China rejuvenated? Governmentality, subjectivity, and normativity: the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games

Chong, P.L.G.

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IV

MORE THAN A SMILE
“We have to have a good Olympics, otherwise not only will our generation lose face, but also our ancestors.”
(Wang Qishan [王岐山], mayor of Beijing) 98

To have a good Olympics, as Wang suggested, was the collective responsibility for all people of Chinese descent. Wang’s words also shed light on the significance assigned to the Beijing Olympic Games — not to “lose face”: to avoid failure, shame, public disgrace, ridicule, and criticisms collectively. The importance of not losing face, he reminded us, was not only for the present generation, but was also our responsibility to our ancestors — the past. His emphasis on “a good Olympics” and “losing face” prompts us to ask the following questions: What is the meaning of face and how is it incorporated into governing strategies to help achieve desired goals? And, why was losing face perceived as such a devastating happening that Chinese would have to avoid at all cost?

The modern Olympic Games is a global media spectacle (Debord 1994 [1967]; Tomlinson 1996). The 2008 Olympics presented the biggest advertising opportunity for the state to showcase itself. Academic researchers working on the Beijing Olympics share the view that the Games served as an important marker for China’s ascendency to the global political arena (G. Xu 2008a; R. Ong 2004; Close, Askew, and Xu 2007; Brownell 2008; Broudehoux 2007; X. Xu 2006; Tomlinson 2008; Price and Dayan 2008; Price 2008;
Haugen 2003, 2005; J. Dong 2005; Black and Bezanson 2004; Dong and Mangan 2008a; Caffrey 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). This China ascendency discourse, promoted as China’s great rejuvenation by the authorities, as I mentioned in chapter 1, is intimately related to the discourse of national humiliation.

In Chinese, national humiliation (国耻) is not only humiliation — insulted, disrespected in public — per se; the character 耻 also refers to shame. However, this shame aspect is generally neglected in the English translation and in academic discussion. The discourse of national humiliation usually gives prominence to humiliation — how the Chinese have been assuming a victim role in the hands of the Western imperialism — and ignores by and large the emotion of shame. Shame is a social emotion, triggered by how others think about us and how we see ourselves (H. Fung, 1999: 182; Probyn, 2005: 45). A glimpse of this sense of shame is revealed by the frequent usage of the degrading title “the sick man of Asia,” as chapter 3 has shown. The ways in which Wang Qishan associated the Olympics to the devastating consequences of losing our and our ancestors’ face also direct us to look at this shamefulness. The discourse of national humiliation in Chinese, which combines both a sense of humiliation and shame, reveals how Chinese perceive their relations with their allegedly more developed Western counterparts. To use Foucaultian language, the discourse is a governing strategy that calls forth the selective past to shape the subjects’ self-perception and their relations with their Western counterparts.

How the Beijing Games were received by the world was read as the fate of the country, as Wang’s words remind us once again. “A good Olympics” would help China gain face — recognition — from the world. This desire for face parallels the fear of losing face, which would be equivalent to shame. The concept of face, understood in the most general sense, refers to the desire for prestige and recognition in order to secure one’s status (Hu 1944). Suffice to say, this desire for prestige and recognition exists in all human society. It is not something exclusively Chinese; yet, I argue, the desire for face and the fear of losing face (i.e. being shamed) have been mobilized by the state in specific ways. The


100 Humiliation happens when one is disrespected and ridiculed; it is inflicted and can be corrected, often through retaliation.

101 Humiliation, according to Collins Cobuild English Dictionary (1997), is the embarrassment and shame one feels when someone makes one appear stupid, or when one makes a mistake in public.
concept of face, as a social behavior that affects, controls, and disciplines individuals’ social behavior, has been studied by sociologist Erving Goffman (1955, 1967) in the Western context, and by Hu (1944) and Ho (1976) in the Chinese contexts. Yet, so far, none has applied this concept to study how it is mobilized as a governing technique in politics and in international relations. In a similar vein, the concept of shame hardly receives any attention in journalistic and academic discourse in the field of China studies.

This fear of being shamed was not that visible or tangible during the Beijing Games. Rather, what one witnessed was a predominately positive image — happiness, joyfulness, harmony-seeking, hospitality, and the like — that the Chinese authorities sought to present to the world. Promotional materials for the volunteer program were indicative in this instance: Smile, the most recognizable positive emotion, was the central theme of all the BOCOG promotional materials and campaigns. This positive image was to be acted out by all the citizens in China in general and the Olympic volunteers in particular. The Volunteers Manual explicitly stated that the volunteer program was directed at all Beijing citizens: “All the citizens of Beijing to smile to express their compassions, to spread civilization, to build a society of harmony and to promote the concepts of People’s Olympics’ and ‘socialist harmonious society’” (99, emphasis added); yet, as I will reveal later, it asked the volunteers specifically to act out this positive image of China.

In most countries, volunteering is usually initiated by non-profit and charity organizations. The relatively recent growing prominence of voluntary services in China is, however, a top-down initiative of the state. Based on the Volunteer Association of China’s definition, volunteers are “people who are willing to provide services or assistance to society or to others, not for material gain, but from a sense of conscience, faith and responsibility” (Volunteers Manual: 4). Sun Baoli, division chief of the volunteers section of the BOCOG, emphasized to me in an interview that modern volunteer services were new in the sense that they had incorporated the western way of organization and

102 Other scholars have used “face” in their writings, for instance, Susan Brownell (1995), yet without much explanation and their focus is not on the concept itself.
103 Most of the materials from the Volunteers Manual, I cite and use for my analysis are in English unless I specifically point out that the materials are taken from the Chinese version of the Volunteers Manual. The contents of both Chinese and English Volunteers Manual are similar; I quote the English version directly to avoid confusion caused by translation.
professionalism in organizing the voluntary works. Yet, the idea of voluntary service was not entirely new. In fact, it was built upon the model citizenry spirit — “serve the people” (为人民服务) — embodied by Lei Feng, as discussed in chapter 1 and 3. Landsberger has also reminded us that the CCP has been promoting the moral education of the people through promoting model citizens who represent correct behavior and correct ideas (2001: 541). The practice of volunteering thus strikes a chord with the model citizens the CCP has sought to promote since its establishment.

Informed by Foucault’s notion of governmentality, this chapter sets out to examine how a model citizenry was produced, not so much by force and law but by a multifaceted set of strategies, tactics, and discourses that regulated, managed, and guided the minds and bodies of citizens to behave as desired by the ruling authority in its quest to host an impeccable Games (Foucault 1991: 95). The government might have introduced the practices of voluntary services to the population, but it did not do so by imposing ideas on the people or by forcing them to become volunteers. Rather, one sees — as demonstrated through my case study — how the government succeeded in arranging things in such ways that molded, guided, and directed its citizens/volunteers to internalize the values and act toward its objectives. The government had thus demonstrated an art of governance that exemplified the generative aspect of power. Model citizens, personified by the volunteers, were produced as the ideals promoted by the state and were inscribed on its citizens.

Despite volunteers’ overwhelming appearance, it is surprising to note that volunteerism and its close relationship with the production of model citizens is an understudied area in the field of Chinese studies. Only two articles on Beijing Olympics have been written about the volunteers: with one tracing volunteerism in Chinese culture back to several thousand years ago (Zhuang 2010) and the other one on the media representation of volunteers (Bladen 2010). Even in general Olympic studies, scant attention has been given to the subject of volunteerism, with a rare exception in human resources and business management (Kemp 2002).


105 My in-depth interviews with volunteers revealed that the volunteers had internalized the values promoted by the state, many expressing that the Olympics were very crucial for China to showcase itself to the world and that they, as Chinese, need to help present the best “face” of the country to the world.
Drawing on an analysis of the Volunteers Manual, posters, and volunteers’ training materials found on the official website of the BOCOG, I trace three intertwining discourses: dream and glory, hosting a great Olympics, and not to lose face. Alongside dream and glory, volunteers had to realize the “national” significance of hosting the Games — a moment for the nation to gain face, and they had to learn to behave in a civilized manner so that the nation would not lose face (e.g. not being impolite to visitors, or not criticizing China). I suggest that these three discourses drew their power from the relatively intangible aspects of national humiliation, the desire for face, and the fear of losing face respectively. Their relative invisibility may well explain their disciplinary power. I will show how the Chinese nation-state mobilized Foucaultian strategies and tactics of governmentality in this volunteer program. The promotional strategies and training materials can be read as governing strategies — invoking and producing specific power relationships through which the state governed its citizens. These strategies shaped citizens’ daily lives by regulating their behavior and turning them into disciplined, happy, dedicated, and selfless volunteers who embraced the Games whole-heartedly. The research aim here is to analyze the production of volunteers as the ideal citizenry, to study the underpinning power relationships, and to question the cultural implications (Foucault 1991: 94–104, 1995).

The following section is a brief discussion of Foucault’s work on governmentality and its relevance to the Beijing Olympic volunteer program (hereafter the Olympic Volunteer program). This is followed by a detailed discussion of the three discourses mentioned above. I will demonstrate how these discourses showcase a new image of China. In the conclusion, I will give a brief discussion of the Shanghai Expo volunteer program to show how the idea of volunteerism was not a one-time phenomenon for the Olympics. As this case study raises more questions than it can answer, I end this chapter by posing questions for further research in the field.
ON THE ART OF GOVERNMENT — GUIDING CONDUCT AT A DISTANCE

The Olympic Volunteer program demonstrates the “art of government” in guiding people to govern the self and the others that shape the possible actions (Foucault 1991). The promotion strategies and the training materials concerning the volunteer program deployed a wide array of strategies and tactics involving many kinds of people and many forms of government to achieve the desired ends (ibid.: 95). The volunteer program was not oppressive in nature; instead, it helped produce an allegedly new citizenry that embraced the positive image the organizers sought to show to the world.

Figure 4.1: Poster in subway, taken on November 22, 2007.

Smile — the most recognizable positive image — was the main theme for the Olympic Volunteer program (see, for example, figures 4.1 and 4.2.) Figure 4.1 is a poster calling for active participation in the Beijing Olympics. As the slogan proclaims, “I participate, I contribute and I enjoy (我参与, 我奉献, 我快乐)”106 Central in this poster was the number “2008” that was comprised of small photos of smiling faces from all walks of life. The poster delivered the following message: participate in the volunteer program;

106 Another translation could be “I participate, I contribute. I am happy.” The Chinese version could be found in many posters and promotion materials; the English version was not as common as the Chinese one and sometimes one could find different English translations of this slogan.
together we make a happy year of 2008. Figure 4.2 shows three promotional posters, representing three different types of volunteers, often accompanied by the following slogans: “Volunteers’ smiles are Beijing’s calling card,” “Smiling Beijing campaign,” “Smile campaign,” and “Wearing the smile wristband campaign.” All the promotional images of the volunteer program, accompanied by slogans, projected positive emotions such as broad smiles and words depicting positive emotions such as “smile,” “splendid,” “enjoy,” and the like.

Figure 4.2: Three posters found in the new subway line 10, taken on July 21, 2008.

These positive emotions were not only confined to pictorial images; they also constituted something that needed to be embraced and acted out by citizens. Promotional materials depicting these positive images were found everywhere: on the streets, billboards, TV screens inside public transportation, and so forth. Discussion and promotional campaigns concerning the volunteer program took place on a daily basis. Media, coupled with new technologies, helped strengthen the program’s maximum visibility.
To ensure citizens’ active participation in the Games as a regularized reality, a broad spectrum of organizations was involved in organizing and planning the promotional campaigns: the BOCOG, which had a department specializing in volunteer service;107 and other government organizations such as the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League (中国共青团), Beijing Olympic Games Volunteer Work Coordination Group (北京奥运会志愿者工作协调小组), as well as all kinds of district-level and community-level organizations. The broad involvement of social and official organizations ensured that the volunteer campaigns enveloped different levels of society, from working units to schools to housing communities. These organizations actively ran a series of campaigns; to name a few examples, “Chinese volunteers, People’s Olympics,”108 “Smiling Beijing” with six working projects (“Towards the Olympics” Voluntary Service Project, the BOCOG Pre-Games Volunteer Project, the Games-time Volunteer Project, the City Volunteer Project, the Social Volunteer Project, and the Olympic Volunteer Work Legacy Transformation Project), recruitment campaigns, volunteer training, different kinds of promotional campaigns in communities (e.g. public discussions and forum, banners and posters encouraging active participation), etc.

Foucault argues that visibility — be it real or imagined — is crucial in disciplining individuals (Foucault 1995). The omnipresence of the promotional strategies worked as a disciplinary scheme that helped the governing body promote the message: embrace the Games. As a normalized reality, the volunteering skills/messages — to participate, to contribute, to enjoy the Games — were proper ideals that citizens should internalize.

Power, to recall Foucault again, is of a productive nature: Power is something that is acted out and performed by individuals (Foucault 1980a). Each individual constitutes a part of power relations within his/her society — power is power relations. The effectiveness of a governing body should be evaluated through how well it manages power.

107 It was responsible for “determining the necessity, recruitment, training, management, logistics support, and rewarding of the preliminary-phase volunteers, ‘Good Luck Beijing’ competition volunteers, as well as Olympic and Paralympic Games-time volunteers; participating in organizing the advertising for and education of volunteers, planning and organizing the ‘Good Luck Beijing’ competition volunteer services as well as Olympic and Paralympic Games spectator services.” “Functional Areas.” 2008. The Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. http://en.beijing2008.cn/bocog/organization/n214071835.shtml#zy (accessed on Oct 11, 2008).

relations, by deploying “men and things” (Foucault 1991) and not by force and coercion. The volunteer program exemplifies this point. The program was, on the one hand, designed to reach all citizens; while, on the other hand, it systematically classified citizens into different categories, and coordinated these categories to ensure that they presented a positive image of China. The six categories were: (1) “Towards Olympics” volunteers, (2) Games volunteers, (3) Paralympic Games volunteers, (4) BOCOG Pre-Games volunteers, (5) city volunteers, and (6) society volunteers (Volunteers Manual: 127).

Each category had its set of recruitment criteria, training, and responsibilities. Hierarchy and prestige were strategically arranged in such ways that individuals knew their roles and responsibilities. In the Volunteers Manual, it was stated that “volunteers for the Olympic and Paralympic Games will be mainly recruited in the Beijing area with college students as the main resource . . . preferred volunteers are those who are well-educated, of high-spirit and with excellent professional skills” (113) and “Olympic volunteers not only need to possess high moral standards, but they should also have solid knowledge and flexible troubleshooting skills” (119). Games volunteers, followed by Paralympic Games volunteers,109 were the most prestigious. Students outside Beijing would also be selected if they had outstanding academic achievements or special skills.110 Many university students applied and the selection processes were demanding. The organizers, as stated in the Volunteers Manual, chose only “the best” for the task.111 The best candidates would be assigned to the most important Olympic venues: For instance, students from Peking University were assigned to the National Stadium, and students from Tsinghua University were dispatched to the National Aquatics Center. In this light, being selected as Games and Paralympic Games volunteers was highly prized, something the volunteers’ families would

109 Most of the volunteers, serving during the Olympics, would become Paralympic Games volunteers. However, new volunteers would still be recruited as some Olympic volunteers withdrew from serving the Paralympics.

110 The official website said that the volunteers would be recruited from all over China. “Volunteer Recruitment for Beijing 2008.” 2007. http://en.beijing2008.cn/78/00/article214010078.shtml. Yet, the majority of the Games-time volunteers were recruited from the universities in Beijing. Universities in Beijing are known to be the best in the PRC; students outside of the Beijing area had to have very good results in order to be accepted, as mentioned in the Volunteers Manual: 176. My interview with a volunteer also mentioned this, “In the Bird’s Nest, there were some volunteers from other regions; their selection processes were more demanding than ours. In Hebei (河北) province, thirty thousand people applied and only one hundred were selected. They had to go through layers and layers of selection process, including talent performances, with judges giving marks and grades; it was like the Super-girl selection.”

111 This was emphasized by my interviewees; some told me that only one-third of the applicants would be selected for the tasks. Some of the interviewees were not chosen in the first-round, but were selected later as Paralympic Games-time volunteers to replace those who had resigned.
often take pride in.\textsuperscript{112} City volunteers (stationed throughout the city) were mostly recruited from the Communist Youth League and high schools in Beijing; whereas society volunteers (stationed in the neighborhoods) were often retired or unemployed citizens living in the same neighborhoods where they also acted as volunteers.\textsuperscript{113} In all these cases, the word “volunteer” actually concealed the fact that becoming a volunteer was never something entirely “voluntary,” but something that often came with different kinds of pressure.

Uniforms for volunteers also differed according to the category of volunteers. Games and Paralympic Games volunteers, the most prestigious categories, had a whole uniform set sponsored by the German sportswear company Adidas;\textsuperscript{114} city volunteers had only a blue t-shirt sponsored by a Chinese telecom company, China Mobile; and society volunteers had a t-shirt sponsored by a Beijing brewery company, Yanjing Beer (燕京啤 酒). Hierarchy and prestige went hand in hand with duties. The most prestigious volunteers were assigned with Olympic post-specific responsibilities\textsuperscript{115} and accordingly given more formal training to acquire “professional knowledge and skills necessary for the posts.”\textsuperscript{116} This classification was crucial: It strengthened the disciplinary of the self \textit{by the self}. It helped produce a self that was committed to be or become a volunteer, an identity that promised happiness, bodily manners, knowledge, and social recognition, which — in the meantime — induced them to serve their country and help others.

The volunteer program displayed the art of government: The organizers and the state organizations invoked not one strategy but a set of multifaceted tactics that helped organize “men and things” in a proper way to achieve their desired ends. Visibility is the first step to subject one to the power of control; yet, to have citizens be or become the ideal volunteers, less visible and invisible governing techniques were deployed. The

\textsuperscript{112} My interviewees told me that their parents asked them to bring along their uniforms on their home-visits in order to show off to their relations and acquaintances.

\textsuperscript{113} Some of these society volunteers might not be “real” volunteers per se — committed to unpaid charitable practices — but unemployed and retired citizens fulfilling neighborhood duties required by the communities. They might get official certificates or small presents for their duties.

\textsuperscript{114} A uniform set included two t-shirts, two pairs of pants, a pair of shoes, a cap, a waist bag, and a water-bottle, all sponsored by Adidas.

\textsuperscript{115} The Olympic post-specific positions were positions that would have direct contacts with the IOC representatives, guests of the IOC, international media, and foreign visitors (\textit{Volunteers Manual} 128).

emphasize on “smile” — to showcase a positive image — presented only the images the BOCOG and the state officials wanted us to see, and this was the most visible disciplinary technology. Yet, other not-so-visible but intertwined discourses were also present. A volunteer’s complete training included a wide array of topics ranging from the basics of decorum to knowledge of the Olympic host city and co-host cities. One important part of these strategies aimed to teach volunteers to be proud of their Chinese heritage, by repeatedly emphasizing China’s five thousand years of civilization, family values and wisdoms, and so on.

DREAM AND GLORY — (IN)VISIBILITY OF A CENTURY OF NATIONAL HUMILIATION

The emphasis on “China’s Olympic dream being realized” presented a moment of pride and glory, a moment that was finally getting closer after a century of national humiliation. Interestingly, like the all-pervading smiles, the discourse of national humiliation gave way to a more positive discourse — a 100-year dream coming true — a moment of glory. Almost all the Chinese people whom I talked to in Beijing in 2008 had high hopes, which were however mixed with a sense of anxiety because of the global media contestations arising after the Tibet demonstrations and followed by the Olympic Torch Relay. They saw the Beijing Games as an invaluable opportunity for China to display the country’s economic strength and accelerating development to the world. In doing so, China could cleanse the past national humiliation. As Callahan argues correctly, “the national humiliation shows how China’s insecurities are not just material, a matter of catching up to the West militarily and economically, but symbolic. Indeed, one of the goals of Chinese foreign policy has been to ‘cleanse national humiliation’” (2004: 202). The discourse of national humiliation went hand in hand with the discourse of national salvation. To “cleanse” this national humiliation China needed a stage, a stage where the country could perform and display a strong nation to the world and be “recognized” by the international community for its achievements in recent years.
The desire for world recognition had been presented as “a dream,” a dream that China had longed to realize for more than a century (see Figure 4.3). The slogan, “China’s Hundred-Year Olympic Dream Finally Comes True” (百年奥运 中华圆梦)\(^\text{117}\) was frequently brought up in the media and the official materials in the run-up to the Games. The Beijing Olympic Slogan — “One World, One Dream” — placed emphasis on the “dream.” The word “dream” appeared frequently in many promotion materials and media, reminding Chinese people of the significance of the Games as an unfulfilled desire of the past that was soon to be realized.

Similar to the emphasis on smiles, the explicit discourse on dream and glory eclipses the discourse on national humiliation. In chapter 3 of the *Volunteers Manual*, a section entitled “Glory and Dream” was devoted to describe positive moments such as achievements and triumph over rocky moments. The opening sentence reads:

Modern China, a product of 5,000 years of civilization and history, with her spirit of hard work and perseverance, finally shook hands with the Olympic Games on this

\(^{117}\) *Volunteers Manual*: 69 and 73.
day [the day China won the right to host the Olympic Games, July 13, 2001],
fulfilling the great dream of the Chinese people. *(Volunteers Manual 69)*

The humiliation and weakness of the past mentioned in the discourse on national humiliation were downplayed and described as follows: “the development of friendship between China and the Olympics has been rocky . . . It has been a long road for China, but the day is coming soon when this dream will be fully realized.” *(ibid.)* The hardship and suffering referred to in the national humiliation discourse were articulated in the following way: “[It] has been rocky” and “it has been a long road for China”; through affirmation such as “[we] worked hard to know more,” the dream was given its narrative place. For instance, all three titles in the first part of this chapter contained the word dream — “Start of the Dream — First Contact with the Olympics,” “Dreams Keep Rising — The Olympic Road of New China,” and “Dream Comes True — Beijing & the Olympics” *(ibid.: 69–73).* In this chapter alone, the word dream appeared twenty-six times.

To have a dream was not enough. Readers were reminded of past glories — “unforgettable memories” *(ibid.: 75)* when Chinese athletes had won gold medals in previous Olympic Games. Photos of moments of triumph and glory were shown in the *Volunteers Manual* *(ibid.: 76–77).* The authors presented three charts showing how Chinese athletes had continually improved their performances in consecutive Olympic Games.

The past became almost “humiliation-free.” The only mention in the *Volunteers Manual* about the past humiliation concerned the foreign invasion in the nineteenth century and the destruction of Yuanmingyuan (圆明园) in the tourism section of chapter 7, “Olympic Cities.” The Ruins of Yuanmingyuan (圆明园遗址), Callahan writes, are “the iconic image of the official history of the century of national humiliation” *(2004: 208).* However, this iconic image of the past humiliation was only mentioned in passing:

*It inherited the outstanding traditional architectural highlights of 3,000 years ago . . . It embodies different architectural styles which present an aesthetics and harmonious layout. Unfortunately, when the Anglo-French forces invaded Beijing in 1860, the whole grounds were set on fire, leaving a tragedy in the architecture and history of China.* *(Volunteers Manual: 180–81)*
In introducing other host cities such as Qingdao (青岛), the history of that city as a semi-colony of Germany was not directly mentioned, but the description states:

History left a rich architectural heritage to Qingdao. Buildings of different styles of more than 20 countries present a picture of European continental features . . . The many cultural relics reveal Qingdao’s century old history and the abundance of a combination of [E]astern and [W]estern cultures. (Volunteers Manual: 190)

In the brief description of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the colonial past of Hong Kong and how it was ceded to the British was not mentioned. To quote Callahan, “Hong Kong is written into Chinese national history as a sign of humiliation” (2004: 212). The Volunteers Manual only mentioned this history of Hong Kong briefly: “It [Hong Kong] is a city that blends Chinese and Western features, inheriting the traditions of China as well as deeply impacted by Great Britain. Attractions in Hong Kong include Ocean Park, Victoria Peak and Disneyland” (Volunteers Manual: 192–93). The long-held humiliation symbolized by Hong Kong was left unmentioned.

The recurrent emphasis on dream and glory and the absence of national humiliation in the promotional and training materials of the volunteer program, I suggest, were strategies that, on the one hand, guided citizens and volunteers to embrace the Games with all positive emotions (the discourse of national humiliation needed to be managed carefully; if citizens were emotionally burdened with China’s past humiliation, they might express anger — negative emotions — toward “the [imperial] West”). On the other hand, these materials presented to the citizens the capable image of the ruling authority that led China to the road of national salvation and glory.
HOSTING A GREAT OLYMPICS — THE DESIRE FOR “FACE”

The ruling authority sought to convey and promote a positive face of China to the world. But, what is this face? The Chinese intellectual and writer, Lu Xun (鲁迅) once wrote, “But what is this thing called face? It is very well if you don’t stop to think, but the more you think the more confused you grow” (Lu Xun, quoted in Ho 1976: 867).

Anthropologist Hu (1944), in her article “The Chinese Concepts of ‘Face’,” discusses the concepts of face (lian [脸] and mianzi [面子]). Both lian and mianzi are translated as face in English; however, the two are in fact quite different. According to Hu, lian stands for “the confidence of society in [the] moral character of ego” (61); whereas, mianzi refers to “well-earned popularity which is called mingyu (名誉) — ‘reputation’ in its best sense . . . it [also] implies a desire for self-aggrandizement” (1944: 61). In this section, I will discuss how hosting a Great Olympics was driven by a desire to gain face. The concept of face involving the idea of mianzi — a desire for recognition and reputation — is the most relevant here; whereas the concept of face involving the idea of lian — judged by one’s proper behavior — is discussed in the next section, where I focus on the discourse of not to lose face — (un)doing shame.

The concept of mianzi is applicable to politics. Status is graded within a society; the same applies to the political arena. Within China and the larger Chinese communities globally, the party-state always presents itself as the patriarchal figure of the big family, as prescribed in Confucian and Mencian theories. To be the respectable leader of this family, the ruling party needs mianzi — authority, status, honor, and prestige — in front of the people. In this sense, mianzi is translated in legitimacy and high morals, which enable elites to rule, according to the Chinese definition of power. The desire for mianzi is the ruling authority’s strategy of maintaining its legitimacy to govern China and the people. This desire of face could be analyzed in three types of mianzi: wanting face (要面子), considering face (顾面子), and deserving face (给面子).

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118 Lu Xun is one of the major Chinese writers of the twentieth century. He is renowned for critiquing social problems in China and “Chinese national characteristics.”
Wanting Face (要面子)\textsuperscript{119}

China’s desire for international recognition could be described as *yao mianzi* (要面子), meaning wanting face. Because this desire for face is of high value to a person, that person will do his/her utmost to show off, to project an image that is more than what a person actually is. This desire for face is particularly salient if a person is burdened with an inferiority complex: Once this person of lower social standing achieves a certain economic or social standing, s/he will try psychologically to compensate for the previous lack in social recognition. The discourse on national humiliation reminds us of this inferiority complex: After thirty years of reform, the economy of today’s China has improved tremendously. *Yao mianzi* motivated China to promise to host an Olympics that would be of “high quality and distinction” (有特色高水平).\textsuperscript{120} The *Volunteers Manual* (Chinese version) opened with “世界给我一个机遇, 我还世界一个精彩 (the world gives me an opportunity, and I will give back the world a miracle).”\textsuperscript{121} The world gave China this opportunity, and China and its people declared confidently that they would organize a “miracle-like” Olympics, not just an Olympics. China dressed up Beijing in its most elegant clothes, and provided all visitors with meticulous and caring services. Claims were made in terms of superlatives; for example, the highest number of volunteers in Olympic history, and the highest level of support from the population.\textsuperscript{122}

The population’s support was crucial as it posed a counter-image of how the West often perceived the government as an oppressive regime. As such, support from the people was essential to gain face in the international arena, which would then directly affect the people’s perception of the CCP and China. This support was attained through managing the people’s sentiments — pride — toward China. China’s recent achievement was

\textsuperscript{119} According to Hu (1944), it is the closest to saving face in English. She further elaborates that “the tendency of human beings lacking in education or talent to insist all the more on social recognition, once they have a certain social position, is well known” (58).

\textsuperscript{120} “High quality and distinction” is the goal of the Beijing Games. According to the *Volunteers Manual*, distinction refers to “Chinese style, cultural splendor, contemporary spirit and mass participation” (79).

\textsuperscript{121} This translation is from the official materials I came across in the “One World One Dream” — Theme Exhibition on Beijing Olympic Games, held in the China Millennium Monument, which I visited on August 29, 2008.

\textsuperscript{122} “National Participation: Encourage people from all walks of life to share the opportunities brought by the Olympics; attract and inspire 1.3 billion Chinese nationals and millions of overseas Chinese to support Olympic organization” (*Volunteers Manual*: 82).
repeatedly told; for example, in the official English learning materials “Olympics in China,” it said:

1) China’s successful bid for the 2008 Olympics has given the country the international prestige it has been seeking in recent years.

2) The dynamic growth of Beijing reflects that of China as a whole.

3) By 2008, the environmental quality in Beijing will be comparable to that of major cities in developed countries.

Another section, entitled “About the 2008 Olympics”, included a few mock dialogues:

1) Q: What do you think about Beijing hosting the BOG?
   A: I think it’s a great chance for the world to know more about China.

2) Q: Do you think the Olympics will be successful in Beijing?
   A: I’m sure the Games will be a great success.

3) Q: What do people in your country think about the Olympic Games being held in China?
   A: They think it was a good decision by the International Olympic Committee. They are very curious about China.

4) Q: What do you think of the slogan “New Beijing, Great Olympics”?
   A: I think that Beijing really is a new city. It combines modern technology with ancient history. It’s a world-class city for sure.

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Considering Face (顾面子)

Hosting a great Olympics was an act of *gumianzi* (顾面子), that is, to consider face, to give priority to one’s social standing and take into consideration of what is appropriate for a person’s social standing; for example, the patriarch of a big family would throw a big banquet for his birthday. It is an act that helps maintain status or even to advance prestige (Hu, 1944: 55). Since face is given high priority, the host will do his/her very best to avoid any depreciation of face. A banquet in itself is not enough — the setting, the food served, and the servants who serve — are all important elements that the organizer has to think about, to secure favorable comments in the end.

As the manpower needed to hold a big Olympic party could escalate the cost of operation, the seniors of this family came up with the idea of having their family members work for the banquet, cutting the costs and presenting a picture of a unified and harmonious family. The promotional campaigns opened volunteering services to all citizens, implying that everybody could qualify. Yet, when it came to the actual recruitment, it boiled down to selection for specific positions: Preference was given to young, healthy, law-abiding, and educated citizens who mastered at least one foreign language. Only a small fraction of the population would qualify. When it came to positions such as those of the ceremonial girls, the criteria called for “beautiful girls,” young women endowed with a good figure who represented the feminine beauty of this ancient civilization. Here we see how the disciplinary techniques were inscribed onto the body — only some bodies were allowed to give the nation face, whereas others were excluded. These strategies exemplify Foucault’s art of government — to guide conduct at a distance — “what the government has to do with is not territory but rather a sort of complex composed of men and things” (Foucault 1991: 93).

Deserving Face (给面子)

Through the politics of recruitment, the organizers succeeded in making the selected few believe that they were the “better” citizens, the model citizens that carried this

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125 In the recruiting principles, it says “trying to attract people as much as possible to participate” (*Volunteers Manual*: 113).
national duty to present the best image of China to the world. This national duty required them to embody a sense of pride for their motherland. The phrase *geimianzi* (给面子), to acknowledge one’s status in front of others (Hu 1944: 56), could best describe this desire. An example taken from the *Volunteers Manual* states:

> From the [sic] Olympia to the Great Wall, the century-old glory of the Olympic Movement blends with the splendor of Chinese civilization. In 2008, China, the ancient country with 5,000 years of history, will present her particular appearance and accept different cultures with an open heart. Through this event, the Chinese civilization and the Olympic Movement will add radiance and beauty to each other and create a unique and harmonious heritage for the whole world. (101)

The training materials, such as the *Volunteers Manual* and materials for learning English, referred to China’s long history and cultural background, instilling a sense of national and cultural pride in the volunteers. For example, in a section called “About China, Chinese Culture, and the Chinese”, the authors set a few topics that they thought their imagined Other — the Westerners — would talk about. These were in dialogue format: The Chinese, signified by C, would ask questions; whereas the Westerners, signified by W1 and W2 would express their opinions about China. The following presents some examples:

1)  C: What do you think of China?

   W1: China is a fascinating country. It has a lot to offer the world.

   W2: I don’t know a lot about China yet, but I’m eager to learn.

2)  C: What do you think of the Chinese?

   W1: Chinese are very hospitable and kind-hearted.

   W2: Chinese value family and education more than Americans.

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3) C: What are your feelings about life in China?
   W1: Life in China is so different from life in my country.
   W2: Life here seems more stable than life in my country.

4) C: What do you think of the Forbidden City?
   W1: I feel like I am walking through history.
   W2: It’s really proof of [the] China’s greatness and wisdom.

What were being played out here were self-orientalizing stereotypes about China’s assumed characteristics (emphasizing family values, rich cultures, and wisdoms, etc.) vis-à-vis an imagined Other (often reduced to the United States). These constructions had subsequently strengthened the assumed cultural differences. They helped discipline volunteers into subject positions that were constructed as intrinsically Chinese and essentially different from the Western Other.
The ruling authority, having committed so much to host a “great Olympics,” convinced the population that the world would acknowledge its efforts by giving face — geimianzi — a reciprocal act. Figure 4.4 shows a poster with the caption explicitly stating “Beijing welcomes the world with a smile, the world returns Beijing with a smile” (北京用微笑迎接世界 世界用微笑回报北京). This message was reinforced by the smiles of children of different races — signifying the hope that reciprocity would be long term, as remembered by children who would carry this good impression of China into the future.
NOT TO LOSE “FACE” — (UN)DOING SHAME

The desire for mianzi goes hand in hand with the fear of losing face. In this section, I argue that the fear of losing face led the organizer to deploy the strategy of shame to discipline the volunteers, turning them into model citizens. Losing face has several meanings. First, it can be understood as depreciation of face — meiyou mianzi (沒有面子) — by not doing something properly in keeping with someone’s social standing or say, failing to do it well to impress others. The consequence is that a person will receive critique or unfavorable comments from the people around him/her, so that his/her authority will be challenged.

Second, losing face can be understood as diaolian (掉臉) — causing a sense of shame. Lian is regarded as an important moral characteristic, which can be gained or lost through acceptable or unacceptable conduct. Lian is not a standardized moral code; it is determined by an individual’s role in the family and society. For example, a father loses lian if his son does not behave properly in school, or when teachers complain about the child in school, because it is seen as the father’s responsibility to educate his child well and how the child behaves reflects the parental guidance and the suzhi of the parents. This could also apply to international politics; a country loses lian if his nationals do not behave well or if it fails to live up to its promises to other countries (Ho 1976). Diaolian — losing face — refers to “a serious infraction of the moral code of society . . . [It] is a blemish on the character of the individual and excites a great deal of comment” (Hu 1944: 46). Losing lian is led by public judgment, not necessarily by law or jurisdiction (ibid.: 47). This blemish on an individual's character triggers the feeling of shame. The feeling of shame affects the whole self (Teroni and Deonna 2008), it is an emotion and affect. The psychological reaction to shame is associated with fear, the fear of being ridiculed, laughed at, and humiliated (Probyn 2005: 47; Ho 1976: 876). In terms of behavioral characteristics, shame makes one want to hide, disappear, or escape (Lickel et al. 2005). The feeling of shame usually lasts longer than humiliation and it demands a “global [re]-evaluation of the self” (Lewis, quoted in Probyn 2005: 45; similar idea is also mentioned in H. Fung 1999: 182). Shame is often cast in a negative light. However, as many have argued, shame is not an entirely negative emotion. To quote Callahan, “to have shame is both a virtue and a

128 Following Probyn, emotion is a cultural and social expression while affects are biological and physiological responses to emotion/cognitive stimulation (see, Probyn 2005: 11).
problem along the lines of the tension between having humility and humiliation” (2004: 201–2). Furthermore, losing lian has collective consequences. An individual belongs to a wider community, in which behavior are connected to the glory and shame of this community. Public disgrace caused by individuals’ misconduct is deemed to have an impact on the larger community the individual belongs to, leading to losing lian in a collective sense.

In brief, mianzi is gained and is seen as “the reward for success” (Hu 1944: 63). To obtain this reward one would need to avoid making mistakes or situations that could lead to failure. Mianzi is gained through demonstrating the positive side; losing face is then understood as a failure to do well, both for the individual and the collective. In the run-up to the Games, different strategies were formulated to avoid losing face. These strategies deployed shame — inducing a sense of shame — as a way to guide citizens, particularly those who would be in the front line interacting with the visitors, to follow a set of “correct” and “must-avoid” behavior codes.

The volunteer program worked through the participation of individuals. The uniform assigned to the volunteers was not only a status marker indicating their qualifications and social positions; this uniform also placed them in a field of public visibility where they bore both the roles to govern and be governed (see, for example, figure 4.5). The better the uniform one wore (for example, those of the Games volunteers), the more responsibility one bore. Citizens wearing a uniform became the bearers of power: They needed to act out the volunteering ideals, and they took up the role of policing/surveying and regulating others.
Shaming was used as a governing tool: a means to discipline volunteers so as to present a modern and civilized nation internally and externally. Often seen as something negative, shame — seemingly invisible but omnipresent — was mobilized differently as compared to the other two discourses — the discourse of dream and glory, and the discourse of hosting a great Olympics.

**Governing Tool — (Un)doing Shame**

The *Volunteers Manual*, by defining the characteristics of volunteers, required volunteers to be model citizens. The first chapter was devoted to volunteers and volunteering, and it detailed what was expected of volunteers — that they should be loving, dedicated, helpful, selfless, hardworking, eager to learn, socially responsible, and without expecting any material returns (*Volunteers Manual*: 3–11). As model citizens, these volunteers learned the significance of conforming to the proper behavioral codes and manners pre-scripted by the organizers.

Volunteers learned about instances that would cause shame and about the concomitant consequences. The opening paragraph of Volunteering Skills in the *Volunteers Manual* states:
Good manners and politeness is [are] like an influential recommendation letter. Manners are a reflection of a person’s education and character, enhancing all human relationship[s]. To provide excellent services for the 2008 Olympic Games, volunteers have to maintain good appearance and etiquette as well as possess specific knowledge of decorum so as to practice good manners (Volunteers Manual: 147).

This extract explicitly stated the importance for volunteers to make the Beijing Games look good. “Cultural Differences and Impacts,” the online training material found on the BOCOG website,129 reveals how cultural differences have real “impacts.” Here are some examples:130

1) Chewing with Your Mouth Open

This is the opposite of [W]estern culture. The Chinese appreciate that you make noise while eating. Westerners feel that this is disgusting and shows a complete lack of manners. Chew with your mouth shut!

The example began with the different perceptions regarding this behavior. Yet, it gave more weight to how “the Westerners” felt about it: “disgusting” and “a complete lack of manners,” which pointed out how disgraceful “you” could look. Then, it ended with an exclamation mark, as in an imperative order, asking the readers to stop doing it even though “[t]he Chinese appreciate[d] it.”

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130 Examples 1 to 3 were also mentioned by Sun Yatsen, the father of the new China in the late-nineteenth century as specific causes why China was weak and not taken seriously by Western countries. Sun Yatsen seems to suggest that good manners reflect national strength, this would be strikingly similar to “Good Manners, Olympic Victories” — also a book title by Shi Yongqi (石咏琦), Win Manners Win Games [sic] [奥运礼仪] (Shi 2006).
2) Speaking with Your Mouth Full

This is considered quite rude when at the dinner table. Western children are taught from a very early age never to do this.

Readers were assumed to be adults, and a sense of shame was imposed on the readers by pointing out — to “you” as a grown-up — that “Western children” learned not to talk with mouth full “from a very early age.” The “You” here was assumed to be older and more sophisticated, and therefore should not do so.

3) Passing Gas/Belching/Burping

This is considered rude in any situation. If you do need to pass gas, excuse yourself and go to the bathroom. Of course sometimes this is out of your control. If you accidentally pass gas loudly in front of others, you need to say, “excuse me” and quickly start talking about something to distract the people around you. DO NOT discuss any details about your gas, or any bodily function at the table!

This point started with a strong statement, stating that such behavior was highly unacceptable in any culture and situation. Interestingly the I-You form of dialogue was used in this passage; “you” did not have basic knowledge about these biological phenomena. It therefore advised — “go to the bathroom.” It even went so far as to give an exit strategy — to say “excuse me” and “distract the people around you.” The author of this text assumed the role of an expert: s/he seemed to consider “the worst-case scenario” by issuing another imperative statement with an exclamation mark, and double emphasis in capital letters “DO NOT.” In brief, the message about the unpleasantness of this behavior is very clear: It is not only embarrassing but also shameful.
Cleaning Ears with Fingernails

This is not done in public. It shouldn’t be done in private either! It’s dangerous.
Use a cotton swab!

This example, unlike the other three mentioned earlier, was not concerned with “cultural differences.” Instead, it stressed public/private behavior and health risks. Like a mother instructing a child, it ended with an imperative suggestion. The state assumed the role of a parent, offering guidance for the self to control the self. This also reminded us of Foucault’s (1991a) definition of government — the conduct of conduct and as guidance for self-government.

These examples were presented in a strong disciplining tone, and they were strongly worded: for example, “rude” and “do not.” The imagined responses from the invisible yet omnipresent “Westerners” operated as disciplinary tools: Westerners were the civilized Other in front of whom the Chinese volunteers needed to act out their civilized selves. A sense of shame was implicitly induced. It is important to note that this sense of shame — diaolian — was defined by what “Westerners” found unhygienic about Chinese behavior; in other words, shame was used as a means to ensure conformity to Western hegemonic standard regarding hygiene and proper public behavior.

The organizers gave much prominence to what they considered “proper manners” in their training materials, even going so far as to identify these as “volunteering skills.” In the Volunteers Manual, a whole chapter was dedicated to manners. It had altogether “eight basic rules of decorum” to help Olympic volunteers “provide good service and effectively manage different situations” (147). This was followed by another section on “graceful posture,” which provided detailed descriptions of “good postures” and “postures-to-be-avoided.” On the “avoid” list, a description of wrong postures was followed by strong negative associations; for instance, “low-class and boorish,” “rough,” “cocky and impolite,” “underbred,” “too easy-going,” “careless,” “offensive,” “frivolous,” “stiff,” “strained,” and the like. These negative connotations strengthened the level of disgrace on “must-avoid” items. They also acted as a disciplinary tool that implied losing face through misconduct.

To establish and validate its own regime of truth, the Volunteers Manual borrowed sentiments, and statements and sayings from the Chinese intellectual and philosophical
tradition; for instance, “If there is no learning of rules of propriety, no character is established” (Confucius, *Analects*, mentioned in *Volunteers Manual*: 151) and “Ask about taboos when entering another territory, ask about customs when going to another country, ask about unmentionables when visiting a family” (Confucius, *The Classic of Rites*, mentioned in *Volunteers Manual*: 153). In order to claim universal applicability, the *Volunteers Manual* also included quotes from Western philosophers, such as Francis Bacon: “Deeds are clothes of the heart” (*Volunteers Manual*: 149). These quotes were presented as golden idioms that help produce and strengthen the discourse on good manners. It was a governing strategy that achieved governing goals at a distance.

**CONCLUSION**

“These were truly exceptional Games,” commented IOC president Jacques Rogge in his speech at the Closing ceremony of the Beijing Games. CCTV translated “truly exceptional Games” into *wuyu lunbi* (无与论比), meaning “incomparable.” In the days that followed, Chinese media and Chinese citizens in Beijing had these words on their lips, for Rogge’s comments were being read as a “victory.” Many felt that much of the efforts spent on the Beijing Games had finally paid off. In fact, the English words, “truly exceptional Games,” are not quite the same as *wuyu lunbi*. Rogge did not deliberately compare the Beijing Games to others, but the Chinese translation indicated that no Games could compare to the Beijing Games. Is it lost in translation? To me, the translation *wuyu lunbi* revealed how the Chinese would like the Beijing Olympic Games to be evaluated and remembered: as “the best-ever” Olympic Games in history.

By analyzing the Olympic Volunteer program, this chapter has made an attempt to show how the government used various governing strategies, tactics, and discourses to mold volunteers into model citizens. The omnipresent images of smiles and happiness made the Olympic spectacle highly visible and positive. Yet, these smiles presented only the visible part of the promotional strategies. Underneath these omnipresent positive images were the less visible and, possibly more powerful, disciplinary discourses. In an attempt to spread the significance of the Games to Chinese citizens, the state mobilized the discourse on dream and glory, as opposed to the long-held discourse on national humiliation. This discourse on dream and glory was presented as a collective dream and a collective
responsibility for all participants: Volunteers were required to manifest the significance of the Olympics to all Chinese for it presented a moment of salvation and pride, a moment for the nation to gain face in the global political arena. This discourse encouraged the volunteers to be proud of their own nation, their civilization, and their wisdom. The discourses had made the citizens believe that the Games was a crucial opportunity to showcase a grand China, so important that citizens were taught to avoid causing the country a loss of face. The discourse on not to lose face required volunteers — the model citizens — to discipline the self to behave properly. Shame, as a governing tool, was mobilized to teach volunteers what not to do.

As Foucault says, power is not something imposed from top-down but a relational process. I argue that the volunteers were not passive individuals upon whom power was imposed. Quite the opposite, each volunteer acted as a vehicle of power, through which power was being performed in a web of social relations. The practices of power had transformed them, not necessarily in negative terms. To quote Foucault, “it [power] is a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than a negative instance whose function is to repress” (1984c: 61). The promotional and training materials might involve a lot of self-discipline and internalization of the discourses; yet, these volunteering experiences also offered new windows and new opportunities for volunteers to transform themselves and to connect with the outside world. In my interviews with the Games volunteers, they were always eager to share their experiences and memories. Here are some examples:

Quote 1: I was very surprised. But, ok, it’s not that black and white, but sometimes when they [foreign journalists] asked some questions related to China, I found they knew very little about us. I quite enjoyed communicating with foreigners. During our conversations I found that they were not used to living in China, even when they were here, they did not like getting information from Chinese media, they still preferred their own countries’ media such as BBC and the other similar online news agencies.

Quote 2: A foreign journalist asked me “can you speak English?” I thought it was quite a ridiculous question, of course I can, didn’t you just ask me?
Quote 3: . . . foreigners’ characters, for instance, I was a security guard at the front gate of the Main Press Center, sometimes, foreigners would greet you, then you feel very happy, really very happy, I would greet them back and sometimes I could even chat with them . . . when we saw foreigners, everyone would be very happy, “hi,” if it’s Chinese, they would look at you and then walked by, that’s it.

They were not always happy encounters, but we cannot deny the productive aspects of these volunteering experiences: Many of these young people learned more about the world beyond their “ordinary” daily lives. Through their interactions with the visitors, many of them would start asking questions like, why do foreigners know so little about China? Why does it seem that we are more eager to learn from them and not vice versa? Why would they think so little of us, Chinese? Why are foreigners so much friendlier and more equal to us volunteers than, say, our compatriots?

Similarly, the discourse of not to lose face is not necessarily negative; as Probyn proposes, shame is productive and it reveals a moment of interests; to have shame is to have the desire to connect with other people (Probyn 2004: 329; 2005). In relation to these governing strategies and tactics, this raises the question of the extent to which such a state-orchestrated media spectacle — in which volunteers were trained to become and to embody the new and proud face of the nation — could be used and appropriated by the volunteers to explore new technologies of the self, to invent new modes of being. As Foucault reminds us, “where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (1980b: 95), which gives rise to the question: What are potential moments of resistance within the volunteer program? Since this study is based chiefly on the Volunteers Manual and official materials, a follow-up study to examine the (long-term) effects of volunteering experiences on the volunteers will be fruitful.

In relation to the production of model citizens, this research raises the question of how the volunteer program is different from earlier campaigns. Furthermore, the Chinese state has previously been analyzed in Foucaultian terms (Dutton 1992; Dikotter 1992; Bakken 2000), how different are the disciplinary techniques employed during the Olympics?
Based on my fieldwork in the World Exposition 2010 in Shanghai, I saw many striking similarities (e.g. categorization of volunteers, recruitment criteria, uniforms, contents of slogans) between the Expo volunteer program and the Olympic one. The volunteer program in Shanghai was open to the whole population; yet, when it came to actual practice, volunteers were classified into different categories: Expo site volunteers, city volunteers serving at different stations across the city,131 urban civilization volunteers (城市文明志愿者), and Shanghai Ping’an volunteers (上海平安志愿者).132 Each category had its own uniform, marking respective status and responsibilities. The first two types of volunteers were recruited largely from universities. In order to be selected, the applicants had to meet the official criteria.133 submit an application, and attend interviews. Some of the volunteers I talked to mentioned that only half of the total number of applicants were accepted. Like the Olympic volunteers, serving at the Expo was considered prestigious. After selection, volunteers were required to undergo formal training related to the Expo (e.g. knowledge of the World Exposition, manners, and English-language training). The other two categories of volunteers were meant to serve the wider population.134 To my understanding, their selection criteria were less stringent, and serving stations, uniforms, and so on carried less prestige. The volunteer program’s main slogan was “At your service at the Expo” (世界在你眼前，我们在你身边) with three sub-slogans: “My will, my help, my pleasure” (志在，愿在，我在), “2010, we’re together as one” (2010，心在一起), and “Our city, your joy” (城市有我更可爱). In terms of promotion, the Expo volunteer program also emphasized active participation — “at your service,” “my will,” and “we’re one” — and visible positive attributes — helpfulness, pleasure, and joy — to serve the

132 The last two types of volunteers were under the supervision of the Shanghai Volunteers Association. These criteria were (1) be willing to participate in voluntary services of the Expo 2010; (2) be born before April 30, 1992 for the Expo Site volunteers and before April 30, 1994 for the city volunteers; (3) be a law-abiding citizen; (4) be able to participate in training and relevant activities before the opening of the Expo 2010; (5) possess necessary knowledge and skills required by the post; (6) be in good health to meet the corresponding duties. See “FAQ for Voluntary Work of the World Exposition 2010.” 2010. http://en.expo2010.cn/a/20100316/000001.htm.
The Expo volunteer program, paralleling the Olympic Volunteer program in many ways, showed that the development of volunteering services and its close connection to the production of model citizens was not exclusive but one that symbolized how the Chinese state had adopted the idea of volunteerism in its governing strategies in the production of model citizens.

Volunteerism, through the government’s active promotion and the gradual development of non-governmental organizations, has become a part of social life in today’s China. The 5/12 Sichuan Earthquakes have demonstrated how the public — sometimes, without the government’s immediate instruction — have imbibed the spirit of volunteering: Many rushed to the affected area to become volunteers to give a helping hand to those in need. This development urges us to examine the future development of voluntary services in China. Will volunteering service in non-mega-events command more social significance? In what ways, and what are their implications? And, what will be the role of voluntary services in China’s future development?

Given the limited space, I cannot talk at length about the Expo volunteer program, and the discourses that help to discipline and guide the volunteers-citizens. In fact, the Shanghai Expo volunteer program deserves a case study on its own.