identity’ - just like ‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘citizenship’, ‘democracy’, ‘class’, ‘community’ and ‘tradition’ - as experience-distant categories used by social analysts, since these are already in use as ‘categories of practice’: categories of everyday social experience, developed and deployed by ordinary social actors. It should be avoided to unintentionally reproduce or reinforce such reification by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis.\(^\text{52}\) In other words, by using the terminology of the actors, their perceptions may be legitimised. In the view of scholars like Brubaker and German historian Lutz Niethammer - who just like Brubaker suggests to eliminate the term ‘identity’ altogether\(^\text{53}\) - (ethnic) identity is not primordial, something that was there all along, but a construct of the individual itself. Along this line of thinking, the presence of a fixed ‘identity’ should not be simply assumed; rather, it should be analysed how these feelings come into being and when they occur. When the phenomenon as such is thus regarded dynamic instead of static, the term ‘identification’ comes closer to what is under consideration in this work than ‘identity’.

The Study of Nationalism: Modernists, Primordialists and the Middle Way

When discussing regional identification, there is no way around nationalism. Nationalism was the undisputed dominant factor in identity debates in the nineteenth century and occupied the same position in later scholarly work. In the words of American historian Celia Applegate: “the issue is not so much that nations have been bigger and stronger [than regions] but that the whole process by which the writing of history established itself as a profession in the modern

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era has been closely interwoven with the making and legitimating of nation-states. (...) Historians across Europe wrote about the founding of their nations, the past of their nations, the coherence and unity of their nations. American medieval historian Patrick J. Geary even maintains that modern history was born in the nineteenth century, conceived as an instrument of European nationalism and that the history of Europe’s nations was a great success as a tool of nationalist ideology, but immediately adds that it ‘has turned our understanding of the past into a toxic waste dump, filled with the poison of ethnic nationalism, and [that] the poison has seeped deep into popular consciousness’. It therefore merits focusing first of all on what the study of nationalism has produced mainly in the last decades. The idea that nationalism is a political ideology instead of a natural destiny is relatively new. Intellectual historians such as Isaiah Berlin and Hans Kohn first suggested this approach, later the study of nationalism was given a more political and social orientation in the 1960s and 1970s. Elie Kedourie was the first scholar to contest the ‘naturalness’ view of nationalism in 1960. As Ernest Gellner argued: “Nationalism does indeed see itself as a universal, perennial and inherently - self-evidently - valid principle. It is, on this view, simply ‘natural’ that people should wish to live with their own kind, that they should be adverse to living with people of a different culture and, above all, that they should resent being governed by them”.

The debate entered a new phase with the works of Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith in the 1980s. With the exemption of Smith, these scholars attempted to arrive at a model of nationalism as an ideology and each of them provided insights crucial to the ongoing debate on the nature of the phenomenon. To Gellner, nationalism was largely a top-down affair, a fabrication of nineteenth-century intellectuals. He defined nationalism as the attempt to achieve congruence between the cultural and the political unit, i.e. to map political frontiers onto cultural borders. Modernisation and industrialisation in nineteenth-century Europe provided the indispensable conditions for the success story of nationalist doctrines: the developments in education, production scales, the distribution of print materials and increased mobility provided the kind of egalitarianism necessary for nationalism to flourish. In a pre-modern agrarian society, Gellner maintained, the main function of culture is to reinforce, underwrite, and render visible and authoritative, the hierarchical status system of that social order. He stressed that in the agrarian world, cultural similarity is not a political bond, and political bonds do not require cultural similarity. Furthermore, Gellner noted the rapid upsurge of nationalism as the leading ideology in Europe:

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58 Ibid., p. 175.
Ignored even more than openly spurned in 1815, by 1914 no one ignored it, and most took it for granted. The illusion of the fundamental, natural, self-evident role of nationality in politics was very well established. (...) The moral victory of the principle was almost complete: very few dared raise their voices against it.60

In order to explain the different ways the nation-states of Europe developed, Gellner divided the continent into three zones. Zone One consists of the historically strong dynastic states based on Lisbon, Madrid, Paris and London ‘which corresponded more or less to cultural-linguistic zones anyway, even before the logic of the situation, or nationalist theory, decreed that such a correlation should obtain’. The only major change on the map here created by the introduction of the nation-state is the Republic of Ireland. ‘These cultures’, Gellner maintained, ‘did not need to strive for the creation of their political carapace, they already had it’. Zone Two was roughly defined by what used to be the Holy Roman Empire, where although high, staatsfähig culture was available among both German and Italian speakers, there was political fragmentation: there was a well-developed culture, but no state-protector and as such, Zone Two was the mirror image of Zone One. The most problematic zone according to Gellner was Zone Three, Central and Eastern Europe, where ‘the horror was not optional, but predestined’. While he considered Polish culture an exception, Gellner characterised the situation as follows:

There was a patchwork of cultures and languages, the folk-languages were ill-defined and, for instance, in the case of Slavonic languages, it was exceedingly hard, or impossible, to say where one dialect ended and another one began. (...) There were neither national states nor national cultures. The states which existed were only loosely connected with their own ethnic dominant group.61

Interesting as Gellner’s zone system may be, when one tries to discover the root system of something (nationalist thinking in this case), the claim that there are actually four different roots does not build a particularly strong argumentation. According to American anthropologist Benedict Anderson, Gellner went too far in his anxiousness to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences and thus assimilated ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’. He also criticised Gellner and his thesis of modernisation and industrialisation as the engine of nationalism for failing to give and explanation for the rise of nationalism in non-industrialised Eastern Europe. According to Anderson, the nation is ‘an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’. Anderson considered this community ‘imagined’ because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members but will nevertheless uphold the image of their communion.62 The underlying force

60 Ibid., p. 42
61 Ibid., pp. 50-57. Gellner reserved a fourth zone for the region that once was Czarist Russia and later the Soviet Union, taking to account the fact that there was quite a difference in territorial space between the two and is different for another reason: the demise of the Czarist regime did not lead to the formation of nation-states, but instead it was replaced by a non-national regime.
of nationalism, Anderson argued, is ‘print-capitalism’: the advent of printing, with additional support from the Reformation and its translation of religious texts in vernacular languages, provided the means for geographically dispersed individuals to understand themselves as part of a national culture. He concluded that ‘the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation’. According to Anderson, ‘new’ nationalisms which developed between 1820 and 1920 distinguished themselves from their predecessors on two accounts: first, ‘national print-languages’ were of central ideological and of political importance and second, all were able to work from visible models provided by their predecessors.

Together with Terence Ranger, British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm published his analysis ‘The Invention of Tradition’ in 1983, the same year that Gellner’s work on nationalism appeared. Hobsbawm tried to trace the nature of nationalism and nations back to national traditions, which he claimed are ‘invented’. These ‘invented traditions’ he defines as ‘a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past’. According to Hobsbawm, the nation with its associated phenomena like nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols and so on ‘rests on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative’. He warns for the risk of being misled by the paradox of modern nations claiming to be the opposite of novel - namely rooted in the deepest antiquity - and the opposite of constructed, namely so ‘natural’ that self-assertion is the only definition it needs. Hobsbawm criticised Gellner for explaining nationalism mainly from top-down, elitist dynamism and emphasised the role of ‘the longings and interests of the ordinary people’.

Notwithstanding their differences, Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm belong to the same current of ‘modernist’ analysts of nationalism: basically they agree that nationalism is an invention instead of a force of nature and all three see the process as a modern and recent political phenomenon. Their most prominent opponent is Anthony D. Smith who belongs to the school of ‘primordialists’ or ‘ethno-symbolists’. Primordialism opposes a purely modern origin of nations approach and suggests that modern nations have strong ties with pre-modern ethnic communities. Smith does not consider his view as contrary to the modernists’, but describes his theoretical framework as ‘an internal critique and expansion of modernism’. He acknowledges the crucial role of modernity, but refuses to recognise the free invention of nations and sees nation-building constrained by what he coins *ethnie*: ‘a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more

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63 Ibid., pp. 41-49.
64 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
66 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
elements of shared culture, a link with a homeland, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites’. In this context, ‘ethnicity’ is not used as a euphemism for ‘race’ or referring to the nation as a biological bloodline and descent, but purely as the collective acceptance of a self-image. Smith presents this ‘ethnie’ as the continuing pre-modern grouping necessary for the formation of a nation. The question remains how these ‘proto-national groups’ are to be defined and categorised. Czech historian and political theorist Miroslav Hroch tried to trace back modern-day ‘ethnic groups’ to ‘ethnies’ according to their language situation: he distinguishes a group which can relate to an ancient, weakened written language tradition and a group which cannot because of a lack of or a rupture in a written tradition. Hroch supports Smith’s model of distinguishing between ‘ethnic categories’ and ‘ethnic communities’: Smith defines ethnic categories as ‘human populations whom at least some outsiders consider to constitute a separate cultural and historical grouping’, but emphasises that self-awareness among the respective population may be partly or even totally absent – they are defined by third parties. ‘Ethnic communities’ on the other hand not only have objectively shared traits, but also have a subjective sense of shared identity.

In 1995, the two tendencies in nationalism studies engaged in a debate at Warwick University. The modernist view was represented by Ernest Gellner, the primordialist by his former student Anthony Smith. The issue under debate was simple, Gellner maintained: is the sense of ethnicity, the identification with a ‘nation’, and the political expression of this passionate identification, something old and present throughout history, or is it, on the contrary, something modern and a corollary of the distinctive feature of our recent world? Smith underscored that in his view, the modernist account tells only half of the story, namely that the nation is a product of specifically modern economic, social and political conditions but that it suffers at root from the fact that the account is ineluctably materialist and thus neglects cultural aspects of nationalism. Gellner responded by asking Smith ‘Do nations have navels?’, referring to the philosophical argument about the prototypical Adam: if he did not have a navel, then God created him. In the analogy, the ‘ethnie’ is like the navel. Some have it, some do not, Gellner maintained. Smith’s response was ‘nihil ex nihilo’ - nothing from nothing. Among other things, the Warwick Debates pointed at a weakness of the modernist approach: with all its ability to show how ideologies of nationalism connect with processes of social and

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69 Leerssen 2006, p. 16.


71 As examples of the first group, Hroch mentions the Greeks, Czechs, Magyars, Croatians, Finns, Catalans and Welsh, as examples of the second group the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Bulgarians and Serbs but also the Irish, Basks, (Iberian) Galicians and Norwegians.


73 Gellner 1997, p. 90.
economic change, it tends to regard cultural production and its influence as a mere byproduct.\textsuperscript{74}

This criticism is shared by Dutch literary historian Joep Leerssen, who positions himself between modernism and primordialism by claiming the existence of cultural awareness very early in history, albeit an awareness devoid of a political function and one which defines not the proper community, but the ‘others’: the ‘ethnic’, this subjective community, is not primarily characterised by a sense of ‘belonging together’, but rather by a sense of being ‘distinct from others’ and thus seems related to Smith’s concept of ‘ethnic category’. The disciplines of Comparative Literature and cultural studies identify this phenomenon as the interplay between otherness and self-image. As such, Leerssen approaches the development of national thought and nationalism as the (political) articulation and instrumentalisation of a collective auto (or self)-image.\textsuperscript{75} Unlike Smith, who sought the root system of nationalism in ‘the ethnic origins of nations’, Leerssen proposes to find it in ‘ethnotypes’- commonplaces and stereotypes of how others are identified, viewed and characterised as opposed to the Self. Therefore, alongside the socio-political nation-building developments as studied by the ‘modernists’, Leerssen wants to focus on the discursive patterns of auto-identification, exoticisation and characterisation that take place in the field of culture.\textsuperscript{76} He notes that ethnotypes are not perceived as social actors and contests ‘the deep-rooted aprioristic way of thinking in which cultural expressions are always considered as (side) products, as a ‘consequence’, and rarely as creator, cause, as a process, as the agency’, for ‘directly from their inner substance, regardless of the intentions with which they are expressed, regardless of the social background of the speaker, speech acts actively and autonomously cause a change in the social position of the speaker and the person concerned’.\textsuperscript{77}

\textit{‘Indifference to Nation’ As a Fresh Approach}

In 1996, sociologist Rogers Brubaker contributed significantly to the study of Eastern European nationalism with his ‘Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe’.\textsuperscript{78} Instead of the eternal question ‘what is a nation’, Brubaker insists that scholarly work should focus on ‘nationness’ as an event, a contingent, ever changing property of groups. Just like the other container terminology Brubaker later added to his list of unsuitable categories of analysis (see above), he proposes to see ‘nation’ as a


\textsuperscript{77} Leerssen 2012, p. 3.

category of practice rather a substantial enduring collectivity.\textsuperscript{79} By introducing an approach which he coins ‘groupness as event’, Brubaker offers a strategy to determine when (ethnonationalist) appeals actually produced the desired results, or - so far neglected - when they failed to do so.\textsuperscript{80}

Influenced by criticism by scholars such as Brubaker who warn for unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing reification of nationalist terminology by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis, research on Habsburg Central Europe increasingly devotes attention to manifestations of non-national identification. Historian Pieter Judson says it clearly:

\begin{quote}
If we look to sources beyond those created by the nationalists, if we dissociate ourselves rigorously from nationalist assumptions, and if we attempt to hear what we can of the experiences of the populations of these regions, we may perhaps liberate ourselves from the unnecessary discursive prison that nationalists around us continue to re-create.\textsuperscript{81}
\end{quote}

In his analysis of how nationalist politics forced the inhabitants of the Bohemian town of Budweis/Budějovice to adopt either a Czech or the German national identity, American historian Jeremy King underscores this point. King also notes that for a long time, scholars of Habsburg Central Europe ‘have followed national leaders in regularly using the same vocabulary for nationally conscious and unconscious individuals, and thus in minimising the distinction’.\textsuperscript{82} In this respect, he embraces Brubaker’s definition of ‘groupism’ as a deceptive and widely applied tendency to take discrete and reified ethnic groups as the basic constituents of social life, and in particular as self-evident protagonists in ethnic struggles.\textsuperscript{83} In other words, much of the scholarly work on Habsburg Central Europe simply studied ethnic groups without differentiating between nationalists and speakers of a particular language. By no longer approaching ‘ethnic groups’ as a homogenous cluster of nationalist leaders and their unanimously inspired popular followers, the study of nationalism opens the door to the analysis of a variety of dynamics. Instead of seeing the nationalist violence that plagued much of urban Austria at the turn of the century as reflecting the authentic nationalist sentiments of a peasantry as actions of the majority, it may just as well be regarded as the actions of the few.\textsuperscript{84} Moreover, that familiar picture of radical nationalist conflict may not be the product of emerging nations battling each other or the state, so much as a conflict that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 21.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid., pp. 2, 12
\item \textsuperscript{81} Judson, Pieter M., \textit{Guardians of the Nation - Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria}, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MS)/ London 2006, p. 257.
\end{itemize}
pitted nationalists of all kinds against those whom they perceived as dangerously indifferent to nationhood.85

The group of ‘revisionist historians’, as their American colleague Gary Cohen calls them, includes the Americans Pieter Judson and Jeremy King, the Dane Pieter Bugge, and the Pole Tomasz Kamusella.86 They challenge a number of the underlying assumptions inherent in much of the established literature which has tended to assume an automatic, smooth progression from ‘ethnic’ to ‘national’ identities; to concentrate on nationalist thinkers and developments at the level of ‘high politics’; to study the history of one single ethnic group in isolation from the history of other ethnic groups living within the same province; to ignore the local and regional spheres of identification; to avoid the issue of how precisely the state fitted into the overall matrix of identification processes at the individual or group level;87 and lastly to underplay the gradual erasure of the social possibility of choosing to be not nationalist in the decade leading to the First World War.88 The revisionists point at how nationalist activists constructed conscious national allegiances and specific group solidarities where they did not exist previously in order to create boundaries in public and private life between members of one’s own nation and others, and then captured parts of public space and the state for the interests of one’s nation.89

The growing interest for possible tensions between nationalist activists and their presumed flock, the realisation that Central European nationalists not only fought their nationalist enemies but just as often those in the general population who were ambiguous, indifferent, or mutable in their national loyalties has resulted in a number of case studies which put ‘indifference to nationality’ centre stage.90 In May 2008, eighteen scholars whose work explicitly deals with ‘indifference to nation’ gathered in Alberta. By naming the conference ‘Sites of Indifference to Nation in Habsburg Central Europe’ instead of referring simply to ‘indifference’, the organisers underlined the critical importance of place, context and event for interpreting the phenomena they encountered and as such they followed Brubaker’s line of thinking: they saw indifference not as a ‘thing in the world’, but as a ‘perspective on the

88 Jeremy King according to Judson 2003, p. 145.
89 Cohen 2009.
‘Indifference’ was offered as a way to rethink the continuing powerful influence of national(ist) narratives and categories while acknowledging that this ‘indifference’ defines itself in relationship to that very set of narratives.

The conference focused on local behaviour which often contradicted what historians found in party politics or mass media sources: since national indifference was hardly recorded anywhere, it appears most clearly at the moments that nationalists mobilised to eliminate it.\(^{92}\)

The scholars in Alberta rejected the argument - often propagated by nationalists themselves - that indifference or even rejection of nationhood can be attributed to ‘surviving pockets of economic and social backwardness or premodern religious or regional loyalties’. On the contrary, they argued, they found indifference in quintessential modern developments such as mass education, literacy, industrialisation and migration. Furthermore, they contested the degree to which alleged nations as such had actually functioned as primary agents in the history of the region and suggested that more attention be devoted to the so far often ignored importance of imperial structures in this context. As Jeremy King had already argued:

> If languages divided a population vertically, into protonational columns, then corporative and socioeconomic solidarities divided it horizontally, into Habsburg layers - and had far more institutional anchoring and sociological significance. Yet almost all historians have joined nationals in downplaying the gaps and flaws in the ‘nations emerged from ethnic groups’ explanation as mere gaps and exceptions.\(^{91}\)

The participants of the Alberta conference discussed the complex ways people, families and communities may have used the language of nation flexibly and indeed opportunistically on occasion to pursue personal or community agendas. Such flexibility and opportunism was increasingly thwarted in the late nineteenth century by nationalist activists fighting bilingualism and bilingual education which they saw as a potential danger to the national community. Those nationalists met with resistance from an audience that recognised bi- (or multi-) linguism as an effective tool for obtaining social advancement. Finally, the Alberta conference reaffirmed another element about nationalist activists, namely, the close similarities of their appeals and their organisational structures. Rival nationalist organisations did not develop separately from one another; instead, they shared strategies, ideological appeals, and organisational structures.\(^{94}\) They were ultimately far more similar to each other than to the nationally indifferent whom they failed to mobilise adequately.

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\(^{93}\) King 2002, p. 7; see also Bjork, James E., Neither German Nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 2008, pp. 6-7.

Out of Nationalism’s Shadows: Similarities and Peculiarities of the ‘Regional’

The revisionist approach of nationalism plays a significant role in the increasing attention for multiple, collective and competing identifications in Habsburg Central Europe. This is not to say that it was completely absent before the traditional dominance of nationalist groupism in the debate was challenged. Anthony Smith readily acknowledges the notion of ‘multiple identities’: people define their identity in terms of class, gender, religion group or geographical provenance. He distinguishes these multiple identities from ethnic identities which he regards as various territorial identities not necessarily contradicting each other and possibly complementing each other as layers of an onion.95 With the analytical tools discussed above, Judson’s ‘discursive prison of nationalism’ has opened its doors to studies of identification in the Habsburg Empire other than the traditional pile of nationalist narratives. One of these alternatives is a closer look at regional or crownland identification.

American historian Celia Applegate is one of the scholars who observe a growing interest for the region.96 She describes the devaluation of regions and their pasts in the nineteenth century as naturally emerging alongside the triumph of national historiographies and notices how regional historiography became subordinate to the national history project. It was not until after 1945 that a huge number of publications explicitly took the nation-state, its origins, its developments and its consequences as the object of critical historical scrutiny. Still, post-war historiography followed a ‘modernisation theory’ which foresaw a gradual disappearance of the region in favour of the nation-state or even supra-national structures and thus largely ignored the role of regional developments. Only since scholarship on nationalism has started to emphasise ‘multiplicity and fragmentation, diversities and contingencies, uneven diffusions and incomplete projections’, Applegate argues, regions and regional identities get more attention. Still, much of the historical work on regionalism in European history has been confined to the politics of autonomism and separatism. This way, regions can be too easily dismissed as would-be nations. On top of that, constructivism which has become more or less mainstream in nationalism studies - see for instance the assertion by Benedict Anderson that all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact are imagined - only hesitantly found its way into discussions of regional or local identity. Applegate blames the relative obscurity surrounding the role of regions in European development for this as well as a perceived lack of urgency: manifestations of regional sentiment are often seen as offering a ‘healthy antidote to bellicose and exclusionary national ones’. In the study of regional identification and the way in which regions are imagined she expects a contribution to the analysis of the nation-ness of modern states as well. As an illustration she offers Katherine D. Kennedy’s work on how history textbooks for German schoolchildren encouraged national

loyalty by invoking regional topics. According to Applegate, for historians the study of regional identification complicates rather than undermines national histories. Especially in the case of ‘border regions’ she discovers the ambiguities and instabilities of the nationalising project.

A point Applegate addresses in her analysis of the case of nineteenth-century Germany is that region and nation were not antagonistic and mutually exclusive but reinforcing and interdependent. Obviously, this is not always the case. German historian Philipp Ther even finds the initial research question here: when studying identifications on offer different from the pervasive national one and then moving to a regional focus, first of all the question needs to be answered if that regional identification complements a national one or competes with it.

Then there is ambiguous and tricky terminology. Most of the time when the relation between ‘national’ and ‘regional’ identification is addressed, what is actually meant is the identification with the nation-state and the region. In the case of the Habsburg Empire, the nation-state notion does not apply; rather, there is a triangle of possible identifications. There may be identification with the state, which indeed may be enhanced by provincial/crownland identification, plus a third, national(ist) identification which can partly overlap with the previous two, but may also be competing with them. Then there is the second problem: the nationalist assumptions that have shaped historiography in Europe will not adequately be challenged if research limits itself to the study of institutions which somehow ‘floated above or below the borders of nation-states’ (tourism, religion, regionalism etc.). Such topics have resulted in a large range of ‘transnational histories’ and studies of what are often called ‘borderlands’ (Zwischenraum in German) with ‘hybrid identities’. By dubbing these regions ‘borderlands’ and by accentuating their ‘hybridity’, scholars implicitly acknowledge nationalist terminology and presuppose a territory in between of what was already there and a ‘mixing’ of what already possessed a ‘fixed nature’ before. As Zahra and Judson point out, it was nationalists who drew borders and nationalists who defined the edges of ‘their’ culture. Scholarly work on ‘borderlands, ‘hybrid culture’ and ‘transnationalism’ in fact legitimises nationalist claims.

Many of the insights which have been gained in the field of national identification studies can be applied to its regional equivalent. The way traditions, peculiarities, and history are constructed and distributed are no different. Whether a territory can be considered a region

99 See for instance Ther 2003, p. XII.
will largely depend on whether people living there accept this space as a region and identify with it. Essentially, this makes the region a mental construct no less than the nation. So far, regional studies rarely reflect on the constructed quality of the region itself. Dutch historian Eric Storm underscores that just like nations, regions are relatively of a recent date and largely ‘invented’, albeit important to note the tenacity of identifications: the fact that they are constructed does not mean that they are easily revised. These realisations are of importance for the role ‘regional identification’ obtains. Scholars warn for the mistake of perceiving regions, regional identifications and regional political cultures as derivatives of persistence and continuity in opposition to constructs of the nation as the engine of change. In fact, regional identifications were more precisely defined or even invented after 1890 when the corresponding national identification had already largely crystallised.

Such risks seem limited to the analysis of regions with historical claims and/or aspirations. Numerous regions cannot, and often do not attempt to, claim to have ‘navels’ in the way discussed by Ernest Gellner: they were created on imperial drawing tables and shaped by demographic policy and local collective memory is very much aware of this. Territorial assertions in the name of the ‘nation’ are often vague - regional identification, however, is territorial by definition. ‘Topophilia’, the attachment to a context with the core elements of physical locality, durability and constancy demand a prominent place in expressions of regional affiliation. Those who live and work in a certain area are expected to have a unique solidarity with it that only can be understood by its other inhabitants and internally communicated among them. The idea of topophilia is closely connected to what is known in the German-speaking area as Heimat: although later contaminated by its inclusion in Nazi propaganda, the translation-defying Heimat points at a homeland, a place contrasted to things foreign and different as well as the place where one eventually returns. German historian Gerhard Brunn sees a shift from the notion of ‘region’ to the one of ‘Heimat’ when soft cultural criteria such as ‘customs’, ‘lifestyle’ and ‘dialectal peculiarities’ come into play.

105 Kühne 2000, p. 61.
Although the territorial character of Heimat is obvious, its size and reach are not; French historian Bernard Michel regards it as the village or town of birth rather than a region.\textsuperscript{110} Even more, Heimat may refer to the family farm, the village, the region or the nation-state.\textsuperscript{111} Central to the Heimat are ‘longing and belonging’.\textsuperscript{112} With the rise of nationalism and the spreading of the nation-state, Heimat was increasingly linked to this understanding and the specifications \textit{weitere}/\textit{engere} (broad/narrow) \textit{Heimat} were often applied to distinguish between one’s citizenship and one’s regional affiliations.\textsuperscript{113} Although most scholars who have worked on the Heimat notion readily acknowledge its use in the entire German-speaking realm, most of their research remains limited to the territory of the German state. However, the Heimat terminology also reached the Habsburg Empire. In its Austrian half, Cisleithania, with its power structure of autonomous crownlands under the rule of Vienna, the \textit{engere Heimat} became a customary reference to one’s crownland of origin. In the Romantic-nostalgic sense, attachment to the Fatherland (\textit{weitere Heimat}) was considered a political, civic virtue, attachment to one’s homeland (\textit{engere Heimat}) was of a more sentimental, moral quality.\textsuperscript{114}

\textit{Auto-, Hetero- and Meta-Images}

As said, regional identification basically uses the same tools as its national counterpart and instrumentalises ‘primordial’ elements such as history, language, religion or a proper culture in order to ‘prove’ the region’s intrinsic uniqueness and to set itself apart. This identification conveyed and staged through symbols - for example, celebrations, anniversaries or patrimony days - ultimately serves the purpose of integration on the inside and exclusivity to the outside. Identifications are thus based always on the dichotomy of ‘us’ and the ‘other’.\textsuperscript{115} This brings the scope of ‘regional identification’ research onto the field of imagology or image studies which analyse cultural representations (books, plays, films, press releases) regarding their perceptions of peoples, cultures and societies. With its origins in Comparative Literature, imagology overlaps with many other disciplines, from social psychology to arts and cultural history and examines the deeply ingrained habit to characterise societies and individuals on the basis of their nationality and ‘national character’. Since nationality and nation-ness are now widely regarded as patterns of identification rather than as identities, as subjective constructs rather than as objective essences, there is growing attention for the study of intercultural relations in terms of mutual perceptions, images and self-images. Imagology was

\textsuperscript{112} Wickham, Chris, \textit{Constructing Heimat in Postwar Germany: Longing and Belonging (Studies in German Thought and History)}, E. Mellen Press, Lewiston 1999.  
\textsuperscript{115} Brunn, p. 28.
developed in France in the 1950s but met resistance in the American scholarly world, which was still more oriented towards criticism, the aesthetic of individual texts. Comparatist Hugo Dyserinck nevertheless continued imagological research in Aachen and developed a method which captures the multi-nationality of literature in terms of transient national subjectivities. He made the crucial leap from a constructivist branch of the old ethno-psychology to the study of cultural-literary representation patterns. Central insight was especially the dynamic interplay between the image of the Self and the Other, auto- and hetero-image. His work implies that the images concerned are not merely mental representations by nations about nations, but actual constituents of national identification patterns. As such, the constructivist approach of nationalism by Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm generated renewed interest for imagology. In Amsterdam, Joep Leerssen has put the imagological approach of national identification on the map. Together with Dyserinck he is the editor of Studia Imagologica, which has produced 20 volumes so far.

Leerssen focuses on the identification of ‘ethnotypes’, which he sees as being at the root of nationalism. He proposes three working methods in the imagological approach of texts: the intertextual method inventarisises images as commonplaces ramifying from text to text. On this basis, the typology of the given ethnotype is established. The focus is on whether and if so, how auto- and hetero-images have determined or influenced each other. The literary-historical implication of this is that in the mutual influence of literary traditions across state and language borders, the national perceptions between the relevant peoples often play a guiding or filtering role. With respect to the history of ideas, the chronological order of the sources clarifies how image creation has developed in the course of time. This way, intertextual study provides a typology of a given national image. This kind of typology almost always turns out to be highly variable: the image of a nation or nationality differs from era to era, from country to country and often shows highly contradictory traits. The contextual approach relates constants and shifts in perception to the historical circumstances in which texts have been created. Rivalry between countries leads to negative perceptions (war propaganda); a more intriguing question is why at times from one country to the other the valuation and intensity of interest tends to vary. For cultural history and the history of nation and nationalism, imagological research demonstrates that nationalism can be seen as the

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116 Leerssen 2012 (Ethnotypen sind Akteure), pp. 7-8.
117 In addition to auto-and hetero-images, Leerssen distinguishes meta-images (images of the images the Other is suspected to have), which he sees as one of the most relevant and promising prospects of a new, practice-oriented imagology. The use of ethnotypes in the last century has often assumed this form: for instance, the exotic, prejudiced persona of a foreign visitor is used to allow an inflated portrayal of one’s own national characteristics. Work by J.Th. (Joep) Leerssen on imagology includes Spiegelpaleis Europa: Europese cultuur als mythe en beeldvorming, Vantilt, Nijmegen 2011; Alterity, Identity, Image. Selves and Others in Society and Scholarship, Rodopi, Amsterdam 1991 (with Raymond Corbey); German Reflections (Yearbook of European Studies, 7) Rodopi, Amsterdam 1994 (with Menno Spiering); Imagology: The Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters - A Critical Survey (Studia imagologica, 13), Rodopi, Amsterdam 2007 (with Manfred Beller); The rhetoric of national character. Theme issue of the European journal of English studies, 13.3, 2009 (with A.J. Hoenselaars).
118 Leerssen 2006, p. 17.
119 Leerssen 2012 (Ethnotypen sind Akteure), p. 15.
political instrumentalisation of cultural self-or auto-image: the perception of one’s own ‘character’ determines the identity one wants to see confirmed politically. The textual method examines the rhetorical and narrative functions of national characterisations and analyses how authors distribute positive or negative character traits on the basis of the nationality of their protagonists and if national characterisations are deployed with serious, satirical or ironic intentions.

Determining the parameters of the variability of ethnotypes, the complex back and forth between auto-and hetero-image and thus going from the typological ‘vocabulary’ of national characterisations towards a ‘structural grammar’ of these processes seems to be the task of a ‘new imagology’. An important insight of such a more structurally working imagology is that most concrete images of nations and peoples are dominated by underlying binary, oppositional structures such as north-south (hot-cold, virtue- honour civic-not civic, phlegmatic/sanguine- melancholic/choleric) or central-peripheral (progressive and traditional, dynamic and static, pragmatic and mystical). Many specific ethnotypes combine and vary such moral archetypes, and their application to real peoples is therefore formulaic and poetic rather than resulting from empirical observations. ‘Recognising the formulas means debunking the stereotypes’, Leerssen argues.120

How to Approach Regional Identification in Habsburg Bukovina

Key question now is how the theoretical debates and developments as sketchily summarised above may relate to ‘regional identification in Habsburg Bukovina’. By approaching ‘identity’ as dynamic rather that static or - to paraphrase Brubaker - as ‘a perspective on the world’ rather than as ‘a thing in the world’, it seems logical to adopt the term ‘identification’ instead. This way, the focus will shift from what identity ‘is’ to when and how it occurs. Since Bukovinian historiography so far almost exclusively consists of - conceived consciously or subconsciously - nationalist, ‘groupist’ narratives, there is no way around analysing how different national movements gained ground in Bukovina. For this kind of analysis, the work of primarily modernist scholars such as Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm is indispensable. The notions of modernisation, ‘imagined community’ and ‘invention of tradition’ will consistently need to be mirrored against the ‘universal, perennial and inherently valid’ principle of the nation which was common in the contemporary discourse of the era under discussion.

Then again, the weakness of the modernist approach of being focused solely on processes of social and economic change and its tendency to neglect regard cultural production and its influence also comes to the fore in the case of Habsburg Bukovina, which was only partly shaped by what can be called modernity and for such a small territory boasted a remarkable range of different national movements. The question of how these movements ignited and influenced each other or even provoked counter-movements cannot be ignored.

120 Ibid., p. 9.
By introducing the notion of ‘groupism’, Rogers Brubaker rejects a monolithic view on ‘the nation as a collective’ and provides a strategy to determine when nationalist appeals actually produced the desired results, or when they failed to do so. By differentiating constantly between ‘Romanian nationalists’ and ‘Romanian speakers’, ‘Ruthenian nationalists’ and ‘Ruthenian speakers’ and so on, in this work the aim will be to refrain from groupist analysis - sometimes perhaps at the risk of laboured prose. The revisionist school of argumentation creates room for the analysis of tensions between nationalists and those they tried to reach or to convert and focuses on ‘indifference to nationalism’. It also raises awareness of the trap of using terminology coined by the very nationalists whose dominance revisionists try to free themselves of. This trap, closely related to that of groupism, will hopefully be avoided in this thesis by refraining from contaminated terminology such as ‘national awakening’, ‘transnational’ or ‘borderland’.

The breach the revisionists have opened in the fortress of nationalism makes room for alternative identifications in Habsburg Bukovina. For a crownland which has entered collective memory for its outstanding cultural production and lively local political debates, a closer look at elements of specifically regional identification seems obvious. In other words: when, where and how did Bukovinianness occur? This approach is closely connected with the phenomena of enhancing and competing identities or, more likely in the Habsburg constellation, the complex triangle of identifications with the State, the nation and the region which will be duly addressed. Recent studies of regional identification have led to the - rather unsurprising - conclusion that the root system of regional identification is no different from its national counterpart, with the most striking difference that regional identification has a stronger territorial component than the national one, which in turn seems to have additional affinity with the ‘Heimat’ notion.

Imagology, so far, focuses largely on the literary representation of national characters. Especially in the European context there is no shortage of material throughout the centuries which makes literary texts, together with their currency and topicality, excellent sources for the study of how stereotypes work. Literary texts can - but not necessarily will - outlast many other kinds of source materials, such as picture images, journalism, reports and so on. Then there is the focus on national stereotypes. Undoubtedly, as has been argued here before, during the last centuries, national characterisations, classifications and ethnotypifications have claimed centre-stage, and in order to discover more about the root system of national thinking there is no way around national stereotyping. With recent debates on ‘indifference to nationality’ and alternatives to national identification in mind, the question arises if the methodology so far developed and applied in the field of imagology is not equally useful in the study of stereotyping other than strictly national. When discussing regional identification, the point has already been made that regions are mental constructs and ‘invented’ in the same way that nations are. ‘The regional community’ functions in the same way as an ethnie - defined by Leerssen as ‘a subjective community established by shared culture and historical

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memories’. In other words, there is no reason to assume that regions are more or less ‘real’ than nations and that imagological text analysis would not be applicable in a regional context.

An easily conceivable practical problem is the possible paucity of source material. In a cultural landscape so strikingly dominated by the nationalist discourse, literary creation specifically addressing regional images and stereotypes may be hard to find - which does not mean it is not there. The relatively short existence of autonomous Habsburg Bukovina (strictly speaking only from 1848 until 1918) does little to expect a large literary treasure trove relating to the area. Then again, there is no reason to limit research activities to the study of literary texts alone. For a small crownland with a short lifespan, Bukovina had an impressive press activity. Especially in an era in which it was often unclear where journalism ended and, say, political agitation, feuilletonism, satire and even fiction started, press sources provide a surprisingly rich source of information. A contextual approach may shed light on the varying perceptions by and of Bukovinians in the course of the crownland’s short existence. Next to the available archival primary sources, the Habsburg Bukovinian press will therefore be the starting place of a search for ‘sites of regional identification in Habsburg Bukovina’.