Following the news: Patterns of online and offline news consumption
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Chapter 2

Skipping current affairs:

The non-users of online and offline news

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Introduction

In an information-rich environment with ample choice, do citizens still get exposed to what is going on around them in society? This question sounds paradoxical. Is it not true that the new information offers are actually used for more news and public-affairs information than ever before? On top of this, the audience gets rid of paternalizing journalists, is finally free of being manipulated by PR people and other gatekeepers – this is what an optimistic vision suggests. Citizens no longer depend on what media organizations pre-select. Both the abundance and accessibility of primary, original sources allow citizens to put together themselves whatever they want to know (e.g., Gillmor, 2004; Negroponte, 1995).

But there are serious fears that people are rather lazy and less responsible than the optimists assume. Once given the chance, they might actually avoid all information that is not of their strictly personal interest. Indeed, many more channels on television have made this possible, and more outlets in the magazine sector, but above all, the Internet. Its audience is feared to increasingly consist of “information hermits,” focused on their personal hobbies only. Being surprised by information one was not interested in beforehand would disappear, and thus learning about it “incidentally” (Zukin & Snyder, 1984). This should inevitably lead to less knowledge of current affairs (Baum & Kernen, 1999; Eveland & Dunwoody, 2002; Prior, 2007; Schonbach, De Waal, & Lauf, 2005; Tewksbury, 2003; Tewksbury & Althaus, 2000) – indispensable for citizens’ participation in a democratic society (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; Habermas, 1962, 2006; Strömbäck, 2005).

This pessimistic view of the new media environment (e.g., Sunstein, 2001; Tewksbury, 2005) mourns about a better past when television, radio, newspapers and magazines were spreading information about a wide range of events and issues to most of the citizens. In addition, the traditional media prioritized and contextualized their news (e.g., Gans, 2003; Luhmann, 1974; Schudson, 1995). Pessimists claim that the scarcity of outlets made this information rather hard to circumvent. Also, the journalists working for those media typically
shared criteria of newsworthiness (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). That way, they made sure that the audience inadvertently learned about a common core of news and current affairs that then could be deliberated about by all (e.g., Lee, 2007; Sunstein, 2001). But now, with a more diverse offer – so the fear goes – people can at all times select the media content they exactly want. Thus, personal preferences become the main determinant of the content people are exposed to. Formerly, the audience could only be active within the clear limitations set by the mainstream media. But now, people have much more opportunities to select the media content they exactly want. So, those who do not care about current affairs, politics and news now could simply avoid it – without having to do without any media exposure at all.

And indeed, on the one hand, in US households with more television channels, people who prefer entertainment seem to skip informative content (Prior, 2007; see also Chaffee & Metzger, 2001). Also, the prime-time share of the three major network channels in the US with their general-interest content declined (Webster, 2005). Instead, viewing time has increasingly been spread across a large number of more specific channels. Websites, too, seem to fragment audiences (Tewksbury, 2005), possibly separating polarized “issue publics”, groups of people with similar political attitudes (Morris, 2007; Stroud, 2010).

On the other hand, it is certainly reassuring to know that most people still seem to follow the news, with 38 percent of Americans relying exclusively on offline sources and 59 percent using both on- and offline ones (PEW Internet & American Life Project, 2010b). Also, the Internet is actually full of news, some say, and thus could increase incidental learning about topics one was not interested in before (Lee, 2009; Tewksbury, Weaver & Maddex, 2001). And, as in the times of newspapers, radio, and television, news outlets on the Internet, such as blogs as well as major news sites, are said to not differ much in the societal issues they cover (Lee, 2007).

**Fragmentation, selective exposure, and factors affecting news use**

The concerns raised by Internet pessimists address a classic issue in communication research: Is media exposure determined mostly by personal characteristics of the recipients (for instance, their interests) – or by structural factors, such as what the media offer (see, e.g., Cooper & Tang, 2009)? As structural constraints seem to vanish, the idiosyncrasies of the audience should indeed gain
more and more importance (Wonneberger, Schoenbach, & Van Meurs, 2009). This is why a possible fragmentation of the news audience has been explained by the concept of selective exposure. Based on rational-choice theory, it assumes an active audience deciding what to watch, read or listen to according to individual interests and preferences only (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; Sears & Freedman, 1967; Zillmann & Bryant, 1985; Frey, 1986).

Recent studies on selective exposure by Garrett (2009a, 2009b), Stroud (2008) as well as Kobayashi and Ikeda (2009), however, make us aware that those individual interest and preferences indeed lead to exposure to sources closely matching their preferences, but at the same time, people are still curious about the world outside: Those who expose themselves to highly partisan and specialist sources also use an above-average level of general-interest news (Bimber & Davis, 2003, see also Zaller, 1992). There are more signs for this: People on average do not use a lot of different news sites on the Internet, but concentrate on a few, often run by professional news organizations: 57 percent of the Americans get their news from only two to five websites; only 11 percent routinely use more than that (PEW Internet & American Life Project, 2010b). Primary or alternative sources and weblogs for news and political information hardly play a role in that diet (e.g., Bakker, 2013; Schmidt, Frees, & Fisch, 2009). Instead, news consumption still seems to rely heavily on television and newspapers. And even those who use YouTube for their information often find material from traditional media there (May, 2010). Online news sites as well, although having recently begun to substitute traditional outlets, still are mostly professional ones (e.g., De Waal & Schoenbach, 2005, 2010; Lin, Salwen, Garrison, & Driscoll, 2005; PEW Research Center For The People & The Press, 2008; Gaskins & Jerit, 2012). In sum, then, the fragmentation of the audience should be less dramatic than, e.g., Sunstein (2001) expected (see also Dahlberg, 2007).

Still, it is not clear yet to which extent people in a high-choice media environment really avoid general-interest news sources of all sorts and, instead, concentrate on information about the one topic – or maybe a few of them – they are personally interested in. Of course, many media provide material for focusing on a certain topic as well, by offering background information and interpretation (Schröder & Steeg Larsen, 2010). Similarly, Tewksbury, Hals, and Bibart (2008) distinguish between browsing to get a broad overview and selectively using the media content one is interested in. Also our study will focus on what may be called the minimal prerequisite to participate in public discourse:
at least knowing what topics and events are actually out there (Ferree e.a., 2002; Habermas, 1962, 2006). Therefore, this study tries to shed light on the use of media for topical overviews of what is going on in the world, among them, as Sunstein (2001, p. 35) puts it, inevitably “topics that you would not have chosen in advance”. We investigate if in a high-choice media environment, selective exposure is prevalent and exposure to sources providing such an overview really is not common any more, as the pessimists assume:

RQ1: How widespread is news-overview avoidance today?

The pessimist viewpoint suggests that news was hardly avoided in the past only because media choices had been heavily restricted (Prior, 2007). Thus, in a high-choice environment where possibilities for selective exposure to non-news sources are no longer limited, personal factors should gain importance in the selection process. A high influence of these personal factors would reflect a high amount of selectivity – because in a non-selective audience, everyone, regardless of his personal preferences, would use similar media content.

Based on this approach, entertainment preference is a possible obstacle for news exposure. Prior (2007) showed that if there is no other choice available, even those who prefer entertainment above news watch the news. This personal preference, therefore, had no big influence in low-choice environments, but gained importance as the number of alternatives rose. The same argument can be made for political interest: While highly interested people follow the news anyway, also those with a low interest do so if no attractive alternative is offered (Prior, 2007).

Similarly, the duty to keep informed, the feeling that a good citizen has to follow the news (McCombs & Poindexter, 1983; Poindexter & McCombs, 2001), influences media choices: For example, it furthers newspaper browsing to get a broad overview (Tewksbury, Hals, & Bibart, 2008) and increases the likelihood of preferring national news above local news (Prior, 2003). Also here, the same argument as for entertainment preference and political interest applies: Once there are more choices, those who lack a perceived duty to keep informed, can easily chose non-news media offers if they do not feel the need to watch the news.

Following the news makes most sense for those who actually believe that they can influence political decisions. Accordingly, both internal political efficacy, that is the belief that one is capable to participate in politics, and external political efficacy, that is the perceived responsiveness of the political system, are related to news use (Tewksbury, Hals, & Bibart, 2008; Aarts & Semetko,
But again, in low-choice environments, some with a low efficacy still might have followed the news because of a lack of alternatives.

The discussion on who avoids the news, however, has not been limited to political attitudes: Also the young (e.g., Lauf, 2001; Lewis, 2008; Mindich, 2005; Peiser, 2000; Zubayr & Geese, 2009) and poorly educated (e.g., PEW Research Center for The People & The Press, 2008) are feared not to follow the news. Additionally, two psychological traits have been linked to news exposure: extraversion (Finn, 1997; Shim & Paul, 2007; Kraaykamp & van Eijck, 2005) and Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Das, Echambadi, McCordle, & Luckett, 2003; Kraaykamp & Van Eick, 2005). It has been argued that these personal traits influence someone’s need for surveillance of the environment, and therefore increase motivation to follow the news – which, again, should gain influence in a high-choice environment.

All these factors will be used to assess who it is that avoids the news:

RQ2: Which factors affect news-overview avoidance how strongly?

To address concerns of increased news-overview avoidance in high-choice media environments with more variety and more possibilities, we investigate if some of these factors are more influential in an online context. In fact, those who fear that the Internet furthers selective avoidance of general-interest news basically assume that the role of individual-level factors is bigger the more choices one has: For example, due to the lack of choices in some offline media, even those who would prefer entertainment still might expose themselves to informative content, as no alternative closer to their preference is available (Prior, 2007). But as the Internet offers the highest possible number of choices, individual factors should play a stronger role for online news exposure than for offline news exposure. Whether this is true, will be assessed by comparing the factors affecting online and offline news exposure, respectively. Some factors might even play no role at all online, but be important offline.

RQ3: In how far is online news avoidance influenced by other factors than offline news avoidance?

Method

Our analysis is based on a representative survey in the Netherlands. The Netherlands is not only one of the oldest democracies, but also one of the countries with the highest Internet penetration: 90% of the people 16 years and older having access to the Internet and 77% of the population even using a broad-
band connection (Lööf & Seybert, 2009). In the US, for example, 74% of the adults use the Internet and only 60% have a broadband connection at home (PEW Internet & American Life Project, 2010a). For a population of about 16 million, the Netherlands offers a wide range of newspapers every day: twelve national ones, among them three free dailies. In addition, every community is served by at least one local newspaper. Three public TV stations and three of the private stations broadcast programs with news and current-affairs content daily. Most of them provide news via their teletext service, too. There are six national public service radio stations and a large number of commercial and regional stations, and virtually all of them carry news.

**Sample**

Our web-based survey draws on a large sample representative for the Dutch population aged 13 years and older. News consumption in the Netherlands traditionally is very high (Tenscher, 2008) – but little is known about who it is that does not expose themselves to any news overviews, and what role the online media play in this context.

As the Netherlands have an Internet penetration of 90 percent, an Internet survey reaches virtually a representative sample of the population. Data collection took place in December 2009. From a panel with 233,467 members in total, a sample of 2,900 participants was drawn. For recruitment, research bureau TNS Nipo approached possible participants offline, too. Since a response rate (AAPOR-RR1) of 73 per cent was achieved, the final sample size was 2,130. Because of invalid answers, 49 cases were removed from the sample, as were 127 respondents aged younger than the legal voting age of 18 years. Thus, 1954 cases were included in the analysis. Completion of the questionnaire lasted 20 minutes on average. Prior to the fieldwork, we had conducted a pre-test with 74 participants filling in an earlier version of the questionnaire. Based on an analysis of these responses and extensive feedback by the participants, we further improved the questionnaire.
**Measurement**

*News exposure.* Our questionnaire gauged news use separately for 49 sources\(^3\) with a general-news offer – covering public affairs of all kinds. These sources range from newspapers via television broadcasts to news websites. We included all newspapers, all news and current-affairs programs on Dutch television channels, the websites of these offline outlets, radio news, and teletext. In addition, we compiled an extensive list of websites which are not linked to any offline source, but offer at least some general-interest news. Based on traffic statistics provided by web tracking company Alexa, we subsequently excluded those sources which we expected to be used by less than 0.5 percent of our sample. For each source, we measured the number of days it is used in a typical week (question wording see appendix).

For each source a respondent claimed to use at least once a week, he or she was asked to indicate five specific purposes the source could serve – from a list of five: “because it gives an overview of what is going on in the world,” “because it gives background information or opinions,” “because it is fast,” “because it is pleasant to use” and for “other [unspecified] purposes.” Multiple responses were possible. To limit the length of the questionnaire and to avoid drop-out, functions of use were asked for up to 15 randomly selected outlets. Missing values were substituted by the mean. We used “because it gives an overview of what is going in the world” as a filter variable to include only the news sources which we were theoretically interested in: those people which claim to use for a broad overview. Doing so, we employed an approach similar to the one chosen by Tewksbury, Hals, and Bihart, who were only interested in what they call “browsing” and “a desire to survey the world” (2008, p. 262), and excluded news media that were used for information on specific topics only – and thus not for a broad overview – from their analysis.

*Independent and control variables.* Unless stated otherwise, the following variables were measured using seven-point scales (for the exact question wordings see the appendix):

*Entertainment preference:* The respondents were asked to indicate on three ten-point scales whether they use newspapers, television and the Internet, respectively, for information or for entertainment purposes. The relative

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\(^3\) In addition, the datasets contains the use of four weekly magazines. They are excluded from this analysis as by definition, a weekly magazine cannot offer up-to-date news overviews on a more or less daily basis.
entertainment preference of a respondent, then, is the sum of the three z-transformed scales (Cronbach’s α = .62).

Political interest: answers to the question “Generally speaking, how interested are you in politics?” ranging from “not interested at all” to “very interested”.

Civic duty to keep informed: agreement with the statement “It is important that people in society are informed about news and current affairs”.

Political efficacy: Both the internal efficacy scale, consisting of four items (Cronbach’s α = .82), and the external efficacy scale (three items, Cronbach’s α = .78) were inspired by Niemi et al. (1991).

Personality traits: To measure need for cognition, we shortened a scale provided by Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984) (Cronbach’s α = .84). Extraversion was measured based on four items used by Stefanone and Jang (2007) and McCrae and Costa (1996) (Cronbach’s α = .70).

Sociodemographics: Age and gender were gauged, as was education. For the latter, the highest level of education attended was asked using a seven point scale, reaching from elementary education or even less to a university degree.

Results

Avoiding news overviews

Seven out of ten people (70%) obtain a news overview over what is going on in the world every single day in a typical week. In contrast, only nine percent use no information channel at all for finding out what is going on in a typical week. So, total news-overview avoidance seems not to be too widespread (RQ 1). In detail, those who use at least one overview source at least once per week, use on average 2.5 different overview sources per day. When we add up all news-overview sources in a typical week, the average citizen views 7.3 television broadcasts, reads 2.7 newspaper copies and visits 2.8 times a website to get an overview. On 1.4 days per week s/he uses teletext for this purpose, and on 1.9 days he listens to radio news to get to know. These numbers show: Most people do get – even frequent – news overviews: News-overview avoidance seems to be limited to a small part of the society.
Figure 2-1
Frequency of exposure to online and offline news overviews

Note. The bars show the number of respondents sharing the same frequency of media use, calculated as the sum of the frequencies of all outlets they use to get a news overview.

But which factors affect news-overview avoidance (RQ2)? To answer this question, we ran zero-inflated negative binomial regressions with the summed-up days of use of all news overview sources as the dependent variable. This type of regression was applied because it fits the data that are skewed to the right (Skewness = 1.38 for all media, 1.16 for offline media and 3.17 for online media) and have an excessive number of zeros (Figure 2-1). Another advantage of this type of analysis is the possibility to distinguish between complete avoidance on the one hand and the amount of exposure on the other hand. In a first step, to find out who it is that completely avoids news overviews, we examine

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4 We also ran all models with the counted number of sources as the dependent variable. By this, we assessed whether our independent variables rather influenced the number of sources or the frequency of exposure per source or both. The models remained almost the same, as both dependent variables are extremely high correlated (r = .91). Thus, the overall frequency of exposure is almost completely explained by the number of sources someone uses.
the binary equation of the regression. Second, to predict the frequency of exposure among those who are exposed to news overviews at least once, we take a look at the count equation.

Table 2-1

Determinants of news-overview exposure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>News-overview exposure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binary equation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.08 (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.07) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal political efficacy</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External political efficacy</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for cognition</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraversion</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rel. entertainment preference</td>
<td>0.27 (0.09) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic duty</td>
<td>-0.38 (0.07) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.51 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((\alpha))</td>
<td>-0.92 (0.05) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudo-likelihood</td>
<td>-6983.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi²</td>
<td>200.97 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero observations</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-zero observations</td>
<td>1757</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N = 1940. Unstandardized coefficients from a zero-inflated negative binomial regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* \(p \leq 0.05\). ** \(p \leq 0.01\). *** \(p \leq 0.001\).

Those who belong to the group of complete news-overview avoiders typically are less educated; they prefer entertainment and have a low sense of a civic duty to keep informed (see the binary equation in Table 2-1, which predicts the chance of the dependent variable being zero). To illustrate how important these predictors respectively are, we calculated the change of the odds of belonging to the group of complete avoiders when the predictor variable is varied by one standard deviation. Interestingly, the three determinants of news avoidance in our model have approximately equally strong effects: A change of one standard deviation of the independent variable reduces the odds of being an absolute news-overview avoider by a factor between 0.61 and 0.76.
But is there a difference between the factors influencing news avoidance offline and online (RQ3)? As virtually all users of online overview information use also some offline media for that purpose (only 26 out of 758 users do not), it is not surprising that education, entertainment preference and duty to keep informed influence overall exposure and offline exposure equally strong. In other words, those who do not claim to use offline media to find out about what is going on in the world are again lower educated, prefer entertainment and feel a low duty to keep informed (Table 2-2).

The other way around, a large number of offline news-overview users does not consult online media for the same purpose (1,012 out of 1,744). And those who avoid online news seem to be structurally different from those who do not use offline news. In contrast to offline avoidance, preferring entertainment is not related to skipping online news overviews completely. At the same time, and maybe not surprisingly, older people seem to be more likely not to use online media at all. Like in the offline case, civic duty increases the chance of using news online – but its impact is only less than half as strong. Introverts are more likely to be online news overview avoiders, but not offline. The only factor with the same effect for both media types is education: Low educated people are more likely to avoid news overviews completely, both on- and offline.

**The frequency of exposure among news overview users**

As one would expect from the results above, preferring information, and feeling a civic duty to keep informed do not only strengthen the chance of using some news overviews at all. Among the users, these factors also increase the frequency of exposure. This is revealed by the count equation in Table 2-1. A higher age, political interest, internal political efficacy, and extraversion lead to more exposure among news users while they have no influence on skipping the news at all. Interestingly, while a lower education increased changes of being a complete news avoider, it had a reverse effect among the users: Once someone is using news overviews at all, a higher education decreases her/his frequency of exposure.

In detail, one standard deviation of political interest results in 12% more exposure to news overviews, and being one standard deviation older increases exposure by 10%. One standard deviation less entertainment preference increases exposure by 7%, while one standard deviation of civic duty adds 7% as
well. The effects of internal political efficacy (5%) and education (3%) are weakest.

Table 2-2
Determinants of news-overview exposure, separated by sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>News-overview exposure</th>
<th>offline sources</th>
<th>online sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.01 (0.18)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.15 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.00) ***</td>
<td>0.01 (0.00) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.20 (0.05) ***</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.01) **</td>
<td>-0.15 (0.04) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. pol. eff.</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext. pol. eff.</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFC</td>
<td>0.01 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.02) *</td>
<td>0.02 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraversion</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02) **</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.06) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP</td>
<td>0.30 (0.08) ***</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.02) ***</td>
<td>0.02 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol. interest</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.01) ***</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic duty</td>
<td>-0.37 (0.06) ***</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02) ***</td>
<td>-0.15 (0.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.53 (0.75)</td>
<td>2.01 (0.17) ***</td>
<td>2.63 (0.51) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ln(α) | -1.09 (0.05)*** | -0.37 (0.10) * |
Log pseudo-likelihood | -6572.97 | -3352.44 |
Wald chi² | 249.96*** | 31.45*** |
Nagelkerke pseudo-R² | 0.198 | 0.072 |
Zero obs. | 209 | 1187 |
Non-zero obs. | 1731 | 753 |

Note. N = 1940. Unstandardized coefficients from zero-inflated negative binomial regressions with standard errors in parentheses. eq.=equation, int.=internal, ext.=external, pol.=political, NFC=need for cognition, REP=Relative Entertainment Preference., obs=observations.

* p ≤ 0.05.  ** p ≤ 0.01.  *** p ≤ 0.001.

Among offline news users, specifically, the frequency of exposure is predicted again the same way as in the overall model – with two exceptions. Internal political efficacy is not significant any more, while Need for Cognition becomes an additional significant predictor: The higher the Need for Cognition, the lower the frequency of offline exposure (see the count equation in Table 2-2). The frequency of online exposure, however, depends on different...
characteristics of the audience. Most interestingly, the personal factors that should, as we argued, have especially strong effects in high-choice environments (like political interest, entertainment preference, and the civic duty) do not play any role here. The same holds true for age – a strong predictor in the offline model. In fact, the only significant predictor is education – which, surprisingly, leads to less online news exposure.

**Conclusions and discussion**

Is there a reason to fear that now, because of the Internet, people systematically avoid overviews of what is going on in the world around them? Actually, only a very small group of people does not use any information channel at all for news overviews – at least once per week. Most people seem to seek some sort of surveillance of their environment and use different news sources to get a broad overview of what is going on in the world.

As earlier research on selective exposure suggested, increased exposure to a specific type of source does not necessarily lead to avoiding other sources for the same purpose. The distribution of our data made it necessary to apply a technique that distinguishes between complete avoidance and the amount of exposure. This yielded very interesting results: The analysis revealed a relatively sharp difference between complete avoidance and little exposure. The few people who do not expose themselves to overviews are typically less educated. But among those who use it at least once in a while, education has actually the reverse effect – actually quite plausibly: People with a better education do not necessarily need more sources than anybody else to get to know what is going on in the world. Instead, they may be even more selective and stick to the – few – sources that they may have discovered as particularly useful. No matter if one uses online or offline or online news, the more highly one is educated the fewer sources one uses for an overview over the world.

For some people, passing the threshold to get news overviews at all seems to be easier online – for those who strongly prefer entertainment over information. The Internet reaches them with at least some overview of news and current affairs. A possible reason could be that getting this overview can easily be integrated into surfing sessions. One does not have to miss one’s favorite entertainment offer just because one scans some news as well. And news on the Internet is free, as opposed to, e.g., most newspapers. Similarly, a low sense of a civic duty to keep informed makes it more likely to avoid news offline, but it does not keep people away from online news that much. These findings
clearly contradict the pessimist expectation that those with a weaker motivation to follow the news do not use online news media, while they still might be "trapped" by offline media. In fact, it might be the other way round.

The civic duty to keep informed in general still is one of the strongest predictors for both using news overviews at all and the frequency of exposure. But also here, the Internet might have the potential to reach those who do not feel a strong civic duty to keep informed. On the Internet, people with weak civic attitudes actually seem to follow the news: Regardless of how strong their civic attitudes, their preference for entertainment, and their political interest are, their frequency of exposure does not differ. And using online news overviews at all, albeit only once a week, is much less a matter of civic attitudes online than offline.

So, as opposed to popular fears, the Internet may even have an integrating function for the public discourse. It also exposes those to news overviews who are likely to avoid it because they are much more interested in media entertainment than in news and political information. Those who prefer entertainment, have a low political interest and a low duty to keep informed are just more likely to avoid news overviews in an offline setting than online. Rather in online contexts than offline, the entertainment-orientated can be trapped into following the news.

This is reflected in the impact of the personal factors for news media use that we could examine here: They clearly do not have a stronger influence on the consumption of online news than on the use of offline news. We thus could not confirm a basic assumption of the pessimistic position – that vanishing structural constraints in an online environment should make personal factors more important for news exposure. In other words, we do not find support for the notion that people’s tendency to selectively expose themselves to content closely matching their preferences would result in avoidance of general-interest news overviews in high-choice environments. The audience in 2010, thus, seems to be active, but not hyper-active in the sense that once the offer is large enough, recipients start pursuing their own interests only and actively avoid all kind of exposure to overviews of public affairs.

But then, is democracy in danger? Of course, pessimists could argue that nine percent of news overview avoiders are nine percent too much. And this specific group again seems to consist of the usual suspects – i.e., those who in the past have been identified as the victims of increasing knowledge gaps or a digital divide: the badly educated ones (see, e.g., Tichenor, Donohue & Olien,
as early as in 1970; Norris, 2001). But for the young, often feared as tuning out when it comes to news (e.g., Mindich, 2005), news on the Internet might actually be good: Younger people are more likely than older ones to use online news overviews at all; and among the users, the younger ones use online news as often as older people do.

In sum, these results do not support the grimness of the fears that news use is vanishing: The scope of the problem of selectively avoiding general-interest news seems to be rather limited in the Netherlands in 2010. And although absolute figures of exposure might be lower in other countries, we could show that those who have been suspected to tune out as soon as online media make it easy for them, do not do so.