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State and Minorities in Communist East Germany by Mike Dennis and Norman LaPorte (review)

Ruud van Dijk

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The statements of the former Stasi officers are often apologetic, but they give valuable insight into what happened to these people when the GDR collapsed.

A question that frequently comes up in the book is whether the Stasi did an effective job—a question that is hard to answer. One possibility is to look at the informants. Bruce emphasizes that the local Stasi officers spent too much time relying on agents who achieved little, just for the sake of meeting planned economic goals. Thus the high number of agents did not necessarily guarantee a sound evaluation of the mood of the GDR population. Another way to measure success or failure is to see whether the Stasi met its ultimate goal; namely, to secure the Communist hold on power. The revolution of 1989 meant the total defeat of the Stasi, including the disbandment of the agency soon after the opening of the Berlin Wall. The peaceful revolution revealed a fundamental problem with the East German model, namely that “the Stasi was only as effective as its political masters.” Regardless of the number of state security officers, if the Communist party was unable to withstand political and economic challenges, the Stasi would not be able to retain power. In the end, the party did not have the answers. In Perleberg district the only answer the first secretary of the party, Gerhard Uhe, had was suicide.

The Firm is notable for its high level of knowledge of German research and excellent source material. Gary Bruce’s book is one of the finest English-language works on the subject, offering an astute analysis of the Communist repressive apparatus in the post-Stalin era.


Reviewed by Ruud van Dijk, University of Amsterdam

This exceptionally useful volume by Mike Dennis and Norman LaPorte deals with a topic that not only forms an important part of the history of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), but also tells us a good deal about the nature of the Communist regime there, its obsessions, and the relative reach of its state apparatus. Using their own research in local, state, party, and national archives of the former GDR (including those of the Ministry for State Security, or Stasi) alongside much recent German-language scholarship, Dennis and LaPorte have delivered a series of essays that will be useful for both scholars and students. Next to the original research that has gone into them, the essays also provide context and historical background to make the material accessible for non-specialists.

The authors’ ambition is greater than providing an English-language introduction to the way the East German regime tried to control and in some cases “operationally decompose” (p. 68) prominent non-compliant minority groups, and the ways these groups resisted. As Dennis and LaPorte discuss in the first chapter, they also seek to demonstrate that rather that plain “totalitarian,” the regime dominated by the So-
cialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) can be more usefully characterized as “post-totalitarian.” The SED police state was intolerant and often nasty, and it aimed to be in full control of society, as witnessed by the mushrooming Stasi apparatus, especially after the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. In practice, however, the SED also had to rely for its survival on a modus vivendi with the population, including minority groups (a quest that was ultimately unsuccessful).

A quick look at the conclusion may give the impression that Dennis and LaPorte see so much complexity and ambiguity that the criminal nature of the SED state falls by the wayside. Any depiction of the system, they say, “should embrace the intersecting and shifting layers of complicity, accommodation, retreat, cooperation, idealism and human agency typical of the experiences and actions of the wide range of minorities explored in this book” (p. 203). However, none of the chapters confirms such an impression. Rather, the case studies Dennis and LaPorte present make clear that although the regime ardently aspired to totalitarian control, this goal proved overly ambitious and impractical. The state apparatus was not up to the job because of a surfeit of repressive assignments, incompetence, and durable resistance by large sections of the population. One of the main strengths of the book is that it shows, on the one hand, the state’s efforts to control groups that tried to foster an identity or ideology separate from its own, and, on the other, how these efforts rarely, if ever, managed to meet the goals the regime set for itself.

Together, the minority groups that are covered in the individual chapters did constitute a sizeable, albeit heterogeneous, chunk of GDR society, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Dennis and LaPorte have chosen groups that at first sight had relatively little in common: Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Asian and African workers, soccer fans and hooligans, punks, and skinheads. What they did share was that they all defined themselves in contrast—though not always immediately also in opposition—to the Communist state. Jews and Jehovah’s Witnesses did so for religious reasons; Mozambican and Vietnamese guest workers especially set themselves apart through their independent economic activities outside regular work hours; the soccer fans, punks, and skinheads, for all their mutual differences and conflict, insisted on a separate cultural identity, although politics came to play a large role in it, especially in the case of the skinheads.

In taking an independent stance, these groups automatically represented a threat to the state, at least as viewed by the SED regime, which believed that non-compliance indicated not just opposition, but also complicity with the hostile West. Researching state strategies for dealing with all these groups (and their internal justifications), the authors invariably found evidence that the East German authorities perceived such a link. From the regime’s perspective, any kind of religious, economic, or cultural independence inside the GDR must have been instigated by the West.

Finally, when faced with state pressure to conform, all groups resisted and managed to a greater or lesser extent to hold their own. The individual stories vary greatly, both in the intensity of the repression the respective minority groups faced and in the way groups or members responded to government policies. In the aftermath of Josef Stalin’s anti-Semitic campaign after 1949, Jewish communities in the GDR were “lit-
tle more than exhibits in a socialist museum” (p. 38), but these same moribund com-
munities benefited in the 1980s from the regime’s desire for better relations with the
United States. Jehovah’s Witnesses probably experienced the worst treatment because
of their principled and organized resistance to the state’s pressure to submit and their
ties to coreligionists in the West. Unlike other groups, they were banned and faced
harsh persecution. Dennis and LaPorte argue that the incarceration of Jehovah’s Wit-
ness conscientious objectors was “one of the darkest chapters in the history of the
GDR” (p. 78). In the 1970s and 1980s the outside world, especially the West, or the
example of the West, did begin to intrude more and more into the GDR. However,
football fans and hooligans, punks, and skinheads derived their energy just as much
from local circumstances, whether hatred of Stasi chief Erich Mielke’s team BFC Dy-
namo, youth alienation from GDR society and a desire for autonomy, or nationalist,
right-wing extremism.

The SED regime exacerbated many of the challenges it faced in dealing with its
citizens. As Dennis and LaPorte point out, the regime had built an insular, intolerant,
militarized, anti-Western, authoritarian society in which there had been no honest ef-
fort to master the past, especially Germany’s recent history. No wonder many GDR
citizens, especially from minority groups with a strong sense of their own identity,
would not comply. Perhaps it goes too far to dismiss the GDR as a mere footnote to
world history, as Hans-Ulrich Wehler has done. However, after reading this rich col-
lection of essays, one is struck by the misguidedness and futility of it all. The volume
itself is anything but futile or misguided. On the contrary, through its careful depic-
tion of the complex relationships between the regime and important minority groups,
it throws much light on how the GDR functioned and why it ultimately collapsed.

✣ ✣ ✣

John Kent, America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo.
Reviewed by Crawford Young, University of Wisconsin-Madison
This compact, dense monograph provides remarkably thorough coverage of U.S. pol-
picy in the Congo (Kinshasa) from the achievement of independence in 1960 until
mid-1964. The United Nations (UN) operation, at the time unprecedented in scope
and cost, is a secondary focus; its time frame of July 1960 until June 1964 apparently
sets the temporal parameters of the volume. Congo decolonization and the turbulent
politics of the immediate independence period provide the stage and background
scenery for the detailed diplomatic narrative.

Some previous authors, notably Madeleine Kalb (The Congo Cables: The Cold
War in Africa—from Eisenhower to Kennedy, 1982), Richard Mahoney (JFK: Ordeal in
Africa, 1983), and Sean Kelly (America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire,
1993) had earlier covered this ground, both through interviews with principals and
declassified some documents. The station chief of the U.S. Central Intelligence

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