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Fehér, A.

Publication date
2024

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Citation for published version (APA):

Fehér, A. (2024). *Essays in law and economics*. [Thesis, fully internal, Universiteit van Amsterdam].

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Essays in Law and Economics

Ádám Fehér

The first two papers of my PhD thesis focus on non-competition agreements, while the final chapter examines the liability of digital social media platforms for user-generated content. All three papers develop a microeconomic model grounded in standard labor economics theory to investigate how regulatory measures regarding noncompetes and digital platform liability could enhance social welfare.

Ádám Fehér holds a BSc in Economics from Corvinus University of Budapest and an Mphil degree in Economics from the Tinbergen Institute. In 2018, he commenced his PhD studies at the University of Amsterdam supervised by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Enrico Perotti. Adam currently works as a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union, based at Trier University in Germany.

Essays in Law and Economics
Ádám Fehér



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ISBN : 978 90 361 0748 8

Cover design: Crasborn Graphic Designers bno, Valkenburg a.d. Geul

This book is no. **839** of the Tinbergen Institute Research Series, established through cooperation between Rozenberg Publishers and the Tinbergen Institute. A list of books which already appeared in the series can be found [here](#).

Essays in Law and Economics

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
prof. dr. ir. P.P.C.C. Verbeek

ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie,
in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel
op vrijdag 24 mei 2024, te 10.00 uur

door *Ádám Fehér*
geboren te Budapest

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Acknowledgement of Financial Support: I received the Law and Economics Fellowship from the New York University School of Law's Center for Law, Economics, and Organization in the academic year 2021-2022.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my PhD advisors, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Enrico Perotti, for their continuous support and guidance throughout the PhD process and academic life, beginning from my TI master thesis. Their mentorship has been indispensable.

Additionally, I want to thank my colleagues and friends at the Law and Economics department and the Finance department of UvA. I am particularly grateful to Adrian, Amit, Davide, Edoardo, and Magda for their invaluable assistance and insightful advice regarding the job market (paper). Furthermore, I have gained valuable insights from my interactions with colleagues during my research visit at NYU, as well as from interactions with my new colleagues at IAAEU, Trier University.

The long journey of TI and the PhD was made smoother by the friendships I forged during this time. Whether it was playing board games, watching or participating in sports, or sharing lunches and dinners, I always had a great time with Alejandro, Andreas, Asli, Chris, Diana, Diarmaid, Fatjon, Felipe, Kathi, Konsti, Linxiang, Louisa, Maryam, Mate, Oscar, Rafa, Rik, Stefan, Thu, Wally, Xiny, and Yasmine.

And lastly, but certainly most importantly, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to my family. From helping me relocate to Amsterdam at the beginning of my journey, my parents, Anya and Apa, and my sister, Panka, alongside her husband, Norbi, have been unwavering pillars of support. Together with Dora and Sanyi, they have always been there for me when I needed them the most. I also extend my thanks to Yiwen for enduring the life of a PhD student.

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