Against all odds: aiding political parties in Georgia and Ukraine

Bader, M.

Citation for published version (APA):

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
CHAPTER THREE: THE CONTEXT OF PARTY ASSISTANCE IN GEORGIA AND UKRAINE

Party assistance, when it works, has a positive impact on how parties develop. As party (system) development is one element in processes of political change, so is party assistance one type of intervention in the broad palette of democracy assistance, with other types of assistance aiming at different aspects of politics and government, such as elections, legislative functioning, or an independent judiciary. Party development is affected foremost by domestic factors, but external, international factors can have a noticeable impact. With all other possible international factors in party development, party assistance constitutes the international dimension of party development. The context of party assistance, then, is shaped by the following four areas: party development, the area that party assistance seeks to have a direct impact on; democracy assistance, in which party assistance is embedded organizationally and conceptually; political change; and elements in the ‘international dimension’ of party development other than party assistance. In a graphical illustration, the relationship between party assistance and the context of party assistance looks like this:

As figure one demonstrates, party assistance is a subset both of party development and of democracy assistance. Party development and democracy assistance in turn are subsets of political change. Party assistance is also one element in the international dimension of party development. The international dimension of party development by default is a subset of overall party development.

The effectiveness of party assistance hinges on well crafted programs and on the permissiveness of domestic factors in party development. The party assistance programs that have been operated in Georgia and Ukraine will be assessed in chapters
five and six. The next chapter pinpoints the outcomes of party development in Georgia and Ukraine throughout the post-communist period, and identifies which factors have blocked the development of a stable and democratic party system. The current chapter reviews the remaining areas which shape the context of party assistance with relation to Georgia and Ukraine - political change (sections one to three), democracy assistance (section four), and the international dimension of party development (section five). This review provides some insight into the rationale which underlies party assistance, and into the factors which constrain and facilitate its implementation.

The opening section discusses how the post-communist political regimes of Georgia and Ukraine have been looked upon and where they have been situated in regime classifications. Second, a number of the foremost explanations - the impact of the ‘leninist’ legacy, ill-suited political culture and popular values, problems with state-building and internal diversity, economic issues, inadequate institutional design, limited linkage and leverage to and from the West, and agency - for the failure of comprehensive democratization during most of the post-communist period are outlined. Concluding the discussion of political change, the causes of the Rose and Orange Revolutions, as well as the role of the West in these arguably most defining political events of the period since 1991 in Georgia and Ukraine, are set forth. Next, the chapter provides some evidence of the extent and form of Western democracy assistance in Georgia and Ukraine both before and after the Revolutions. Finally, international factors other than party assistance that have an impact on party development in Georgia and Ukraine are briefly discussed.

3.1. IN THE GRAY ZONE

Ukraine (until 2005) and Georgia have been among the large majority of ‘transitional’ states which in the years after the initial move away from (politically closed) autocracy did not consolidate to become liberal democratic regimes (Carothers 2002: 9). Both states have for the most time lingered in the ‘partly free’ category of the both widely used and heavily criticized Freedom House Freedom in the World comparative assessment of political and civil rights.26 Georgia scored 5 in the first years under Shevardnadze, before improving to 3.5 in the late 1990s and regressing to 4 in the years immediately preceding the Rose Revolution. After the Revolution, Georgia’s rating improved to 3-3.5, and then fell back to 4 in 2007 and 2008. Ukraine scored 3.5 in most years until 2003, then slipped to 4 in 2003 and 2004, before improving markedly to 2.5 in the years since the Revolution.27 The literature on regime classifications has termed regimes like those in Georgia and Ukraine competitive
authoritarian (Levitsky and Way 2002), semi-liberal authoritarian (Siaroff 2005), electoral authoritarian (Schedler 2006) where the emphasis is on the authoritarian practices inherent in these regimes; and illiberal democratic (Merkel 2004: 49), delegative democratic (O'Donnell 1994) and other democratic-with-adjective designations (Collier and Levitsky 1997) where the emphasis is rather on the procedural and institutional elements of the political systems.

Manifestations of the less-than-democratic nature of Georgia and Ukraine (until 2005) include, as in many other places, an uneven political playing field, inadequate safeguards of civil and political rights, and weak horizontal accountability due to a concentration of power in the executive. In assessments of Ukraine under Kuchma, the focus is most often on the corruptive entanglement of the political and economic domains, and on the frequent prevalence of informal practices over formal institutions (neopatrimonialism). Way (2005: 4) contends that Kuchma’s ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime rested on the two pillars: ‘first, an extensive set of largely informal authoritarian institutions and processes that served to harass oppositionists and to falsify election results; and second, a coalition of oligarchic forces in parliament and in the administration that organized support for Kuchma, competing for his patronage’. D'Anieri (2007: 69) similarly argues that ‘machine politics’ under Kuchma was characterized by a combination of patronage, selective law enforcement, and control over the economy and law enforcement. Since the Revolution, abuse of power by the executive and the leverage of oligarchs over politics have decreased. Much analysis of the ‘façade democracy’ (Devdariani 2004) or ‘Potemkin democracy’ (King 2001) of Shevardnadze-era Georgia stresses the impact of all-pervasive corruption and weak state capacity on how the country was governed. Wheatley (2005: 218) argues that Georgia essentially was a ‘contested oligarchy’, where a number of influential groups vied for political and economic power, while the state was largely incapable of providing for the common good. According to King (2001: 100), ‘Georgia is a chronically weak state. In a region of only minimally successful countries, however, the Georgian case is particularly dire [...] Indeed, it is worth asking whether a state called "Georgia" even exists today in any meaningful sense’. Since the Revolution, corruption is no longer all-pervasive and government has become more effective, while political competition is as circumscribed as before the Revolution.

3.2. CONSTRAINTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION

Among the factors that are most commonly believed to have constrained democratization in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere in the post-communist
world are, in random order, ‘the leninist legacy’, elite political culture and popular values, problems with state-building and nation-building, constitutional design and electoral legislation, economic problems, weak linkage and leverage to and from the West, and finally agency. These factors are discussed here in turn. Adjudicating the relative weight of the factors which contribute to constrain democratization is beyond the scope of this chapter. The implications of a number of the factors discussed here for party (system) development specifically are discussed in the next chapter.

**Legacies**

Defined as ‘the structural, cultural, and institutional starting points of ex-communist countries at the outset of the transition’ (Pop-Eleches 2007: 910), legacies are widely believed to cast a long shadow over the political trajectories of post-socialist states. Hanson (1997) argues that the ‘leninist legacy’ (Jowitt 1992) is made up of distinct ideological, political, socioeconomic, and cultural legacies. Ruling forces in Georgia and Ukraine have quickly, and without too much opposition, rejected the ideological legacy of marxism-leninism. The Communist Party of Ukraine remained widely popular throughout the 1990s but was kept continuously out of power. Elements of the political legacy have left deeper traces. The type of communist rule - patrimonial communism - that Kitschelt et al. (1999) argue was prevalent in the Soviet Union, helps to explain the adoption of strong presidential rule in Georgia and Ukraine as well as the ubiquity of patronage and neopatrimonialism (March 2006: 343). Regarding the institutional legacy, D'Anieri (2007: 81) notes that institutional continuity and little turnover in elites have inhibited a more decisive break with the past. Georgia and Ukraine, moreover, ratified their post-communist constitutions only in 1995 and 1996, respectively. The systematic corruption, rule-breaking, and clientelism that were rife in the governance of Soviet Georgia, finally, are found to have been continued after 1991 (Wheatley 2005: 24). The socioeconomic legacy of the Soviet Union necessitated drastic economic reforms in the early post-communist years. These reforms were poorly managed (Ukraine) or hardly managed at all (Georgia) and were complicated by far-reaching economic retraction. Ramifications of the cultural legacy of leninism are discussed separately below.

**Political culture and value systems**

Popular values and political and civic culture have for long been seen as important variables in political regime outcomes (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1990; Putnam 1993), though the weight of values is also contested (Jackman and Miller 1996; Muller and Seligson 1994). The relationship between values and regime outcome is a chicken-and-egg question: do the right values produce democracy
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005) or does democracy produce values that help sustain democracies (Muller and Seligson 1994)? Political culture, a poorly defined concept (Formisano 2000; Johnson 2003), is shaped by, among other things, interpersonal trust, popular trust in political and administrative institutions, belief in democracy, and civic participation. When societies display low scores on these variables, they are thought to be less likely to be or to become democracies. According to Jowitt (1991: 13), the leninist legacy includes 'a ghetto political culture that views the state with deep-seated suspicion; a distrustful society where people habitually hoard information, goods, and goodwill, and share them with only a few intimates; a widespread penchant for rumormongering that undercuts sober public discourse; and an untried, often apolitical leadership, barely familiar with and often disdainful of the politician's vocation'. Hanson (1997: 232) similarly refers to a 'distinctive late Leninist culture of cynicism and alienation from the public sphere'. The actuality of these observations is confirmed by value surveys. Georgians and Ukrainians tend to trust only a narrow circle of relatives and acquaintances while distrusting fellow citizens (Panina 2005: 40-1; Sapsford and Abbott 2006: 63). Especially before the Revolutions, trust in political institutions (the president, government, parliament, etc.) was abysmally low (CEORG 2004; Gutbrod 2006: 43). At the same time, Georgians and Ukrainians do support the principles of democracy and increasingly reject authoritarian rule (Haerpfer 2008; IRI et al. 2007: 48). Finally, civic participation, including membership of political parties, by international comparison, is low (Carson 2000; Howard 2003).

**Nation-building and state-building**

The 'transition' to democracy has often been cast as a dual process of political reforms and economic reforms. A number of states in the post-communist world, especially in the Western Balkans and the former Soviet Union, for the first time experienced modern statehood and had to cope with questions that flowed from this. For these states, coming to terms with their newfound stateness constituted the third element in what has been termed their 'triple transition' (Offe 2004). State-building requires first and foremost that the legal borders of the state are not disputed by any large domestic grouping. This requirement has not been met by Georgia, which as a newly independent state lost control over two of its regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Furthermore, for a number of years until 2004 the region of Adjara was ruled as a de facto independent state, albeit one that did not seek formal independence. At least partly responsible for Georgia’s woes was the territorial-administrative structure that was inherited from Soviet Georgia (Duffy Toft 2000). While the loss of two regions has not necessarily been a constraint on democratization, restoring ‘territorial integrity’ has been a major political issue throughout the post-communist years.
In addition to establishing fixed and undisputed borders, some authors contend that nation-building is an equally important task for new states. In a seminal article, Rustow (1970) noted that some degree of national integration has to be accomplished for democracy to be consolidated. Nation-building should limit cultural diversity, which is often seen as being an obstacle to democratization, especially when diversity stems from ethnic differences (Horowitz 1985; Roeder 1999). Diversity in Ukraine is manifested in an ethnic cleavage (through a large Russian minority), a linguistic cleavage (Russian and Ukrainian), different cultural and ideological outlooks ('Eastern Slavic' against ethnic Ukrainian) and, most crucially, regional differences in voting patterns, with the greatest distinction between the eastern and Western oblasti. Sasse (2001) argues that regional diversity not only causes trouble, but as well has contributed to political stability by balancing opposing political interests. From the conviction that its diversity nonetheless presents a constraint on Ukraine’s development, Kuzio (2001) has intimated that active nation-building should be undertaken as a fourth task of Ukraine’s transition. By contrast, other authors advocate the promotion of a state-nation rather than a nation-state model, along the lines of equally diverse states such as Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland (Stepan 2005) and the promotion of an inclusive, civic national identity rather than an ethnic national identity (Szporluk 2000; Wilson 2002a).

Constitutional design and electoral legislation
Georgia was a presidential republic until the Rose Revolution, after which, through the introduction of the post of prime-minister, executive-legislative relations formally became semi-presidential. Ukraine has had semi-presidential government all along since 1991. Until 2006, when constitutional amendments entered into force that had been agreed upon during the Orange Revolution, most power was concentrated in the presidency, while afterwards powers between the president and the prime minister were more balanced. In terms of the actual distribution of power, Georgia throughout the post-communist period and Ukraine until 2006 have been ‘superpresidential’ (Fish 2005: 224-44; Ishiyama and Kennedy 2001), meaning simply that the presidency was by far the most powerful institution.

It is widely argued that political arrangements with a strong legislature fare better at consolidating democracy and accommodating conflict than presidential regimes (Bunce 2000; Foweraker and Landman 2002; Norris 2008). Presidential regimes can excessively concentrate power in the presidency, provide disincentives for stable party development, have a tendency to personalize politics, and are prone to incite conflict due to the winner-take-all nature of the presidential contest and the fact that the
presidential term is fixed (Linz 1990; Fish 2006). Against these arguments, some authors maintain that presidentialism does not necessarily bode ill for democratization (Horowitz 1990; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). The perils associated with strong presidential rule have been clearly discernable in Georgia and Ukraine. In Ukraine specifically, long-lasting clashes between president and parliament have been common. In both states, presidents have abused executive power and evoked irreconcilable opposition. Also, as the next chapter will discuss in detail, the weakness of party development in Georgia and Ukraine is partly explained by strong presidentialism. Considering the drawbacks of presidentialism, Ukraine has been wise to cut the powers of the president after the Revolution, resulting in a more balanced distribution of powers between president and the prime minister, and a stronger legislature. One of the first measures in Georgia after Saakashvili assumed the presidency was to install a prime minister, but at the same to further enhance presidential power, so that Georgia is now even more ‘superpresidential’ than before the Revolution (Fairbanks 2004: 118).

All elections in Georgia since 1992 and two parliamentary elections in Ukraine before the Orange Revolution have been conducted according to a mixed system, combining national party list voting and single member districts (SMDs). As with the perils of strong presidential rule, a majority of scholarly research finds that a large degree of proportionality is better suited for states moving away from authoritarianism, especially in ‘plural societies’ (Hoffman 2005; Lijphart 1995; Norris 2008). Among other things, the first-past-the-post principle in SMD races tends to personalize electoral campaigns. Moreover, SMD elections are more likely to be fraudulent than MMD elections (Birch 2007). Most negative consequences flowing from a mixed electoral system, as the next chapter will argue, are related to weak party development. While the electoral system remained unchanged in Georgia after the Rose Revolution, SMD voting has been abandoned in Ukraine in favor of party list voting for all seats in the legislature.

The economy
A further explanation for why Georgia and Ukraine did not complete a transition to democracy is found in economic factors. Severe economic contraction in the first years of independence led to a marked decrease in per capita income and GDP, rendering Georgia and Ukraine poor countries in comparison with most democracies, as well as in comparison with Russia. In 1999, Ukrainian GDP stood at 37% of the 1989 level (Prizel 2002: 365). From that moment, the economy recovered fast, with GDP growing at an average annual rate of 7% between 2000 and 2007 (Pleines 2008: 1179). The
Georgian economy was hit even harder. Reportedly, during the turmoil of 1992-1993 GDP decreased by eighty per cent (Papava and Tokmazishvili: 27). From the mid-1990s, subsequently, the Georgian economy began to grow at a fast rate. Still, in 2005 52% of Georgians were reported to live below the poverty line (Jones 2006: 35), against 29% of Ukrainians in 2008 (Gorobets 2008: 95).

The once widespread belief that a certain level of economic development is a prerequisite for democratization has been replaced by a more nuanced view on the relation between economic development and democracy. At a minimum, it is now accepted that high per capita income increases the likelihood that democracy is sustained (Bunce 2000: 707). Considering the low per capita income of Georgia and Ukraine, their chance to sustain democracy from this perspective seems small in comparison. Two related phenomena which have had an adverse effect on democratization are corruption and the interwovenness of state governance and the economy. These phenomena can be seen both as obstacles to democratization and as a consequence of the shortage of democratization. Georgia in 1999 was ranked eighty-fourth in a sample of ninety-nine states by Transparency International in its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (McFaul 2006: 171). Ukraine took the eighty-third position out of ninety-one in 2001 in the same index (Birch 2003: 525). Under Shevardnadze, four groups were seen as controlling most political and economic resources at the same time (Wheatley 2005: 110). In Ukraine under Kuchma, similarly, there were ‘five or six economic clans that enjoyed a close relationship with the president’ (Puglisi 2003: 114). The Kuchma regime rested partially on its control over the economy (D’Anieri 2007). The interwovenness of the economic and political spheres in Georgia and Ukraine entailed a large measure of state capture, the situation ‘when powerful groups buy influence and shape the laws to their benefit’, at the expense of responsible, good governance (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002: 29).

The international dimension

Democracy promotion and assistance, discussed later on in this chapter, is the most visible, though not necessarily the most potent international factor related to the prospect of democracy in individual states. Variables lying outside the domestic realm that can have an impact on the chances of democracy include cross-national diffusion (or ‘contagion’); different types of linkage besides mere geographical proximity; and leverage, understood as the possibility to exert influence over foreign states or actors. The overarching concepts of linkage and leverage collectively subsume both democracy promotion and democracy assistance.29
The fact that democracies tend to exist in geographical clusters suggests that a diffusion effect between adjacent states is at play in democratization or the preservation of democracy (Gleditsch 2006). Examples of authoritarian states surrounded by democratic states, and vice versa, are rare. Macroquantitative studies indeed reveal a correlation between geographical proximity to democratic states and democratization (Coppedge and Brinks 2006; Wejnert 2005). Ukraine in this regard has been in an ambiguous position, located quite literally between the successful cases of democratization of Central and Eastern Europe, and two cases of clear failure of democratization, Russia and Belarus. Georgia’s location, outside Europe or on its farthest southeastern border, and in the largely undemocratically governed Caucasus (both North and South), has been a disadvantage. Considering the even more doomed geography of a democratic state such as Mongolia (Fish 1998; Fritz 2008), however, this factor does not necessarily rule out democratization. Geographic proximity is a strong determinant of the degree of linkage to foreign states and IGOs. The extent of linkage, in the form of, among others things, information flows, transnational civil society, international travel and trade, and intergovernmental ties, correlates with the prospects of democratization. Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) find that competitive authoritarian states with extensive linkage to the West are much more likely to undergo democratization than states without such linkage.

With respect to the extent of linkage to the West, Georgia and Ukraine have been, in a cross-national comparison of the post-communist world, in an intermediate category: they benefit from less linkage than CEE states, largely due to a greater distance to the West and the absence of an EU membership perspective, but are certainly more linked to the West than Central Asia, and arguably also Armenia and Azerbaijan. Linkage to the West in the case of Ukraine, and less so in the case of Georgia, has been offset by a great extent of linkage to Russia, which may have partly unmade the possibly positive effects from linkage to the West. In the latter years of the Kuchma regime, increasingly warm ties with Russia compensated for the icy relations with the West. During the presidential elections in 2004 and on other occasions, Russia has sought to directly influence political outcomes in Ukraine (Petrov and Ryabov 2006). Also, according to various sources, Russia has taken punitive measures, foremost economic, vis-à-vis Georgia and Ukraine (e.g. Ambrosio 2007).

Undemocratic states can be vulnerable to a pressure to democratize, first, when they are linked with democratic states, and second, when these democratic states are able to exert leverage over the undemocratic states. One of the most visible instruments of leverage is a policy of conditionality. As the experience of EU accession of Central and Eastern European states has demonstrated, conditionality can be very effective in
inducing actors to comply with given norms, rules, and policies (Schimmelfennig 2007; Vachudova 2002). Since Georgia and Ukraine have lacked any perspective on accession to the EU and NATO during most of the post-communist period, the potential of conditionality there has not been tested. The example of other former Soviet republics shows that membership in the Council of Europe and OSCE do not have the capacity to instill democratic values on member states. Western leverage over Georgia could be substantial, given the country’s small size, its economic feebleness, and the interest that is associated, domestically, with good ties with the West, and especially with integration into European IGOs and NATO. Due to the country’s larger size, population, and economy, the extent of leverage is somewhat smaller in relation to Ukraine, but still substantial. The West, however, has barely used available levers to impact on the political process in Georgia and Ukraine. There has been no push to integrate Georgia and Ukraine into IGOs with a credible policy of conditionality. Also, Western governments and IGOs have often been relatively uncritical of authoritarian tendencies in Georgia and Ukraine. As with linkage, a second source of leverage - Russia - arguably has counterbalanced the democratizing pressure that comes from Western leverage.

Agency
With the partial exception of institutional design and choices in nation-building and state-building, the explanations for the failure of democratization discussed so far in this section are by and large structure-oriented. Decisions made by elite actors, however, have helped to determine the course of political transformation in Georgia and Ukraine. The weight of agency has been particularly enhanced as a result of the high degree of concentration of power in the presidency in both states. Georgia’s first president Gamsakhurdia, who ruled as president from his election in May 1991 until he was deposed in a coup in January 1992, has been widely depicted as a colossal political failure. Probably most damaging were Gamsakhurdia ill-conceived economic policy and the measures, inspired by a radical nationalist sentiment, taken with respect to minorities, triggering the two armed clashes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia’s second president, Shevardnadze, and Ukraine’s first, Kravchuk, were both communist-era leaders, which has shaped their style of governing. Especially with regard to Ukraine, the relative lack of elite turnover since Soviet times has been seen as a constraint on democratization (D’Anieri 2007: 81). While Kravchuk was voted out of office in 1994, Shevardnadze stayed on until the Rose Revolution of 2003. The corruptive practices of patronage, clientelism and state capture which marked Shevardnadze’s presidency were also present when Shevardnadze led the Georgian Soviet Republic in the 1970s and 1980s. With Shevardnadze and Ukraine’s second
president Kuchma unwilling to allow a change of power through fair elections, regime turnover in the end could seemingly only transpire in the form of extra-constitutional action.

Both Georgia and Ukraine have experienced an inauspicious start as independent states, which may have locked the two countries in a dynamic which made a turn to democratization unlikely in the short term. The two states suffered very substantial socioeconomic degradation. Georgia, in addition, fought a number of armed conflicts with separatist regions and a brief civil war in which first president Gamsakhurdia was overthrown, while Ukraine went through years of relative political deadlock during which the adoption of a new constitution was put off and reforms were stalled. The inauspicious developments of the initial years resulted to a large measure from poor decisions by the countries’ leaders. Kuchma’s and Shevardnadze’s self-interested advocacy for strong executive power at the expense of the legislature, moreover, resulted in the type of executive-legislative relations which, as argued above, facilitated authoritarian persistence.

Conclusion
As the next chapter will demonstrate, the prolonged existence of semi-authoritarian rule in Georgia and Ukraine has had direct implications for the types of political parties that have occupied the political playing field over the years. This, in turn, has helped to suffocate the potential of successful norm diffusion through political party assistance. A palette of factors, both proximate and remote in time, both structural and hinging on agency, both domestic and international, help to explain why Ukraine, at least until 2005, and Georgia have not gone past the stage of less-than-democratic government. A few of the constraining factors appear to have been remedied in Ukraine as an outcome of the Orange Revolution: most significantly, executive power has been curbed, and major political elite actors from both the opposition and the ruling forces now adhere to democratic norms. Concomitantly, Ukraine’s performance in Freedom House’s and other ratings has improved. Most of the factors which constrained democratization in Georgia under Shevardnadze, on the other hand, are still in place.

3.3. REGIME CHANGE THROUGH ELECTORAL REVOLUTION
In 2003 in Georgia and in 2004 in Ukraine, incumbent regimes were involuntarily removed from power in the aftermath of fraudulent elections. The Rose and Orange Revolutions occurred according to a largely similar pattern: following accusations by
the political opposition of electoral fraud in elections - parliamentary in Georgia, presidential in Ukraine - large and protracted street protests erupted, at which the opposition demanded a fair vote count and then government resignation. After weeks of mounting domestic and international pressure, the regimes were eventually forced to step down, after which new elections were held that were won by the opposition. Because of a striking similarity between the Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and other instances of regime change, most notably in Yugoslavia in 2000 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and because of an alleged diffusion effect connecting the Revolutions, these events have often been collectively termed ‘electoral revolutions’. The electoral revolutions were widely expected, particularly in the West, to have ‘liberalizing outcomes’ (Howard and Roessler 2006). Whereas liberalizing outcomes have indeed been observable in the cases of Ukraine and Yugoslavia (Serbia), liberalization of the political domain has been less forthcoming in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Relevant to the topic of this thesis, the events surrounding the electoral revolutions have raised political and scholarly questions about the impact of international factors, including democracy promotion and its subareas such as party assistance. Chapters five and six provide information on the activities around the Revolutions of the main actors involved in party assistance.

An already long line of scholarly work has sought to contribute to an explanation of the occurrence of the electoral revolutions. Most accounts can be distinguished along two dimensions: first, emphasis on the societal origin against the elite origin of the Revolutions; and second, emphasis on the weight of international factors at play in the Revolutions, versus explanation of the Revolutions from domestic factors (see table two).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>societal origin</th>
<th>elite origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>domestic factors</strong></td>
<td>- civil society capacity (detecting electoral fraud, mobilizing voters and protesters)</td>
<td>- divisions within the regime and coercive apparatus, aggravated by ‘lame duck syndrome’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- civic participation and mobilization, most notably by youth movements</td>
<td>- some degree of opposition unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>international factors</strong></td>
<td>- Western support of domestic civil society</td>
<td>- Western support to opposition parties and politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- diffusion effect, both purposeful (imitation) and indirect (contagion)</td>
<td>- diplomatic pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- mediation, conflict resolution by Western actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Accounts of the Rose and Orange Revolutions
On the domestic side, much has been made of the remarkable extent of grassroots
civic activity (Demeš and Forbrig 2007; Diuk 2006). Civil society organizations proved
effective in exposing electoral fraud, monitoring the media, mobilizing voters, etc. In
addition, larger numbers of people than expected, especially in Ukraine, turned out
onto the streets to demonstrate, creating the impression of opposition strength both
to the regime and to outsiders. The activity of youth movements has particularly been
ascribed a crucial role in firing up protests and motivating young people to challenge
the regime (Bunce and Wolchik 2006b; Kuzio 2006). Explanations that emphasize the
role of elite actors point to divisions within the regime and within the coercive state
apparatus against some degree of unity among the opposition. In Ukraine, president
Kuchma was to leave office at the time of the elections, to be replaced by his hand-
picked successor. In Georgia, president Shevardnadze was nearing the end of his last
term. Hale (2006) suggests that the nearing end of the presidents’ last term lowered
the loyalty to the regime of elite actors. Division within the coercive apparatus of the
regime meant that police and armed forces were not ready to apply force to defend
the regime (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006). The failure of the Kuchma and
Shevardnadze regimes to unite elites, and division within their coercive apparatuses
were clear symptoms of weak state capacity, which more generally is seen as a driver
of regime breakdown (Levitsky and Way forthcoming; Way 2008). Against divisions
within the regime, the Western-oriented democratic opposition in Ukraine was able to
nominate a single candidate for the presidency, a feat that was probably key to the
success of the Revolution, as it has been in other cases of regime change (Howard and
Roessler 2006). Large parts of the Georgian opposition, by contrast, united only after
street protests against the regime had already started.

The contribution of Western governments and international organizations has in part
consisted of democracy assistance efforts in the years preceding the Revolutions.
These efforts were sometimes specifically targeted at enforcing regime change, but
more often they were not: in any event, they did strengthen the civil society
organizations that were at the forefront in the Revolutions (Wilson 2006). A second
international factor in the Revolutions concerns diffusion from one Revolution to the
next. In addition to an ideational contagion effect, there are clear indications that the
revolutionaries in Ukraine took cues from previous successful Revolutions.
Revolutionaries sought to imitate or emulate the ‘model’ of these Revolutions
(Beissinger 2007). Furthermore, revolutionaries have formed transnational activist
networks with the aim of passing over knowledge and techniques to opposition
movements in states that had not yet experienced regime change (Bunce and Wolchik
2006a). Finally, international factors have also impacted on actions and decisions by
elite actors in Georgia and Ukraine. Against Russia’s open endorsement of the Yanukovich candidacy, some Western actors supported Yushchenko in his bid, while most actors that were more bound politically, maintained a neutral position, at least officially. A number of high-ranking, mostly U.S. politicians visited Georgia and Ukraine and met with the country’s leadership in the months ahead of the elections to advocate a fair election process. Also, during the days of political crisis Western actors frequently had contact with the main players in the events to promulgate a non-violent solution of the conflict. Lastly, European actors took the lead in the mediation effort that led to a compromise solution to the conflict in Ukraine, and eventually made Yushchenko’s election possible (Pifer 2007). A necessary condition of success in the Revolutions has been the pluralistic, semi-authoritarian, rather than repressive authoritarian nature of the regimes undergoing regime change. The Revolutions could occur because the regime did not block alternative political assembly and a degree of media pluralism, and did not systematically or widely repress opposition politicians. Realizing the potential of electoral revolution in these semi-authoritarian settings, governments in other post-Soviet states have taken measures to inoculate their regimes from ouster by further curbing political rights (Silitski 2004).

3.4. DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE

Financial and technical assistance to Georgia and Ukraine aimed at promoting democracy has followed a largely similar pattern after 1991. During the 1990s Georgia and Ukraine emerged as significant recipients of European and U.S funds. Both countries received large amounts of U.S. assistance relative to other countries, worldwide and in the FSU. Some sources note that Georgia has been the third largest recipient of overall US aid per capita after Israel and Egypt (Lieven 2001; Matveeva 2003: 8), another that Ukraine has been the third largest recipient, again after Israel and Egypt, in absolute terms (Kubicek 1999: 21). A likely reason for the large volume of funds to Georgia is the favorable reputation that president Shevardnadze enjoyed in the West at least until the late 1990s (Lieven 2001; Metreveli and Hakobyan 2001). A strong Ukrainian lobby in the U.S is seen behind the large amounts of aid to Ukraine, particularly between 1996-1998 (Tarnoff 2003: 11). Partially driving the high levels of U.S. aid to Georgia and Ukraine also was a barely warranted degree of optimism about the countries’ prospects of democratization. According to a 1996 USAID document, for instance, “President Eduard Shevardnadze enjoys great respect in America originating from the time he served as foreign minister of the Soviet Union and his outspoken support of democratic development since his return to Georgia. In 1992, he has
presided over a halt to civil conflict and the beginning of notable democratic and economic reforms. Georgia's elections last November were relatively free and fair, and the new parliament is active and reformist.” (USAID 1996: 7-8). Similarly, 'the Clinton administration stubbornly continued to insist that Ukraine was making "progress" which warranted generous American aid’ (Prizel 2002: 382). In order to secure further aid, the efficacy of democracy aid programs were sometimes aggrandized: “USAID overstates the success of democratization in Georgia to maintain federal appropriations levels; USAID-funded organizations overstate their successes to USAID; and local NGOs overstate their successes to their international NGO partners” (King 2001: 103).

Until 2007, Georgia and Ukraine were recipients of EU Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). TACIS and similar instruments in other parts of the European neighborhood were renamed European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument in 2007. Georgia and Ukraine have also been eligible to funds from the EU administered European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Around the turn of the century, optimism regarding democracy in Georgia and Ukraine faded among donors. From that moment, policy documents more often speak critically of the governments’ reform record, a shift in outlook that has been reflected in democracy aid programs. 31 Particular damage to the reputation of Ukraine’s government was done by the Gongadze murder, in which Kuchma and his entourage were implicated, and by arms sales to Iraq. The inability to stem corruption was seen as the biggest flaw of the Georgian government in these years. Both U.S. and EU actors have claimed a significant role in the occurrence of the Revolutions. EU foreign policy advisor Robert Cooper is reputed to have said that the EU has ‘done regime change’ in Ukraine through its diplomatic effort (Youngs 2006: 116). A USAID publication has it that ‘the United States has been a major contributor to recent peaceful democratic transitions in Georgia and the Ukraine’ (USAID 2006a). Another USAID publication details U.S. contributions to instances of democratic breakthrough in different parts of the world, including also Georgia and Ukraine (USAID 2005). Figures two and three display tendencies in USG expenditures on Democracy and Governance (figure two) and Electoral Assistance and Political Party Support programs (figure three) from 1992 until 2004.
Figure 2. Total USAID investment for all Democracy and Governance (DG) programs in millions of constant 1995 US dollars in the NIS. Amounts of funding are from Finkel et al. (2006-2007).

Figure two displays the bulk of USG expenditures on democracy assistance in the newly independent states of the FSU. Similar data on the exact amounts of democracy assistance by the EU and their member states are not readily available. As this figure reveals, the size of DG aid to Ukraine has been comparable to that of Russia since 1997. Trailing behind Russia and Ukraine are the other FSU states. Despite being one of the smallest of these states, Georgia is still among the biggest recipients, during some years coming in third after Russia and Ukraine.
As for U.S. electoral assistance and political party support, Ukraine and Russia received comparable amounts of assistance from 1997 until 2001 (see figure three). From that year, remarkably, assistance to Ukraine started to grow fast, leaving all other states, including Russia, behind. The increase is the more remarkable since overall USAID investment in Ukraine after 1999 fell sharply year by year. These figures, obviously, could give rise to suggestions that the U.S. worked towards changing the Kuchma regime. Electoral and political party assistance to Georgia similarly increased substantially in the two years leading up to the Rose Revolution. As with DG assistance overall, Georgia has often been the third biggest recipient among the NIS, during some years even surpassing Russia.

The Revolutions in 2003 and 2004 induced new optimism regarding the prospects of democratization in Georgia and Ukraine. USAID funding for Georgia in the immediate years after the Rose Revolution increased markedly, before falling to below pre-Revolution levels, consistent with the overall trend of decreasing USAID funds for the FSU (Tarnoff 2003; Tarnoff 2007). After the Revolution, Georgia was hailed by U.S. president Bush as a ‘beacon of liberty’, and a special Support to the New Government of Georgia program was installed, fed by the assumption ‘that the Government of Georgia has made a concerted effort to bring in democratic principles’ (USAID 2006b). In a less sanguine assessment, another 2006 USAID document notes that ‘despite remarkable progress, a democratic deficit persists’ (USAID 2006c: 4). USAID funding for Ukraine increased for only one year, and insignificantly, after the Revolution (Tarnoff 2003; Tarnoff 2007). Reflecting more intense relations with the EU within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy, Tacis and ENPI funds to Georgia and Ukraine increased after the Revolutions,32 an increase that, unlike the increase of U.S. funds, was sustained.

3.5. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT

Besides non-profit assistance provided by specialized organizations, political parties are exposed to a number of other external influences. These external influences, together with party assistance, constitute the ‘international dimension’ of political party development. The most obvious but least apparent forms of influence are demonstration and contagion: parties in Georgia and Ukraine are influenced by political ideologies that originate from party politics in Western democracies, and by...
models of party organization that are equally associated with parties in Western democracies. The fact that many parties bear names similar to the names of parties in Western democracies - liberal-democratic, socialist, republican, etc. - while in reality these parties are often ideologically diffuse, points to a demonstration effect. Also, the way parties are formally organized, including the existence of procedures of internal democracy, seems to implicate that Western models of party organization and operation are imitated. It is of course difficult to establish the precise diffusion mechanism at play in the imitation of Western models. Other, more tangible types of external influence on parties - association with transnational party organizations, fraternal contacts with parties in the post-communist world, and for-profit consultancy - are discussed separately in this section.

Transnational party organization

437 political parties worldwide are members of one of five party internationals, which unite parties of analogous ideological stripes, and offer a platform for dialogue and exchange (Hällhag 2008). Next to the party internationals with their global span, European transnational party organizations comprise parties from member states of the European Union, and reach out to parties in the EU’s neighborhood by granting these parties observer status or a different form of affiliation (Desoldato 2002). Both the party internationals and the European parties have youth wings. Parties in Georgia and Ukraine generally have been eager to join or become affiliated with the transnational party organizations, and some have been successful in this regard. Of Ukrainian parties, Batkivshchyna, Our Ukraine, and NRU have observer status in the European People’s Party; the CDU is a member of the Centrist Democrat International; and SPU and SDPU are ‘consultative parties’ in the Socialist International (SI). Remarkably, SPU changed its official ideological position from ‘socialist’ to ‘social-democratic’ in order to become eligible for inclusion in the SI. Of Georgian parties, the Republican Party is a member of the European Liberal Democrats and has observer status in the Liberal International; the Christian-Democratic Union of Georgia, the National Democratic Party, and the People’s Party are members of the Centrist Democrat International; the New Rights Party is an associate member in the International Democrat Union; and the United National Movement has observer status in the European People’s Party. Furthermore, a relatively large number of youth wings of political parties and independent political youth movements have joined the youth wings of transnational party organizations. Some parties seem to have put their interest in joining the transnational party organizations before the decision to which of the party families they are closest ideologically or ideationally. The United National Movement of Georgia initially sought to join the Liberal International, but then
changed course to affiliate with the European People’s Party. Batkivshchyna in Ukraine, similarly, first attempted to join the Socialist International, and later acquired close contacts with the European People’s Party.

German and Dutch political foundations have played a role in lobbying on behalf of Georgian and Ukrainian parties for membership in the transnational party organizations, or have provided their partners with useful contacts within these organizations. For the *Stiftungen*, lobbying for fraternal parties is considered part of *Parteiförderung* (support for one specific party), distinct from *Parteienförderung* (assistance to several parties at once) (Saxer 2006a: 13). Until some time ago, the *Stiftungen* only assisted parties that had already gained membership in one of the party internationals. In recent decades, this criterion has been loosened, probably because the *Stiftungen* have started working in a large number of countries where membership in the party internationals was or still is rare. Representatives of the *Stiftungen* on the ground can now select parties for assistance independently, and are no longer bound to work intensively with parties that are in the party internationals.

The practical use of (partial) membership in transnational party organizations is not always evident. Among the reasons why association with the transnational party organizations is nonetheless sought are: first, association lends prestige, which is recognized both by other parties and by voters; abroad, association adds respectability, opening doors which otherwise remain closed; and lastly, during the foreign trips that result from association, party leaders and activists become acquainted with how parties are run elsewhere, and thus learn skills that can be implemented to the benefit of their own parties. A specific reason was given by an informant from Batkivshchyna who remarked that contacts with European transnational party organizations will be helpful for Ukraine’s integration into Europe once the party’s leader, Tymoshenko, is president.

*Fraternal ties in the post-communist world*

Besides the contacts that have been established with transnational party organizations, most relevant parties in Ukraine, and a few in Georgia, have developed fraternal relations with parties in the geographical neighborhood of Ukraine and Georgia. A look at the choice of partners sheds some light on the political outlook of parties. Notably, since the Rose and Orange Revolutions a particular increase in contacts between Georgian and Ukrainian parties has taken place. The People’s Movement of Ukraine (NRU) has informal contacts with the Belarussian National Front, the New Rights Party of Georgia, and an unspecified party in Moldova. Our Ukraine has informal contacts with like-minded parties in Moldova and Latvia, and with the
PORA is related with the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) party, with the Other Russia opposition movement, and with opposition parties in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The Communist Party of Ukraine, reportedly, has maintained relations with (ruling) parties in Cuba and China, and with communist successor parties in Russia and Serbia. The Party of the Regions is involved in meetings with representatives from the ruling One Russia and Yeni Azerbaijan parties, while its youth wing has relations with One Russia’s and Yeni Azerbaijan’s youth wings, and with a youth movement that supports Belarusian president Lukashenka. The youth wing of the New Rights Party of Georgia, finally, has established relations with political youth movements in Ukraine. Apart from the symbolic value of these relations, and a mere exchange of experience and opinions, informants have not indicated reasons why their parties benefit from the ties with fraternal parties in neighboring states.

For-profit aid
Soliciting the services of foreign and domestic political strategists has become common practice for political parties in Ukraine in recent years. Since the political strategists shy away from publicity, and parties are often not keen to digress on the consultancy services that they solicit, little reliable information is available about these activities. A general trend has been that Russian agents have been partially replaced by Western, mostly American agents, especially after the Orange Revolution (Khmara 2007). American consultants have not only advised Ukrainian parties on the conduct of electoral campaigns and image improvement, but have as well sometimes promoted their political interests in the United States. The more palatable image and Western-style type of campaigning adopted by the Party of the Regions since the Revolution are ascribed to the work of the Davis, Manafort and Freedman consultancy firm (Page 2006). Because the Party of the Regions was already involved with the Davis, Manafort and Freedman firm, the party allegedly rejected to receive assistance from NDI for some time. According to different sources, the firm previously consulted the governments of a number of (semi-)authoritarian Third World states (Nayem 2007: Voitsekhovskii 2006). Paul Manafort, leader of the firm’s activities in Ukraine, has also been an adviser to former presidential candidate John McCain (Jacoby and Simpson 2008).

The BYuT electoral coalition has hired a number of American consultancy firms, including TD International, the Glover Park Group, and Dezenhall Resources (McKenna 2007). Instead of providing advice on political strategy, TD International has mainly lobbied for BYuT in the United States, and was heavily involved in a visit of BYuT
leader Tymoshenko to the U.S. in 2007 (Lynch 2007; McKenna 2007). Also, Russian political strategist Aleksei Sitnikov, head of the Image Contact consultancy company, is said to have worked with BYuT (Khmara 2007). Working for the American consultancy firm Aristotle Inc., NDI chief of party from 2002 until 2005 Andreas Katsouris advised former ally of the Kuchma regime Viktor Medvedchuk for some time after he left NDI (Voitsekhovskii 2006). Aristotle Inc.’s links with Medvedchuk are remarkable because the firm has also taken credit for lending consultancy services to the 2004 opposition election campaign. Katsouris’ successor as NDI chief of party in Ukraine, David Dettman, worked for Aristotle Inc. prior to his engagement with NDI.

The only well-documented case of Western consultancy to a political party in Georgia is the involvement of American political strategist Michael Murphy with the New Rights Party in the campaign for the 2003 parliamentary elections. Among other things, Murphy, who has also worked for electoral campaigns of Jeb Bush, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and John McCain, advised the New Rights Party on how to position itself in the campaign, and, after the example of American election campaigns, proposed a bus tour throughout the country (Areshidze 2007: 84-9). Since Murphy’s tactics did not resonate well with part of the party’s leadership and with party activists, Murphy’s advice was barely implemented, and the consultancy was suspended before the end of the campaign (Mitchell 2008: 55-6).