Complex criminality - an introduction

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This book presents a collection of essays on complex criminality. These essays were written for a national gathering of PhD candidates at the University of Amsterdam on 6 June 2014. Complex criminality, which was the theme of that gathering and is the title of this book, calls for a definition. Is not, after all, all criminality complex? Do not all legal dealings with criminality involve a complex factual and normative analysis of occurrences? And does conduct that is labelled as criminal not practically always involve a complex mixture of, partly interacting non-personal and personal circumstances?

So how can criminality not be considered complex?

Neither does it help to focus on the meaning of the term ‘complex’ if one wishes to get a clearer view of this book’s subject. Aside from ‘complicated’, or perhaps ‘multi-layered’, or ‘multi-dimensional’, the adjective ‘complex’ may have the meaning of ‘sophisticated’, which may at first blush appear difficult to apply to criminality, at least perhaps until one thinks of financial or economic criminality.

‘Complex’ may further refer to some activity that entangles, or complicates subject matter that to an outsider or a lay person does not necessarily seem complex. We often encounter such activity in criminal law. Just like practitioners of other disciplines, criminal lawyers translate a certain factual complex into their own jargon and thereby reduce or interpret facts in such a manner that those directly involved in the factual occurrences may feel alienated from the outcome of such an interpretation or translation.

‘Complex’ may yet have another meaning, i.e., when used, as a substantive, in the phrase ‘the military-industrial complex’. If understood in this sense, complex does not refer to the complicated, or sophisticated nature of the criminality, nor to the activities of lawyers translating seemingly non-complicated subject-matter into legal jargon. It rather refers to the systemic nature of its object.

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Systemic, then, in connection to criminality, may be understood in at least three
different ways. First, it may refer to the context in which criminal acts are
committed, a context which may be characteristic or even a constitutive element
of specific crimes; a context that may consist of, for instance, a State or a multi-layered
organization, one which has certain purposes and officials working for it, occupying
different roles or functions. This is what in international criminal law is meant by
'system criminality', i.e., the 'phenomenon that international crimes – notably
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes – are often caused by collective
entities in which the individual authors of these acts are embedded'.

Second, systemic may assume the ordinary meaning of 'system' as listed in the
Oxford Dictionary, i.e. 'a set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or
an interconnecting network; a complex whole'. An example would be the digestive
system. The emphasis is hereby placed on the operational aspect: the functioning of
the whole depends on the cooperation of the parts. If we shift our focus from
criminality to criminal justice, then this interpretation of the term systemic makes
sense as well. We simply need to look at the contributions of the various stages and
agents of the criminal justice process to the system’s eventual output. Such an output
has qualitative and quantitative aspects like, for example, a completed trial that may
be labelled just, or the punishment of persons found guilty of committing an
offence. But there appears to be something more to criminal justice than mere
output defined in qualitative and quantitative terms. After all, output defined as
'punishment of those found guilty', even if that presumes the existence of reliable
fact-finding and a fair criminal procedure, still remains rather vague. It does not say
anything about the objectives of such punishment, or about what binds the justice
apparatus together, aside from a shared strive for a certain output defined in terms of
quality and efficiency.

A third meaning of the term 'systemic' may provide some further guidance.
Complex may assume the meaning, also listed in the Oxford Dictionary, of 'a set of
principles or procedures according to which something is done; an organized
scheme or method'. It is not difficult at all to see how the phrase 'procedures
according to which something is done' is relevant to criminal justice and, more
specifically, to the law of criminal procedure. Examples are evidence law and
regulations governing unlawfully obtained evidence.

3 These qualitative and quantitative aspects can, of course, not be completely separated in a
criminal justice apparatus governed by the rule of law in a democratic society.
It would be more challenging to apply the phrase ‘a set of principles according to which something is done’ to criminal justice. Is there a set of principles that bind together criminal justice, all of its agents, and all of its stages? When searching for such principles, it might be convenient to link up with notions are usually referred to for this very reason, i.e., the notions of retribution and prevention as overarching goals of criminal justice. If, however, retribution were the main principle, or objective, guiding the legislature when establishing sanctioning norms, would this necessarily require its expression an application in the other, subsequent stages of criminal justice? Back in 1975, Jonkers argued that, for a proper understanding of penal principles, a distinction must be made between the levels of legislation, application (by which he meant sentencing) and execution.\(^4\) According to him, these levels are not strictly separated. The level of execution refers to that of application which, in turn, refers to that of the legislature. The lower level should always take into account the aims governing the higher level(s).\(^5\) More contemporary scholars have, however, argued that the execution stage does neither look back at the sentencing phase, nor at the legislature’s purposes of punishment, but is rather forward looking, thereby assuming a character that differs from criminal justice’s other phases or stages. They recognize the existence of a relative autonomy that exists between the principles and purposes that guide sentencing judges and those that govern the enforcement stage.\(^6\)

It may, therefore, be doubted that there exists some bunch of principles that can or ought to guide the whole gamut of criminal justice, which would render criminal justice a system under the third meaning of ‘systemic’.\(^7\) In other words: although complex criminal justice, may be understood as a system according the first and second meaning of systemic as described above, this does not yet imply that ‘one size fits all’ principles can be applied to all the different aspects and stages of criminal justice.

What transpires from the foregoing thoughts, is that ‘complex criminality’ is a very broad notion with many distinct meanings, e.g., complicated criminality, which may actually apply to all forms of criminality, sophisticated criminality, common facts

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rendered more difficult to understand for lay persons as a result of a translation into criminal legal jargon, or the systemic nature of certain crimes. This wide diversity of understandings is exemplified by the papers contained in this book, which cover a wide range of topics while they, nonetheless, all deal with complex criminality.