Ethno-territorial conflict and coexistence in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Fereydan

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Chapter Seven

Analysis: Searching for Explanations

In Chapter 6 analytical descriptions were presented of eight cases of ethno-territorial conflict. The present chapter aims at systematic analyses of all ethno-territorial encounters by statistical and qualitative comparative analyses in order to answer our main research questions: “Why are certain ethno-territorial encounters afflicted by conflict and others are not?”; “What are the conditions that lead to ethno-territorial conflict?”; and “To what extent can the mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration explain the emergence of ethno-territorial conflict?” To answer these questions, the following explaining conditions and corresponding hypotheses (in italics) were selected:

- Ethno-political subordination (S):
  The chances of ethno-territorial conflict are higher in ethno-territorial encounters in which one group is ethno-politically subordinated to the other than in ethno-territorial encounters in which no group is ethno-politically subordinated to the other.

- Religious difference (R):
  The chances of ethno-territorial conflict are higher in ethno-territorial encounters in which the groups adhere to different religions than in ethno-territorial encounters in which both groups adhere to the same religion.

- Linguistic difference (L):
  The chances of ethno-territorial conflict are higher in ethno-territorial encounters in which the two groups speak native languages that are not intimately related to each other than in ethno-territorial encounters in which their native languages are intimately related.

- Traumatic peak experience (T):
  The chances of ethno-territorial conflict are higher in ethno-territorial encounters in which at least one group has had a traumatic
peak experience than in ethno-territorial encounters in which neither
group has had such an experience.

- Autonomous setting (A):
The chances of ethno-territorial conflict are higher in ethno-
territorial encounters in which both groups are titulars, at the same
or different levels of hierarchy, than in ethno-territorial encounters in
which one group is not titular or both are not.

- Titular demographic dominance (D):
The chances of ethno-territorial conflict are higher in ethno-
territorial encounters in which both groups constitute the majority of
the population in their respective titular territories than in ethno-
territorial encounters in which one group does not constitute the
majority or both do not.

- Contiguity to titular kin (G):
The chances of ethno-territorial conflict are higher in ethno-
territorial encounters, located in a country/republic, which is
territorially contiguous to the titular territory of a kinfolk of one or
both groups than ethno-territorial encounters where no such
contiguity exists.

- Transborder dominance (B):
The chances of ethno-territorial conflict are higher in ethno-
territorial encounters, located in a republic/country, in which the
ethno-politically subordinated group is contiguous to a neighboring
titular territory of their kinfolk whose number is at least three times
larger than the number of their overlords in their host
republic/country than where no such transborder dominance exists.

- Mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M):
The chances of ethno-territorial conflict are higher in ethno-
territorial encounters located in areas that can be typified as a mosaic
type of ethno-geographic configuration than ethno-territorial
encounters located in areas which can be typified as other types of
ethno-geographical configuration.

To answer the research questions (and test the hypotheses), a dataset of
129 ethno-territorial encounters was constructed. On the basis of
fieldwork, literature, and governmental and non-governmental statistical
data, this dataset was filled. Needless to say, there were many problems and many arbitrary decisions were taken.\textsuperscript{189}

The 14\textsuperscript{th} century Persian poet Hafez of Shiraz wrote: “\textit{Jang-e haftad-o do mellat hame-ra ozr be ne;, chon nadidand haqiqat rah-e afsane zadand}”. which can be interpreted roughly as follows: “Forget about the war between the 72 peoples; as they did not see the truth, they wandered in the myths”. Although not claiming to establish the absolute truth, this chapter attempts to uncover some explanations for the ethnic wars and show the falsity or veracity of many prevailing myths, such as “ethnically diverse regions are conflict-prone”, “minorities have a great risk of getting into conflict with their hosting state”, or “differences in religions causes wars between their adherents”.

The next section will present first a statistical testing of the hypotheses mentioned above, followed by a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Finally, the conclusions of both analyses will be summarized. Before that, the assumption that Central Eurasia, especially the Caucasus, is conflict-prone will be brought under scrutiny and discussed.

\textbf{The Myth of Shatterbelts} \textsuperscript{190}

Shatterbelts are regions of the world which are persistently afflicted by conflict and in which conflict and warfare are highly expected. Central Asia and particularly the Caucasus are regions in which many people have suffered greatly from ethno-territorial conflicts. Similar to the Balkans, Central Africa, the Horn of Africa, and West Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia are among the regions of the world which were afflicted by protracted and bloody conflicts in recent decades (Kaldor 1999: 128; Kaldor 2001:9). Central Asia and the Caucasus are regarded by many as conflict-prone regions (e.g. Huntington 1993; Huntington 1997; Kaldor 1999: 128; Kaldor 2001: 9; Kaplan 2000a; Kaplan 2000b; Longworth 1998; O’Loughlin & Raleigh 2008: 497; O’Sullivan 2001: 31-47; Salomons 2005: 21; Vichos & Karampampas 2011).

The vast majority of the conflicts in our study, and in the post-Soviet space in general, have emerged in the Caucasus. They represent five out of the eight ethno-territorial conflicts in our study and five out of the nine in the post-Soviet space in general—the Transnistrian conflict in

\textsuperscript{189} Mistakes in codifications may affect the results of statistical analyses only insignificantly and are unlikely to affect the results of Qualitative Comparative Analyses at all.

\textsuperscript{190} Discussing “Islam’s Bloody Borders”, Huntington mentions explicitly the Caucasus and Central Asia as fault-line wars, which are characterized as protracted and fatal (Huntington 1997: 253 and 255).
Moldova (Moldavia) is the only ethno-territorial conflict in the (post-)Soviet space outside the Caucasus or Central Asia.

O’Loughlin and Raleigh (2008: 497) explicitly call the Caucasus a shatterbelt region: “Shatterbelt regions, such as the Caucasus, are defined as areas with a globally significant natural resource, ethnic diversity, external intervention and a history of local conflict”. As written, this definition of shatterbelt is too broad. Very often different scholars, journalists, policymakers, etc. mean different things by the word shatterbelt.

Shatterbelt, meaning conflict-prone, is a relative concept. The Caucasus is more conflict-prone compared with most other regions of the world. Nevertheless, it is an exaggeration to label the Caucasus and Central Asia as shatterbelts if one looks at the number of ethno-geographical encounters, and hence potential cases of ethno-territorial conflicts, in these regions. Out of the total 129 ethno-territorial encounters, only eight (6.2%) are marked by ethno-territorial conflicts. Despite its ethno-religious similarities with the Caucasus, the Iranian “little Caucasus”, Fereydan, is free of ethno-territorial conflict. The proportion of conflicts as a percentage of total ethno-territorial encounters is rather modest in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Relatively fewer ethno-territorial encounters are afflicted by conflict in the Caucasus (6.3%) than in Central Asia (9.1%) (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1. Ethno-territorial encounters (E) and conflicts (C) in absolute and relative numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF E</th>
<th>NUMBER OF C</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF C IN TOTAL NUMBER OF E</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF C IN TOTAL NUMBER OF C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Caucasus</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fereydan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These percentages are similar to, and often do not exceed, the proportions of conflict in the many datasets which are used in peace and conflict studies. The proportion of armed conflicts as a percentage of total cases in different datasets using different definitions of armed conflict vary between 5.9% and 13.0% on an annual basis, and between 10.1% and 22.2% in a time period of 5 years (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005: 809, Table 3).
Testing the Explaining Conditions Separately

The first step in testing the hypotheses is to see whether there is any positive correlation between each condition and ethno-territorial conflict (C). As these conditions are dichotomous variables, their presence and absence are represented by 1 and 0, and hence the correlations can be calculated. In Table 7.2 the correlations between the variables and ethno-territorial conflict (C) are presented. Table 7.2 reveals that titular demographic dominance (D) correlates strongly and very significantly with ethno-territorial conflict (C). Transborder dominance (B) correlates rather weakly but significantly with ethno-territorial conflict (C). The correlations between ethno-territorial conflict (C) and ethno-political subordination (S) and autonomous setting (A) are weak but significant. The correlations between ethno-territorial conflict (C) and all other variables are weak and not significant at all.

Table 7.2. Correlations between ethno-territorial conflict (C) and independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>CORRELATION COEFFICIENT***</th>
<th>SIG. (2-TAILED)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-political subordination (S)</td>
<td>.229**</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious difference (R)</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic difference (L)</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traumatic peak experience (T)</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous setting (A)</td>
<td>.201*</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titular demographic dominance (D)</td>
<td>.706**</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity to ethnic kinfolk (G)</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transborder dominance (B)</td>
<td>.281**</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M)</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>.155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
The correlation coefficients Phi, Cramer’s V, and Pearson correlations measure the same when the variable is a dichotomous one.

Next, in order to test the effect of the selected conditions on ethno-territorial conflict, the ethno-territorial encounters that fulfil these conditions are compared with those that do not (Table 7.3).

All hypotheses prove to be valid: encounters that fulfil the condition have more chance of conflict than encounters that do not fulfil the condition. However, not all conditions seem to be equally important.

Titular demographic dominance (D) proves to be the most important condition: 83.3% of the encounters in which both ethno-territorial groups constitute the demographic majority in their respective
titular territories are afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict. Only 2.4% of the encounters without titular demographic dominance are afflicted by such conflict. A second important condition proves to be transborder dominance (B): 40% of the ethno-territorial encounters in which the ethno-politically subordinated group possesses transborder dominance are afflicted by conflict, while only 4.8% of ethno-territorial encounters in which it is absent are afflicted by such conflict.

The mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M) and linguistic difference (L) also prove to be important. While only 7.7% and 7.2% of the encounters in which, respectively, a mosaic configuration and linguistic difference are present are afflicted by conflict, no ethno-territorial encounters in which they are absent are afflicted by conflict. Below, the effects of each condition on ethno-territorial conflict will be discussed further. (All encounters are listed in Appendix 5.)

Table 7.3. Percentage of ethno-territorial conflict (C) in ethno-territorial encounters (E) in which a condition is absent and in which it is present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF C IN THE E IN WHICH THE CONDITION IS ABSENT</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF C IN THE E IN WHICH THE CONDITION IS PRESENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-political subordination (S)</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious difference (R)</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic difference (L)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traumatic peak experience (T)</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous setting (A)</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titular demographic dominance (D)</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity to ethnic kinfolk (G)</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transborder dominance (B)</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ethno-political subordination (S)**

The wars in the (post-)Soviet space—with the exception of the horizontal conflict between the Ossetians and Ingush over Prigorodny (Rezvani 2010) and the partial exception of the Tajikistani Civil War—are separatist wars fought by ethnic separatists, who in most cases are correctly classified as “ethnonationalists” by Barbara Harff and Robert Ted Gurr (2004: 23-25 and 198) and fit Gurr’s (1993; 1994; [ed.] 2000)
descriptions and phrases of “Peoples versus States”, “Peoples against States”, and “Minorities at Risk”.

Even though the (post-)Soviet regions are, or were, notorious for the salience of ethno-nationalism, still most minorities have not come into ethno-territorial conflict with their host states or “majorities” there in order to “liberate themselves”. Although most ethno-territorial conflicts are marked by the ethno-political subordination of one ethno-territorial group to the other—a vertical case in our terminology—not all cases of ethno-political subordination lead to ethno-territorial conflict.

**Religious difference (R)**

It is often said that in regions where different religions are practiced and adhered to, the chances of clashes between them are higher. The most prominent voice of this theory or assumption was the late Samuel Huntington (1993; 1997), the theoretician of the “Clash of Civilizations” and the author of a homonymous book. Huntington explicitly referred to the Caucasus as a region in which a fault line of civilizations exists and hence is conflict-prone. Huntington identified civilizations with religions, believing that most civilizations are built around a (world) religion and that major religions are the basis of at least one civilization. As his examples show, he regarded religious difference as a major conflict-generating factor.

The thesis of the “Clash of Civilizations” (i.e. religions) cannot be supported, neither in the Caucasus nor in other regions of this current study. The results of this study are consistent with Cornell’s (1998a: 61) statement that religion is not a decisive factor in the explanation of the Caucasian conflicts. Such a conclusion is also valid for the wider region covered in this study. Of the eight ethno-territorial conflicts, only half are marked by religious difference. The conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Gorno-Badakhshan (Pamiris in Tajikistan), Chechnya, and Prigorodny are between ethnic groups with different religions. The South Ossetian, Abkhazian, Uzbek-Tajik (in Tajikistan), and Kyrgyz-Uzbek (in Kyrgyzstan) conflicts are fought between ethnic groups that adhere to the same religion.

Examining all ethno-territorial encounters, the very weak effect of religious difference on ethno-territorial conflict becomes even clearer. While there are many encounters marked by religious difference, only a small proportion thereof are afflicted by conflict.

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in Harff & Gurr 2004: 197-204).

192 Somewhat similarly, Svensson (2007: 944) concludes: “Conflicts with parties belonging to different religious traditions are not more difficult to settle than conflicts where parties belong to the same religious tradition”.

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**Linguistic difference (L)**

A remarkable finding is that ethnic kinfolks, as measured by the intimacy between their languages, have not come into ethno-territorial conflicts with one another. All ethno-territorial conflicts, in all regions, are fought by ethnic groups whose native languages are not intimately close to each other. On the other hand, there are many cases of peaceful coexistence between groups that speak unrelated languages. Only a modest proportion of such encounters have come into conflict.

The reason behind this observation is certainly not inability to communicate due to language difference, because members of all ethnic groups, at least the young and middle-aged males, speak Russian and can communicate with each other. Moreover, because of our operationalization of the variable, speaking only intimately related languages is considered as no linguistic difference.

The lack of ethno-territorial conflict between ethnic groups with similar languages can be interpreted as the absence of ethno-territorial conflicts between ethnic kinfolks. In this study linguistic similarity is a very good indicator of ethnic kinship. The operationalization of linguistic difference in this study implies that those ethno-territorial encounters marked by no linguistic difference are encounters by ethnic groups whose languages are very intimately related. Therefore, only intimately related groups, i.e. ethnic kinfolks, do not fight with each other. Ethnic groups belonging to the same wider language family may fight. For example, both the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks speak Turkic languages. Nevertheless, their languages do not belong to the same branch and are not, therefore, intimately related.

In summary, it appears that although linguistic difference does not necessarily lead to ethno-territorial conflict, all ethno-territorial conflicts are fought by ethnic groups whose languages are dissimilar to each other. In addition, ethnic kinfolks—that is, those ethnic groups whose languages are intimately related—do not come into ethno-territorial conflict with each other. This observation is consistent with the ideas of primordialism and ethnic nepotism.

**Traumatic peak experience (T)**

Not all ethno-territorial encounters in which at least one group has experienced a traumatic peak experience are afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict. On the other hand, all ethno-territorial conflicts in the North Caucasus and one of the three in the South Caucasus are between ethno-territorial groups one of which has had a traumatic peak experience.
Although the effect of a traumatic recent past on the emergence of an ethno-territorial conflict cannot be totally disregarded, still a relatively small share of all such encounters marked by traumatic peak experience are afflicted by ethno-territorial encounters. Their share is, nevertheless, relatively larger in the North Caucasus than anywhere else. This is a result of the Stalin-era deportations of so many Muslim North Caucasian ethnic groups. Nevertheless, even there, not all traumatized peoples have come into conflict. Although the North Caucasus is marked by a significant number of “traumatic encounters”, it is not as much afflicted by conflict as one would have expected, most probably because of (the absence of) other conditions.

**Autonomous setting (A)**

In general two views exist on the effect of territorial autonomy on the emergence of ethno-territorial conflict. Many view it as a mitigating condition, while many others view it as a condition which enhances the probability of the emergence of ethno-territorial conflict. Referring to the discussion in the theoretical chapter of this book, it is more likely that in a context of a state in disarray (Van der Wusten & Knippenberg 2001), territorial autonomy rather enhances the chances of ethno-territorial conflict than reduces them. The Soviet Union in its last years of existence, after glasnost and perestroika, was politically and economically very unstable and could be regarded as a state in disarray. Consequently, it is expected theoretically that possession of territorial autonomy enhances the likelihood of the emergence of ethno-territorial conflicts.

According to Svante E. Cornell (1999; 2001; 2002a; 2002b), the possession of territorial autonomy enhances the probability of separatist wars in the former Soviet Union. Cornell (2002a) concluded, from the comparison of a limited number of the larger ethnic groups in the South Caucasus, that ethnic groups who possess territorial autonomy are more likely to engage in a separatist war than those who do not.

Indeed, six out of eight or 75.5% of all ethno-territorial conflicts have occurred in autonomous settings, either in a situation in which the ethno-politically subordinated group possessed a lower-ranked autonomy (ASSR or AO) inside a union republic/state (vertical cases), or in a situation in which both ethno-territorial groups possessed territorial autonomy and were at the same level of hierarchy (a horizontal case). The vertical ethno-territorial conflicts which emerged in an autonomous setting are the wars in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Gorno-Badakshshan, and Chechnya. The only example of a horizontal ethno-territorial conflict—that is, is the conflict between the Ingush and Ossetians in the North Caucasus—occurred in such a setting too.
The condition autonomous setting is present in all ethno-territorial conflicts in the Caucasus, but only in one third of them in Central Asia. All ethno-territorial autonomous territories in the South Caucasus are afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict. Adjara and Nakhichevan are exceptions: the titulars of the union republics, respectively Georgians and Azerbaijanis, are also the lower-ranked titulars in these autonomous territories. It is important to remember that in the current study these are not the territorial units but the ethno-territorial encounters that are the units of analysis. There must be two different ethno-territorial groups with a different or equal level of autonomy in order to speak of an encounter marked by autonomous setting. The possession of different levels of autonomy may refer to the possession of fully independent states, union republics (SSRs), autonomous republics (formerly called ASSRs), or autonomous provinces (AOs). Consequently, to be precise, all ethnicity-based autonomous territorial units in the South Caucasus, in which an ethnic group other than the union republican/state-wide titular group is titular, are afflicted by ethno-territorial conflicts. In the North Caucasus, however, most encounters marked by autonomous setting remain peaceful. The reason is, probably, that many North Caucasian autonomous territories are shared by two or more titulars. Only one of the two encounters marked by autonomous setting has led to conflict in Central Asia. In total, in only one of the three ethno-territorial conflicts in Central Asia is the condition autonomous setting fulfilled. Two of the three ethno-territorial conflicts have occurred outside the context of an autonomous setting. That condition is, therefore, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the emergence of ethno-territorial conflict.

While only 2.5% of the encounters which do not fulfill this condition are afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict, 12.5% of those which do fulfill it are afflicted by such conflict. Therefore, without being either a necessary or sufficient condition, the presence of the condition autonomous setting in an ethno-territorial encounter makes the chance of conflict higher. However, looking into all cases, it can be concluded that this condition’s effect seems to be rather moderate.

**Titular demographic dominance (D)**

Discussing autonomous setting (A) above, it became obvious that despite it being a conflict-generating condition, not all encounters in which this condition is present are afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict. This was particularly the situation in the North Caucasus. It is remarkable that in the North Caucasus many autonomous territorial units are bi-titular, and Dagestan belongs to many official (read titular) ethnic groups. In such cases titular groups share their autonomy. Consequently, the internal
competition within those autonomous territories takes priority over separatism. Moreover, a bi- or multi-titular territory is much less associated with one ethnic group than a mono-titular one is. Ethno-nationalist mobilization is more difficult in such autonomous territories than in mono-titular ones. The main reason lies in the demographic situation in these territories. In these bi- or multi-titular territorial units, one ethnic group rarely constitutes the majority of population. The only such case was the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, in which the Chechens had an absolute demographic majority. In none of the other North Caucasian bi- or multi-titular autonomous territories did one of the titulars constitute a majority of the population. Even in Adygheya in the North Caucasus and Karakalpakstan in Central Asia, their respective titulars did not constitute the majority of the respective territories’ population, despite being mono-titular autonomous territories.

Titular demographic dominance—that is, the possession of a demographic majority by a titular group in a certain autonomous territory—enhances the titular group’s policy-making capabilities and hence also ethnic mobilization. Moreover, in such cases the territory is more associated with the titulars by outsiders and insiders. Toft (2003) believes in a similar mechanism when she speaks about indivisibility of territory. According to her, being concentrated in a certain territory and possessing the demographic majority there creates a sense of (exclusive) entitlement to the territory by that titular group and hence enhances the chances of separatism. Although she did not explicitly investigate the impact of autonomy, all cases included in her study (Toft 2003) were autonomous territories. The analysis of her cases (Toft 2003) generally supported this theoretical explanation. The only exception was Abkhazia. Indeed, in Abkhazia the ethnic Abkhazians do not constitute a majority of the territory’s population, but the Abkhazians have waged a successful separatist war against Georgia. Either in the South Caucasus, or in Georgia specifically, the possession of autonomy (being accompanied by other conditions) may suffice; or the Abkhazian conflict’s explanation as an odd case may depend on various contingent factors.

Cornell (2002a) has also asked himself whether concentration/relative demography—by which he means the demographic majority of a subordinated ethnic group in an area—is not a very important factor for the explanation of ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. As this theoretical explanation was supported in only three out of nine cases in his study (Cornell 2002a: 125), he concluded that it is not an important factor for such an explanation. However, Cornell’s (2002a) approach has many shortcomings. To begin with, he has included Adjarans as a case. Apparently, he regarded the Adjarans as a separate ethnic group. Adjarans—that is, the Georgians of Adjara, an autonomous
region of Georgia—are simply ethnic Georgians. It is true that in Adjara many Muslim Georgians are living, but they still consider themselves Georgians. The religious make-up of that region was obscure during the Soviet era. Although Adjara has had a large Muslim Georgian population, and Muslim Georgian communities are still living there, the majority of its population is not necessarily Muslim. Many Muslim Georgians emigrated to Turkey after Adjara’s inclusion into the Soviet Georgia, while many Christians from other parts of Georgia have immigrated to Adjara, and in addition many Adjaran Muslims are converted to Christianity (Pelkmans 2002). A more important fact leading Cornell (2002a) to reach such a conclusion, however, is the fact that his relative majority does not refer necessarily to a majority in autonomous territories, but may refer also to a majority in an area without an autonomous status, or even without clearly defined borders. Although it might be possible to determine ethnic concentrations in parts of a country, it is impossible to determine whether a certain ethnic group constitutes a majority, without referring to a geographically delimited territory. In addition, a demographic dominance within an autonomous territory differs from that outside such a territory. Demographic dominance of the titular group inside its autonomous territory enhances its real or symbolic autonomous capabilities, while a demographic majority without autonomy does not have such properties, simply because in the latter case ethnic groups lack autonomous self-ruling capabilities.

Titular demographic dominance (D) appears to be the most important condition in explaining the emergence of ethno-territorial conflict: 83.3% of ethno-territorial encounters in which this condition is present are afflicted by conflict, while only 2.4% of those in which this condition is absent are afflicted by such conflicts (Table 7.3).

The condition titular demographic dominance is present in five out of eight conflicts. Only in the Abkhazian conflict is the possession of titular autonomous territory not accompanied by demographic dominance. The other two cases—the Uzbek-Tajik and Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflicts, respectively in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—lack not only the condition titular demographic dominance (d) but also autonomous setting (a). The Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not possess any titular autonomous territory at all. In the North Caucasus only one ethno-territorial encounter marked by titulars’ demographic dominance—the Russian–Ossetian ethno-territorial encounter—is not afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict. On the other hand, that condition is present in all ethno-territorial conflicts in the North Caucasus.

In conclusion, this condition is a very important one for explaining ethno-territorial conflict, but it is not a necessary condition.
The lack of titulars’ demographic dominance can apparently be compensated for by other conflict-generating or facilitating conditions.

**Contiguity to titular kinfolk’s homeland (G)**

Being contiguous to ethnic kinfolks may hypothetically enhance the chances of ethno-territorial conflict between an ethno-politically subordinated ethnic group and their overlords. The reason may lie in the mechanisms of ethnic solidarity, which are often associated with primordialism and ethnic nepotism. Nevertheless, it is most probably not restricted to such mechanisms. The territorial and ethno-political histories in a region often drag ethnic kinfolks into their kinfolk’s conflict. Indeed, this type of contiguity itself may interact with ethno-territorial disputes and manifest itself as irredentism. Often, the ethnic kinfolks, who are usually dominant in a neighboring state or a part thereof, may demand incorporation of their ethnic kinfolk’s territory into their own territory, or their often subordinated ethnic kinfolk may demand unification with them. It is uncertain that ethnic enthusiasts mobilizing for a conflict count on their kinfolk’s support beforehand, but it is not surprising if they do so.

Usually the external third parties interfering or showing interest in a conflict are states which are culturally and ethnically related to a party of conflict in another country. Huntington (1993: 35-39; 1997: 272-291) speaks of “kin-country syndrome” in this regard.

According to Horowitz (1991), it is possible to bring the external actor to the negotiation table if that state’s interest is on a basis other than ethnic affinity. However, when the external state’s interference or interest is based on ethnic affinity, it is more difficult, because the situation is usually very emotionally charged for the ethnic groups involved:

First, when the help of the assisting state is based on some political interest other than ethnic affinity, there is room for state-to-state negotiation to induce a change in policy.... Second, when the help of the assisting state is based on ethnic affinity...domestic opinion in the assisting state will be moved only by concessions on the outstanding ethnic issues. Such concessions, however, are subject to the constraints of domestic opinion in the state affected by the ethnic violence. Or, to put the point differently, this is a matter of foreign policy that is coterminous with domestic ethnic politics. (Horowitz 1991: 473-474)

Using the examples of India (and Indian Tamil Nadu) and Sri Lankan Tamils and of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland’s Catholics, Horowitz (1991: 473) asserts that most kin-countries and their political establishments are apathetic towards the incorporation of a (potentially)
conflict-struck kinfolk.\textsuperscript{193} This may be so, but still their neighboring kinfolk’s involvement in a conflict has repercussions for the kin-country itself. Therefore, external kinfolks and kin-countries are most likely not indifferent towards their ethnic kinfolk’s cause. Indeed, incorporation of a conflict-struck area is one thing and support for ethnic kinfolk is another thing.

Moreover, Horowitz (1991: 473) provides examples of established states and their kinfolks in another state. The reality is, however, that such cases differ significantly from intra-state cases. The post-Soviet states, arguably, are still so politically intertwined with each other that it would not be unfair to regard them as part of the same geopolitical realm. In any case, the ethno-territorial conflicts in this study erupted at a time when the Soviet Union had not yet collapsed or at times when the legacies and memories of the Soviet Union were still very fresh. Therefore, it is rather plausible and easy to grasp that the contiguity of an ethno-politically subordinated ethnic group to its kinfolk’s titular territory may enhance the chances of ethno-territorial conflict, even though moderately (as shown in Table 7.3).

In Cornell’s (2002a: 118) study only four of nine cases support the proposition that the existence of “ethnic kin” in another country enhances the risk of conflict. Reading his study, it is obvious that by the existence of ethnic kin in another country, he meant, in fact, contiguity of the ethno-politically subordinated ethnic group to its ethnic kinfolk across a state’s or union republic’s borders—even though he has not expressed it precisely. According to Cornell’s (2002a) study, this condition does not seem to greatly enhance the risk of conflict. Nevertheless, as he puts it: “However, it is significant that all three cases of conflict do correlate positively with the proposition. Hence, while ethnic kin may theoretically, judging from these results, be a necessary factor, it is obviously not a sufficient one” (Cornell 2002a: 118).

Despite the fact that Cornell’s (2002a) study deals only with a limited number of cases, and only with the South Caucasus, its results are still largely consistent with those of the current study. In all cases of ethno-territorial conflict in the South Caucasus, the ethno-politically subordinated ethnic group is contiguous to its kinfolk’s autonomous territory across the border, either a union republic or to a lower-ranked autonomous territory (G). This condition is, nevertheless, not present in all ethno-territorial conflicts in other regions and is, therefore, not a necessary condition.

In most ethno-territorial conflicts in which this condition is present (G), autonomous setting (A) is also present. Only the Uzbek-

\textsuperscript{193} This was his contention, even though he might not have used exactly the same words.
Kyrgyz conflict in Kyrgyzstan and that between the Tajiks and Uzbeks in Tajikistan were conflicts in which Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lived contiguously to their ethnic kinfolk in Uzbekistan (G), without possessing titular autonomies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (a).

Overall, only a modest proportion of ethno-territorial encounters marked by this condition are afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict. This is true in Central Asia as well as in the North and the South Caucasus.

**Transborder Dominance (B)**

According to Kaufman (1999: 31): “Demographic threats may also motivate ethnic fears, most insidiously in cases involving an ‘ethnic affinity problem’ in which the minority in a country…is the majority in the broader region”. The chances of fears, active involvement of ethnic kinfolks, and hence conflict are greater if the borders are soft, as they were, and are, in the (post-)Soviet space, where much transborder interaction still exists.

The ethno-territorial encounters in which transborder dominance is present (B) are more likely to be afflicted by conflict than those in which this condition is absent (b). In other words, those encounters in which the ethno-politically subordinated group has a kinfolk in a neighboring republic/state—a republic/state in which it is titular and three times as populous as the titulars in the host republic/state are—have a much higher chance of being afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict than those encounters in which such a condition is absent. While 40% of the first type of encounters are struck by ethno-territorial conflict, only 4.8% of the second type are (Table 7.3). Therefore, transborder dominance greatly increases the chances of ethno-territorial conflicts.

Besides the ethno-territorial conflicts in which the conditions titular demographic dominance (D) or autonomous setting (A) are present, there are two other conflicts which are not marked by these factors. These two other ethno-territorial conflicts are those which are marked by transborder dominance (B). There are five encounters in Central Asia in which this condition is present (B) and only two of them are afflicted by conflict. This condition is not present in other regions of this study. Although only 9.1% of all ethno-territorial encounters in Central Asia are afflicted by conflict (Table 7.1), the percentage of conflict in that region is drastically higher (40%) when only encounters are considered in which this condition is present (Table 7.3). Apparently, although it may compensate for the lack of autonomy (a) and titular demographic dominance (d), transborder dominance (B) alone is not a sufficient factor.

Transborder dominance (B) is often present in encounters between other groups, and Russians and Uzbeks. The reason is that
although Uzbeks and Russians in many Central Asian states are formally ethno-politically subordinated, they are titular in the neighboring Uzbekistan or Russia where they have a large demographic presence. The Uzbeks in Uzbekistan and the Russians in Russia are many times more populous than the Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan or the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, for example. Nevertheless, all ethno-territorial conflicts in which this condition is present are located in the southeastern part of Central Asia. Apparently, there are other conditions present in this area, which in combination with transborder dominance can contribute to the emergence of ethno-territorial conflict. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a useful method to investigate the sufficiency and necessity of conditions in combination, and will be used in the analyses later in this chapter.

The mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M)

Being situated in a mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration appears to be an important condition for the emergence of an ethno-territorial conflict. Although only 7.7% of encounters situated in such an ethno-geographic configuration (M) are afflicted by ethno-territorial conflict, no ethno-territorial conflict has occurred in other types of ethno-geographical configuration (m) (Table 7.3).

It is remarkable that although the larger part of Central Asia, which does not display the mosaic type of ethno-geographical configuration (m), is free of ethno-territorial conflict, its smaller part (the southeastern part), which does display such an ethno-geographic configuration (M), is afflicted by three ethno-territorial conflicts. Obviously this condition enhances the chances of ethno-territorial conflict in Central Asia. The only ethno-territorial conflict in Central Asia in which the conditions autonomous setting (A) and titular demographic dominance (D) were present—the Tajik–Pamiri ethno-territorial conflict—was situated in such a type of ethno-geographical configuration (M). It is also remarkable that the condition transborder dominance (B) has apparently contributed to the emergence of ethno-territorial conflict, only in those encounters which are situated in a mosaic configuration (M)—these are situated in Tajikistan and the Fergana Valley. Other encounters in other parts of Central Asia in which the condition transborder dominance is present—for example, the Russian–Kazakh one in northern Kazakhstan—are not afflicted by such conflicts.

A similar conclusion is very difficult to reach in the Caucasus, where all ethno-territorial encounters are situated in such a type of ethno-geographic configuration (M). Also all encounters in Fereydan are situated in a mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M), without being afflicted by conflict. This fact, plus the fact that most ethno-
territorial encounters in Central Asia and the Caucasus are not afflicted by conflict, despite being situated in such an ethno-geographic configuration, means that being situated in a mosaic type of ethno-geographical encounter is a necessary condition, although not a sufficient one, for the emergence of ethno-territorial conflict.

**Qualitative Comparative Analysis**

In this section I will present the results of Qualitative Comparative Analyses (QCA). QCA is a comparative method based on Boolean algebra and investigates which combinations of (whether present or absent) conditions—also called causal configurations—explain ethno-territorial conflicts. In contrast to the above-implemented statistical analyses, the QCA does not analyze the effects of each condition separately, but looks at the effects of combinations of conditions on the outcome. In contrast to the statistical methods, it does not produce results with a probabilistic but rather with a deterministic character. It may appear, therefore, that a condition—a variable or a factor, in more technical terms—with a low frequency of presence in the encounters afflicted by conflict is actually an essential part of the explanation of ethno-territorial conflict, while another condition with a higher frequency of presence is not so.

In QCA the different conditions in the equations are traditionally written next to each other without asterisks (*) or any other multiplication signs, and the results of an analysis are presented by different equations connected by plus signs (+). In this chapter I do not use the plus sign, but I will mention in parentheses the ethno-territorial conflicts which are explained by these equations. The traditional QCA notation system of capital letters for the presence, and lower-case letters for the absence, of a condition are maintained. In brackets are mentioned the (other) common or popular names of the ethno-territorial conflicts. The equations are numbered consecutively in the text. The closest terms in daily human language for “*” and “+” are, respectively, “and” and “or”: in order to explain the outcome, this condition and that condition and another condition must be present; or, this condition must be absent and that condition and the other condition must be present; or, etc. Appendix 2 explains how QCA works, using a simple example. By a satisfactory result is meant that a causal configuration should not produce

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194 The combination of absent and present conditions that explain an outcome may also be called “configurations”. Actually, I prefer “configuration” above “causal configuration” for certain philosophical and methodological reasons; but I will use “causal configuration”, or simply “combination”, in order to avoid confusion with the unrelated concept of “ethno-geographic configuration”.
contradictory outcomes. In this study, we speak of satisfactory results when a causal configuration does not explain conflict and coexistence (no-conflict) at the same time. In other words, a conflict formula is satisfactory when it explains conflict only.

The different ethno-territorial encounters in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Fereydan will be compared with each other in order to explore which causal configurations—i.e. combinations of absent and present conditions—have led to ethno-territorial conflict. The units of analysis are the 129 ethno-territorial encounters (Appendix 5). Below, the qualitative comparative analyses are performed iteratively and in steps. These analyses attempt to arrive at conflict formulas, which are as parsimonious and brief as possible and which can explain as many ethno-territorial conflicts as possible. Each ethno-territorial encounter is represented by a number, which corresponds to those in the dataset (Appendix 5). The column under “n” gives the number of cases—both conflicts and not-conflicts—explained by the combination of absence and presence of those certain conditions. Because of the lack of space (and in order to avoid repetition), only a few “truth tables” are presented in this chapter. In the first step all selected conditions are included into the analysis.

**Step 1: Inclusion of all conditions**

The analysis with the inclusion of all selected conditions (S, R, L, T, A, D, G, B and M) explains the outcome of 127 out of 129 ethno-territorial encounters (98.5%). It explains seven out of eight (87.5%) of the ethno-territorial conflicts by four equations.\(^\text{195}\) It shows that combinations of our selected conditions are able to explain a large share of conflict and coexistence. Nevertheless, this analysis is unable to explain all cases of conflict and coexistence satisfactorily: one causal configuration (S * r * L * t * A * D * G * b * M) produces a contradiction. This causal configuration illustrates the situation in two ethno-territorial encounters: Ossetian-Russian in the Russian Federation and Ossetian-Georgian in Georgia. While the latter is marked by ethno-territorial conflict, the former is not. It is obvious that both ethno-territorial encounters are similar in all aspects except the polity they are located in. It is understandable that the location of the ethno-territorial encounters within different countries (states) or union republics matters. The addition of an extra condition to the analysis, “location in the Russian Federation”, or

\(^\text{195}\) These equations are as follows: C= R * L * T * A * D * G * b * M; C= S * R * L * A * D * g * b * M; C= S * r * L * A * D * G * b * M; C= S * r * L * d * G * b * M; C= S * r * L * t * a * d * G * B * M
simply in Russia (F), can solve the problem. Below is discussed why this is a sensible addition.

Among the (post-)Soviet republics, Russia is the most exceptional one. The discussion of the Soviet nationalities policy and its ethno-territorial manifestations made it clear that peoples with lower-ranked titular status used to seek protection and mediation from Moscow. Moscow, in this view, was a balancer and protector against the union republics. According to Gachechiladze (1995: 33), the lower-ranked territorial autonomous units (ASSRs and AOs) were laid by the Soviet Center as delayed-action mines. His view is consistent with the competitive and divisive nature of the Soviet nationalities policy and its ethno-territorial manifestations (see e.g. Bremmer 1997). Nevertheless, Moscow was and is the Soviet Center as well as the Russian capital. Therefore, Moscow’s impact on the lower-ranked autonomous units inside and outside the Russian Federation was not uniform. This was certainly the case before the Russian Federation established its own Communist Party and union republican institutions (see e.g. Dunlop 1997: 34; Shaw 1999: 54). This situation suggested that the Soviet Union was, in fact, the Russian Federation plus a periphery to which a number of cultural and administrative concessions were made. For example, it is remarkable that the Soviet national anthem and those of many union republics (SSRs) had paid notable attention to Russians and Russia.

After perestroika and the demise of the federal Soviet government, the balance of power shifted in favor of the Russian Federation. Ultimately, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation inherited most of its assets and territory but also all of its foreign treaties and obligations. Already before its collapse, the Soviet Union was often equated with Russia or Greater Russia, and the Russian people associated themselves with the whole Soviet Union probably as much as they did with Russia. The Russian hegemony did not vanish totally in the wake of the Soviet Union’s break-up. “After the break-up of the Soviet Union, several variants of restorationism emerged among Russians—all of them virtually indistinguishable from imperialism” (Zevelev 2001: 271). There are indications that the Soviet Center and hence also the Russian Federation played a role in the ethno-territorial conflicts outside its borders. For example, the Russian invasion of Georgia (August 2008) had indeed a longer history. The inclusion of a new condition such as foreign support is difficult in this QCA, first of all because the support prior to the outbreak of the ethno-territorial conflicts was mostly covert and hence uncertain. In addition, in all of the 129 ethno-territorial encounters it must be checked whether or not one of the ethno-territorial groups received support from outside, which is a very difficult task mainly because of the ambiguity in the definition of foreign
support. One type of support is not another. Therefore, the aforementioned condition (F) is preferred above this and is included in the analysis.

Another reason for this inclusion is that the Russian Federation is a very large and, in most aspects, strong country. Russia has far more “infrastructural power” (Mann 1984) than any other (post-)Soviet republic. In addition to the fact that it is more difficult for another country to interfere in Russian internal affairs, it is also more difficult for the ethno-territorial groups there to rebel against Russia. In other words, the threshold of conflict eruption is higher in the Russian Federation than in the other countries in this study. In fact, the presence of this condition (F) has a mitigating effect on the eruption of ethno-territorial conflicts.

A question arises whether or not it is sensible to add a condition which distinguishes between the ethno-territorial encounters located in Iran and those located in the (post-)Soviet space. The question seems legitimate because the ethno-political systems in different Soviet republics and the Soviet successor states were and still are very different from the Iranian ethno-political system. The main difference between Iran and the (post-)Soviet ethno-political system is the fact that Iran lacks any ethno-territorial autonomies. The selected conditions, however, cover the differences between the ethno-political systems in the (post-)Soviet Union and Iran. The lack of ethno-territorial conflicts in Iran can already be explained satisfactorily by these conditions. Therefore, there is no need for the addition of an extra condition.

**Step 2: The addition of F**

In the second step, all conditions plus the condition “location in the Russian Federation (F)” are taken into the analysis. Now, no contradictions remain any more. Nevertheless, the equations are too long and each explains only one or at most two ethno-territorial conflicts. These equations, in fact, give the characteristics of each conflict and are consistent with the descriptions of conflicts discussed in Chapter 6. The truth table (Table 7.4), the most inclusive one in our analysis, is presented fully. Because of lack of space, however, the full names of the ethno-territorial encounters (cases) are not given in the truth tables. Each encounter is represented by a number in the truth table which corresponds with those in the dataset (Appendix 5). The explained conflicts are given in the parentheses under the relevant equations of ethno-territorial conflict, and the more popular names of these conflicts are given in the brackets.
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The results of the analysis are presented below:

1. \( C = S \times r \times L \times t \times A \times G \times b \times M \times f \)  
   (Georgian–Abkhazian in Georgia [Abkhazian Conflict] + Georgian–Ossetian in Georgia [South Ossetian Conflict])

2. \( C = S \times R \times L \times T \times A \times D \times G \times b \times M \times f \)  
   (Azerbaijani–Armenian in Azerbaijan [Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict])

3. \( C = S \times R \times L \times T \times A \times D \times g \times b \times M \times F \)  
   (Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya])

4. \( C = s \times R \times L \times T \times A \times D \times G \times b \times M \times F \)  
   (Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict])

5. \( C = S \times r \times L \times t \times a \times d \times G \times B \times M \times f \)  
   (Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in Tajikistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

6. \( C = S \times R \times L \times t \times A \times D \times g \times B \times M \times f \)  
   (Tajik–Pamiri in Tajikistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

As that condition is present (M) in all ethno-territorial conflicts, it appears that the location of the encounter in a mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M) is a necessary condition for the explanation of ethno-territorial conflicts.

The following steps attempt to exclude conditions in order to reach parsimonious equations (conflict formulas) that at the same time explain more ethno-territorial conflicts simultaneously. Conditions are excluded from, and included into, the different analyses, somehow iteratively and experimentally, in order to arrive at more parsimonious equations. It is possible that combinations of fewer conditions lead to fewer and shorter conflict formulas without producing “contradictions”. In the following analyses such combinations of conditions are explored.

**Step 3: Analysis with the inclusion of A, D, B, M, F, and T**

The occurrence of the condition traumatic peak experience (T) in the analysis renders ethno-political subordination (S), religious difference (R), linguistic difference (L), and contiguity (G) redundant. This occurrence does not need to be accompanied by a positive value (presence) of that condition. Its mere inclusion into the analysis renders the other conditions redundant. By redundant conditions I mean those conditions that can be
excluded from the analysis without contradictions being produced. The results are presented below:

(7) $C = T \times A \times D \times b \times M$
(Azerbaijani–Armenian in Azerbaijan [Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict] + Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict])

(8) $C = t \times A \times b \times M \times f$
(Georgian–Abkhazian in Georgia [Abkhazian Conflict] + Georgian–Ossetian in Georgia [South Ossetian Conflict] + Tajik–Pamiri in Tajikistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

(9) $C = t \times a \times d \times B \times M \times f$
(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

Equation 7 means that traumatic peak experience by at least one ethno-territorial group in an encounter (T) which is located in a mosaic type of ethno-geographical configuration (M), and in which both ethno-territorial groups are titulars at the same or different levels of ethno-territorial hierarchy (A) and possess demographic majority in their titular territory (D), leads to conflict (C). This equation also informs us that in such an ethno-territorial encounter, in order to bring about an ethno-territorial conflict, the subordinated ethno-territorial group should not possess transborder dominance. There is no sensible interpretation for this part of the formula. There is also no sensible interpretation for the part of the formulas (Equations 8 and 9) that indicates that in order to get involved in conflict no ethno-territorial groups should have had a traumatic peak experience (t). It may be hypothetically a conflict-generating combination, but the empirical data do not support it, only because such a combination does not appear in any of ethno-territorial encounters in the dataset. Therefore, QCA assumes that the presence of one is accompanied by the absence of the other. In reality, however, no such necessity seems to be plausible.

QCA has certain properties which makes it very sensitive to the existing empirical cases (in a dataset). Certain combinations may hypothetically lead to a certain outcome but may not appear in the formulas because they do not appear in the cases in the dataset. A way to solve this problem is to include the missing combinations with their assumed outcomes—often called the fictive cases—into the analysis. Regarding the availability of theoretical discussions and analytic case descriptions, however, the interpretation (and hence correction) of
outcomes seems a more sensible method and is used in this study. These two above-mentioned methods are, in fact, very similar methods and follow the same logic. In both of them theoretical assumptions are used in order to modify “strange” results. Methodologists propose many (similar) methods to deal with these or similar problems (see, e.g. Delreus & Hesters 2010; Rihoux & Ragin [eds] 2009; Rohwer 2008; Schneider & Wagemann 2003; Stokke 2007; Vanderborght & Yamasaki 2004).

The last equation (9) relates to the conflicts in the southeastern part of Central Asia, where the prevalent type of ethno-geographic configuration is the mosaic type. That equation informs us that for an ethno-territorial encounter to lead to ethno-territorial conflict, it needs to be located outside the Russian Federation (f) and in a mosaic type of ethno-geographical configuration (M), and that at least one ethno-territorial group should not be titular, which in this context means that the subordinated group should not possess territorial autonomy within the host republic/state (a). But on the other hand, the subordinated ethno-territorial group needs to have transborder dominance (B). In other words, it needs to be contiguous to a territory in which its kinfolk is titular and is three times larger in number than its overlords in the host republic/state. In fact, there is logic to this: contiguity to an ethnic kinfolk that is three times larger in population than the titulars in the host country/republic compensates for the lack of possession of territorial autonomy. Hypothetically, in conflict formulas, transborder dominance (B) may go hand in hand with the titular status of both ethno-territorial groups (A) when the subordinated ethno-territorial group possesses territorial autonomy in its host country/republic. In reality, however, this situation does not appear in any ethno-territorial encounter. In addition, the absence of traumatic peak experiences (t) in the equation seems to be caused by the empirical data—i.e. is contingent upon the real existing cases—and cannot be supported reasonably by theoretical argumentation. Although hypothetically possible, there are no such encounters in the dataset in which such a combination appears. In other words, the result is contingent upon the fact that in this study no “traumatized” ethno-territorial encounters exist in which transborder dominance (B) is present.

The second equation (8) informs us that ethno-territorial encounters located in a mosaic area (M) outside the Russian Federation (f), in which both ethno-territorial groups are titulars (A) without having experienced a traumatic peak experience (t), and in which the subordinated ethno-territorial group is contiguous to a territory in which their kinfolk is titular (G), lead to ethno-territorial conflicts (C). In addition to the above-mentioned contingency of the absence of transborder dominance (b), it is strange that in “non-traumatized” ethno-territorial encounters (t) the titulars must have no demographic majority in
their respective homelands (d), while theoretically this condition contributes to a positive outcome. It is not totally clear why the Armenian–Azeri ethno-territorial encounter in Azerbaijan is very different from the Georgian–Abkhazian and Georgian–Ossetian ethno-territorial encounters in Georgia and the Tajik–Pamiri ethno-territorial encounter in Tajikistan. The case of Abkhazia is the only one in which the subordinated ethno-territorial group possesses no demographic majority in the territory in which it is titular. In addition, it is ambiguous to what extent the case of Armenians is different from that of Abkhazians. Both of these ethnic groups have experienced trauma in the past, but the Abkhazian trauma experience could not be qualified as a traumatic peak experience according to the criteria of this study. A similar case is that of the Yezidi traumatic-peak experience, which, like the Armenian case, also occurred in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, as the only ethno-territorial encounter with Yezidis in the dataset is the one between them and Armenians, this issue can be dealt with, implicitly, by dealing with the Armenian one. The main reason that the Armenians, as opposed to the Abkhazians, are specified as traumatized in this study is because the Armenian Genocide occurred in the 20th century, while the Abkhazian deportations proceeded in the 19th century. On the other hand, the Ossetians in Georgia (South Ossetia) also possessed titular demographic dominance (D) without being traumatized (t). Therefore, it could be expected that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could also be explained without Armenians being traumatized (t). The case of Armenian–Azeri ethno-territorial conflict in Azerbaijan requires more investigation, and it will be examined further before the results of analysis with the inclusion of other conditions are reported.

**Step 4: Experimenting with T**

To investigate the aforementioned issue I made a new dataset, in which it is hypothetically assumed that Armenians have not had a traumatic peak experience and in which the condition experiencing a traumatic peak experience (t) is (experimentally) absent in all encounters in which one of the ethno-territorial groups are Armenians. After this experiment, the dataset with the original values will be used again in the subsequent steps. This experiment is, in fact, an effort to solve the aforementioned problem(s) in Step 3. Similar to the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Ossetians in South Ossetia possessed titular demographic dominance (D) without having undergone a traumatic peak experience (t). Possibly the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be explained by the same (parsimonious) formula as the South Ossetian conflict will be. The description of conflicts (Chapter 6) taught us that conflicts in the South Caucasus are similar to
each other. It is, therefore, not easy to understand why in other cases autonomy (A) suffices without being traumatized (t), whereas in the case of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, who possess demographic majority in their autonomous territory (D), they should also be traumatized (T) in order to explain the conflict. Therefore, we changed experimentally the value of traumatic peak experience from present (T) to absent (t), in encounters in which Armenians are one party, to see whether (shorter) explanations could be produced in which traumatic-peak experiences are irrelevant. The results of this (experimental) analysis are as follows:

(10) \[ C = t \times A \times b \times M \times f \]

(11) \[ C = T \times A \times D \times b \times M \times F \]
(Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict])

(12) \[ C = t \times a \times d \times B \times M \times f \]
(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

In the results of this analysis, the ethno-territorial conflicts inside Russia are listed together (Equation 11). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is listed together with other ethno-territorial conflicts outside Russia (Equation 10), in which, in contrast to the result of the former analysis (Equation 7), the condition traumatic peak experience is absent (t). Although its absence in this conflict formula is experimental, it nevertheless means that there is no necessity for Armenians to have undergone a traumatic peak experience in order for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to erupt. Similar to other ethno-territorial conflicts in the Caucasus and the Pamiri–Tajik ethno-territorial conflict, the possession of territorial autonomy by the subordinated group in the host state/union republic (A) and location in a mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M) suffice for the explanation of ethno-territorial conflicts (C) there.

Strictly speaking, according to the formula (Equation 11), the condition transborder dominance should be absent (b), but as discussed

196 To be more accurate, in such an experiment there should be no other group having experienced a traumatic peak experience in encounters with Armenians; but there appear no such cases in the dataset anyway.
earlier this is a matter of factual circumstances and cannot be interpreted by theoretical assumptions or common sense—simply because a similar equation but with capital “B” does not appear in any ethno-territorial encounter.

This experiment—that is, assuming hypothetically and experimentally that Armenians have not undergone a traumatic peak experience—does not influence the results of other analyses (the next two steps) with the inclusion of other conditions, simply because the condition “traumatic peak experience” is redundant in them.

**Step 5: Analysis with the inclusion of A, D, B, M, F, and R**

In addition to the condition traumatic peak experience (T), the inclusion of religious difference also renders the conditions ethno-political subordination (S), linguistic difference (L), and contiguity (G) redundant. The analysis offers satisfactory results when the condition traumatic peak experience (T) is replaced by religious difference (R). The results are presented below:

(13) \[ C = R \times A \times D \times b \times M \]

(14) \[ C = r \times A \times b \times M \times f \]
(Georgian–Abkhazian in Georgia [Abkhazian Conflict] + Georgian–Ossetian in Georgia [South Ossetian Conflict])

(15) \[ C = r \times a \times d \times B \times M \times f \]
(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

The equations (13–15) resulting from this analysis with the inclusion of religious difference (R) or (r) are very similar to those (Equations 7–12) with the inclusion of traumatic peak experience (T) or (t). In these equations the condition religious difference replaces the condition traumatic peak experience. Taking this into consideration, the interpretation of the results of previous analyses is also valid here. Certain problems of interpretation appear also here.

The condition titular demographic dominance does not appear in Equation 14; it is irrelevant there because while being absent in the Abkhazian conflict, it is present in the South Ossetian conflict. This
equation means that in cases outside the Russian Federation (f), whenever there is no religious difference (r) between the fighting groups, the combination of possession of autonomous territories (A) and location in a mosaic type of ethno-geographical configuration (M) suffices for explaining the ethno-territorial conflicts. Similar to the results of the previous steps, transborder dominance is absent (b) here simply because no other encounter exists which is similar in all other aspects but in which transborder dominance (B) is present. In addition, it is neither theoretically explainable, nor can it be understood by common sense, why titular demographic dominance is irrelevant in the cases in which no religious difference exists between the fighting groups (r) (Equation 14), but it must be present (D) in cases in which religious difference does exist (R) (Equation 13). Similar to the above-mentioned problem, also this problem is contingent upon the real existing cases (in the data-set). These problems are solved in the next steps (see especially Step 9).

There is a similar problem: in this analysis it is notable that the Tajik–Pamiri ethno-territorial encounter in Tajikistan is explained by the first equation (13), in which demographic majority in the autonomous territory is required (D), while in the former analysis it was listed under those in which this condition did not even appear in the equation (10). Similar to the above-mentioned case, also this case is not theoretically apprehensible and leads us to believe in our earlier assumption that the presence of the extra condition traumatic peak experience (T) in the former, and religious difference (R) in this current, analysis may not be necessary for the explanation of ethno-territorial conflicts outside the Russian Federation. This analysis is itself one more reason to investigate this issue further by more analyses.

**Step 6: Analysis with the inclusion of A, D, B, M, F, S, and G**

The inclusion of ethno-political subordination (S) and contiguity (G) together renders traumatic peak experience (T), religious difference (R), and linguistic difference (L) redundant. Linguistic difference (L) is not necessary for any parsimonious equations and can be dispensed with. This analysis, however, produces four instead of three conflict formulas (16–19) and has its problems of interpretation. The results are as follows:

(16) \( C = S \times A \times G \times b \times M \times f \)  

(17) \( C = S \times A \times D \times g \times b \times M \)
(Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Tajik–Pamiri in Tajikistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

(18) \( C = s \times A \times D \times G \times b \times M \times F \)
(Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict])

(19) \( C = S \times a \times d \times G \times B \times M \times f \)
(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

The inclusion of ethno-political subordination (S) distinguishes between horizontal (Equation 18) and vertical ethno-territorial conflicts (Equations 16, 17, and 19). The only case of horizontal ethno-territorial conflict (the Prigorodny conflict) is located in Russia (F) and is characterized by autonomous setting (A), in which both titulars (the Ingush and Ossetians) possess demographic majority in their respective titular territories (D). This is not surprising, because of all countries covered in this study only in Russia do lower-ranked autonomous territories border each other. Only in Russia can two ethno-territorially subordinated ethno-territorial groups be titular in two bordering lower-ranked autonomous territorial units.

The result of the first equation of this analysis (Equation 16) looks very plausible. It suggests that in the cases in which one ethno-territorial group is contiguous to a titular territory of its kinfolk (G), the possession of demographic majority of population is irrelevant. This condition is not at all part of the equation. This simply means that contiguity renders the (lack of) dominant demographic position irrelevant as a condition. Irrelevancy, however, does not mean absence: in three out of the four cases the ethno-territorial groups do possess demographic majority in their respective titular territories. Only in the case of the Abkhazian conflict do the Abkhazians not possess demographic majority in Abkhazia. In the previous analyses the Tajik–Pamiri ethno-territorial encounter in Tajikistan was listed together with other cases under the conflict formulas in which a dominant demographic position in titular territory was irrelevant (Equations 8, 10), while the results of this analysis suggest that dominant demographic majority (D) is a necessary condition for its explanation. This case also requires further investigation.

Despite what Equation 17 suggests, the requirement for the absence of contiguity to a titular kinfolk in a neighboring union republic/country (g) does not seem to be a very plausible condition in the explanation of the Russian–Chechen conflict (Equation 17). It is rather strange that a “tough” case such as the Chechen–Russian conflict requires the absence of a conflict-facilitating condition in order to be explained. The results of this analysis suggest that the different outcomes of the two
similar cases of the Russian–Chechen and the Russian–Ossetian encounters in the Russian Federation are determined only by the fact that the Ossetians are contiguous to South Ossetia. It is not particularly plausible or comprehensible to assume that contiguity to their ethnic kinfolk, as an extra asset, has prevented North Ossetians from rebellion against Russia or that Russia is deterred by the North Ossetian contiguity to South Ossetia. It does indeed appear strange. The only sensible interpretation would be that a calculating “Eurasianist” Russia would not attack North Ossetians because it needs to have their southern kinfolk as its allies. Nevertheless, as the discussions showed, these were not the host countries/union republics that initiated attacks on subordinated ethno-territorial groups out of nowhere; first there were demands for separation and rebellion, to which the host countries/union republics reacted. In this particular case, however, the North Ossetians did not even rebel against Russia. Nevertheless, it is not too far-fetched to believe that North Ossetians have calculated that they had better not rebel against Russia, which (allegedly) was an ally of their southern kinfolk. The discussion of the ethno-territorial conflicts (Chapter 6), however, suggested that Ossetians, the only non-Slavic Orthodox Christian people in a sea of Sunni Muslims in the North Caucasus, had always been privileged by Russians and hence had not much reason to be aggrieved and yearn for secession from Russia. It should also be taken into account that rebellion against Russia is a much more difficult task than rebellion against Georgia or Azerbaijan.

Apparently, the harsh ordeal through which many North Caucasian Muslims have gone has conditioned their ethno-political behavior. The analyses including religious difference (Step 5) and traumatic peak experience (Steps 3–4) produce much more sensible results than this one with contiguity (Step 6). This is one more reason to believe that the Chechen traumatic deportation in 1944, in which large numbers of Chechens died (T), in combination with other factors such as having a dominant demographic position in their titular territory (D) and being located in a mosaic type of ethno-territorial configuration (M), has been essential in bringing about the Chechen conflict and rebellion against Russia (C).

Step 7: Splitting contiguity

It seems that the dynamics of ethno-territorial conflicts in the Russian Federation (F) follow another logic than those outside the Russian Federation (f). Putting the ethno-territorial encounters inside and outside the Russian Federation into the same analysis creates confusions in the results and makes their interpretation rather difficult. Therefore, it seems
to be a good idea to perform separate analyses for the ethno-territorial encounters located inside and outside Russia.

Before doing that another oddity needs to be addressed. The type of contiguity which occurs most often in ethno-territorial conflicts, and is sometimes difficult to interpret, seems to be a “lower-ranked contiguity”—that is, contiguity to an autonomous territory inside a union republic/state. Such lower-ranked territorial units were called ASSRs and AOs in the Soviet period. There are many cases of contiguity to a kinfolk’s titular union republic/state—that is, “higher-ranked contiguity”—which remain peaceful. A higher-ranked contiguity is only present in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In that case the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan in general, are contiguous to Armenia (and the Armenian SSR). In the Abkhazian, Ossetian, and Prigorodny conflicts a “lower-ranked contiguity” is present. In the former conflict, the Abkhazians are contiguous to their Abaza and Circassian kinfolks in Karachayevo-Cherkessia (and Kabardino-Balkaria and Adygheya).197 In the latter conflict, the Ossetians in South Ossetia and North Ossetia were contiguous to their kinfolk on either side of the Georgian–Russian border. South Ossetia was an autonomous province (AO) in Georgia at the onset of the conflict. All other mentioned territories are now autonomous republics of the Russian Federation and were formerly either an internal autonomous republic (ASSR),198 (North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria) or an autonomous province (AO) (Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Adygheya).

According to the results of the above analysis (Step 6), part of the explanation of the Prigorodny conflict lies in the fact that Ossetians in Russia are contiguous to South Ossetia in Georgia. It is doubtful that South Ossetians have played a major role in bringing about the Prigorodny conflict. Of course they may have supported their northern kinfolk, but it is unlikely that they played any direct role in the eruption of that conflict. In the description of that conflict it was already mentioned that the North Ossetian leadership has stated that it needed Prigorodny District, as it offers space for the housing of the South Ossetian refugees. It is not certain, however, that the North Ossetian leadership would give in to the Ingush demands, even if there were no South Ossetian refugees.

Contiguity to an ethnic kinfolk in war may have either a conflict-instigating or a conflict-hampering effect, but we should bear in mind that

197 Abkhazia has borders only with Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Karachayevo-Cherkessia has borders with Kabardino-Balkaria and is proximate to Adygheya. Abkhazia itself is also proximate to Adygheya and Kabardino-Balkaria. Therefore, it can be said that Abkhazia is contiguous not only to Karachayevo-Cherkessia but to the whole Circassian area in the North Caucasus.

198 These internal autonomous republics were called “Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic” (ASSR), which is a confusing name when one realizes that the union republics with higher level of autonomy were simply called “Soviet Socialist Republic” (SSR).
the condition contiguity (G) is not the same as contiguity to a conflict-afflicted territory; it simply accounts only for territorial contiguity to an ethnic kinfolk’s titular homeland, with or without being afflicted by conflict.

The formula (Equation 18) suggests that the emergence of conflict in Prigorodny depends on the North Ossetian contiguity to their southern kinfolk, even when there was no conflict in South Ossetia.

In order to investigate this oddity further, I split the condition “contiguity” (G) into two: “higher-ranked contiguity” (Q) means that the subordinated ethno-territorial group is contiguous to a state or union republic, in which its kinfolk is titular; and “lower-ranked contiguity” (K) means that the subordinated ethno-territorial group is contiguous to a lower-ranked autonomous territory in which its kinfolk is titular. The replacement of the condition “G” by “Q” does not produce satisfactory results. There occurs a contradiction. The causal configuration “S * A * D * q * b * M * F” relates to the Russian–Chechen and Russian–Ossetian ethno-territorial encounters in Russia. The former one is marked by ethno-territorial conflict and the latter is not. As expected, however, the replacement of the condition contiguity “G” by lower-ranked contiguity “K” produces satisfactory results:

(20) C= S * A * D * k * b * M

(21) C= S * A * K * b * M * f
(Georgian–Abkhazian in Georgia [Abkhazian Conflict] + Georgian–Ossetian in Georgia [South Ossetian Conflict])

(22) C= S * A * D * K * b * M * F
(Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict])

(23) C= S * a * d * k * B * M * f
(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

The formulas of conflicts (Equations 20–23) are similar to those produced by the former analysis. It is remarkable, however, that similar to the result (Equation 10) of the experimental analysis (Step 4), here also, the Tajik–Pamiri ethno-territorial conflict is grouped together with the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict (Equation 20).\textsuperscript{199} On the other hand, interpretations of equations with titular demographic dominance and transborder dominance remain problematic also in this analysis.

All in all, and referring to all arguments in this step and previous ones, there is ample reason to take the ethno-territorial encounters inside and outside Russia into separate analyses. These separate analyses will make it clear whether or not our earlier assumptions were correct. However, one thing should be taken into account: the condition mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M) is constantly present in the North Caucasus. Despite being a necessary condition in the explanation of all ethno-territorial conflicts in this study, this condition (M) can be dispensed with because its exclusion from the analysis of the encounters in the Russian North Caucasus does not produce contradictions. Nevertheless, in spite of being redundant in the parsimonious equations, this condition should be taken seriously. Its inclusion only adds to the plausibility and robustness of the results if one looks further than the North Caucasus. Its omission from the analysis would have produced unsatisfactory results if encounters from other Russian regions were also taken into analysis. The fact that nowhere else in the Russian Federation have ethno-territorial conflicts erupted but in the North Caucasus suggests that the mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M), which distinguishes the North Caucasus from other regions of the Russian Federation, is a necessary condition in explaining ethno-territorial conflicts in Russia.

**Step 8: Analysis of the encounters in the Russian Federation**

Separate qualitative comparative analyses of the 46 ethno-territorial encounters in Russia produce satisfactory results consistent with our expectations (Equations 24–27). These analyses follow the same logic as those of the previous analyses, in which encounters inside and outside Russia were not taken separately. Transborder dominance (b) is lacking in the Russian Federation. Therefore, its omission from the analysis does not create any problems, while resulting in more parsimonious equations. Similar to those previous analyses, the inclusion of traumatic peak experience (T) renders the conditions ethno-political subordination (S), religious difference (R), linguistic difference (L), and all conditions relating to contiguity (whether G, Q, or K) redundant. It also renders the autonomous setting (A) redundant. Nevertheless, it does not lead to any conceptual or interpretative problems, as titular demographic dominance

\textsuperscript{199} Also, this fact suggests that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may be explained even when Armenians were not traumatized.
(D) also includes that condition (A). Similarly, the inclusion of religious difference (R) renders ethno-political subordination (S), traumatic peak experience (T), linguistic difference (L), autonomous setting (A), and all conditions relating to contiguity (whether G, Q, or K) redundant. Of the two conditions resulting from the differentiation of type of contiguity (i.e. K and Q), the lower-ranked contiguity (K) is the one that gives satisfactory results. Its inclusion in the analysis, in combination with ethno-political subordination (S), renders traumatic peak experience (T), religious difference (R), and linguistic difference (L) redundant. The truth tables pertaining to these analyses are very clear and clarifying and are, therefore, presented (Tables 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7).

The result of the analysis of ethno-territorial encounters in the Russian Federation with the inclusion of traumatic peak experience (T) is as follows:

\[(24) \ C = T * D * M \]

(Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict])

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>C ENCOUNTERS</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0, 35, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 46, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0, 38, 49</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0, 39, 42, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0, 40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The result of this analysis is very parsimonious and “powerful”. The two ethno-territorial conflicts in the Russian Federation are explained by just one parsimonious formula (Equation 24). These ethno-territorial conflicts (C) are explained by the fact that both ethno-territorial groups in the conflict constitute the majority of population in their respective titular territory, be it Russia or an autonomous republic (D). In addition, at least one of the ethno-territorial groups in the encounter—the Chechens and the Ingush in these cases—has had a traumatic peak experience (T). Furthermore, the ethno-territorial encounters are located in an ethno-geographical configuration of the mosaic type (M).

The inclusion of religious difference (R) results in a similar conflict formula (Equation 25). It only replaces traumatic peak experience (T) with religious difference (R):
(25) \( C = R \times D \times M \)

(Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict])

Table 7.6. Truth table in the Russian Federation with \( R, D, \) and \( M \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>C ENCOUNTERS</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 46, 48, 72, 76, 77, 80</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38, 49</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44, 45, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Equation 25 means that these ethno-territorial conflicts (\( C \)) are explained by the fact that both ethno-territorial groups in the conflict constitute the majority of population in their respective titular territories (\( D \)). In addition, the ethno-territorial groups in the encounters—the Chechens and Russians in the first and the Ingush and Ossetians in the second case—adhere to two different religions (\( R \)). Moreover, the ethno-territorial encounters are situated in an ethno-geographical configuration of the mosaic type (\( M \)).

Religious difference (\( R \)) and traumatic peak experience (\( T \)) overlap to a large extent in the North Caucasus and the conflict formulas containing them can be interpreted more or less in the same way. The traumatized people in the North Caucasus were Muslims. Among the North Caucasian Muslims only the Dagestanis and Circassians were not subjected to the Stalinist collective ethnic deportations (\( t \)), but they do not constitute a majority of population in their titular homelands (\( d \)). Even though they have a history of violent encounters with the Russian Empire they were not subjected to the harsh and deadly deportations of the 1940s (\( t \)). Among the North Caucasian peoples the Orthodox Christian Ossetians have enjoyed the best treatment from Russia and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the best interpretation of this situation would be as follows: the traumatized Muslim peoples in the Caucasus, who constitute a majority in their titular autonomous territory, (are likely to) come into ethno-territorial conflict against Russia or their other non-Muslim neighbors who constitute a majority of the population in their titular autonomous territory. The single example of the latter type of “neighbor” in the North Caucasus is the Orthodox Christian Ossetians.

The inclusion of lower-ranked contiguity (\( K \)) in combination with ethno-political subordination (\( S \)) results in almost similar conflict formulas to those (Equations 20–23) of one of the earlier analyses (Step 6), in which
the ethno-territorial encounters inside and outside the Russian Federation were not taken separately into the analysis:

(26) \( C = S \times D \times k \times M \)  
(Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya]

(27) \( C = s \times D \times K \times M \)  
(Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict])

These formulas (Equations 26–27) are less “powerful” because each can explain only one conflict and, in addition, are less parsimonious in comparison with the formulas produced by the other two analyses above. Moreover, the interpretation problems, which have already been discussed in the earlier analysis, remain.

**Table 7.7. Truth table in the Russian Federation with S, D, K and M**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>C ENCOUNTERS</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 35, 36, 37, 39</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 38</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 41, 42, 43</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1 49</td>
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<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Step 9: Analysis of the cases outside the Russian Federation**

The separate qualitative comparative analysis of the 83 ethno-territorial encounters outside the Russian Federation produces very parsimonious and “powerful” results (Equations 28–29). Moreover, many of the interpretation problems disappear, notably that of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is yet another indication that the Step 4 experiment was sensible. Aside from autonomous setting (A), transborder dominance (B), and the mosaic type of ethno-geographical configuration (M), all other conditions are redundant in this analysis and can be dispensed with. The corresponding truth table is presented below (Table 7.8). The results of this analysis are as follows:

(28) \( C = A \times b \times M \)  
(29) \( C = a \times B \times M \)
(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

**Table 7.8. Truth table outside the Russian Federation with A, B, M, and C**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>C ENCOUNTERS</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 95, 98, 101, 102, 105, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 6, 21, 22, 99</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 81, 96, 112</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 97, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0 106</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are no horizontal ethno-territorial encounters outside the Russian Federation in which two neighboring ethno-politically subordinated groups possess lower-ranked territorial autonomies. Therefore, all encounters in which the condition autonomous setting (A) appears are vertical ethno-territorial encounters between a group that is titular at union-republican or state-wide level and an ethno-politically subordinated group that is titular in a lower-ranked autonomous territory inside that host state/union republic.

Even though it is hypothetically possible and theoretically a conflict-generating formula, the combination “A * B * M” does not appear in the dataset of ethno-territorial encounters in this study—simply because there is no encounter in this study in which both conditions “A” and “B” are present at the same time. This situation may result in conflict formulas parts of which may look “strange”. As discussed before (Step 3), such problems can be solved by sound interpretations or by the inclusion of fictive but theoretically correct cases into the reduction process of the analysis. The logic of both methods are very similar.

The results of this analysis can be interpreted as follows: all these ethno-territorial conflicts (C) are produced by ethno-territorial encounters located in a mosaic type of ethno-geographical configuration (M). They are in an autonomous setting (A) if there is no transborder dominance (b) (Equation 28). On the other hand, if there is such a dominance (B)—that is, the subordinated ethno-territorial group’s kinfolk in a neighboring country/union republic is titular and is three times more populous than the titular overlords in the host country/union republic—the conflict can still be explained without the subordinated ethno-territorial group having a
lower-ranked autonomous homeland within the host country/union republic (a) (Equation 29).

Using the other aforementioned method, we list first all combinations of these three conditions. In addition to the combinations in Table 7.8—c= A * b * m, c= a * b * m, c= a * B * m, c= A * b * M, C= A * B * M, c= a * B * M, c= a * b * M—two “fictive” combinations exist: “A * B * M” and “A * B * m”. Based on the theoretical assumptions and consistent with the results of statistical analysis, autonomous setting (A) and transborder dominance (B) are both important conditions which contribute to conflict. Moreover, although most encounters in such a type of ethno-geographical configuration do not lead to conflict, all conflicts are located in an area which can be typified as the mosaic type of ethno-geographical configuration (M). Therefore, it can be theoretically expected and assumed that the combination “A * B * M” may lead to conflict (Equation 30). At first glance it is uncertain whether the combination “A * B * m” does, or does not, produce conflict. On the one hand, in this combination two important conflict-generating conditions “A” and “B” are present, while only “m” is absent. Therefore, it could be suggested that the absence of “m” in combination with the presence of “A” and “B” might lead to conflict. On the other hand, the empirical data in Table 7.8 show that the combinations “a * b * M”, “a * b * m”, and especially “A * b * m” and “a * B * m” do not lead to conflict, which suggests that “A * B * m” may not lead to conflict. One has to realize that the presence of either “B” or “A” in combination with the absence of “m” has not produced any conflicts in so many encounters, all of which show, in reality, a combination of at least five other conditions with different values—that is, the combination of absence and presence of at least five other conditions. All this suggests that “A * B * m” may not produce conflict (Equation 31):

(30) C= A * B * M
(31) c= A * B * m

The addition of the combinations “A * B * M” and “A * B * m” respectively as a “conflict-generating” combination (Equation 30) and a “peaceful-remaining” combination, together with the existing combinations (Table 7.8), into the analysis—which is here, in fact, a simple Boolean reduction process—results in two parsimonious equations (32–33), which are easy to interpret and can explain the conflicts explained earlier respectively by Equations 28 and 29. The addition of only “A * B * M”, without “A * B * m”, produces the same results (Equations 32–33), which is fine because the assumption “c= A * B * m” (Equation 31) was not really certain:
(32) C = A * M  

(33) C = B * M  
(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War])

These equations mean that ethno-territorial conflicts outside the Russian Federation are explained by a mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M) in combination with either autonomy (A) or transborder dominance: (A + B) * M.

Apparently, transborder dominance compensates for the lack of autonomy. In contrast to the former equations (28–29), these improved conflict formulas (Equations 32–33) do not imply that the presence of one condition must be accompanied by the absence of the other. According to these formulas (Equations 32–33), a fictive encounter in which both transborder dominance (B) and autonomy (A) are present simultaneously, in addition to being located in a mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M), would be afflicted by conflict (C). Moreover, neither combination results in any contradiction: “A * M” and “B * M”, outside the Russian Federation, always lead to conflict and never to co-existence.

**Step 10: Comparing explanations**

After I have addressed a number of issues below, Table 7.9 will compare the explaining power of different combinations. A few plausibly interpretable explaining combinations are presented in this table. Each of these combinations can explain one or more ethno-territorial conflicts. An ethno-territorial conflict can be explained by more than one combination at the same time, and some combinations are implicitly present in the others. The condition location in (F) and outside the Russian Federation (f) is not included in these combinations, but the location of each encounter is mentioned in the table.

It appears that the combination of the mosaic type of configuration and autonomous setting (A * M), and the combination of the mosaic type of configuration and titular demographic dominance (D * M) are the most important explaining combinations, whether with or without any other accompanying conditions. Nevertheless, these combinations overlap to a great extent. The combination of the mosaic type of
configuration and autonomous setting (A * M) is present in all cases in which the second combination (D * M) is present, but not vice versa.

Titular demographic dominance (D) appears to be a necessary condition in the only vertical case of ethno-territorial conflict in Russia (Chechnya) but does not appear to be so outside Russia. However, it is often present even there. Titular demographic dominance (D) is present in three of the four ethno-territorial conflicts explained by the combination of the mosaic type of configuration with autonomous setting (A * M). The Abkhazian conflict is the only ethno-territorial conflict outside Russia in which a lower-ranked titular group does not constitute the majority of population in its titular territory (d). Therefore, it can be concluded that the combination of the mosaic type of configuration and titular demographic dominance (D * M), instead of the other one (A * M), is a necessary combination for explaining ethno-territorial conflict, the Abkhazian conflict being an exception.

The combinations of either autonomous setting (S * A * G * M) or titular demographic dominance (S * D * G * M), and ethno-political subordination, contiguity, and the mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration do not explain any more, but explain fewer, ethno-territorial conflicts than the previous two (A * M and D * M) do. The addition of the combination of ethno-political subordination and contiguity (S * G) to those combinations (A * M and D * M) does not result in any improvements. In other words, the conflicts explained by the latter combinations (S * A * G * M and S * D * G * M) are subsets of those explained by the previous shorter combinations (A * M and D * M), while the conflicts explained by the combination of titular demographic dominance with the mosaic type of ethno-geographic dominance (D * M) are themselves a subset of those explained by the combination of autonomous setting and the mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (A * M). The Prigorodny conflict, the only horizontal ethno-territorial conflict, can be explained by the combination of titular demographic dominance, contiguity, and the mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration accompanied by a negative value (absence) of ethno-political subordination (s * D * G * M); but the interpretation of this combination is somewhat difficult. However, this combination is also a subset of the combination of titular demographic dominance and the mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (D * M), but in the Russian Federation this combination (D * M) appears not to be sufficient for the explanation of ethno-territorial conflicts and has to be combined with either traumatic peak experience (T) or religious difference (R).

200 Similarly, a combination (S * D * k * M) exists which may explain the Chechen conflict, but its interpretation is very difficult and not at all plausible. “K” is itself a subset of “G”.

320
The combination of the mosaic type of configuration and transborder dominance (B * M) is also an important one. Although it explains no more than 25% of ethno-territorial conflicts, the cases explained by it cannot be explained by any other combination.

All in all, location in a mosaic type of ethno-geographical configuration (M), autonomous setting (A), and titular demographic dominance (D) are the most important explaining conditions, because they are the most frequently present ones in the explaining conditions (conflict formulas). Religious difference (R) and traumatic peak experience (T) are important in Russia because there the combination of titular demographic dominance and the mosaic type of ethno-geographic dominance (D * M) can explain conflict only in combination with either of these conditions. Transborder dominance (B) can explain conflict only in combination with a mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M). This combination (B * M) explains only 25% (two of the eight) ethno-territorial conflicts. The condition transborder dominance (B), nevertheless, is an important one because it is part of the only combination (B * M) which is able to explain the two ethno-territorial conflicts in Central Asia.

### Table 7.9. A number of explaining combinations and their coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPLAINING COMBINATION</th>
<th>EXPLAINED</th>
<th>C % EXPLAINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T * D * M</td>
<td>Azerbaijani–Armenian in Azerbaijan [Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict] + Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict]</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s * D * G * M</td>
<td>Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict]</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

While Central Eurasia is generally known to be a conflict-prone region, only a small proportion (6.2%) of all ethno-territorial encounters in the current study are afflicted by conflict. Despite the Caucasus being known as a shatterbelt, the proportion of ethno-territorial encounters afflicted by conflict is smaller in the Caucasus (6.3%) than it is in Central Asia (9.1%). Despite its ethno-religious diversity and resemblance to the Caucasus, Fereydan, the Iranian “little Caucasus”, has remained free of ethno-territorial conflict. Apparently, ethnic diversity alone cannot cause ethno-territorial conflicts; only those ethno-territorial encounters lead to conflict which fulfill (a combination of) certain conditions.

All conditions appear to enhance the chances of emergence of ethno-territorial conflict. Nevertheless, those conditions are not equally important in this respect. The demographic dominance of ethno-territorial groups inside their titular territorial autonomy (D) appears to enhance radically the chances of an ethno-territorial encounter becoming marked by conflict. Transborder dominance (B) also enhances these chances to a rather large extent.

Whereas the statistical analysis of variables produces a neat arrangement of conditions that are more and less associated with ethno-territorial conflict (Table 7.2), the application of the QCA method evokes the image of a workshop in operation where semi-finished products and waste are difficult to distinguish. The reason is QCA’s great ambition of determinism and the (initially) large number of conditions in the analysis. When the number of positive cases (showing conflict) is relatively small and the set of conditions large, as in the current study, one may easily end with a separate formula for each conflict. This result (approximately Step 1 in the analysis above) is obviously closer to the ideal of descriptive studies hailing the uniqueness of social phenomena than to the goal of generalization. In order to reach more general conclusions (parsimonious equations), I have manipulated the set of conditions and in one case experimentally changed the value attributed to a condition (T). This may convey the impression of manipulating data in order to prove a preconceived idea; however, there was no hypothesis (neither from the author nor in the literature) that could have been written in a specific Boolean equation; and, moreover, different subsequent analyses (steps) confirmed the results of these manipulations in one way or another. This part of the research, therefore, seems more heuristic than the preceding univariate analysis, which at least (dis)proved assumptions from the literature, such as the role of religion.
There are, nevertheless, strong reasons to apply QCA: first, because it is a more accountable version of the comparative method that some authors apply off the cuff in descriptive analyses of a handful of cases that seem to illustrate a theoretical issue; second, because it just as meticulously scrutinizes the host of cases in which the theoretically interesting phenomenon (conflict) does not occur (121 of the 129 cases of ethno-territorial encounter in this study); and third, because the combination of conditions seems to reveal the essential role of a condition that remains invisible in statistical analyses. The superiority of the method, however, seems to be counteracted by the complexity of the outcomes. One may ask if manipulation in order to get more parsimonious results is a methodologically sound strategy. Actually, manipulation is acknowledged in QCA methodology on account of some peculiarities that are intrinsic to the method, such as the silent role of non-occurring cases (=combinations). Another argument is that uncertainties of measurement—such as the assignment of a dichotomous value—have a more disastrous effect in QCA than in statistical analyses, where they just merge into the noise of a probability coefficient. In any case, the recurrence of certain conditions such as “M” (the mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration) is telling.

A more relevant question is whether the power of the result is not undermined by such measures as splitting up the population into separate “worlds” (inside and outside the Russian Federation). While producing more parsimonious equations, it diminishes the generalizing power of the equation. On the other hand, splitting up, or introducing an extra condition, is wholly in the spirit of QCA. It eliminates the complex conditions implied in the political-historical context of a region and brings to the fore politico-territorial factors that control the behavior of ethno-territorial groups.

All in all, the most significant result is that being located in a mosaic type of ethnic configuration is a necessary condition in explaining ethno-territorial conflict. Mosaicness, in combinations with autonomous setting (A * M) or transborder dominance (B * M), explains ethno-territorial conflict outside the Russian Federation. Inside Russia, however, more conditions are required. In Russia the combination of location in a mosaic area and titular demographic dominance explains ethno-territorial conflict, either in combination with traumatic peak experience (T * D * M) or with religious difference (R * D * M).