Contesting national belonging: An established-outsider figuration on the margins of Thessaloniki, Greece

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Appendix I

I. 1 Open questions asked in the context of the GEITONIES survey

Questions asked to native residents:
Do you have relations with people from your neighbourhood?
How would you describe those relationships?
How do you view the relations between different categories of people in the
neighbourhood?
Do you have relations with the immigrants in the neighbourhood?
How would describe those relations?
What is your opinion about the immigrants in the neighbourhood?
Which are the immigrant groups that live in your neighbourhood?
How many of the immigrants in the neighbourhood are of Greek descent?

Questions asked to FSU Greek residents:
How would you describe your relation with native Greeks when you first came to
Greece?
Have they changed in time?
In what ways and why do you think this has happened?
Do you have relations with people from your neighbourhood?
How would you describe those relationships?
How would you describe your relation with the native Greeks in the neighbourhood?
Which aspect of your life in the FSU would you wish to retain in Greece and which
aspects of your life in Greece do you appreciate the most?
Which groups would you include in the word наша in Greece and which groups did
you include in the FSU with the same word?
I. 2 The Pontic exodus

In 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered WW I on the side of the Axis powers and a general call of conscription, including to non-Muslim millets, was issued for the first time in the history of the Empire. After the heavy defeat by the Russian army in Sacramis, Christian soldiers were disarmed and sent to labour battalions (amele taburu) in the interior of Anatolia. Forced to work in inhuman conditions, resulting in heavy causalities, several Pontics defected. They returned to Pontos, joining brigands in the mountains and other draft defectors, who had escaped conscription, to avoid arrest; guerrilla bands gradually organized in the West Pontic Mountains. The Ottoman authorities took violent reprisals against members of the Greek communities, demanding the surrender of the draft defectors (Samouilides 2002). West Pontos became a theatre of violence between irregular Muslim and Christian armed bands with many victims among the civilians of both religions (Marantzidis, 2001). The tragic events culminated in massacres and deportations of Orthodox Pontic civilians.

In East Pontos conditions were different. Russian troops conquered Trabzon in 1916 and for two years political power passed into the hands of a provisional government in which Metropolite Chrisanthos, the Orthodox religious leader of the city, played a key role (A. Karpozilos, 2002, p. 138). Russians were secretly providing arms to the Pontic guerrilla fighters in the west whom they used as a counterplot. However, after the outbreak of the October revolution the Russian troops started withdrawing and Ottoman irregulars attacked the city. A large proportion of the Orthodox population of East Pontos took refuge in Russia. In February 1918 the Russian troops evacuated the city which was recaptured by the Ottomans. With the 17 October truce an amnesty was provided to the area of Pontos.

Peace lasted only for a short period. Mustafa Kemal renounced the authority of the sultan, formed the Turkish National Movement and reorganized the Turkish army under his leadership. The Greek government opted for a diplomatic solution of ‘the Pontic’ issue and proposed its integration in a Ponto-Armenian Federation. Chrysanthos negotiated the possibility of an autonomous Pontic state with equality between Christians and Muslims and a Ponto-Armenian Federation. An agreement was achieved with the Armenians but the plans did not last long after the fall of the new Armenian state.

In the meantime, Greek-Pontic populations once more organized in guerilla bands and irregular and regular Turkish forces attacked them. A new deadly fight arose followed by massacres, arson attacks, and deportations of Pontic Greek civilians. In 1921, a large segment of the political and intellectual elite of the Pontic Greek community was murdered after summary trials under accusation of propaganda for the creation of an independent Pontic Greek state. Such plans were pursued in coordination with members of the Pontic Diaspora. In August 1922, the Greek army was defeated and in November the first ship with Pontic-Greek refugees left for the imagined motherland. Until 1924,

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223 It should be noted that non-Muslims became obliged to serve the Ottoman army only after the Hatt-ı Hümayun reforms in 1856.
Pontic-Greeks gathered in refugee camps in Istanbul or remained in the mountains trying to reach Greece by any means and any route. Organized evacuation eventually took place in 1924 after the signing of the Lausanne treaty. The remaining populations were transferred to Greece.

As mentioned in the main text, Pontic Greeks completely deserted their ancestral home, fleeing to Russia or being permanently expelled to Greece as part of the population exchange of the Lausanne convention. Tens of thousands of Pontic Greeks perished as victims of the labour battalions, deportation, massacres, diseases and hardships on their way to Russia and Greece or in the guerrilla battles (Samouilidis, 2002, p. 230). Of the remaining population more than 200,000 fled to Greece and approximately 85,000 (Hassiotis 1997), primarily from East Pontos, fled to Russia. The decimated Pontic Orthodoxy was divided between two new homelands.

I. 3 The contested issue of the Pontic genocide

Pontic associations and researchers of Pontic origin count the number of those who perished in the tragic period 1912-1922 as up to 353,000 people. This is probably a miscalculation based on an overestimated original population. The Orthodox Greek population in wider Pontos (i.e., Sivas, Trabzon, Kastamonou) was approximately 477,000 in 1912, according to the Greek Patriarchate statistics, or approximately 467,000 in 1910, according to the Ottoman official statistics (Pentzopoulos 2002: 30). The survivors of the catastrophe include the 182,169 Pontic refugees in Greece and part of the 47,091 refugees who were registered as originating from Caucasus (a part of this population concerned people who had settled in Caucasus in the 19th century, before the turbulent period of 1912-1922 (see for example Xanthopoulou 2000; Hassiotis 2006)). At the same time, Hassiotis estimates that approximately 85,800 Pontic Greeks took refuge in Russia, excluding those who were displaced in Kars. Nevertheless, even these data need to be read with caution. According to Vergeti (2000), more Pontic Greeks arrived in Greece and registered as Asia Minor or Thracian Greeks. For the Caucasian refugee population, it is not clear whether it concerns the Greeks who took refuge in Kars, and thus should be added to the surviving Pontic population, or is part of the 85,800 people mentioned in Hassiotis to have fled in Russia – and thus should be subtracted from them. Finally, the Patriarchate and Ottoman censuses are also contested as accurate sources for the calculation of Greek population in the beginning of the 20th century (Pentzopoulos, 2002).

Despite the lack of precise data, the undisputable fact remains that Pontic Greeks experienced a tragic mass destruction; tens of thousands perished (Samouilides, 2002). Whether their tragedy may be called a genocide is not a question about numbers. It directly concerns the concept of genocide itself. In the absence of a theory of genocide the editor of the Journal of Genocide Research recommends caution in its usage (as cited

224 In this turbulent period approximately 25% of the total Ottoman populations perished (Marantzidis 2001).
in Voutira, 2006). The Greek genocide has been recognized by the International Association of Genocide scholars but it is doubted by others including Mazower (2001). Valentino (2005) claims that when conflict between Greece and Turkey erupted between 1919-1923, the new Turkish regime decided on the ‘cleansing’ of the remaining Greek population but the death toll was probably lessened by the refugee’s ability to flee to Greece and the eventual international supervision of the population transfer (pp. 289). It is interesting to note that the Pontic genocide is also contested within Greece, by the supporters of the ‘Greek genocide’. According to their thesis, defining the Pontian experience as an exclusive, isolated, and distinct event reduces the genocide to only northern Asia Minor, ultimately shrinking the actual number of Greek genocide victims throughout the whole of the Ottoman Empire (see http://www.pontiangenocide.com). In 1998 the Greek government, excepting the Pontic genocide, affirmed the genocide of Greeks in Asia Minor as a whole and designated 14 September a day of commemoration.

I.4 Emigration from Tsalka

According to Agtzidis, emigration from Tsalka, similar to the rest of the Greek communities in Central Georgia, was not intense during the early years (1991). In the late Soviet period, Tsalka was one of the most productive agricultural regions of Georgia with a high standard of living. However, after the collapse of the USSR, the local economy disintegrated; the Soviet internal market broke down and the roads and railway links fell into disrepair (Wheatly, 2009).

Due to continuous state neglect, infrastructural problems became alarming and living standards plummeted. Growingly people were relying on a low cash economy while the continuous deterioration of transport links made it unprofitable to sell their agricultural products in Tbilisi or Marneuli (Wheatley, 2006, pp.6). In such conditions the prospect of emigration to Greece (as well as to Russia) was increasingly seen as viable alternative to the stagnant socio-economic situation the Greek populations were faced with. Emigration increased in the early 1990s and continued at a steady pace. Between 1989 and 2002 the Greek population of Tsalka fell by 80% to mere 4,589 people (Trier & Turasvili, 2006:61). Greeks ceased to be the majority in a largely ‘Greek area’.

At the same time, Tsalka witnessed a substantial arrival of ecologically displaced populations and economic migrants who were attracted by the availability of work in the construction of the oil pipeline known as BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan). The majority of the newcomers, Georgian in background, illegally occupied the houses which had had been abandoned by Greeks. However, rights over land were tied to official proof of house ownership; the house titles were associated with land from the former collective farms that the owners had acquired. Even those newcomers who had bought rather than squatted the local houses did so unofficially, thus having no rights over land (Whitley 2006). The Greek emigrants had entrusted their property to relatives, or to Greek and in some cases Armenian neighbours (Trier & Turasvili, 2006). As a result the remaining Greek families possessed, either themselves, or on behalf of their relatives or neighbours, most of the former collective farm land and leased it to the immigrant families. This kind of arrangement caused discontent among newcomers (Trier & Turasvili, 2006:36).
The situation soon became unstable and conflict-prone, aggravated further by the fact that newcomers and established residents had little limited capacity to communicate, considering that the majority of the newly-arrived rural Georgians could not speak Russian. The latter had hitherto been the main language of inter-ethnic communication between the Greek, Armenian, and Azeri populations which comprised 95% of the local population. The communication barrier between newcomers and established groups, combined with the lack of any kind of state regulation, led to tension exacerbated by the land shortage and a perception by many of the older inhabitants that the newcomers were favoured for work on the BTC pipeline (Wheatly, 2009).

Tensions between Greeks and Georgians in Tsalka became common. In 1999 the Georgian government was forced to send troops to Tsalka after a quarrel between a Georgian and an ethnic Greek led to armed clashes that left two people dead (Liklikadze 2006). Clashes intensified in the following years and reached a peak in early 2005 contributing to the decision of more Greeks to leave the area. As a result of continuous out migration the situation of the remaining Greek population had become very vulnerable and severe. According to the World Council of Greeks Abroad (2005), from 2003 to 2005 eight ethnic Greeks had been murdered in the Tsalka district. The Georgian Ombudsman reported that ‘the Greek population […] is the most undefended, since in Tsalka district there remain those mainly of advanced age … Criminal groups exploit this situation and mainly rob the Greek population’ (Wheatly, 2006, pp.14).

By 2006 the number of Greeks had fallen to around 1,500, comprised largely by the elderly. At that time, interethnic conflict had largely decreased due to intervention by the Georgian and the Greek state. However, the Greek presence in Tsalka had practically vanished. Relative deprivation may not be the only cause for the self-feeding character of emigration.225 In ethnically mixed communities during periods of political instability, extended emigration might lead to shifts in local power relations making it more difficult for the remaining population to stay, hence inducing further migration.

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225 Relative deprivation refers to the process whereby non-immigrant populations become increasingly prone to immigrate when economic disparities grow at the local level due to remittance and other money flows from migrants.
Appendix II

Table I. National, ethnic and religious minorities in Greece in 1928

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Turks</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>86,506</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Slavo-Macedonians</td>
<td>Slavo-Macedonian</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>81,844</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chams</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>18,598</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sephardic Jews</td>
<td>Ladino</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Armenians</td>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>31,038</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Koutsovlachs</td>
<td>Koutsovlach</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>19,679</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Pomaks</td>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>16,755</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Greek Catholics</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>27,747</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Greek Jews</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>9,090</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Other(^a)</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,685</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MINORITIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>384,942</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Greeks(^b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,819,742</td>
<td>93.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL POPULATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,204,684</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, Mavrogoratos 1983

Map I. The founding of Marioupol and the first migrations to the north
Map II. Nikopoli’s location

Map III. Segregation in Nikopoli
PHOTOS

The Old Nikopoli and the Rema

A house in old Nikopoli

Houses in old Nikopoli

Shops and houses in old Nikopoli

The torrent (réma)

The road to the Réma area

Houses in the Réma area
Efxinoupoli

A general view of Efxinoupoli

Children building their house in Efxinoupoli

A garden in communal land in Efxinoupoli

Houses in Efxinoupoli

The monument of the Pontic people in Efxinoupoli

The boxing club in Efxinoupoli
The high voltage pylons next to houses in Efinoupoli

New Nikopoli

A Typical road in New Nikopoli

The open market

Cars parked in unused space in New Nikopoli

The shack of the grannies before its destruction by the Municipality
After its destruction: ‘saving the property’

Reclaiming space back

Another leisure shack

A street gathering in Nikopoli

A FSU restaurant in New Nikopoli

A romantic Roma couple passing through New Nikopoli

Photos: Manolis Pratsinakis, Flip Lindo, Stratis Voyatzis