

The Social Construction of Ignorance: Experimental Evidence

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A Appendix: Instructions

These instructions for CAP treatments were translated from French. Instructions for the No-CAP treatments are into brackets.

A.1 Instructions for the RANDOM treatment

Welcome to this experiment. Please switch off your mobile phone and refrain from communication with the other participants throughout the experiment, or we must exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. Please read the instructions carefully. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand or press the red button on the side of your desk and we will come to your desk and answer to your question in private.

You will receive €5 for showing up on time. You can earn additional earnings based on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. The experiment consists of three parts that can include several periods. At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select one of these periods, each with equal probability, and we will pay you according to your payoff in the selected period. Thus, you should think carefully when making each decision, as it could be the one that will be paid. At the end of the session, your total earnings will be paid to you in cash in a separate room. [*Last sentence omitted in the NoCAP treatment*]

For each participant, the experimenters have prepared a donation of €15 to a charity, GiveDirectly. GiveDirectly transfers money to very poor families in developing countries. This charity is rated as one of the 7 top charities in terms of cost-effectiveness by the charity evaluation site GiveWell, above many traditional charities in the world. Here is an excerpt from the website “GiveDirectly.org” presenting its objectives (we have also distributed a document on the operating mode of GiveDirectly and information from Wikipedia):

“We use mobile payments technology to send your donations to extremely poor families in the developing world in the most capital efficient way currently possible. \$0.91 of your dollar ends up in the hands of the poor. Our model is setting the benchmark for philanthropic efficiency around the world. We strive to promote a new approach to philanthropy that uses constant experimentation and analytical rigor to understand the most impactful ways to achieve positive outcomes.”

During the session, we will show you pictures and testimonials of people who have passed the screening of GiveDirectly, and are potential recipients of the donations in this session. Their pictures and testimonials, translated into French, are taken verbatim from the website “GiveDirectly.org” and they may thus include typos.

The experimenters commit on honor to transfer the donations to GiveDirectly after the experiment. Note that the deontological rules of GATE-Lab do not allow deception of participants by the experimenters. So, all promised donations for the selected period at the end of the session will actually be sent to GiveDirectly. If you want more information about the transfer, please contact an experimenter after the session.

However, as we explain below, your choices may lead to a cancellation of the donation prepared by the experimenters, in which case GiveDirectly will not receive a donation for your participation.

The instructions for the first part follow below. The instructions for the next parts will be distributed after all participants have completed each part.

Part 1

In this part you will make two decisions. In each of these decisions, you are asked to choose between “Option 1” and “Option 2”. Both options affect your own payoffs and the donation to GiveDirectly.

For **Decision one** you will see on your screen before your choice the picture and testimonial of a potential recipient of the donation, who has passed the screening by GiveDirectly, as illustrated in the screenshot below. Choosing “Option 1” will result in €9 for yourself and will *not cancel* the donation of €15 by the experimenters to GiveDirectly. Choosing “Option 2” will result in €15 for yourself, and will *cancel* the donation to GiveDirectly.

In **Decision two** as in decision one, you can choose between “Option 1”, which will result in €9 for yourself and “Option 2”, which will result in €15 for yourself. The difference with the first decision is that the program determines randomly which one of the two options will result in a cancellation of the donation of €15 to Give Directly. With 50 chances out of 100, choosing “Option 2” cancels the donation while “Option 1” confirms

the donation, just like in decision 1. With 50 chances out of 100 the situation is reversed, so choosing “Option 1” cancels the donation and “Option 2” confirms the donation. You are not informed which situation is chosen by the program, and the consequences for GiveDirectly are replaced by “???”.

Before choosing between “Option 1” and “Option 2”, you have to choose between two types of information. You can choose “Recipient”. This means that before choosing between “Option 1” and “Option 2”, you will learn which situation was chosen by the computer, and the “???” will be replaced with information about the consequences for GiveDirectly. Furthermore, like in decision 1, your screen will display the picture and testimonial of a potential recipient before your choice of option.

Or you can choose “Cute animal” [“No information”]. This means that your screen will display the picture of a cute animal, as illustrated in the screenshot below. [“This means that you will not see any picture on your screen”] You will not learn which situation was selected by the computer, neither before nor after your choice of option.

After making this choice, we will inform you about the number of participants in this session and ask you to guess the number of participants who have chosen “Recipient” and the number of participants who have chosen “Cute animal” [“No information”]. Regardless of whether this period is selected or not for payment at the end of the session, you will earn 1 euro if your guess is correct, and 0 euro otherwise. Therefore, you should try to guess as accurately as possible. You will be informed on whether your guess is correct at the end of the session.

After you have chosen between “Recipient” and “Cute animal” [“No information”] and reported your guess, you will have to choose between “Option 1” and “Option 2”. Your earlier choice between “Recipient” and “Cute animal” [“No information”] determines the information you see on your screen before making your choice.

Summary of the Decisions

1. In Decision 1, you choose between Option 1 and Option 2.
2. In Decision 2, the program randomly selects which one of the two options cancels the donation.
3. You choose between the sets of information “Recipient” or “Cute animal” [“No information”].
4. You report your guess about the numbers of other participants in the session who chose ‘Recipient’ or ‘Cute animal’ [“No information”].
5. Your screen displays the information you chose in step 3, and you choose between Option 1 and Option 2.

Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button. A comprehension questionnaire will be displayed on your screen.

Part 2

In this part, you are randomly matched with 6 other participants to form a group of 7. There are two roles: Receivers and Senders. Receivers and Senders refer not to donations but to pictures and information, as explained below. All the participants in the group will first make decisions as Senders. Then, all of them will make a decision as Receivers. We first describe each role before explaining decision-making.

Choice of the Receiver

The Receiver has to choose between “Option 1” and “Option 2”. The consequences from this decision are the same as in the second decision of part 1:

“Option 1” results in €9 for the Receiver and “Option 2” results in €15 for the Receiver.

The program picks randomly which one of the two options cancels the donation to GiveDirectly. Each option has 50 chances out of 100 to be picked.

The program randomly determines the consequences of each option independently for each Receiver. Thus, these consequences can differ across Receivers. Before making a choice between Option 1 and Option 2, the Receiver is not informed of the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly. However, s/he can obtain information from the Sender, as we now describe.

Choice of the Sender

With 80% chance, the Sender learns which one of the two options cancels the donation. With 20% chance the Sender does not learn the consequences of each option.

If the Sender does not learn the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly, the program displays automatically the picture of a cute animal [“No information”] on the Receiver’s screen before s/he makes his/her choice. The Receiver is not informed on the consequences of this option for GiveDirectly.

If the Sender learns the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly, s/he has to choose between two types of information for the Receiver. If s/he chooses “Recipient”, the Receiver will learn which one of the two

options cancels the donation before choosing an option, and s/he will see the picture and the testimonial of a potential recipient of the donation. If the Sender chooses “Cute animal” [“No information”], the Receiver will see the picture of a cute animal but not the consequences for GiveDirectly [“will not see any information nor the consequences for GiveDirectly”], neither before nor after the choice of option.

Decision Making in Part 2

In this part, all the participants first make two decisions in the role of a Sender in the case they are informed about the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly. Precisely, as a Sender, you have to choose between two types of information for the Receiver, either “Recipient” or ‘Cute animal” [“No information”]:

in the case you learn that the donation to GiveDirectly is cancelled after “Option 1” , but not after “Option 2”;

and in the case you learn that the donation to GiveDirectly is cancelled after “Option 2”, but not after “Option 1”.

Then, all the participants will make a decision as Receivers. As a Receiver, you will have to choose between “Option 1” and “Option 2”. Before you make your choice, the computer will randomly determine which option cancels the donation. It will also randomly pair you with a Sender in your group. The choice of the Sender between “Recipient” or ‘Cute animal” [“No information”] determines the information you have about the consequences of each option.

Summary of the Decisions

1. You first decide as a Sender which picture and information to share if you are informed of the consequences of each option for Give Directly.
2. You are next a Receiver. You are randomly matched with a Sender.
3. You obtain the information chosen by the sender, “Recipient” or ‘Cute animal” [“No information”].
4. You choose between Option 1 and Option 2.
5. You are paid based on your choice as a Receiver in case this part is selected for payment.

Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button.

Part 3

In this part, you are still matched with the same 6 other participants as in part 2. But now, participants are randomly assigned to one of the roles and will be identified with an ID. There are four Receivers and their IDs are R1, R2, R3, and R4. There are three Senders and their IDs are symbols (spade, diamond, club). We will communicate your role and your ID on your screen at the beginning of this part. This part has 25 identical periods and you will keep the same role and the same ID throughout this part. We now describe each of these periods.

Choice of the Receiver

In each period, the Receiver chooses between “Option 1” and “Option 2”. The consequences from this decision are the same as before:

“Option 1” results in €9 for the Receiver and “Option 2” results in €15 for the Receiver.

The program picks randomly which one of the two options cancels the donation to GiveDirectly. Each option has 50% chance to be picked.

In each period, the program randomly determines the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly, independently for each Receiver. Thus, these consequences can differ across periods and across Receivers.

The Receiver is not informed about the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly. Before choosing between Option 1 and Option 2, s/he can receive information from the Sender.

Choice of the Sender

With 80% chance, the Sender learns the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly chosen by the program for each Receiver for the current period. If the Sender learns the consequences, s/he has to decide which set of information to share with the Receiver. As before, if s/he chooses “Recipient”, i) the Receiver is informed which option cancels the donation before choosing an option, and ii) the picture of a potential recipient with his/her testimonial is displayed. If the Sender chooses “cute animal” the picture of a cute animal is displayed [“No information”, no information is displayed] on the Receiver’s screen and the Receiver does not learn which option cancels the donation, neither before nor after the choice of option.

With 20% chance the Sender does not learn the consequences of each option and the picture of a cute animal [“No information”] is displayed automatically on the Receiver’s screen. The Receiver does not know whether the Sender has been informed or not.

The decision of the Sender is illustrated in the screenshot below. The first column of the table shows the ID of the Receivers (i.e. R1, R2, R3 or R4). The second column indicates for each Receiver, which option cancels the donation. The “???” sign indicates that the Sender did not receive information for participant R3; in this case, the sign of a cute animal [the symbol ;] is automatically pre-selected with no action from the Sender. In the next column, when informed, the Sender has to choose between “Recipient” and “Cute animal” [“No information”]. In this example, the Sender makes three decisions, as s/he has information about the consequences of each option for three out of four Receivers. Once the Sender has made his/her decisions, the last column of the table indicates which information will be displayed on the screen of the Receiver.

As we explain now, the Sender can earn €10 for each Receiver to whom s/he has been randomly matched by the program in that period.

The Receiver is Matched with a Sender

Before the Receiver chooses an option, s/he is randomly matched with one of the Senders (spade, diamond, or club) for the current period. The screenshot below reflects the screen the Receiver will see in the experiment. The example shows period 5. The first column shows the ID of each Sender. For each of the past periods, the screen shows which set of information each Sender shared with the Receiver (indicated by the symbol of an animal [; for “No information”] or the symbol GD for a recipient of GiveDirectly). The symbol of an animal [;] reflects *either* that the Sender had no information, *or* that the Sender received the information and decided to share this picture; the Receiver cannot distinguish between these possibilities. The past choices of the Senders

in the group are only visible to the Receivers, not to the other Senders. In this example, symbols have been chosen randomly.

Before being randomly matched by the program to a Sender, the Receiver only knows the past choices of the Senders but not those for the current period. The Receiver's information ("Recipient" or "Cute animal" ["No information"]) is determined by the randomly matched sender's choice for the current period. The Senders are not informed of the choices of the Receivers.

Summary of the Decisions

1. For each Receiver, the program randomly selects which option cancels the donation.
2. With 80% chance, the Sender learns the consequences of each option. If s/he learns the consequences, the Sender has to choose a set of information to share with the Receiver ("Recipient" or "Cute animal" ["No information"]).
3. The Receiver sees information about the senders' choices in earlier periods. S/he is randomly matched by the program to one of the Senders. The Receiver's information is determined by the choice of that sender ("Recipient" or "Cute animal" ["No information"]) in the current period.
4. The Receiver decides between Option 1 and Option 2.
5. The same procedure applies for the 25 periods.

Summary of Earnings

The program randomly selects one of the 28 periods for payment (the two decisions in part 1, the decision as a Receiver in part 2 and the 25 periods in part 3). If a decision in part 1 or in part 2 is selected for payment, you will receive either €9 or €15, depending on whether you chose option Option 1 or Option 2 in that period. If a decision in part 3 is selected, payoffs for each player are as follows:

The Receiver earns either €9 or €15, depending on the chosen option in that period.

The Sender earns €10 for each Receiver to whom s/he has been randomly matched by the program in that period. Thus, the Sender minimally earns €0 if s/he has not been matched to any Receiver, and maximally earns €40 if s/he has been matched to the four Receivers.

Finally, **GiveDirectly** will receive a donation of €15 for any choice in the selected period that does not cancel the donation.

End of the Session

At the end of part 3 a questionnaire will be displayed on your screen and then you will receive a feedback on your earnings in the session. On invitation of an experimenter, you will move into the payment room with your pre-filled receipt of payment and your computer tag.*[Last sentence omitted in the NoCAP treatment]*

Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button. A comprehension questionnaire will be displayed on your screen.

A.2 Instructions for the CHOICE treatment

Welcome to this experiment. Please switch off your mobile phone and refrain from communication with the other participants throughout the experiment, or we must exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. Please read the instructions carefully. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand or press the red button on the side of your desk and we will come to your desk and answer to your question in private.

You will receive €5 for showing up on time. You can earn additional earnings based on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. The experiment consists of three parts that can include several periods. At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select one of these periods, each with equal probability, and we will pay you according to your payoff in the selected period. Thus, you should think carefully when making each decision, as it could be the one that will be paid. At the end of the session, your total earnings will be paid to you in cash in a separate room.*[Last sentence omitted in the NoCAP treatment]*

For each participant, the experimenters have prepared a donation of €15 to a charity, GiveDirectly. GiveDirectly transfers money to very poor families in developing countries. This charity is rated as one of the 7 top charities in terms of cost-effectiveness by the charity evaluation site GiveWell, above many traditional charities in the world. Here is an excerpt from the website “GiveDirectly.org” presenting its objectives (we have also distributed a document on the operating mode of GiveDirectly and information from Wikipedia):

“We use mobile payments technology to send your donations to extremely poor families in the developing world in the most capital efficient way currently possible. \$0.91 of your dollar ends up in the hands of the poor. Our model is setting the benchmark for philanthropic efficiency around the world. We strive to promote a new approach to philanthropy that uses constant experimentation and analytical rigor to understand the most impactful ways to achieve positive outcomes.”

During the session, we will show you pictures and testimonials of people who have passed the screening of GiveDirectly, and are potential recipients of the donations in this session. Their pictures and testimonials, translated into French, are taken verbatim from the website “GiveDirectly.org” and they may thus include typos.

The experimenters commit on honor to transfer the donations to GiveDirectly after the experiment. Note that the deontological rules of GATE-Lab do not allow deception of participants by the experimenters. So, all promised donations for the selected period at the end of the session will actually be sent to GiveDirectly. If you want more information about the transfer, please contact an experimenter after the session.

However, as we explain below, your choices may lead to a cancellation of the donation prepared by the experimenters, in which case GiveDirectly will not receive a donation for your participation.

The instructions for the first part follow below. The instructions for the next parts will be distributed after all participants have completed each part.

Part 1

In this part you will make two decisions. In each of these decisions, you are asked to choose between “Option 1” and “Option 2”. Both options affect your own payoffs and the donation to GiveDirectly.

For **Decision one** you will see on your screen before your choice the picture and testimonial of a potential recipient of the donation, who has passed the screening by GiveDirectly, as illustrated in the screenshot below. Choosing “Option 1” will result in €9 for yourself and will *not cancel* the donation of €15 by the experimenters to GiveDirectly. Choosing “Option 2” will result in €15 for yourself, and will *cancel* the donation to GiveDirectly.

In **Decision two** as in decision one, you can choose between “Option 1”, which will result in €9 for yourself and “Option 2”, which will result in €15 for yourself. The difference with the first decision is that the program determines randomly which one of the two options will result in a cancellation of the donation of €15 to Give Directly. With 50 chances out of 100, choosing “Option 2” cancels the donation while “Option 1” confirms the donation, just like in decision 1. With 50 chances out of 100 the situation is reversed, so choosing “Option 1” cancels the donation and “Option 2” confirms the donation. You are not informed which situation is chosen by the program, and the consequences for GiveDirectly are replaced by “???”.

Before choosing between “Option 1” and “Option 2”, you have to choose between two types of information.

You can choose “Recipient”. This means that before choosing between “Option 1” and “Option 2”, you will learn which situation was chosen by the computer, and the “???” will be replaced with information about the consequences for GiveDirectly. Furthermore, like in decision 1, your screen will display the picture and testimonial of a potential recipient before your choice of option.

Or you can choose “Cute animal” [“No information”]. This means that your screen will display the picture of a cute animal, as illustrated in the screenshot below [“This means that you will not see any picture on your screen”]. You will not learn which situation was selected by the computer, neither before nor after your choice of option.

After making this choice, we will inform you about the number of participants in this session and ask you to guess the number of participants who have chosen “Recipient” and the number of participants who have chosen “Cute animal” [“No information”]. Regardless of whether this period is selected or not for payment at the end of the session, you will earn 1 euro if your guess is correct, and 0 euro otherwise. Therefore, you should try to guess as accurately as possible. You will be informed on whether your guess is correct at the end of the session.

After you have chosen between “Recipient” and “Cute animal” [“No information”] and reported your guess, you will have to choose between “Option 1” and “Option 2”. Your earlier choice between “Recipient” or ‘Cute animal” [“No information”] determines the information you see on your screen before making your choice.

Summary of the Decisions

1. In Decision 1, you choose between Option 1 and Option 2.
2. In Decision 2, the program randomly selects which one of the two options cancels the donation.
3. You choose between the sets of information "Recipient" or "Cute animal" ["No information"].
4. You report your guess about the numbers of other participants in the session who chose "Recipient" or "Cute animal" ["No information"].
5. Your screen displays the information you chose in step 3, and you choose between Option 1 and Option 2.

Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button. A comprehension questionnaire will be displayed on your screen.

Part 2

In this part, you are randomly matched with 6 other participants to form a group of 7. There are two roles: Receivers and Senders. Receivers and Senders refer not to donations but to pictures and information, as explained below. All the participants in the group will first make decisions as Senders. Then, all of them will make a decision as Receivers. We first describe each role before explaining decision-making.

Choice of the Receiver

The Receiver has to choose between Option 1 and Option 2. The consequences from this decision are the same as in the second decision of part 1:

Option 1 results in €9 for the Receiver and Option 2 results in €15 for the Receiver.

The program picks randomly which one of the two options cancels the donation to GiveDirectly. Each option has 50 chances out of 100 to be picked.

The program randomly determines the consequences of each option independently for each Receiver. Thus, these consequences can differ across Receivers. Before making a choice between Option 1 and Option 2, the Receiver is not informed of the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly. However, s/he can obtain information from the Sender, as we now describe.

Choice of the Sender

With 80% chance, the Sender learns which one of the two options cancels the donation. With 20% chance the Sender does not learn the consequences of each option.

If the Sender does not learn the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly, the program displays automatically the picture of a cute animal on the Receiver's screen before s/he makes his/her choice. The Receiver is not informed on the consequences of this option for GiveDirectly.

If the Sender learns the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly, s/he has to choose between two types of information for the Receiver. If s/he chooses "Recipient", the Receiver will learn which one of the two options cancels the donation before choosing an option, and s/he will see the picture and the testimonial of a potential recipient of the donation. If the Sender chooses "Cute animal" ["No information"], the Receiver will see the picture of a cute animal, but not the consequences for GiveDirectly ["will not see any information nor the consequences for GiveDirectly"], neither before nor after the choice of option.

Decision Making in Part 2

In this part, all the participants first make two decisions in the role of a Sender in the case they are informed about the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly. Precisely, as a Sender, you have to choose between two types of information for the Receiver, either "Recipient" or "Cute animal" ["No information"]:

in the case you learn that the donation to GiveDirectly is cancelled after "Option 1", but not after "Option 2";

and in the case you learn that the donation to GiveDirectly is cancelled after "Option 2", but not after "Option 1".

Then, all the participants will make a decision as Receivers. As a Receiver, you will have to choose between "Option 1" and "Option 2". Before you make your choice, the computer will randomly determine which option cancels the donation. It will also randomly pair you with a Sender in your group. The choice of the Sender between "Recipient" or "Cute animal" ["No information"] determines the information you have about the consequences of each option.

Summary of the Decisions

1. You first decide as a Sender which picture and information to share if you are informed of the consequences of each option for Give Directly.
2. You are next a Receiver. You are randomly matched with a Sender.
3. You obtain the information chosen by this sender, "Recipient" or "Cute animal" ["No information"].
4. You choose between Option 1 and Option 2.
5. You are paid based on your choice as a Receiver in case this part is selected for payment.

Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button.

Part 3

In this part, you are still matched with the same 6 other participants as in part 2. But now, participants are randomly assigned to one of the roles and will be identified with an ID. There are four Receivers and their IDs are R1, R2, R3, and R4. There are three Senders and their IDs are symbols (spade, diamond, club). We will communicate your role and your ID on your screen at the beginning of this part. This part has 25 identical periods and you will keep the same role and the same ID throughout this part. We now describe each of these periods.

Choice of the Receiver

In each period, the Receiver chooses between "Option 1" and "Option 2". The consequences from this decision are the same as before:

"Option 1" results in €9 for the Receiver and "Option 2" results in €15 for the Receiver.

The program picks randomly which one of the two options cancels the donation to GiveDirectly. Each option has 50% chance to be picked.

In each period, the program randomly determines the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly, independently for each Receiver. Thus, these consequences can differ across periods and across Receivers.

The Receiver is not informed about the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly. Before choosing between Option 1 and Option 2, s/he can receive information from the Sender.

Choice of the Sender

With 80% chance, the Sender learns the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly chosen by the program for each Receiver for the current period. If the Sender learns the consequences, s/he has to decide which set of information to share with the Receiver. As before, if s/he chooses "Recipient", i) the Receiver is informed which option cancels the donation before choosing an option, and ii) the picture of a potential recipient with his/her testimonial is displayed. If the Sender chooses "cute animal" ["No information"] the picture of a cute animal is [this will be] displayed on the Receiver's screen and the Receiver does not learn which option cancels the donation, neither before nor after the choice of option.

With 20% chance the Sender does not learn the consequences of each option and the picture of a cute animal ["No information"] is displayed automatically on the Receiver's screen. The Receiver does not know whether the Sender has been informed or not.

The decision of the Sender is illustrated in the screenshot below. The first column of the table shows the ID of the Receivers (i.e. R1, R2, R3 or R4). The second column indicates for each Receiver, which option cancels the donation. The "???" sign indicates that the Sender did not receive information for participant R3; in this case, the sign of a cute animal [the symbol ;] is automatically pre-selected with no action from the Sender. In the next column, when informed, the Sender has to choose between "Recipient" and "Cute animal" ["No information"]. In this example, the Sender makes three decisions, as s/he has information about the consequences of each option for three out of four Receivers. Once the Sender has made his/her decisions, the last column of the table indicates which information will be displayed on the screen of the Receiver.

As we explain now, the Sender can earn 10 for each Receiver that selects him/her in that period.

The Receiver Selects a Sender

Before the Receiver chooses an option, s/he has to select one of the Senders (spade, diamond, or club) for the current period. The selection decision is illustrated in the screenshot below, which reflects the screen the Receiver will see in the experiment. The example shows the decision in period 5. The first column shows the ID of each Sender. For each of the past periods, the screen shows which set of information each Sender shared with the Receiver (indicated by the symbol of an animal [the symbol ; for "No information"] or the symbol GD for a recipient of GiveDirectly). The symbol of an animal [;] reflects either that the Sender had no information,

or that the Sender received the information and decided to share this picture [not to share it; the Receiver cannot distinguish between these possibilities. The past choices of the Senders in the group are only visible to the Receivers, not to the other Senders. In this example, symbols have been chosen randomly.

When choosing a Sender, the Receiver only knows the past choices of the Senders but not those for the current period. The Receiver chooses a Sender by clicking on a box in the left column. The Receiver's information (\Recipient" or \Cute Animal" [\No information"]) is determined by the selected sender's choice for the current period. The Senders are not informed of the choices of the Receivers.

Summary of the Decisions

1. For each Receiver, the program randomly selects which option cancels the donation.
2. With 80% chance, the Sender learns the consequences of each option. If s/he learns the consequences, the Sender has to choose a set of information to share with the Receiver (\Recipient" or \Cute animal" [\No information]).
3. The Receiver sees information about sender's choices in earlier periods. S/he then chooses one of the Senders. The Receiver's information is determined by the choice of that sender (\Recipient" or \Cute animal" [\No information"]) in the current period.
4. The Receiver decides between Option 1 and Option 2.
5. The same procedure applies for the 25 periods.

Summary of Earnings

The program randomly selects one of the 28 periods for payment (the two decisions in part 1, the decision as a Receiver in part 2 and the 25 periods in part 3). If a decision in part 1 or in part 2 is selected for payment, you will receive either e 9 or e 15, depending on whether you chose option Option 1 or Option 2 in that period. If a decision in part 3 is selected, payoffs for each player are as follows:

The Receiver earns either e 9 or e 15, depending on the chosen option in that period.

The Sender earns e 10 for each Receiver that selected him/her in that round. Thus, the Sender minimally earns e 0 if s/he has not been chosen by any Receiver, and maximally earns e 40 if s/he has been chosen by the four Receivers.

Finally, GiveDirectly will receive a donation of e 15 for any choice in the selected period that does not cancel the donation.

End of the Session

At the end of part 3 a questionnaire will be displayed on your screen and then you will receive a feedback on your earnings in the session. On invitation of an experimenter, you will move into the payment room with your pre-filled receipt of payment and your computer tag.[Last sentence omitted in the NoCAP treatment]

Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button. A comprehension questionnaire will be displayed on your screen.

A.3 Instructions for the INDIVIDUAL treatment

Welcome to this experiment. Please switch off your mobile phone and refrain from communication with the other participants throughout the experiment, or we must exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. Please read the instructions carefully. Whenever you have a question, please raise your hand or press the red button on the side of your desk and we will come to your desk and answer to your question in private.

You will receive €5 for showing up on time. You can earn additional earnings based on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. The experiment consists of three parts that can include several periods. At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select one of these periods, each with equal probability, and we will pay you according to your payoff in the selected period. Thus, you should think carefully when making each decision, as it could be the one that will be paid.

For each participant, the experimenters have prepared a donation of €15 to a charity, GiveDirectly. GiveDirectly transfers money to very poor families in developing countries. This charity is rated as one of the 7 top charities in terms of cost-effectiveness by the charity evaluation site GiveWell, above many traditional charities in the world. Here is an excerpt from the website "GiveDirectly.org" presenting its objectives (we have also distributed a document on the operating mode of GiveDirectly and information from Wikipedia):

"We use mobile payments technology to send your donations to extremely poor families in the developing world in the most capital efficient way currently possible. \$0.91 of your dollar ends up in the hands of the poor. Our model is setting the benchmark for philanthropic efficiency around the world. We strive to promote a new approach to philanthropy that uses constant experimentation and analytical rigor to understand the most impactful ways to achieve positive outcomes."

During the session, we will show you pictures and testimonials of people who have passed the screening of GiveDirectly, and are potential recipients of the donations in this session. Their pictures and testimonials, translated into French, are taken verbatim from the website "GiveDirectly.org" and they may thus include typos.

The experimenters commit on honor to transfer the donations to GiveDirectly after the experiment. Note that the deontological rules of GATE-Lab do not allow deception of participants by the experimenters. So, all promised donations for the selected period at the end of the session will actually be sent to GiveDirectly. If you want more information about the transfer, please contact an experimenter after the session.

However, as we explain below, your choices may lead to a cancellation of the donation prepared by the experimenters, in which case GiveDirectly will not receive a donation for your participation.

The instructions for the first part follow below. The instructions for the next parts will be distributed after all participants have completed each part.

Part 1

In this part you will make two decisions. In each of these decisions, you are asked to choose between Option 1" and "Option 2 ". Both options affect your own payoffs and the donation to GiveDirectly.

For Decision one you will see on your screen before your choice the picture and testimonial of a potential recipient of the donation, who has passed the screening by GiveDirectly, as illustrated in the screenshot below. Choosing "Option 1 " will result in €9 for yourself and will not cancel the donation of €15 by the experimenters to GiveDirectly. Choosing "Option 2 " will result in €15 for yourself, and will cancel the donation to GiveDirectly.

In Decision two as in decision one, you can choose between "Option 1 ", which will result in €9 for yourself and "Option 2 ", which will result in €15 for yourself. The difference with the first decision is that the program

determines randomly which one of the two options will result in a cancellation of the donation of 15 to Give Directly. With 50 chances out of 100, choosing \ Option 2 " cancels the donation while \ Option 1 " confirms the donation, just like in decision 1. With 50 chances out of 100 the situation is reversed, so choosing \Option 1" cancels the donation and \ Option 2 " confirms the donation. You are not informed which situation is chosen by the program, and the consequences for GiveDirectly are replaced by \???".

Before choosing between \Option 1 " and \ Option 2 ", you have to choose between two types of information. You can choose \Recipient". This means that before choosing between \Option 1 " and \ Option 2 ", you will learn which situation was chosen by the computer, and the \???" will be replaced with information about the consequences for GiveDirectly. Furthermore, like in decision 1, your screen will display the picture and testimonial of a potential recipient before your choice of option.

Or you can choose \Cute animal". This means that your screen will display the picture of a cute animal, as illustrated in the screenshot below. You will not learn which situation was selected by the computer, neither before nor after your choice of option.

After making this choice, we will inform you about the number of participants in this session and ask you to guess the number of participants who have chosen \Recipient" and the number of participants who have chosen \Cute animal". Regardless of whether this period is selected or not for payment at the end of the session, you will earn 1 euro if your guess is correct, and 0 euro otherwise. Therefore, you should try to guess as accurately as possible. You will be informed on whether your guess is correct at the end of the session.

After you have chosen between \Recipient" and \Cute animal" and reported your guess, you will have to choose between \Option 1 " and \ Option 2 ". Your earlier choice between \Recipient" and \Cute animal" determines the information you see on your screen before making your choice.

Summary of the Decisions

1. In Decision 1, you choose between Option 1 and Option 2 .
2. In Decision 2, the program randomly selects which one of the two options cancels the donation.
3. You choose between the sets of information \Recipient" or \Cute animal".
4. You report your guess about the numbers of other participants in the session who chose \Recipient" or \Cute animal".

5. Your screen displays the information you chose in step 3, and you choose between Option 1 and Option 2.

Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button. A comprehension questionnaire will be displayed on your screen.

Part 2

This part has 25 periods. We now describe each of these periods. In each period, you have to choose between \Option 1 " and \Option 2 ". The consequences from this decision are the same as before:

\Option 1 " results in €9 for you and \Option 2 " results in €15 for you.

The program picks randomly which one of the two options cancels the donation to GiveDirectly. Each option has 50 chances out of 100 to be picked.

In each period, the program randomly determines the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly. Thus, these consequences can differ across periods.

You are not informed of the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly. However, before choosing between \Option 1 " and \Option 2 " you can obtain information from the program.

With 80% chance, the program makes available the information on the consequences of each option for GiveDirectly chosen by the program for the current period. You have to decide which set of information to receive. As before, if you choose "Recipient", i) you will be informed on which option cancels the donation before choosing an option, and ii) the picture of a typical recipient with his/her testimonial will be displayed on your screen. If you choose "cute animal", the picture of a cute animal will be displayed on your screen and you will not learn which option cancels the donation, neither before nor after your choice of option.

With 20% chance the program makes available the information on the consequences of each option and the picture of a cute animal is displayed automatically on your screen.

Summary of the Decisions

1. The program randomly selects which option cancels the donation.
2. With 80% chance, the program makes available the information on the consequences of each option. If information is available, you have to choose the set of information to receive (\Recipient" or \Cute animal".

3. You decide between Option 1 and Option 2 .
4. The same procedure applies for the 25 periods.

Summary of Earnings

The program randomly selects one of the 27 periods for payment (the two decisions in part 1 and the 25 periods in part 2). For the randomly selected period:

You earn either e 9 or e 15, depending on the chosen option in that period.

GiveDirectly will receive a donation of e 15 if the choice in the selected period does not cancel the donation.

End of the Session

At the end of part 2 a questionnaire will be displayed on your screen and then you will receive a feedback on your earnings in the session.

Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button.

B Appendix: Summary of Sessions

Table B.1: Summary of sessions

Session	Treatment	N Participants	Females	Mean Age	Mean Payo
1	CAP-CHOICE	21	66.67%	29.10	18.76
2	CAP-CHOICE	21	61.90%	23.38	18.52
3	CAP-CHOICE	21	52.38%	23.67	18.81
4	CAP-CHOICE	21	52.38%	23.43	19.33
5	CAP-CHOICE	21	52.38%	21.38	18.33
6	CAP-CHOICE	21	57.14%	20.24	18.76
7	CAP-CHOICE	21	38.10%	21.52	19.05
8	CAP-CHOICE	14	42.86%	20.93	18.21
9	CAP-RANDOM	21	40.00%	21.48	18.86
10	CAP-RANDOM	21	80.95%	20.76	17.67
11	CAP-RANDOM	21	57.14%	20.62	18.48
12	CAP-RANDOM	21	57.14%	23.52	15.48
13	CAP-RANDOM	21	61.90%	23.43	18.24
14	CAP-RANDOM	21	61.90%	21.67	18.90
15	CAP-RANDOM	14	57.14%	20.79	19.57
16	CAP-RANDOM	21	38.10%	23.10	19.14
17	NoCAP-RANDOM	21	52.38%	21.24	19.38
18	NoCAP-CHOICE	21	66.67%	20.52	19.90
19	NoCAP-RANDOM	21	38.10%	20.76	19.86
20	NoCAP-CHOICE	21	57.14%	21.29	20.57
21	NoCAP-RANDOM	21	47.62%	23.76	20.24
22	NoCAP-CHOICE	21	60.00%	21.14	20.19
23	NoCAP-RANDOM	21	52.38%	25.00	19.43
24	NoCAP-CHOICE	21	61.90%	22.52	19.43
25	INDIVIDUAL	10	20.00%	21.40	19.70
26	NoCAP-CHOICE	21	71.43%	20.48	19.57
27	INDIVIDUAL	14	71.43%	21.00	19.21
28	NoCAP-RANDOM	21	57.14%	21.33	19.48
29	NoCAP-CHOICE	21	61.90%	20.52	18.81
30	NoCAP-RANDOM	21	47.62%	21.00	19.00
31	NoCAP-CHOICE	21	57.14%	20.52	19.81
32	INDIVIDUAL	17	41.18%	24.65	17.94
33	NoCAP-RANDOM	14	35.71%	23.36	19.43
34	NoCAP-CHOICE	14	64.29%	21.00	19.86
35	NoCAP-RANDOM	14	71.43%	21.64	20.07
36	INDIVIDUAL	20	70.00%	21.65	18.30
37	INDIVIDUAL	14	57.14%	21.57	18.86
Total		712	55.63	22.07	19.04

Notes: The table reports the number of participants, the percentage of females, the mean age of the participants, and the mean participant's payo in Euros, per session. The smaller number of participants in some sessions (one per treatment) is due to no show-up. The high mean age in session 1 is due to the presence of two participants aged 60 and 63.

C Appendix: Additional Figures on the Supply of Information

In this Appendix, we show more details of the distribution of supply, using our metric for the suppression of bad news, which we call the s statistic, defined as

$$s_i := \frac{\text{Number of bad states suppressed by sender } i}{\text{Number of bad states observed by sender } i}$$

We also provide additional figures displaying the roles of senders' beliefs and senders' suppression of good news.

Supply: Overview of suppression of bad news

Figure C.1 shows the cumulative distribution of s -statistics over senders in each treatment, which reveals several results. First, the distributions do not differ much by treatment. Indeed, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject equality of the distributions ($p = 0.248$). Second, almost one third of senders in each treatment transmits all bad news and the large majority suppresses at least some news. Third, about 25% of senders suppress more than half of the bad news they receive ($s > 0.5$). Appendix C gives individual examples to illustrate various patterns of information suppression by senders with different s -statistics.

Figure C.1: Suppression of bad news by senders

Note: The figure displays the cumulative distribution of individual s -statistics by treatment.

Supply: Correlation between beliefs and suppression of bad news

The left panel of Figure C.2 shows the suppression rates by senders who believe that less than 50% of other participants in the session prefer animal pictures over recipients' info ("belief low") and senders who believe the fraction is 50% or more ("belief high"). In both treatments, the (minority of) senders who believe the majority prefers distractions are more likely to suppress information. However, contrary to a strategic motive of attracting clients, this difference is larger in the RANDOM treatment than in the CHOICE treatment.

These results are consistent with the idea that senders are trying to do decision makers a "favor", rather than strategically adjust their behavior to increase their chance of being selected by decision makers. However, beliefs may also reflect a "false consensus effect" and be a proxy for senders' own preferences for information. If so, our findings could indicate "paternalism": a wish to impose the sender's preferred information or decision on the decision maker.

To investigate this possibility, we consider the correlation between sender beliefs and sender preferences. The right panel of Figure C.2 shows the beliefs split by the senders' own preferences in the dilemma, based on the individual decisions in Part 1. In line with the "projection" hypothesis, senders who prefer to avoid receiver information ("Avoiders") are more likely to think that others prefer to do so. The impact of taking a selfish decision in the dilemma ("Selfish") is less clear.

Figure C.2: Sender beliefs and suppression of bad news

Notes: The left panel shows the impact of sender's beliefs about the number of subjects (in the session) that want to remain uninformed on the rate of suppression of bad news. Belief high (low) is for senders that believe the majority wants to remain ignorant (wants to know). The right panel shows the average belief about the number of subjects that want to remain ignorant conditional on the sender's preferences as revealed in Part 1 of the experiment. Vertical bars show the standard errors. In the left panel, standard errors are based on a linear probability model that clusters errors at group level and it is analogous to the ones reported in Table 3. Compared to the table, the model only includes the treatment dummy, a dummy that is equal to 1 when the sender believes that the majority wants to remain uninformed, and their interaction as explanatory variables.

Supply: Suppression of good news

Although the suppression of good news does not affect the decision makers' choice, senders may suppress information symmetrically to avoid that decision makers infer that "no news means bad news". To investigate this, Figure C.3 shows each sender's suppression pattern for both good and bad news. We observe that most of the observations are close to the diagonal, indicating symmetric suppression. Fisher tests reject the null hypothesis that the senders have the same fraction of suppression for bad and good news for only 35 out of 138 senders. Of these, 21 systematically suppress bad news more than good news and 14 suppress good news more than bad news. Thus, only a minority systematically suppresses news asymmetrically, which is consistent with the idea that senders think about the (Bayesian) inferences of the decision maker.

At first glance, it is somewhat puzzling that 14 senders suppress good news more than bad news. One rationale for suppressing mostly good news is to signal information suppression in order to lure decision makers who would prefer to remain ignorant. Indeed, such a strategy makes the picture of the beneficiary (and potential victim) more salient when news are bad. For example, one subject reported in the final questionnaire: "When option 1 cancelled the donation, regardless of whether I give information or not, the Receiver would choose to earn 15 Euros (option2), which is good since it gives money to the charity. Even if it has no impact on their decision, I prefer send them a picture of a cute animal. When option 2 cancelled the donation, I sent the picture of GD hoping that this would force the receivers to think further, so that the charity would receive a donation (option 1), even if they would earn only 9 Euros." By providing them with bad news, an altruistic sender may exert pressure on such decision makers to act altruistically, thus increasing revenue for the charity. This idea is consistent with the data: of the 14 decision makers who mostly suppress good news, 12 are Altruistic and 2 are selfish. Again, this suggests that senders employ rather sophisticated strategies.

Figure C.3: Individual suppression rates of good and bad news by treatment

Notes: The figure displays suppression of good news (x-axis) and bad news (y-axis). Each dot is a sender. Multiple senders with the same suppression patterns are indicated by bigger dots.

Supply: Illustrations of the supply of information by senders with various s-statistics

The following three figures correspond to three senders with different s-statistics. In the figures, each line corresponds to one of the four decision makers in the sender's group. The horizontal axis indicates the 25 periods in part 3 of the experiment. B is for bad news (option 2 cancels the donation); G for good news (option 1 cancels the donation); and an hyphen indicates that no news has been sent (either because the sender was not informed or because he or she decided not to send news). Colored letters indicate that the corresponding news has been sent and dark letters that the news has not been sent.

Figure C.4: Transmission of information to decision makers by a sender with s -statistic = 0

Notes: Figure C.4 illustrates the case of a sender that transmits all information (s -statistic = 0).

Figure C.5: Transmission of information to decision makers by a sender with s -statistic = 0.66

Notes: Figure C.5 illustrates the case of a sender that suppresses all types of news except for one decision maker (s -statistic = 0.66).

Figure C.6: Transmission of information to decision makers by a sender with s -statistic = 0.89

Notes: Figure C.6 illustrates the case of a sender that suppresses most bad news and does not discriminate among decision makers (s -statistic = 0.89). This sender sends news almost only when they are good.

D Appendix: Additional analysis of the Demand for Information

In this Appendix, we provide additional figures and tables to understand information demand in the main CHOICE treatment (with cute animals pictures), and use a number of additional methods to classify decision makers' selection strategies.

Probability to choose the senders | Multinomial models

Table D.1 reports multinomial logit models where the three alternatives are the senders providing Low, Medium, and High ignorance. The individual specific explanatory variables include the dummies capturing the type of the decision maker, i.e., *Sel sh - Altruistic* and *Avoider - Seeker*, obtained from the choices in Part 1. Both Model 1 and Model 2 include random effects at the individual level on the intercepts of the two equations. Compared to Model 1, Model 2 includes fixed effects at the group level using group dummies.

The estimates in Table D.1 show the effect of the decision maker types on the odds ratio of Low versus Medium and of Low versus High ignorance, respectively. Moving from *Altruistic* to *Sel sh* and from *information Seeking* to *Avoiding* significantly lowers the odds to choose the sender that provides the lowest level of ignorance compared to the odds to choose the sender that provides the intermediate level (Medium ignorance equation), and compared to the odds to choose the sender that provides the highest level of ignorance (High ignorance equation). Results are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects at the group level.

Table D.1: Probability to choose the sender that provided the highest, intermediate and lowest level of ignorance.

	Model 1 Est. (S.E.)	Model 2 Est. (S.E.)
Medium ignorance		
(intercept)	-1.010 (0.109)***	-0.000 (0.379)
<i>Sel sh</i> (DM)	0.349 (0.181)	0.476 (0.200)*
<i>Avoider</i> (DM)	1.013 (0.247)***	1.089 (0.282)***
<i>Sel sh</i> (DM) <i>Avoider</i> (DM)	-0.675 (0.365)	-0.844 (0.430)*
M	0.779 (0.105)***	0.498 (0.127)***
High ignorance		
(intercept)	-1.037 (0.116)***	0.355 (0.405)
<i>Sel sh</i> (DM)	0.848 (0.188)***	0.741 (8.218)***
<i>Avoider</i> (DM)	1.573 (0.253)***	1.647 (0.301)***
<i>Sel sh</i> (DM) <i>Avoider</i> (DM)	0.001 (0.385)	-0.917 (0.441)*
H	1.560 (0.140)***	1.190 (0.139)***
Group dummies	NO	YES
Log-Likelihood	-1327.3	-1293.4
Number of observations	1380	1380
Number of subjects	92	92
Number of groups	23	23

Notes: These regressions are based on a multinomial logit model where the alternatives are the three senders ordered by the amount of ignorance supplied in the previous 10 periods (the baseline alternative is the sender that supplies the lowest level of ignorance). Individual specific variables are the dummies indicating the preferences of the decision makers. Both models include random effects at subject level on the intercepts. Model 2 includes group dummies. Regressions use data of the last 15 periods. *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; 0.1.

To help interpret these findings, Figure D.1 shows the predicted probability to choose each sender for each decision maker. It shows that the effect of heterogeneity is mostly captured by shifting the probability mass from the Low ignorance to the High ignorance sender, while the predicted probability to choose the Medium ignorance sender is about 20-25% and does not change much across types. Both the *Sel sh* and *Altruistic Avoiders* show

a significantly lower propensity to choose informative senders.

Figure D.1: Predicted probability of the decision makers' choice of sender

Notes: The figures display the predicted probability to choose the sender providing the highest, intermediate, and lowest level of suppression for each of the 92 decision makers. The figure on the left reports predictions based on Model 1 of Table D.1 and the figure on the right reports predictions based on Model 2 of Table D.1. The color of the dots captures the type of the decision maker elicited in Part 1. The cross shows the average frequency of choice.

Demand as measured by news consumption

Here, we compute how often a decision maker actually observes bad news, compared to the bad news that is available from senders in the group. We focus on bad news, since this is the only news that matters from an ethical or efficiency perspective. We define the d -statistic, which is the fraction of bad states seen by the decision maker out of the average number of bad states reported to the decision maker (DM) by the three senders he or she was matched with throughout the 25 periods of Part 3:

$$d_i := \frac{1}{3} \frac{\sum_{j=1}^3 \text{Number of bad states seen by DM } i \text{ by sender } j}{\text{Bad states reported to the DM } i \text{ by sender } j}$$

Selecting a sender at random will lead to $d = 1$. A decision maker who consistently selects informative senders will have $d > 1$, whereas selecting uninformative senders will yield $d < 1$.

Figure D.2 shows the distribution of the d -statistic. The left panel ranks all individual d -statistics by size, whereas the right panel shows the density distribution of the d -statistic. The left panel tells us that 40 out of 92 (43.5%) decision makers have $ad < 1$, and can be classified as information avoiders in Part 3, while the rest consists of information seekers. Appendix C illustrates the demand for information by decision makers with different d -statistics. However, the d -statistic is a noisy measure since groups differ in the distribution of news, and hence in the possibility to become more or less informed. In an extreme case where all senders transmit the same amount of news, the d -statistic will necessarily be 1, no matter what the news consumption is. We control for this by conducting simulations based on a decision maker who chooses randomly. This yields a distribution of d -statistics that we use to construct a 90% confidence interval.¹ By comparing the actual d -statistic to this confidence interval, we can classify with 90% confidence 13 decision makers as information avoiders (identifiable by triangles on the left hand side of the left panel), and 21 as information seekers (identifiable by triangles on the

¹The procedure is as follows: (i) keeping fixed the senders' behavior, we simulate the choice of each decision maker in each period under the assumption that he/she randomly selects one of the 3 senders; (ii) given the simulated choices of the decision maker, we compute the implied d -statistic; (iii) we repeat the procedure 100000 times. The confidence intervals are obtained by taking the 5th and 95th percentiles of the simulated d -statistic over the 100000 simulations. This interval captures the most likely values of the d -statistic under the assumption that the decision maker is neutral to the information received.

Figure D.2: Information demand

Notes: The figure displays the distribution of the d -statistic across subjects in the CHOICE treatment. A d -statistic equal to 1 corresponds to a random choice of senders; a d -statistic higher (lower) than 1 corresponds to the selection of informative (uninformative) senders. The left panel ranks the individual d -statistics by size (dots and triangles indicate the observed d -statistic) and shows a 90% confidence interval for the subject's d -statistic under the null hypothesis of random sender choice (black bars). When the observed d -statistic lies outside the black bars (which is indicated with a triangle), one can reject the null hypothesis of a random selection of sender at the 10% confidence level. The right panel shows the overall distribution of the observed d -statistic.

right hand side of the left panel), out of a total of 92. The percentage of avoiders in the set of clearly classifiable decision makers is 38.2%, not too far from the 43.5% we found above.

Overall, this analysis confirms that a sizable minority of subjects appears to either avoid informative senders or at least not seek them out. Coming back to our type classification of decision makers, the d -statistic correlates with the decision to avoid information in the first individual part of the experiment (Pearson $r = 0.202$, $p = 0.054$).

Illustrations of the demand for information by decision makers with various d -statistics

The following three figures correspond to three decision makers with different d -statistics. In the figures, each line corresponds to one of the three senders in the decision maker's group. The horizontal axis indicates the 25 periods in part 3 of the experiment. B is for bad news (option 2 cancels the donation); G for good news (option 1 cancels the donation); and an hyphen indicates that no news has been received. The colored items indicate which advisor has been selected in each period and which news has been revealed in the period after the sender has been selected.

Figure D.3: Demand for information of a decision maker with d -statistic = 1.23

Note: Figure D.3 illustrates the case of an information seeker who sanctions any transmission of no news (d -statistic = 1.23).

Figure D.4: Demand for information of a decision maker with d -statistic = 0.75

Notes: Figure D.4 illustrates also the case of an information avoider who is less able to establish a stable relationship with a sender (d -statistic = 0.75).

Figure D.5: Demand for information of a decision maker with d -statistic = 0.18

Notes: Figure D.5 illustrates the case of an information avoider who establishes a long term relationship with a sender who never provides news (d -statistic = 0.18).

Decision to switch sender | Linear probability models

Here we present a third way to analyze demand, namely by the decision to switch to another sender conditional on the information received. This decision is informative of decision makers' information seeking or avoiding strategy. It provides an alternative way to look at information demand based on sender history. Figure D.6 shows the fraction of decision makers that change sender in part 3 in the CHOICE treatment after sender reported good, bad or no news. The left panel shows aggregate results, which demonstrates that switching rates are substantial and vary between 47.3% after bad news, 43.1% after good news, and 56.9% after no news. On aggregate, switching is highest after no news, in line with the idea that most people are information seekers.

Figure D.6: Switching senders

Notes: The figure displays the fraction of decision makers that change sender after sender reported good, bad or no news in the CHOICE treatment. The left panel shows aggregate results. The right panel shows a split by decisions made by information seekers and information avoiders in part 1. Bars are standard errors based on the regression model 3 given in Table D.2.

The right panel shows a split by the "type" of decision makers, based on their revealed preferences in part 1. This panel reveals that the aggregate results hide a lot of heterogeneity. In particular, the largest group (Altruistic - Seekers) clearly penalizes non-informative advice: the switching rate is 66.0% after receiving no news, 42.8% after bad news and 40.5% after good news. By contrast, there is a smaller group (Selfish - Avoiders) that does the opposite: the switching rate is 26.8% after receiving no news, 53.4% after bad news and 43.8% after good news. Moreover, except for the Altruistic - Seekers group, participants show a higher switching rate after bad than after good news, consistent with "shooting the messenger".

Table D.2 evaluates these results statistically in a linear probability model with the switching decision as an independent binary variable and standard errors clustered at group level². The results of Models 1 and 2 confirm that the baseline category (Altruistic - Seekers) is about 26 percentage points more likely to switch sender after no news, an effect that is almost entirely canceled in the group with Avoiders, which comprises 22 subjects (24% of all decision makers). We also see a significant effect for Selfish decision makers, who are significantly more likely to switch after bad news than altruistic subjects are. Adding interactions between Selfish and Avoider to the previous models, Model 3 and Model 4 show that these results continue to hold. Decreased switching rates after no news are driven

²In some cases the coefficients do not precisely match the height of the bars in Figure D.6, as the former include demographic control variables, while the latter show pure frequencies.

both by the Sel sh and Altruistic Avoiders.

Table D.2: Decision to switch senders

			Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
			Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)
(Intercept)			0.409 (0.052)***	0.557 (0.062)***	0.405 (0.051)***	0.552 (0.062)***
GOOD news	Sel sh		0.076 (0.091)	0.123 (0.082)	0.089 (0.097)	0.132 (0.084)
GOOD news	Avoider		-0.024 (0.103)	-0.023 (0.096)	0.005 (0.131)	-0.004 (0.128)
GOOD news	Sel sh	Avoider			-0.062 (0.186)	-0.039 (0.188)
BAD news			0.025 (0.031)	0.026 (0.030)	0.023 (0.035)	0.020 (0.034)
BAD news	Sel sh		0.105 (0.079)	0.164 (0.071)*	0.125 (0.098)	0.195 (0.080)*
BAD news	Avoider		0.025 (0.085)	0.025 (0.097)	0.064 (0.116)	0.094 (0.120)
BAD news	Sel sh	Avoider			-0.084 (0.196)	-0.134 (0.195)
No news			0.268 (0.055)***	0.264 (0.060)***	0.256 (0.064)***	0.255 (0.070)***
No news	Sel sh		-0.104 (0.076)	-0.034 (0.078)	-0.054 (0.102)	0.002 (0.107)
No news	Avoider		-0.249 (0.079)**	-0.252 (0.076)***	-0.169 (0.104)	-0.194 (0.088)*
No news	Sel sh	Avoider			-0.170 (0.185)	-0.120 (0.179)
Age				-0.000 (0.003)		0.000 (0.003)
d(Male)				-0.118 (0.052)*		-0.118 (0.051)*
BAC				-0.000 (0.017)		-0.000 (0.017)
N of past participations in exp.				-0.007 (0.017)		-0.007 (0.017)
Period dummies			NO	YES	NO	YES
Number of observations			2208	2088	2208	2088
Number of clusters			23	23	23	23

Notes: These regressions are based on linear probability models. The binary dependent variable is the decision maker's choice to switch to another sender in part 3 of the CHOICE treatment in each of the 25 periods (24 switching decisions per decision maker). Robust standard errors clustered at group level are in parentheses. d for dummy variables. Control variables are: age of the participant (demeaned); gender dummy d(Male); high school grade at the Baccalaureat (BAC) (demeaned); number of past participations in experiments. Period dummies are included with period 2 as the reference category. *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; 0.1.

E Appendix: Additional Analysis of Assortative Matching and Unethical Outcomes

Table E.1 shows the results of linear probability models where the dependent variable is equal to one if a decision maker matches with an Avoider sender. In addition to the decision maker's type, the independent variables include period dummies and individual characteristics of the decision maker.

Model 1 shows that being an Avoider increases the probability of matching with an Avoider-sender by 21 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Being a Sel sh decision maker does not increase the probability further, and in fact slightly decreases it. This pattern makes sense, as we have shown above that being an Avoider predicts both the demand for ignorance as the supply. In addition, we add an interaction between the two dimensions of the decision-makers' type. This shows that the tendency for assortative matching is somewhat larger for Sel sh Avoiders. Overall, this category is almost 30 percentage points more likely to match with an Avoider Sender than the baseline category (Altruistic Seeker), which is statistically significant at the 5% level (see Table Notes).

Table E.1: Matching of types in the CHOICE treatment

	Model 1	Model 2
	Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)
(Intercept)	0.524 (0.103)***	0.549 (0.101)***
Sel sh DM	-0.059 (0.054)	-0.096 (0.061)
Avoider DM	0.210 (0.105)*	0.148 (0.111)
Sel sh DM Avoider DM		0.148 (0.132)
Age	-0.008 (0.002)***	-0.009 (0.002)***
d(Male)	-0.116 (0.049)*	-0.119 (0.047)*
BAC	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.011)
# of past participations in exp.	0.031 (0.015)*	0.025 (0.015)
Period dummies	YES	YES
Number of observations	1150	1150
Number of clusters	12	12

Notes: The regressions are based on linear probability models. The binary dependent variable is the decision maker's choice of a sender who is an Avoider in Part 3 (in each of the 25 rounds). Regressions include only data from the groups where there was at least one sender per type. Robust standard errors clustered at group level are in parentheses. DM for decision maker; d for dummy variables. Control variables are: age of the participant (demeaned); gender dummy d(Male); high school grade at the Baccalaureat (BAC) (demeaned); number of past participations in experiments. Period dummies are included with period 1 as the reference category. *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; 0.1. Model 2 Wald test: = 0:148 + 0:148 = 0:296, p = 0:027).

F Appendix: Motives in Questionnaire Responses

In the nal questionnaire, we asked both senders and decision makers about their motives in a free form text format. To categorize these motives, we hired three independent raters, who categorized each response into several pre-specified motives. We classify a response if two out of three raters agree on the category. Below we provide more information about the categories.

F.1 Decision maker motives

At the end of the sessions, decision makers were asked to answer the following question: "According to which principle(s) did you select the sender?". We classified the different comments left by the Senders. Below we illustrate each category by examples of Senders' comments.

Categories. Table F.1 summarizes our categories and the instructions we provided to raters.

Motive	Description	Examples
Increase my payo	Mention willingness to increasing own payo s	"Maximized my payo s", "I was indifferent, as I always made the decision that paid me 15"
Senders' equality	Mentions equality of payo s between the senders	"I selected in a fair way: in each part I chose a different sender"
Information seeking	Mentions the willingness to be informed on the consequences of one's choice on the charity	"I wanted to have information on GD", "the sender who was able to provide information each time", "the frequency of information on the beneficiary"
Information avoidance	Mentions the willingness to ignore the consequences of one's choice on the charity	"I did not want to know the consequences", "I only wanted to see animals pictures"
Random (No rule)	Mentions randomness in the selection of the sender	"I chose at random"
Sender's morality (Honesty)	Mentions a choice based on the honesty or transparency of the sender	"I rewarded transparency"
Other	None of the above	-

Table F.1: Response categories for decision makers. These motives, descriptions and examples were shared with raters.

Results. Table F.2 summarizes the result of the exercise for both CAP and NoCAP CHOICE treatments.

	CAP	NoCAP
Increase my payo	1	2
Senders' equality	14	11
Information seeking	43	38
Information avoidance	7	10
Random (No rule)	11	12
Sender's morality (Honesty)	4	1
Other (None of the above)	11	16
No coders' agreement	1	2
No explanation provided (blank)	0	0
Total	92	92

Table F.2: Decision makers' classification based of the provided explanation of their reasons to choose a Sender in the CHOICE treatments (classification by majority out of 3 coders: 86.4% of the classifications reached by unanimity, 12.0% by majority, and 1.6% no agreement)

F.2 Sender motives

At the end of the sessions, Senders were asked to answer the following question: "According to which principle(s) did you decide to report or not the consequences to the receivers?". We classified the different comments left by the Senders. Below we illustrate each category by examples of Senders' comments.

Categories. Table F.3 summarizes our categories and the instructions we provided to raters.

Motive	Description	Examples
Strategic	Mention a wish to be selected, increasing own payoffs	"Maximized my payoffs", "I would be more likely to be selected if giving info"
Paternalistic	Mentions wish for specific action of decision maker	"I gave information hoping that the decision maker would not cancel the donation", "I counted on them making a donation"
Autonomy	Mentions agency or autonomy of the decision maker	"I gave information to let them make their own decision", "let them decide according to their values", "giving them responsibility"
Help the decision maker	Mentions wish to help the decision maker in some way or fulfill preferences of decision maker	"Make their decisions easy", "Relieve their conscience", "they would prefer remaining ignorant/having information", "I gave information according to their earlier choices"
Rule based	Mentions general (moral) rule	"Transparency is important", "Always give information"
No Rule	Mentions randomness in the decision to send the picture of a beneficiary or the picture of a cute animal	"I chose at random"

Table F.3: Response categories for senders. These motives, descriptions and examples were shared with raters.

Results. Table F.4 summarizes the result of the exercise split by CHOICE and RANDOM and CAP and NoCAP. Table F.5 aggregates these results over the CAP and NoCAP treatments, and hence focuses on CHOICE versus RANDOM.

	Choice - CAP	Choice - NoCAP	Random - CAP	Random - NoCAP
Strategic	4	8	1	1
Make DM decision easy (Help DM)	12	8	2	6
Paternalistic	6	7	13	15
Autonomy of DM	5	6	6	15
Moral rule	14	11	13	8
Random (No rule)	10	12	11	7
Other (None of the above)	11	13	21	14
No coders' agreement	5	3	2	0
No explanation provided (blank)	2	1	0	0
Total	69	69	69	66

Table F.4: Senders' classification based of the provided explanation of their reasons to share (or not) information (classification by majority out of three coders: 64.8% of the classifications reached by unanimity, 31.5% by majority, and 5.7% no agreement)

	Choice	Random
Strategic	12	2
Make DM decision easy (Help DM)	20	8
Paternalistic	13	28
Autonomy of DM	11	21
Moral rule	25	21
Random (No rule)	22	18
Other (None of the above)	24	35
No coders' agreement	8	2
No explanation provided (blank)	3	0
Total	138	135

Table F.5: Senders' classification based on the provided explanation of their reasons to share (or not) information (classification by majority out of three coders: 64.8% of the classifications reached by unanimity, 31.5% by majority, and 5.7% no agreement)

G Appendix: Analyses of the NoCAP Treatments

G.1 Comparison of the CAP and NoCAP treatments

Table G.1: Unethical outcomes and ignorance consumption in CAP and NoCAP

	Unethical outcomes		Ignorance consumption	
	Model 1 Est. (S.E.)	Model 2 Est. (S.E.)	Model 3 Est. (S.E.)	Model 4 Est. (S.E.)
Constant	0.840 (0.047)***	0.851 (0.052)***	0.374 (0.042)***	0.379 (0.050)***
d(NoCAP)	0.025 (0.028)	0.019 (0.037)	-0.035 (0.029)	-0.046 (0.043)
d(CHOICE)		-0.021 (0.046)		-0.014 (0.047)
d(NoCAP) d(CHOICE)		0.013 (0.057)		0.022 (0.058)
Altruistic DM	-0.432 (0.026)***	-0.433 (0.026)***	-0.025 (0.020)	-0.024 (0.021)
Avoider DM	0.100 (0.035)**	0.101 (0.035)**	0.074 (0.030)*	0.074 (0.031)*
Age Age	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
d(Male)	0.026 (0.028)	0.026 (0.028)	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)
BAC $\overline{\text{BAC}}$	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)
# of past participations in exp.	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)
Period dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES
Number of observations	4498	4498	8875	8875
Number of clusters	91	91	91	91

Notes: The regressions are based on linear probability models. The binary dependent variable in Model 1 and 2 is the cancellation of the donation in Part 3 in each of the 25 rounds. These models include only data where the state is bad. The binary dependent variable in Model 3 and 4 takes value one when the decision maker is observing NO NEWS. Robust standard errors clustered at group level are in parentheses. DM for decision maker; d for dummy variables. Control variables are: age of the participant (demeaned); gender dummy d(Male); high school grade at the Baccalaureat (BAC) (demeaned); number of past participations in experiments. Period dummies are included with period 1 as the reference category. *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; 0.1.

Table G.2: Suppression of bad and good news in CAP and NoCAP treatments

	Bad news Model 1 Est. (S.E.)	Good news Model 2 Est. (S.E.)
(Intercept)	0.177 (0.053)***	0.241 (0.048)***
d(NoCAP)	-0.046 (0.037)	-0.065 (0.032)*
Altruistic	-0.076 (0.033)*	-0.077 (0.032)*
Avoider	0.146 (0.051)**	0.097 (0.049)*
Belief # ignorant	0.015 (0.004)***	0.006 (0.004)
Age	-0.003 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.003)
d(Male)	0.005 (0.030)	0.017 (0.033)
BAC	-0.006 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)
# of past participations in exp.	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)
Period dummies	YES	YES
Number of observations	10731	10438
Number of clusters	91	91

Notes: The regressions are based on linear probability models. The binary dependent variable in Model 1 is the senders choice to suppress bad news in Part 3 (in each of the 25 rounds), the binary dependent variable in Model 2 is the senders choice to suppress good news in Part 3 (in each of the 25 rounds). Robust standard errors clustered at group level are in parentheses. DM for decision maker; d for dummy variables. \Belief # ignorant" is the subject's belief about the number of participants in their session that were willing to remain uninformed in Part 1. Control variables are: age of the participant (demeaned); gender dummy d(Male); high school grade at the Baccalaureat (BAC) (demeaned); number of past participations in experiments. Period dummies are included with period 1 as the reference category. *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; 0.1.

G.2 Replication of the analyses made for the CAP treatment

Table G.3: Unethical outcomes and ignorance consumption (NoCAP version of Table 2)

		Unethical outcomes		Ignorance consumption	
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
		Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)
	(Intercept)	0.858 (0.054)***	0.827 (0.052)***	0.371 (0.060)***	0.355 (0.063)***
	d(RANDOM)	0.003 (0.031)	0.090 (0.028)**	-0.014 (0.034)	0.019 (0.047)
	Avoider DM	0.130 (0.046)**	0.181 (0.050)***	0.087 (0.052)	0.262 (0.073)***
Avoider DM	d(RANDOM)		-0.078 (0.085)		-0.333 (0.081)***
	Altruistic DM	-0.454 (0.034)***	-0.392 (0.052)***	-0.021 (0.027)	-0.016 (0.042)
Altruistic DM	d(RANDOM)		-0.130 (0.060)*		0.017 (0.050)
	Age Age	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)
	d(Male)	0.020 (0.035)	0.017 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.024)
	BAC BAC	0.002 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.0005 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)
	# of past participations in exp.	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.021 (0.010)*
	Period dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Number of observations	2237	2237	4450	4450
	Number of clusters	45	45	45	45

Notes: The regressions are based on linear probability models. The binary dependent variable in Model 1 and 2 is the cancellation of the donation in Part 3 in each of the 25 rounds (i.e., the choice of Option 2). These models include only data where the state is bad. The binary dependent variable in Models 3 and 4 takes value one when the decision maker is observing NO NEWS. Robust standard errors clustered at group level are in parentheses. DM for decision maker; d for dummy variables. Control variables are: age of the participant (demeaned); gender dummy d(Male); high school grade at the Baccalaureat (BAC) (demeaned); number of past participations in experiments. Period dummies are included with period 1 as the reference category. *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; 0.1.

Figure G.1: Information consumption and choices of the decision makers (NoCAP version of Figure 2)

Notes: Panel A displays the distribution of information observed by the decision makers in Part 3, split by treatment. The horizontal lines show the distribution of information available to senders. Panel B displays the fraction of times Option 2 has been chosen by decision makers, split by treatment and information received. Vertical bars are standard errors based on a linear probability model with errors clustered at group level. Labels below the bars indicate both the number of subjects (s) and the total number of choices (n).

Table G.4: Suppression of bad news by senders (NoCAP version of Table 3)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)
(Intercept)	0.069 (0.070)	0.057 (0.073)	0.041 (0.072)	0.061 (0.066)
Belief # ignorant	0.018 (0.005)***	0.018 (0.005)***	0.021 (0.006)**	0.015 (0.006)*
d(CHOICE)		0.021 (0.044)	0.051 (0.048)	0.040 (0.048)
d(CHOICE) Belief # ignorant			-0.006 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.008)
Altruistic				-0.031 (0.041)
Avoider				0.173 (0.071)*
Age Age	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
d(Male)	0.024 (0.046)	0.026 (0.046)	0.026 (0.046)	0.038 (0.043)
BAC BAC	0.002 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)
# of past participations in exp.	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.018)
Period dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES
Number of observations	5342	5342	5342	5342
Number of clusters	45	45	45	45

Notes: These regressions are based on linear probability models. The binary dependent variable is the sender's choice to suppress bad news in Part 3 in each of the 25 rounds. Robust standard errors clustered at group level are in parentheses. d for dummy variables. "Belief # ignorant" is the subject's belief about the number of participants in their session that were willing to remain uninformed in Part 1. Control variables are: age of the participant (demeaned); gender dummy d(Male); high school grade at the Baccalaureat (BAC) (demeaned); number of past participations in experiments. Period dummies are included with period 1 as the reference category. *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; 0.1.

A - By type of sender

B - By type of sender and decision maker




Figure G.2: Predicted probability to choose a given sender (NoCAP version of Figure 3)

Notes: The figure displays the frequency of choices of the three senders in the CHOICE treatment. Senders are ranked (low, medium, and high) according to the relative level of ignorance they provided in the previous 10 periods. Panel A shows displays the predicted probability to choose the sender providing the highest, intermediate, and lowest level of suppression for each of the 92 decision makers. Predicted probabilities are based on Model 1 of Table G.5 of appendix G. Panel B adds the type of the decision maker. The color of the dot captures the type of the decision maker based on decisions in Part 1. The cross shows the average frequency of choice.




Figure G.3: Assortative matching - choice of an avoider sender by decision maker type (NoCAP version of Figure 4)

Notes: The figure displays the frequency of choice of an AVOIDER sender. Decision makers are split by type, as defined based on decisions in Part 1. The frequencies are calculated on the subset of groups where there is at least one and at most two AVOIDERS among the senders. Vertical lines represent standard errors based on a linear probability model with clustering at the group level. The two factors on the x-axis and their interaction are the only explanatory variables. Pairwise comparisons reported above the bars are based on a Wald test performed using this estimated model. Signific. codes: *** $p < 0.001$; n.s. means $p \geq 0.05$.




Figure G.4: Selfish decisions in the bad state and ignorance consumption by condition and decision-maker type (NoCAP version of Figure 5).

Notes: Panel A displays the fraction of selfish decisions in the different experimental conditions. The fraction of selfish decisions in the RANDOM and CHOICE treatments are computed using only the cases where the state is bad. Panel B displays the fraction of NO NEWS consumption in the different experimental conditions. Panel A splits decision makers into Selfish and Altruistic. Panel B splits them into Avoider and Seeker, based on their decision in Part 1. In all panels, vertical lines represent standard errors based on a linear probability model with clustering at the group level. In all models, the two factors on the x-axis and their interaction are the only explanatory variables. Pairwise comparisons reported above the bars are based on a Wald test performed using these estimated models. Signific. codes: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; n.s. means $p > 0.10$.




Figure G.5: Suppression of bad news by senders (NoCAP version of Figure C.1)

Note: The figure displays the cumulative distribution of individual s-statistics by treatment.




Figure G.6: Sender beliefs and suppression of bad news (NoCAP version of Figure C.2)

Notes: The left panel shows the impact of sender's beliefs about the number of subjects (in the session) that want to remain uninformed on the rate of suppression of bad news. Belief high (low) is for senders that believe the majority wants to remain ignorant (wants to know). The right panel shows the average belief about the number of subjects that want to remain ignorant conditional on the sender's preferences as revealed in Part 1 of the experiment. Vertical bars show the standard errors. In the left panel, standard errors are based on a linear probability model that clusters errors at group level and it is analogous to the ones reported in Table G.4. Compared to the table, the model only includes the treatment dummy, a dummy that is equal to 1 when the sender believes that the majority wants to remain uninformed, and their interaction as explanatory variables.




Figure G.7: Individual suppression rates of good and bad news by treatment (NoCAP version of Figure C.3)

Notes: The figure displays suppression of good news (x-axis) and bad news (y-axis). Each dot is a sender. Multiple senders with the same suppression patterns are indicated by bigger dots.

Table G.5: Probability to choose the sender that provided the highest, intermediate and lowest level of ignorance (NoCAP version of Table D.1)

	Model 1 Est. (S.E.)	Model 2 Est. (S.E.)
Medium ignorance		
(intercept)	-1.011 (0.122)***	-1.932 (0.503)***
Selfish (DM)	0.616 (0.163)***	0.105 (0.203)
Avoider (DM)	1.819 (0.903)*	0.151 (1.051)
Selfish (DM) Avoider (DM)	-1.960 (0.968)*	0.517 (1.133)
<i>M</i>	1.186 (0.127)***	0.915 (0.137)***
High ignorance		
(intercept)	-2.818 (0.244)***	-2.319 (0.728)**
Selfish (DM)	2.172 (0.239)***	1.973 (0.312)***
Avoider (DM)	6.089 (0.805)***	5.247 (1.003)***
Selfish (DM) Avoider (DM)	-3.253 (0.832)***	-3.653 (1.098)***
<i>H</i>	1.962 (0.159)***	2.598 (0.268)***
<i>Group dummies</i>	NO	YES
Log-Likelihood	-1197.3	-1161.7
Number of observations	1380	1380
Number of subjects	92	92
Number of groups	23	23

Notes: These regressions are based on a multinomial logit model where the alternatives are the three senders ordered by the amount of ignorance supplied in the previous 10 periods (the baseline alternative is the sender that supplies the lowest level of ignorance). Individual specific variables are the dummies indicating the preferences of the decision makers. Both models include random effects at subject level on the intercepts. Model 2 includes group dummies. Regressions use data of the last 15 periods. *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; ° 0.1.




Figure G.8: Predicted probability of the decision makers' choice of sender (NoCAP version of Figure D.1)

Notes: The figures display the predicted probability to choose the sender providing the highest, intermediate, and lowest level of suppression for each of the 92 decision makers. The figure on the left reports predictions based on Model 1 of Table G.5 and the figure on the right reports predictions based on Model 2 of Table G.5. The color of the dots captures the type of the decision maker elicited in Part 1. The cross shows the average frequency of choice.




Figure G.9: Information demand (NoCAP version of Figure D.2)

Notes: The figure displays the distribution of the d -statistic across subjects in the CHOICE treatment. A d -statistic equal to 1 corresponds to a random choice of senders; a d -statistic higher (lower) than 1 corresponds to the selection of informative (uninformative) senders. The left panel ranks the individual d -statistics by size (dots and triangles indicate the observed d -statistic) and shows a 90% confidence intervals for the subject's d -statistic under the null hypothesis of random sender choice (black bars). When the observed d -statistic lies outside the black bars (which is indicated with a triangle), one can reject the null hypothesis of a random selection of sender at the 10% confidence level. The right panel shows the overall distribution of the observed d -statistic.




Figure G.10: Switching senders (NoCAP version of Figure D.6)

Notes: The figure displays the fraction of decision makers that change sender after sender reported good, bad or no news in the CHOICE treatment. The left panel shows aggregate results. The right panel shows a split by decisions made by information seekers and information avoiders in part 1. Bars are standard errors based on the regression model 3 given in Table G.6.

Table G.6: Decision to switch senders (NoCAP version of Table D.2)

			Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
			Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)	Est. (S.E.)
	(Intercept)		0.293 (0.050)***	0.445 (0.097)***	0.285 (0.051)***	0.438 (0.096)***
GOOD news	Selfish		0.143 (0.076) ^o	0.130 (0.072) ^o	0.158 (0.082) ^o	0.140 (0.076) ^o
GOOD news	Avoider		0.333 (0.152)*	0.330 (0.134)*	0.604 (0.064)***	0.496 (0.064)***
GOOD news	Selfish	Avoider	—	—	-0.330 (0.200) ^o	-0.200 (0.178)
	BAD news		0.064 (0.045)	0.069 (0.049)	0.065 (0.046)	0.070 (0.051)
BAD news	Selfish		0.150 (0.087) ^o	0.125 (0.079)	0.163 (0.089) ^o	0.133 (0.082)
BAD news	Avoider		0.377 (0.088)***	0.371 (0.099)***	0.649 (0.069)***	0.515 (0.079)***
BAD news	Selfish	Avoider	—	—	-0.330 (0.120)**	-0.174 (0.139)
	No news		0.260 (0.044)***	0.257 (0.039)***	0.269 (0.046)***	0.260 (0.042)***
No news	Selfish		0.078 (0.070)	0.087 (0.070)	0.077 (0.083)	0.091 (0.083)
No news	Avoider		-0.403 (0.081)***	-0.384 (0.083)***	-0.409 (0.094)***	-0.369 (0.083)***
No news	Selfish	Avoider	—	—	0.009 (0.144)	-0.023 (0.140)
	Age	Age	—	0.005 (0.035)	—	0.005 (0.035)
		$d(\text{Male})$	—	-0.077 (0.086)	—	-0.075 (0.086)
	BAC	\overline{BAC}	—	-0.007 (0.021)	—	-0.007 (0.021)
	# of past participations in exp.		—	0.018 (0.031)	—	0.018 (0.031)
	Period dummies		NO	YES	NO	YES
	Number of observations		2208	2160	2208	2160
	Number of clusters		23	23	23	23

Notes: These regressions are based on linear probability models. The binary dependent variable is the decision maker's choice to switch to another sender in part 3 of the CHOICE treatment in each of the 25 periods (24 switching decisions per decision maker). Robust standard errors clustered at group level are in parentheses. d for dummy variables. Control variables are: age of the participant (demeaned); gender dummy $d(\text{Male})$; high school grade at the Baccalaureat (BAC) (demeaned); number of past participations in experiments. Period dummies are included with period 2 as the reference category. *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; ^o 0.1.

Table G.7: Matching of types in the CHOICE treatment (NoCAP version of Table E.1)

		Model 1
		Est. (S.E.)
	(Intercept)	0.515 (0.125)***
	Selfish DM	-0.133 (0.109)
	Avoider DM	0.037 (0.248)
Selfish DM	Avoider DM	—
	Age	Age
		0.067 (0.023)**
		$d(\text{Male})$
		0.088 (0.106)
	BAC	\overline{BAC}
		0.053 (0.028) ^o
	# of past participations in exp.	-0.010 (0.050)
	Period dummies	YES
	Number of observations	875
	Number of clusters	9

Notes: The regression is based on a linear probability model. The binary dependent variable is the decision maker's choice of a sender who is an Avoider in Part 3 (in each of the 25 rounds). The regression includes only data from the groups where there was at least one sender per type. Robust standard errors clustered at group level are in parentheses. DM for decision maker; d for dummy variables. Control variables are: age of the participant (demeaned); gender dummy $d(\text{Male})$; high school grade at the Baccalaureat (BAC) (demeaned); number of past participations in experiments. Period dummies are included with period 1 as the reference category. *** 0.001; ** 0.01; * 0.05; ^o 0.1.