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### Political economics in the laboratory

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# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Information and Strategic Voting</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1	Introduction . . . . .	5
2.2	The Model . . . . .	9
2.2.1	Equilibrium Analysis . . . . .	10
2.2.2	Behavioral Predictions . . . . .	21
2.3	Experimental Design . . . . .	22
2.4	Results . . . . .	23
2.4.1	General Overview . . . . .	23
2.4.2	Strategic Voting . . . . .	25
2.4.3	Voter Types . . . . .	26
2.4.4	Summarizing the Results . . . . .	29
2.5	Concluding remarks . . . . .	29
	Appendix 2.A Pivotal Probabilities and Asymptotics . . . . .	32
	Appendix 2.B Experimental Instructions . . . . .	34
	Appendix 2.C Realizations of the Random Draws . . . . .	36
	Appendix 2.D MLC for each unique situation . . . . .	37
	Appendix 2.E Limiting MLC for each unique situation . . . . .	43
<b>3</b>	<b>Strategic Voting and Heterogeneous Preferences</b>	<b>45</b>
3.1	Introduction . . . . .	45
3.2	The Model . . . . .	47
3.2.1	Theoretical Analysis . . . . .	48
3.2.2	Behavioral Predictions . . . . .	54
3.3	Experimental Design . . . . .	54
3.4	Results . . . . .	56
3.4.1	Election Winner . . . . .	56
3.4.2	Aggregate Behavior . . . . .	57
3.4.3	Strategic voting by Rank-Type . . . . .	60
3.5	Concluding remarks . . . . .	62

Appendix 3.A	Experimental Instructions . . . . .	64
<b>4</b>	<b>Information and Economic Voting</b>	<b>67</b>
4.1	Introduction . . . . .	67
4.2	Literature . . . . .	69
4.3	Economic Voting and Information Search . . . . .	72
4.4	Experimental Design . . . . .	75
4.4.1	Treatments . . . . .	78
4.5	Predictions . . . . .	78
4.5.1	Case 1: Pure self interest . . . . .	79
4.5.2	Case 2: Other-regarding preferences . . . . .	79
4.6	Results . . . . .	80
4.6.1	Politicians' Behavior . . . . .	80
4.6.2	Voters' Behavior . . . . .	83
4.6.3	Summary of Results . . . . .	91
4.7	Discussion . . . . .	91
Appendix 4.A	Experimental Instructions . . . . .	93
Appendix 4.B	Experimental Screen Shots . . . . .	99
<b>5</b>	<b>Preference for Efficiency or Confusion?</b>	<b>101</b>
5.1	Introduction . . . . .	101
5.2	The Experiment . . . . .	103
5.3	Theoretical Predictions and Estimation Procedure . . . . .	104
5.4	Results . . . . .	107
5.5	Conclusions . . . . .	111
Appendix 5.A	Maximum Likelihood of $\alpha$ for varying $\mu$ -values . . . . .	113
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>123</b>
	<b>Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)</b>	<b>125</b>