Governing diversity, experiencing difference
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Chapter 2

Diverse cities and good citizenship: How local governments in the Netherlands recast the national integration discourse

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ABSTRACT – Western European national policies increasingly portray diversity as negative and migrants as Others who do not belong to the national community. This chapter examines how local governments articulate alternative discourses of belonging based on residents’ shared membership in the civic life of the city. In a Dutch case study, the ways in which local policy-makers diverge from exclusionary national narratives are examined. It is argued that discourses about urban citizenship offer opportunities for the inclusion of migrants by drawing new boundaries between ‘good’ citizens and those who are unwilling to participate.
2.1 Introduction

Recent migration waves have diversified the ethnic make-up of Western urban societies. These changes in population composition are also present in the policy discourses of countries and cities. Much has been written on cross-national variations in migrant integration, often in the form of national typologies or models (e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 2000). Underlying this literature is the assumption that integration policies are formed according to nationally specific circumstances (Scholten, 2013a). While such analyses are undoubtedly valuable, the danger is for a ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002) in researching migration which overstates the consistency and coherence of national discourses (cf. Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012). Therefore, recent studies have focused on local dimensions of migration policy-making, especially the comparison of cities (e.g. Alexander, 2003; Caponio & Borkert, 2010; García, 2006; Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello, & Vertovec, 2004). This chapter builds upon this ‘local turn’ (Scholten, 2013a) by focusing on the relation between national and local discourses, more specifically cities' possibilities to diverge from national integration models and develop different ways of managing diversity. Two strategies to replace national definitions that problematize diversity are investigated: defining diversity as a constitutive element of and (potential) asset for urban societies, and recasting exclusive national definitions of citizenship to be more localized and inhabitant-centric.

This study examines the policy discourses of two large cities in the Netherlands; Amsterdam and The Hague. The Netherlands is often considered the prototypical example of a shift from a multiculturalist to a restrictive integration regime (Joppke, 2007) and its policy shift and the concomitant public outcry against multiculturalism has been labelled ‘more extreme than elsewhere’ (Vasta, 2007, p. 715). According to Entzinger (2006), the dominant national political and public discourse on the alleged failure of multiculturalism portrays ethnic diversity and migrants’ ‘refusal to integrate’ as threats to Dutch civic liberties. The question that is examined in this chapter is to what extent Dutch cities recast diversity as an asset rather than a problem, and to what extent citizenship is re-conceptualized as a tool for inclusion rather than exclusion.

The next section briefly presents the concepts which structured the research, diversity and (urban) citizenship, after which the Dutch national context and its possibilities for the production of alternative local policy discourses are introduced. Following a description of the research methodology, the empirical findings are presented in two sections on Amsterdam and The Hague, which aim to show how
Diverse cities and good citizenship

these cities construct diversity and urban citizenship and in doing so position themselves discursively vis-à-vis the national integration discourse. The final section discusses the findings and presents some avenues for further research.

2.2 Diversity and citizenship

According to Joppke (2007), Western European nation-states follow increasingly similar trajectories by adopting civic integration policies which mark a change from recognizing migrants’ cultural distinctiveness towards privileging the native majority’s cultural identity. Concerns regarding the increasing size and diversity of migration flows (cf. Vertovec, 2007) and the hardening of public debate and electoral attitudes towards migrants underlie this shift. Increasingly, diversity is viewed as a problem to be controlled by strict migration and integration policies (Dukes & Musterd, 2012). The introduction of civic integration regimes which emphasize migrants’ integration into ‘the’ native majority culture can be seen as part of a more general ‘civic turn’ (Mouritsen, 2008) which intends to create or conserve social cohesion through a redefinition of citizenship. These regimes connect the policy fields of integration and migration control by making the acquisition of citizenship dependent on migrants’ successful integration (Joppke, 2007). Although civic integration policies are primarily concerned with inclusion in the national community, they often focus explicitly on the local as the appropriate level for the demonstration of ‘good’ citizenship (Schinkel, 2010).

However, while national governments adopt restrictive policies, large cities have been found to retain ‘old’ multiculturalist policies or to experiment with new inclusive forms of migrant incorporation (Uitermark, Rossi & Van Houtum, 2005). Cities are traditionally attractive to (internal and international) migrants for economic reasons, but also because of their diverse social environment and relative anonymity. Cities offer everyday experiences and negotiations of diversity through encounters with difference which often challenge national representations (Amin & Thrift, 2002). This necessitates the formulation of a city-specific view on diversity and citizenship, an undertaking which has been described as the articulation of a ‘politics of difference’ based on city life as the ‘being together of strangers’ (Young, 2011 [1990], p. 240), or as a city’s ‘symbolic attempts to racialize and place modernity’ (Amin & Thrift, 2002, p. 292). In fact, according to some scholars urban diversity should be considered an asset to both ‘the diverse’ themselves and their locales. An appreciative or even celebratory approach of diversity is in line with the idea that diversity benefits cities’ economic development and innovative potential by
attracting members of the ‘creative class’ who would be drawn to open, inclusive, and diverse places (Florida, 2003). Although the creative class theory has been heavily criticized (e.g. Peck, 2005), its prescriptions have been readily adopted by urban policy-makers (Hoymann & Faricy, 2009), not least because it legitimizes spending money on ‘soft’ policy areas such as diversity by their connection to ‘hard’ economic profits (Musterd & Murie, 2010). Moreover, the focus on individual characteristics instead of group-based attributes is attractive to policy-makers looking to formulate inclusive policies beyond the multiculturalist paradigm (Faist, 2009). Therefore, cities have started to formulate more inhabitant-centric notions of citizenship based on localized notions of social justice (García, 2006). Contrary to national citizenship, urban citizenship would comprise a shared ‘right to the city’ based on residence and disconnected from nationality (Bauböck, 2003). Whereas according to Dukes and Musterd (2012) urban citizenship offers possibilities for the expression of difference within the overarching identity of city resident, Schinkel (2010) is more negative. He argues that cities use the concept of the ‘active citizen’ to discipline their residents and make them conform to a blueprint of the ideal citizen based on the dominant culture. Urban citizenship then takes a defensive mode which aims to neutralize threatening Others. A more thorough examination of the ways in which cities conceptualize and use urban citizenship is, therefore, needed to determine whether it fosters inclusion or exclusion.

2.3 The Dutch national context: Constraints and possibilities for local policy discourses

Diversity as a term is not much used in Dutch integration discourse. Rather, policy-makers first spoke of ‘ethnic minorities’ and ‘minorities policy’ which later became ‘integration policy’ and then ‘civic integration policy’. The designation ‘ethnic minorities’ located the difference of migrants in their – problematic – ethnicity, as it targeted only those groups considered in need of assistance (Scholten, 2013a). Another set of terms which gained currency from the 1980s onwards and now dominates both policy and public discourse is the allochtoon/autochtoon distinction. Whereas previously policies focused on specific ethnic minority groups, now the focus has shifted to individual allochtonen who are contrasted with the native majority (Van der Haar & Yanow, 2011). Allochtoon describes both first and second generation migrants. Although envisaged at first as less rigid than ‘ethnic minority’, the distinction between allochtoon and its opposite autochtoon became a ‘bright boundary’ (Alba, 2005):
differences between the groups are considered permanent and insurmountable, while internal differences are obscured (Dukes & Musterd, 2012).

Like other Western European countries, The Netherlands experienced a shift from a multiculturalist regime, which allowed and encouraged migrants to retain their cultural distinctiveness, to a more assimilatory civic integration regime. While multiculturalism celebrated the intrinsic value of migrant cultures, these are now considered to be incompatible with the Dutch majority culture. Fostering ethnic identities is thought to result in a disconnect from Dutch society and the rejection of Dutch values (see e.g. Scheffer, 2000). With the introduction of civic integration policies, adaptation to the Dutch majority culture became a normative end-goal. Failure to meet this goal results in migrants’ exclusion from membership in the Dutch national community, as national citizenship has become increasingly restrictive. Receiving a permanent residence permit is dependent on passing so-called ‘citizenship exams’ which test knowledge of the Dutch language and norms and values (Joppke, 2007). Migrants are also increasingly denied ‘moral’ citizenship, denoting their acceptance by and inclusion in society (Schinkel, 2010). The current Dutch national policy discourse has almost no conception of the potentially beneficial aspects of a diverse society within the national discourse (Dukes & Musterd, 2012) and little room for the articulation of individual migrants’ identities (which are subsumed under the umbrella term ‘allochthonous’).

Dutch national policy discourse stresses the local environment as the appropriate scale for the integration of migrants, as evidenced by the following quotation from a national policy paper on integration:

*Living together – taking note of one another’s views, addressing problems together, and building a common future – requires that Dutch citizens meet each other within a safe and liveable environment and across the boundaries of their different backgrounds. By doing things together in the district and neighbourhood citizens develop something that they have in common, differences become less threatening, and there even arises room for difference* (VROM Ministry7, 2009, p. 11).

This interpretation of integration as a micro-scale practice may make room for the formulation of city-specific diversity discourses. While previous studies have compared the content of cities’ policies and developed models of incorporation (e.g.

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7 Ministry of Public Health, Spatial Planning, and the Environment
Alexander, 2003; Penninx et al., 2004), this research has a slightly different focus as it is concerned with the discourses through which migrants are categorized and evaluated. Although the nation-state constrains the scope for policy formulation, cities develop institutional and discursive structures which affect ethnic minorities in different ways (Nicholls & Uitermark, 2013). Dutch local policy actors often have considerable leeway in implementing national policy directives. Policies in the field of integration are routinely decentralized (Penninx, 2009), and national budget cuts will likely further strengthen the policy-making capacities of municipalities. Policy-making processes in cities do not simply reflect national ones but are characterized by a different logic. Local actors have tactical and strategic advantages in the design and implementation of policies since they are closer to their implementation and daily practice in a diverse context (Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008). Often, city-specific policies and discourses pre-date national ones which make them resistant to change ‘from above’. The focus on pragmatics and efficiency which is characteristic to the municipal level can also result in the continuation of old policies, even if these contradict stated policy aims (De Zwart & Poppelaars, 2007).

National policy frameworks and discourses interact with circumstances and discourses ‘on the ground’ to create context-specific policy outcomes. Previous studies in the Netherlands have indeed found large differences between municipalities in the implementation of national integration policies such as civic integration classes (Kirk, 2010) and naturalization ceremonies (Verkaaik, 2010). Although it is often assumed that local policies will be more accommodating, this need not be the case: indeed, local policy actors can also ignore migrant issues or seek to externalize them (Mahnig, 2004). One example is the policy introduced by the city of Rotterdam (the second-largest city in the Netherlands and one of the most diverse) in 2005 which enabled the municipality to designate areas (euphemistically called ‘opportunity zones’) where the inflow of low-income households and those households exhibiting ‘problematic’ behaviour could be restricted. This measure was born out of concern regarding the share of disadvantaged migrant households in these areas (Van Eijk, 2010). Thus, although Dutch cities have considerable autonomy both in implementing national civic integration policies and in formulating city-specific policy discourses, this need not result in more inclusive policies.
2.4 Data and methods

This study uses a discourse analytical approach to examine the discursive gap between the national and the local level. Following the writings of Foucault (1977, p. 49), discourse is here defined as ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak (...) they constitute them and in doing so conceal their own invention’. Discourses construct systems of knowledge and belief which exercise meaning-making and problematizing powers. The focus is on policy discourses, i.e. the ‘official’ definitions of social situations (Van Dijk, 1997) as they are expressed in policy texts. Policies are not viewed as response to problems existing in a world ‘out there’, but as themselves constituting both problems and solutions. They determine what can legitimately be said and what is rendered invisible from debates and (policy) practices. Previous research has found that migrants are positioned as problematic objects (Van Dijk, 1997) and are Othered through, among other things, their discursive placement ‘outside’ society, the introduction of new terms of classification, and the sensationalizing of integration debates through the use of rhetorical tricks (Schrover & Schinkel, 2013). This research elaborates on these findings by comparing multiple discursive contexts. Discourses relate to and draw upon each other (interdiscursivity), especially when they are hierarchically ordered (as is arguably the case with a national discourse and local discourses). A comparative case study approach of two Dutch cities was chosen to examine the discursive gap between the national and the local policy level.

Amsterdam and The Hague were selected as case studies because of the continuous presence of migrant policies in these cities and their relative salience, arguably a factor of their (for Dutch standards) large and diverse populations and national prominence. With close to 800,000 residents Amsterdam is the capital and largest city in the Netherlands. The Hague is the seat of the national government and the third largest city in the Netherlands, with a population of over 500,000. Slightly over fifty per cent of both cities’ inhabitants are first or second generation migrants (OIS, 2014; The Hague in Figures, 2014). However, differences between the cities in terms of economic and socio-spatial structure as well as political orientation are likely to influence their discursive opportunity structures. Amsterdam is generally considered to be a progressive and left-wing city (its politics has been historically dominated by the Labour Party) with moderate levels of class and ethnic segregation and a thriving urban economy, based primarily in the service sector. In contrast, The Hague is much more segregated (Musterd & Van Kempen, 2009), and its urban economy is weaker and largely dependent on public service
and administration (Kloosterman & Priemus, 2001). Radical right-wing and populist parties have been a recurring factor in municipal politics. The analysed material consists of twelve policy papers in Amsterdam and eleven in The Hague, dating from 2003 to 2013. Statements made in political forums (such as debates or speeches) were not considered, nor the reception and/or interpretation of policy discourses. Included were all policy papers which focused on migrants and diversity during the 2003-2013 period, as well as articles on the municipal website discussing migrant policies. In addition, policy papers which prominently mention migrants (e.g. concerning adult education or emancipation) and general policy papers detailing the plans of the new administration were examined. By looking at documents where migrants were the central topic and documents where they were not, the robustness of discourses could be examined, thus increasing the validity of the findings. All papers are authored either by the municipal board or the alderman of the respective policy field, and can therefore be considered representative of the municipality’s policy discourse. However, as will be shown, this does not mean that the articulated discourses are necessarily coherent or that multiple discourses cannot be present simultaneously. Central in the analysis is the idea that notions such as diversity and citizenship do not have a (permanently) fixed meaning, but should be considered ‘floating signifiers’: stakes in the ongoing struggle of competing discourses to fix their meaning. Discourses articulate the meaning of signifiers through processes of association and disassociation (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). From initial readings of these policy papers urban diversity and citizenship emerged as central ordering points. The analysis proceeded to further unpack these terms by examining their role in describing the city and its residents, their valuation and their use as tools for the discursive inclusion and/or exclusion of social groups. Attention was paid to points of convergence or divergence between cities and between cities and the national level, and to developments over time.
2.5 Amsterdam: The power of a diverse city

Alexander (2003) and Uitermark, Rossi and Van Houtum (2005) among others have described the development of Amsterdam’s minorities policy until 2003, starting with the 1989 memorandum ‘Municipal minorities policy’. In line with national-level developments, this memorandum stimulated the organization of minority groups in associations and advisory councils on an ethnic basis. In the 1990s however, emancipation within the own (ethnic) group became seen as constraining and stigmatizing. Whereas at the national level the individualization of migrants in policy discourse resulted in a renewed focus on the Dutch majority culture, in Amsterdam the first steps towards a ‘diversity policy’ were made. The 1999 draft-memorandum ‘The power of a diverse city’ rejected the allochtoon/autochtoon dichotomy and introduced the notion of the Amsterdammer (resident of Amsterdam) who has a multifaceted (‘diverse’) identity. The diversity policy, which aims to encourage inter-ethnic dialogue and counter stereotypes, emphasizes individuals over groups and projects over organizations.

The following quotation demonstrates that these shifts can also be identified in more recent policy papers in Amsterdam, although the ethnic dimension dominates in practice (religion is notably absent):

*Gender, age, sexual orientation, and ethnic group are the most important dimensions for the description [of diversity in Amsterdam]. Incidentally, the emphasis is on the integration of ethnic groups and subcategories within these groups (young/old, first/second generation, low/high educated et cetera) (Amsterdam, 2004)*

(Ethnic) diversity is first of all presented as a fact of urban life, albeit one that should be regulated by municipal policies: ‘migration is a part of urbanity and something which the local government must permanently take into account’ (Amsterdam, 2003, p. 12). Amsterdam presents itself as a ‘creative knowledge city’ and as accessible, social, and tolerant. Its creative industry and diverse population are seen as two of the city’s most important characteristics (www.amsterdam.nl). According to Florida (2003), in order to prosper cities need to attract the ‘creative class’ who would be drawn to open, diverse, and tolerant places. Amsterdam aligns itself with this view and finds evidence for it in the city’s past as successful trading hub:
Cultural diversity creates innovation, creativity, and flexibility, which traditionally have enriched the commercial spirit of Amsterdam (...) the success of the city is to a great extent the result of the degree to which Amsterdam knows how to use these forces (www.amsterdam.nl)

Diversity attracts international corporations and young high-potential Western migrants (Amsterdam, 2012), but the ‘vitality, ambition, and work ethic’ of refugees are also considered assets (Amsterdam, 2011a). In short, diversity is essential to the presentation of Amsterdam as a ‘strong brand’ (Amsterdam, 2003). However, prospering from the ‘forces of diversity’ depends on the city’s ability to evade the risks which diversity also brings:

Diversity is the strength of the open city. But diversity is also a potential source of conflict. Discrimination, feelings of detachment, and radicalization threaten social stability and can lead to a divided city (Amsterdam, 2006a, p. 2)

Two images of the city are contrasted: there is the open city which offers freedom and opportunities for self-realization, as well as relative anonymity (Amsterdam, 2011b), but at the same time diversity can lead to a divided city characterized by instability and radicalization. Crucially, the second scenario can be averted by policies which mitigate diversity’s potential tendency towards permissiveness: diversity should be accompanied by participation and emancipation (Amsterdam, 2010), and tolerance should not mean indifference (Amsterdam, 2012).

The potential of local (city) identity to connect people of different backgrounds and create more inclusive political communities is often cited as rationale behind the introduction of urban citizenship (Bauböck, 2003; Dukes & Musterd, 2012) as it allows for the creation of a common ‘we’ while preserving individual differences. In Amsterdam’s policy discourse, belonging to the city is a key theme: ‘By offering a shared view of “reality” between increasingly opposing groups, residents of Amsterdam can identify with Amsterdam and feel accepted and like they are part of the story Amsterdam’ (Amsterdam, 2006b, p. 12). Citizenship in Amsterdam is formulated in an explicitly inclusive manner:
At its core, citizenship means to Amsterdam that everybody can participate in society, and is involved with the city and his or her fellow residents. Every Amsterdammer is citizen of the city regardless of age, origin, belief, or ethnicity. Citizenship transcends and bridges the differences among the population of Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 2011b, p. 1)

Thus, citizenship is defined as the common basis of all residents of the city. As no additional criteria (other than residency) need to be fulfilled to qualify as ‘citizen of the city’, it is an ascribed rather than an achieved identity. This inclusiveness is also evident in the terminology which is used to refer to (children of) migrants. From 2013 onwards, the nationally dominant labels ‘allochtoon’ and ‘autochtoon’ are no longer used. Instead, the city opts for an ‘American’ system of hyphenated identities (e.g. Moroccan Amsterdammer) to be used only when naming national origins is deemed relevant. The rationale for this switch is twofold: those with migrant backgrounds consider the term ‘allochthonous’ to be stigmatizing, and for the municipality it is too broad to be informative anyway (Amsterdam, 2013a). Thus, the desire to create an urban community which recognizes ‘diverse’ citizens yet at the same time allows for their continued registration has led to the adoption of a more fine-grained classification which emphasizes migrants’ bond with the city.

However, citizenship of Amsterdam also has elements of an achieved status. This is because it is conceptualized as going beyond previous integration policies. No longer are behavioural and attitudinal demands only made of migrants: ‘building the city’ becomes the responsibility of all Amsterdammers. The core of urban citizenship in Amsterdam consists of five ‘citizenship competences’: identification (with the city), representation, accountability, defensibility, and tolerance (Amsterdam, 2012). These citizenship competences are to be expressed through everyday, mundane practices of civility and attentiveness which take place in residents’ direct environment, such as greeting one’s neighbours, helping senior citizens, and maintaining one’s garden (www.amsterdam.nl). Therefore, the construction of urban citizenship as something which emphatically includes migrants at the same time delimits the in-group in other ways, namely by excluding those who do not (want to) practice citizenship in this way or who do not feel connected to the city.

Where the city’s policy paper on integration, dating from 2003, poses the question ‘when am I/can I become a full citizen of the Netherlands (Amsterdam)?’ (Amsterdam, 2003, p. 9), almost a decade later it is stated that ‘every Amsterdammer is citizen of the city’ (Amsterdam, 2011b, p. 1). However, in practice a distinction between
‘full’ and ‘deficient’ citizens is still made, dependent on mastery of citizenship competences. Migrants are more at risk of being cast as nonparticipating as their belonging is less self-evident (hence the initial formulation: natives are, migrants become). Moreover, migrants’ fitting the ‘good citizen’ template can be enforced (as is also the case for those ‘native’ Dutch who occupy socioeconomically weak positions and/or are dependent on the state). For example, citizenship competences are a component of Amsterdam’s language courses, which are obligatory for first-generation migrants while they are also taken by some (semi)illiterate ‘native’ Dutch (Amsterdam, 2013b). Although all Amsterdammers are expected to be competent citizens, exhortations to participate focus on migrants:

The municipality considers it important that new Amsterdammers participate and play an active role in society (...) All citizens must be able to gain knowledge and develop competences to take part in and contribute to our diverse and complex city. Effective citizenship contributes to a sense of identity and belonging (www.amsterdam.nl – emphasis added)

Amsterdam’s diversity policy entails a move away from national-level civic integration discourse. Adaptation to the majority culture is replaced by loyalty to and participation in the city. Through the individualization and broadening of the notion of diversity, societal problems related to ethnicity are depoliticized, and diversity is reframed as positive and as an asset to the city. Notable in this regard is the absence of religion as a salient aspect of diversity. Although some (e.g. Nicholls & Uitermark, 2013; Uitermark & Gielen, 2010) argue that Amsterdam has made extensive use of religious institutions to incorporate and pacify religious minorities, in the examined policy documents religion is relatively absent. Islam is only mentioned at some length in a policy paper which was written after the murder of prominent Islam critic Theo van Gogh by a Moroccan Amsterdammer. This policy paper emphatically states that ‘this dynamic [of polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims] should of course be broken’ and ‘moderate Muslims are of course part of “WE”’ (Amsterdam, 2005, pp. 5, 21). Muslims are brought into the fold as a matter of course, while the national government is criticized for framing problems in terms of a presupposed ‘gap’ between Islamic and Western values (Amsterdam, 2006b) and for being unwilling to recognize the reality of living with diversity: ‘where “The Hague” [reference to the national government] calls [for migrants to] “adapt or leave”, Amsterdam should focus on what connects us, on the necessity of, literally, living together’ (Amsterdam, 2005, p. 44).
2.6 The Hague: Integration within one generation

The Hague rose to prominence as the seat of the national government, a position it still holds today. The city also houses 160 international institutions and organizations, among which the International Court of Justice and the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration. Compared to other Dutch cities The Hague is relatively segregated in terms of income and ethnicity, which has a historical basis in the division between the parts of the city built on sand (the sea-side, for the richer households) and peat (the inland side, for the poor). Moreover, it is one of only two cities in which the populist anti-immigrant party PVV is represented in the municipal council (since 2010).

The Hague presents itself as a city whose global orientation matches the international make-up of its population. As stated by the municipal board with regard to The Hague’s bid for the title of European Cultural Capital of 2018:

*This title will* give The Hague the opportunity to – proudly – present itself as city of peace and justice in all its versatility and history. Together of course with the open and connecting position of The Hague, both towards Europe and towards itself, with its different neighbourhoods and diversity of residents (The Hague, 2012a, p. 1)

This quotation among others illustrates the city’s attempts to connect its (desired) status as ‘legal capital of the world’ with the presence of increasing numbers of migrants. The Hague presents diversity and the multicultural city as a factual reality, with diversity primarily conceived as different ethnic groups: ‘The Hague is a diverse city. Around half of the inhabitants has a different ethnic background’ (www.denhaag.nl). Some distinctions within ethnic groups are also made, based on generation (first or second) and length of stay (recent versus established migrants). Religion is hardly mentioned, which is remarkable considering its overwhelming discursive dominance at the national level. The only references are to prayer houses (mosques, mandirs), which are seen as places in which specific ethnic (not religious) groups congregate. The continued focus on ethnic groups is apparent from references to inter-group contacts, inter-group discrimination et cetera. In principle, the municipality establishes contacts with migrants through intermediaries of their own ethnic background. Support for the integration policy among migrant organizations is considered very important (The Hague, 2012b). This indicates a divergence from the more individualized national policy discourse.
The Hague presents diversity as both potential asset and problem. European organizations and expats are considered valuable since their presence generates employment (www.denhaag.nl). However, the link between the city’s international profile and its diverse population is rather incidental since international elite workers are not assumed to be more attracted to The Hague because of its migrant population. ‘Ordinary’ migrants also contribute to the city’s continued economic vitality, especially as ethnic entrepreneurs and caretakers of the elderly (The Hague, 2011). Moreover, diverse neighbourhoods such as Chinatown but also Transvaal (which is generally considered a problematic area) are presented as potential tourist attractions (The Hague, 2006). The past serves to justify today’s positive outlook:

*Over 50% of the residents of The Hague is not of Dutch descent. That is an asset for our city. Namely, diversity offers opportunities in the economic, social, and cultural field. That was the case in past centuries and that is still the case* (www.denhaag.nl)

The presence of migrants is also seen to bring problems such as language delays, unemployment, discrimination, and negative reporting by the media (www.denhaag.nl). The focus is on the problems of diversity which are considered already present while the assets of diversity are presented as potentiality to be realized (‘diversity offers opportunities’).

In contrast to the national discourse which distinguishes *allochtonen* and *autochtonen*, The Hague mostly uses the term ‘migrants’ (earlier policy documents do follow the national terminology as they distinguish between *allochtone* and *autochtone Hagenaars*). Migrants are contrasted with ‘Dutch residents of The Hague’ (*Nederlandse Hagenaars*) (The Hague, 2011). This terminology associates the native Dutch population with the city. In contrast, ‘migrants’ (a term which includes the second generation, who have technically not migrated) are not directly connected to The Hague. Although they are included as citizens, they also have to consciously choose to be part of and identify with the city. Through their integration they become ‘valuable’ citizens and *Hagenaars*:

*Some [migrants] have made a conscious choice to be Hagenaar. Others (still) consider themselves to be Moroccans, Turks, or Africans first and are primarily oriented towards the own community (...) Migrants are an asset to The Hague if they are economically independent and active*
The current integration policy, which is based on the 2011 paper ‘Differing pasts, one future’, follows the national discourse by rhetorically distancing itself from formerly professed multiculturalism. The first paragraph of the city’s policy paper on integration stresses the new aspects of the policy. Whereas previously connecting different groups was the central aim, now the motto is ‘integration within one generation’. The more detached objective of fostering mutual respect replaces the earlier emphasis on connection. In some cases, the municipality even goes beyond national civic integration requirements. For example, The Hague wants to make pre-school language trajectories for migrant children obligatory, as well as civic integration exams for more migrant categories than currently required.

Integration is defined as economic independence and social participation, which aligns with the national definition of civic integration. However, while the national discourse privileges cultural over socioeconomic integration (Schinkel, 2010), The Hague considers social participation (including language acquisition) to be instrumental to achieving economic independence. Dutch national integration discourse puts great emphasis on shared values, norms, and practices. The Hague similarly acknowledges the desire of native Dutch Hagenaars to feel comfortable and at home in their own neighbourhoods, which is made dependent on the absence of – unintegrated – migrants:

_During the past decades, a lot of citizens have been confronted with one large societal change after the other. They no longer feel at home in their street and their city. Every day they experience what failed integration means: neighbours with whom they cannot talk and who cannot be their allies in the struggle for a liveable, safe, and social neighbourhood. We want to win back those justly concerned citizens for our policy. We will do this by taking their problems, fears, and needs seriously. By demonstrating that this government also wants to find solutions for their problems. By increasing the pace of integration_ (The Hague, 2011, p. 2)

The city does implicitly distance itself from divisive national policy rhetoric by stressing the right of migrants to the city and the need for rational discussion between groups:
The right of migrants to be and stay here is not up for discussion. In a multicultural city there are no first- and second-class citizens, but everybody has equal rights and duties and gets an equal say. Real problems of both original residents and migrants when it comes to living together in a multicultural way should be discussed and resolved, without getting bogged down in rancour or accusations of discrimination and without inflating problems between individuals into a clash of civilizations (The Hague, 2011, p. 13)

Similar to Amsterdam, The Hague introduced urban citizenship (referred to as burgerschap or citizenship) as a more inclusive and less polarizing alternative to integration. When it was first conceived, one of the aims of the concept was to increase positive intercultural contacts and the appreciation of diversity (The Hague, 2005a). Moreover, there was room for cultural differences in the interpretation of urban citizenship (The Hague, 2005b). More recent policy documents however paint a different picture. Urban citizenship is now something which residents owe the city, rather than a way of improving interpersonal relations: ‘don’t ask what The Hague does for you, but what you contribute to The Hague’ (The Hague, 2010, p. 6). In answer to the question: ‘citizen: are you one or do you become one?’ the city states ‘citizenship is not only a juridical notion but also a way of life…citizenship also means that citizens who shirk their social responsibilities (“those who are unwilling”) will be reproached’ (The Hague, 2005a, pp. 9-10). A distinction is made between those who are merely ‘juridical’ citizens and those who do not just reside in, but also contribute to the city. Especially for migrants, non-participation is not an option:

We do not accept that migrants (...) themselves choose to stand aside (...) A prerequisite to become a citizen is the desire to be a citizen. Those who are elsewhere in their heads and only stay here temporarily cannot focus sufficiently on building a future in The Hague (The Hague, 2011, -pp. 7-9)

Thus, migrants are the primary addressee of policy papers on citizenship while the commitment of the ‘native’ population is assumed. The past recognition of the rights of migrants to help shape the ‘rules of the game’ instead of unilaterally adapting to ‘the’ Dutch or The Hague society (The Hague, 2005b) is replaced by the more restrictive notion of ‘good’ urban citizenship which demands that residents identify with the city and involve themselves in city life.
2.7 Discussion

This study adds to the research on the construction of policy discourses on migrants and citizenship by focusing on the still understudied ‘local turn’ (Scholten, 2013a) of migrant policy formulation. It does so by examining the comparative positioning of cities within one national discursive context. Findings show that although the Dutch national government constrains the scope for policy formulation, local policymakers formulate alternative discourses based on the realities of governing diverse cities. Diversity and urban citizenship are central in these endeavours. Diversity is an attractive concept to policymakers as it combines an individualist approach with a concern for social inclusion (Faist, 2009), and because theories on the competitive edge of diverse cities help justify expenditures on social policies (Musterd & Murie, 2010). For example, Amsterdam and The Hague explicitly connect their self-positioning as a global city to the diversity of their residents. However, diversity is not only viewed as asset: both cities demonstrate great awareness of (potential) problems associated with diversity, and both turn to urban citizenship as a potential solution.

Urban citizenship creates possibilities for the construction of overarching identities which remain sensitive to the diverse backgrounds of cities’ inhabitants (Dukes & Musterd, 2012). Thus, it offers an alternative to national discourses which
seek to dissolve cultural difference through integration: ‘an urban citizenship that is emancipated from imperatives of national sovereignty and homogeneity may become a home base for cosmopolitan democracy’ (Bauböck, 2003, p. 157). However, urban citizenship can also be used to enforce policy-makers’ notions of the ‘good’ citizen, effectively drawing new boundaries based on identification and involvement. This results in a situation of false equality where migrants have to ‘choose’ to be a citizen and ‘learn’ how to do this while ‘native’ majority members are exempted from such demonstrations of loyalty. Whereas Bauböck (2003) envisioned an ascribed form of urban citizenship based on residence, in Amsterdam and The Hague it also has prominent elements of an achieved status, as can be seen from new differentiations between ‘good’ citizens and those who are labelled as uncooperative and unwilling. Migrants are more likely than ‘native’ majority members to be placed in the latter category.

As various authors argue, integration practices necessarily take place at the local level (Penninx, 2009; Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008). Local governments therefore have reason to resist the centrifugal tendencies of symbolically charged nationalist discourses. Arguably, cities’ potential to do so is enhanced through the focus of both national and cities’ discourses on the local as the place where integration is realized (Amin, 2005). This ‘romanticizing’ of local communities legitimizes cities and other localities as objects of identification and loyalty and justifies their formulation of place-specific policies. Indeed, cities’ policies do not focus solely on practical matters. Amsterdam and The Hague have constructed alternative discourses in which diversity and (urban) citizenship are key signifiers. Urban citizenship strives to overcome boundaries between social (ethnic) groups by relating them to a common project (the city) and by defining a new ‘enemy’: the ‘unwilling’ resident. Through positing a new collective identity and form of group membership cities constitute a new social imaginary.

The Hague conforms more closely to the national discourse than Amsterdam, especially with regard to the city’s continued emphasis on integration and its demands for unidirectional adaptation by migrants. While Amsterdam started by conceptualizing urban citizenship as something to be achieved by migrants and today stresses its universal and connecting characteristics, The Hague has moved towards a more restrictive definition of urban citizenship which leaves less room for ethnic differences. Differing social, political, and historical contexts might provide possible explanations for this divergence in local policy discourse. Amsterdam’s reputation for tolerance – especially with respect to religious and sexual minorities – facilitates
the presentation of ethnic diversity as merely another aspect of a diversity which has long been regarded as ‘quintessentially Amsterdam’. The Hague, on the other hand, has historically been more insulated and is today characterized by more polarized class and spatial divisions. Moreover, whereas Amsterdam’s municipal government has been dominated for a long time by left-wing political parties, in The Hague the anti-immigrant PVV is one of the larger parties in the municipal council (although not part of the local government). As Van Gent and Musterd (2013) show in the case of The Hague, characteristics of the residential environment are related to support for right-wing populist parties. Similarly, the comparatively polarized discourse of The Hague might emanate from the more polarized make-up of the city itself.

This chapter analysed the discursive usage of diversity and citizenship in policy papers in two Dutch cities. While allowing for a demonstration of the ways in which these concepts are used in the construction of social groups and their positioning relative to urban society, analysing ‘official’ documents reveals less about the origins of policy discourses and any alternative voices that did not ‘make it’. Any explanations for divergences from the national discourse or differences between the case-study cities necessarily remain speculative. Future research could, therefore, examine policy-makers’ own understanding of concepts such as diversity and urban citizenship and their role in addressing urban issues. Furthermore, the analysis of policy papers tells us little about their implementation. Broad notions such as ‘diversity’ require a lot of interpretation before they can be applied (De Zwart & Poppelaars, 2007). Moreover, discursive changes can be resisted at the level of actual policy practices. Therefore, even though it is disavowed in local policy discourses, ethnicity may in practice remain a dominant frame of interpretation.