Between local governments and communities
van Ewijk, E.

Citation for published version (APA):

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
4. From centralized governance to local governance networks in Morocco, Turkey and the Netherlands

4.1. Introduction
Worldwide the role of local governments is changing as a result of decentralization processes. Chapter 2 elaborated on these processes and addressed some of the challenges faced by local governments. This chapter will focus on local governance in Morocco, Turkey and the Netherlands, and will describe the political and institutional frameworks in which local governments and other actors within their jurisdiction operate. The chapter looks at current governance structures and processes, highlighting the main governance processes over the last two decades. Furthermore, the role of civil society in relation to the state is discussed. Knowledge about roles, mandate and resources of local governments is relevant in order to understand their opportunities and capacity in (1) formulating and executing new policies aimed at strengthening local governments and local governance processes; (2) establishing intra-municipal partnerships (relations between local governments and civil society actors); and (3) engaging in international relations and cooperating with peer local governments (including their capacity to contribute complementary resources). These three aspects will be discussed in the context of Morocco, Turkey and the Netherlands. Section 4.6 focuses on two Dutch support programmes financed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which aim to strengthen local governance in Morocco and Turkey.

4.2. Local governance in Morocco

4.2.1. Political context
Morocco has been a constitutional monarchy since 1972. The Head of State is the King, who is considered to be a descendant of the prophet Mohamed. He is also the supreme religious authority (Amir al-Muminin—The Commander of the Faithful) (Waterbury 1970), which implies that Morocco is a non-secular state (Ottaway and Riley 2006: 4). The current King, Mohamed VI, succeeded his father Hassan II in 1999. Morocco has the formal characteristics of a parliamentary democracy and the constitution is based on a multi-party system. In 1996, after a referendum, a Parliament with two chambers was established. The elections of 2002 were considered the first free and fair elections, but it should be mentioned that democratic institutions are generally weak in the Arab region and political participation levels are low (United Nations 2005).

The House of Representatives (395 members in 2011) is elected for a period of three years in general elections. The House of Advisors (270 members) is elected indirectly; once every three years one-third of the members are replaced. The country spans 446,550 km² (or 710,850 km² if the disputed region of Western Sahara is
and has a population of 32.2 million inhabitants (UN Statistical Division 2012). It is divided administratively into 16 economic regions, 13 prefectures and 62 provinces. Each prefecture and province is further subdivided into districts (cercles), municipalities (communes) or urban municipalities (communes urbaines), and arrondissements in some metropolitan areas. The districts are subdivided into rural municipalities (communes rurales). In total there are 1,502 rural communities and municipalities.

Because Morocco is both a monarchy and parliamentary democracy, there is duality within the governance system. The King (al Malik) possesses a lot of power as both a constitutional and religious leader. Together with his ‘royal cabinet’ and the makhzen (the closed circle of people surrounding the King), he rules and controls political and governance processes (Adolf 2005). Adolf (2012) argued that despite decentralization processes and the democratic reforms of 2011 the King has largely retained his dominant position. Morocco is a lower middle-income country with a GDP of USD 4,196 per capita in 2011 (UNDP 2011), and steady economic growth of 3.7% of GDP in 2010 (BTI 2012). Still, the county has many of the characteristics of a ‘developing country’. In 2009, it had an under-five mortality rate of 38 per 1,000 live births. Its 2011 Human Development index is 0.582 (UNDP 2011), which is below the world average. Fourteen percent of Moroccans live on an income of less than USD 2 a day (World Bank 2012). The main challenges are the low adult literacy rate of 56.1% (2005–2010) (UNDP 2011) and the high unemployment rates—in particular for youth (21.9% in 2009) (UN statistical division).

4.2.2. Decentralization processes
Like most countries in the Central (or Middle) East and North Africa (MENA) region and beyond, Morocco has been undergoing a process of decentralization, which implies a changing role for local governments. At the same time, governance processes are still centralized, especially compared to countries in West and Central Africa. Budgets and land allocation are still highly centralized and are influenced by the control systems introduced in the colonial period (UCLG 2008).

Decentralization in Morocco has its roots in an endogenous process: since the 1960s the national government has made attempts to assign certain management and decision-making functions to the local level, in reaction to social pressures from the local level. A decentralization law was adopted in 1973, and two constitutional reforms were introduced in 1986 and 1992. These reforms increased the mandate of local governments and other sub-national authorities, but due to limited transfer of fiscal competencies by the central government, local authorities obtained only a small degree of autonomy in the allocation of their resources (Wunsch 2001: 11). In 1999, Mohamed VI introduced the ‘new concept of authority’ (le nouveau concept de l’autorité) providing

55 Morocco controls most of the Western Sahara; however, most member states of the United Nations have not recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara territory (United Nations 2006).
56 Estimate based on the 2004 population census.
local authorities with more financial resources and a broader mandate. In 2002, the Municipal Charter was introduced, broadening the responsibilities of the councils, granting councillors an official status as well as granting special status to the large urban areas (Berg 2010: 743).

The territorial administrative structure is rather fixed and tied to the structure of a governate (called wilaya). In practice this implies that local governments have limited room to manoeuvre and are heavily dependent on the central government (especially the King). The King remains the dominant religious and political authority in the country and the main driver of the reform process. Bergh (2010: 743) argued that ‘rather than representing a transformative political agenda, decentralization in Morocco was driven by the monarchy’s strategy to shore up its own legitimacy and not primarily by a desire to increase citizen’s political participation or government accountability’. Morocco’s form of decentralization can therefore best be labelled as ‘deconcentration’ (Jari 2010), whereby the central government exercises direct control, all the way down to regions, provinces, cities and districts. The reforms of 2011 place more emphasis on the role of the regions, but did not jeopardize the leading position of the King.

The Arab spring
The Arab spring of 2011 clearly exposed the tensions in Moroccan society and the distrust in the governance system by part of the electorate. Compared to other North African countries, the revolution in Morocco has been less intensive and less violent; however, there are certainly commonalities with the social movements of the North African countries. The democratization movement in the Arab states is directly related to human development, including modernization and democratization processes (UNDP 2011: 24). On the one hand, people who are educated and experience a certain level of progress are more likely to claim their rights. On the other hand, development can also increase inequality. This can result in a situation whereby the increasing expectations of the citizens are not met, which, in turn, can lead to deeply felt frustrations. The Arab states have strikingly high unemployment rates, particularly among the educated youth (half the population is 25 years old or younger).

In 2011, the King announced democratic reforms as a reaction to the increased tension in civil society during the Arab spring. There are different views on the relevance of these reforms. Whereas some authors have emphasized their importance and have pointed at the unique role of Morocco in North Africa, others have been more critical arguing that the main power still remains in the hands of the King (Adolf 2012). Earlier reforms have been criticized for the same reasons. In an article published in

57 The Minister of Internal Affairs during the regime of Hassan II developed the deconcentration structure in Morocco in such a way so that it did not limit the power and mandate of the King and makhzen (Basri 1994).

58 There are different views on the kind of decentralization occurring in Morocco. According to Wunsch (2002: 11), decentralization in Morocco can be identified as a form of ‘moderate devolution’ (see section 2.2.1 for an explanation on the various forms of decentralization).
2006, Ottaway and Riley argued that the real democratic transformation has not yet begun, as none of the measures introduced by the King limited his power.

A dual system
Due to the duality within the Moroccan governance system, two different authorities function next to each other at the local government level. Representatives of the central government body are appointed by the King and are called deconcentrees; they include officials affiliated to the Ministry of the Interior but also to line departments dealing with issues like health and education. The officials appointed by the King include the caïd and pacha at the local level, and governors and walis at the provincial levels. Moreover he can control local governance bodies through the Ministry of the Interior. The elected authorities at the local level are referred to as decentralisees, consisting of a city council headed by a president. The role of the president can be more or less compared to a mayor. The Municipal Charter of 2002 did enlarge the responsibilities of the councils, provided councillors with an official legal status and gave a special status to the big urban areas. Moreover communes were granted a stronger role in reducing poverty and exclusion. The charter—for the first time—provided opportunities for partnerships with NGOs (Bergh 2010: 743). Moroccan municipalities deal with all of the common local governance affairs (including health, education, social affairs and sports) with limited mandate and resources (UCLG 2008).

Catusse et al. (2007) argued that there is competition between the two kinds of local institutions, which is complicated further by the division of tasks between officials at the different governance levels. As the jurisdictions are not clearly defined this often results in overlap, redundancy and conflict. Jari (2010: 24-25) argued that one of the main questions is how to handle the tension between decentralization and the old central government structure, and how centralization and decentralization should complement each other.

It can be concluded that there is some ambivalence in the role and mandate of local governments. On the one hand, decentralization is perceived as important by central government, and more government functions are being transferred from the central to the local level. On the other hand, the central government—particularly the King—still have a lot of power, and the mandate of local government bodies is limited. The Ministry of the Interior still retains important supervisory power.

4.2.3. Horizontal arrangements: local governments and civil society
Opening up and growth of civil society organizations
In the last ten years important changes have taken place in Morocco transforming civil society. After a long period of oppression during the regime of Hassan II and his father Mohammed V, spaces have been gradually opening up and civil society has obtained more room to organize itself. The process of change already started under King Hassan II; during the last years of his regime the number of civil society organizations grew rapidly (Dimitrovova 2010; Sater 2007). Ottaway and Riley (2006: 8-9) argued that
Morocco has ‘made real progress in terms of transforming itself into a more open country with laws that are more in tune with those that regulate life in a democracy’. The growing openness is reflected in the increasing role of civil society as actors in local governance processes. The process of opening up is however relatively new, and the centralized and dual governance structure is said to hamper the process of strengthening civil society. According to the Arab Human Development Report (2009: 73), ‘popular demand for democratic transformation and citizens’ participation is a nascent and fragile development in the Arab countries’. The north of Morocco deserves a special note as it is characterized by a tradition of general distrust of citizens in local government bodies, connected to a long history of oppression of the Berber population and uprisings. The north of Morocco has also been neglected by central government for a long time (De Mas 1978; Obdeijn and De Mas 2012).

Central government has started two main initiatives in the last ten years to strengthen the role of local governments and to support non-governmental organizations. First of all, the 2002 municipal development plan (Plan Communal de Développement–PCD) focuses on improving local governance and the municipal administration as well as on introducing and strengthening new forms of cooperation and partnerships (Royaume du Maroc 2009; Bergh 2010: 743). The plan includes an approach to promote ‘good governance’, including equal access to public services, participation of citizens, addressing exclusion and promoting transparency and responsibility (Laghrissi 2010). The PCD made special arrangements for cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants that are managed by a single commune, delineating arrondissements that are not legal entities.59 Also, the National Initiative for Human Development (Initiative National pour le développement humain–INDH), launched in 2005, has led to a major increase in the establishment of NGOs. INDH was set up to improve the socio-economic conditions in several poor areas. In 2010, the programme focused on five million people with a budget of USD 1.1 billion (Bergh 2009).

Grassroots CBOs and NGOs, especially Islamic organizations, have fulfilled an important role in providing all kinds of services that are not provided by local governments. They often emerged spontaneously and fill in the gaps left by government bodies (Roque 2004, in Dimitrovova 2010). These CSOs are generally not officially registered. Of all NGOs, these organizations are said to be the closest to the people. At the local level services like water and waste management are increasingly being privatized, and local governments are for the first time starting to work in PPPs (Royaume du Maroc 2010).

**Limitations**

Despite the emergence of a stronger civil society, several authors have emphasized the constraints on CBOs in Morocco, and they have raised the fundamental issue of

---

59 The charter was inspired by French political configurations of cities like Paris, Lyon and Marseille (UCLG 2008: 32).
representation. First, the Moroccan public sphere is still seen as oppressive, and CBOs have to operate within certain boundaries of the ‘public sphere’ (Dimitrovova 2010: 525). Second, large segments of society are still excluded from the public sphere, as Berriane (2010: 101) has pointed out in a case study focusing on the impact of the INDH on women’s organizations. According to her, representation can be partial and selective, because the process of choosing projects, organizations and leaders is not transparent, favouring actors already seen by local authorities as fitting into the promoted profile of civil society actors. In Bergh's (2009) view, the fact that regional representatives of the Ministry of the Interior (not the elected councillors) manage the funds poses limitations to developing a truly bottom-up approach and limits the accountability of such initiatives. Bergh (2012) even claimed that the INDH actually increased the power of these unelected representatives of the ministry, at the expense of local government. According to Dimitrovova (2010) several NGOs that address human rights and women’s right issues have elite characteristics and close relations with the makhzen. Dimitrovova concluded that Moroccan ‘politics of exclusion and inequality are diametrically opposed to Habermas’ notions of the public sphere in which dialogue between the state and civil society is based on mutually accepted ethical principles’ (Dimitrovova 2010: 525).

The EU and donor organizations also have an important impact on civil society formation. The EU has emphasized the importance of strengthening civil society. As the Moroccan government seeks to intensify its relations with Europe, they are open to exploring changes in line with EU policy. Dimitrovova and Carapico argued that the EU agenda is dominated by trade and security issues (stimulating free trade and controlling illegal immigration), which has favoured NGOs closest to the centres of political power. CSOs that agitate for greater degree of social justice and welfare have profited less from EU policies (Dimitrovova 2010: 536-537; Carapico 2002: 380). Moreover, Cavatorta (2006) argued that several Western actors (mainly from the United States) have focused on supporting only secular organizations, even though engagement with Islamist groups is necessary in order to strengthen civil society as a whole.

4.2.4. Transnational city networks

Municipal councils are free to establish linkages elsewhere, as long as they respect the choices made in the international cooperation policies of the Kingdom of Morocco (Royaume du Maroc 2010). However, local governments have no financial resources to fund international exchanges and are, therefore, highly dependent on the resources brought in by their international partners. The National Association of Local Authorities of Morocco (l’Association Nationale des Collectivités Locales du Maroc–ANCLM), established in 2002, played a minor role in supporting international exchanges.61

\[\text{60} \quad \text{Berianne (2010: 107) argues in some cases reforms can even lead to ‘an increase in the governor’s importance and to a weakening of elected political leaders, and by doing so they are said to contribute to undermine the core elements of political representation.}\]

\[\text{61} \quad \text{The information was obtained during an interview with a former coordinator at the Morocco Municipal Platform (27 February 2011).}\]
association organized its first international forum in 2007, and international cooperation has mainly focused on cooperation with the French local government association Cites Unies France, cooperation within the Maghreb, USAID and cooperation between local government bodies within Africa (Collectivités locales Marocaines et Collectivités locales Africaines) (http://www.anclm.ma).\(^{62}\)

### 4.3. Local governance in Turkey

#### 4.3.1. Political context

Turkey is unique as it is geographically situated both in Europe and Asia and has a long history of being engaged in Europe. It is a pluralist secular democracy where most of the citizens are Muslims (UCLG 2008). The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal (commonly referred to as Atatürk [father of the Turks]). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s ambition was to create an independent, modern, democratic and secular country, based on the western civilization model. Today Turkey is a parliamentary republic, with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leading the government. AKP is inspired by Islam and this has frequently led to tensions in society as Turkey is a secular country. At the moment of finalizing this dissertation long felt tensions which are said to be related to the general dominant position of the AKP, have erupted and many people demonstrated at Taksim square in Istanbul as well as other public places in urban areas\(^{63}\). Turkey spans a surface of 769,360 km\(^2\) and has 74.2 million\(^{64}\) inhabitants. Ninety-five percent of Turkey’s territory lies in Anatolia, the eastern Asian part of Turkey. Turkey’s largest city, Istanbul, has 13.4 million inhabitants, i.e. 18% of Turkey’s total population (census 2011), and it is located directly at the Bosporus Strait, where the European meets the Asian continent (Tarifa and Adams 2007).

Its governance system has traditionally been highly centralized (Mango 1994; Sozen and Shaw 2002; Ertugal 2010). Turkey’s territorial public administration consists of a central level and a local level subdivided in 81 provinces. The provinces in turn are divided into sub-provinces. Traditionally there was no meso-level or regional level of administration as the state wanted to safeguard the unity and security of the nation (Ertugal 2010: 98). The regional level has become more important with the implementation of EU-funded regional programmes between 2001 and 2006, which was instrumental for the establishment of service unions, Programme Implementation Units (PIUs) and 26 Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) (Ertugal 2010: 100-101). The local level has long been governed through a dual structure: (1) The provincial

---

\(^{62}\) The establishment of the Moroccan LGA follows the general trend in Africa of establishing local government networks primarily in order to foster decentralized cooperation (UCLG 2008). Most African countries have established local government associations, and there is also an umbrella organization UCLG Africa.

\(^{63}\) See several blogs and references to publications at http://www.turkije-instituut.nl/

\(^{64}\) This is an estimate for 2010; according to the latest available census data it had 71.5 million inhabitants in 2008 (United Nations Statistical Division 2012).
administrations, which are headed by centrally appointed governors;\textsuperscript{65} and (2) (metropolitan) municipalities headed by elected mayors. Thus an elected mayor and an appointed official work in parallel, each with their own responsibilities. The municipal tasks are mainly related to infrastructure (urban planning, housing, water and waste management), while the national government body is responsible for health, education and social affairs. According to Ertugal (2010) there are almost no coordinating mechanisms between the two bodies.\textsuperscript{66} Turkey is an upper middle-income country, with a Human Development Index of 0.699 and a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of USD 12,246 (UNDP 2011). The country has shown a steady average annual economic growth of 5.3\% over the last 10 years, which is expected to continue in the coming years (OECD 2011).

4.3.2. Decentralization processes

Turkey is currently undergoing a process of decentralization and is heading towards devolution, whereby responsibilities, financial resources and decision-making powers are transferred to local governments (UCLG 2008). In July 2005 a new law on local governments was introduced by the AKP (Party of Justice and Development), which enhanced local autonomy by delegating more competencies and resources as well as lightening the administrative tutelage (Bayraktar 2008). However local governments are still strongly tied to higher government levels as they have to execute municipal legislation (Göymen 2007). Both formal and informal ties between local and central government are strong and clearly linked to party lines. Local expenditures amount to 4\% of GDP, and 50\% of the municipal budget is provided by the state (UCLG 2008: 217). According to UCLG (2008: 218) the system's stumbling block is that local authorities have no taxing rights, with the exception of taxes on property ownership. Local taxes account for 12.4\% of the municipal budget.

Since the 1990s Turkey has been implementing structural reforms, initiated due to dissatisfaction with the centralized administrative system and the changing priorities related to Turkey's development and reform agenda (heavily influenced by its aspirations to join the European Union) (Ertugal 2010). Turkey was officially granted the status of candidate country to the European Union in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit of the European Council. During the Copenhagen Summit in 2002, it was decided that if Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria,\textsuperscript{67} the European Union would open accession negotiations with Turkey. Turkish membership to the EU would require fundamental

\textsuperscript{65} The governors are called \textit{vali}, while the appointed head of the sub-province level are called \textit{kaymakam}.

\textsuperscript{66} On 6 December 2012 an amendment was adopted that aims at ending this dualist structure in the 29 provinces with metropolitan municipalities covering the entire provincial area (Aktar 2012).

\textsuperscript{67} The Copenhagen criteria define the membership conditions and requirements for candidate countries, including 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and 3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union' (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm).
changes to the basic governing structures, including the creation of mechanisms for multi-level governance (Ulusoy 2009). International organizations like the International Monetary fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank have also stressed the importance of undertaking a decentralization process. In an effort to meet the EU criteria, Turkey has been focusing on implementing reforms related to decentralization, public administration and combating corruption. Furthermore, the government is stimulating the use of information and communication technology (ICT) as a means to increase transparency, efficiency and participation in decision-making processes (especially those traditionally excluded, such as women and youth). Also service delivery (e.g. waste management) will have to change to meet EU standards. According to Ertugal (2010), the implementation structures for EU funds mainly promote the horizontal dimension of multi-level governance at the central level (i.e. EU’s impact has been greatest in promoting cooperation and coordination between public institutions at the central level).

Ulusoy described the ‘Europeanization process’ as a very powerful driving force. The whole concept of multi-level governance is part of the Europeanization process, serving ‘both as a normative narrative for countries such as Turkey in the accession process and as an empirical condition describing the social, political and institutional transformation currently underway in the EU’ Ulusoy (2009: 368). At the same time Ulusoy (2009) and Ertugal (2010) warn that the progress of democratic reforms in Turkey is sometimes too easily linked to EU reform processes; other important domestic changes have taken place within Turkey in the past years. For instance, the creation of 26 regional development agencies (RDAs) in 2006 was primarily a result of domestic national policy (Ertugal 2010). Although the RDAs do not affect the real power and authority of the state, Ertugal concluded that the creation of the RDAs has been an important step in strengthening the vertical dimension of multi-level governance. Moreover, interactions and interdependence between local actors from different sectors at the regional level has increased, which has also strengthened the horizontal dimension of governance at the regional level (Ertugal 2010: 102–104). In practice, domestic changes and exogenous influences are interlinked and cannot easily be separated.

The reforms have also strongly influenced local governance processes. Bayraktar (2007: 26) argued that ‘the evolution of the Turkish municipal system since the eighties improved the state of local autonomy’. However, it did not have an actual impact on local democracy, mainly because of the powerful position of mayors. ‘Central government’s overseeing and control of municipal functions and resources seems to be gradually substituted—though not entirely—by the hegemonic empowerment of local executives in the personality of mayors. Put simply, the “centre-periphery” dichotomy has been replaced by a problematic scenario of “centres in the periphery”’ (Bayraktar 2007: 26).

---

68 These RDAs have the task to prepare and implement regional development plans and programmes, and they are also responsible for monitoring and evaluation of the programmes and the promotion of cooperation among public and private sectors and NGOs (Ertugal 2010: 101).
His argument is that a new conceptualization of local democracy—including more political elements—is required to truly understand the contemporary state of Turkish local politics.

Resistance and negative impacts
There is resistance towards the Europeanization process by the guardians of the established political system and governing elites. They tend to use the process of Europeanization for personal power gains, instead of using it to transform the political system (Ulusoy 2009: 378). Ulusoy also discussed the general perception of the Turkish population of EU reforms. Many Turkish citizens feel that the reform processes are being conducted under European pressure, which negatively impacts the domestic dynamics and the adaptation of more democratic forms of governance. The unstable relations with the EU and the uncertainty about the status and timetable of EU membership contribute to this resistance (Ulusoy 2009: 379).

Likewise, EU member states have their reservations towards expanding the EU with Turkey as a member. This resistance is linked to (1) Turkey’s large population (second only to Germany); (2) its distinct cultural and religious character (the fact the largest part of the population is Muslim stirs scepticism); (3) its large agricultural sector and the related fears of competition, especially with other countries with large agricultural sectors; 4) fears of mass labour migration to the EU (Turkey is both a major sending and receiving country for migrants); and (5) concerns related to its political system (e.g., the involvement of the military in politics) and human right violations (Altinyelken 2010; HWWI 2006). The strong resistance in various Western European EU member states to Turkish EU membership, amplified by the economic crises in Europe and the economic growth in Turkey, is said to have spurred a shift away from the West in Turkish political circles. However, Mathoz (2011) argued that Turkey has always maintained a broader scope, towards the Middle East and Asia, and has also acted unilaterally.

4.3.3. Local governance and civil society
As the system of governance has traditionally been highly centralized, the state historically occupied a dominant position over civil society (Mango 1994; Ertugal 2010). Some authors have argued that the patrimonial structures—dominant for many centuries under the framework of the Ottoman Empire (1299–1923)—have deeply influenced the relationship between state and civil society. The state has maintained its powerful position in order to prevent opposition and disunity (Karaman and Aras 2000). The Turkish population has thus been accustomed to the devlet baba (father state) (Kubicek 2002: 762). The dominant position of the state has resulted in a poorly organized civil society today. According to Ergun (2010: 510), ‘until the early 1990s civil societal activity developed within a domestic context of satisfying basic social needs and operating predominantly on the basis of voluntarism with weak organizational structures and low membership’. Also the private sector has been very dependent on the
state (Sozen and Shaw 2002: 482). In addition to a poorly organized civil society, connections between political parties and social groups have been limited, thus further strengthening the isolation between public policymaking processes and civil society (Ertugal 2010). The process of democratization was hampered by human rights violation and intolerant attitudes towards opposition, especially towards ideas alternative to state ideology. Karaman and Aras (2000: 58) went on to conclude that ‘Turkey has a long way to go in its quest for the development of an authentic civil society that is fully democratic and that has its fundamental human rights duly respected by the government’.

Despite the strong role of the state, Turkey has had a unique community structure at the neighbourhood level. In towns in Turkey, local community leaders (called muhtars) are the chair of their neighbourhood council and have traditionally fulfilled an important role as coordinators within the local communities. A municipal law (Article 9, law no 5393) has officially codified the roles of these community leaders (UCLG 2008: 210). The new municipal law is said to have put more emphasis on civic participation, however, Bayraktar (2007: 26) argued that in practice little attention has been paid to strengthening democratic municipal structures, in favour of neo-liberal priorities and principles, like focusing on economic development and working on efficient, effective local governments.

**Influence of the Europeanization process**

The process of Europeanization and the adoption of European governance in Turkey implies a major challenge of mobilizing civil society groups that have long been excluded from the centres of power. The EU reform process ‘challenges the very core of state power’ (Ulusoy 2009: 367). In the period after 1999, when Turkey obtained EU candidate country status, important changes did take place. Turkey introduced several reforms, including the abolition of the death penalty and the extension of cultural rights for ethnic and religious groups (Altinyelken 2010; Onis 2004). EU’s involvement and the increased international funding opportunities have been influential in changing the nature of civil society. The number of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Turkey has increased significantly, but also the number and type of their activities has changed. Moreover, CSOs have been professionalizing, which is producing a civil society that is more active, lively and dynamic than before Turkey acquired EU candidate country status (Ergun 2010). Turkey is also said to have achieved strides in transparency (UCLG 2008: 217).

An important drawback of the Europeanization process is that the ‘dependency on international funding and project-based work has alienated domestic civil society actors from their grassroots basis and weakened their relations with core supporters and members’ (Ergun 2010: 520). Interestingly, similar drawbacks were found in the development of civil society in Morocco.
4.3.4. **Transnational city networks**

Like Moroccan municipalities, Turkish municipalities have either no or a very limited budget for international relations. Officially Turkish municipalities have to consult the Ministry of Internal Affairs (art. 74, Law on Municipalities) before establishing official municipal partnerships. This process can take a long time, and several Turkish municipalities have requested help from the representatives of the ministry to speed up this process.\(^6^9\) The Turkish Local Government Association Union of Municipalities of Turkey (UMT) has been collaborating with other LGAs (like VNG International) to coordinate support programmes related to international cooperation.\(^7^0\) All municipalities are members of the Union of Turkish Municipalities (membership is mandatory).

4.4. **Local governance in the Netherlands**

4.4.1. **Political context**

The Netherlands is a relatively small country spanning approximately 42,000 km\(^2\), of which 4,000 km\(^2\) are covered by water (rivers, canals and lakes). With a population of 16 million people, the country is among the most densely populated countries of the world. The Netherlands is both a constitutional monarchy as well as a decentralized democratic and unitary state (VNG 2008). The National Parliament consists of the Upper House (*Eerste Kamer*) and Lower House (*Tweede Kamer*). Parliament is referred to as the ‘States-General’ and the Dutch Cabinet, which is appointed by the Queen, is dependent for its survival on enjoying the confidence of the simple majority in the States-General. According to most Dutch observers the system could be described as one of ‘limited dualism’ (Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 121).\(^7^1\) Andeweg and Irwin (2002: 133) argued that the Dutch Parliament ‘is less an institution confronting other institutions and more an arena in which political parties try to influence public policy’. The National Parliament is elected every four years, just like the provincial and municipal councils.

The three main levels of government (central, provincial and municipal) have their own responsibilities, with the formulation of legislation and supervision in the hands of the central government. There are 415 municipalities (as of January 2012).\(^7^2\)

---

\(^6^9\) Final seminar LOGO East programme Turkey, Ankara, January 2010.

\(^7^0\) UMT has been active in coordinating exchange programmes with Dutch, Swedish and Spanish local governments.

\(^7^1\) There is some discussion whether the relationship between the Crown and the States-General is ‘monistic’ (a situation with no clear distinction between Parliament and cabinet) or ‘dualistic’ (a situation in which government and Parliament have distinctive roles and responsibilities).

\(^7^2\) See CBS [http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/methoden/classificaties/overzicht/gemeentelijke-indeling/2012/default.htm](http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/methoden/classificaties/overzicht/gemeentelijke-indeling/2012/default.htm), last accessed 1 august 2012. As will be discussed elsewhere, the number of municipalities is declining with the merging of small municipalities that are seen to lack the capacity for implementing modern local government (Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 163).
and 12 provinces. The Association of Dutch Local Governments (VNG), of which all municipalities are voluntary members, is the most important lobby instrument for Dutch municipalities. In contrast to Morocco and Turkey, the governance type can be called ‘co-governance’, whereby the three levels of government (national, provincial and local) function in cooperation with each other rather than in a hierarchical relation. Local government is the most important level, which is visible within the governance system (Hendriks and Tops 2003). The provinces fulfil an intermediary role between local and national authorities, and their impact in policymaking is limited, with the exception of a few policy fields (such as transport infrastructure and environmental protection) (Nomden 1999, in Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 161).

At the local government level the municipal council consists of groups or ‘fractions’ of elected representatives (council members) of different political parties, who supervise the municipal executives. The mayor, appointed by the Crown, is both chairman of the municipal council and the executive. Together with a group of aldermen the mayor forms the board of mayor and aldermen (BMA). In 2002, a new Local Government Act was introduced which put the council and executive at a larger distance from each other, in order to make a clear distinction between the two bodies. In addition, more powers were assigned to the BMA, giving it primacy in all executive matters. In the new local government act the council concentrates on its legislative functions, and on the formulation of general principles and guidelines to steer and control the political executives (Denters et al. 2003).

The Netherlands is a high-income country with one of the highest human development index numbers in the world: 0.910 in 2011. (The Netherlands is number three on the list, just after Norway and Australia). Gross National Income per capita is USD 36,402. However, the country had a negative economic growth (economic contraction) of 0.75% of the GDP for 2012. It is expected that in the year 2013 the economic contraction will be 1%, followed by a recovery of 1% growth in 2014 (CPB 2013).

4.4.2. Decentralization
Since 1982 it has been official policy of Dutch governments to decentralize tasks that were previously performed at higher levels of governments. Compared to Turkey and Morocco, Dutch municipalities have a very broad mandate. The role of local governments is both defined in terms of ‘autonomy’, whereby municipalities are autonomous with regard to ‘municipal affairs’ (as determined by the national government) and in terms of ‘co-governance’, referring here to the tasks of local governments in implementing national legislation. Since the early 1980s, the central government has been transferring tasks to local governments. Nevertheless, Dutch municipalities are still heavily tied to the central government as the bulk of municipal

revenue consists of subsidies and grants from the central government (Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 167; Hoetjes 2009). Two major forms can be distinguished: general grants and earmarked funds. The earmarked funds cover competencies regarding social services, primary education and urban regeneration, and cannot be reallocated (VNG 2008: 53).

Centralization developments
Interestingly the process of decentralization in the Netherlands is combined with a process of centralization at the local and regional level to increase economies of scale. At the local level, municipalities cooperate with their neighbouring municipalities in order to cope with newly decentralized tasks. Also some small municipalities have been joined together, resulting in a decline of the total number of municipalities. Andeweg and Irwin (2002: 175) argued that inter-municipal cooperation has actually formed a new layer of government between municipalities and provinces. At the regional level, provinces are joining forces in regions (landsdelen) as they are too small from a European perspective: not comparable to a German state (land) or a Belgian region (gewest/région) (Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 162). The ‘inter-municipal regions’ or ‘landsdelen’ are not clearly defined or officially recognized.

4.4.3. Local governments and civil society
Compared to Morocco and Turkey, civil society in the Netherlands has been organized for a long time. Participation of citizens in local governance is important and local governments fulfil an important role in coordinating the engagement of citizens in local governance processes. In urban planning, for instance, citizens have the legal right to object to government/municipal plans, and procedures are in place to assess these objections. In many projects citizens are involved in ‘interactive decision-making’ processes (VNG 2008). To obtain a better understanding of the contemporary role of civil society in relation to local governments in the Netherlands it is crucial to look at its development. Civil society has long been tightly organized in social groups or subcultures, mainly along religious divisions. These subcultures are known as zuilen (pillars), and the segmentation of Dutch society into these subcultures as verzuilings (pillarization) (Lijphart 1992; Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 23). These groups were connected to political parties, but they also structured other aspects of life, like the labour union or school one belonged to (Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 22-23).

During the second half of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the role of ideology or religion declined, and new political parties not organized along the old ‘pillars’ emerged. In a relatively short period of time the Netherlands changed from being one of the more religious societies in Europe to a country with the lowest percentage of religious adherents (SCP 2000: 133). At the same time both internal and external forces connected to the old pillars weakened and overall membership in organizations related to the pillars declined (Andeweg and Irwin 2002). This process, also known as ‘depillarization’, did not mean that civil society became less fragmented.
On the contrary, fragmentation increased. While membership in organizations related to the old pillars declined, citizens became affiliated with other kinds of organizations. The composition of Dutch society also changed due to immigration. During the course of several decades (1960s–1980s), there was a large influx of mostly labour immigrants from Turkey and Morocco as well as immigrants from the former colony of Suriname. The main immigrant groups established numerous organizations. Many Turkish organizations are organized along different schools of Turkish Islam, which are highly interlinked. Compared to the Turkish migrant population, there are fewer Moroccan organizations, which are also less organized in networks at the national level (Van Heelsum 2004).

The role of the state in relation to civil society

The national government has played an important role in relation to civil society organizations. Whereas the Dutch government initially just offered space for civil society actors to perform their duties, government and civil society slowly became more connected to each other. Central government started to become more involved in issues that were at first considered a task for civic actors (like taking care of the poor). This also implied financial involvement of central government and the formulation of regulations for civic actors. As a result, civil society became more organized but also more dependent on government. As a result of the economic slowdown and the budget cuts under Prime Minister Rutte’s Government (2010–2012), there were reductions in the influence of local governments and also cuts in the financial contributions to civil society groups. In 2011, the Dutch government also ended the policies that paid specific attention to particular migrant or ethnic groups (Ministerie BZK 2011). This development is not unique to the Netherlands. In other Western European countries the state is gradually beginning to withdraw in certain sectors, leaving more to its citizens. ‘Active citizenship’ has been placed high on the agenda. Citizens in the Netherlands are indeed increasingly organizing themselves because the state is pulling out, and/or because they are not satisfied with the quality of the provided services (Van der Berg et al. 2011; Tonkens 2008). The literature has outlined several risks of these policies, such as the ‘Big Society’ in UK. The main concern is that these policies can enlarge differences and inequalities in societies, since large segments of the citizenry are not used to organizing themselves (Kinsby 2010).

Privatization

The role of local governments is also changing as a result of policies that promoted outsourcing tasks to private organizations. Internationally, the Netherlands is seen as a ‘good’ example of the reform process known as ‘new public management’ (Kickert 2003: 378). Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, important reform processes have taken place,

---

74 It must be mentioned that civil society was still pluriform, including many voluntary organizations (Lelieveldt 1999).

75 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
increasing the role of private organizations in the process of service delivery. Government bodies were privatized and private organizations were contracted under PPPs, focusing on specific services (e.g. waste and water management). Increasing the market orientation in the public sector was believed to lead to greater cost efficiency for governments at all levels (local, regional and national). However, the increased role of the private sector in governance arrangements is a hotly debated topic and has not only had positive effects. As Kickert (2003) pointed out, several tragic events in 2000—a fireworks explosion in the municipality of Enschede and a New Years’ Eve fire at a bar in the municipality of Volendam—led to increased calls for more state control.

4.4.4. Dealing with diversity
As mentioned before, dealing with diversity counts among the most challenging policy issues in the Netherlands. Many local governments struggle to find ways to engage all the inhabitants of their municipalities and address problematic aspects related to the integration of migrants. Haus and Heinelt (2005: 13-14) even use the strong term ‘government failure’ when referring to the inability of local governments to deal effectively with complex integration issues and coordinate social interactions today.

The search for effective ways to deal with diversity is also reflected in the discourse. Dutch policy with regard to settled migrants and their descendants was initially called minority policy, later on replaced by allochtonen (literally meaning non-natives) policy (WRR 1989) (although the government never officially adopted the term). In the 1990s, the term ‘integration policy’ was favoured, mainly to indicate a greater degree of tolerance and respect to ethno-cultural differences (Kruyt and Niessen 1997, in Vemeulen and Penninx 2000). The primary goal of policies towards integration in the Netherlands has been to improve the socio-economic position of disadvantaged ethnic minorities. Other important elements are full and equal participation in the institutions of society, fostering mutual acceptance and combating discrimination. The debate whether migrants should assimilate or integrate, while remaining closely linked to their own culture and religion, is still ongoing today. The 2010 elections clearly indicated a swing in policy circles and public discourse back to assimilation and cultural adaptation.

Role of religion
Both Turkey and Morocco are predominantly Islamic countries, and for most migrants living in the Netherlands today religion is an important aspect of their culture and identity. The influence of Islam on the integration of migrants in Dutch society has become one of the most important and influential topics on the political agenda in the Netherlands (Scheffer 2007). Events, like 9/11 (the 11 September 2001 attacks on the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Center) and the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a Muslim fundamentalist, have fostered a perception in the Netherlands of Islam as closely connected to violence and terrorism. Moreover, the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh showed the interconnectivity of events between faraway
geographical places. The murder happened within the territory of the Netherlands but it was not only a national process. As Ian Buruma wrote, 'Theo van Gogh was a Dutchman and was killed by a Dutchman and yet this is not a Dutch tale but a dramatic event that was transported out of the Middle-East to the heart of Europe' (quoted in Scheffer 2007: 186).

**Different dynamics at national and local level**

As described earlier in this section, in 2011 the Dutch government ended the policies that paid specific attention to particular migrant or ethnic groups. The new national policies had an important impact on local government formulation of local level policies. Combined with general budget cuts, it effectively meant the end of many specific programmes aimed at stimulating the integration of particular groups. In 2012, two Dutch professors (Han Entzinger and Paul Scheffer), who both dedicated most of their work on issues related to integration and social cohesion, wrote a joint report on integration in Rotterdam and Amsterdam (commissioned by the two municipalities). Based on their results, they supported the end of general integration policies and supported policies focusing on good urban policies for all citizens. However, they did make a plea for establishing policies that would target the specific problems that strongly affect particular migrant groups. These include health problems among the Turkish population and high youth criminality in the Moroccan community (Gemeente Rotterdam and Gemeente Amsterdam 2012). Although local governments are dependent on central government, they can still stretch the boundaries of how national policies are implemented at the local level, perhaps keeping some of the specific target group policies. Penninx already wrote in 2005 about the different dynamics at national and local level:

> It is at this local level that integration takes place, and where policies have to be implemented. What we see increasingly is resistance to the new national policies at that local level, coming both from local government, but increasingly also from civil society at large. In my view the key for future policies and its implementation lies at the local level. It is there that practical solutions have to be found for difficult and long-term integration processes (11).

Also Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) showed that the framing of problems related to integration at the local level led to a more accommodative approach to migrant integration, compared to national policies.

### 4.4.5. Transnational city networks

The first chapter described Dutch national policies towards city-to-city cooperation and how these policies have changed over time. According to Hoetjes (2009: 158), generally there is a willingness at the central government level to involve municipalities in policymaking, both individually and through the Association of Netherlands municipalities ‘when and where this is politically useful within national foreign policy’. As described in chapter 1, unlike other Western European countries—for example, the
limited role of municipalities in Germany (see Nitschke et al. 2009)—Dutch municipalities are very much ‘part of the scene’ (Hoetjes 2009).

Issues related to international cooperation are usually discussed within the municipal council, which has the right to establish—and also to adjust or end—international contacts. Even though Dutch municipalities have broad mandates and substantial budgets as well as the freedom to engage in international cooperation, public and political support for international cooperation at the local level is fragile as it is not considered a core local government competence. Working internationally is thus a balancing act for most local governments. In the linkages with migrant source countries international relation policies are connected to objectives of the Dutch municipality (Van Ewijk 2007). Moreover, the existence of support programmes from which to secure support was an important trigger for Dutch municipalities to engage in international exchange programmes, because it enabled them to work internationally with limited use of their own financial resources. The international branch of the Dutch Local Government Associations (VNG International) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs have played an important role in supporting the exchanges in the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish municipal partnerships. The general budget cuts and the budget cuts on international cooperation of the Rutte I (2010–2012) and the current Rutte II cabinets have had an important impact on the opportunity and willingness of actors at the local level to engage in international cooperation.

4.5. Comparing the mandates of Moroccan, Turkish and Dutch local governments

Morocco, Turkey and the Netherlands have different constitutional frameworks, different histories and are in a different stage in decentralization processes. These differences strongly impact the roles of local governments in the international exchange programme. Both Morocco and Turkey are in a process of decentralization, but as government functions are still quite centralized the mandate of local governments is rather limited (Wunsch 2001; Jari 2010; Sozen and Shaw 2002; Ertugal 2010). There are some similarities in the roles of local governments in Morocco and Turkey, but also some important differences. Morocco’s decentralization form can be labelled as deconcentration: Moroccan local governments can exercise a number of legislative and administrative tasks, but the central government limits the resources allotted to the local level (Jari 2010). Turkey has more characteristics of devolution, whereby responsibilities, financial resources and decision-making power is transferred to local governments (UCLG 2008). However, local governments are still strongly tied to higher government levels through municipal legislation (Göymen 2007).

A shared characteristic of Morocco and Turkey is the existence of two parallel governance structures at the local level: on the one hand, the municipality headed by the mayor as the local executive (Turkey) and the Collegiate in Morocco (also known as
and, on the other hand, central government structures at the local level—with the Ministry of the Interior as the most prominent body. In Morocco these officials are appointed by the King and called deconcentrees. In Turkey the local level is governed by provincial administrators (Kaymakam) headed by centrally appointed governors. The municipal tasks are mainly related to infrastructure (like urban planning, housing, water and waste management), while the national government body is responsible for health, education and social affairs. In Morocco the municipalities deal with a wide range of affairs, including social affairs and sports, even though their mandate and resources are limited (UCLG 2000).

Other common features include the fact that in both countries the national government has dominated civil society for a long time and the momentum of recent reform processes, which are giving civil society actors more room to act. This also implies that local governments are slowly starting to work together with other actors within their municipalities, which increases the importance of horizontal governance arrangements.

Compared to Morocco and Turkey, local governments in the Netherlands have a significantly broader mandate and more financial resources, giving them more space to develop their own policies for engaging with various partners within their locality (Andeweg and Irwin 2002). However, as part of the financial resource allocated to local governments is earmarked by central government, the decision-making power of local governments regarding the dispersal of these funds is limited. Also, Dutch local governments, like in other Western European countries, face different challenges. While service delivery in terms of providing basic services (e.g. waste and water management) is generally well addressed, one of the main challenges is dealing with the increased diversity within their constituencies. Stimulating social cohesion and participation of different groups within society is one of their main concerns. The economic slowdown, which started in 2007, has seriously impacted the budget allocations by the central government and posed a significant challenge for local governments, forcing them to economize. Also government bodies are taking a step back and leaving more to citizen initiatives.

There are no formal policies stimulating or restricting international cooperation at the local level in Morocco, Turkey and the Netherlands. In Morocco and Turkey local governments have no or a very limited budget for international relations. Although Dutch municipalities have broader mandates and bigger budgets, public and political support for international cooperation at the local level is fragile and international cooperation is a balancing act. As described before, the main motivation for Dutch municipalities to link up with local governments in Morocco and Turkey is directly related to the composition of their populations, as a large portion of these citizens have their roots in Morocco and Turkey.

Both Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish municipal partnerships have made use of support programmes. Support for Dutch-Moroccan partnerships is part of the EU policy on promoting stability in ‘Europe’s new neighbouring countries’. Support to
Turkey is linked to the country’s EU candidate status and is connected to the governance reform processes necessary for meeting EU membership criteria. Table 4.1 presents an overview of the forms of decentralization and the roles of local governments.

Table 4.1 Forms of decentralization and roles of local governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>the Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Form of decentralization</strong></td>
<td>• Deconcentration</td>
<td>• Between deconcentration and devolution</td>
<td>• Devolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mandate of local governments</strong></td>
<td>• Limited</td>
<td>• Moderate and increasing</td>
<td>• Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Still strongly tied to national government policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial resources of local governments</strong></td>
<td>• Limited</td>
<td>• Moderate and increasing</td>
<td>• Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil society in relation to local government</strong></td>
<td>• Strong increase in establishment CBOs and NGOs • Emerging partnerships</td>
<td>• Civil society traditionally not strongly organized • Spaces opening up</td>
<td>• Tradition of strong organized civil society • Working in partnerships is well established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interfaces local government–citizens</strong></td>
<td>• Spaces opening • Strong influence of central government bodies</td>
<td>• Spaces opening up</td>
<td>• Possible strong interfaces • Challenges in diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International cooperation</strong></td>
<td>• Limited capacity and financial resources to engage in international exchange processes • Weak LGA</td>
<td>• Officially approval needed by central government to establish linkages and to dedicate a budget line for international relations • LGA has a coordinating role</td>
<td>• Freedom to establish linkages and to dedicate a budget line for international relations • Strong supporting LGA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6. Support programmes

The Netherlands is among the few countries that have set up support programmes for municipal international cooperation. It has also allocated a relatively large budget (compared to other OECD countries) to support these objectives (see also chapter 1). Several support programmes (implemented through multilateral, bilateral channels and NGOs) have focused on governance processes as well as on democratization in Morocco and Turkey. For cooperation with Turkey, Dutch municipalities could draw on the LOGO East programme, and for cooperation with Morocco several municipalities made use of the MATRA programme. The MATRA programme also includes exchange programme between Dutch and Moroccan colleagues or peers, for example, the exchanges between judges and lawyers.

76 Both programmes were funded by the Dutch Ministry of...
Foreign Affairs. The support programmes aimed at strengthening local governance processes in Morocco and Turkey, and have had an important impact on the kind of exchanges (including the themes addressed and the actors involved) in city-to-city partnerships, especially in the initial phase (Van Ewijk 2012). This will be further discussed in the next chapters.

4.6.1. The LOGO East programme: Dutch-Turkish cooperation

Between 2005 and 2010, partnerships between Dutch and Turkish municipalities were supported by the LOGO East programme (implemented by VNG International and financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands). The programme specifically focused on public service delivery in the following countries in Central and Eastern Europe: Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro. Turkey was also included due to its candidate country status. The programme had two phases: LOGO East I (2005–2007) and LOGO East II (2007–2010). The programme built on the already existing local government twinning networks, but also aimed at increasing the total number of twinning cooperation. The themes covered in partnerships between Dutch and Turkish local governments included waste management, setting up a complaint desk for citizens, fire safety and disaster management, cultural heritage preservation, care for psychiatric patients, CO₂ reduction and energy efficiency. Up to EUR 70,000 could be granted per municipal partnership per project period (one and a half to two years).

4.6.2. The MATRA programme: Dutch-Moroccan partnerships

Most Dutch-Moroccan partnerships have received support through the MATRA programme. MATRA stand for ‘societal transformation’ (abbreviation of the Dutch terms MAatschappelijke TRAnsformatie). The programme was initiated in 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and initially aimed at promoting the construction and strengthening of civil society in the Central and Eastern European countries. In 2006, it was decided to extend the MATRA programme to the ‘new neighbours of Europe’, including all countries around the Mediterranean Sea (Ministerie BZK 2009). In the period 2006–2010, a special MATRA programme focusing on youth participation and good governance in Morocco was introduced, and several municipal partnerships made use of this support. Another MATRA programme focused on waste management. An

---

77 The LOGO East and a similar programme focussing on a select number of countries in the Global South (the LOGO South programme) have both expired. Another programme focusing on a select number of countries in the Global South (the Local Government Capacity Programme) was introduced at the beginning of 2011.

78 Contrary to the LOGO South programme, which has a few central themes per country, the LOGO East programme offered more freedom to address various themes.

79 Morocco is not a ‘partner country’ as defined in the development cooperation policy of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was not included as a country in the LOGO South programme.

80 A related programme was the ‘Capacity building for Moroccan Local Authorities on Waste Management Issues’ of the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. The programme was
individual grant of the MATRA programme was also awarded to combat domestic violence, administered under the partnership of the Health Department of the Municipality of Rotterdam (GGD) and an NGO in Casablanca.

4.6.3. Other support programmes

There are numerous other support and cooperation programmes between the Netherlands and Morocco/Turkey. Some EU programmes focus on Morocco and Turkey as neighbouring countries of the European Union. In others, especially regarding cooperation with Morocco, ‘development cooperation’ has a more prominent role. Several funds and programmes on the European and national levels are also open for Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish municipal partnerships and civil society organizations. Some civil society initiatives operating under the umbrella of municipal partnerships made use of a programme called MarokGO of the Marokkofonds, a Dutch NGO.

The celebration of 400 years of relations between the Netherlands and Morocco in 2005 and the celebration of 400 years of relations between the Netherlands and Turkey in 2012 provided an important impetus to the Dutch-Moroccan and the Dutch-Turkish partnerships. Funds were made available by the national government to NGOs at the local level, and many municipalities have taken up this opportunity to coordinate and organize events, mostly related to cultural exchanges. VNG International has played an important role in focusing some of the activities between Dutch and Moroccan local governments on ‘good governance’. A programme to involve Moroccan administrators in the Dutch 2006 general elections was part of the 400 years celebration.

Lastly, it should be emphasized that local governments in Morocco and Turkey have several other possibilities for securing support, including cooperation with other Western European municipalities. For instance, many Moroccan municipalities

implemented in cooperation with VNG International (April 2009–October 2010). Four Moroccan municipalities in the north of Morocco (Nader, Al Hoceima, Berkane and Aknoul) were involved. The programme included workshops with Dutch experts (the waste management company VAR, a Dutch consultant based in Al Hoceima, and a coordinator from the ministry). However, as it did not make use of the established city-to-city linkages, this programme was not included in the research.

Another programme that builds on C2C partnerships is the Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue (CIUDAD) programme (2009–2013). The programme is implemented by VNG International in cooperation with the German international cooperation organization GTZ, the Italian consultancy JCP and the Dutch knowledge institution IHS. The programme is not incorporated in this research as it does not include Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish municipal partnerships. The overall objective of the CIUDAD programme is ‘to promote mutual understanding, dialogue and cooperation between local actors in the EU and in the partner countries of the Neighbourhood region through the provision of capacity building for the modernization and strengthening of local and regional government’. With a EUR 14 million budget, financed by the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the programme specifically focuses on environmental sustainability and energy efficiency, sustainable economic development and reduction of social disparities and good governance and sustainable urban development planning (http://www.ciudad-programme.eu/about.php?lang=1).
cooperate with French municipalities, and many Turkish municipalities cooperate with Swedish and Spanish municipalities. The next chapter will introduce the case studies along with the relevant institutional and individual actors, and discuss the influence of the mentioned support programmes.

4.7. Conclusion

There is a clear difference between Morocco, Turkey and the Netherlands in the mandates, roles and financial resources of their local governments. Knowledge about roles, mandate and resources of local governments is relevant in order to understand their opportunities and competencies for (1) formulating and implementing new policies aimed at strengthening local governments and local governance processes; (2) establishing inter-municipal partnerships (relations between local governments and civil society actors); and (3) engaging in international relations and cooperating with peer local governments (including their capacity to contribute complementary resources).

Whereas Moroccan local governments have narrow mandates and limited budgets, local governments in the Netherlands have broad mandates and large budgets. Morocco’s decentralization effort can be categorized as deconcentration, while the Netherlands has all the characteristics of devolution. Turkey holds a position somewhere in-between and is moving towards devolution. Interestingly, in both Morocco and Turkey there are parallel governing systems at the local level—officials appointed by the central government and locally elected officials—making the coordination of activities more complicated. Despite the different stages of decentralization in Morocco, Turkey and the Netherlands, all local governments face the challenge of working with a more active and engaged civil society. While in all three counties local governments have a certain degree of freedom to establish international relations, they are all limited by different constraints. Moroccan and Turkish municipalities have virtually no budget to spend on international exchanges. Turkish municipalities have more manoeuvring space, but still have rather limited mandates. Dutch local governments are free to dedicate a small budget to international cooperation; however, the public and political support for city-to-city cooperation is fragile. The support programmes LOGO East (for Dutch-Turkish municipal partnerships) and MATRA (for Dutch-Moroccan municipal partnerships) have had an important impact on cooperation between the municipalities.