Cross-examining the past
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2. Unravelling the Past: Transitional Justice

The banality of evil transmutes into the banality of sentimentality. The world is nothing but a problem to be solved by enthusiasm

- Teju Cole

2.1 Introduction

What is mass violence and how does it fit the classifications of the legal lexicon of transnational atrocity criminalities? Writing on these issues necessitates sharp operationalisation, description and demarcation of terminology. Noticeably, it does not comprise everyday ‘ordinary’ aggressive violence, like pub fights, bank robberies or manslaughter. Nor are serial killings or terrorist attacks, but even those acts are not automatically included in the framework, notwithstanding the fact that they may cause lot of victims and that it can certainly be part of mass violence. Also, violations of the bulk of internationally recognised human rights are not necessarily ingredients of the mass violence corpus. All these crimes aside, the crux of the notion of international crimes lies in the unusual, systematic and macro-unsettling nature of the violence, as well as the socio-political situations in which it takes place. Often this type of violence is deemed so “serious” or so “unimaginable” that it “deeply shock[s] the conscience of humanity.” Seldom does this ‘ultraviolence’ transpire in peacetime. Neither does it often appear within the borders of democracy-styled or so-called rule of law nations, although these states or their nationals can be involved in them elsewhere. More common backgrounds and triggers of mass violence involve, amongst other things, war, civil conflict, insurgency, state repression, revolution, rapid political change or ecological

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224 Although, some criminologists argue that “magnitude aside, genocide is similar in many ways to ordinary violent crime and can be profitably studied in the ways that ordinary violent crime is studied.” Nicole Rafter, The Crime of All Crimes. Toward a Criminology of Genocide (New York & London: New York University Press, 2016), e-book.
225 Although terrorism is defined in international law and applied by an international criminal tribunal, but it typically is not included in the lexicon of international crimes. Yet, some jurisdictions, like The Netherlands, adjudicate crimes of terrorism within the International Crimes Chamber. See: Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), Appeals Chambers, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging (STL-II-001); 16 February 2011, art. 58; Rechtbank Den Haag, Vonnis (09/827101-16; 22 July 2016).
226 For instance, General Stanislav Galic was convicted for war crimes of having conducted, between September 1992 and August 1994, a campaign of sniping and shelling attacks on the civilian population of the Bosnian capital Sarajevo, causing death and injury to civilians, “with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.” UNICTY, TCI, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic: Judgement (IT-98-29-T; 5 December 2003), §26-49.
227 In jargon, only those human rights violations are included which are deemed “serious human rights violations.” The first set is generally dealt with at national jurisdictions or specialised regional human rights courts, including the European Human Court of Human Rights (HCHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) or the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). See: Andrew Clamham, ‘Human rights and international criminal law’, in: William A. Schabas, The Cambridge Companion to International Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 11-33.
229 Analogous to, for instance: Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities.
230 Examples include the role of the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK). Historical cases, in northern Africa, include cases such as Chad and Algeria. HRW, Enabling a Dictator. The United States and Chad’s Hissène Habré, 1982-1990 (New York: HRW, 2016); Martin Evans, Algeria. France’s Undeclared War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); The Iraq Inquiry, The Report of the Iraq Inquiry (London, 6 July 2016).
change. Crucially, mass violence stretches beyond individual isolated incidents and is rather a state of affairs over a period of time, which typically involves larger groups of perpetrators and victims and affects comprehensive parts of communities or societies as a whole. War can be so. But conventional warfare itself is not per se illegal. Generally, it is rather symmetric and battled out between professionally organised and recognisable armed units, such as military, gendarmerie, paramilitary, militias or mercenaries. Mass violence differs for it typically involves the asymmetric, and often systematic, targeting of numerous unprofessionally, unorganised and unarmed civilians, regularly by a large group of organised and armed people. When talking about mass violence, we mean those situations in which human integrity (humanity) is violated beyond the individual and where numerous killings – or other types of physical and psychological violence - of civilian non-combatants occur.

What is in a name? Mass murder, mass killing, massacre, pogrom, extermination, annihilation, ethnic cleansing, persecution, political violence, state crime and genocide may all sound the same and these types of mass violence could all be thought of as gross human rights violations, crimes against humanity or war crimes. And indeed they are interchangeable – and often confusingly and instrumentally - used in public, policy and academic vernaculars. Technically however, particularly when applying the operative legal definitions of these crimes, the terms imply diverse performances of violence, committed with dissimilar motives, in specific contexts and are sometimes targeted at differentiated victim groups. For example, genocide can involve extermination by mass killing, but exterminatory mass slaughter is not automatically genocide. Yet it surely is a crime against humanity. At least this would be the case for jurists, who would refer to the legal definitions and handle large-scale, methodical and group-selective violence from the strict juridical perspective. Social and political scientists, on their turn, tend to be more creative and flexible and tend to apply their own theoretical framework and self-styled definitions to “mass categorical violence” and may apply the genocide terminology in alternative academic definitions. Although often confusing for general audiences, the apparent dichotomy between the disciplines is that lawyers pursue to judge

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231 Sudden deployment of security forces or commencement of armed hostilities; Spill over of armed conflicts or serious tensions in neighbouring countries; Measures taken by the international community perceived as threatening to a States’ sovereignty; Abrupt or irregular regime changes, transfers of power, or changes in political power of groups; Attacks against the life, physical integrity, liberty or security of leaders, prominent individuals or members of opposing groups. Other serious acts of violence, such as terrorist attacks; Religious events or real or perceived acts of religious intolerance or disrespect, including outside national borders; Acts of incitement or hate propaganda targeting particular groups or individuals; Census, elections, pivotal activities related to those processes, or measures that destabilize them; Sudden changes that affect the economy or the workforce, including as a result of financial crises, natural disasters or epidemics; Discovery of natural resources or launching of exploitation projects that have a serious impact on the livelihoods and sustainability of groups or civilian populations; Commemoration events of past crimes or of traumatic or historical episodes that can exacerbate tensions between groups, including the glorification of perpetrators of atrocities; Acts related to accountability processes, particularly when perceived as unfair. United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes. A tool for prevention (UN, 2014), p. 17.

232 Straus would define it as “large-scale, systematic violence against civilian populations”. Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide, p. 31.

233 The ‘Rules of War’, as enshrined in for example the 1949 Geneva Conventions, comprises a large body of customs, practices, usages, conventions, protocols, treaties, laws and other norms that govern the conduct of hostilities, limits the methods and means of warfare used by fighting parties and seeks to protect civilians from suffering.


235 See for example: Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations, p. 17.

236 Over 30 such diverging scholarly definitions – that propose alterations in the meaning of intentionally, the range of the protected groups or the specific genocidal acts - can be distilled from the literature since 1959. See for a sample of 22 definitions: Adam Jones, Genocide. A Comprehensive Introduction. Second Edition (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 16-20. New definitions continue to transpire and often they strikingly resemble other crimes, such as crimes against humanity. See for example: “Genocide can be defined as a complex process of systematic persecution and annihilation of a group of people by a government.” Uğur Ümit Üngör, ‘Introduction. Genocide, an Enduring Problem of our Age’, in: Uğur Ümit Üngör (ed.), Genocide. New Perspectives on its Causes, Courses, and Consequences (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), p. 15.
perpetrators, sociologists and criminologists try to understand the underlying processes and historians opt to reconstruct and explain the events within a larger historical context. To outlaw such puzzlement in this thesis, though, I will discuss below the operational definitions applied in this study.

2.2 Genocide

The people who asked others to die for ideas were the last ones to do so themselves.

- Alain Mabanckou

Perhaps the most ambiguous, frequently contested and sturdily politicised tag of mass violence is genocide, an ideologically based and discriminatory crime per se. Etymologically and substance-wise, the term has a resilient antecedent in Zulu (Izwekufa), German (Völkermord) and possibly other languages. But it was not Shaka Zulu’s campaign of expansion and extermination in present-day South Africa and Zimbabwe in the early nineteenth century, nor Germany’s mass killing of Herero’s in present-day Namibia that gave birth to the concept as we know it since the second half of the twentieth century. Informed by other historical precedents, including the Turkish massacres of Armenians between 1915 and 1918, the current word surfaced during the Second World War and in context of the persecutory and exterminatory policies by the Axis powers in Europe. Stringing together the ancient Greek word for race or tribe (genos) with the Latin suffix for killing (cide), the term was first authored by the Polish public prosecutor and commercial lawyer Raphael Lemkin. Conceived “to denote an old practice in its modern development”, he described genocide as “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.” In the popularly assumed hierarchy of crimes,
genocide, a crime against groups rather than individuals, is often considered to be the vilest, the most devilish and destructive human sin; it is denoted as the ‘crime of crimes’. Historically, genocide as a term and historical framework is connoted with the racist, discriminatory and industrial obliteration of millions of European Jews and other socially categorised groups by Nazi Germany. In fact, the term itself was crafted and enshrined in law with that very exterminatory violence - within its immediate European political, social and continental context - in mind. Ever since, the usage of the word has been a sensitive matter; ranges of besieged groups have claimed to be targets of genocide and have sought to have their plight acknowledged as such, while suspected culprits vehemently deny their violence was genocidal. Genocide is an emotionally, morally, legally and politically delicate and polemic subject. Victims, perpetrators, politicians, civil society agents, journalists, academics and even judges can therefore not agree on which events in history constitute genocides – and under which definition, legal or non-legal - and which not. The very conception of the Genocide Convention in 1948 was already the result of four years of political diplomacy and compromise. As it is beyond the scope of this thesis to look at alternative academic definitions, this study operationalises the description treasured in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which since its adoption in 1948 and entry into force in 1951 remains the most widely accepted, adopted and applied legal definition. Unaltered ever since and featuring in the statutes of the tribunals and courts dealt with in this dissertation, genocide means killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life to bring about physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent births and, or, forcibly

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249 In its first reference to genocide, the United Nations Generally Assembly defined it as: “a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political, and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part.” Furthermore, the Assembly affirmed “that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals and accomplices, - whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds – are punishable.” UNGA, Resolution 96 (I): The Crime of Genocide (11 December 1946).

250 Many books and articles on genocide carry this adjective. See for instance: Rafter.

251 See f.

252 Although, in the most important trial of the Nazi leaders, at Nuremberg, the crime of genocide was not charged: International Military Tribunal, ‘Judgement’, in: International Military Tribunal, Trial of The Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November – 1 October 1946 (Nuremberg, 1947), pp. 171-341.


255 As it is beyond the scope of this thesis to look at alternative academic definitions, this study operationalises the description treasured in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which since its adoption in 1948 and entry into force in 1951 remains the most widely accepted, adopted and applied legal definition. Unaltered ever since and featuring in the statutes of the tribunals and courts dealt with in this dissertation, genocide means killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life to bring about physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent births and, or, forcibly
transferring children \(^{263}\) with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.\(^{264}\) A perpetrator of the crime of genocide, in the legal meaning but operationalised throughout this dissertation, \(^{265}\) is any person who was found by a court of law to have committed, conspired, directly or indirectly incited, attempted or was complicit in one or more of these acts, while having the intent that these acts would bring about the partial or complete destruction of any of the four specific groups.\(^{266}\)

Genocide, as enshrined in the *Convention* is a crime against many, but it first and foremost serves a legal concept and instrument for prosecution and individual punishment.\(^{267}\) Despite the fact that the *Convention* also talks about prevention.\(^{268}\) In the legal setting, proving the crime of genocide commands two basic requirements to prove its perpetration: the physical element *actus reus* (the committed or omitted acts) and the mental or moral element *mens rea*\(^{269}\) (intent and ‘specific intent’ *dolus specialis*).\(^{270}\) All components, starting with the alleged underlying facts must be proved beyond any reasonable doubt.\(^{271}\) For instance, the specific genocidal acts – killing, causing seriously bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent births and forcibly transferring children – necessitate, without exception, that the victim belonged to either a national, ethnical, racial or religious group whilst the offender envisioned to destroy that particular group as such in whole or in part. Crucial, at the ICC,\(^{272}\) is that the perpetrator acted “in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.”\(^{273}\) There

\(^{260}\) The perpetrator imposed certain measures upon one or more persons. The measures imposed were intended to prevent births within the particular group. ICC, *Elements of Crimes*, art. 6 (d) (1) & (4).

\(^{261}\) The perpetrator forcibly transferred one or more persons under the age of 18. The transfer was from the one particular group to another group. The perpetrator knew, or should have known, that the transferred person or persons were under the age of 18 years. The term “forcibly” is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment. Ibidem, art. 6 (d) (1), (4), (5) & (6).

\(^{262}\) UNGA, A. Adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (A/RES/260 (III); 9 December 1948), arts. 2-3.

\(^{263}\) Social science uses the concept of perpetrator or perpetration of genocide much more broadly and generally. In order not to confuse, this dissertation uses perpetrator only in case of legal conviction. When talking in broader terms, I will use either alleged perpetrator or the more generic term *génocidaires*.


\(^{265}\) The Rome Statute defines the mental element as follows: “a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime […] only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge […] A person has intent where: (a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. […] ‘Knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. ‘Know’ a that the perpetrator acted "in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.”
is no doubt that this crime is difficult to prove. So far, on the level of international criminal tribunals, only the UNICTY and UNICTR have rendered verdicts on genocide – on the basis of the Convention - crimes perpetrated by individual actors.\textsuperscript{274} Just one other international judicial forum, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), found that genocide occurred: the July 1995 massacres in Srebrenica.\textsuperscript{275} In Phnom Penh, the first genocide trial started in October 2014, concerning Khmer Rouge killings of ethnic Cham Muslims and Vietnamese nationals between 1975 and 1979.\textsuperscript{276} At the ICC, there is one outstanding arrest warrant for three counts of genocide on the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa peoples in Darfur, allegedly committed by Sudan’s President Omar al Bashir.\textsuperscript{277} In the context of these and other criminal cases and for the purpose of this study, genocide is thus understood to be a criminal offence as defined above, committed in the past.\textsuperscript{278} Whereas non-legal disciplines, such as political science, sociology and anthropology, may be helpful in providing insightful theory to help understand the phenomenon and its assumed general processes more in-depth and comparatively,\textsuperscript{279} this study restricts itself to the post-facto juridical framing of mass violence, its epistemology and historiography: how it is dealt with, framed and debated in the trial setting and how is it proved.

\subsection*{2.3 Crimes against humanity}

Genocide has been doused with demonic superlatives, often accrediting it with the title "crime of crimes."\textsuperscript{280} However, it is closely related to the concept of crimes against humanity. Not only were genocide and crimes against humanity immediate conceptual responses to the Nazi crimes in the 1940s, its two designers, Raphael Lemkin and Hersh Lauterpacht, came from the same multi-ethnic Polish city (Lvów, now Lviv in Ukraine), studied at the same law school (Jan Kazimierz University, Lwów) and competitively advocated their theories to be included at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg.\textsuperscript{281} Although strongly disagreeing on how to legally encapsulate the Nazi atrocities, both their concepts are now firmly – and often in conjunction – established as moral,
legal and academic concepts.\textsuperscript{282} Whereas Lemkin came up with a new word, Lauterpacht picked up already existing terminology,\textsuperscript{283} which was, unlike genocide, then enshrined - alongside crimes against peace and war crimes\textsuperscript{284} – in the IMT and IMTFE statutes.\textsuperscript{285} Accordingly, German and Japanese officials, or “war criminals” as they were called, were charged with acts of “muder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and ‘other inhuman acts’ committed against any civilian population, before or during war” as well as “persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds”.\textsuperscript{286} Like genocide, which was codified into a Convention, a day before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and entered into law in 1951,\textsuperscript{287} crimes against humanity faded to the background in international legal practice, only to manifestly resurface in the wake of the Cold War and the rise of ethnically tainted violence in the early 1990’s.

Brutal wars, mass murders and ethnic cleansing\textsuperscript{288} – with strong inter-ethnic, group-selective and large-scale exterminatory dimensions - in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda led the UN’s Security Council to establish its two \textit{ad hoc} tribunals.\textsuperscript{289} But for UNICTY and UNICTR prosecutors, genocide proved a difficult crime to establish, particularly for its special \textit{mens rea} requirement that “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.” As historian, legal professor and practitioner William Schabas outlines, the prosecution must establish that the offender must have had a ‘specific intent’ (\textit{dolus specialis}), as discussed above. If not established, the act remains punishable, not as genocide, but may be classified as a crime against

\textsuperscript{282} Apart from genocide, however, there exists no convention on crimes against humanity. For a general background with respect to the emergence of the concept of crimes against humanity as an aspect of international law, its application by international courts and tribunals and its incorporation in the national laws of some states, see: UNGA, First Report on Crimes Against Humanity. By Sean D. Murphy, Special Rapporteur (ACN.4/608; 17 February 2015).


\textsuperscript{284} The Tribunal listed “deliberate and systematic genocide” as a war crime (count 3), defining it as “the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly, Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others.” It was not discussed in the judgement.

\textsuperscript{285} “(c) Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan.” General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers’, Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, \textit{General Orders}. No. 1 (APO 500; 19 January 1946), art. 5.

\textsuperscript{286} International Military Tribunal (IMT), \textit{The United States of America, The French Republic, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - against - Hermann Wilhelm Goring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter Funk, Hajmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen Und Halbach, Karl Donitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur Von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz Von Papen, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Constantin Von Neurath, And Hans Fritzsche, Individually And As Members Of Any Of The Following Groups Or Organizations To Which They Respectively Belonged. Namely: Die Reichs- Regierung (Reich Cabinet); Das Korps Der Pol- Litischen Leiter Der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps Of The Nazi Party); Die Schutzstaffeln Der Natio- Nalsocialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Commonly Known As The "SS"); And Including Der Sicher- Heidtdienst (Commonly Known As The "SD"); Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, Commonly Known As The "Gestapo"); Die Sturm-Abteilungen Der Sud (Commonly Known As The "Sa"); And The General Staff And High Command Of The German Armed Forces, All As Defined In Appendix B, Defendants: Indictment (Berlin, 6 October 1945) Count 4 (A) & (B).

\textsuperscript{287} The Convention entered into force on 12 January 1951. Ethiopia was the first to ratify the Convention, on 1 July 1949. Eleven more states ratified (Australia, Norway, Iceland, Ecuador, Panama, Guatemala, Israel, Liberia, the Philippines, Yugoslavia and El Salvador) and seven accessed it (Monaco, Jordan, Saud Arabia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Vietman and Sri Lanka). On 14 October 1950, two States ratified (France and Haiti) and three acceded (Cambodia, Costa Rica and the Republic of Korea), bringing the total to twenty-four contracting States. The text was published in the five official UN languages Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish: ‘No 1021. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948’, \textit{United Nations Treaty Series}, Vol. 78 (1951), pp. 277-323.

\textsuperscript{288} The forced removal of an ethnic group from a territory. The acts, which can be very similar to genocide and crimes against humanity, but the concept as such has not been criminalised as such. Mostly, it serves as a criminological, political or popular euphemism for certain atrocities crimes. See: John Hagen & Todd J. Haugh, ‘Ethnic Cleansing as Euphemism, Metaphor, Criminology, and Law’, in: Leiza Nadya Sadat (ed.), \textit{Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 177-201. See for a contextualised history of the establishment of these, and other, international courts: Scheffer, \textit{All the Missing Souls}.
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons. Such arrest, detention or abduction was followed or accomp

international law. Ibidem, art. 2.

Seems to be a mistake: 302

cause by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or

301 torture, 302 sexual violence, 303 persecution, 304 enforced disappearances and

against a designated and objective social group. 291 For prosecutors at the UNICTY the alternative of charging crimes against humanity was harder since the mandate puts crimes against humanity nearly on the same level as genocide as they required evidence of discriminatory elements. 292 Next to “any civilian population” it adds in its definition “on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”, nearly equalling it with genocide crimes and thus placing a heavy burden on the prosecution at the tribunal to establish that crimes were directed at specific groups. 293

Crimes against humanity have now become a preferred and prominent legal framework – but not an alternative to genocide - at international tribunals and particularly at the ICC and countries that have incorporated the Rome Statute into national law. 294 By now, it is the most comprehensive and universally accepted definition, since no convention of crimes against humanity exists. 295 Likewise, the Rome Statute’s definition is the conceptualisation this study uses, except when explicitly noted differently. Thus, for the purposes of this dissertation, crimes against humanity encompass the broad set of ‘inhumane acts’ of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearances and

...
apartheid, 306 “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” 307 Breaking up the constitutive elements of crimes against humanity, four crucial contextual factors come to the fore. First, crimes against humanity concern the repeated commission of violent acts, not an isolated incident. 308 Either quantitatively, the violence can be widespread in that it concerns, for example, large numbers of victims or extends over a broad geographic area. Or qualitatively, the violence can be systematic for its organisational nature. Secondly, although some level of predetermined planning often animates attacks, the existence of a plan is not a necessary requirement but according to the ICC legal framework, such violent acts ought to be carried out "pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack." 309 Thirdly, CAH do require a mens rea, but it differs from the genocidal intentionality – to destroy a group in whole or in part - in that it suffices for the perpetrator to have knowledge of the attacks and “intended to further such an attack” and purposefully perpetrate the underlying crimes, such as murder or torture. 310 Like genocide, fourthly, which focuses on group-discriminatory destruction, crimes against humanity are defined by its victims. In this case, rather than solely protecting members – which may include non-civilians - of a national, ethnic, racial or religious social group, CAH include targeting of 'any civilian population', and not necessarily in a group-discriminatory manner. For instance, persecution as the only explicitly discrimination-based CAH is carried out on “ political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law” 311 while extermination includes the mass killing of member of any civilian population, irrespective of its discriminatory or not motives. Although, genocide and crimes against humanity can have overlapping contextual grounds and do not necessarily exclude their parallel perpetration, in times of war or peace, the latter provides a much broader framework in that captures more acts, events or policies and is not limited to intended group-oriented destruction. 312 Thus, ambiguous terminology such as genocidal acts, genocidal violence and even ethnic cleansing may post-facto not legally be labelled as genocide as a crime, but rather as crimes against humanity.

2.4 War crimes

Next to genocide and crimes against humanity, war crimes take an important place in the lexicon of refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons; or (b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom. Such arrest, detention or abduction was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization. Such refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons was carried out by, or with the authorization or support of, such State or political organization. The perpetrator intended to remove such person or persons from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. ICC, Elements of Crimes, art. 7 (1) (i). 308

The perpetrator committed an inhumane act against one or more persons. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the character of the act. The conduct was committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups. The perpetrator intended to maintain such regime by that conduct. ICC, Elements of Crimes, art. 7 (1) (j). 309

Rome Statute, art. 7; ICC, Elements of Crimes, art. 7. 310

Although at trial, a defendant can be actually charged with a single incident crime, which is committed as part of a widespread attack. 311

ICC, Elements of Crimes, art. 7.

Idem. 312

The Rome Statute includes broadest array of persecutory grounds. The UNICTY, UNICTR, SCSL, SPD, ECCC all refer to “political, racial, or religious persecution”. The EAC does not include persecution as a crime against humanity, yet it includes “political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or sexual” grounds for the crimes of torture and other inhumane acts. 312 Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide, p. 36.
this study, as it features not only in the statutes of the courts under study but also because it is often used as overlapping terminology when talking about mass atrocity, perpetration or the colloquial use of ‘war crimes trials’. Often, mass atrocities, even if they describe genocide or crimes against humanity, are simply referred to as war crimes and their agents as war criminals. In the legal realm, however, war crimes are very specific. Historically evolved as part of customary law and international humanitarian law (IHL), the rules governing the conduct of violent warfare automatically led to the incorporation of violations or ‘grave breaches’ of these rubrics. The concept of war crimes matured in the wake of World War I. It was introduced in the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and after World War II the wording was used in the London Agreement setting up the International Military Tribunal (IMT). One year after the subsequent adoption of the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 saw the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, which referenced to “grave breaches” which were updated in 1977. From 1993, both UN tribunals included war crimes – more commonly known as serious violations of international humanitarian law - in their respective statutes, yet the most current, comprehensive and detailed definition is provided in the Rome Statute. It lists no less than 50 specific offences divided over four chapters: (a) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, acts against persons or property; (b) other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law; (c) Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause; and (d) other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law. Seen altogether, the extensive list of specific war crimes includes acts very similar to genocide or crimes against humanity but the context in which they are committed differs. War crimes are specifically carried out during international or non-international

113 Constituted, until the Second World, by the various Hague Conventions of 1907 and the two 1929 Geneva Conventions. See for a comprehensive overview of International Humanitarian Law Treaties: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Treaties and States Parties to such Treaties (www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByDate.xsp, last visit: 12 May 2014).
115 The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, and other treaty engagements, signed at Versailles (28 June 1919), art. 228. It reads, in part: “The German Government recognizes the right of the allied and associated powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violations of the laws and customs of war.”
116 Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecutions of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis: Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, art. 6 (b). It reads: “Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.”
119 ICTY, Statute, art. 2 & 3: “Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 & Violations of the laws or customs of war”; ICTR, Statute, art. 4: “Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.”
120 ICC, Elements of Crimes, art. 8.
121 Rome Statute, art. 8.
122 Such as: killing, torture, directing attacks against civilian populations, attacking civilian objects, destroying historical, social or religious buildings.
armed conflicts. Also, war crimes are not as group-selective as genocide or crimes against humanity. However, the law on war crimes protects civilians and non-combatants and shield them from deliberate violence in times of war, a context often animating genocide or crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{323}

\textsuperscript{323} Straus, \textit{Fundamentals of Genocide}, p. 39.
2.5 Recent and Remote Mass Atrocities and Atrocity Trials

Altogether, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes constitute the main corpus of what is generally known as gross human rights violations, international crimes or atrocity crimes. Again, the overarching lexicon has historically evolved. From the mid-2000s, the dominant framework gradually became encapsulated under the concept of atrocity crimes, in order to separate the political use of genocide from its legal definition as a crime of individual responsibility. In extension of this wording, but including the non-legal concept of ethnic cleansing, which also seems to bridge a definitional and colloquial gap between the reality on the ground, the law and social science – all of which deal with mass violence - I will use throughout the thesis the term mass atrocity. This serves two purposes. First, as a legal concept, it is clear which broad range of crimes are covered, without continuously having to refer to specific details if not particularly necessary. Secondly, applying the term to different historical events, contexts or processes, it remains clear under what comparative legal framework these can be understood. In operationalising the generic term of mass atrocity, rather than mass violence, I take note of the fact that when discussing history, the problem arises that some of the underlying legal concepts, like genocide, were not in place yet when events occurred that retroactively may actually be determined to be genocide. Ergo, anachronisms may arise. Yet, in this respect, I employ the concept of ‘historical imprescriptibility’, as coined by Antoon De Baets, and which is informed by the notion of ‘legal imprescriptibility’ – the principle that atrocity crimes have to be investigated, prosecuted, and punished regardless of the passage of time, that is regardless of time bars or statutes of limitations. Legal imprescriptibility, however, can only pertain to ‘recent’ mass atrocities of which at least some perpetrators or (direct and indirect) victims are still alive. When there are no more such agents that could pull past events into the scope of atrocity law, atrocities enter the realm of history. Yet, invoking the principle of historical imprescriptibility, these past events can be analysed as historical crimes: crimes of the past similar to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Applying this perspective, this dissertation employs the terms mass atrocities, both for recent historical events as well as remote historical events. In consistency with all the above, when discussing trials, I will employ the term atrocity trials, rather than the somehow standardised, yet often misapplied, terminology of ‘war crimes trials’. In conjunction with the imprescriptibility

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330 For example, the historical case of the deliberate mass killing of Herero and Nama peoples by German colonial military could retroactively be termed genocide.
principles, I employ the term atrocity trial for all criminal and civil trials that in one way or the other deal with atrocity crimes, irrespective of when they took place or whether they addressed recent or remote atrocity trials and international criminal justice, these and a broad variety of non-legal dealings with the past reside under what is known as transitional justice (TJ). Writing about it, demands clear operationalisation of the term as well as demarcating the specific elements that are subject of this book: dealing with the past, criminal trials and to some extent truth commissions. Also, it needs to be clear what, for the purposes of this dissertation, is understood when talking about transitional justice. From the outset, as I have already observed in the introduction, transitional justice, as a social, political and legal concept is an impractical and normatively problematic neologism. For starters, the nearly utopic, positivist idealism and the prophetic Universalist realm in which it is framed, rests on a set of amorphous, almost mythical, notions like closure, reconciliation, truth and justice. Second, the moral, political and activist field comprises an excess of mechanisms, goals and applications, which often even compete with one and another and occasionally have counterproductive results. Yet these are all currently accumulated in a blueprinted international prescriptive first-aid-kit policy framework full of cleansing rituals ready for export to potential, real-time or post-conflict situations. But do these transitional scripts offer realistic plots? Indeed, increasingly criticised as having become a paternalistic, orientalist and imperialistic “cottage industry” of ‘the West’, serious concerns have been voiced about its successfulness in repairing human relationships in post-conflict

2.6 Configuring transitional justice

Recent or remote cases of mass atrocity, as conceptualised and operationalised above, led to conscious legal and non-legal encounters with their occurrences. Although this study focuses on legal atrocity trials and international criminal justice, these and a broad variety of non-legal dealings with the past reside under what is known as transitional justice (TJ). Writing about it, demands clear operationalisation of the term as well as demarcating the specific elements that are subject of this book: dealing with the past, criminal trials and to some extent truth commissions. Also, it needs to be clear what, for the purposes of this dissertation, is understood when talking about transitional justice. From the outset, as I have already observed in the introduction, transitional justice, as a social, political and legal concept is an impractical and normatively problematic neologism. For starters, the nearly utopic, positivist idealism and the prophetic Universalist realm in which it is framed, rests on a set of amorphous, almost mythical, notions like closure, reconciliation, truth and justice. Second, the moral, political and activist field comprises an excess of mechanisms, goals and applications, which often even compete with one and another and occasionally have counterproductive results. Yet these are all currently accumulated in a blueprinted international prescriptive first-aid-kit policy framework full of cleansing rituals ready for export to potential, real-time or post-conflict situations. But do these transitional scripts offer realistic plots? Indeed, increasingly criticised as having become a paternalistic, orientalist and imperialistic “cottage industry” of ‘the West’, serious concerns have been voiced about its successfulness in repairing human relationships in post-conflict
and especially post-colonial settings.\textsuperscript{335} Vocal observers and stakeholders from the ‘non-western’ world – or ‘global south’ - are therefore urging thinkers and actors in transitional justice to consider context and location, reconstruct notions of transitional justice that are informed by a wider moral and social universe and to craft an agenda that assumes a more holistic approach.\textsuperscript{336} On the other side of the spectrum, however, we observe activist historians to become more and more engaged in the field, as participants, even arguing that historical research and writing in a \textit{preventive manner} would facilitate goodwill and shared empathy among peoples.\textsuperscript{337} Academically, the debate on transitional justice is at least of a bipolar nature in that there is a striking contrast between activists and critics. An overview of the current state of affairs, debates and criticism would fill a separate book and is not at the heart of this study. I would therefore stop at the point where, non-historians have dubbed the post-

Cold War period the age of global transitional justice.\textsuperscript{338} It may carry some etymological truth, but the meanings, goals and uses of transitional justice policies are strikingly different from when the field erupted after the Second World War.

As a novel human rights framework, TJ and its plurality of mechanisms have evolved through the dealing with the Second World War (1940s), political transcendence (1980s), mass violence (1990s), historical injustices (2000s) and international politicking (2010s).\textsuperscript{339} Interestingly, the field matured alongside the evolution of human rights law and atrocity law specifically. As a starting point, transitional justice was rather synonymous to post-WWII prosecutions at the International Military Tribunals and Allied war crimes trials.\textsuperscript{340} Modern transitional justice surfaced and evolved from the late 1980s, early 1990s, parallel to the tumbling of one-party regimes and impervious dictatorships in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia.\textsuperscript{341} How to realise ‘justice in transition’? The principal ethical, legal and practical question among human rights activists, lawyers and legal scholars, policy makers, journalists, donors and political scientists was how successor regimes could deal with the abusive legacies of their precursors.\textsuperscript{342} The practices were not new at the conclusion of

\begin{itemize}
 \item \textsuperscript{335} Makua Matua, “What is the Future of Transitional Justice?”, pp. 1-9: 5.
 \item \textsuperscript{336} Matua, “What is the Future of Transitional Justice?”, p. 5. UN, Guidance Note of the Secretary General.
 \item \textsuperscript{340} For ‘internationalised’ post-WWII prosecutions, see: Yuma Totani, Justice in Asia and the Pacific Region, 1945-1952. Allied War Crimes Prosecutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

\end{itemize}
the Cold War, the presumed triumph of free market ideologies and political liberation around the globe, but the overarching term only gained standing in 1995, when Neil Kritz edited a voluminous study titled *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes*. Yet at the time, only the subtitle revealed what defined transitional justice. For some, this English phraseology could not capture its substance. Reason for British historian Timothy Ash to suggest two German words: *geschichtsaufarbeitung* and *vergangenheitsbewältigung*. Still, he summarised, that the various potential translations show the complexity of the matter: “treat” the past, “working over” the past, “confronting” it, “coping, dealing or coming to terms with” it; even “overcoming” the past. Ever since however, the term ‘transitional justice’ – with its French and Spanish conversions *justice transitionnelle* and *justicia transicional* – has normalised, but many definitions do still coexist.

The idiom is now commonly accepted and used by various scholarly disciplines, professionals, politicians, (non- or semi-governmental) lobby groups and civil society actors. But even while transitional justice is omnipresent around the globe in various contexts, the multi-usage and the evolution of its terminology have made its essence multidimensional and ambiguous. Is it an academic framework, a universal dogmatic human rights doctrine, a formula for democratic rule or a UN directive? Or is it truly an answer to human aspirations or has it become a branch of the humanitarian industry? Besides its use, the terminology itself likewise raises questions. What is a transition, from what into what, how, when, by whom and why? What is justice, who renders it, who receives it and who decides so? Are its foundations and applications truly universal? Also, if

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348 Ruti Teitel, a leading scholar on Transitional Justice defines transitional justice as “the conception of justice in periods of political transition.” Later, she updated it: “Transitional justice can be defined as the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” Ruti Teitel, *Transitional Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 3; Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’, *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, Vol. 16 (2005) 69-94: 69. According to the United Nations (UN), “Transitional justice initiatives promote accountability, reinforce respect for human rights and are critical to fostering the strong levels of civic trust required to bolster rule of law reform, economic development and democratic governance. Transitional justice initiatives may encompass both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, including individual prosecutions, reparations, truth seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals. See: UNSC, *The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. Report of the Secretary-General* (S/2011/634, 12 October 2011), §17. According to the ICTJ ‘Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms. Transitional justice is not a “special” kind of justice, but an approach to achieving justice in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression. By trying to achieve accountability and redressing victims, transitional justice provides recognition of the rights of victims, promotes civic trust and strengthens the democratic rule of law. See: ICTJ, *What is Transitional Justice?* (www-text: http://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice), visited: 8 August 2014). The specialised Oxford Encyclopedia says “Transitional Justice comprises a variety of judicial and non-judicial means through which states and societal groups seek to come to terms with past human rights violations by providing truth, justice, redress, and reconciliation. In some cases, this occurs in the context of a state’s transition to democracy from repressive rule or to peace from violent conflict. In others, established democracies confront past serious injustices, sometimes generations after they were committed.” Lavinia Stan & Nadya Nedelsky (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Transitional Justice. Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. xli. Since 2011, the UN’s Human Rights Council has called into life a Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence: UNGA, *Human Rights Council, Resolution 18/7 (A/HRC/RES/18/7, 13 October 2011)*. The position is filled by Pablo de Greiff (Colombia) since 1 May 2012.
350 Transitional justice has become a popular field of study within a variety of academic disciplines. There are at least two specialised journals on the topic: *International Journal of Transitional Justice* (Oxford University Press: 2009 - present) and *Transitional Justice Review* (Open access: 2012 – present).
there is alleged justified transitional justice what then is unjustified transitional justice and who is the judge on that matter? Is there such a thing as transitional injustice? Conservative transitional justice is a normative and a mostly positivist activist-inspired constellation, to a large extent also within academia. Its processes are framed in a dominant Universalist human rights discourse that they offer a good [just] roadmap for successful transitions [to democratic or rule-of-law-states or to peace]. ‘Negative’ transitions, departing from democratic rule or from peace, fall outside its scope,\(^{355}\) despite the fact that transitional justice mechanisms such as prosecutions and amnesties can be ‘unjustly’ applied. Hence, transitional justice – in its totality - is an extremely dynamic and multi-faceted concept, without a forthright definition. There is an important pitfall, however. That is that just like another delicate and emotionally loaded field like genocide studies – as briefly discussed above - transitional justice is a viable academic concept only “if protected from moral, legal, political and emotional constraints. It \textit{should} [my emphasis] be approached in a dispassionate, amoral, non-juridical and apolitical way” to the largest extent possible.\(^{356}\)

In all, and perhaps at best, transitional justice could be understood as the acquired diversity of human rights related practices, mechanisms, policies and trepidations guiding societal and political transitions, aimed at confronting real or perceived injustice.\(^{357}\) As much as these processes are perceived to succour rather lofty ends such as truth, accountability, reconciliation and redress, they are not evidenced models with guaranteed outcomes.\(^{358}\) In real life, they can also be ignored, deficiently executed or managed, neglected, misplaced, utilised to reach the contrary or they can turn out not to have these intended effects at all.\(^{359}\) The success of transitional justice is simply in the eye of the beholder, often depending on its heirs.

For the sake of clarity and useful empirical operationalisation, this study departs from the use of transitional justice as framework and rather opts to treat transitional justice endeavours as historic phenomena, or historical \textit{rites de passage}: case, local and culturally specific cleansing rituals guiding deep-rooted social and/or political change from widespread atrocity violence to the absence thereof.\(^{360}\) Breaking down the elements of this operative description, this thesis applies the following criteria. First, transitional justice is a liminal moment; it takes place at certain times and certain places for a certain time. It is transitory as it strives for closing and resolution. Second, transitional justice rituals


\(^{357}\) Frequently these include, alone or in tandem and inexhaustively: nothing [let bygones be bygones, impunity], amnesties [political prisoners, perpetrators], purges [vetting, lustration], prosecutions [national, regional and international], truth seeking [inquiry, exhumation, documentation], mediation, reparations [monetary, moral, symbolic], memorialisation [lieux de mémoire, commemorations, arts], social engineering [reconciliation, cohabitation, dialogue, rehabilitation], remedy [counselling, trauma healing, healthcare] and institutional, educational and socio-economic reforms.


\(^{359}\) Cilliers et al., ‘Reconciling after civil conflict’, pp. 787-794.

\(^{360}\) The French Ethnologist Arnold van Gennep described \textit{rites de passage}, as rituals marking significant transitions in human lives, such as birth, puberty, marriage and death. He introduced the concept of \textit{liminality} to describe the time in which people are on the threshold of entering a new phase in their life, having left the previous one behind. The ceremonies marking this transition enable people to experience this liminal phase, losing and then recreating their identity. See: Arnold van Gennep, \textit{Les rites de passage} (Paris: Emile Nourry, 1909).
can be both actions as well as inactions: for instance, to face the past or to not face it. Third, the change – or transition – applies to or has far-reaching implications for societies at large, or at minimum, significant parts thereof. Habitually, but not always necessarily, transitions are political, are escorted by political reconfigurations or have some kind of political consequences. Fourth, this study is particularly concerned with changes from a situation of widespread atrocious violence to a situation of non-widespread atrocious violence: the rites de passage of reckoning with mass atrocities as defined earlier in this introduction, irrespective of the political nature of the new regime. Fifth, the prime focus is on transitional fact finding agents, particularly criminal trials and (semi-) truth commissions. Sixth, despite its historical and global occurrence, this study focuses on these mechanisms in modern sub-Saharan Africa.

Thus, notwithstanding the possible critiques and pitfalls described above, transitional periods as such leave behind legacies, historical records of fighting past injustices. How to deal with this active dealing or breaking with the past? While living in this ‘age of transitional justice’, it is not only vital to critically address these processes itself, but also how parts of it functioned and what they leave behind. This study aims at offering glimpses of the process of shaping that legacy, of establishing narratives of the atrocious past and the potential and real-time uses and abuses of those ‘final’ truths or ‘transitional truths’. What kind of narrative truth do these mechanisms produce? What are the sources (testimony, forensics, documents)? Who are its creators (judges, truth commissioners, investigators, prosecutors, perpetrators)? Who are its consumers (victims, survivors, society, and politicians) and who were left out? In what way was transitional justice utilised by its protagonists, critics or affected societies and individuals? Last but not least, who takes ownership of the historical discourse in transitional justice? These are interesting questions when discussing transitional justice and they will be implicitly dealt with below.

2.7  Studying transitional justice

How to study transitional justice after mass violence? “In war, truth is the first casualty,” said the Greek tragedian Aeschylus. History is a fragile substance in the dramaturgy of conflict as it can be used and abused through deceptions, erasures and denials that blur the margins between verity and fiction. It is contested throughout its three-act structure; incompatible narratives of the past pave the way to or legitimise violence (pre), nourish war (per) and fester on in peacetime (post). Guns can be put to rest and perpetrators locked away, but it is conflicting memories and narratives that cannot be settled easily. Wordfares and competing narratives about the violent past may endure or substitute

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362 Aeschylus (525-524 BC - 456/455 BC).
363 See for an important discussion on this issue: Antoon De Baets, ‘A Theory of the Abuse of History’, In: Antoon De Baets, Responsible History (Oxford 2009), pp. 9-48. De Baets outlines that the natural habitat of abuses of history is a non-democratic environment but that its traces are also present in many democracies.
physical conflict, deeply simmering for generations to come and lingering like phantom pains. The essence of history is that it epitomises the route taken to the present. But it is the here and now that defines and shapes the representation of that passageway. Milan Kundera, the Czech novelist, elegantly described the process. According to him “we pass through the present with our eyes blindfolded. We are permitted merely to sense and guess at what we are actually experiencing. Only later when the cloth is untied can we glance at the past and find out what we have experienced and what meaning it has.” But history is also given meaning, through the way one wants to perceive it.

Historians, thus, do not just deal with the past, but also critically monitor and scrutinise the dealing with the past: how it is approached, unravelled and how narratives about the past come about. And for what reasons? Shortly, how is history used and possibly abused? Manifestly, criminal trials, as well as truth commission, warrant the historian’s notice because these are historical events, in which the past is on the agenda and where historical sources are used, created and verified. Also, their protagonists promise that these non-academic ventures will write ‘official’ and authoritative history. Simultaneously, transitional justice rites de passages – or cleansing rituals - are often presented as the closing ceremonies of violent eras as well as windows onto non-violent futures. But objective history is hardly the ultimate goal, because transitional justice formalities always take place in the contentious arena of truth politics: who decides what is to be known, can and may be known, by whom, how, where and when? Goals may heavily differ per agency group. Where victors, victims and survivors may want to seek, establish and reveal details about the repression, losers, perpetrators or bystanders rather distort, veil or obliterate those facts. Moreover, vanquishers without a clean slate can themselves employ transitional justice instruments to veil impunity, to whitewash prior crimes or to legitimise social engineering or foreign intervention.

In the light of either these enactments or non-enactments of history, in particular the recent past remains emotionally, morally, politically and legally litigious and contested narratives and different truths about the past will always persist. Narratives about the past frame history and the way it is experienced in many ways. The South African experience is a good example. For Archbishop Desmond Tutu, stories about the past bestowed a roadmap to “another country”, which landscape is versatile: “The way its stories are told and the way they are heard change as the years go by. The spotlight gyrates, exposing old lies and illuminating new truths.” In Tutu’s mind, the foreign past represented a jigsaw puzzle. Piece by piece, a fuller portrait emerges. But “it is not and cannot be the whole story,” Tutu writes in his preface to the ample report that concluded South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

(TRC) process in the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, he continues, its account provides a “perspective” as well as a “road map to those who wish to travel into our past.”\(^{370}\) And the voluminous TRC report definitely offers a guide alongside the country’s meandering pathways from Apartheid to egalitarianism, the ‘rainbow country’ spirited in Ubuntu.\(^{371}\) However, as a piece of history writing, the report was fundamentally constrained, in particular by the immediate transitional political context in which it was conceived, its objective of promoting national unity and reconciliation and the legal, geographical and temporal extent of its mandate.\(^{372}\) Furthermore, throughout its mandate, South Africa’s inquisitorial commission amassed some thousands of individual memories through testimony, \textit{viva voce} or by affidavit.\(^{373}\) ‘Truth telling’, as the process was dubbed, enabled victims as well as perpetrators to memorise and narrate publicly, without much reservation. Lifting the veil of secrecy that had covered South Africa, formerly repressed memories, sentiments and opinions were allowed to enter the public sphere. But they were not always of the same nature. It was therefore that throughout its process of public hearings as well as report writing, the TRC held four different notions of truth and operationalised them at various levels, balancing between the objective and subjective dimensions of its mandate: factual or forensic truth,\(^{374}\) narrative truth,\(^{375}\) dialogical truth\(^{376}\) and healing or restorative truth.\(^{377}\) In addition to these notions, a fifth conception, punitive truth, could be added, which is similar to a process of naming and shaming.\(^{378}\) Particularly in South Africa, the TRC operationalised truth as a form of public and official acknowledgement of previously denied, obscured or rationalised crimes against humanity.\(^{380}\) As a result, a register of various truths told by thousands of victims, perpetrators and bystanders moulded one official account of the past: a transitional truth, the product of a negotiated politics of memory. Although the TRC’s historical narrative is now part of South Africa’s rich historiography, conflicting narratives about the history of Apartheid persist well into the future. Thus, the past has not been settled.

\(^{369}\) TRCSA, Report, Volume I, p. 2.

\(^{370}\) Ibidem, p. 2.

\(^{371}\) Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the TRC’s President, described the Nguni Bantu term Ubuntu [“human kindness”] as a social harmony, in which “a person is a person through other persons.” Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), p. 29.

\(^{372}\) The objective of the TRC, as enshrined in its mandate, was “To provide for the investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated in the Constitution, within or outside the Republic, emanating from the conflicts of the past, and the fate or whereabouts of the victims of such violations; the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past during the said period; affording victims an opportunity to relate the violations they suffered; the taking of measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity of, victims of violations of human rights; reporting to the Nation about such violations and victims; the making of recommendations aimed at the prevention of the commission of gross violations of human rights; and for the said purposes to provide for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, comprising a Committee on Human Rights Violations, a Committee on Amnesty and a Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation; and to confer certain powers on, assign certain functions to and impose certain duties upon that Commission and those Committees; and to provide for matters connected therewith. Republic of South Africa, ‘Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995’, Government Gazette, Vol. 361, No. 16579 (26 July 1995).

\(^{373}\) It received over 21000 statements from individuals alleging they were victims of human rights abuses and 7124 from people requesting amnesty for acts they had committed, authorised or failed to prevent. See: TRCSA, Report, Volume I, p. 1.


\(^{375}\) On a personal (who, what, where and when) and social (context, causes and patterns) level. TRCSA, Report, Volume I, p. 110-114.

\(^{376}\) See further for a discussion: Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), p. 29.

\(^{377}\) The truth as it unfolds when individuals recount on their pasts. In this process of truth-telling, observations, stories, myths, and experiences are recorded in order to reconstruct the national memory as it was suppressed in the past. Idem.

\(^{378}\) Truth in the process of truth finding and interaction - through debate and dialogue between different factions in society. Idem.

\(^{379}\) Through public acknowledgment and exposure of the realities of past injustices \textit{can} lead to societal healing, historical fairness and rehabilitation of human dignity. TRCSA, Report, Volume I, p. 110-114.

\(^{380}\) In the South African context where perpetrators were given to chance to come clean publicly – they were offered amnesty in exchange for the truth – it was viewed that public shame during these ‘confessions’ could serve as an alternative form of justice. Paul Gready, \textit{The Era of Transitional Justice: The Aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and Beyond} (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 21-23.
That these macro remembrances, or history, transform continuously and can strongly differ from objective truth, as they happened, in the Rankean sense, is hardly a surprise. Already on the level of the individual, human memory is dominated by discard, selectivity and forgetting, as was brilliantly illustrated by Luis Borges. Through Funes the Memorious, the Argentinean fictionist illuminates why the human brain does not and cannot catalogue all particulars witnessed by our five senses so we can use them to fully reconstruct the past; it would paralyse and confuse us. Also, these accounts of the past are never finished. Instead, they evolve in response to the needs of the present, in dialogue with others and with our own imagination. Further objective particulars of the past then often get lost in translation in the process of storing memories in the form of language. Recollections become narratives and the revival of them relies mainly on verbal associations. And indeed, from the micro to macro scales of events, “facts, in the field of history, come wrapped in words” and are thus interpreted, arranged and presented in narratives. This trickles down into the setting of criminal trials, in which memory and truth politics might obscure the truthfulness of facts about the past and cause confusion and disorientation.

In the court setting, enticed, constructed and contested narratives often outweigh the forensic, or Rankean, truth. Law in itself is not an exact science; in the words of Charles Dickens “it is an ass – a idiot.” Rather, as a medley of moral agreements, rituals and interpretations, its stringent self-referential application is predominantly about words and their enactment. What appears, for instance, from the Gbagbo proceedings is that international trials, which argue the law, are layered word games. What the Gbagbo trial further demonstrates is that history is used in case theories and abused as rhetorical window-dressing for both legal and extra-legal purposes. Trials represent a legal politics of memory; the transformative and political ways in which violent political events are recalled, recounted and framed and the larger role legal institutions play in moulding and controlling historical memory about those events. Tribunals are also affected by macro levels of memory

382 Physically, forgetting takes charge from the moment humans receive information. The five sensory registers are equipped only for an extremely short stay and anything not taken onwards from there vanishes. The absence of forgetting would not create an improved memory but instead a growing confusion. Douwe Draaisma, Forgetting: Myths, Perils and Compensations (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2015), pp. 2-3.
383 After once falling of a horseback and becoming paralysed, Funes perceives everything in full detail and remembers every bit of it. Nineteen years old, the fictional Uruguayan boy recites, in perfect Latin, the first paragraph of the twenty-fourth chapter of the seventh book of Historia Naturalis. But his memory stretches way beyond recitations. Funes knows by heart the forms of the southern clouds at dawn on 30 April 1882. He can reconstruct his dreams, even his half-dreams. Without hesitation, he remembers a whole day; but it takes him precisely 24 hours. In this fictional story, Borges suspects that the youngster is incapable of thinking, as it requires forgetting, generalising and making abstractions. And living in his inalterably precise world, Funes el memoriós is confined in his infallible perception and memory. Once their tête-à-tête comes to an end, Borges even worries that all his words and his movements would endlessly inhabit Funes’ implacable memories. By his trying to safeguard Funes from more ‘useless’ remembrance, Borges presents the ability to memorise everything in crystal-clear detail as a curse. Not as a blessing. Luis Borges, ‘Funes the memoriós’, in: Donald A. Yates & James E. Irbí (eds.) Labyrinths. Selected Stories and other Writings. Jorge Luis Borges (New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation, 2007), pp. 59-66.
385 Draaisma, Forgetting, pp. 22.
389 In the larger filed of transitional justice the politics of memory was understood to consist “of policies of truth and justice in transition (official or public memory); more widely conceived, it is about how a society interprets and appropriates its past, in an ongoing attempt to mould its future (social memory). [...] Historical memories and collective remembrances can be instruments to legitimate discourse, create loyalties, and justify political options. Thus, control over the narrative of the past means control over the construction of narratives for an imagined future. Memory is a struggle over power and who gets to decide the future. What and how societies choose to remember and forget largely determines their future options.” Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Paloma Aguilar, Carmen González-Enríquez, ’Introduction’, in: Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Paloma Aguilar, Carmen González-Enríquez (eds.), The politics of memory. Transitional Justice in Democratizing societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 37-38.
policies. In fact, their creators decide on their itinerary. Politics, law and pragmatism each in one or another way, escort, outline and contract transitional programmes. Thus, these backward-looking ventures are consistently confined and straitjacketed by mandates, policies and funds. Different from professional historians, judiciaries or truth commissions are set up to target and criminalise demarcated acts, during precise episodes and carried out by particular agents, often ignoring interconnected events, wider contexts and pivotal actors. The parallel, or even sequential, quest for truth and justice, as a consequence, is hardly ever a harmonious process. ³⁹⁰

Even more so, courts work towards final judgements, in which they present factual findings, which are largely based on witness testimony. However, at all times, the narratives people compose and rely on are deficient and sketchy by nature. In fact, they may well be different at other times. This is the result of the merger of oblivion, discard and selectivity. Also, accounts of the past are never finished as they evolve into the present. What we take for fact now can be exposed as a semi-truth or lie in the future - or vice versa. For the professional historian, chronicles about the past are never static. Discovery of new fact, debate and reinterpretation continually adjust insight and understanding of what has been or has taken place in earlier times. Revision is the rule, rather than the exception. Weaving together panoramas of evidence, employing historical critique and balancing probabilities, historians endeavour to get as close as possible to truth, or at best present a most plausible version thereof. Thus, critically probing the past itself as well as its representations is not simply a technique. It is an academic imperative. In the field of transitional justice, with its emotional, moral, political and legal connections to the past, this is rather an exemption, as it may not serve its interests. History is momentous and having its course on one’s side is alluring. But time and again, history falls victim to opportunism, politics or ideology as it is often censored, manipulated or fabricated. Evidently, history is an important, dangerous and fragile subject. ³⁹¹ In this respect, also the seemingly harmless pursuit for historical truth, appeasement with the past or (temporary) oblivion in the field of transitional justice needs to be approached critically and dispassionately.

³⁹⁰ In South Africa, for instance, during the TRC process, amnesties were traded for ‘truthful’ confessions. Many amnesties were refused in the expectations of criminal trials, but hardly any criminal trial was held. Alan Cowell, ‘Truth, Reconciliation, and Now, a Prosecution in South Africa’, The New York Times, 19 February 2016. Between 1997 and 2009, only 11 trials were held while 5392 petitioners were denied amnesty: Ole Bubenzer, Post-TRC Prosecutions in South Africa. Accountability for Political Crimes after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Amnesty Process (Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), pp. 23-92.
2.8 The right to historical truth

Gentlemen, please. We are trying to cut out this type of argument. We are running a trial now. We are not a truth commission. That’s the point. There is nothing to contradict this witness anymore because when shown the document he admitted that he had made an error [...] So there is no reason for entering it at this point [...] And I think that it is time for us to draw a distinction between the truth commission and a trial where we are trying to focus on the issues that are really important [...].

- Dennis Byron, Judge

Out of the great variety of transitional justice mechanisms, this study’s emphasis is unambiguously on African atrocity trials. Yet, closely related are truth commissions, particularly when it comes to unravelling mass atrocities and picturing a violent past. Whereas truth commissions are very different – they explain rather than judge – they often play a role prior, during or after national or international atrocity trials. In some exceptional African cases, like in Ethiopia and Rwanda, individual prosecutions and historical fact finding were pursued simultaneously by the same mechanism. In other cases, as we will see in Sierra Leone, trials and truth commissions operated at the same time. In Argentina, the truth commission’s report and victim’s testimonies became a crucial source for prosecutors in the trials of former junta leaders. Only in Colombia, at the time of

182 UNICTR, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Edouard Kereymara, Mathieu Nyiramapate & Joseph Nzirorera: Transcript (ICTR-98-44-T; 2 November 2006), pp. 28-29. Also cited in: Nigel Eltringham, “We are not a truth commission”: Fragmented Narratives and the Historical Record at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, Journal of Genocide Research, 11 (1) (March 2009), pp. 55-79: 56. Eltringham, omits to identify the trial as well as the date of this courtroom quote, but was so kind to inform me where it came from.


184 As explained by the truth commission in Guatemala: “La Comisión no fue instituida para juzgar, pues para esto deben funcionar los tribunales de justicia, sino para esclarecer la historia de lo acontecido durante más de tres décadas de guerra fratricida.” “The Commission was not established to judge - that is the function of the courts of law - but rather to clarify the history of the events of more than three decades of fratricidal war”. Comision para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio (June 1999), p. 15.

185 Notably, in Guatemala, the Commission for Historical Clarification’s report was instrumental in many subsequent prosecutions and convictions, including the country’s former President Efraín Rios Montt. The Commission’s finding are heavily cited and relied upon throughout the judgement. It features, amongst many other things, its historical findings and corroborative testimony: Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos Contra el Ambiente, Sentencia (C-01076-2011-00015 of 2; Guatemala Ci; 19 May 2012), pp. 662-665. Similarly, before the Extraordinary African Chambers, Chad’s truth commission’s report was used to highlight historical background, archival material, testimony and other evidence. The president of the truth commission was among the first to give testimony during the trial. See discussion in: Chambre Africaine Extraordinaire D’Assises, Ministère Public c. Hissein Habré: Jugement (Dakar, 30 May 2016), §238-251.


187 The first objective of Rwanda’s Inkiko Gacaca was “identifying the truth about what happened during the genocide.” See: Republic of Rwanda, Summary of the report presented at the closing of Gacaca courts activities (Kigali, June 2012), p. 29.

188 For example, in East Timor, where next to the Special Panels for Serious Crimes the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation was holding hearings. Caitlin Reiger & Marieke Wierda, The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect (New York: ICTJ, March 2006).

189 Author’s Interview with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Nairobi, 15 May 2010.
writing, in what may become the boldest transitional justice experiment ever, if eventually approved and implemented, will operate a complex system in which trials and a truth-endavour conjoin to an extent not experienced before.\textsuperscript{401} In fact, truth commissions deal with similar atrocities as courts – and can de facto operate as a kind of inquiry chamber or pre-trial investigative body - but they do so differently.\textsuperscript{402} A main difference is that trials are centred on individual agency on the context of atrocities, whereas recording the atrocities themselves and their societal impact run central at truth commissions. But, in both settings, the testimonies of both agents are often central features. However, it is safe to say that, more than trials, truth commissions are about history and the historical narratives. At times, they have been described as archaeologists of the atrocious past and as venues for a collective rendezvous with past atrocity.\textsuperscript{403} With their wider mandates and looser truth regimes, they are perhaps better equipped to reveal the underneath, or truth, of the mass atrocity than trials.\textsuperscript{404} As such, truth commissions, or other specialised commissions of inquiry, have been credited as significant accountability tools for meeting the desire, need or legal right to truth and right to know.\textsuperscript{405} As such they can fill a gap left by trials,\textsuperscript{406} for instance on missing persons and continuing crimes such as enforced disappearances\textsuperscript{407} or non-legalised crimes such as cultural genocide.\textsuperscript{408}

The right to truth about mass atrocities,\textsuperscript{409} on both the individual and societal level, poses a direct obligation on those in power to protect these rights to know and to conduct effective and transparent investigations into human rights violations and state sponsored violence in order to ‘fight
impunity’.\footnote{UNESCO, Study on the Right to Truth, §§55-60. When considering this duty of states enable remembrance, one has to bear in mind that on the individual level, as historian Antoon De Baets has pointed out that, “there exists an individual right not to hold memories and a right not to be informed; if there is a right to memory, there is a right to oblivion too.” Antoon De Baets, ‘A declaration on the responsibilities of present generations towards past generations’, History and Theory, No. 43 (December 2004), pp. 130-164: 156.} Truth commissions, or commissions of inquiry,\footnote{Note that commissions of inquiry come in various shapes. They are increasingly called upon the determine whether international crimes have been committed in a given situation of armed conflict or distress, a practice that is recognised by the UN (UNGA, Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (A/RES/46/59; 9 December 1991). Various UN bodies created a myriad of fact-seeking ‘commissions’, including most recently the situations in Eritrea (2014; OHCHR), Central African Republic (2014; UNSC), Gaza (2014; OHCHR), Sri Lanka (2014; OHCHR Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2013; OHCHR), Syrian Arab Republic (2011; OHCHR). See for a helpful and comprehensive overview of various other UN inquiries: Larissa van den Herik and Catherine Harwood, ‘Sharing the Law: The Appeal of International Criminal Law for International Commissions of Inquiry’, Grotius Centre Working Paper, 2014/016-ICL (29 January 2014).} are increasingly established to fulfil this obligation.\footnote{412 Although, still, they may also be used as an opportunistic cover up or surrogate for prosecutions, like the first such commission in Uganda in 1974.\footnote{In this light, the first ever modern truth commission has thus been totally discarded from the transitional justice literature – the 1986 Uganda’s second truth commission did not even mention its predecessor.\footnote{It was only later that countries in transition to forms of democratic rule used them to settle with past injustices, often as a - temporary - substitute to criminal trials, particularly in Latin America.\footnote{Many similar truth commissions – or commissions of inquiry – have been established around the globe ever since.\footnote{In Africa alone, there have already been more than fifteen with its most famous example being the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for South Africa (1995-1998), which dealt with human rights abuses during the Apartheid-era.\footnote{Irrespective of all the varying objectives between past, present and future truth commissions,\footnote{their common perspective is to establish a narrative about the past. But, like trials, truth commission are likely to only reduce the number of lies about the past,\footnote{uncover partial truths\footnote{or just tips of an iceberg of truth.\footnote{And like judges, truth commissioners occasionally}}}}}}}}}

410 \footnote{At the end of 2014, for example, on the same day, the Brazilian truth commissions presented its final report, while in Burundi commissioners were sworn in. See: Comisión Nacional Da Verdade, Relatório (Comisión Nacional da Verdade, 2014); Impunity Watch, Policy Brief, Sintrup”miento de Burundí’s Commitment to TJ under Scrutiny as TRC Commissioners Sworn In; Four Year TRC Mandate Officially Begins (Bujumbura, December 2014).} Such as the first ever example of such an organ was set in Uganda, when in June 1974, then president id Amin Duda, established a commission of inquiry to investigate and report on disappearances in the first years – from 25 January 1971 to July 1974 – of his own government. Himself an abusive autocrat, he purportedly set it up to whitewash his own abuses. But instead, it heard 545 witnesses, identified culprits and people still see its concluding report – which documented 308 cases of disappearances – as quite a critical marker as to what took place. At the time, the report was not made public, none of its recommendations were ever adopted, and by large the report had no impact on the practices of Amin’s government. The commission was given the full name: Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda since 25 January 1971. It was comprised of an expatriate Pakistani Judge, two Ugandan police superintendents and a Ugandan army officer. Priscilla B. Hayner, ‘Fifteen Truth Commissions 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study’, Human Rights Quarterly 16, No. 4 (1994), pp. 597-655: 612; Thijis Bouwknegt, ‘Unspeakable truths: Interview Priscilla Hayner’, International Justice Tribune, No. 115, 20 October 2010; Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearance of people in Uganda since the 25th January, 1971 (Available at www-text: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Uganda74-Report/truth_commissions_Uganda74.pdf, visited: 6 January 2015).}

411 \footnote{Hayner, ‘Unspeakable truths’, pp. 51-52.}

412 A second, better-known, commission of inquiry was set up in Argentina in 1983 after seven years of successive military juntas. During this ‘anti-Communist’ epoch, a reported 10,000 to 30,000 ‘subversives’ disappeared at the hands of the military. The Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desaparición De Personas (CONADEP) [National Commission on the Disappeared] was set up by President Raúl Alfonsín to probe the widespread human rights abuses of the prior junta’s. In nine months, the commission had collected over 7,000 statements, documenting 8,961 so-called desaparacidos – the disappeared. It also revealed the existence of 365 torture centres throughout the entire country. Although there were no public hearings, the commission received overwhelming public interest as the report, in a shortened version ultimately became one of the bestselling books in Argentina. ‘Decreto 187/83’, 15 December 1983 [Reprinted in: Anales de Legislatción Argentina. 1984, Tomo XLIV-A, LA LEY (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Anónima, 1984), pp. 137-138; Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP), Nunca Más: Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1984). [English translation available at www-text: http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm, visited: 9 January 2015].

413 Priscilla Hayner studied over 40 truth commissions established since the 1970’s to record the ‘unspeakable truths’ about human rights abuses. They have been spread out almost evenly between the Americas, Africa and even in Asia. There have also been some commissions in Europe - such as in the former Yugoslavia. In North America, there have also been such commissions, like in North Carolina and more recently in Canada, which is looking into treatment of indigenous populations going back several decades. Bouwknegt, ‘Unspeakable truths’, p. 4.

414 Uganda (2x), Zimbabwe, South Africa (3x), Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo, Morocco, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Nigeria, Tunisia, Guinea (Conakry), Burundi, Solomon Islands.


417 Janet Cherry, ‘Historical Truth: Something to fight for’ in: Charles Villa Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd (eds.), South Africa after the war, Morocco, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Nigeria, Tunisia, Guinea (Conakry), Burundi, Solomon Islands.

recognise their shortcomings in establishing the truth. TRC narratives stereotypically serve as official records of the past that typically defy the distorted versions of history, propagated by an outgoing regime, or alternatively, as in Colombia, strive for a combined narrative. Truth commissions, in theory, can bring the scale and impact of a violent past to the public consciousness, especially in cases where the violence was covert. Moreover, an inquisitorial commission can identify what has happened to people who ‘disappeared’ or are buried in unknown mass-graves. However, like trials – truth commissions opt for ‘usable truths’. Conventionally, they seek to use the truth and the process of truth finding as a means to promote reconciliation, prevention and national unity, socio-psychological healing and restorative justice or transformative justice. For these purposes, truth commissions generally choose the open arena to expose truth by hearing victims, perpetrators and institutions. Arguably, this modus operandi catalyses public debate on complex social, political and legal issues, which in turn may lead to a much wider informed and nuanced representation of past mass atrocities than those coming out of atrocity trials. On the other hand, however, historians studying truth commissions should always be cautious in using TRC records as objective accounts of history, as much as they should if they study atrocity trials in the field of international criminal justice.

2.9 Judging the past: international criminal trials

Whereas truth commissions, as a mixture between pseudo-accountability mechanism and pseudo-historian, operate within the legal framework of the right to know about legally framed atrocities, prosecutions serve the formal punitive demands of transitional justice. By doing so, they condense mass atrocity to individual agency (framed in terms of responsibility) at the perpetrator side. Although truth commissions continue to operate around the globe, often now in conjunction with prosecutions, the dominant, but also most classic, transitional justice response since the 1990s has been international criminal justice (ICJ). This evolving enterprise is principally designed to pursue the main architects and puppet masters of mass atrocities, although they rhetorically operate within the larger agenda of transitional justice. As such, since 2002, the first permanent transitional justice mechanism to deal with the aftermath of mass atrocities, while also introducing victims, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) has taken permanent seat in The Hague, The Netherlands.\textsuperscript{429} Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,\textsuperscript{430} who was once a flamboyant politician and militia leader in the Ituri province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was the first to be convicted by the ICC and joined the illustrious but select group of convicted mass-atrocity perpetrators.\textsuperscript{431} In the arena of the public international (-ised) courtroom these figures have become the emblems of evil and the heralded trophies of the ever growing field of transitional justice. By reducing mass crime back to ‘those most responsible’, criminal justice has anthropomorphised and to a certain degree personalised mass atrocities. Thus, whereas truth commissions are interested in macro questions of history, trials deal with micro individual agency focused history.

Only fourteen years old, the ICC took over sixty years to be established. It follows in the footsteps of the International Military Tribunal (IMT)\textsuperscript{432} and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)\textsuperscript{433} for the trials of “major war criminals” in Germany and Japan. After these first two international tribunaals, the UN set in motion the idea for a permanent tribunal, most notably to prosecute the crime of genocide.\textsuperscript{434} But it was not until 1993 that the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (UNICTY) – set up “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”\textsuperscript{435} - became the third international criminal tribunal.\textsuperscript{436} Almost seventeen months later, the UN decided on a second ad hoc tribunal, this time “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States.”\textsuperscript{437} Almost fifty years after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, the UNICTR was the first international court to convict an individual on the basis of the Convention, in 1998.\textsuperscript{438}

\textsuperscript{429} Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{430} Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was convicted on three charges of war crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including enlisting, conscripting and using child soldiers. He was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment. ICC, TCI, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (ICC-01/04-01/06; 16 March 2012) & ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (ICC-01/04-01/06; 10 July 2012); ICC, AC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction (ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5; 1 December 2014).
\textsuperscript{431} By 2013, in 65 years of international criminal justice, nine past and present international criminal courts and tribunals concluded 172 cases in which over 250 judges and 23 Chief Prosecutors were involved. All in all, 745 suspects were indicted, 356 were convicted. The ‘average’ convicted perpetrator is male, aged 40 and a member of a military or paramilitary organisation from judges and 23 Chief Prosecutors were involved. All in all, 745 suspects were indicted, 356 were convicted. The ‘average’ convicted perpetrator is male, aged 40 and a member of a military or paramilitary organisation from
\textsuperscript{432} Agreement by the Government of the United States Of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom Of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (‘London Agreement’, 8 August 1945). The Charter of the International Military Tribunal is annexed to the agreement.
\textsuperscript{433} By 2013, in 65 years of international criminal justice, nine past and present international criminal courts and tribunals concluded 172 cases in which over 250 judges and 23 Chief Prosecutors were involved. All in all, 745 suspects were indicted, 356 were actually tried and, of these, some 281 defendants were convicted. The ‘average’ convicted perpetrator is male, aged 40 and a member of a military or paramilitary organisation from Europe, Asia or Africa who is acting on behalf of his government. See: Alette Smeulers, Barbora Hola and Tom van den Berg, 'Sixty-Five Years of International Criminal Justice: The Facts and Figures', International Criminal Law Review, 13 (2013), pp. 7-41.
\textsuperscript{434} UNGA, Genocide Convention, art. I & IV; UNGA, B. Study by the International Law Commission on the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction (A/RES/260 (III); 9 December 1948).
\textsuperscript{436} UNGA, Genocide Convention, art. I & IV; UNGA, B. Study by the International Law Commission on the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction (A/RES/260 (III); 9 December 1948).
\textsuperscript{438} UNSC, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (S/25704; 3 May 1993), art. 4.
\textsuperscript{431} Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice, p. 63.
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\textsuperscript{433} Agreement by the Government of the United States Of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom Of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (‘London Agreement’, 8 August 1945). The Charter of the International Military Tribunal is annexed to the agreement.
\textsuperscript{434} Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces, ‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East’, General Order No 1 (Tokyo, 19 January 1946).
\textsuperscript{435} Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice, p. 63.
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\textsuperscript{437} By 2013, in 65 years of international criminal justice, nine past and present international criminal courts and tribunals concluded 172 cases in which over 250 judges and 23 Chief Prosecutors were involved. All in all, 745 suspects were indicted, 356 were actually tried and, of these, some 281 defendants were convicted. The ‘average’ convicted perpetrator is male, aged 40 and a member of a military or paramilitary organisation from Europe, Asia or Africa who is acting on behalf of his government. See: Alette Smeulers, Barbora Hola and Tom van den Berg, 'Sixty-Five Years of International Criminal Justice: The Facts and Figures', International Criminal Law Review, 13 (2013), pp. 7-41.
\textsuperscript{438} Agreement by the Government of the United States Of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom Of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (‘London Agreement’, 8 August 1945). The Charter of the International Military Tribunal is annexed to the agreement.
The two temporary UN tribunals - which have jointly morphed into a new tribunal, the United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals - were geographically and temporally specific, in contrast to the permanent ICC. The latter has enduring jurisdiction to potentially examine, investigate, prosecute, try and judge atrocity crimes across the globe.\textsuperscript{430} By the time of writing, it has examined and investigated alleged crimes in over a dozen countries or nationalities, covering Africa,\textsuperscript{440} the America’s,\textsuperscript{441} Asia\textsuperscript{442} and Europe.\textsuperscript{443} As a result of this wide-ranging fusion of atrocity situations, the ICC as a whole can be seen as a broad collection of mini \textit{ad hoc} tribunals. Still, however, because of the ICC’s remaining temporal and jurisdictional limits,\textsuperscript{444} other specialised tribunals, with international features,\textsuperscript{445} have been erected, including\textsuperscript{446} the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),\textsuperscript{447} the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC; East Timor),\textsuperscript{448} the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court (IHCC),\textsuperscript{449} the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC),\textsuperscript{450} the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL),\textsuperscript{451} the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC)\textsuperscript{452} and the Kosovo Relocated Specialist Judicial Institution (KRSJI).\textsuperscript{453} At the time of writing, highly politized discussions on internationalized – hybrid – tribunals were ongoing in relation to atrocities in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Sri Lanka and Syria.

Lubanga’s case was the debut trial of what is the pinnacle of the twentieth century’s evolution in international criminal justice. All these \textit{ad hoc}, ‘special’ or ‘extraordinary’ international or internationalised trial systems have been scrutinised ever since their creation. However, critical, distant and empirical historiography, written by historians, on the modern panels has only gradually emerged. In the infancy days of the UN and hybrid tribunals as well as the ICC, studies were commonly conducted by a generation of its founders: a community of activists, judges, prosecutors,

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\textsuperscript{431} Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic, Kenya, Libya, Sudan, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Guinea (Conakry), Burundi, Gabon, Comoros.
\textsuperscript{432} Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras.
\textsuperscript{433} Republic of Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine.
\textsuperscript{434} UK, Georgia, Ukraine.
\textsuperscript{435} Temporally, the ICC can only deal with crimes committed from July 2002. Geographically or personally, the ICC is limited in its power towards countries that are members of the court, countries that have accepted its jurisdiction only for certain ‘situations’ or the permanent Security Council members.
\textsuperscript{436} Either established by treaty (IMT, IMTFE, ICC), the UN (ICTY & ICTR) or in conjunction with the UN (SCSL, SPSC, ECCC, STL), the African Union (EAC), the European Union (KRSJI) or foreign powers (IHCC).
\textsuperscript{437} Other jurisdictions included strong international dimensions, including in Kosovo and the War Crimes Chamber in the Court of Bosnia Herzegovina. United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Regulation no. 2000/64 on assignment of international judges/prosecutors and/or change of venue (UNMIK/REG/2000/64; 15 December 2000); Law on the amendments to the law on the court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, \textit{Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina}, No. 61.04 (January 2005).
\textsuperscript{438} Set up “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone.” Agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone & Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
\textsuperscript{441} Set up to “to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom and international conventions recognised by Cambodia.” Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the prosecution under Cambodian law of crimes committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea (Phnom Penh, 6 June 2003, UNTS 2239-I-41723).
\textsuperscript{443} Accord entre le gouvernement de la Republique du Sénégal et l’Union Africaine sur la creation de chambres africaines extraordinaires au sein des juridictions Sénégalaises (Dakar, 22 August 2012).
\end{flushright}
lawyers and legal scholars (most of who have been involved themselves in “the justice project” in one way or another). Describing the trials and errors of a maturing criminal justice system, they mostly celebrated the precedents they shaped. Gradually, political scientists, practitioners and non-governmental lobby groups entered the sheltered and self-referential realm of international criminal justice. Only more recently anthropologists and historians started to observe courtroom rituals and debate legacies of modern international trials.454

Except for some rare efforts by journalists or bloggers, non-legal conventional literature on contemporary African atrocity trials hardly focused on the processes itself.455 In most studies, investigations, testimony and courtroom dynamics often only serve as a colourful or anecdotal illustration at the side-lines of the argument. This has been a hapless omission in (post) transitional justice research. There was and there is more to a trial than its surrounding politics, opening statements and verdicts. As argued earlier, the trial itself is a theatre of thought, debate and scrutiny. It is the pitch where barristers and judges exercise the rituals of testing the law and cross-examining witnesses. Likewise, the courtroom experience is furthermore “a social encounter, where different modes of being and different worldviews might conceivably collide.”456 Trial hearings, arguably, are the beating heart of international justice fact exposure. International criminal tribunals are the factories of historical evidence and the trial is the workshop of detailed fact about mass violence. It is also the arena where histories and scripts about the past are contested. Yet it is too often just an ill referenced footnote in academic literature. Ignoring all this blurs our knowledge and understanding about the legal dealing with mass atrocities at its heart. This book hopes to fill this gap.

454 See for instance: Kelsall, Culture under Cross-Examination; Wilson, Writing History; Kamari Maxine Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge 2009); Donia, Radovan Karadžić.
455 See in Rwanda: Ubutabera, Hirondelle News Agency, International Justice Tribune covered the day to day proceedings at the ICTR and SCSL.
456 Kelsall, Culture under Cross-Examination, p. 17.
2.10 History writing in international criminal trials

Charges are not merely a loose collection of names, places, events, etc., which can be ordered and reordered at will. Instead, charges must represent a coherent description of how certain individuals are linked to certain events, defining what role they played in them and how they related to and were influenced by a particular context. Charges therefore constitute a narrative in which each material fact has a particular place. Indeed, the reason why facts are material is precisely because of how they are relevant to the narrative. Taking an isolated material fact and fundamentally changing its relevance by using it as part of a different narrative would therefore amount to a "change in the statement of facts [...]."

- Christine van den Wyngaert, ICC Judge

How do law and history relate to each other? Are they incompatible, as many from both professions maintain, or, are there intimately connected, as many from both professions also argue? Much has been said and written about it, in general terms and in specific cases. Yet, it was German trial reporter on the Eichmann case in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt, who put the debate on the map. Famously, she observed:

The purpose of a trial is to render justice and nothing else; even the noblest of ulterior purposes – such as “the making of a record of the Hitler regime which would withstand the test of history,” which is how Robert G. Storey, executive trial counsel at Nuremberg, formulated the supposed higher aim of the Nuremberg Trials – can only detract from the law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due punishment.”

“Justice demands that the accused be prosecuted, defended, and judged, and that all the other questions, though they may seem to be of greater import - of "How could it happen?" and "Why did It happen?" - of "Why the Jews" and " Why the Germans?", of "What was the role of other nations" and "What was the extent to which the Allies shared the responsibility,", of "How could the Jews, through their own leaders, cooperate in their own destruction?" and "Why did they go to their death like lambs to the slaughter?", be left in abeyance. Justice insists on the importance of Adolf Eichmann, the man in the glass booth built for his protection: medium-sized, slender, middle-aged, with receding hair, ill-fitting teeth, and near-sighted eyes, who throughout the trial keeps craning his scraggy neck toward the bench (not once does he turn to face the audience), and who desperately tries to maintain his self-control- and mostly succeeds, despite a nervous tic, to which his mouth must have become subject long before this trial started. On trial are his

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deeds, not the sufferings of the Jews, not the German people or mankind, not even anti-Semitism and racism. 462

In Arendt’s view, courts deal with individual criminal responsibility and should not be blinded by the historical political and social circumstances in which the defendant operated. 463 More than fifty years later, including more than 20 years of passionate international judicial reckoning with atrocities around the globe, no real consensus has been reached on the matter, particularly among the non-historians. However, social anthropologist Richard Wilson, in his landmark book on the topic, summarises it effectively: “courts of law produce mediocre historical accounts of the origins and causes of mass crimes.” 464 Wilson, who is not a trained historian himself, divides the debate into different schools. In Arendt’s tradition, first there is the ‘justice-and-nothing-more-doctrine, which asserts liberal legalist view that justice agents should not attempt to write history at all, that it would even be inappropriate. In this view, extra-judicial historical probes should not overshadow due process, fair trial and the principles of law. Law-and-society adherents, 465 who take it a step further, maintain that even if they try, courts will fail in their endeavour. 466

Wilson offers four reasons for law’s incapability to deal with history. 467 First, historians and judges apply different methodologies and truth regimes: academic discussion versus cross-examination and balance of probabilities versus beyond any reasonable doubt. They also reach different conclusions: provisional and interpretative versus definite, verifiable and revisable (ne bis idem). Second, if history does not fit law’s templates and principles, then the historical narrative is bent in such a way that it will, not vice versa. Law ultimately distorts history. Third, not the full historical story may come up in the trial setting, but just parts of it, simply because law does not cover certain events or law agents choose not to deal with them. Fourth, the historical dimensions or narratives are overshadowed by the procedural technicalities, complexities and details of international trials. ‘Slow-trials’ spark boredom and lose historical momentum and their presumed educational functionality as ‘show trials’. 468 Two differences must be added. The first concerns the topic; judges concentrate on individual responsibility for specific actions and thus on the behaviour and motives of


463 Perhaps she lent her insights from the court’s own perspective, which from the start clarifies that: “In this maze of insistent questions, the path of the Court was and remains clear. It cannot allow itself to be enticed into provinces which are o

464 First, historians and judges apply different methodologies and truth regimes: academic discussion versus cross-examination and balance of probabilities versus beyond any reasonable doubt. They also reach different conclusions: provisional and interpretative versus definite, verifiable and revisable (ne bis idem). Second, if history does not fit law’s templates and principles, then the historical narrative is bent in such a way that it will, not vice versa. Law ultimately distorts history. Third, not the full historical story may come up in the trial setting, but just parts of it, simply because law does not cover certain events or law agents choose not to deal with them. Fourth, the historical dimensions or narratives are overshadowed by the procedural technicalities, complexities and details of international trials. ‘Slow-trials’ spark boredom and lose historical momentum and their presumed educational functionality as ‘show trials’. 468 Two differences must be added. The first concerns the topic; judges concentrate on individual responsibility for specific actions and thus on the behaviour and motives of
unique and a-typical individuals. Historians call this approach to the past agency or event history, while they themselves emphasise agency and structure. They focus on the acting of persons and the structure and context in which they do.\textsuperscript{469} Secondly, and what we will see in this dissertation, is that lawyers have a different relationship with the past than historians. Disparate from professional historians, lawyers like to make – and become part of - history themselves, tweak historical narratives according to their argument and like history – like law – to be static. Thus, for the historian history is object and objective while for the lawyer history is subject and subjective.

In his book, Wilson tests these critiques in light of the UNICTY, UNICTR and the ICC.\textsuperscript{470} Central in his probe, is the question whether these international courts delivered innovative and significant understandings of the origins and causes of armed conflict and whether or not their historical inquiries undermined due process and violated the rights of the accused. Unprecedented, much court proceedings dealt with extensive historical deliberations on the Balkans, Rwanda and Congo, with a range of historians, social scientists and other ‘experts’ testifying about these conflicts’ causes, contexts and courses. Key is that, often, legal issues warranted these historical explorations. Proving past crimes against humanity and war crimes simply demands understanding the conflicts as such, the political and social contexts in which they took place and how they for instance fit the demanding legal criteria of the \textit{Genocide Convention}, or not. In all, Wilson maintains that the complex endeavours of judging international crimes and writing history of an armed conflict cannot be characterised by “either harmonious accord or inherent contradiction.”\textsuperscript{471} No matter which one is true, the relationship between law and history is ever present. The main issue, however, is the way in which prosecutors and defence counsel use non-legal evidence and historical narratives, and for what reasons: rhetorical window dressing or integral case theories?\textsuperscript{472}

Wilson is not advocating for more history or historians in international criminal trials, simply and strictly for it is not in their mandates. Exhibiting historical and social contexts proves to be delicate and hazardous. In the legal realm, it may be of poor quality, considered irrelevant to the charges, misunderstood, ill represented, oversimplified, misused, or in the extreme, undermine the integrity of the court proceedings. Despite these pitfalls, with international courts risking producing unsatisfying historical narratives, I agree with Wilson’s observation that they may provide invaluable source material for historians, at least in documentary and literate contexts such as the Balkans which is the prime focus of his research.\textsuperscript{473} But first of all, pursuing justice and writing history is something else than pursing justice and reviewing history. The first pair is arguably irreconcilable, but the second is not. Disputes about the contexts and broader courses of alleged misconduct are at the heart of international criminal trials as the accused’s actions during highly contested historical events, acts and

\textsuperscript{470} Based on interviews with legal actors, research staff at the courts and external experts as well as court records and an online staff survey at the UNICTY.
\textsuperscript{471} Wilson, \textit{Writing History}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{472} Ibidem, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{473} Ibidem, p. 69.
decisions are being litigated. Without historical inquiry or contextual explanations, ‘intentional group-discriminatory’ genocides, ‘widespread and systematic’ crimes against humanity and illegal acts of ‘war’ are effectively unmanageable to establish in isolation. Somehow, they constitute the legal requirements for these specific categories of crimes. Therefore, prosecutors and defence counsel utilise – use and abuse - historical interpretations in their case theory and evidence. During trial, historical discussions, or about interpretations on bygone events, are therefore inevitable, but they are not essentially about establishing historical truth. The language that frames the law confines the legal narrative during trial and it is what prevails in the end.

Trials excavate data and create cradles of information useful to historians, but they may significantly vary in quantity and quality, depending on the specific conflict and locality. And indeed, the UNICTY – from which most of Wilson’s empirical data derives – was a rather ‘forensic’ tribunal: witnesses were introduced to introduce material evidence. But the practice at the UNICTR, SCSL were and the ICC is different. Rather, they can be considered as being almost exclusively ‘testimonial’ courts: the evidence came from witnesses. So their evidentiary source legacy is crucially divergent and the historically substantial facts uncovered there are reasonably scarce. Other than at the UNICTY, if history was written at these courts, it ought to be valued much more like a narrative oral history from the perspective of victims, survivors, bystanders and perpetrators than as a collection of physical data introduced by witnesses. It is thus a dissimilar history, based on complex memory sources enticed in an arena where not only perceptions of justice may differ, but also where entire reference frame works – in particular cultural and linguistic – may clash and cause crucial misconceptions and decisive lost-in-translation-situations. And whereas the valorisation of victim testimony – as experienced facts - indeed increased from the mid-1980s and found its way into the international court rooms in the 1990s, judges have increasingly struggled to use eye witnesses as reliable and verifiable evidence in complicated cases, particularly in non-western settings where there is no – or hardly any - tangible forensic corroborative material available. It lays bare an old problem of western-style fact-finding in non-western oral societies, considerable time after the events: fact-finding without facts. In that context, witness testimony about the atrocious past, arguably, tells an ambiguous story about the past and leads to shallow historical findings.

2.11 Historical trial testimony

The marvel of oral tradition, some will say it is a curse, is this: messages from the past exist, are real, and yet are not continuously accessible to the senses. Oral traditions make an appearance only when they are told.

- Jan Vansina

Every witness shall, before giving evidence, make the following solemn declaration: "I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth."777

In his activism for recording Africa’s historical, religious, philosophical and scientific knowledge, Amadou Hampâté Bâ famously said that “every time an old man dies in Africa, it is as if a library has burnt down.” He added that “writing is the photographing of knowledge, but it is not knowledge itself.” Speaking at a UNESCO conference in 1962, the Malian historian’s speech captures the problematical nature of oral history as evidence and testimonial evidence as oral history, an issue constantly recurring at the international tribunals and courts. Non-western witness testimony has been featuring chiefly in western-style international criminal atrocity trials, typically in Sub-Saharan African circumstances. Operating in an international, mostly non-African environment, this custom, however, brings to light a striking epistemological misbalance between what evidence law demands, judges prefer and fact-seekers seek ideally on the one hand and what prosecutors present during evidentiary hearings.

Although a Liberian proverb says that “law is chameleon-like” and that “only those who know it well can tame it,” international criminal justice, as a system, is far from flexible. Like scholarship on international criminal justice – which typically builds on the a-typical Nuremberg case – the system itself remains ethnocentric and conservative in applying its liberal deep Christian based legalism, norms and dogmatic human rights vocabulary. On the global level, this immediately sparks questions on the suitability of a cosmopolitan form of justice in diverse cultural contexts, where basic concepts of justice may already differ.

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783 See for an insightful analysis of this type of “white men’s justice”, Khoshl, Culture under Cross-Examination, pp. 1-16.
784 In Japan, for instance, there was hardly any cultural basis for international trials; “situational ethics” were, at the time, inherently unlegalistic. Judith N. Shklar, Legalism. Law, Morals, and Political Trials Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 179-181.
is western in its very origin and it is run by a politics of fact positivism. At the two tribunals that dealt with atrocities in Europe, the IMT and UNICTY, lawyers could operate relatively successfully as documentary and forensic evidence was abundant. The situation at the other tribunals, however, was strikingly different as the forensic basis for prosecutions was particularly absent, necessitating a strong reliance on testimonial evidence.

Hearing oral testimony however is not an exclusive characteristic of the contemporary atrocity tribunals. But it is mainly its purposes, meaning and weight that differ. Witnesses performed already in Nuremberg, although extremely modestly. Justice Robert Jackson, the IMT’s first Chief Prosecutor wanted “to put on no witnesses we could reasonably avoid” particularly because of questions regarding their reliability. As the prosecution was running a ‘paper trial’, offering thousands of documents found in German army headquarters, government buildings, salt mines, buried in the ground, hidden behind false walls and other secret places – they only featured thirty-three witnesses, but mainly to authenticate or explain documents. Sixty-one witnesses were put before the bench by the defence in rebuttal, alongside the live testimony of nineteen of the defendants. The Tribunal itself heard twenty-two witnesses. Whereas Nazi archives were the substantial underpinnings of the case, the more laborious Tokyo trial of 28 Japanese war crimes suspects stretching over 818 public sessions – heard live testimony from 419 witnesses, permitted 779 witness depositions and affidavits and introduced expert evidence (including from historians).

But unlike its Nuremberg-twin, which worked on the basis of masses of documents, the ‘Far East’ court was generally “disappointed by a large part of this evidence” as it regarded itself “handicapped” in its “search for facts” by the absence of official records. Most archives were either burned during the bomb raids on Japan or the deliberate destruction after the surrender, which the tribunal found a “disservice to the cause of international justice.”

Halfway through the trial, after the prosecution
rested its case, the tribunal relaxed its burden of proof by introducing a ‘rule of best evidence’. Much hearsay evidence was introduced, and besides lamenting the slowing down the proceedings because of live testimony, the chamber in its judgement found many witnesses unreliable as they had met the bench “with prolix equivocations and evasions, which only arouse distrust.” A major trial of victor’s justice in Asia, complicated by matters of translation, lengthy cross-examinations and six months of drafting a 1218-page opinion, the IMTFE produced a long trial record, almost reaching 50,000 pages of transcript. Arguably it is an invaluable source for historians. Occupied with penning down an official history, the majority devoted 1,050 pages to findings of fact, on the basis of which – through command responsibility – the Japanese leaders were found guilty of conspiracy to commit aggression and the aggression itself. But unlike Nuremberg, which rendered a unanimous verdict, five IMTFE judges, including the most outspoken, Judge Radhabinod Pal from India, contested this version of history. In his drawn-out dissenting opinion which meticulously exposes the lack of linkage testimonies and other direct evidence against the accused, Pal reasoned he would render a finding of not-guilty on all the accused: “The devilish and fiendish character of the alleged atrocities cannot be denied. I have indicated against each item the nature of the evidence adduced in support of the occurrence. However unsatisfactory this evidence may be, it cannot be denied that many of these fiendish things were perpetrated. But those who might have committed these terrible brutalities are not before us now.”

In fierce wordings, the Tokyo tribunal has been castigated for its cultural narrowness, ethical dogmatism and historical emptiness and its impact on the popular memory of Japanese was practically nihil. Nevertheless, it is reported that the “Tokyo Trial View of History” in the end became widely accepted among the populace, as it attributed the blame for the register of misconduct on its military leaders – not on the people themselves. Years later, in Jerusalem, acceptance was not enough. When Adolf Eichmann was brought before the Israeli court in 1960, shock therapy, identity-formation and social education were on the Prosecutor’s agenda. Even though it would have been sufficient to secure Eichmann’s conviction by letting the archives speak, it was particularly through the personal experiences of victims, so believed state prosecutor Gideon Hausner, that the trial could “superimpose on a phantom a dimension of reality,” a “living record of a gigantic human and national disaster.” And indeed, the court – despite the reservations of presiding judge Mosche Landau towards a

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494 International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), Judgement, p. 48423.
496 Minear, Victor’s Justice. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, pp. 125-159.
498 Kelsall, Culture under Cross-Examination, p. 11.
499 Osiel, Mass atrocity, pp. 181-183.
500 Ibidem, pp. 15-17.
theatrical, educational and political trial – opened up its doors to the testimony of 121 Holocaust survivors. Gruesome personal stories were narrated by a carefully selected cross-section of victims: professors, housewives, artisans, writers, farmers, merchants, doctors, officials and labourers. An interlaced story about the entire Holocaust echoed through the courtroom, but none of it was directly related to Eichmann who was in fact for a lengthy part of the trial virtually forgotten. Thus, despite the strict legal positivism driving the court in its judgement, the court approved its public and widely televised trial hearings to become an extraordinary forum for history telling, victim narratives and collective memory consolidation. Still, regardless of their evidentiary lenience – including witness testimony - the three-panelled bench, in its judgement, was not shy to underline that “without a doubt, the testimony given at this trial by survivors of the Holocaust, who poured out their hearts as they stood in the witness box, will provide valuable material for research workers and historians, but as far as this Court is concerned, they are to be regarded as by-products of the trial.”

What remained was a decision that very precisely described Eichmann’s particular crimes as well as the limits of his responsibility, mainly based on his own admissions and documentary proof.

The Eichmann trial is not only pivotal in the maturation of the internationalised justice venture, tackling international crimes crossing borders and time, it also set a particular precedent in terms of legal procedure, evidence, testimony and theatrical setting. Narrative content based on victims’ memories became an important feature of criminal procedure, next to adjudicating personal criminal responsibility. Extravagant trials about extravagant crimes demanded extravagant proceedings. The liberal show trial for administrative massacre was born. Displaying the horrific consequences of the illiberal vices and elucidating the human drama of mass violence, atrocity trials morphed into social and cultural performances involving historical reflection, social education and to some degree reconciliation of society by means of legal or other ritual procedures. Witness-driven mass atrocity prosecutions became the standard after the Eichmann trial. The model entered into full swing across the globe, including other Holocaust related hearings in Israel (Demjanjuk) and Canada (Finta). But also the junta trials in Argentina and the red terror cases in Ethiopia and profoundly influenced the proceedings at international tribunals. In their fashioning of grand-narratives on the wars in the former Yugoslavia, prosecutors weaved together testimony of large numbers of witnesses.

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505 The chamber was quite clear on its stand: “In this maze of insistent questions, the path of the Court was and remains clear. It cannot allow itself to be enticed into provinces which are outside its sphere. The judicial process has ways of its own, laid down by law, and which do not change, whatever the subject of the trial may be. Otherwise, the processes of law and of court procedure are bound to be impaired, whereas they must be adhered to punctiliously, since they are in themselves of considerable social and educational significance, and the trial would otherwise resemble a rudderless ship tossed about by the waves. It is the purpose of every criminal trial to clarify whether the charges in the prosecution's indictment against the accused who is on trial are true, and if the accused is convicted, to mete out due punishment to him. Everything which requires clarification in order that these purposes may be achieved must be entirely eliminated from the court procedure. Not only is any pretension to overstep these limits forbidden to the court - it would certainly end in complete failure.” District Court of Jerusalem, Attorney General v. Adolf Eichmann: Judgement (40/61; Jerusalem, 11 December 1961), §2.
506 Osiel, Mass atrocity, pp. 15-17; 67.
508 District Court of Jerusalem, Eichmann Judgement, §2.
During the first six-month trial, against low-level Bosnian Serb camp guard Duško Tadić, they called no less than 76 witnesses, many of whom were victims.\(^{510}\) All the subsequent trials saw a parade of over 4500 witnesses traveling to The Hague.\(^{511}\) In Arusha, at the Rwanda-tribunal, a total of 3378 witnesses have testified at trial.\(^{512}\) Their role, however, changed significantly over time.

When the UNICTY was established in 1993, it faced a different landscape than its predecessor in Nuremberg and to a lesser extent Tokyo. A most important variance was that the Bosnian war was not over; some of the fiercest atrocities had not yet occurred, including the massacres in Srebrenica in July 1995. Politics were at play as well. Five years of war, disintegration and subsequent peace negotiations had left no clear winners or losers.\(^{513}\) In this context, state cooperation became the biggest obstacle for the tribunal.\(^{514}\) In particular, fact-finding through criminal investigations was thus a huge challenge. Serbia, Croatia, and Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina had become practically inaccessible to the UNICTY investigators, who could not obtain critical documents (if they even existed) held by authorities unsympathetic to the Tribunal’s existence or goals.\(^{515}\) Political transitions in these countries gradually led to increased assistance. But documents, defendants and witnesses were only slowly secured. Yet, when the UNICTY’s workload increased from 1997 onwards, prosecutors faced the reality that they could not depend as heavily on paper trails as they had hoped. Offenders in the Balkans had simply not been meticulously documenting their actions and particularly their individual involvement in possible crimes, as did the Nazi’s. And even if they did, the documents did not always end up on the tribunal’s desks.\(^{516}\) Therefore, in The Hague, most early cases required substantial numbers of eyewitnesses to prove the very occurrence of crimes. Only in the first years already, 971 victim-witnesses came to The Hague to testify. The first genocide trial, involving Radislav Krstić, involved 103 prosecution witnesses, twelve defence witnesses and two Chamber witnesses.\(^{517}\) But already in his case, glitches ascended. Some massacres had been so effective that they left no survivors and thus no corroborating witnesses, prompting the prosecution to exclude episodes from their case.\(^{518}\)

Central to criminal proceedings is to establish the facts underlying the charges: to show that crimes have indeed occurred. Like the UNICTY, all the tribunals have faced problems in this respect.
At the ICC, in its first case for stance, the heart of the case was the question if Thomas Lubanga Dyilo had conscripted, enlisted and used children under the age of fifteen in his militia.\(^{519}\) But throughout the case\(^ {520}\) the essential baseline element – that the children alleged to be children were indeed younger than fifteen – was hotly contested.\(^ {521}\) As we will see in the chapter on Congo, the Congolese defendant was ultimately convicted, by majority, for three war crimes,\(^ {522}\) but the evidentiary basis, nine alleged former child soldiers, was at least flimsy.\(^ {523}\) The dissenting appeals judge, who deemed the evidence to be insufficient, expressed the hope “that future prosecutions of these crimes at the Court will adduce direct and more convincing evidence and preserve the fairness of proceedings, which lies at the heart of criminal prosecutions and should not be sacrificed in favour of putting historical events on the record.”\(^ {524}\) Essentially, the Lubanga judgement, in a detailed manner, narrated the court’s baseline truth-finding crisis.\(^ {525}\) Lubanga’s case rested almost exclusively on vivavoce witness testimony, collected by three Congolese intermediaries as well as other third-party interviews with witnesses, most notably the UN and Human Rights Watch. Hardly any first-hand onsite investigations had been conducted and, as a result, the prosecutor had introduced no relevant forensic evidence during trial, not even concerning the ages of the alleged child soldiers. With two exceptions,\(^ {526}\) all the tribunals, more or less, faced this fact-finding obstacle and therefore have no direct access to unvarnished forensics and first hand witness testimony.\(^ {527}\) Consequently, the bulk of collected evidence consists of eyewitness testimony gathered by prosecutors and featured in reports by non-governmental organisations (NGOs).\(^ {528}\) But judges have increasingly discredited witness testimony as being possibly manipulated, unreliable, inconsistent or vague and deemed several NGO reports to lack corroborative value.\(^ {529}\)

\(^{519}\) ICC, PtCl, Situation on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Document Containing the Charges, Article 61 (3)(a) (ICC-01/04-01/06; 28 August 2006).

\(^{520}\) The Chamber heard a total of 67 witnesses over 204 days of hearings: 36 Prosecution witnesses, including three experts and nine former child soldiers, 24 Defence witnesses, three victims called as witnesses following requests from their legal representatives and four expert Chamber witnesses. A total of 1,373 items of evidence (368 by the prosecution and 992 by the defence) were admitted into evidence. ICC, Lubanga Dyilo Judgment, §12; For a discussion on the evidence: Caroline Busman, ‘Delegating Investigations: Lessons to be Learned from the Lubanga Judgment’, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer 2013), pp. 30-82.


\(^{522}\) ICC, Lubanga Dyilo Appeals Judgement.

\(^{523}\) ICC, AC, Situation on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Transcript (ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5; 1 December 2014), pp. 17.


\(^{525}\) ICC, Lubanga Dyilo Judgement, pp. 50-228.

\(^{526}\) The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor received much forensic evidence relevant to the indictments as UN-mandated forensic experts were soon present at the scene after the violence to conduct exhumations and autopsies. See: Nancy Amoury Combs, Fact-Finding Without facts. p. 13; Mohamed C. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda and East Timor (Berlin: Springer, 2005), pp. 106-107. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon also received forensic details from crime scene investigations carried out just after the Bomb attack on former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. See: UNSC, Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1395 (2005) (S/2005/662; 20 October 2005), pp. 20-36.

\(^{527}\) Time is an important factor. As a rule, much time elapses before on-ground investigations and prosecutions of these extraordinary, complicated and typically disordered international crimes are commenced, regularly some years. At the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL and the ICC, it took at least two to three years before the first investigators got to the field to unearth facts and investigate crimes. In Bangladesh, Cambodia and Chad, there even is a lapse of several decades. See for a practitioner’s experience: Witteven, ‘Dealing with Old Evidence’, pp. 68-69.

\(^{528}\) As a result of belated investigations, investigators and prosecutors have turned heavily to second-hand primary sources, particularly UN missions, humanitarian organisations, human rights advocacy groups, journalists and academia from various disciplines. Their reports, information and assistance are often very useful as the starting point, providing basic information, leads, possible witnesses and sometimes documentary evidence. A recurring problem, however, is that these sources often cite witness testimony themselves, which can hardly be corroborated later. Former ICC investigation team leader Bernard Lavigne compared the procedure of investigation of humanitarian groups to general journalism. ICC, Lubanga Dyilo Transcript (17 November 2010), p. 47.

\(^{529}\) ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor vs. Callixte Mbarushimana: Decision on the confirmation of charges (ICC-01/04-01/10; 16 December 2011); ICC, Lubanga Judgment; ICC, Situation en République Démocratique du Congo. Affaire le Procureur c. Mathieu Ngudjolo: Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut (ICC-01/04-02/12; 18 December 2012).
It lays bare the problem that in remote, unfamiliar and mostly non-documentary contexts, answering seemingly simple, yet basic, questions like what happened to whom, where and when already proves to be problematic. While journalists, human rights researchers, academics and the public easily pinpoint culprits, criminal investigators face problems corroborating these allegations beyond reasonable doubt.\(^{530}\) Courts, thus, appear to be less competent *chroniquers* about mass atrocity as is generally believed.\(^{531}\) In fact, when confronted with non-documentary societies such as Rwanda,\(^{532}\) inaccessible areas\(^{533}\) or when documents has have been destroyed as in Japan, their groundwork is often uncertain. Practically, that means trial judges have to determine individual responsibility for the most serious crimes almost exclusively on the basis of witness accounts which are given five, ten, sometimes 20 years or even longer after the facts have occurred.\(^{534}\) It poses a complex fact-finding challenge: the data of atrocity crimes is embedded in the fallible memories of people close to the violence,\(^{535}\) which in turn ultimately results in simplistic and distorted images of mass violence.\(^{536}\)

Recent studies, alongside legal practice and trial proceedings, demonstrate how this state of affairs impairs fact-finding processes and truth-ascertaining capacities.\(^{537}\) According to Nancy Combs, eyewitness testimony - which requires coerced, enticed and contextualised remembering - at international tribunals is of highly questionable reliability.\(^{538}\) She describes their modus operandi as ‘fact-finding without facts’. Combs has shown that witnesses at the Rwanda, Sierra Leone and East Timor tribunals have a hard time providing the kind of testimony that fact finders need to receive to determine with any kind of certainty basic facts like who did what to whom. Oral testimony at these tribunals is frequently vague, lacks detail and is often inconsistent with previous written statements. These deficiencies stem from multiple causes: witnesses’ lack of education, investigator errors, language interpretation, cultural divergences between the witnesses and courtroom, evasion or perjury.\(^{539}\) Crucial is that it is almost impossible for judges to separate one from the other and Combs therefore argues that international tribunals purport a fact-finding competence they do not possess. She concludes that international criminal trials appear on the surface to be western-style trials, but that they constitute a much less reliable fact finding mechanism.\(^{540}\) An additional complicating factor to

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532 The most extreme example can be found in Rwanda, where hardly any relevant document exists on the execution of the genocide and the roles of individuals therein. Even video footage of the killings themselves or related events are extremely rare. Witteveen, ‘Dealing with Old Evidence’, pp. 71-72.
533 The ICC was hindered in its investigations in the dense and volatile jungles of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or ‘no-go’ area of Darfur in Sudan. See the testimony of former team leader at the Office of The Prosecutor (OTP) Bernard Lavigne about the Congo investigations: ICC, Lubanga Dyilo Transcript (16 November 2010) & ICC, Lubanga Dyilo Transcript (17 November 2010); ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the Case of the Prosecutor vs. Abdullah Banda Abukar Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jemal: Defence Request for a Temporary Stay of Proceedings (16 November 2010); ICC, Lubanga Dyilo Transcript (17 November 2010); ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the Case of the Prosecutor vs. Abdullah Banda Abukar Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jemal: Defence Request for a Temporary Stay of Proceedings (ICC-02/05-03/09); 6 January 2012).
538 Combs, Fact-Finding Without facts, p. 4.
540 Romaseyvich & Anstiss, ‘When facts are thin,’ p. 4; Combs, Fact-Finding Without facts, p. 176.
these fractures in the fact-finding process is that the brain endures physical and psychological erosion. Witness’ memories tend to simply be selective and poisoned with trauma and they often fade, distort or get influenced over time. This corrosion combined with the protracted proceedings leaves trial judges with the extremely difficult task of assessing witness credibility and reliability of the information rendered by witnesses and to ensure that the content of what has been said has been accurately conveyed in the trial setting.

The arena for international justice is the closed courtroom and its formal decorum. African witnesses travel miles away from home and end up in serene courtrooms where they are to perform an unfamiliar legal ritual, largely in the absence of supporters or spectators from home. Besides the often-frightening face-to-face meeting with the accused, the witnesses are confronted with robed judges and foreign lawyers who cross-examine them via invisible interpreters. The questions are complicated, direct and it is expected that the answers follow the same style. Sometimes it takes hours before it is established that witness “TFI1” or “XRA” walked from point A to B and that it took him about 5 minutes. Translations go from Kinyarwanda, Lingala, Swahili or Arabic into French and then into English. Very often, the very essence of testimony literally gets lost in translation. The translated words spoken however, find it to a final transcript. But once the witness takes the stand, her or his chronicle may only be channelled through the designated subject: the role of the accused in criminal activities. There is hardly any room for dwelling of topic. Contrary to the customary storytelling and narrative traditions of witnesses, international procedures limit the natural flow of narrative. They exclude everything deemed ‘inadmissible’ or ‘irrelevant’ to the crimes charged in the indictment and to the role of the accused therein. Although ‘Victims and Witness Support Units’ carefully take the witnesses through process of testifying, the very stage of the courtroom has often been hostile to international witnesses. Witnesses giving evidence at the UNICTR, SCSL and ICC have complained on being in the intimidating plain view of the perpetrators they are testifying against. Similarly, they have shied away from testifying about sexual violence before a gender-mixed panel and public they do not know. The very scenery often clashes with African customary law, which is more informal. Besides, particularly in the Francophone countries, it is often inquisitorial instead of adversarial.

Likewise, witnesses are often not accustomed to western fact-finding and legal discourse. Many witnesses from Rwanda, Sierra Leone or Congo are illiterate farmers, ‘bush’ soldiers or youngsters who often have a dissimilar reference framework and perception of time and space than the lawyers, prosecutors and judges questioning them. Some witnesses find it hard to testify as to

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542 At the ICTR and ICC, transcripts are only produced in the working languages, English and French, not in the local ‘African’ languages. At the SCSL, all the transcripts are in English, not in Krio.
544 Author’s observations.
545 Idem.
dates, time, distances or colours and others struggle to identify exhibits as maps, photographs and video’s. They often do not speak tribunal’s *lingua franca* French or English. Then there is the temporal distance between the crimes and the testimony: memories fade and details corrode while outside information interferes. A fundamental problem, however, is often the ‘witnessing’ itself. In several instances, witnesses have recounted facts or events they did not observe themselves but instead learned from others or via media. In all, most often, testimony lacks the desired detail and is often fuzzy.

Interpreting this oral testimony is problematic and there are many cultural factors that might disturb understanding this type of evidence. An often-cited problem is the mastered art of secrecy and evasion that Rwandans and Sierra Leoneans reportedly display. In their cultural life, directness or honesty is perceived as a weakness or sign of impoliteness. This inevitably challenges international fact-finders and judges. Who says what and what is true? In the end, foreign judges have to rule on the reliability and credibility of witnesses who appear before them. How do they do that when there is no documentary material to test their accounts? How to interpret this testimony? A judge is neither an anthropologist nor a psychiatrist. Some have acknowledged to problem. During the first cases at the UNICTR, judges therefore called in the assistance from anthropologists, sociologists, linguists and historians to guide them through Rwandan cultural practices. At the hybrid SCSL, the Sierra Leonean judges informed their international colleagues and often clarified issues with witnesses during testimony. The SCSL and UNICTR did identify the cultural differences and the problematic nature of witness testimony but were hardly able to put it to test. The ICC judges, in their first verdict do not explicitly deal with cultural factors while testing testimony but observed that they are to be extremely careful when there is doubt.

At the UNICTR, the trial chambers in the very first case, against Jean-Paul Akayesu, were clearest about their findings on cultural factors that could affect testimony at the tribunal: “[...] the interpretation of oral testimony of witnesses from Kinyarwanda into one of the official languages of the tribunal has been a particularly great challenge due to the fact that the syntax and everyday modes of expression in the Kinyarwanda language are complex and difficult to translate into English or French. These difficulties affected the pre-trial interviews as well as the in court translation of testimony.” When discussing hearsay or second hand witnessing, the tribunal observed it was at “times clarified that evidence which had been reported as an eyewitness account was in fact a second-hand account of what was witnessed.” In addition, the UNICTR heard expert testimony that “it is a particular feature of the Rwandan culture that people are not always direct in answering questions, especially if the question is delicate. In such cases, the answers given will very often have to be

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546 Trial judges at the UNICTR recognised this problem, as they found: “Most Rwandans live in an oral tradition in which facts are reported as they are perceived by the witness, often irrespective of whether the facts were personally witnessed or recounted by someone else.” UNICTR, Akayesu Judgement, §155.  
547 UNICTR, Akayesu Judgement, §145.  
‘decoded’ in order to be understood correctly. This interpretation will rely on the context, the particular speech community, the identity of and the relation between the orator and the listener, and the subject matter of the question.” In many of their judgements, however, judges omitted to highlight the instances where they considered these factors. Many mistakes have probably been taken for granted.

The rather isolated arena in which this testimony is provided often shields it from those affected by the crimes and public scrutiny. Trials are extremely inaccessible for most affected communities, not only because they take place far away from the crime scenes, but also many years after the events. While the performance space already irreversibly detaches the trial from society, there is another alienating factor. In theory international criminal justice is transparent, in practice however, the public only sees a glimpse of what takes place in the courtrooms. In Arusha, security personnel closed a blue curtain and sent the public home, in The Hague the electric blinds go down and the delayed web streaming would say “No Transmission: Closed Session”. These behind the curtain hearings of protected anonymous witnesses became the norm rather than the exception at the UNICTR. They are an erratic problematic feature of the fact-ascertainment process as it shields off those who testify from public scrutiny over the very truthfulness of their testimony. At the UNICTR, ICC and SCSL we only receive bits and pieces of the testimony and narrative through the trial process, despite the fact that tribunals are collectors, producers and archivists of oral testimonies and micro histories. In addition to that, witnesses were only allowed to relate on what their questioners deemed necessary. The alleged cathartic function of publicly testifying in international trials seems to fade. The arena of international justice is at times a hermetically sealed universe of tightly controlled and isolated testimony. This strikingly contrasts with the open-air Gacaca courts or the public hearings of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian TRC’s. The public staging of these processes are perhaps better-suited platforms for oral histories and personal experiences about mass violence.

Notwithstanding the restrictive environment in which trials take place, live trial testimony remains – as argued before- to be the foundation of international criminal justice. The trial is the site where controlled storytelling manifests itself and where different theories and narratives collide. The primary goal is to convince the judges beyond any reasonable doubt that a person is guilty or innocent. Prosecutors and defence teams select witnesses to substantiate their scripts. Each side tells a story and tries to convince the judge their version is the ‘true’ one. Testimony is presented and witnesses are cross-examined by opposing parties. To put it simply: there are generally three narratives during the trial. The prosecutor presents a detailed crime scene with the accused at its

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549 Ibidem, §156.
550 Quantification of these instances proves to be challenging because a sheer amount of information is unavailable. A bulk of ICTR transcripts are not posted to the online Judicial Database (www: http://trim.unictr.org) but much testimony within the transcripts that are posted was held in closed sessions and show many redactions.
551 But for judges at the ICTR publicity did not seem to be a primary concern. As a former ICTR vice president, Judge Erik Mose once remarked in the media trial: “Public access is less important than the speed of the trial.” Quoted in: Thierry Cruvellier, Court of Remorse. Inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Wisconsin 2010), p. 53.
centre. The defence often downplays the crimes and presents the accused as a bystander or peace broker. Both parties present their narratives through witness testimony. The judge is to make findings on the witness’ credibility and the truthfulness of his testimony. As we have observed, this is already a delicate practice, which is further complicated by inter-cultural misunderstanding in most Sub-Saharan African atrocity trials.

Against this background, we have to observe the rise of a new kind of witnesses. Ever since the increasing number of Rwandans on trial in western countries under the norms of universal jurisdiction, some ‘regular’ witnesses have skilled themselves in testifying. After being heard in dozens of investigations they know what investigators want to hear and how they want to hear it. They are already familiar with the practice of western fact-finding. Then there is the eruption of the so-called NGO narrative. Humanitarian organisations working in conflict zones train people in the art of witnessing: people start to remember dates and time of atrocities. Post-war narratives are becoming formulas and standardised. Besides, there are witnesses who lie or tell half-truths. They do so for a variety of reasons. Some are triggered by feelings of revenge and would testify against anybody to get justice. More often, however, ‘witnesses’ see a way out of their miserable circumstances at home. Tribunals offer attractive daily allowances, protection and sometimes relocation – often with family members – to another country. Recognition as a victim and a witness at an international court thus offers advantages. But testifying on behalf of defendants can be beneficial as well. For example, three Congolese witnesses that came to testify at the ICC immediately sought asylum in The Netherlands and one simply ‘disappeared’.\textsuperscript{552} Another problem currently occurring at the ICC are witnesses who claim to have been paid or coerced to testify, or in the extreme case, to retract their testimony, either by the defence or the prosecution. At other times witnesses are deemed to ‘hostile’, uncooperative or unwilling to answer. These truth-traps make it difficult for judges to differentiate between genuine testimonies, made up stories, truths and half-truths and have given them reason to demand ‘better proof’ from prosecutors.

Meanwhile, some judges have sought creative solutions. ICC judges brought an entire trial chamber - including prosecutors, defence lawyers and victim’s representatives - along to the eastern Congolese village Bogoro for a judicial site visit.\textsuperscript{553} Some witnesses had testified in The Hague that they had seen the warlords Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui orchestrate an ethnic massacre in 2003. The witnesses had fled the attack and saw the killings from a nearby hill. The judges themselves climbed up the hill to verify if the witnesses could have physically identified


people from there. To see is to believe is their credo. Other trial chambers are considering holding *in situ* hearings, hoping for public exposure and scrutiny.

This overall situation poses epistemological questions. If convictions before tribunals indeed have uncertain foundations – what position do we take towards the products of the international trial? How to value these testimonies, judgements and facts? If the recollection of modern mass crime in non-western contexts is embedded in the memory of witnesses and if these recollections can be seriously fractured, misinterpreted or orchestrated what kind of narrative then do they establish? What is its use in the criminal trial? How to deal with them? What is their implication for the historical record of mass crime? And last but not least, how to discern this from the trial record?

### 2.12 Trials and Trial Records as Historical Sources

After having outlined the conceptual framework of this dissertation, the following paragraphs discuss the trial record and archives of international criminal tribunals and its promises and pitfalls of its use as historical source. In light of the tribunalisation of mass atrocities and at the closure of some tribunals, this question becomes pertinent. In December 2015, the UNICTR’s Appeals Chamber delivered its final judgement and shape shifted into the Arusha branch of the UN’s Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (UNMICT). Other tribunals, like the SCSL and the Special Panels in East Timor have already finalised their mandates, while the UNICTY and the short-lived Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) are winding down. At the same time, a plethora of courts, like the ICC, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are in full operation. At this transitional juncture, lawyers and judges make room for archivists and historians. Archivists become the custodians of the court record and historians stand in line to consult them as source material for research on the trials themselves as well as the conflicts they have adjudicated. Whereas some of the international courts have already started to include archivists already during the process, historians similarly do not only step in after the events. Importantly, it ought not just the post-trial trial record that should interest historians, but also the trials themselves as well as the pre-trial proceedings. In these specific areas, historians assess the retroactive processes, methodologies and subsequent possible biases of fact-finding and truth ascertainment on the past. Moreover, understanding the trials, such as in the case of Laurent Gbagbo,”

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554 The importance of adequate on-ground investigations cannot be underestimated. Nancy Combs points out that in three of the five ICTR trials in which defendants were acquitted, the Trial Chambers made on-site visits to the Rwandan crime scenes. By contrast, such on-site visits were made in only four of the eighteen ICTR trials that resulted in convictions. Combs, *Fact-Finding Without facts*, pp. 148.


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in which history and historical narratives are enticed, invoked and debated, is crucial to the appreciation of the trial record, to understand as well, the very birth of the trial record and its credentials.

Tribunals entice, collect, present, question and review testimony about the past as well documents from the past, for legal purposes and through a legal lens. As argued, atrocity trials and their end judgements may lead to historically empty narratives, yet importantly, as they unravel history, at minimum previously undetermined facts are exposed in testimonial stories, guilty pleas and evidence that may transpire in the larger realm of a tribunal.558 For instance, the UNICTR established beyond legal dispute that, during 1994, there was a genocidal “campaign of mass killing intended to destroy, in whole or at least in very large part, Rwanda’s Tutsi population.”559 Besides these kinds of significant historical conclusions, courts collect a wealth of historically relevant sources. Amongst many other things, they also exhumed forensic evidence through forensic investigations, DNA tests or ballistics analysis that have been carried out by professional experts on demand of tribunals.560 But they also produce historical sources: particularly witness testimony. Amongst the most interesting achievements of the international courts, is that they have established a massive repository of oral history on mass violence, although, again, through the very limited lens of criminal procedure.561

As argued, trials are creative processes and bring about normative experiences. They end with the trial record, a legacy of documents. Being convinced and accepting that the trial record is an invaluable source for historians; it should preferably not be our only reference. Understanding how it came about is perhaps equally important: how was the trial record established, who established it and under what conditions? We also should know what made it to that record and what did not? And why were these decisions made? The publicly available trial record is only a part of the trial record.562 Confidentiality agreements and sometimes censorship through redactions, witness protection or agreements with third parties are problematic bars for historians. Another bar for

559 UNSC, Report on the completion of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, §55; UNICTR, Karemera, N'girumponge, Nzirorera: Judicial Notice.
561 For instance, approximately 11,100 witnesses, including multiple and video-linked testimonies and support persons, have testified and assisted the ICTY (7,700) and ICTR (3,400). (www-text: http://www.unmict.org/en/about/witnesses, last visit on 9 May 2016).
562 For instance, the UN’s Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (UNMICT), tightly controls all inactive records and archives of the UNICTR, UNICYT and the UNMICT itself. Exempt from disclosure are: (a) Records and information received or transmitted on a confidential basis or with the expectation of confidentiality, including any confidential information from or sent to third parties; (b) Records and information whose disclosure is likely to endanger the safety or security of any individual, violate his or her rights or invade his or her privacy. This shall include records and information related to the protection of witnesses, victims and other vulnerable individuals referred to in the evidence presented before the ICTR, ICTY or Mechanism or otherwise related to the judicial process, including records which contain information which, if disclosed without appropriate authorization, would reveal the identity and location of protected witnesses, victims and other vulnerable individuals. This shall also include personal information related to persons, or families of such persons, who have been or are currently detained by the ICTR, ICTY or Mechanism; (c) Records and information whose disclosure is likely to endanger the security of Member States or prejudice the security or proper conduct of any operation or activity of the United Nations; (d) Records and information covered by legal privilege or related to internal investigations, including judicial records classified by the submitting party or by order or decision of Chambers as “confidential” or “strictly confidential” and all information related to the deliberations of Chambers, as well as the records and information of the OTP which, if disclosed without appropriate authorization, would jeopardize investigations or prosecutions; (e) Internal inter-office or intra-office documents, including draft documents, if disclosure would undermine the Mechanism's free and independent decision-making process; (1) Commercial records and information, if disclosure would harm either the financial interests of the Mechanism or those of other parties involved; (g) Other kinds of records and information, which because of their content or the circumstances of their creation or communication must be deemed confidential. United Nations, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (UNMICT), Access Policy for the Records held by the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (UNMICT/17; 12 August 2016).
historians, after twenty years of international atrocity trials is that the trial records of the tribunals have grown to such enormity that it is an indigestible labyrinth for newcomers. Aside from the millions of pages of evidence, testimony, motions, decisions and judgements, the trial against Charles Taylor and Radovan Karadzic, for example, also produced thousands of pages of transcripts, worth months of reading. Even the experienced judge, assisted by a dozen staff members, needs time. In the ten-year trial against the Serbian nationalist politician Vojislav Sešelj, judge Mandiaye Niang, who replaced a colleague after the trial was closed, took 1.5 year to “familiarise” himself with the case record, on the basis of which he had the pronounce a judgement. Robert Donia, a historian who testified for the UNICTY’s prosecution and wrote a biography on Karadzic for instance explained that over the years, he was only able to sift through a segment of the evidence. Thus, in tandem with the immediacy of trial proceedings and the continuous creation of new records, trial observers may be crucial to our understanding of trials, in lieu of the trial record. A pioneer in this respect is Hannah Arendt. In her journalistic observations, representations and opinions in the New Yorker about the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, she not only showed that trials are dynamic processes and historical events on their own, but also their banality. From my own experience, covering proceedings since 2003, I came to understand that, in all respects, trials are real-time performances, which require real-time observation and study – their meaning gets lost when read from the armchair at university offices or legal libraries. Unfortunately for the post-trial researcher, most of the courtroom drama and theatrics cannot be captured in legal filings, written testimonies and documents, or out of their context. From the transcribed trial record, we cannot see the tears, hear the voices of witnesses or feel the tension in the courtroom and public galleries. For example, from the transcript we cannot read: the applause by Gbagbo supporters in the ICC’s public gallery when ‘their defendant” made a court entrance; that the Rwandan singer Simon Bikindi sang his closing statements at the UNICTR; and how Thomas Lubanga through his intense staring confused a former child soldier witness who accordingly recanted his testimony at the ICC. These trial events are often not even captured on the redacted video- or audio recordings, which are recorded, edited and distributed by the courts. Legally speaking, these things may be irrelevant, but for the social sciences and historians who need to contextualise their sources these are crucial. In this respect, one would bring back to memory the popular saying that ‘journalism is the first draft of history.’ At the UNICTY, trials were relatively continuously covered by journalists from the region as well as by the international press corps. At the ICC, which deals with an increased case-load from many situation countries, the reporting by

563 Only see the Judicial Records and Archives Database (JRAD), which provides access to all UNMICT public judicial records, as well as to the public judicial archive records of the ICTR. The JRAD includes filings from parties and non-parties to trials; exhibits tendered in court; transcripts and audio-visual recordings of court hearings. Available at: http://jrad.unmict.org.
565 Donia, Radovan Karadžić; ‘Interview Robert Donia’.
566 ICC, Gbagbo - Blé Goudé Transcript (28 January 2016).
567 As observed by the author on 30 September 2009.
568 ICC, Lubanga Dyilo Transcript (28 January 2009).
‘locals’ is mixed, while international journalists are increasingly organised and specialised.\textsuperscript{570} For the more obscure or distant trial settings that was not the case. Conceivably, we owe it to the endeavours of contemporary independent investigative journalists like Thierry Cruvellier that we know at least some critical details about the many trials and errors at the UNICTR in Arusha between the crucial years of 1997 and 2002.\textsuperscript{571}

Arendt, Cruvellier and many other investigative reporters were capable of providing critical understanding into these daily realities of the trial, vital data that can hardly be distilled from the trial record or from the pre-selected official “outreach” of the tribunals.\textsuperscript{572} Observers also highlight the critical moments in trials, which in daily reality are tirelessly boring, banal and disillusioning. But there is something else. The post-trial researcher can of course use the official court transcripts, videos and audio from the trial record to corroborate basic facts, like quotes, dates and names etcetera. But regrettably, the trial record is not always complete.\textsuperscript{573} Often because evidence was not used at trial, documents are confidential, or huge parts of the trial took place behind closed curtains or because documents were later redacted, or in the most extreme cases because it was censored. For instance, only those present at the delivery of judgement in Charles Taylor’s trial, including the author, were witness to the strong disagreement from the alternate judge. Malick Sow, from Senegal, who had sat through the entire trial, said he found the prosecution case was “not proven beyond any reasonable doubt” and that “there had been no deliberations” and that he feared the international justice system “was heading to disaster.”\textsuperscript{574} But, during his statement, the tribunal was quick to cut off the microphone and lower the blinds in the public gallery. Afterwards, his statements were deleted from the court’s video record and from the court transcript. His name was initially not even published on the written Judgement.\textsuperscript{575}

These deliberate erasures from the trial record are disturbing. But there are other, more ordinary, elements that we will not find in the transcripts or videos. These include judges and other court staff, who fell asleep during the proceedings or battle out personal arguments amongst themselves behind the screens. But there is more. We cannot scrutinise Judges’ deliberations and look into their notes. These are private and secret. Similarly, we cannot see the various draft judgements with different scenarios that are usually produced by a batch legal officers and interns. These are probably electronically deleted or physically destroyed. Also, we do not see the non-verbal power

\textsuperscript{570} Through the Association of Journalists at the ICC (AJICC). Amongst several other media, there is a specialised website, which monitors at the proceedings at the ICC, in the Guatemalan genocide trial against Efrain Rios Montt as well as the Khmer Rouge trials at the ECCC: Open Society Justice Initiative, International Justice Monitor (www-page: http://www.ijmonitor.org).

\textsuperscript{571} Through his writings and those of a handful of other journalists in the subsequent magazines Diplomatique Judiciaire and the International Justice Tribune (IJT), whose archives are available at: https://www.justicetribune.com. Cruvellier’s reporting in Arusha formed the basis for his book on the ICTR: Cruvellier, Court of Remorse.


\textsuperscript{574} El Hadj Malick Sow, ‘Oral Statement’ (Leidschendam, 26 April 2012) on file with author. Also see an interview with Sow: ‘Justice Sow: Charles Taylor should have walked free’, New African (December 2012), pp. 46-53.

plays in the courtroom – for example between the accused persons and witnesses. We cannot read those from the written transcript. Next to that, post-trial researchers, cannot deduce from the trial record those lawyers and prosecutors who were on Facebook, Twitter or Instagram while their colleagues were cross-examining their witnesses. The latter may sound entertaining, but these are serious things that happen during war crimes trials. And we may only know about these things because independent observers or journalists witnessed them from the public galleries overlooking the courtrooms. Perhaps it is a cliché, but it is a very important one, particularly when studying international criminal justice, which in itself is a self-referential system. When using trials and the trial record as historical sources, we should always observe, read and analyse the trial record in tandem with independent and impartial first-hand reports and observations, preferably outside of the legal realm, because it provides critical context and is likely to fill gaps of information we do not always get through the official channels of the officially distributed court records.

Now, shifting away from the trial itself, there is another lacuna in the trial record. It concerns the records that were collected, selected and produced in the lead up to the trials: the investigations and the gathering of evidence. All tribunals start with sending investigators to the field. They conduct the first interviews, locate documents in dusty archives, follow leads, stumble upon various crime scenes, conduct exhumations, talk to low-level perpetrators, tap phones, collect materials from intelligence agencies, government agencies and UN peacekeeping missions, conduct forensic analysis and what more. Arguably, from a historian’s point of view, this is one of the most interesting elements of the work of a tribunal, because, it deals with the fundamental collection of facts, evidence and testimony. But it is also the least transparent part of the tribunal’s work and it seldom finds its way to the public trial record. This is the case both for the prosecution and for the defence and it creates a black hole in the trial record. Often we do not know anything about the investigators, their professional background, their methodologies and even their own reliability and objectivity.576 We know little about investigation decisions: how to investigate, when to investigate, where to investigate, who to investigate? This automatically also counts for when not to investigate, where not to investigate and who not to investigate. In the court records and tribunal’s archives, we do not find minutes of meetings of investigative teams, decision by chief investigators and investigator’s notebooks. In conjunction, the trial record does not disclose the early testimonies collected during the initial investigations, mostly because they were not introduced as evidence in the trials. More importantly, the prosecution, defence and the chambers’ archives are not an integral part of the publicly available court archives and we therefore miss a lot of valuable information. It is only quite recently that we are becoming more aware of the methodologies applied in these vital areas of

576 At the ICC, for instance, this is confidential, including the Operations Manual. Author’s email exchange with Michel de Smedt, the ICC’s Head of Investigations, 15 May 2015.
work.\textsuperscript{577} The ICC, in its three Judgements, has opened up an interesting insight into the prosecutor’s investigations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.\textsuperscript{578} Particularly, the Lubanga judgement is interesting in this respect.\textsuperscript{579} But we also continue to learn more in the Kenyan cases as lawyers have been calling for an independent investigation of the OTP’s modus operandi of alleged witness tampering.\textsuperscript{580} Thus, as the trials continue, the trial record expands and our understanding of it increases.
2.13 Conclusions

This chapter has operationalised described, defined and demarcated terminology, concepts and frameworks. It then has outlined the debate that provides the contextual framework of the key elements of this thesis.

First, to sidestep pointless dwelling on definitions on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes which are interchangeably – and often confusingly and instrumentally - used in public, policy and academic vernaculars, I understand these events as criminal offences as defined in the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute. Conceptualising mass violence as atrocity crimes specifically or mass atrocities more generally serves two purposes. First, as a legal concept, it is clear which broad range of crimes are covered, without continuously having to refer to specific details if not particularly necessary. Secondly, applying the term to different historical events, contexts or processes, it remains clear under what comparative legal framework these can be understood. Furthermore, I employ the term mass atrocities, both for recent historical events as well as remote historical events. The first belongs to the legal realm, the latter to the historical. In consistency with all the above, when discussing trials, I will employ the term atrocity trials, rather than the somehow standardised, yet often misapplied, terminology of ‘war crimes trials’. Also, when discussing truth commissions, the scope is limited to the arena of mass atrocities. Similarly, I also set out to employ the terminology of mass atrocities in broader discussions on transitional justice and similar responses to either recent or remote historical episodes of mass violence.

Secondly, I have also sought to demarcate the ambiguous concepts of transitional justice. In all, I understand transitional justice as the acquired diversity of human rights related practices, mechanisms, policies and trepidations guiding societal and political transitions, aimed at confronting real or perceived injustice. Furthermore, in order to come to a more complex, detached, understanding of transitional justice, I have argued that the systems’ mechanisms can also be ignored, deficiently executed or managed, neglected, misplaced or utilised by political agents for much less lofty goals than prescribed in the cosmopolitan dogmatic human rights discourse to reach the contrary or they can turn out not to have these intended effects at all. In sum, transitional justice is inherently political and its mechanisms are therefore open to uses, abuses and manipulations in order to achieve other goals than the human rights it claims to serve. For the sake of clarity and useful empirical operationalisation, I have departed from the use of transitional justice as academic framework and rather opted to treat transitional justice endeavours as historic phenomena, or historical rites de passage: case, local and culturally specific cleansing rituals guiding deep-rooted social and/or political change from widespread atrocity violence to the absence thereof. In this dissertation, the particular rites de passage researched are criminal trials. Additionally, I have argued transitional
justice is a viable academic concept and can solely be convincingly investigated only if approached in a dispassionate, amoral, non-juridical and apolitical way to the largest extent possible.

Third, within the above understanding of transitional justice, I have discussed the two prime transitional justice mechanisms that are occupied with questions on historical truth finding: truth commissions and atrocity trials. I have argued that truth commissions, as a mixture between pseudo-accountability mechanism and pseudo-historian, operate within the legal framework of the right to know about legally framed atrocities and that prosecutions serve the punitive demands of transitional justice. I then turned to the broader discussion on the problematic relationship – as a forced marriage - between history writing and adjudicating historical events. I have argued that lawyers simply have a different relationship with the past than historians. Disparate from professional historians, lawyers like to make – and become part of - history themselves, tweak historical narratives according to their argument and like history – like law – to be static. Thus, for the historian history is object and objective while for the lawyer history is subject and subjective. Furthermore, I have shown that a key limitation to truth finding in the trial setting is the dependency on witness testimony. I have problematised the foundational problem that in geographically and temporally remote, unfamiliar and mostly non-documentary contexts, answering seemingly simple, yet basic, questions like what happened to whom, where and when already proves to be problematic and that courts appear to be less competent chroniquers about mass atrocity as is generally believed. In this apparent modus operandi of ‘fact-finding without facts’, I then question what position do we take towards the products of the atrocity trials: the trial record.

Fourth, this dissertation has thus far shown the promises and pitfalls of its use of court records as historical source. Despite the shortcomings discussed above, the tribunals have contributed to establishing facts beyond any legal dispute. But besides these kinds of significant historical conclusions, courts also collected, produced and brought together a wealth of historical sources: particularly witness testimony. For historians, the trial records and court’s archives are a unique source in studying mass atrocity, although there may be problems as to confidentiality, accessibility and the sheer volume of court material. I have argued, for a variety of reasons, that despite the enormity, court records ought to be read in context and using non-court sources, particularly in those instances where proceedings took place behind closed doors or where the court record is censored otherwise. Historians studying mass atrocities and the subsequent dealings with those mass atrocities by courts and other transitional justice mechanism ought to act careful in using these sources. During and after these trials, we ought to be diligent that the expanding trial records ultimately settle in the histories of mass violence and mend into historiographies of atrocious past of individual conflicts. Thus, while the trial record is an invaluable source for historical research on the situations of mass violence they have adjudicated as well as their discussions on the past, interesting, vital and sometimes deliberate lacuna’s remain and thus ought to be cautiously read with informed knowledge.
about why, how and under which circumstances they came and in conjunction with independent third-party primary sources.