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Essays in pension economics and intergenerational risk sharing

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Contents

1	Introduction and Overview	1
2	Intergenerational risk sharing, pensions and endogenous labour supply in general equilibrium	9
2.1	The command economy	12
2.1.1	Individuals and preferences	12
2.1.2	Investment and production	12
2.1.3	The resource constraints	14
2.1.4	The social planner's solution	14
2.2	The decentralized economy	15
2.2.1	The pension systems	16
2.2.2	Individual budget constraints	19
2.2.3	Individual and firm optimization	19
2.2.4	Market equilibrium conditions	20
2.3	Optimality of pension systems	20
2.3.1	Pension fund optimality conditions	20
2.3.2	Optimality of different pension systems	21
2.4	Discussion	23
	Appendix to Chapter 2	25
2.A	Derivation of the planner's solution	25
2.B	Individual first-order conditions	25
2.B.1	Period 1 individual first-order conditions	25
2.B.2	Period 0 individual first-order conditions	26
2.C	Infinite horizon model	27
2.C.1	Notation	27
2.C.2	Social Planner	27
2.C.3	Decentralised economy	28

3 Sharing of Demographic Risks in a General Equilibrium Model with funded Pensions **31**

- 3.1 The command economy 34
 - 3.1.1 Individuals and preferences 34
 - 3.1.2 Demographics 35
 - 3.1.3 Production 35
 - 3.1.4 Resource constraints 35
 - 3.1.5 The social planner’s solution 36
- 3.2 The decentralized economy 37
 - 3.2.1 The pension arrangements 37
 - 3.2.2 Individual budget constraints and generational accounts 40
 - 3.2.3 Individual and firm optimization 41
 - 3.2.4 Market equilibrium conditions 43
- 3.3 Optimal pension policy 43
 - 3.3.1 The optimum under perfect demographic foresight 44
 - 3.3.2 Demographic uncertainty 46
- 3.4 Calibration 47
- 3.5 Numerical results 48
 - 3.5.1 Measures for welfare comparison 48
 - 3.5.2 No demographic uncertainty 49
 - 3.5.3 Deterministic variation in demographic variables 50
 - 3.5.4 Introducing demographic uncertainty 53
 - 3.5.5 Fertility risk 57
 - 3.5.6 Mortality risk 58
 - 3.5.7 Simultaneous presence of both types of demographic risk 61
- 3.6 Robustness: varying the degree of risk aversion 69
- 3.7 Conclusion 70
- Appendix to Chapter 3 73
 - 3.A Description of solution of model 73
 - 3.B Proof of Proposition 1 73
 - 3.B.1 Part (i) 73
 - 3.B.2 Part (ii) 75
 - 3.C Derivatives of expressions in Proposition 1 77
 - 3.C.1 DRB 77
 - 3.C.2 DWB 78

4	Voluntary Participation and Intergenerational Risk Sharing in a Funded Pension System	79
4.1	Introduction	79
4.2	Model and autarky solution	83
4.3	Introduction of a pension fund	84
4.3.1	Individuals	85
4.3.2	The pension fund	85
4.4	The participation constraint	87
4.4.1	Recursive formulation of the participation constraint	89
4.4.2	Equilibrium definition	90
4.4.3	Solutions for \tilde{r}	91
4.4.4	Properties of the solutions for \tilde{r}	92
4.4.5	Assumption about initial beliefs	96
4.4.6	Feasible pension fund rules	96
4.4.7	The optimal pension fund rule	98
4.5	A numerical example	100
4.6	Conclusion	107
	Appendix to Chapter 4	108
4.A	Details on first-order condition pension fund without participation constraint	108
4.B	Details on $U^p(r, \tilde{r}' = r)$	108
4.B.1	$U^p(r^*, \tilde{r}' = r^*)$ approaches U^a from below as $r \uparrow r^*$	108
4.B.2	Second-order derivative of $U^p(r, \tilde{r}' = r)$	110
4.C	Calibration of the returns process	111
5	Redesigning the Dutch occupational pension contract: Simulation of alternative contracts involving soft and hard entitlements	113
5.1	Introduction	113
5.2	The Model	116
5.2.1	Demographics	116
5.2.2	Wage income and pension fund contributions	117
5.2.3	Second-pillar entitlements and liabilities under the old contract	118
5.2.4	Assets	120
5.2.5	Economic shocks	121
5.2.6	The timing	122
5.3	Pension fund policy	123
5.3.1	The current contract	124

5.3.2	Proposals for the new contract	125
5.3.3	The Rolling Window contract	125
5.3.4	The Fraction contract	129
5.3.5	The Split contract	130
5.3.6	Contribution policy	131
5.4	Calibration and simulation	132
5.4.1	Calibration	132
5.4.2	The simulation setup	133
5.5	Results	134
5.5.1	Indexation to wages	135
5.5.2	Indexation to prices	137
5.5.3	Robustness checks	138
5.6	Conclusion	144
	Appendix to Chapter 5	146
5.A	Derivation of (5.14)	146
5.B	Indexation Policy Rolling Window proposal	146
5.B.1	Reduction of hard entitlements	147
5.B.2	Indexation of hard entitlements	147
5.B.3	Indexation of soft entitlements	148
5.B.4	Figures for base scenario	149
5.B.5	Figures for replacement rates base scenario	152

Bibliography