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Embodied Identity in Werewolf Films of the 1980s

Julius Koetsier & Charles Forceville

Abstract

The Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) fathered by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson claims that human beings do not just use metaphor in language, but actually think metaphorically. An important tenet in the theory is that abstract concepts are systematically understood in terms of concrete phenomena. These latter are characterized by being accessed via sensory perception and bodily movement. For this reason, CMT is also known as a theory of “embodied cognition.” In order to further investigate the ramifications of the theory and its consequences, it is crucial that conceptual metaphors are examined not just in purely verbal discourses, but also in multimodal ones, such as films. In this paper, we argue that the genre of werewolf films, a highly “embodied” film genre, draws systematically on a conceptual metaphor that can be verbalized as Deviant identity is transformed body. We discuss five specimens of the genre, showing that each film emphasizes different aspects of the “deviant identity.” The findings will benefit both (werewolf) film theory and conceptual metaphor theory.

Résumé

La Théorie des Métaphores Conceptuelles (TMC) de George Lakoff et Mark Johnson prétend que les êtres humains utilisent des métaphores non seulement pour le langage, mais qu’ils pensent métaphoriquement. Un principe important de cette théorie est le suivant : des concepts abstraits sont compris systématiquement en termes de phénomènes concrets. Ces derniers sont présents par la perception sensorielle et le mouvement du corps. Pour cette raison-là, TMC est connue comme une théorie de « embodied cognition ». Pour examiner en détail les implications de cette théorie et de ses conséquences, il importe d’examiner les métaphores conceptuelles non seulement dans des discours tout à fait verbaux, mais aussi dans des cas multimodaux comme des films. Le présent article prétend que le genre cinématographique des loups-garou, un genre très « incarné », s’appuie systématiquement sur une métaphore conceptuelle que l’on peut nommer ainsi : Identité déviante est un corps transformé. Nous analysons cinq exemples de ce genre pour montrer que chaque film accentue des aspects différents de l’identité déviante. Nos résultats sont pertinents non seulement pour la théorie du cinéma, mais aussi pour la TMC.

Keywords

Embodied cognition, Conceptual metaphor theory, Werewolf films, Identity.

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Introduction

The conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) proposed by Lakoff and Johnson and further developed by many others (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson *Metaphors; Embodied Mind*; Lakoff; Johnson; Gibbs; Kövecses) discusses metaphor as “embodied.” One of the theory’s basic claims is that conceptual metaphors typically structure abstract target domains in terms of concrete source domains. “Concrete domains” are domains that pertain to motor functions and sensory perception (Forceville *Varda* 282). Human beings, that is, draw on “physical” knowledge (the knowledge they have acquired, ontogenetically and phylogenetically, with respect to moving through space and thanks to their sensory organs) to understand, or structure, abstract phenomena (e.g., “love,” “time,” “identity”). There is thus, according to this view, a “super”-metaphor MIND IS BODY (Lakoff & Johnson *Embodied Mind* 235).

In order to test the implications of the Lakoffian claim that we “think metaphorically” (Lakoff & Turner 51) – or, if this should be necessary, to criticize it – it is crucial to extend the examination of conceptual metaphors in media that do not only draw on language. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the argument in favour of the conceptual status of metaphor by discussing only verbal manifestations may be vulnerable to the criticism that the distinction between conceptual metaphors and verbal metaphors is an artificial one; since the conceptual level is rendered in language (typically: in small capitals) no less than the verbal manifestations themselves, skeptics might say there is only one level, not two. In the second place, investigating its (audio)visual manifestations may reveal dimensions of metaphor that do not surface in its verbal varieties (see e.g., Forceville *Advertisements; Advertising; Child; Journey; Varda; Forceville & Jeulink; Fahlenbrach *Embodied Spaces; Metaphern*; Eggertsson and Forceville; Coëgnarts and Kravanja; see also Carroll *Metaphor*). After all, for the creation of metaphors film can draw on the visual, verbal, sonic, musical and gestural modes/modalities (for discussion of what counts as a mode/modality, see Forceville *Framework; TV Commercials*).

Film is the medium *par excellence* to examine non-verbal and multimodal metaphors, both creative and structural ones (see Forceville *Advertisements; Advertising; Child; Journey; Varda; Forceville & Jeulink; Fahlenbrach *Embodied Spaces; Metaphern*; Eggertsson and Forceville; Coëgnarts and Kravanja; see also Carroll *Metaphor*). After all, for the creation of metaphors film can draw on the visual, verbal, sonic, musical and gestural modes/modalities (for discussion of what counts as a mode/modality, see Forceville *Framework; TV Commercials*).

In this paper, we will examine American werewolf films from the 1980s, a decade rich in such films, to show that the central transformations that give the genre its name suggest metaphorical interpretations. Our argument is that werewolf films exploit the notion that we tend to associate “identity” very much with the body. While what characterizes werewolf films more than anything else obviously is a more or less spectacular transformation from human being into wolf and vice versa, we claim that this is only the most embodied aspect of what is really a mental transformation: we propose that what makes the genre interesting is that the films exemplify variations of a conceptual metaphor that could be phrased as DEVIANT IDENTITY IS TRANSFORMED BODY. This highly embodied metaphor, however, gives rise to different meanings in different films.

In the following sections, we will first briefly survey how the notion of “transformation” is discussed with reference to the genre of the horror film. Subsequently, we analyse five werewolf films in light of the DEVIANT IDENTITY IS TRANSFORMED BODY metaphor, taking into account sources from both metaphor and werewolf film scholarship. In our last section we will draw some conclusions.
Transformations in the horror film genre

Paul Wells considers most monsters in modern horror cinema to be metaphors for certain threats to “the prevailing paradigms and consensual orthodoxies of everyday life” (9). They disturb the order and question our established ideas about the value and meaning of what it is to be human. In terms of CMT terminology, monsters are the source domain in a metaphor that can be verbalized as **THREATS TO ESTABLISHED IDEAS AND VALUES OF SOCIETY ARE MONSTERS.** Wells discusses the antagonists that the animal kingdom has presented to the horror genre. He claims that the explanation for the fact that these creatures make such popular monsters lies in the dichotomy between civilized, human society and the primordial world, which coexist but can never become one. We use animals as providers of all sorts of products, but when they escape our control, when they are no longer our servants, they become threatening, turning into monsters (13). Another fear that Wells discusses that is highly relevant for transformation horror is the fear for other people: most successful horror texts work because the reader or viewer has a certain emotional engagement with the characters and is afraid of what might happen to them (15). In the case of animal transformation horror, antagonist and protagonist are frequently the same creature: it is often a major character who turns into the monster. So not only do we have a creature that is fearful because it breaks the rules of civilisation, we also face the frightening thought that this creature was once itself a part of civilisation. When discussing animal horror, Wells states that this subgenre often prompts “a deeper recognition of the required consensus and constraint needed to achieve even the most basic level of civilisation” (13). Although he does not mention transformation horror in this context, this seems to be true for this subgenre more than any other: it is civilised humans themselves who turn out to be capable of switching to the other side, becoming part of the primordial world that disrupts order, and that civilisation therefore tries to suppress.

Robin Wood also links the horror genre to repression, distinguishing between basic repression, the mechanism which tries to keep animal instincts and urges under control, and surplus repression, a given culture’s censorship of certain minorities, alternative opinions and sexual preferences (25). In the case of surplus repression, what is being subdued is what in psychoanalysis is called “the Other”: that which society cannot accept and therefore must suppress or destroy (27). Woods claims that central to the horror genre is the “dramatization of the dual concept of the repressed/Other, in the figure of the Monster” (28). In other words, the monster metaphorically represents that which society cannot accommodate.

Without using psychoanalytical terminology, Jason Zinoman appears to agree with Wood, stating that almost every monster in the modern horror film is something uncanny and abnormal (114). He quotes horror director Guillermo del Toro singing the praise of H. P. Lovecraft, who, according to Del Toro, often describes his monsters as “unnamable” (115): so different from everything we understand that they cannot be captured in language.

Noël Carroll points out that part of the reason for people’s fascination with fictional monsters is the fact that, were we to encounter a typical horror monster in real life, we would not know how to deal with it, as it defies our notions of what is possible and what is not (Horror 40). Carroll does not see the monster as a representation of the repressed, but he agrees with Wood, Wells and Zinoman that
part of the reason that monsters effectively scare people is the fact that they do not “fit in” our world. In line with this view, Anne Bartsch claims that what monster films of the vampire, werewolf and zombie variety have in common is that their genre-typical transformations “symbolize the unleashing of violent and sexual impulses and the contagious spreading of moral corruption throughout society” (Bartsch 255).

Kim Newman cites the revolt of nature as an important theme of the modern horror film. His use of the word “revolt” suggests that certain urges had been suppressed before and, indeed, Newman detects similar mechanisms to the ones Wells described in his discussion of monsters. Not even using the word metaphor, Newman describes monsters as standing in for something: the rats that often populate animal horror films are “standing in for all the repressed, filthy, forgotten and despised elements we have tried to squash from our lives” (89). Werewolf films can be seen as a subgenre within revolt-of-nature films: a variety in which the revolt, disturbingly, takes place in the human person him/herself. Such films have often been described as containing the “beast within” metaphor: the werewolf as a representation of the animal urges that society requires us to suppress (362). Steven Jay Schneider similarly argues that the transformations of shape-shifters (of which he considers werewolves a subcategory) “do not so much cause the existence of a physical double as manifest the existence of a mental one” (Schneider Horror 112).

What makes the ideas on the subject of monsters discussed above relevant for the study of werewolf films is that they all concentrate on the fundamental difference between the monster and the human. Whatever the monster is, its effectiveness as a source of fear seems to emanate from the fact that it represents what humans are not, or rather, what humans would not like to see themselves as. This raises important questions about the image that werewolf films offer us of a human being turning into a monster: if the monster is typically something that cannot be human, then what does it mean if a human becomes a monster? In the next section, we will analyze five werewolf films in some detail, showing how in each case the physical transformation from human into monster – an “embodied” process par excellence – invites us to construe metaphors that are variations of the metaphor DEVIANT IDENTITY IS TRANSFORMED BODY.

Case studies

An American Werewolf in London (John Landis, USA 1981)

The title An American Werewolf in London immediately draws attention to one of the most important subjects of the film: difference. It emphasizes that we are not just watching a werewolf, we are watching a werewolf in a different country than the one he hails from. Indeed, much of the film concentrates on pointing out that the main character, David Kessler, an American vacationing in England, is confronted with a very different culture than the one he is used to.

Early in the film, David and his friend Jack reluctantly enter the stereotypically English pub “The Slaughtered Lamb,” located in a stereotypically English rural village. An awkward silence falls the moment the two tourists step in: people are not used to strangers around here. One patron calls the
John Wayne film *The Alamo* (1960) “bloody awful” and loudly tells a joke ridiculing “the Yanks,” to the amusement of everyone in the pub except David and Jack. These first ten minutes make crystal clear that David and Jack do not belong here.

On their way back from the pub, the two get attacked by a werewolf that kills Jack and bites David. This results in David himself turning into a werewolf at the next full moon and going on a killing spree in London. After realizing what he has done, David attempts to get himself arrested before he changes again. He uses his non-English-ness to offend a police officer, insulting English culture: “Queen Elizabeth is a man! Prince Charles is a faggot! Winston Churchill was full of shit! Shakespeare was French!” David wants to establish his identity as that of a threat to the values of English society. The officer, however, does not realize how dangerous David truly is and refuses to arrest him. When night falls, David transforms again and rampages through the city, starting in London’s famous Eros Cinema and eventually causing a traffic accident involving a typically English red double decker bus. We see his outsider-identity embodied in the shape of a monster that attacks symbols of a culture he does not belong in. Eventually, David is shot dead by police officers and returns to his human form: it takes the authority figures of this society to neutralize the threat to their culture. The central metaphor here could be verbalized as FOREIGNNESS IS TRANSFORMED BODY.

*The Howling* (Joe Dante, USA 1982)

Another famous werewolf film of the 1980s is *The Howling*, which presents one of its central metaphors in the opening scene. We see a psychiatrist being interviewed on a talk show, stating:

Repression is the father of neurosis. Of self-hatred. Now, stress results when we fight against our impulses. We’ve all heard people talk about animal magnetism. The natural man, the noble savage. As if we’d lost something valuable in our long evolution into civilised human beings. Now, there’s a good reason for this. Man is a combination of the learned and the instinctive. Of the sophisticated and the primitive. We should never try to deny the beast, the animal within us.

Given the subject of the film, this monologue can already lead us to the assumption that the “beast-within” metaphor described by Newman will be literalized in the shape of werewolves.

Indeed, immediately after the scene of the interview we meet our first werewolf: a rapist who lurks in an erotic-video store and invites a young woman named Karen into a booth. He makes her watch footage of a girl being raped, telling her that “she doesn’t feel anything. None of them do. They’re not real, the people here, they’re dead. They can never be like me.” He then transforms into a wolf-man and assaults Karen, after which he is shot dead by police officers hearing her scream. With the context provided by the psychiatrist’s explanation, we can easily construe a metaphor that can be verbalized as PEOPLE WHO LET THEIR ANIMAL URGES RUN FREE ARE WEREWOLVES. After this traumatic experience, Karen visits her therapist, the psychiatrist from the opening scene, who recommends her and her husband Bill to come with him to the Colony, a secluded resort in the woods where he sends “very special patients.” All these patients and the therapist himself, however, turn out to be werewolves who can
shapeshift at will. The therapist apparently started the Colony in order to help werewolves accept their “gift,” as he calls it, and he plans to persuade Karen to join them. He wants werewolves to be able to coexist peacefully with normal people, controlling their transformations and fitting in with society. An old Colony member disagrees: “You can’t tame what’s meant to be wild, doc. It ain’t natural.”

Apart from the PEOPLE WHO LET THEIR ANIMAL URGES RUN FREE ARE WEREWOLVES metaphor being repeated, the way this scene shows werewolves as a separate community struggling to fit in with society also conveys that MINORITIES ARE WEREWOLVES. As in An American Werewolf in London, we see those who are different represented as monsters, but in The Howling, they are not tourists: they intend to stay. This, however, is impossible, as they deviate so fundamentally from the norm. The solution is not very reassuring: all the werewolves burn to death in the film’s climax.

**Cat People (Paul Schrader, USA 1982)**

In Cat People, the title characters are members of a race of people transforming into black leopards when having sex with people who are not part of their race. The only way to transform back into a human being is to kill somebody who is not a cat person. The cat people are incestuous, as this is the only way they can reproduce. One of them is Irena Gallier, a young woman who lives in New Orleans. She has never known her family and at the beginning of the film is unaware that she is a cat person. Her brother Paul tracks her down to tell her about her inherited inclinations, and to explain to her that he is her only possible sexual companion: having sex with anyone else would lead to a disaster. Irena refuses to accept this fate and begins a relationship with the zoologist Oliver, keeping her cat identity a secret from him and not consummating their love out of fear of what might happen. Eventually, however, she can no longer restrain herself: she has sex with Oliver and transforms into a leopard. She then flees, not killing Oliver, as even in her leopard shape she feels love for him. Irena ends up at a secluded lake house, where she kills a caretaker in order to regain human form. Oliver manages to track her down and she asks him to kill her, devastated by the realisation they can never have a functional relationship. When Oliver refuses to do so, Irena answers: “Then free me. Make love to me again. I want to live with my own.” Oliver ties Irena to a bed and has sex with her. In the final scene of the film Oliver is seen working at the zoo, walking to a cage containing a black leopard. He hand-feeds and strokes the leopard, which it allows, after which it growls at him. The implication, of course, is that this leopard is Irena, who will now remain a caged leopard for the rest of her life.

The fact that Irena’s transformation is the result of her giving in to her sexual urges conveys the metaphor OUR NATURAL IMPULSES ARE AN ANIMAL WITHIN US that is also present in The Howling. Irena knows that having sex with Oliver is dangerous, but she cannot help herself: the inner beast comes out. There is another striking similarity between The Howling and Cat People: like those in The Howling, the shapeshifters in Cat People are shown as a minority that seems incapable of finding a place in normal society. They can only reproduce among themselves, and will cause harm if they have sexual relationships with ordinary people: they must live in their own small, secluded society. Irena attempts to fit in with society by having a relationship with Oliver, but is doomed to fail. The idea of Irena as a character who does not belong in the environment she lives in is also strongly present in a sequence where she dreams
that she is in the place where the cat people originally hail from: a savannah occupied by black leopards, where her brother Paul awaits her, saying: “Welcome home.” This is Irena’s real home, and no matter how hard she tries to live a normal life in New Orleans, she will not succeed: she will always be the Other. Eventually, Oliver finds a way for her to exist in conventional society without being a threat to it by keeping her locked up. He represents a society that allows minorities to exist, but only at a safe distance from the rest of the world. The film thus gives a rather bleak view of minorities struggling but failing to fit in with society, and only being allowed an existence without freedom: MINORITIES ARE CAT PEOPLE. The metaphor is similar to that conveyed in The Howling. The main difference is that whereas the only solution The Howling provides to the problem of difference is destruction, Cat People allows the Other to exist, as long as it is kept in control. The Howling destroys, while Cat People subjugates the Other.

**Teen Wolf (Rob Daniel, USA 1985)**

Several dimensions of the werewolf metaphor can be found in Teen Wolf, in which unpopular teenager Scott Howard is a rather uncharacteristic werewolf: his transformation is not one into a savage creature, but into a hairier version of himself with superhuman strength and dexterity with essentially the same personality as his “normal” self, albeit more extraverted. Here, the monster is not the senseless creature from the films discussed above, but essentially a strange-looking human. The film thus breaks with the tradition of the monster as something incapable of reason as described by Wood, Wells and Zinoman.

Scott’s transformations are not caused by the full moon, as in most werewolf movies, but occur initially when he is in stressful situations, until he finally manages to control them and turns into a wolf-teenager whenever he wants to. His werewolfism is not caused by an attack by another werewolf, but inherited from his parents. It is not an unnatural force of evil, but a natural part of his development, which starts when he is in his teens. All this makes it reasonable to construe the metaphor PUBERTY IS WEREWOLFISM: Scott becomes hairy, his voice gets lower and he finds it difficult to deal with these bodily changes, at first being ashamed of them. When he tells his basketball coach that he is considering quitting the team because he is “going through changes,” the coach interprets this as meaning Scott is going through puberty and tells him everybody has this experience. Only after having a conversation with his father, who shows him his own hairy wolf-face, does Scott become more comfortable with his new identity.

Once Scott has accepted this new identity, the message of the film seems to change to the BEING DIFFERENT IS BEING A WEREWOLF metaphor also found in the three films discussed above, albeit in a more positive way. When helping him come to terms with his condition, Scott’s father tells him that despite society’s prejudices, “Werewolves are people too,” describing them as a discriminated minority. The idea is reinforced when Scott wants to tell his friend Styles that he is a werewolf, and Styles replies to Scott’s statement that he has something important to say: “You’re not gonna tell me you’re a fag, are you? ‘Cause if you’re gonna tell me you’re a fag, I don’t think I can handle it.” The idea of werewolves as a discriminated minority is perhaps expressed strongest when a bully, aware of Scott’s werewolfism, calls him a freak and tells him: “I’ve dealt with your kind before. Your mommy used to
steal chickens from the backyard. Until I blew her head off with a shotgun.” But despite society’s fear and hatred of monsters, most people respond positively to Scott’s werewolfism when they discover it has its advantages: in his wolf-shape, Scott becomes an excellent basketball player and dancer, and helps his friend find a lost bag of marijuana thanks to his superior sense of smell. He decides no longer to hide his condition, instead walking around proudly as a wolf-teenager almost permanently, and he quickly becomes the most popular boy at school. Finally, however, he decides that wolf-Scott is an alter ego that should not take over his life. He helps his basketball team win a game in fully human shape and from that point onwards does not transform again. His love interest likes fully human Scott better than wolf-Scott, and the two get into a relationship. Although Scott’s werewolfism gave him the confidence required to excel at basketball and win the girl he is in love with, it is now time to leave that part of him behind. Scott’s werewolfism was a temporary period of change that helped him grow and turn from a boy into a man.

_Silver Bullet (Daniel Attas, USA 1985)_

One important difference between _Silver Bullet_ and the films discussed before, is that here the werewolf is not the main character. _Silver Bullet_ is a whodunit, in which the main characters figure out the identity of the shapeshifter terrorizing their rural community. It turns out to be the trusted reverend of the local church, Lester Lowe, who believes he is on a holy mission. His victims are mostly people the church would consider sinners: the first victim is a notorious drunk, the second a teenage girl who is planning to commit suicide and states to herself: “Suicides go to Hell. Especially if they’re pregnant. And I don’t even care,” before the werewolf storms in and kills her. Lowe believes, we find out, that by preventing the girl’s suicide he has saved her soul from going to Hell. In a dream sequence, Lowe sees the population of the village transform into werewolves while he is giving a sermon in his church, suggesting he considers them, the sinners who refuse to listen to his view of morality, as the monsters.

Being a respected figure in the community and using his shapeshifting ability to enforce Christian morality, Lowe seems a different kind of werewolf than the ones discussed before: he is not the outsider we normally see transforming in this genre. He also remains capable of rational behaviour when in wolf-form, having plausible motivations for all his murders. In _Silver Bullet_ it is not the monster but its killers who are outsiders: Lowe is eventually defeated by wheelchair-bound pre-teen Marty and his older sister, a book smart, introverted girl who is bullied by other children in the first scene in which she appears. Marty enjoys the company of his eccentric uncle Red, a possible alcoholic who allows him more freedom than his parents. “You oughta realize there’s more to Marty than him not being able to walk,” Red criticizes Marty’s concerned mother. When the parents are conveniently away, it is this trio of social misfits that manages to kill the werewolf by shooting it with the eponymic silver bullet, which was created from amulets worn by Marty and Jane. While resting from the fight, Marty turns to his sister and says: “I love you, Jane.” Jane replies: “I love you too.” The film ends with retrospective voice-over narration by the now older Jane: “I wasn’t always able to say that. But I can say it now. I love you, Marty.”

The social misfits destroy a monster that represents the suppressive force of Christian morality at its most extreme, using a weapon that can be seen as a symbol of their personalities. Having rid
themselves of the oppressing force, they are finally able to show their love for each other. Thus, in *Silver Bullet*, THE OPPRESSOR (rather than THE OPPRESSED) IS A WEREWOLF.

**Concluding remarks**

On the premise that monsters are typically seen as fundamentally un-human, we asked the question what it means for a human to become a monster in so-called werewolf films. We argued that the profoundly embodied transformation from human into (were)wolf should be understood in terms of varieties of the conceptual metaphor DEVIAN I DENTITY IS TRANSFORMED BODY. In the case of *An American Werewolf in London, The Howling* and *Cat People*, the monster represents an aspect of the shapeshifter’s human character, namely that these characters in one way or another deviate from the norm. The fact that they do not fit into their cultural community and are thus the Other, makes them un-human in the eyes of society; this idea is literalized by their transformation. They are not normal people turning into abnormalities; they were abnormal to begin with. *Teen Wolf* also exemplifies this metaphor of minorities as werewolf monsters, but also portrays werewolfism as a normal and acceptable stage in a young man’s life by showing the transformation as a source domain in the metaphor PUBERTY IS TRANSFORMED BODY. *Silver Bullet* goes against the convention of showing the werewolf as an outsider, even in his human form, by making him a respected authority figure. Here, the werewolf monster represents the oppressing nature of certain moral values, to be eliminated by the outsiders. However, what all these films have in common, is that the werewolf is a literal representation of the identity of the person who turns into it. In werewolf films the metaphor DEVIAN I DENTITY IS TRANSFORMED BODY is thus central to the genre, but the dimensions of that “Otherness” identity differ for each film. This interpretation is commensurate with that proposed by Schneider, who combines psycho-analytic and CMT approaches to horror films. In shapeshifter films (of which he considers Werewolf films a subcategory) the transformed body reflects universal, subconscious fears but always does so in the context of a specific time and place – and thus of specific socio-cultural concerns (Schneider *Monsters*).

This last comment is also pertinent to an evaluation of the role played by the visual and the verbal modalities, respectively, in the werewolf metaphors discussed. The transformation of human into werewolf, with its threat of violence, is usually visualized: it is the most embodied, spectacular dimension of the metaphor and arguably feeds on the universal, atavistic fear of transformation of the human body. The cultural dimension of the mappings from TRANSFORMED BODY to DEVIAN I DENTITY are invariably rendered via dialogues and monologues, that is, in the verbal modality. It is the transformation aspect of the metaphor that makes it typically cinematic; the cultural motivation for the metaphor, as one anonymous reviewer pointed out to us, could appear equally effectively in the medium of the novel (see Forceville et al. *Adaptive Value* for some further discussion of the embodied versus cultural dimensions of metaphor). All this serves as a reminder that “film” should not be equated with “moving images,” but constitutes a truly multimodal medium, with different modalities serving different functions. Film scholars restricting their focus to features of film that it does not share with other media are guilty of an undesirable essentialism. In this respect, we agree with Carroll that “the film theorist benefits from thinking about what film has in common with other arts” (*Metaphor* 222).
Together with **LIFE IS A JOURNEY** (Forceville *Journey*; *Varda; Animation*; Forceville and Jeulink; Kromhout and Forceville), the **DEVIANT IDENTITY IS TRANSFORMED BODY** metaphor is a conceptual metaphor that is worth examining more consistently in the analysis of **IDENTITY** in film (see also Teodorescu). Both **LIFE IS A JOURNEY** and **DEVIANT IDENTITY IS TRANSFORMED BODY** are highly embodied metaphors and eminently visualisable, and thus are attractive options for cinematic narratives to exemplify protagonists’ struggles with their deviant identities and with the life goals they want to pursue. As discussed, the werewolf belongs to the larger category of shapeshifters that also appear for instance in vampire and zombie films. It will be pertinent for the delimitation of these respective genres as well as for a theorization of the possible metaphorical mappings from **TRANSFORMED BODY** to **DEVIANT IDENTITY** to systematically investigate how monsters “contaminate” innocent people in these various subgenres (we owe this observation to Anne Bartsch, personal communication at SCSMI conference, Berlin, June 2013). Finally, we submit that the central metaphor also deserves sustained attention in science fiction films and in the medium of animation.

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**Bibliography**


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