Many voices of a Turkish state factory: working at Bakirköy Cloth Factory, 1932-50
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Chapter 1

Contextualizing the Bakırköy Factory:
The Political and Economic Universe of the Early Republican Period

This chapter examines the structure of capitalist economic development in early Republican Turkey with an emphasis on the implementation of etatist economic policy in the 1930s. The analysis presented here introduces the reader to the political, economic and ideological universe of the early Republican period. In a way, this chapter is a prelude to our travels within the Bakırköy Factory since it portrays the social formation in which that national factory existed. The chapter also portrays the general characteristics of state structure during this period. Any study of working-class formation should include an analysis of the state structure in which that formation occurred for there is a constitutive relation between them. This necessity is even more pressing in the current study because, in the Turkish case, the state and the workers faced each other directly as employer and employee. Thus, the character of the state apparatuses and the particular ideological superstructure of the early Republican period are analysed in this part of the study. It should be noted that, although the analysis is underlined by a theoretical framework that helps to conceptualize the relation between the Turkish state and the social classes, my aim here is not to provide a thorough analysis of the class character of the state during this period. I confine myself to explain the transformation of the Turkish state from the regulating and controlling agent of the economy to an entrepreneur within that economy. I also address the practical and ideological ways the early Republican Turkish state engaged with the labour question in general and the state workers in particular.

As it corresponds to Ira Katznelson’s first layer of analysis of class formation, this experience-distant level of class formation prepares the reader for later chapters, where the analysis becomes considerably experience-near. In a way, it portrays the general characteristics of the social context in which the state workers experienced the process of proletarianization. A cautionary remark should be made here, however. I try to be as careful as possible when choosing verbs to describe the function of the analysis here. “To introduce” and “to prepare” sound the most neutral verbs to describe the relation between the current chapter and the following ones. I explained earlier that the general structure of the study follows the four layers described by Ira Katzneld in *Working Class Formation*. However, as
the editors of that volume also emphasise, these layers do not suggest a chronological and/or a causal relationship between them. Rather, the analytical distinctions between them are meaningful as long as they help us to distinguish between questions on different instances and aspects of the process of class formation and to improve the model of “class in itself-for itself” by means of avoiding teleological assumptions and a priori conclusions. Thus, the following sketchy analysis of macroscopic economic development of the young Turkish Republic should not be read as the determining factor of the working-class formation.

This macroscopic development had a peculiar characteristic pertaining to the atypical conjoining of economic and political temporalities. The process of the formation of an industrial proletariat in Turkey was simultaneous with the process of nation-building. The interactions between these two processes, I argue, had a significant effect on working-class political and cultural behaviour. For this reason, the analysis here goes beyond the realm of economic development to tackle the character of state-society relations in general and the state-working-class relations in particular. My aim here is to conceptualize etatism, the main component of the macroscopic economic development in the 1930s, beyond economic policy by means of unfolding the class structure that gave way to its rise in the first place. To do so, we should first look at the economic structure into which the Republic was born and discuss the shift from the liberal economic practices of the 1920s to the practice of state-led industrialization in the 1930s.

Conventionally, the implementation of etatism has been explained as a response to the drastic effects of the Great Depression on Turkish economy. However, I argue that, if Turkish etatism is reduced to a response to world economic conjuncture, its specific character is not explained. Nor could we understand its often contradictory and changing content. Such an approach would also be irrelevant to my current purposes as it overlooks the changing class dynamics and state-society relations. For these reasons, I analyse the rise of etatism during the 1930s from the perspective of changing composition of the ruling class and the class character of the state power in Turkey. I tackle the following questions: What were the internal political and economic conditions that brought the liberal economic policies of the 1920s to an end? What was the rationale presented by the state for taking on the task of building industry? How can we interpret this motivation in relation to the efforts of nationalizing the economy that had continued from the first constitutional period under Ottoman rule? In what ways did the implementation of etatism affect the class character of the state and state-society relations? After answering these questions, I proceed to analyse the practical means through which
From the Empire to the Republic: A Complex Story of Rupture and Continuity

Every social formation is a product and, to some extent, a continuation of earlier social formations. When there is a regime change, however, the emergence of a new social order is often presented as a complete break from the past. The official historiography of the Turkish Republic is a perfect example of this. The radical change of political regime, from the Empire to the Republic, has been presented as a strong case of rupture with the past, a past that had already become the symbol of tyranny. In a context where the entire state apparatus changed and political and social life underwent radical reforms, which were believed to be the requisite conditions of Western modernity, this idea of radical rupture acquires a convincing status. The problem here is to transfer this idea to the realm of economics since it takes much longer for relations of distribution and exploitation to change.\(^{62}\)

As we shall see later, the argument that the Republican social formation signified a totally novel and peculiar social formation functioned as a discursive weapon in the hands of the state to legitimise its actions. The historiographical implication of a radical rupture is a jump-start of development and progress in which analyses centred on the changes in social structure are replaced by stories of great men’s actions.\(^{63}\) As a result, individual agency replaces class struggle as the motor of history. Studied in this way, etatist economic policies become Kemalist regime’s solution for the post-Great Depression world economy. The state bureaucracy, and, above all, Mustafa Kemal himself, and his infamous ability to foresee, are

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\(^{62}\) Perry Anderson calls the systematic transformation of the young Republican Turkey a strange one: “a cultural revolution without a social revolution, something historically very rare indeed that might look a priori impossible. The structure of society, the rules of property, the pattern of class relations, remained unaltered. (‘Kemalism’, London Review of Books, 11 September 2008).

\(^{63}\) Recent historiography of the early Republican period is rich in remarks about the need to establish the continuity with the Ottoman past against the Kemalist claim of definitive rupture. From the profile of the ruling cadres to the administrative bodies, from cultural ideologies to social rituals, historians of this era have been busy with delineating the continuum as opposed to the idea of rupture advocated by official historiography. A short list of examples include M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Orada Bir Köy Var Üzakta: Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köyçü Söylem [There is a Village Far Far Away: The Villagist Discourse in the Early Republican Period], (Istanbul: İletişim, 2006), p.17; Ayhan Aktaş, Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları [Capital Levy and the Turkification Policies], (Istanbul: İletişim, 2000), p.215; Füsun Üstel, ‘Makbul Vatandaş’ın Peşinde: İI. Meşrutiyetten Bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi [In Search of the Agreeable Citizen: Citizenship Education from the Second Constitutional Period until Today], (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), pp.155-6; Haldun Gülalp, “Capitalism and the Modern Nation-State: Rethinking the Creation of the Turkish Republic,” Journal of Historical Sociology, Vol. 7, Iss. 2, June 1994, pp. 155-6.
the agents of this project of taking the Turkish economy out of an economic impasse. As such, etatism is reduced to a reaction to a changing world economic conjuncture. The debates around the term ‘etatism,’ the actions and reactions of the state elites to policy implementations, and the demise of etatism due to changes in the balance of power within the ruling bloc are the themes around which such analyses are centred. Limited by a legalist framework, these analyses fall short of explaining why etatism took the exact form, or forms, that it did. Most importantly, by focusing exclusively on state actions and intellectual debates, this approach neglects how the masses were affected by and reacted upon the implementation of etatist policies, i.e. how they experienced etatism.

If, however, etatism is analysed within the larger context of state-society relations, it appears as an important moment of state-formation and nation-building; processes that are characterized by both rupture and continuity. Such an analysis also reveals, especially in terms of the class composition of the ruling class and the desire to create a national economy as a means to maintain the class position of certain groups within that class, that there is more continuity in political structure between the two state forms than granted. The perspective Çağlar Keyder develops in State and Class in Turkey reflects this complex character of social change through a study of the dynamics of the ruling class composition. Emphasising the continuity between the Ottoman and the Turkish state structures, in terms of the role bureaucracy played, Keyder provides a historical analysis of bureaucracy’s transformation, systemic location, political capacity, and the alliance it made with the bourgeoisie. Historically, the bureaucratic class has seen itself as the agent of change through societal reforms from above. Despite very different historical contexts, its main concern has always been to secure the existence of the State against the claims of sovereignty of both the national and religious groups, since the well-being of the state also guaranteed that class’s secure existence. The etatist policies of the 1930s are but another effort to save the state in the face of the hardening of its conditions of existence, both politically and economically. As I will explain below, state intervention in the economy in the 1930s presents a contrast with the relatively liberal 1920s. Instead of explaining this dramatic policy change as a mere reaction to the changing conjuncture of the world economy, keeping the focus on the intra-ruling bloc struggles would unfold etatism as a moment in a long history of state-society relations in Turkish history.
The Ottoman Heritage: A Dependent Economy

Korkut Boratav defines the Ottoman economic heritage as a semi-colonized social structure.\textsuperscript{64} In the 1920s, this inherited social structure was characterized by the predominance of agricultural activity of which the share in the national income was 50 percent. Eighty per cent of the population was engaged in agricultural production carried out by simple methods.\textsuperscript{65} Agricultural products made the biggest share of the export trade the final stage of which was monopolized by foreign merchants. Foreign capital had also played an important role in the encouragement and organization of export-oriented agriculture through mechanisms such as trading ventures, merchant houses, banks and direct participation in the distribution of credit.\textsuperscript{66} Industrial production made up 10 to 11 per cent of the national income, the rest of which derived from service sector activities.\textsuperscript{67} A Law for the Encouragement for Industry was passed in 1909; but in 1913 there were only 269 establishments with machines in the whole of Ottoman Turkey, which employed around 17,000 workers.\textsuperscript{68} Even in the 1920s, the structure of the manufacturing sector was characterized by the predominance of traditional craft production, since the integration into the world economy at that stage did not require the transformation of traditional crafts into modern manufacturing.\textsuperscript{69} Foreign capital also dominated the industrial sector. Two thirds of the capital in manufacturing firms was of a foreign origin.\textsuperscript{70}

The dominance of foreign capital had its origins in the historical composition of the Ottoman bourgeoisie. This predominantly non-Muslim class had engaged mainly in commercial activity.\textsuperscript{71} Starting from the second Constitutional period onwards, i.e. 1908, the policies of Turkification of the population applied also to the bourgeoisie and changed its ethnic composition. Within the paradigm of ‘national economy,’ the transfer of the economic position of the Christian minority to the Turkish-Muslim minority was a systematic policy that first started under the Young Turk regime of 1908-1918 and finally ended by the end of

\textsuperscript{67} Kazgan, “Türk Ekonomisinde 1927-35 Depresyonu,” p. 238.
\textsuperscript{70} Keyder, \textit{The Definition of a Peripheral Economy}, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{71} Boratav, \textit{Türkiye İktisat Tarihi}, p. 23.
the Kemalist War of Liberation. Keyder explains the increasing involvement of foreign capital in the economy in the 1920s through the inherent contradiction of interests between a local merchant bourgeoisie and foreign capital as parties with opposing developmental projects. The expulsion of the Christian bourgeoisie partially solved this contradiction to the advantage of foreign capital. The liberalization of the conditions of property ownership of foreigners in January 1924 further increased foreign direct investment in manufacturing.

The total investments of foreign capital in manufacturing corporations doubled the contributions of Turkish capital between 1923 and 1929, and certain foreign firms acquired monopoly rights to import and sell particular goods. To take another indicator, the state budget made only 8 to 9 per cent of the total national income, whereas the total capital of 94 foreign companies in 1924 amounted to one third of the national income.

The development of the manufacturing industry in the periphery is circumscribed by the needs of commercial activity, for the former is expected to complement the latter. In other words, native capital is reduced to an adjunct to penetrating capital, which in the Turkish case is of a merchant character. As a rule, the development of the manufacturing industry in a peripheral economy is dependent on the needs of export processing. It is only expected to produce manufactured goods that are too costly to import. In any case, it is determined by trade relations that not only dictate the terms of this production but also supply its technological needs. It is this dual structure that distinguishes the manufacturing industries in the peripheral economies from those at the centre of the world economy. Whereas in the latter “industry developed autonomously and out of a transformation of rural manufacturers, [such] a transformation was precluded in the periphery because of the competition of imports and the destruction of traditional manufacturing.” The enactment of the Law for the Encouragement of Industry in 1927, which was a modified version of the 1913 law with the same name, was an effort by the Turkish state to bypass this arrested development of the manufacturing sector. This law was planned to stay in effect until 1942, thus giving the private industries fifteen years to increase the level of capital accumulation.

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73 Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, p. 93.
74 Keyder, The Definition of a Peripheral Economy, p. 59.
75 Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, p. 94.
77 Keyder, The Definition of a Peripheral Economy, p. 130.
78 Ibid., p.57.
In a nutshell, the decade of the 1920s was an exemplary structure of a dependent economy in which the intervention of the state had been minimal.\textsuperscript{80} On top of this, the extremely restricting rules imposed by the Lausanne Treaty, according to which Turkey had to live under the Ottoman trade regime until 1929, practically hog-tied the Turkish state. Kazgan asserts that, throughout the 1920s, the new state tried to clear out the Ottoman heritage but could not do so because the economic institutions themselves were a part of that heritage. In addition, a state that did not have even an emission bank, and was subject to speculative exchange and interest mechanisms, was what the laissez-faire ideology of the period wished for.\textsuperscript{81}

**Industrial Activity in the 1920s**

Even before the Great Depression hit the already vulnerable Turkish economy, efforts to increase national industrial production were made. The internal market was protected mainly through the increased customs tariff after 1929 and the state’s control over the number of imports. For example, in 1927, the old Law for Encouragement of Industry (Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu)\textsuperscript{82} was revised and, in June 1929, with the Law of Protection for Industry (Sanayi Koruma Kanunu), protectionist policies for industrial production were enacted.\textsuperscript{83}

According to the first industrial census of the Republic conducted in 1927, 266,900 people worked in 65,300 industrial establishments, 79 per cent of which employed three or more workers. The average number of workers per enterprise was 3.9. In terms of sectoral concentration, enterprises in textile and food sectors made up 60 per cent of the total number. The low level of productivity in these enterprises created the necessity of imports, ranging from sugar to cotton textiles giving way to chronic trade deficit and the accompanying devaluation of the Turkish lira in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{84}

During this protectionist period, the positive effects of the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, which entitled qualified manufacturers to benefits such as customs exemptions, land grants and guaranteed public purchase, was felt. But, these laws affected only those firms with a certain level of mechanisation and scale, leaving a large number of small enterprises

\textsuperscript{80} Keyder, *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy*, p.vii.
\textsuperscript{81} Kazgan, “Türk Ekonomisinde 1927-35 Depresyonu”, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{82} The first Law for the Encouragement of Industry was enacted by the Young Turk government in 1913. It was revised in 1915.
\textsuperscript{83} Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt* [The Second Man Volume 1], (Istanbul: Remzi, 1984), p. 360.
\textsuperscript{84} Kazgan, “Türk Ekonomisinde 1927-35 Depresyonu”, p. 238.
out.\textsuperscript{85} Thus, after 1930, the number of enterprises benefiting from this law decreased in number but grew in scale, a change which was reflected in the 2.4 increase in the gross output per firm between 1932 and 1939.\textsuperscript{86} Compared to the total number that all enterprises reported in the 1927 census, the number of qualified enterprises is indeed low.\textsuperscript{87} Keyder concludes that the effectiveness of the law was limited until 1930, the year when protectionist measures were taken. Five years after the enactment of the Law for the Encouragement of Industry, the average number of workers per enterprise was 38 for qualified firms. The striking difference between this figure and the 1927 figure for all enterprises suggests that the approved firms had come close to becoming modern factories.\textsuperscript{88}

When the trade deficit doubled in 1929, the government took measures to control imports, which resulted in a 42 per cent decrease from 1928 to 1934. Cotton textiles constituted the biggest share in the total imports throughout this period. The total share of all intermediate and end textile products decreased from 32.25 per cent in 1929 to 28.96 per cent in 1934, while the share of yarn imports in total textile imports and the share of textile machines in total imports increased.\textsuperscript{89} The enactment of two laws concerning industrial production, as Aydemir argues, hindered further development of industry. The first law was the Business Tax levied only on large industrial enterprises. According to Aydemir, this law held back a considerable amount of further investment in constant capital by protecting the primitive enterprise at the expense of the modern one. The second law, the Law of Regulation of Overproduction, enacted in 1933, granted the state the regulation and control of future investments in industrial production. Supposedly aimed at protecting the already existing investments, this law had been an impediment before the further development of private

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\bibitem{Keyder2005} Keyder, \textit{The Definition of a Peripheral Economy}, p. 58; Keyder, \textit{State and Class in Turkey}, p. 103; Aydemir, \textit{İkinci Adam}, p. 443. Kazgan specifies the criterion required to benefit from the Law as follows: those enterprises using a minimum of ten horsepower and paying 1500 daily wages a year were qualified to benefit from all provisions, while those using less than ten horsepower and paying 750 daily wages could benefit from some of them. The number of enterprises benefiting changed from 1443 to 1103 during the 1932-1939 period. Though this was only 3% of the total number of enterprises reported in the 1927 census, Kazgan reminds us that in terms of their size of labour force and production value, these firms constituted a much higher share in the total figures (\textit{Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler, 1929-2001: “Ekonomi Politik Açısından bir İrdeleme} [Crises in Turkish Economy, 1929-2001: An Analysis from the Perspective of “Political Economy”), [Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005], p. 80).

\bibitem{Keyder2010} Keyder, \textit{State and Class in Turkey}, p.103. Of the 1473 enterprises benefiting from the law in 1932, 651 were in sectors related to agriculture, animal raising and hunting activities, while 351 were in the textile sector. The percentages are respectively, 44.3 per cent and 23.8 per cent (Haldun Derin, \textit{Türkiye’de Devletçilik}, [Istanbul: Çiğuri Biraderler, 1940], p. 84). The figure on textile sector is important because of the later activity in this sector both by the state and private capital.

\bibitem{Derin2010} Derin, \textit{Türkiye’de Devletçilik}, p. 83.

\bibitem{Keyder2008} Keyder, \textit{The Definition of a Peripheral Economy}, p. 58. It should also be noted that these firms were highly concentrated geographically, with 47 per cent of them located in Istanbul and Izmir.

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industrial production. Between 1930 and 1938, the private sector did not improve, not because the state was against it, but because of investment difficulties and contradictory legal arrangements.\footnote{Aydemir, İkinci Adam, pp. 421-441.}

However, there were also frequent attempts by industrial capitalists to organize in cartels in order to prevent overproduction.\footnote{Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, p. 103.} As such, it might be misleading to interpret this law as a total blow on private capital as Aydemir suggests. Similarly, Ilkin and Tekeli argue that, these industrialists, who benefited from the Law for the Encouragement of the Industry, wished for internal protection as well as protection against imports. Behind the use of the term ‘overproduction’ was the desire to maintain the already high rates of industrial profit.\footnote{İlkin and Tekeli, Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye’de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu, pp. 219.} The economic policy, thus, presented a significant contradiction as the state was trying to establish industry on the one hand, while enacting various laws to hold back the further capital investment in industrial production, on the other. Like many other bureaucrats of the day, Aydemir was insistent that etatism did not hinder the development of private industries, and his emphasis on investment difficulties and legal contradictions should be read against this background. Similarly, after citing the decreasing number of enterprises benefiting from the Law of Encouragement for Industry after the 1933 Law of Regulation of Overproduction, he immediately states that the decrease can be explained by private enterprises combining in order to achieve more productivity. In fact, when we look at the changes in the value of constant capital, we see that there is an increase of 12.6% in 1933, 21.2% in 1934, 25.3% in 1933, and 36.4% in 1936 compared to 1932. Similarly, there is also an increase in the horsepower of the engines. Most importantly, although the number of enterprises decreased, the value contributed by industrial production to the gross value increased by 11.8% between 1932 and 1933.\footnote{Derin, Türkiye’de Devletçilik, pp. 86-7.} Thus, there is enough reason to think that the size of the enterprises and the level of productivity increased in the 1930s.

Between 1928 and 1934, the share of industry in the gross national product increased from 11 per cent to 17.8 per cent. Between 1929 and 1934 the annual growth rate of industrial production was 15.5%. Although Ilkin and Tekeli note that this increase was mainly due to initially low figures, these figures prove the existence of an encouraging environment for
increasing industrial concentration and profitability. They also point to an extension and intensification of the already existing relations of productions in the aftermath of the Great Depression.

However, all these measures did not suffice for the establishment of a national industry. The Great Depression brought capital accumulation to a halt and left commercial capital and the credit mechanism in a mess in the 1930s. The lack of entrepreneurs, technicians and workers also added to the problem. Despite the various disagreements on the definition of etatism, economic planning and protectionism became increasingly popular in the context of the deepening of the economic crisis worldwide that brought about planned state intervention even in developed countries. Thus, in Boratav’s periodization, the period of liberal economy, which was characterized by strong encouragement for private industry, ended in 1929. During the period from 1930 to 1932, protectionism was in practice, but support for private capital continued. This brief period of import substitution was replaced by a synthesis of protectionism and etatism after 1933.

**Why and How to Build a National Economy**

The most dramatic effect of the Great Depression on Turkish economy had been the abrupt downfall in the price of agricultural products, the single most important item of export. This has resulted in an exchange crisis and a dramatic decrease in the value of the Turkish lira. Bankruptcies in the commercial sector highlighted the weakness of the bourgeoisie for it depended excessively on foreign markets “to an extent that the material base of its activity could disappear at a moment’s notice”. While the local economy was showing its vulnerability, foreign merchants continued to benefit from the trade mechanism. It was in this context that the nationalization of the economy, a project that had been voiced since the Young Turk regime of 1908-1918, gained more prominence.

The idea that political sovereignty had to be complemented with economic sovereignty was voiced repeatedly. İnSEL argues that economics was regarded as a matter concerning the very existence of the state from the beginning of the Republic. Similar to Keyder’s analysis of the bureaucracy’s ceaseless efforts to save the state, İnSEL argues that the most important

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aspects of economics were those that concerned the reproduction of the state’s existence. Economy had to have a national character for economy’s increasing autonomy would constitute a threat to that very existence.\textsuperscript{99} The fact that this had been the desire of the ruling classes from the Young Turk governments to the Republican state raises the question as to why the 1920s did not witness nationalization of the economy on a larger scale. The political preoccupations of the 1920s, together with the limitations on the customs sovereignty imposed by the Lausanne Treaty, did not allow the state to be more active in the economy. The state spent the 1920s trying to impose superstructural reformism, which received substantial opposition, and overcome threats to territorial integrity such as the 1925 Kurdish rebellion. However, the attempts to nationalize the economy had already started in 1926 with the Cabotage Law, which enforced the transportation of goods between Turkish ports by Turkish ships, the abolition of tax concessions, the requirement of conducting correspondence between firms in Turkish, the obligation to employ Turkish personnel and the nationalization of the foreign railway companies.\textsuperscript{100} On 11 June 1932, a new law which specified the crafts and services that could only be done by Turkish citizens was enacted and foreigners were given a year to leave these crafts and services.\textsuperscript{101} In the banking sector, the number of deposits controlled by national and foreign banks changed in favour of the former.\textsuperscript{102}

In popular imagery, any foreign merchant who speculated against the Turkish lira and the foreign banks’ reserves in foreign currencies was seen as a culprit in Keyder’s words. This negative perception was institutionalized through government organized associations such as Association for National Economy and Parsimony (Milli İktisat ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti), which was founded in 1929, the year when the Turkish lira lost value against the British pound. The tasks of this association were “to promote frugality, to reduce the consumption of imported commodities by encouraging the production and consumption of local products, and generally to promote the idea of economic self-sufficiency”.\textsuperscript{103} This is an indication of the extent of the politicization of the discourse on the economy. Writing in 1940, a bureaucrat makes the following observation: there was a considerable degree of animosity towards capitalism, which shaped the policy decisions in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{104} This is a curious remark because, as we

\textsuperscript{100} Kazgan, “Türk Ekonomisinde 1927-35 Depresyonu”, p. 238.
\textsuperscript{101} Derin, Türkiye’de Devletçilik, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 51.
\textsuperscript{103} Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{104} Haldun Derin started his career as a coding clerk for Mustafa Kemal in 1933. He served first as a clerk for the Presidency and then as executive assistant for President İsmet İnönü from 1945.
shall see below, the comments on etatism were very carefully worded in order to stress its originality; it was presented as a completely unprecedented policy that would resemble neither capitalism nor socialism. Indeed, as we read into the words of this bureaucrat, it becomes clear that what he means by animosity towards capitalism is indeed a specific configuration of nationalism and the experience of economic hardship. The animosity towards capitalism in Turkey is completely different from other countries, he continues, for it is actually the animosity towards foreign capital that hides its political character under a commercial form. Both society and the state respect the private entrepreneur who conducts business fairly regardless of his ethnic origin. Thus, the problem is not with capitalism or any of its components such as free competition, land rent or interest, but with the economic activities of non-Turkish people that supposedly threatened the Turkish nation’s sovereignty.\textsuperscript{105} We will see different expressions of this popular sentiment later in this study, when we discuss examples on the perception of the state and the worker in an employer-employee relationship. Suffice to say here that the negative perception of foreign capital was instrumental for the state to take economic matters into its hands.

\textbf{The Formation and Dissolution of the Bourgeoisie-Bureaucracy Alliance}

The founding ideology of the Turkish Republic, Kemalist nationalism, has two origins according to Gülalp: the ethnic conflict that resolved in favour of the Muslim/Turkish element, and the political process of nation-state building.\textsuperscript{106} In economic terms, the first component of this ideology was the removal of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie from the territory of the new nation-state leaving a considerable number of vacant positions and physical property to be seized by the Muslim bourgeoisie-in-formation. This nascent bourgeois class had already gained some impetus owing to the Young Turk government’s favourable policies. At the sociopolitical level, these third-party resources to be expropriated ensured that “the relationship between the bureaucracy and the Muslim commercial class could continue without engendering a conflict over distribution.”\textsuperscript{107} Within this equation, the latter party had neither the strength nor the pressure of further asserting itself thanks to the already greater scale of opportunity they could deal with. The expansion of the world economy in the 1920s enabled the merchant capital to make use of the opportunities opened thereby in the context of minimal intervention by the political authority.

\textsuperscript{105} Derin, \textit{Türkiye’de Devletçilik}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{107} Keyder, \textit{State and Class in Turkey}, pp. 94-5 (quotation from p. 95).
With the Great Depression, the hopes of this bourgeoisie-in-formation to participate more in political power came to a halt because of the crash in the world market, which devastated the commercial sector. According to Keyder, besides revealing the weakness of the Muslim bourgeoisie, the conditions of the aftermath of the Depression revealed the impossibility of the continuation of this precarious relationship between the two parties: “There was no possibility of utilizing the existing links towards a structural transformation; for that, the political authority needed at its disposal a different set of instruments and policies. By 1929, the bureaucratic faction in power had emerged victorious from the intra-class struggle.”

From the perspective of class composition of the ruling class, the years 1930 and 1931 witnessed political transformations through which the bureaucracy consolidated its place within the power bloc. When the Depression crashed the boom economy and gave an end to trade as a lucrative economic activity, the political authority gained more relative autonomy. In the context of the economic hardship, the bureaucracy found the opportunity to install itself into the class equation. At the same time, the economic difficulties experienced by the commercial bourgeoisie required the formulation of new economic policies. As a result, a new state form came into existence, which “together with the set of measures originally formulated to combat the crisis, resulted in a regime which represented the culmination of bureaucratic reformism”, and it remained in force until the end of World War II.

Ilkin and Tekeli make a similar analysis to Keyder in explaining how the change in economic policy became possible from the perspective of class character of the ruling class. The class composition of the ruling class at the end of the 1920s was dominated by the commercial bourgeoisie, which had recently started to include bureaucrats, and large landowners. These were the sectors of the economy most badly affected by the Great Depression. For the large landowners, the problem was the dramatic decrease in the price of agricultural products. Their expectation from the state was to create mechanisms that would

108 Ibid., pp. 95-6 (quotation from p. 96). Keyder traces the historical roots of the emergence of a civil bureaucracy to the centralization efforts of the Ottoman state in the 1830s and points to the Young Turk government as the period when bureaucratic activism evolved into its revolutionary version. Analyzing the intellectual constitution of the Young Turk movement, and delineating its primary aims as overcoming economic backwardness through the creation of national economy and re-establishing the autonomy and the geographical integrity of the Ottoman state, he shows the extent of the dependence of its class position on the condition of “saving the state.” (Ibid., pp. 49-54) This historical account enables us to understand the historical development of the still very much strong state-centered perspective of the Turkish bureaucracy.

109 Keyder, The Definition of a Peripheral Economy, p. 3.

110 Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, pp. 96-7 (quotation from p. 97).
keep the prices high, in order to secure guaranteed public purchase, and to regulate agricultural exports. But the state’s involvement in the organization of export trade was completely against the class interests of the commercial bourgeoisie. This conflict of interests between the two ruling factions caused the dissolution of this coalition and gave bureaucracy the chance to implement state-led industrialization by securing the support of the landed faction, which would eventually benefit from industrial production as providers of raw materials. For the export merchant, this was tolerable as long as the state did not intervene in organizing the export trade. Thus, neither faction of the ruling class had strong reasons to oppose state-led industrialization.\textsuperscript{111}

In summary, the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s created a peculiar situation in which the global economy and the national political and ideological atmosphere pointed in the direction of a more restrictive trade policy, which had become possible with the expiration of the open trade policy imposition by the Lausanne Treaty. The crisis of the commercial bourgeoisie required new formulations for economic policies, which turned the years 1930 and 1931 into years of economic innovation and zealous debates about the role of the state in the economy among politicians and the intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{112} As such, etatism was “the double response of a historically specific polity: first, to the World Depression and, secondly, to developments in the Turkish political economy in the years 1923 to 30.”\textsuperscript{113} Three years of uncertainty about the new power dynamics of the further capitalist development came to a halt in 1932, when the state and the workers came face-to-face as employer and employee.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{Definitional Problems: “Moderate Etatism”}

Although the necessity of national production of consumer main goods was an agreed upon idea by the beginning of the 1930s, there was no consensus on the means to achieve this. The debate surrounding the role of the state in the economy in the early 1930s was characterized by the disagreement between those who argued that this could only be realized through industrial activity by the state and those who believed that industrial activity should be left to the entrepreneurs. The debate was not only about economics; it also reflected differences of opinion on state-society relations. On one side the bureaucracy was trying to secure its ruling

\textsuperscript{111} İlkin and Tekeli, \textit{Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye’de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu}, pp. 76-7.
\textsuperscript{112} Keyder, \textit{State and Class in Turkey}, p. 96.
role within the framework of a strong state. On the other side were the more liberally minded politicians and intelligentsia who believed that the state’s role in the economic sphere should be restricted. Although on a discursive level the disagreement was seemingly confined to the degree of state intervention in the economy, it signified more important ideological differences.

The following example illustrates this multifaceted character of the debate. In August 1930, the Liberal Republican Party was founded by Ali Fethi Okyar upon Mustafa Kemal’s request. The rationale was to create an opposition to the ruling RPP and thus to establish the tradition of multi-party democracy in Turkey. In its programme, the party announced its commitment to the RPP principles but opposed its economic policy advocating for the encouragement of foreign investment and criticising state intervention in the economy, which, to Okyar, left all the burden of rebuilding the nation on the shoulders of one generation through the enormous amounts of money allocated to public works. The Prime Minister refuted these accusations by defining the peculiar economic policy of the Republic as “moderate etatism.” To him, this was necessitated by two factors. First, he cited the complete dependence of the Turkish people on the state, even for the simplest economic activity. Expecting to benefit from the economic activities of capitalists, he argued, would be a mistake because the people would not agree. In a way, then, he expressed a common belief in the inability of Turkish society to act for itself without the guidance of a strong state on which it both depends and holds accountable for every single problem. Read against the background of the increasing dissatisfaction with the RPP government, this could also be interpreted as an effort of the RPP to reconnect with the people.

The second factor concerned the issue of the national character of the economy: “For years, the propaganda for capital had been trying to undermine national politics.” Inonu does

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115 This extremely short-lived party is an important case study to understand the dynamics of the Turkish democracy in this period. Fethi Okyar’s visit to Izmir, an important city in the Aegean region, created a scandal due to the enormous number of people supporting the party, which resulted in the death of two people. Ilkin notes that among these supporters, there were also workers (Selim Ilkin, “Devletçilik Döneminin İlk Yıllarında İşçi Sorununa Yaklaşım ve 1932 İş Kanunu Tasarısı” [Approaches to the Labor Question in the Early Years of the Etatist Period and the 1932 Labor Law Draft], Gelişme Dergisi 1978 Özel Sayısı, p. 258). Following this, the party was accused of stirring up a reaction against Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist reform program. Liberal/Free Republican Party annulled itself on 17 November 1930, after only 99 days. Following this, the single party regime continued until 1945, and the Republican People’s Party ruled until 1950, when it lost to Democrat Party one of the founders of which was Adnan Menderes, an adherent of Liberal/Free Republican Party.

116 Aydemir, Ikinci Adam, p. 372.

117 The clearest example of this dissatisfaction was the incident of Free Party – by then in existence only for days – leadership’s visit to Izmir. Despite the local RPP officials’ efforts to block their coming, the support of the people was overwhelming. The leader of the party, Fethi Okyar admits that he was taken by surprise with the extent of the support, which caused panic among the ruling elite. (Ali Fethi Okyar, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Nasıl Doğdu Nasıl Feshedildi [How was the Free Republican Party Born and Dissolved], [Istanbul, 1987]).
not elaborate on this point but we could speculate that what he means by “propaganda for capital” here is the dominance of foreign capital in the Turkish economy. Considered together with the previously cited words of a bureaucrat who distinguished animosity towards capitalism from animosity towards foreign capital, these words reveal the strong nationalist element in Turkish etatism. On the other hand, the adjective ‘moderate’ displays the sensitive balance between the emphasis on nationalism, on the one hand, and the effort not to alienate private capital from this specifically Turkish economic policy, on the other. These arguments could also be read as an example of the state’s uses of claims of peculiarity. The Prime Minister is actually trying to convince the public that state intervention in the economy was a must because of the peculiar character of both the Turkish people and the historical conditions of economic development of the country. Once this claim acquires hegemonic status, it functions as a protective mechanism in the service of the state for its actions could not be evaluated, for example, according to the standards of Western liberal democracy. Even in this simple argument, we acquire a glimpse of the perception of the society by the state.

In 1931, etatism, and also the principle of revolutionism, entered the party programme of the Republican People’s party at the second party congress and completed the six principles of the Party. It was written into the constitution on 5 February 1937. Although made official in these ways, there was still confusion around the term. Despite its common use in many contexts, the term was not given a clear definition. Many bureaucrats understood it as the prerequisite of a national economy, or sometimes its synonym and thus invoked it as the remedy to the problems of economic sovereignty. To a prominent intellectual, and, later, also a bureaucrat of the period, etatism – like liberalism or socialism – was a system within national economy, which was a totality of economic relations. As seen in this example, the definitions did not have much analytical value. Moreover, the expectations of etatism went beyond economic development. Within the framework of the ideology of ‘solidarity in the service of state’, etatism was seen as a means to strengthen the state. But this was also undesirable since “too much etatism” would practically mean socialism.

However, etatism was never conceptualized as an economic policy within the general framework of capitalism either. Etatism signified an alternative both to liberal capitalism and socialism at the same time. It was a practical solution, not a regime change. The bulk of the state’s efforts during this period were directed at convincing private capital that the goal of

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118 The first party congress was held in October 1927. Mustafa Kemal defined four party principles: republicanism, nationalism, secularism and populism.
Etatism was not to replace private enterprise with state investments but to create an investment atmosphere in which the two complemented one another. The RPP was often at pains to explain that the main goal was not to hinder the development of private capital but to take the tasks that cannot be carried on by private capital onto the state. For example, in *Civil Knowledge for the Citizen* (Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler), a book that was written under the close supervision of Mustafa Kemal, Afet İnan writes: “While recognizing private enterprise as the principle, our etatism entails state involvement in tasks, especially in the sphere of economy, that the common and higher interests of the people dictates in order to carry the people and the country to prosperity in the shortest time possible.”  

Similarly, when Prime Minister İnönü published an article on etatism in *Kadro* (Cadre), he argued that Turkish etatism is not a doctrine but a means to achieve the goal of creating a national industry. Most significant here were the efforts to formulate etatism in such a way as to make its distance from socialism clear. For example, the following words in the preface to the second five-year industrialization plan by Mustafa Kemal emphasizes the peculiarity of Turkish etatism: “Turkish etatism is not a system translated from the socialist theories developed since the nineteenth centuryinstead, it is a system that emerges from the specific needs of Turkey, a system peculiar to her”.  

William Hale summarizes these claims of peculiarity as follows: “[O]fficially, etatism was usually defined as a home-grown plant, specifically evolved for Turkish conditions”. I noted above that these claims were repeatedly used by the state in different contexts pertaining to various aspects of Turkish state and society structure. These claims gave the state more power to keep societal dynamics under control. In other words, they were functional in terms of increasing the hegemonic capacity of the regime.  

In the following chapters, we will see other examples of the uses of this rhetoric of peculiarity. For the sake of the current argument, it suffices to say that not only did this rhetoric help the implementation of etatism in the face of liberal critics; they also contributed to the self-image of the Turkish state. During the period etatist policies stayed in practice, they also helped the state to contain and, when necessary, prosecute sporadic incidents of disdissence.

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120 Quoted in ibid., p. 445. Aydemir notes that Mustafa Kemal personally worked on this formulation; he had actually seen the corrections he made on the original document. He cites this as an example of the extent of care given to definitions.


122 Ibid., p. 105.
A Classless, Fused Mass: The Discourse of Populism

In his examination of the interaction between ideological debate and economic development in Turkey after 1930, William Hale discusses populism as the ideological commitment of the regime that was most closely related to etatism. Among etatism’s supporters he cites “the radical-reform nationalist who saw etatism as a permanent alternative to capitalism and who linked its principles to the belief in social solidarism labeled as ‘populism’”. Key to these interpretations was the belief in the unity between the nation and the state. Hale quotes one of the founding fathers of Turkish nationalism, Tekin Alp (an Ottoman Jew by birth who converted to Islam and advocated for the Turkification of the minorities) as an extreme example of this identification: “[I]n the Kemalist regime Nation and State form a single, indivisible and inseparable whole. The spirit with which the whole nation, and particularly the elite which surrounds the leader is imbued…constitutes a guarantee against any possible deviation or degeneration of etatism…The Kemalist state cannot tolerate the implantation in Turkey of perpetual and fratricidal struggles between the two elements of national production, the employers and the workers.”

Populism was the embodiment of this concatenation of the economic policy with the peculiar character of the Turkish nation and state. Formulated as one of the six principles of the RPP in 1937, it was defined in the 1943 Party Program as follows:

It is one of our main principles to regard the people of the Turkish Republic not composed of different social classes but as a community organized around division of labor for individual and social life. Farmers, small industry holders and shopkeepers, workers, independent business holders, merchants and civil servants are the main laboring groups that make the Turkish community. The labouring of each of these is requisite for the living and happiness of the others and the community in general. The objective of our party aimed through this principle is to provide social order and solidarity instead of class struggle and to maintain harmony between interests that are not opposing each other.

123 Ibid., p. 105.
124 CHP Programi (RPP Programme), (Ankara: Zerbamat Basın ve Yayıncılık, 1943), p.4. Ankara. In her study on citizenship education in Turkey from the second constitutional period onwards, Füsun Üstel gives examples of the discourse of social division of labor and solidarity from textbooks of the 1930s, which she defines as the period when the Republican pedagogues undertook the mission of producing the citizen that is compatible with the single-party regime (“Makbul Vatandaş’ın Peşinde”, p.215). One particular example concerns the use of the category of “laboring” within that discourse: “The emphasis on ‘personal initiative’ in the textbooks of the second constitutional period is replaced by [the concept of] “laboring” through [an understanding of] ‘responsibility/work ethic’ directed at mobilizing the entire society on the basis of the project of national development from the early Republican period onwards. Without referring to economic underdevelopment, the emphasis of ‘labor’ presents ‘work’ as a value in itself, a virtue and as a mode of moral existence in the final
Written in 1943, that is, after the decade of the 1930s, which consolidated the identification of the party with the state, the definition reflects a solidarist understanding. The party-state rules independent of any interest groups in that supposedly unprivileged mass. Historically, there were two factors that enabled the state to present itself as the disinterested party vis-à-vis the society. First, the fact that the ruling cadre was mainly composed of the military elites who took part in the independence war provided the top government officers with a considerable degree of respectability and status. Those forces that saved the country from enemies in the Independence War later served in the construction of the new Republic, and their former commitment saved them from suspicion of seeking their self-interest at the expense of the people they “rescued” in the first place. That is why, for example, while addressing the RPP’s Izmir Congress months after the Free Party incident, Mustafa Kemal emphasized the specific nature of the party:

As you know political parties are formed for narrow and specific reasons. For example the merchants of Izmir may form a party to accomplish their own aims. Or there could be a party for farmers. There may be such narrow parties but our party is set up to achieve the aims of each class of the people without hurting the interests of any other.

Second, in the popular imagery of the day, far from being conceptualized as a part of the changing world in the aftermath of WWI, the Independence War was seen as a singular case of an heroic action of a people coming together under the leadership of one man: Mustafa Kemal. Together, these two factors functioned as the cement of the construction of the Turkish state as a supreme independent entity, the very existence of which laid the foundation of Turkish society.

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analysis. On the other hand, while ensuring the ignoring of class differences on the basis of a corporatist understanding, the theme of ‘laboring’, at the same time, denotes the economic ‘other’ of the Republic, i.e. ‘idler.’ In this regard, there is no unemployed in the Republican narrative, there is the non-working idler” (Ibid., p. 190).

125 The strongest expression of this identification was the presentation of the Society for the Defence of the Rights of Thrace and Anatolia, the organization that led the Independence War, as the predecessor of the RPP and the acceptance of the Sivas Congress as the first party congress of the party. (Hakkı Uyar, “‘Devletin İşçi Sınıfı’ ve Örgütlenme Girişimi”, Vol. 27, No. 157, 1997, p. 14) It should be noted that in saying this, I do not mean to suggest this perception of the state officers as a consensual social reality. If nothing else, the story of the brief existence of the Free Republican Party in 1930 testifies to the discontent about the RPP government among the masses. Rather, what I am portraying is the popular imagery reflected in various state-issued declarations and the cultural products of the day.

126 Qtd. in Feroz Ahmad, “The Development of Class-consciousness in Republican Turkey, 1923-45,” in Donald Quataert and Erik Jan Zürcher (eds.), Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995), p. 90. In a publication of Association of Izmir Workers and Craftsmen in 1935, the RPP addressed the Turkish workers as follows: “There is no you and me, dear Turkish worker; there is only us!” (Uyar, “‘Devletin İşçi Sınıfı’ ve Örgütlenme Girişimi”, p. 17).
Whether perceived in a unity with the Nation or as ruling over the Nation without any interest of its own, these narratives on the Turkish state suggest a certain sense of peculiarity. By rejecting the existence of social classes, the Turkish state also rejected the possibility of any class interest infiltrating the state apparatus. An extreme example of this view came from the Prime Minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, during his parliamentary speech on 5 August 1942:

Privileges and classes never existed in our case. Democracy is a great reality that comes from the depth of Turkish history. We have been populist, are populist and will remain populist. The fact that we have formed a single-party state is mainly based on this great reality. We want no reign of court, of capital or of classes. All we want is the sovereignty of the Turkish people.

All these arguments create the impression that in implementing etatist economic policies, the Turkish state had considerable relative autonomy. When we analyse the practical effects of these policies, however, a different picture arises. Not only did etatism emerge in a class society, but through its reproductive effects it furthered the development of that society.

The First Five Year Plan and Sümerbank

In their detailed study on the practical implementations of etatist economic policy in Turkey, Ilkin and Tekeli provide a thorough analysis of the actors, debates and documents on etatism in the early 1930s. Though this detailed analysis lies beyond the scope of the current study, especially the section on the preparation of the First Five Year Plan, it is relevant for it illustrates the interactions between the ideology of populism and the implementation of

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127 An exception to the argument of peculiarity could be found, mainly in relation to the second factor discussed here, is Şevket Süreyya Aydemir’s assessment of etatism: “The social classes in the countries of the ‘national liberation front’ and those in the industrialized countries do not have a similar formation. In the former, the existence of a capitalist class hinders industrialization [presumably because its interests are linked to those of capitalism in the industrialized countries]. Therefore, this function devolves on the state. The establishment of industry, transport networks and major credit institutions by the state, under the state’s control and within the framework of a planned economy will bring about not just economic welfare, but also social harmony, since the state’s directory role will prevent the emergence of opposing classes in the country, and thus of class conflict. The result will be the creation of a “united society, without privilege or classes” (Hale, “Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey”, p. 106). Although very different both in terms of analytic value and the reasoning from other assessments referred to in the same study, Aydemir’s analysis is similar to them in terms of his expectations from etatism: a classless society.

128 Qtd. in Aktar, Varlık Vergisi, p. 142-3.
To Ilkin and Tekeli, there are two predecessors to the first five year plan: reports written by the Ministry of Economy, the Department of Industry and the reports of the Soviet experts. In December 1931, the General Director of Industry, Ahmet Şerif Onay, was given the task of reporting on RPP program’s parts concerning industrial activity. The report he presented is important because it included many of the ideas that were later included in the Plan. To begin with, Onay advocated an import substitution model in which the national industries would use local raw materials and produce main goods leaving the end product manufacturing to private industry. He argued for protection of the internal market through high custom tariffs and emphasized the need for creating consumer demand for the manufactured goods. Thus, at the end of his report, he also addressed issues of distribution. This did not make Onay any more popular with the more liberal minded bureaucrats and the private capital holders. Soon after, first the Minister of Economy, who had personally appointed Onay to that position, and then Onay himself had to resign.

The significance of this report for our current purposes lies in the direct connection Onay establishes between populism and etatism. After asserting that a reasonable economic policy could avoid class divisions, he explains how the principle of populism could work in the realm of industrial activity:

Production is based on labour and capital. The fruits of production are distributed between these two differently in different countries. A big part of capital in our country is of foreign origin, whereas labour is almost completely national. Thus, an important part of capital’s share goes abroad. Labour’s share, however, is almost entirely paid to the [Turkish] people. This is why we should organize our rules and organizations in such a way that labour’s share is as big as possible compared to capital’s share. Because the main component of national income is indeed labour’s share. In fact, to secure this type of distribution is the duty of any national government.130

What stands out in this explanation is the emphasis on the national character of the economy as the rationale for planning, on the one hand, and the immediate reference to the principle of populism, on the other, after the threat of class struggle is mentioned. As we shall see in the following pages, this identification was widely made, not only by the government but also by the labour movement. Populism was often invoked as the solution to the problem of class conflict.

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129 Tekeli and İlkin, Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye’de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu, pp. 145 to 158.
130 Ibid., p. 147.
Soon after Onay submitted his report, the Prime Minister visited the Soviet Union and Italy, where he secured a considerable sum of credit for the establishment of industries. The government was already impressed by the successes of the planned economy in the Soviet Union and these visits became the starting point for cooperation between the two countries. First, Turkish experts examined seventy textile manufacturing enterprises in the Soviet Union. Later a committee of Soviet experts came to Turkey to study the locations and other practicalities of the planned state factories. By mid 1932, a three-year plan that focused primarily on cotton textiles had been prepared. But later that year, the Minister of Economy changed and alterations in the organization structure of state institutions responsible for state enterprises followed.

The institutional arrangement for the implementation of planned industrialization already became a subject of discussion in early 1932. The Bank for Industry and Mining was established in 1925 to run the state factories until they were handed over to the private sector. This institution was supposed to enter into partnership with private capital by means of providing credit and banking services to private entrepreneurs. As such, it was not considered appropriate for performing the new tasks entailed by the etatist policies. In July 1932, laws for the establishment of first the State Industrial Office and then the Industrial Credit Bank were enacted. While the Bank for Industry and Mining was supposed to run the enterprises until they were taken by private capital, the State Industrial Office, endowed with considerably large authority in regulating relations with the private sector, took upon the task of permanently managing new state enterprises. This signalled a change of attitude toward private businesses. With the forceful replacement of the Minister of Economy in September 1932, from a devoted advocator of stated-owned industrial enterprises to a name known for his close relations to business circles, this change became more institutionalized. The two institutions began to be criticised soon after they began operating. It was at this point that the name Sümerbank, which was allegedly coined by Mustafa Kemal, was first mentioned in the press. Enacted on 3 June 1933, the Sümerbank law presented its legislative intention as to replace the Industrial Office, which, the law’s preamble argued, “instead of helping the development of national industry, [had the effect of] worrying the industrialists.”

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131 It is worth mentioning a few words about the first cadre of the Ministry of Economy during the planning of etatism is order to establish their difference from the later cadres. Mustafa Şerif Özkan, the Minister of Economy between September 1930 and September 1932, was the first person to work for etatism’s inclusion in the RPP program (İlkin, “Devletçilik Döneminin İlk Yıllarında İşçi Sorununa Yaklaşım”, p. 285). Further comparisons between the approaches of these two ministers to the question of formulating a Labor Law before and in 1932 are made in İlkin’s 1978 article.
132 Tekeli and İlkin, Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye ’de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu, pp. 149-55 and 177.
The Class Character of State Power

The disagreements on the state’s role in the economy reflect multiple aspects of the class character of the new Turkish state. This brief account of the organizational and institutional arrangements and of the transfer of power – from bureaucrat with protectionist opinions to those defending the rights and interests of private business – provides significant insights into the class character of the state during this period. To understand the long-term effects of these changes, I would follow Göran Therborn’s conceptualization of the class character of state power.

Therborn begins by defining the class character of state power with a significant argument, which helps us to overcome certain conceptual and terminological confusions. According to this conceptualization, state and political power must be analysed in relation to the ongoing processes of social reproduction and transformation. In this model, the class character of a state is not defined in terms of its constituency and composition but the reproductive effects created through its interventions. Therborn defines three objects of reproduction affected by state power: the relations and forces of production, the character of the state apparatus and the particular ideological superstructure with its specialised apparatuses of qualification and subjection.133

In the economic sphere, state interventions may further allow, go against or break existing relations of production. ‘To further’, in this context, means to extend given relations of production as exemplified in opening up new areas and labour resources for capitalist exploitation. In addition, ‘to further’ also means intensifying the exploitation or domination of the ruling class of a given mode of production.134 Above, I illustrated the efforts of government officials to delicately formulate their statements on etatism in order to convince private capital that its existence is not under threat.

For Therborn, the character of the state apparatus has a key role because it is “a material crystallization of the relationships and division of labor dominant in society” and it has an indirect and delayed effect on the other two objects of reproduction, namely economy and ideology. First of all, everything that is done by the state is done through the state apparatus; thus it provides a filter determining the modality of state economic and ideological interventions. Moreover, the manner in which state economic and ideological policies of a given aim and content are actually implemented is a crucial determinant of their effects.

134 Ibid., p. 160.
particularly those of an indirect and intermediate kind. Secondly, the state apparatus, as a material condensation of class relations, affords a strategic base for an overall change in state policy. Once it is entrenched in the state apparatus, the ruling class or hegemonic class of an alliance enjoys a privileged position of strength, from which it may proceed to withdraw concessions, and end or shift alliances.\textsuperscript{135}

Indeed, the effects of these institutional arrangements on these two objects of reproduction are easy to detect. In the sphere of economy, the positive reactions of the private capital to the replacement of the Industrial Office by Sümerbank, especially after it was announced that the latter would grant loans to industrialists, reveal that capital had managed to steer the development of economic policy through its representatives in the state apparatus.\textsuperscript{136} A very interesting statistic supporting this argument concerns the ownership structure of the private enterprises established in the 1930s. In Keyder’s words, it became difficult to distinguish between the top ranks of the political class and the industrial bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{137} Indeed, 74.2 per cent of those running these enterprises were state officers. Kazgan explains this high figure as an outcome of the increasing income level of bureaucrats in the face of decreasing prices and the opportunity to learn business at state enterprises. Thus, she concludes, state’s contribution to the industrialization of the economy was not limited to opening new factories. The recruitment of private entrepreneurs from within the bureaucracy was also an important input.\textsuperscript{138} This merging of interests on a personal level also indicates a newly emerging coalition between bureaucracy and the nascent industrial class.

On the ideological level, it should suffice to say that the same Minister of Labour, who initiated the attack on the Industrial Office, became one of the founders of the oppositional liberal Democrat Party in 1945, which utilized an anti-étatist stance in its campaign for the 1950 elections. The elections resulted in DP’s victory. As such, Turkish étatism exemplifies what Therborn calls the nationalization of capitalist enterprises, which “indicated a real temporary weakness of the bourgeoisie, they posed no threat to its power”.\textsuperscript{139}

Consider the following list of Sümerbank’s tasks in light of this framework: running the factories taken over from the State Industry Office, managing the state shares in private

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid., pp. 150-1.
  \item \textsuperscript{136} On a similar note, Tekeli and İlkin illustrate how the bureaucracy maintained and reproduced its existence within the state apparatus in the context of the Great Depression through an analysis of the social expenditure in the 1930s. A striking example would be the dramatic increase in the share of social security expenditures, which covered only the civil servants in this period, in total state expenditures rose from 0.2 % in 1927 to 8.3 % in 1934 (\textit{Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye'de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu}, pp. 51-4).
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Keyder, \textit{State and Class in Turkey}, p. 105.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Kazgan, \textit{Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler}, p. 81.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Therborn, \textit{What does the Ruling Class do}, p. 152.
\end{itemize}
industrial enterprises, preparing and directing the preliminary research and projects of all factories built with state investment (with the exception of factories established through special laws), participating in or helping out the establishment or expansion of enterprises that are economically productive for the country, opening up schools to train foremen and workers required by factories, financing the education of industrial engineers and experts in the higher education institutions or helping schools that are opened for this reason by the Ministry of Economy, sending students and interns to foreign countries, providing credit to industrial enterprises and carrying out general banking tasks, and carrying out research on the conditions of development of national industry and reporting back on this issue as well as other issues requested by the Ministry of Economy. As this long list illustrates, instead of being confined to tasks concerning only state enterprises, Sümerbank was given the task of encouraging the development of the national economy as a whole, mainly through the provision of credit, and investments in training and education. The emphasis on national economy characterised the practicalities of planned economy and state-led industrialization, and its effects became visible in later decades with a dramatic increase in national industrial production.

The Content and the Success of the Plan

The Plan was a collection of different reports that had been written over a long course of time. It was made public in January 1934 and its implementation officially began on 17 April 1934. The presentation text explained the need for planned economy by means of rejecting the international division of labour and Turkey’s role in it as the provider of agricultural products and raw materials. The goal is specified as the manufacturing of end products using locally produced raw materials. This would benefit the national economy as a whole, it is argued, since it would give an impulse to agricultural production and increase the price of raw materials.

140 Derin, Türkiye’de Devletçilik, pp. 92-3.

141 An interesting example of the benefits the private sector enjoyed through etatism comes from the war years when cotton yarn was very difficult to find. The Local Products Market, the buying and selling institution of Sümerbank, replied positively to the offers of private textile manufacturers who demanded yarn in return for selling their end products. Various inspection reports complain that the private manufacturers took advantage of this deal. When available, they bought cheaper and poorer quality yarn from the market and used it for products they sold to Sümerbank, while they used the better quality yarn for products they sold in the market. In the end, the deal benefited the private textile manufacturers who not only took advantage of guaranteed public purchase but also increased their profits by taking the opportunities opened in the private market. See: Sümerbank 1942 Yılı Uumuni Murakebe Heyeti Raporu, (Ankara: Basvekalet Devlet Matbaası, 1943), p. 23; Sümerbank 1943 Yılı Uumuni Murakebe Heyeti Raporu, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Matbaası, 1944), p. 13; “Sümerbank Yerli Mallar Pazarları Müessesesi 1944 Yılı Murakebe Heyeti Raporu”, in Sümerbank 1944 Yılı Uumuni Murakebe Heyeti Raporu (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Matbaası, 1945), p. 13.
materials. The industries would also open new areas of employment and increase the purchasing power of the people as a whole. In the words of the Minister of Economy, the ‘national factories’ would meet the needs of the internal market. In short, his proposed model of industrialization was import substitution and it reflected the popularity of the term “national economy”, which was first and foremost understood as the attainment of economic sovereignty. In practical terms, it meant national factories producing the basic consumer goods. Thus, the main objective of the First Five Year Plan was to establish enterprises that would produce hitherto imported commodities for which raw materials could be either imported or gathered within the country. The choices of industrial sectors for state investment were made accordingly.

Five such branches of industry were covered in the plan: textile, mining, cellulose, ceramic and chemical industries. Of these five industries, textile and mining were the top two in terms of their share in total imports. While the former constituted 24.7 per cent of total imports, the latter made up 11.1 per cent. In accordance with these figures, these two sectors were assigned 50.7 and 26.9 per cent, respectively, of the total expected investment.\(^{142}\) Within textiles, cotton received the biggest share with 42.2 per cent of the total investment.\(^{143}\) The following projects were realized in this sector: on 13 August 1934, the extension of Bakırköy Cloth Factory started. The building of Kayseri Cotton Textiles Combine and Ereğli Hosiery Combine started on 20 May 1934 and 20 September 1934, respectively. While the former factory was opened in 1936, the latter opened in 1937. The building of three factories started in 1935: a calico factory in Nazilli which started operating in 1937, an artificial silk factory in Gemlik which started operating in 1938, and a merino factory in Bursa was opened in 1938. The construction work for a hosiery factory in Malatya started in 1937 and the factory opened in 1947.\(^{144}\) With the opening of this factory, Sümerbank became the top producer of cotton textiles. The bank controlled 47 per cent of all the spindles as well as 47 per cent of the entire workforce in the textile sector and carried out 68 per cent of all the textile production.\(^{145}\)

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\(^{142}\) Percentages calculated using the data in Aydemir, İkinci Adam, pp. 414-5.

\(^{143}\) Percentage calculated using the date in Derin, Türkiye’de Devletçilik, p. 94. There is a slight difference between the percentage of total textile investment calculated through the data in Aydemir and Derin. The share of textile investment is 50.7% and 49.8% when calculated using the date given in the two accounts, respectively. The difference stems from the fact that, while Derin states the total investment to be 45 million TL, the figure he provides in the tables is 43,953,000 TL.

\(^{144}\) Aydemir, İkinci Adam, p. 436.

\(^{145}\) Derin, Türkiye’de Devletçilik, p. 96.
Aydemir notes that the plan was not carried out completely because of the additional projects, inaccurate calculations, underestimation of needed resources.\textsuperscript{146} Tekeli and Ilkin, however, assert that it was implemented to a large extent, although it took until 1948 for all the investments to be completed mainly because of the war conditions.\textsuperscript{147} A second five year plan was prepared in 1938, but, because of the difficulties in securing financial means for the first five year plan and the threat of a new world war, this plan was abandoned. In its stead, a four-year plan was made and accepted on 16 September 1938. Together with the unfinished projects from the first five-year plan, this second four-year plan constituted the main document on industries. The total amount of anticipated capital for these projects amounted to 164,240,545 TL in 1938 whereas the state revenue was 250,094,000 TL in the same year. Thus, the state had to drop many of the projects, including the establishment of 70 new factories by Sümerbank.\textsuperscript{148}

\textbf{Labour Force Overview: Numbers, Legal Arrangements and Conditions}\textsuperscript{149}

Numerical information on the size of the labour force during this period mainly comes from industrial censuses that have two main problems. First, the information they provide is incomplete. Second, the results are difficult to compare because of the definitional and classificational differences between them. Nevertheless, the lack of better statistics compels us to rely on them to document the general development of the industrial workforce during the period. The incongruence among the following figures should be evaluated against this background information.

The following figures illustrate the growth in the size of the proletariat from 1915 to the end of the 1940s. In 1915, fewer than 15,000 workers worked in the manufacturing industry.\textsuperscript{150} 15\% of the investment in industries was of national origin, and Turkish workers made up 15\% of the entire workforce. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce statistics, in 1922, the total number of industrial workers was 75,411 and 35,316 of them worked in the textile sector. The average number of workers per enterprise was 2.3 for all

\textsuperscript{146} Aydemir, \textit{İkinci Adam}, p. 418.
\textsuperscript{147} Tekeli and Ilkin, \textit{Uygulamaya Geçerken Türkiye’de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu}, pp. 198-9.
\textsuperscript{148} Aydemir, \textit{İkinci Adam}, p. 419.
\textsuperscript{149} The term labour force here denotes factory-or workshop-based free wage labourers.
\textsuperscript{150} 50 Yılda Çalışma Hayatımız, (Ankara: T.C. Çalışma Bakanlığı, 1973), p. 46. Almost half of those worked in the textile sector. An interesting point to note here concerns the large difference between daily wages in the textile sector and the other sectors of industry. Wages in the former were approximately half of the second worst paid industry. This could be explained by the widespread employment of women in textile manufacturing and the dissolution of the small-scale production (Türkiye’de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı, p. 145-6).
industries and 1.76 for textile manufacturing enterprises.\textsuperscript{151} In 1927, four years after the independence, the number of industrial workers was 256,900, while workers employed in large enterprises\textsuperscript{152} totalled 52,173 in 1932 for the entire country.\textsuperscript{153} With the development of state industrialization, the size of the manufacturing workforce in such enterprises grew rapidly to reach 165,700 by the late 1940s.\textsuperscript{154}

Derin gives the number of all employees in the occupational category of industry as 299,369 in 1927 and 656,421 in 1935. This drastic increase, however, could be misleading mainly because of the changes in the classification between the two censuses. During the same period, total employment increased from 5,351,215 to 7,921,205.\textsuperscript{155} Accordingly, while in 1927 industrial employment made up 5.6\% of total employment, its share increased to 8.3\% in 1935. Makal, however, states that the share of industrial employment in total employment increased from 4.6\% in 1924 to 8.0\% in 1939 and 8.3\% in 1944.\textsuperscript{156} Thus, a nine-year gap exists between the two accounts.

The number of workers at enterprises qualified for the Law for the Encouragement for Industry increased from 27,000 in 1927 to 90,000 in 1939. In the latter year, they made up one-quarter of all industrial workers.\textsuperscript{157} In Aydemir’s account, the number of workers at qualified enterprises is slightly higher: 105,596 workers at 1394 qualified enterprises.\textsuperscript{158} Regardless of these differences in figures, we can conclude that the decrease in the number of qualified enterprises at the same time, when the size of labour force was fast increasing, proves a trend toward the concentration of capital and the increase in the size of industrial enterprises. As such, we can conclude that enterprises resembling modern factories were growing in number.

As for the textile sector before state-led industrialization began, the following figures portray the picture of an underdeveloped industry. Textile enterprises made up 14.3\% of the

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{152} This was defined as those enterprises with five or more workers where transducer is used, and ten or more workers where it is not (\textit{Kalkınan Türkiye, Rakamlarla 1923-1968} [Developing Turkey], [DPT KD-İstatistik Şubesi Yayın NO: DPT: 772-KD: 62], [Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969], p. 55).
\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Kalkınan Türkiye}, p. 56. A striking point here is the very low number of workers of foreign numbers: 347 (\textit{Türkiye de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı}, p. 51).
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Kalkınan Türkiye}, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{155} Derin, \textit{Türkiye de Devletçilik}, p. 40. This drastic increase, however, could be misleading mainly because of the changes in the classification between the two censuses.
\textsuperscript{156} In real numbers, in the early 1940s, the total number of workers in all sectors, i.e. industry, agriculture and home production, is somewhere around 701,000 and the composition would be 275,000 workers subject to the labour law, 20,000 workers in small industry, 100,000 working as small artisans, 100,000 handicraft artisan working at home, 6000 sea workers, and 200,000 agricultural workers (Ahmet Makal, \textit{Amelede İşçiye: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ekmek Tarifi Çalışmalar}, [İstanbul: İletişim, 2007], p. 72).
\textsuperscript{157} Kazgan, \textit{Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler}, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{158} Aydemir, \textit{İkinci Adam}, p. 443.
total 65,245 formal manufacturing enterprises in 1927 and 18.7% of the industrial workforce worked in the textile sector. This number, however, excludes those engaged in home-based production. Among formal textile establishments, only 4.6% had 11 workers or more and, even fewer, 2.6%, had motorized equipment. Of the 38,000 women working at establishments employing four workers or more, which made up 16 per cent of all workers at such enterprises, 16,000 was in textiles, and they made 52 per cent of the textile workforce. Interestingly, women from a wide range of age groups were employed.

Further complication arises when we analyse the distribution of this workforce between private and state enterprises, for different authors use varying criteria to define state employment. For example, Makal gives the following figures: the total number of all employees in state industrial enterprises increased from 70,455 in 1938 to 146,902 in 1948. If we compare these figures with the total number of industrial workers we calculated above, we can argue that workers in the state enterprises made up 16.9% of the entire workforce in industry in 1938. Their number continued to increase; it was 146,902 in 1948 meaning a 109 per cent rate of increase. The share of state workers in the total number of workers employed in enterprises that are subject to the Labour Law was even higher at 62-63 per cent. This indicates that state workers constituted the majority in large-scale enterprises where labour was concentrated and production was mechanized. As for Sümerbank, data gathered from inspection reports indicate a considerable increase in the number of workers between 1940 and 1950. The total number of workers was 20,000 in 1940; 22,000 in 1945; and 30,050 in 1950.

Assessing the effects of etatism on industrial employment, Makal reminds us of the employment opportunities opened in the private sector through the effects of state industrialization and concludes that state industrial enterprises had a considerable effect on total employment figures. It was in these enterprises that a modern working-class came into being, not because of numerical increases but because of the increasing concentration of

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162 Makal, *Ameleden İşçiye*, p. 119.
163 Ibid., p. 44.
labour and the developing technical conditions of production.\textsuperscript{165} State-led industrialization also affected the employment structure in other sectors. One such effect concerned the state’s interventions in the agricultural sector during this period both directly and indirectly. Direct interventions were the agricultural experimental stations and enterprises to raise brood stock. Indirectly, the Ministry of Agriculture was in charge of improving cotton production in order to meet the needs of the textile industry. While until 1930, cotton produced in the country was an export commodity, after 1932 the local textile industry’s cotton demand increased dramatically, which, in effect, increased the need for agricultural labour.\textsuperscript{166} Thus, the establishment of state-owned cotton textile factories created a considerable amount of employment beyond the actual production site.

**Origins of the Industrial Proletariat**

The transformation of traditional Ottoman production structures occurred in the nineteenth century in the context of the peripheralisation of the Ottoman economy. Karakışla explains the emergence of the modern manufacturing establishments as a by-product of the *Tanzimat* reforms and a set of economic treaties signed in 1838.\textsuperscript{167} Protectionism was abandoned with the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of August 1839. The reforms signalled a change in the government policy towards local manufacturers by means of permitting foreign merchants to engage in internal trade and thus favouring freedom in the marketplace at the expense of the long-standing monopolies. Still, there was a general revival of Ottoman manufacturing beginning in the early 1870s and continuing until World War I; a revival that was possible thanks to the willingness of the local workers to work for very low wages amongst other factors.\textsuperscript{168}

Three different forms of manufacturing characterized the nineteenth-century Ottoman formation; small handicrafts, state-owned modern manufactures and privately owned urban manufactures.\textsuperscript{169} In terms of labour forms and organization, Şevket Pamuk evaluates the last two of these together and specifies two periods during which they developed. The first period

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item Makal, “Türkiye’nin Sanayileşme Sürecinde İşgücü Sorunu”, p. 38.
\item Derin, *Türkiye’de Devletçilik*, p. 68.
\item Yavuz Selim Karakışla, “The Emergence of the Ottoman Industrial Working-Class, 1839-1923”, in Donald Quataert and Erik Jan Zürcher (eds.), *Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995), p. 19.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
includes the 1830s and 40s when the state undertook manufacturing to meet the needs of the army. The second period starts in the 1880s when protectionism on the Ottoman economy weakened. Manufacturing increased in industries that benefited most from the availability of local raw materials and cheap labour. These included cotton, woollen and silk manufacturing enterprises, which were geographically concentrated in Istanbul and, to an extent, in the Izmir and Adana regions. In 1914, around five thousand workers were employed in such enterprises. The bulk of textile production took place in the countryside where household consumption and a putting-out system existed side by side.  

Privately owned urban manufacturing was concentrated in Istanbul, Salonica (the Empire’s most important industrial centre until 1912) and Izmir, and was mostly undertaken by Ottoman Greeks, Armenians and resident foreigners. Most of the workers were also non-Muslims. These differed from the state enterprises in terms of the scale of production; most of them employed fewer than ten workers. However, Keyder notes that they still signified a novel form of production “because of the introduction of the wage relation bringing together a proletarianized, free labour force and free capital, contracting freely in a labour market.”

The rationale behind the establishment of state-owned manufactures was to meet the demands of the palace and the army. In fact, early Ottoman establishments built during the Tanzimat era were designed to supply the needs of the modernized Ottoman army. In the absence of the sources for factory proletariat, these enterprises depended on soldiers as workers.

Both the financial investment and the bulk of the personnel of these enterprises were of foreign origin. As for the locally recruited unskilled workers, Keyder writes that they were “at least initially, found among convicts, army conscripts, and from populations which were considered to be outside the integral structure of the Ottoman society.” High turn-over rates, which constituted the most significant problem of state enterprises as late as the 1950s, characterized this labour force. These enterprises stopped production after a short while because of the difficulties with securing the raw materials and the labour force. They regained importance with the coming of the War, but the scarcity of labour was persistent. One important development in this period was the employment of female labour in Istanbul’s state

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170 Şevket Pamuk, 100 Soruda Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi, 1500-1914, (Istanbul: Gerçek, 1990), pp. 275-291.
171 Keyder, “Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 125.
173 Keyder, “Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 125.
enterprises.\textsuperscript{174} In fact, Quataert notes that the employment of female labour in manufacturing was commonplace in the nineteenth century, especially in the export-oriented textile industries the employment of girls and women was strikingly common.\textsuperscript{175} With the end of the war, these manufactures declined. Thus, the industrial structure of the young Turkish Republic was very weak.

**Origins of the Bakırköy Workforce**

Bakırköy workers’ files include a valuable form that asks about occupation, and the skill level of the worker. Unfortunately, these forms are almost always incomplete, and only the basic information such as name, date and place of birth are recorded. Thus, it is not possible to collect systematic data on the background of industrial workers during this period.

Sketchy information collected through interviews and presented in the following chapters is insufficient to arrive at general conclusions. We can only make inferences by looking at the changes in other sectors, especially agriculture. It was noted earlier that the Ottoman social formation was characterized by the continuation of small-scale land-ownership. However, this should not blind us to the reality of the landless peasants. Referring to a speech by Prime Minister İnönü in 1936, Derin states that, even at places where land fragmentation had occurred extensively, nearly half of all peasants did not own any land. Likewise, in 1934, Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, reported that five million peasants worked on land that they did not own. In a country with a population of 16,200,694 in 1935, this number is striking indeed. It becomes even more curious when we note that private ownership constituted 5\% of the total land in 1933.\textsuperscript{176} As mentioned above, agricultural production, together with foreign trade, was the most badly hit sector by the Depression in 1929. Although, during the first seven years of the 1930s, 1,280,881 decare land was distributed to peasants, Tekeli and İlkin assert that the crisis in the agricultural sector pulled apart at least some part of the peasantry from the countryside and thus increased labour supply for non-agricultural sectors.\textsuperscript{177} Increasing unemployment in the agricultural sector, which led to migration to the cities, is mentioned widely in newspapers during the first half of the 1930s.\textsuperscript{178}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., p. 133.
\textsuperscript{175} Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing*, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{176} Derin, *Türkiye’de Devletçilik*, pp. 57-61.
\textsuperscript{177} Tekeli and İlkin, *Uygulama Geçerken Türkiye’de Devletçiliğin Oluşumu*, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{178} A short list of examples is given in Chapter 2, footnote 246.
\end{footnotesize}
For the second source of industrial proletariat, the Turkish case presents a peculiarity in that there is a time lag between the disappearance of the guild system and the beginning of industrialization. As a consequence of this time lag, “instead of moving straight from handicrafts into industry, as the workers of many other countries had done, the potential industrial workers of Turkey had to pass through several miserable generations, during which they inevitably tended to lose their standards of skill and their occupational consciousness”.

Indeed, as we shall see later in this study, state workers’ lack of skills and their discontinuity in industrial work constituted the two most important complaints of the factory inspectors.

When we look at the changes in the wage levels under etatism, the picture becomes increasingly clearer in terms of the main beneficiaries of the policy. The 1930s witnessed a dramatic decrease in wages, while industrial production became more and more profitable. Kazgan attributes the increase in the rate of profit to three factors: the decrease in raw material prices, the very low level of wages due to decreasing food prices, and the effect of agricultural crisis in terms of dissolution of peasantry and the decrease in labour cost. Real wages of workers at qualified firms decreased by 25 per cent between 1934 and 1938. Considering that these statistics do not include workers at smaller firms, we could assume that the decrease in real wages was even higher. Between 1938 and 1943, average wages in Istanbul declined by another 40 per cent in real terms, and the increase in real wages lagged well behind the increase in the cost of living. At the same time, industrial production became so profitable during the 1930s that the rate of surplus value increased dramatically from 172 per cent in 1932 to 318.2 per cent in 1939. This was a combined effect of the low labour costs and the length of the working day. Also important here, as Ilkin and Tekeli remark, is the absence of a labour code, which specified a minimum wage level. That had to wait until 1936. But even long after that, in 1949, an ILO report described the wage situation in Turkish industry as follows: “Turkey’s present poverty is inevitably reflected in low rates of remuneration, which for most workers represent a standard of living which at best is little is at all above a bare subsistence level and in many cases is definitely below it.”

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180 Kazgan, Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler, p. 79.
182 Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, p. 105.
183 Türkiye’de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı, p. 155.
185 Labour Problems in Turkey, p. 16.
Bakırköy workers’ wage levels support this observation, as we shall see in detail in the following chapters.

State Factories: Ideological and Spatial Dynamics

Besides being economic enterprises, the state factories of the early Republican period also had ideological functions that went well beyond their physical limits. To begin with, as both Birtek and Makal argue, state industrialization was a result of not only an insufficient level of capital accumulation but also a lack of an industrial labour force.\(^{186}\) Birtek goes on to argue that one of the motivations behind the establishment of state factories was to create a modern and harmonious labour force, which would eventually benefit the private industries. Indeed, the training for personnel for private enterprises was one of the goals of the first five-year industrial plan.\(^{187}\)

On the level of material existence, state enterprises were imagined to exemplify the space of Western modernity, which, in this context, was defined through the infrastructural improvements and recreational facilities around the factory settlements. İnsel quotes a French observer who visited several of these in the 1930s: “With a strong and well cared road structure, green areas, sanitary neighbourhoods, well organized water and electricity provisions, stadiums, and market places, these centres of settlement change the face of the old cities they are located in.”\(^{188}\) They also had the function of accelerating and disseminating the Westernization process. Visiting the Merinos Factory in Bursa in 1939, a journalist described the factory complex as “an industrial abide of the Republican will, a masterpiece of Republic.” The factory, he observes, changed the cultural and social constitution of the entire city and, thus, it was much more than a mere economic enterprise.\(^{189}\) Aydemir would go so far as to claim that with their parks, social housing, and educational, social and sports facilities, state enterprises were “civilized” establishments, the likes of which were not often seen in the “democratic” countries.\(^{190}\) An inspection report from 1943 reveals the extra-economic rationale behind the establishment of state factories through a comparison between private

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\(^{187}\) Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p. 447.

\(^{188}\) Qtd in İnsel, “Devletçiliğin Anatomi”, p. 424.


\(^{190}\) Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, p.447. Looking at Kayseri and Nazilli factory settlements, Burak Peri argued that they were “the built form of the early Republican attempts to modernize society... [they were] also the active centers of social education that exemplified the new life of citizens in a modern country to the workers” (*Building the ‘Modern’ Environment in Early Republican Turkey: Sümerbank Kayseri and Nazilli Factory Settlement*, Unpublished Msc. Thesis, 2002, pp. 107-108).
and state enterprises. The private sector’s geographical choices, the report argues, are based on economic calculations such as the raw material supplies and energy needs, whereas when locations for state enterprises are chosen, long-term interests of the nation are calculated.\textsuperscript{191} Indeed in a geographic context where regional imbalances in industrial enterprises were prominent, the establishment of state factories in remote Anatolian towns could be interpreted as a sign of the state’s desire to penetrate the peripheral areas by means of materializing its existence in the form of factories.\textsuperscript{192}  

A similar argument was made in a commission meeting on Sümerbank factories in 1940. A member of the parliament specifies his reason for joining the commission as the bad talk he heard about Sümerbank, but his experience in the commission convinced him that its establishment was a smart move by the rulers with foresight. They were established to avoid the repetition of the sufferings of the First World War. Note here the historical distortion of the rationale for state industrialization. These enterprises, he concluded, were products of military and political motivations rather than economic ones.\textsuperscript{193} Many social historians also shared this perception of state enterprises as the tools of societal transformation. One of them notes that the scattering of factories around Anatolia was done “in what any sane capitalist would have considered crazy economics”.\textsuperscript{194}  

But state enterprises’ effects went beyond the built environment. In \textit{The Production of Space}, Henri Lefebvre explains how spatial transformations relate to the reproduction of society. In his formulation, space is not only a means of production but also “a means of control, and hence of domination, of power”.\textsuperscript{195} It is a material force that is not only produced by social relations, but also one that produces and inscribes social relations. Consider the following goals of state industrialization in light of this idea: to carry the modern, civilized, progressive lifestyles to the far ends of the country and thus provide examples of progressivism, to set an example for the private enterprises in terms of the value given to the managers, the workers and the employee by means of providing them with an acceptable life

\textsuperscript{191} Sümerbank 1943 Yılı Umumi Murakebe Heyeti Raporu, p. 252. 
\textsuperscript{192} Erdal Yavuz gives the following figures on these regional imbalances: “In 1938, 30 per cent of all industrial establishments were in Istanbul, followed by Izmir and Bursa with 12.9 and 7.3 per cent respectively. On a regional basis, the Marmara and Aegean areas together constituted 71.1 per cent of all industry. Particularly in the Marmara region, where industrial centers like Istanbul and Bursa are situated, the share was about 49 per cent. More precisely, 86 per cent of the textile and 76.2 per cent of the metal works were in the Marmara region” (“The State of the Industrial Workforce, 1923-40”, in Donald Quataert and Erik Jan Zürcher [eds.], \textit{Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic} [London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995], pp. 97-8). 
\textsuperscript{194} Ahmad, “The Development of Class-consciousness”, p. 91. 
standard and to take care of their needs such as housing, healthcare, education and childcare and social life, and to provide them with the means of self-development. In İnsel’s words, state enterprises are educational institutions training the “civilized citizen”. As such, industrial investments were seen as the backbone of social development as a whole. And the blueprints of this development were determined by the peculiar character of the nation-state.

Thus, while creating spaces of Western modernity in Anatolia, these enterprises would also present an alternative to the “Western” type of industrialization characterized by a long and arduous history of class conflict, a model that was utterly detested by the ruling elites of the new Republic. This meant that state factories would set an example for private enterprises as well. Since their primary motivation was not to maximize profit, state factories would illustrate the social organization of a proper workplace. They were to show the newly emerging Turkish capitalists how to engage with their workers, and what conditions to provide at the sites of production.

As we shall see in the following chapter, the motivation behind social provisions was partly constituted by this fear of class conflict during industrialization. The claim that the planned social provisions were not distributed equally among different state factories, and that they were usually not as beneficial as some state documents – and, for that matter, labour history studies based on these documents – claim, constitute the subject matter of the next chapter. Suffice here to say that the material existence of state factories enabled the Turkish state to consolidate the image of a disinterested caretaker.

1936 Labour Law: A Law of Regime

In an article on the failed attempts of establishing a Labour Law in 1932, Ilkin documents the efforts of the Republican State to formulate a legal document on the question of labour. These efforts had started in 1921, during the war years, but each attempt was repressed through inner conflicts within the state apparatus. It was only in 1936 that a Labour Law was enacted.

In the aftermath of the Depression, unemployment increased dramatically. By the end of 1931, the figure had reached 100,000. The effect of this was immediately felt on the wages.

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196 Aydemir, İkinci Adam, p. 446. Being one of the most influential intellectual figures of the period, Aydemir also worked as a bureaucrat; he became the head of the Office of Industrial Examination (Sanayi Tetkik Dairesi). As such, his views are representative to a considerable extent.
On top of this, the very hard working conditions, the complete lack of social security measures and the strict ban on the organizational action left the working masses with a sense of unease. The Kurdish rebellions of 1924 and 1925 led the government to enact a Law for the Maintenance of Order, the overarching main article of which stated that “the government can – with the confirmation of the president – forbid and abolish any institution, behaviour, and publications which disrupt the country’s social order, calm, security, and safety”. This provided an institutional framework for the already established authoritarian rule of the RPP and practically eliminated all possible channels of opposition, which remained closed until the end of the single-party rule.199

The decade of the 1930s is regarded as the period when the Kemalist regime was fully consolidated.200 A nationalist consciousness was arising and the discourse of uniformity had become hegemonic. Keyder explains the rise of nationalism in the following words: “Now that a state had been established, the population living in it had to be forged into a nation. Individuals were supposed to find meaning in their belonging to the national unit, and alternative affiliations, sub or supra-national, were regarded with suspicion”.201 The 1935 RPP program was characterized by this idea of national unity, which supposedly made social classes redundant. This text is important to analyse for it includes the blueprints of the Labour Law enacted the following year. Written three years after etatism began, the programme was formulated in the context of heavy criticism of the RPP’s economic policies. The claim of peculiarity once more became useful as the Party Secretary answered those critics by arguing that the Turkish state is neither liberal nor a class-based state, it is the national state. He recognized that rapid industrialization brought a considerable increase in the size of the working-class; but the poisoning of the Turkish worker with ideas such as class conflict should be avoided at all costs. That is why the program dictated agreement and harmony between the workers and the bosses. If they cannot secure this on their own, the state would interfere through arbitration. When he announced that the programme banned strikes and lock-outs, the audience replied with an enthusiastic “Bravo!” But, he added, it should also be guaranteed that a capitalist would not pressure a worker unfairly, because, after all, populism dictates that they are both sons of the country.202 The next year, full congruency between state administration and party organization was declared. In fact, this was only the legal expression of what had been going on in practice.

201 Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, p. 89.
It was under such political conditions that etatism was implemented. Scholars point to the connections between the economic policy and the changes in the state form and ideology in the following manner. Birtek interprets the implementation of etatism as “part of more general process whereby a particular political mode extends itself to previously uncontrolled spheres of a society”.203 Keyder also makes the same point when he invokes the regime’s realisation of its weakness after the Free Party incident in 1930 as a motivation for a new policy. The increasing suppression of civil rights and the state’s direct involvement in the economy were parts of a new policy, which consisted of heavy oppression of the working class, and an attempt centrally to coordinate investment decisions through increasing the surplus available to an industrial bourgeoisie nurtured by protectionism. All this was achieved with the aid of an ideology of nationalism and a rhetoric of mobilization, where the existence of social classes was denied in favour of a corporatist model of society, and the state was celebrated as the sole source of economic and societal development.204

It was in such a context that the Labour Law, modelled on fascist Italian legislation, was enacted on 12 June 1936 and became effective on 12 June 1937. This was a “law of regime” in the words of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The law concerned those enterprises that technically employ ten or more workers on a daily basis and, thus, covered only 180,000 workers. This became a contentious issue from the start, as an increasing number of workers demanded the protection the law provided. After the war years, the demands of textile workers working in small manufacturing enterprises were increasingly centred on the issue of the law’s scope. The law had in fact provided considerable benefits to labourers. For example, the law determined the working day as eight hours and the working week as forty-eight hours. But there were many exceptions to these rules. Subjected to detailed regulations concerning health conditions and wage compensations, the working day could be extended by three hours. That these regulations were not followed during the war years is often attributed to the National Protection Law, which was enacted in 1940. There was also the impression that at state factories workers were under the protection of the state regarding the working hours, as well as wages and social benefits.205 However, as I demonstrate in the following chapter, these rules were often not followed in state factories even before the war. Regulations concerning health and security matters were also issued in the law. Finally, a minimum wage was determined.

205 Aydemir, İkinci Adam, p. 396.
Although the law brought some protective regulations on the level of individual work relations, its determining feature was the authoritarian measures on the collective level. To Birtek, the law generalized the paternalistic attitude toward workers at state industries to the entire labour force. In fact, the 1935 penal code had already imposed punitive sanctions on strikes but with the Labour Law they became illegal. In 1936, activities aimed at “establishing the hegemony or domination of a social class over the other social classes, or eliminate a social class or overthrow any of the fundamental economic or social orders established within the country” were declared illegal in the Penal Code. The final blow came in 1938 with the revised Law of Associations, which banned all forms of “organizations based on social class.”

We will look at the different ways workers made sense of these bans and prosecutions in Chapter 4. But we have an account of a bureaucrat that gives an interesting reading of the banning of strike and lock-outs from the perspective of the ruling class. Derin begins the short section on the Labour Law in his book on etatism by quoting the definition of populism in the RPP program and then goes on directly to praise the party for renaming the May Day as the Spring Fest and thus allowing it to be enjoyed by everybody, not only workers. Following this is the reference to the banning of strikes and lock-outs in the Labour Law in the party program. Derin’s language is neutral in this part; he only reports what the law and the program states. But he was a bureaucrat, as I mentioned earlier, who had an effect on policy making. Thus, we could read this very brief account of the labour law, written only four years after its enactment, as an indication of the extent and strength of the faith in the principle of populism. It appears that the hegemonic power of the populist discourse was so strong that even the labour law was perceived as both an expression and a guarantor of that.

Kazgan brings a new perspective to the analysis of the rationale behind the Labour Law when she evokes another 1936-dated law that gave the Minister of Economy the power to control and fix the production costs and market prices of industrial products. Both this law and the Labour Law emerged as a necessity to balance the negative effects of the super-exploitation of labour and the dramatic increase in the rate of profit on consumer demand. The recognition of the need to keep a balance between labour and capital in the Labour Law should be read as an indication that the rulers moved from the corporatist social order and realized the existence of social classes. This is a far-fetching interpretation, in my opinion,

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206 Makal, *Ameleden İşçiye*, p. 46.
for the authoritarian measures against collective actions were justified by the claim that there was no room for class conflict in the Turkish society. Thus, the state was persistent on rejecting the existence of social classes discursively. Practically, strikes and collective bargaining remained illegal for years to come because they were declared redundant, for the state already functioned as the disinterested mediator between employers and employees. As such, the state’s recognition of the need to improve working conditions could be explained through multiple motivations. But to conclude that the Labour Law signifies an acceptance of social classes, even at the level of rhetoric, would be misleading for the law reflected and reproduced the new ideology of the solidarity in the service of the state, the anti-thesis of a class society.211

A mission report of the International Labour Office from 1949 observes the curious – and definitely transitional, according to the writers – nature of public opinion with respect to the labour question:

On the one hand, the sentiment of national unity which was generated by the independence movement and which played so large a part in assuring that movement’s success is still a very real factor in Turkish public life. Class distinctions do not appear to be at all sharply defined…On the other hand, there appears to exist in many circles a feeling of distrust toward “labour”-a feeling based rather on a knowledge (not always entirely accurate) of developments in other countries than on actual experience in Turkey.212

It was in the context of these contradictions that the new industrial proletariat constructed its politics.

The Background of the Bakırköy Cloth Factory

Bakırköy Factory was established by Barutçubaşı Ohannes as a private enterprise in 1850. Constructed by Garabet Amira Balyan, it was located in Bakirköy, one of the largest municipalities in the European side of Istanbul. In the beginning, its main activity was hand-weaving and printing; thus it took the name Basmahane (Calico/Printing House). It used calico samples imported from England and produced Turkish and Arabic print designs. Receiving no protection from the state in the midst of the decaying Ottoman economy, the

211 Keyder, State and Class in Turkey, p. 104. Keyder notes these as the words of the general secretary of the RPP.
212 Labour Problems in Turkey, p. 17.
private factory could not continue its production and it was transferred to the Ottoman Private Treasury in 1860 and to the Ministry of War in 1867. For the next 51 years, various types of clothes were manufactured at the factory for the army. In 1921, it was transferred to the General Directorate of Istanbul Factories together with Feshane (a woollen textiles factory also transferred to Sümerbank in 1933), and to the General Directorate of Military Factories in 1923. In 1925, with other military factories, it was transferred to the Bank for Industry and Mining, and underwent some renovations. During this period, efforts to rationalise production were also made. In 1932, the factory became the property of the State Industrial Office and, finally, on 11 July 1933, Sümerbank became the owner of Basmahane. The number of workers at the factory changed from 1173 in 1939 to 2148 in 1950.213

Different sources agree that the factory’s transfer to Sümerbank ownership was a turning point. In fact, between 1922 and 1930, the annual production of cotton cloth had already increased from 41,000 to 1,639,670 metres. The share of market sales in total sales also increased during this period, from 6% to 45%. In 1930, the construction of a new building started.214 However, there was never any serious attempt to renovate the factory or improve the technical conditions. A newspaper reports the striking contradiction between the new machinery and the old building structure, while praising the young and active director of the factory who did his best to improve the production conditions and operated the factory day and night according to a commercial mentality.215 When he wrote a report on the factory in 1936, Von der Porten mentioned the uselessness of the old spinning machines, which had been in use for the past ten years, but had not been properly taken care of. Of the 340 looms at the factory, 60 had to be replaced immediately.216 As late as 1940, these looms were still at the factory and complaints about them were also made in state inspection reports. Comparing the four cotton textile factories in terms of their production levels in 1939 and 1940, one report indicates that Bakırköy was the only factory where the amount of woven cloth actually decreased because of the worn-out machinery.217 In fact, the other three cotton textile

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215 “Bakırköy Bez Fabrikası”, Cumhuriyet (13 May 1933).
216 Max Von der Porten, Bakırköy Bez Fabrikası Hakkında, (n.p., 1936).
factories were established according to the First Five Year Plan, and thus enjoyed not only newer machinery but also social provisions related to the built environment.218

When Sümerbank took over the factory, there were 3,200 spins and 60 old weaving looms. Construction began soon after Sümerbank was in charge and the factory was reopened in 1934 with 8928 spins and 320 looms. Additional facilities included a nursery for female workers and showers for workers. One newspaper article reported that these additions made the factory a perfect example for all Turkish factories.219 New machinery imported from Europe was placed in the factory in early 1934, increasing the number of spins to 10,000. Production capacity quadrupled while a considerable improvement in production quality was observed. By 1935, the annual production of cloth was 4,625,275 metres. Another important development was the production of cotton yarn, which began in 1932 with 322,931 kilograms a year and increased to 978,147 kilograms in 1935.220 These improvements also brought more variety in the types of cloth produced. Besides producing for the army, thin calico printed fabric and cotton dress fabric were also produced for the market in 1934.221 An expert report from 1938 mentions muslin, bed sheet material and apparel cloth among the type of cloth produced, while a state inspection report from the following year specifies canvas, cloth for military outfits, tents and primers, and calico as the main products of the factory.222 As late as 1949, the characteristic product of the factory was still clothes produced for the army. Celebrating the centennial anniversary of Bakırköy, the report praises the factory for the service it provided to the Turkish army.223

Changes in the administrative structure of Sümerbank in the 1930s and 1940s testify to the argument that etatism was very much shaped in practice, and decisions were made in a pragmatic manner rather than in a planned fashion. Three of the four cotton textile factories – i.e. Kayseri, Eregli and Nazilli, established by Sümerbank – had been run as enterprises since they began operating. Different from these three newly built factories, the Bakırköy factory

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218 Another report attributes the decrease to the change in the type of cloth woven in this period (Sümerbank 1940 senesi faaliyet ve hesap devresine ait İdare Meclisi raporu, bilanco, kar ve zarar hesabı, p.13). As we shall see in Chapter 4, while analyzing a work stoppage incident at the factory, during the war years, the factory weaved a coarser and heavier type of cloth. Since the wages of weavers were calculated according to the length of the woven product, this change decreased the amount of their daily earnings. This incident is analysed in detail in Chapter 4 as an example of the effects of the changes in the labour process on the relations in production.


was handed over to Sümerbank by the Bank for Industry and Mining in 1934 and, after two years of operating as an enterprise, it became a joint stock company in 1936. This double structure prevailed until the end of 1938 when the four factories were brought together under the Institution of Combined Cotton Yarn and Textile Factories in early 1939. Functioning as a legal entity, this institution was supposed to run on its own, though the general directions were still given by the main organization, Sümerbank. This was heavily criticized in the inspection report of 1940, and a new administrative arrangement was made with the establishment of the Institution of Yarn and Textile Factories in October 1941. This new arrangement brought nine woollen, cotton and silk textile producing factories together and lasted until 31 May 1949. The inspection reports until this date had all mentioned the administrative problems stemming from an ineffective division of labour between different units and the over-centralization of the decision-making process. Instead of overseeing the management of the factories, the Enterprise intervened in every detail, which not only caused a considerable increase in operational costs but also slowed down business to such an extent that it became inevitable to turn each factory into an individual enterprise by 1949. The twelve cotton and woollen textile producing factories became autonomous enterprises.

Problems pertaining to the productivity levels were continuously mentioned in state inspection reports. In an interview he gave in 1947, the director of the factory complained that the 400 per cent increase in the labour force after Sümerbank took over did not bring with it a corresponding increase in the production level. But, he added, the factory was working more effectively in 1947 and the situation was improving. In fact, in many inspection reports on different Sümerbank factories, similar complaints were often followed by such claims of recent improvement.

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224 Sümerbank 1939 Yılı Umumi Murakebe Heyeti Raporu, p. 7.
226 Sümerbank Bakırköy Sanayii Müessesesinin 1949 Yılı Raporu, p. 1-2; “Sümerbank İplik ve Dokuma Fabrikaları Müessesesi 1948 Yılı Raporu”, in Sümerbank 1948 senesi faaliyet ve hesap devresine ait İdare Meclisi raporu, bilanco, kar ve zarar hesabı, (İzmit: Selüloz Basmevi, 1949), p. 4. This report advises that the factories were to be given more initiative, especially with regards to purchasing decisions.
At the opening ceremony of the Bakırköy Factory in 1934, Prime Minister İnönü described what the new state factories meant to the nation with the following words:

Each worker should think of getting the most out of the machines he uses not only by means of technical knowledge; he should also desire it as a burning ambition. These factories, which the entire nation considers important in terms of giving a direction to its new economic life, are places for only those who are willing to know, work and learn and those who are capable of learning. The nation is not building and will never build factories for those who are not hardworking and diligent to take refuge in. From the first day they enter the factory on, both state officers and workers should internalize this at the bottom of their hearts. This is why the new large factories should try to train craftsmen whose hearts are beating with care they show to their labour.  

In this short quote lies the kernel of the ideological underpinnings of etatist industrialisation. Bakırköy Factory was not just an economic enterprise, but also a national space that was built on the toil of the nation and thus was expected to benefit the nation through its operation. From then on, the workers of this national factory were expected to relate to their labour in these terms. It was not enough that they worked hard; they were also supposed to enjoy working. The patriotic reference to the significance of their toil was made through this highly emotional language, which had a Janus face character. It acknowledged them as part of that nation, or better, the sons of that nation, while bestowing them with the responsibility of serving the nation. Theirs was not simply industrial work; it was their opportunity to pay their homage to the nation and its forefathers. Such was the popular imagery of the ruling class. The remainder of this study explores whether this was a shared assumption by Bakırköy workers.

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228 Sümerbank (1.7.1933-11.7.1943), (Istanbul: Sümerbank Umum Müdürlüğü Yayını, 1943), p. 33.