Moral misfits: The role of moral judgments and emotions in derogating other groups

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Chapter 6

On the Morality and Competence of Immigrants: Moral Emotions as Amplifiers of Expulsion

This chapter is based on Wirtz, C., & van der Pligt, J. On the morality of immigrants: Moral emotions as amplifiers of expulsion. Manuscript under review.
As we have seen in previous chapters, minority group members are often confronted with stereotypes and prejudice. Immigrants for instance, tend to be perceived as incompetent and unfriendly (Cuddy et al., 2009; Lee & Fiske, 2006), and are likely to be avoided or excluded (Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008; McLaren, 2003; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). Research on stereotypes generally uses two dimensions, i.e., warmth and competence, to describe how different social groups are perceived (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Kervyn, Yzerbyt, & Judd, 2010; Ybarra et al., 2008). As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, warmth often comprises two separate dimensions: sociability and morality (Anderson & Sedikides, 1991; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). A number of studies addressed the impact of morality on out-group evaluations (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Phalet & Poppe, 1997). Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, and Yzerbyt (2011) showed that evaluations of a fictitious out-group were more strongly influenced by morality than by competence or sociability ascriptions. When this out-group was portrayed as immoral, the impression of that group was more negative as compared to descriptions that stressed low levels of competence or sociability. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation we showed that the attitude and social distance towards a stigmatized group, i.e., HIV-patients, was also strongly related to perceived morality, while sociability and competence were less important.

In the present research we again investigate reactions to an existing group; i.e., Romanian immigrants. In the last decade people from several countries in the east of Europe moved to Western Europe in order to find work. Polish immigrants now form a sizable minority in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain. More recently, Romanians also moved to western European countries. In the present chapter we experimentally manipulate morality of Romanian migrant workers, and investigate whether it has an impact on general attitudes towards this group and support for their expulsion.

In the context of immigrant workers, we do not expect sociability to be related to the tendency to exclude that group. Indirect support for the modest role of sociability comes from work showing that sociability has less impact on the
impression of an out-group than both competence and morality (Brambilla, Sacchi et al., 2011). The findings described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation provide further support for this view and showed that sociability did not affect prejudice and social distance to members of a stigmatized group. Thus, in the present studies we focus primarily on perceived morality and competence.

Some research suggests that majority group members incorporate perceived competence when forming impressions of minorities such as migrant workers (e.g., Phalet & Poppe, 1997). Generally, immigrants have a lower status than the majority group (e.g., Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998), and in order to maintain that status distinction, majority groups tend to stress differences in competence between the in-group and out-group (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Ellemers, 1993). Thus, competence is likely to play a role in out-group evaluations (see also Fiske et al., 2002). There is also some evidence that perceived incompetence is related to passive forms of harm, such as avoidance and neglect (Cuddy et al., 2007). However, as argued in Chapters 1 and 2, we expect perceived morality to be a more important determinant of prejudice and willingness to exclude others (see also Brambilla, Sacchi et al., 2011).

As we have seen in earlier chapters, moral emotions play an important role in this process. In the introduction of this dissertation we explained that other-condemning emotions (i.e., contempt, disgust, and anger) are likely to be elicited when other groups are perceived as immoral (Haidt, 2003; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). This class of moral emotions may result in the exclusion of the group that evokes these emotions (e.g., Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Contempt and disgust are associated with the tendency to exclude, avoid, or expel the persons who evoke these emotions (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). Generally, anger is related to the tendency to punish, confront or attack the moral violator (Kuppens, van Mechelen, Smits, & de Boeck, 2003; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000), but there is some evidence that anger can also result in avoidance and turning away from the elicitor (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011, Nabi, 2002). Although these three emotions can have different behavioural consequences as a function of context, we expect that they are highly correlated in the context of reactions to immigrants. There is some evidence that
people use all three emotion terms to describe their feelings that express their
general disapproval of moral violations (Grappi, Romani, & Bagozzi, 2013;
Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2012; Nabi, 2002; see also the previous
chapter of this dissertation). All three emotions can result in willingness to expel
immigrants from society, albeit with different motivations (i.e., to punish them or
to avoid them).

Other-suffering emotions such as pity, compassion, and commiseration
(Haidt, 2003) are also relevant in the present context. As discussed in previous
chapters, these emotions are associated with groups that are perceived as honest
and reliable, but disadvantaged (due to incompetence for instance, Cuddy et al.,
2007), and result in a tendency to offer help and reduce harm (e.g., Rudolph,
Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004). Other-suffering emotions are a positive
counterpart of other-condemning emotions; when out-groups are portrayed as
immoral they are likely to evoke contempt and not pity. When other groups are
perceived as moral but incompetent however, pity is likely to be evoked and not
contempt. This also suggests that morality and competence have opposite effects
on other-suffering emotions. Though we expect that the impact of morality on
these emotions will be more pronounced.

Cuddy et al. (2007) showed that specific emotions mediate the impact of
stereotype content on action tendencies towards individuals associated with that
stereotype. They showed that feelings of pity towards other groups mediate the
impact of perceived competence on willingness to avoid members of these groups,
indicating that when people believed that other groups were relatively
incompetent they tended to feel pity. This feeling was in turn associated with the
view that members of the majority group generally avoided or neglected those
out-groups. This finding seems somewhat surprising, as pity is generally
associated with the tendency to help disadvantaged groups (Rudolph et al., 2004).
According to Cuddy and colleagues, pity sometimes involves sadness, sometimes
disrespect. These two feelings could help to explain the relation with avoidance.
However, when pity involves other-suffering feelings such as compassion, it will
more likely lead to help and support (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Tomas, 2010). In
the present study we focus on other-suffering emotions and expect them to be negatively related to prejudice and support for expulsion.

Cuddy et al. (2007) also showed that contempt mediates the relation between warmth (a combination of sociability and morality) and the tendency to harm others; groups that are seen as less warm are more likely to evoke contempt, and this emotion is associated with a tendency to harm these groups. Cuddy and colleagues did not manipulate morality, but focused on the relationship between stereotype content, emotions, and action tendencies that people generally associate with certain groups.

In the present study we manipulate morality and competence of Romanian migrant workers and assess their impact on prejudice and willingness to expel this group. We expect morality to have a strong impact on prejudice and preference for expulsion. More specifically, when Romanian immigrants are portrayed as immoral, we expect this to result in more prejudice and willingness to expel that group than when they are portrayed as moral. We expect the impact of morality to be more pronounced than the impact of competence. We also expect morality to have a strong impact on emotions; immoral immigrants are expected to evoke more other-condemning emotions and less other-suffering emotions than moral immigrants. This effect is also expected to be more pronounced than the effect of competence. Moreover, we expect that other-condemning emotions such as contempt and other-suffering emotions such as pity will mediate the impact of morality on prejudice and willingness to expel Romanians from society.

Study 6.1

Method

Participants. Participants were 103 undergraduates (65 women, 38 men) from the University of Amsterdam, who took part in the study for course credit. Their age ranged from 18 to 51 ($M = 22.23, SD = 5.20$).
**Materials and procedure.** First, we reminded participants of the increased media-coverage of immigration of Romanians to the Netherlands, and asked them to read a newspaper article on this issue. The article started with a general description of Romanians coming to the Netherlands, looking for work. This was followed by the manipulated text: Two versions stressed the [im]morality of Romanians and two their [in]competence. In the former we described research showing that “Romanians can [not] be trusted, are self-reliant [lazy], [un]reliable, and [do not] show respect to each other and superiors”. In the competence conditions we stressed that “research showed that Romanians are well [poorly] educated, have [no] useful work experience, are [un]able to work hard, and need very few [a lot] of instructions”. We based our manipulation on the morality and competence stereotypes used by Leach et al. (2007). This manipulation resulted in a 2 (morality vs. competence) by 2 (high vs. low) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.

After reading this newspaper article, we presented the questionnaire. The first question aimed to assess participants’ prejudice towards Romanians on a scale ranging from 1 (negative) to 11 (positive). This measure is the same we used in the previous chapter and comparable with the evaluation thermometer that has been successfully used in past research to capture attitudes towards groups (e.g., Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993). We reverse scored this measure and a higher score indicated more prejudice. Next we presented thirteen emotion words and asked participants to indicate the degree to which they felt each of the emotions when thinking about Romanians. They could answer these items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a large extent). We calculated the mean score on five emotion words to capture other-suffering emotions: “compassion”, “empathy”, “pity”, “sympathy”, and “commiseration” (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .83$). We also assessed the mean for other-condemning emotions: contempt: “contempt”, “disgust”, “revulsion”, “aversion”, “anger”, and “irritation” ($\alpha = .94$). The list was completed with one positive emotion: “happiness”.

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21 A principal factor analysis after varimax rotation on these items resulted in the expected two factors. The first factor explained 47.8% of the total variance and comprised the six other-condemning emotions (factor loadings .81-.90). The second factor explained
We measured willingness to expel Romanians from society by asking participants’ agreement with eight statements that were based on a scale used by Mclaren (2003). Examples are: “Romanians should return home immediately after their contract ends”, “Romanians add nothing useful to our society”, and “Family reunification should be made impossible for Romanians”. They could answer on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Answers to these statements were averaged (α = .79), and a higher score indicated increased willingness to expel Romanians from society.

To check if our manipulations were successful, we concluded the questionnaire by asking our participants to rate Romanian immigrant workers on two 11-point bipolar adjective scales (immoral-moral and incompetent-competent).

**Results**

**Manipulation checks.** We used 2 (dimension: morality vs. competence) by 2 (level: high vs. low) ANOVA’s to test if our manipulations were successful. The means in Table 6.1 show that the low morality condition scored lower on perceived morality than the high morality condition. The low morality condition also resulted in lower scores on this dimension than obtained in the low and high competence condition. The latter conditions did not differ, and both scored lower than the high morality condition on perceived morality. Competence was seen as lower in the low competence condition than in the high competence condition. Competence was also rated low in the low morality condition. This effect of level was significant, \( F(1, 99) = 129.80, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .09 \). These results indicate that our manipulation of morality was successful. However, the impact of morality seemed to generalize to perceived competence.

21.3% of the variance and captured the other-suffering emotions (loading .61-.86). Happiness loaded moderate on both factors (-.33 and .54, respectively).
Table 6.1  
*Means (and standard deviations) of the main variables per condition (Study 6.1).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Morality</th>
<th>Competence</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality¹</td>
<td>3.13 (1.73)a</td>
<td>8.52 (2.19)b</td>
<td>6.57 (1.41)c</td>
<td>7.41 (2.08)c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence¹</td>
<td>3.96 (2.04)a</td>
<td>9.13 (1.79)b</td>
<td>4.76 (1.74)a</td>
<td>8.74 (2.44)b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudice¹</td>
<td>9.14 (1.36)a</td>
<td>3.53 (2.67)b</td>
<td>6.36 (1.76)c</td>
<td>4.17 (2.38)b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expel²</td>
<td>4.08 (1.12)a</td>
<td>3.05 (.94)b</td>
<td>3.74 (.90)b</td>
<td>3.56 (.96)ab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-C emotions²</td>
<td>4.37 (.81)a</td>
<td>1.94 (1.16)b</td>
<td>2.91 (1.11)c</td>
<td>2.35 (1.05)b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-S emotions²</td>
<td>3.03 (1.19)a</td>
<td>3.88 (.94)b</td>
<td>4.30 (.90)b</td>
<td>4.04 (1.22)b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. ¹ Measured on 11-point scale. ² Measured on 7-point scale. Expel = willingness to expel Romanians from society; O-C emotions = other-condemning emotions; O-S emotions = other-suffering emotions. Means with different superscripts in the same row differ from each other at the .05 confidence level.*

**Willingness to expel.** We performed 2 (morality vs. competence) by 2 (high vs. low) ANOVA’s on all dependent variables. Analysis of willingness to expel Romanians revealed a main effect of level, $F(1, 99) = 9.75, p = .002, \eta^2_p = .09$; and a significant interaction between level and dimension, $F(1, 99) = 4.78, p = .031, \eta^2_p = .05$. Simple main effect analyses showed that participants in the low morality condition excluded Romanians more than those in the high morality condition, $F(1, 99) = 13.68, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .12$. The two competence conditions had intermediate scores and did not differ from each other, $F(1, 99) = .45, p = .50$. The high morality condition scored marginally lower on willingness to expel than the high competence condition, $F(1, 99) = 3.38, p = .069, \eta^2_p = .03$. Mean scores are presented in Table 6.1.

²² Our manipulation checks showed that morality also affected perceived competence, so to ensure that possible effects of morality on the dependent variables are due to our manipulation of morality only, we included perceived competence as a covariate in all analyses. Results of these ANCOVA’s showed that the covariate (perceived competence) only affected prejudice and other-condemning emotions. Importantly, we again obtained the effects on our dependent variables; simple main effects analyses showed that the low morality condition was most negative and differed from the high morality and competence conditions, all $ps < .001$. 

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Prejudice. Next, we tested if our manipulations had an effect on prejudice. Results showed a main effect of level, $F(1, 99) = 89.55, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .48$; and a main effect of dimension, $F(1, 99) = 6.79, p = .011, \eta_p^2 = .06$. These effects are further qualified by a significant interaction, $F(1, 99) = 17.13, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .15$. As shown in Table 6.1, the two high conditions did not differ from each other, $F(1, 99) = 1.14, p = .29$; but the low morality condition was significantly more prejudiced than the low competence condition, $F(1, 99) = 23.44, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .19$. Moreover, the effect size of morality was larger than the effect size of competence ($\eta_p^2 = .48$ vs. $\eta_p^2 = .13$, respectively), this difference was significant at the 99% confidence level.

Emotions. Next, we tested if the conditions differed on reported other-condemning emotions towards Romanians. Results showed a main effect of level, $F(1, 99) = 53.53, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .35$; and of dimension, $F(1, 99) = 6.54, p = .012, \eta_p^2 = .06$. These effects were further qualified by a significant interaction, $F(1, 99) = 20.71, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .17$. Means are presented in Table 6.1. Follow-up analyses showed more other-condemning emotions in the low morality condition than in the low competence condition, $F(1, 99) = 26.04, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .21$. There was no difference between the high competence and high morality conditions, $F(1, 99) = 1.93, p = .17$. Results further showed that there was a substantial effect of morality on these emotions; lower morality was accompanied with more other-condemning emotions; $F(1, 99) = 68.37, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .41$. The effect of competence was smaller but also significant, indicating that higher levels of these emotions were reported in the low competence condition than in the high competence condition, $F(1, 99) = 3.94, p = .050, \eta_p^2 = .04$. The difference between effect sizes was significant at $p < .005$.

Analysis with other-suffering emotions as a dependent variable showed a main effect of dimension, $F(1, 99) = 11.27, p = .010, \eta_p^2 = .10$, and a significant interaction between level and dimension, $F(1, 99) = 6.94, p = .010, \eta_p^2 = .07$. Further analyses showed that the low morality condition evoked lower levels of these emotions than the low competence condition, $F(1, 99) = 18.51, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .16$; but there was no difference between the high morality and the high
competence conditions, \( F(1, 99) = .25, p = .62 \). Moreover, there was a significant difference between the two morality conditions, indicating more other-suffering emotions in the high morality condition than in the low morality condition, \( F(1, 99) = 7.9, p = .006, \eta^2_p = .07 \). There was no difference between the two competence conditions, \( F(1, 99) = .78, p = .38 \).

**Mediation analyses.** Results show that morality, but not competence, had an effect on willingness to expel Romanian immigrants. Participants in the low morality condition reported more other-condemning emotions and less other-suffering emotions than in the high morality condition. In order to test if these emotions mediated the impact of morality on willingness to expel Romanians, we first dummy coded conditions to create a contrast between the low morality condition and the high morality condition (-1 1 0 0). Next, we performed a series of multiple regression analyses to test for mediation. As reported above, there was a significant relation between morality and willingness to expel (\( \beta = -.35, p < .001 \)), indicating that participants in the low morality condition were more willing to expel Romanians than those in the high morality condition. Next, regression analyses showed that low morality predicted other-condemning emotions (\( \beta = -.62, p < .001 \)) and reduced other-suffering emotions (\( \beta = .27, p = .007 \)). Finally, we performed a regression analyses in which we included morality, other-condemning and other-suffering emotions as predictors and willingness to expel as criterion. Only other-condemning emotions were significantly related to willingness to expel (\( \beta = .32, p = .007 \)); morality (\( \beta = -.12 \)), and other-suffering emotions were non-significant (\( \beta = -.09 \)). We used bootstrapping analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to test the significance of the mediation by the emotions. Based on 2000 bootstrap samples, the 95% confidence interval of other-condemning emotions did not include zero \([- .53, -.09]\), which confirms that the indirect effect of morality on willingness to expel through these emotions is significant. The interval of other-suffering emotions did include zero \([- .17, .03]\) indicating that the indirect effect through those emotions was non-significant. This mediation is depicted in Figure 6.1 and indicates that when
Romanians are portrayed as immoral, they evoke other-condemning emotions in others, which results in more willingness to expel them.

![Multiple mediation by other-condemning and other-suffering emotions of the relation between morality and willingness to expel Romanian immigrants (Study 6.1).](image)

**Figure 6.1.** Multiple mediation by other-condemning and other-suffering emotions of the relation between morality and willingness to expel Romanian immigrants (Study 6.1).

*Note. *\(p < .05\). **\(p < .01\).

Finally, we tested whether the emotion clusters mediated the impact of morality on prejudice. Again, we used the dummy coded condition variable (-1 1 0 0 0) to test the effects of morality. First, morality was related to prejudice (\(\beta = -.66, p < .001\)) as indicated above. Next, we already showed that morality was related to other-condemning and other-suffering emotions. Finally, we conducted a regression analysis in which morality and the emotion clusters were added as predictors and prejudice as criterion. Results indicated that other-condemning emotions (\(\beta = .33, p < .001\)) and other-suffering emotions (\(\beta = -.29, p < .001\)) both affected prejudice. The impact of morality dropped but was still significant (\(\beta = -.38, p < .001\)) when we controlled for the emotions. Bootstrap analyses showed that the indirect effects through other-condemning [.09, 1.89] and other-suffering emotions [.09, .66] were significant, suggesting multiple mediation of the relation between morality and prejudice. This multiple mediation is depicted in Figure 6.2.
**Discussion**

In this study we showed that morality affects prejudice and willingness to expel Romanian immigrants from society, while competence only had a relatively modest impact on prejudice. This difference between morality and competence can be explained by the intensity of the emotions associated with these two appraisals. Perceived immorality evoked other-condemning emotions such as contempt and anger and reduced levels of other-suffering emotions such as pity and compassion. Low levels of competence, on the other hand, had a modest effect on other-condemning emotions, and no effect on other-suffering emotions. Particularly other-condemning emotions had a strong impact on willingness to expel, and this emotion class fully mediated the relation between morality and this action tendency. Both other-condemning and other-suffering emotions mediated the impact of morality on prejudice.

In this study we manipulated morality and competence in such a way that participants only read about one of the two dimensions. In everyday interactions however, people often receive information on more than one dimension. In a second study we therefore cross-manipulated morality and competence. Because participants in such a design would receive information regarding both morality
and competence it allows a more direct test of the differential impact of these dimensions on discrimination and prejudice. Moreover, in the first study the negative emotions we measured were all moral emotions, so it remains to be seen whether other negative emotions could also explain the impact of morality. We therefore decided to include another negative emotion that is often mentioned in the context of majority-minority intergroup perceptions; i.e., fear. As indicated in the introduction, low morality could also pose a threat to members of another group. We decided to add this emotion because it has been shown that threats can result in fear (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).

**Study 6.2**

This study was designed to replicate the findings of the Study 6.1 with a different design. We expected other-condemning emotions to be the underlying mechanism that could explain the impact of morality on willingness to expel and prejudice, and not just any negative emotion related to threat posed by immigrants (e.g., fear).

**Method**

**Participants.** Participants were 93 undergraduates (64 women and 29 men) from the University of Amsterdam. Nearly 40 percent studied psychology, the remaining students were undergraduates in other disciplines. Their age ranged from 16 to 52 (M = 22.11, SD = 5.88).

**Materials and procedure.** We used the same procedure as in Study 6.1 but in the present study we cross-manipulated morality and competence, so we used a 2 (Morality: high vs. low) by 2 (Competence: high vs. low) design. Another difference with the previous study is that we informed participants that according to an alleged study, employers either had “a relatively clear and straightforward attitude towards Romanian employees” (in case of similar levels of competence and morality), or “a less certain, slightly ambiguous attitude” (in the mixed high/low conditions). We described the results of that study indicating that Romanians were perceived as being either high or low in morality (i.e.,
“[un]reliable”, “[not] trustworthy”, and “[dis]respectful”; see Leach et al., 2007), and high or low in competence (i.e., “[un]experienced”, “[in]competent”, and “[un]skilful”).

After a short summary of the main results and conclusion of that study, we presented the questionnaire. Prejudice was measured with the same item as in the previous study. We also used the same items to capture other-condemning emotions ($\alpha = .92$) and other-suffering emotions ($\alpha = .84$). The items “fear” and “anxiety” were combined to measure fear ($\alpha = .69$). We added two new items in order to have a more elaborate measure of willingness to expel Romanian immigrants: “Romanians should be treated the same as other immigrants” (reverse scored) and “Romanians are entitled to the same protection by the Dutch government as other immigrants” (reverse scored). Answers to these ten items were averaged and a higher score on this measure indicated increased willingness to expel Romanian immigrant workers ($\alpha = .76$). Our manipulation checks were the same as we used in the previous study.

**Results**

**Manipulation checks.** We performed two 2 (high vs. low morality) by 2 (high vs. low competence) ANOVA’s to test if our manipulations were successful. The means are presented in Table 6.2. Results showed a main effect of morality on perceived morality, indicating that Romanians in the high morality conditions were evaluated as more moral than in the low morality conditions, $F(1, 89) = 37.52$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .30$. There was no effect of competence on perceived morality, and no interaction neither. Results further showed a main effect of competence on perceived competence, indicating that high competence conditions were perceived as higher in competence than low competence conditions, $F(1, 89) = 77.50$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .47$. As expected, there were no other effects. These analyses confirm that our manipulations were successful.

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23 A principal factor analysis after varimax rotation confirmed this three-factor solution. The first factor accounted for 42.8% of the total variance and comprised the six other-condemning emotions (factor loadings: .67-.89). The second factor explained 22.2% of the total variance and captured the five other-suffering emotions (loadings: .63-.91). The last factor comprised the two fear items (loadings .72 and .87) and explained 7.8% of the variance.
**Willingness to expel.** We conducted a 2 (high vs. low morality) by 2 (high vs. low competence) between-subjects ANOVA to test whether the two dimensions affected willingness to expel Romanians. Results revealed a main effect of morality, $F(1, 89) = 3.94, p = .050, \eta^2_p = .04$. As can be seen in Table 6.2, participants were more willing to expel Romanians from society in the low morality conditions than in the high morality conditions. There was no effect of competence, and no interaction.

Table 6.2  
*Means (and standard deviations) of manipulation checks, prejudice, and willingness to expel Romanians (Study 6.1).*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Morality</th>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>Prejudice</th>
<th>Expel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5.46 (2.06)</td>
<td>3.36 (1.92)</td>
<td>6.09 (1.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>7.68 (1.55)</td>
<td>3.88 (1.51)</td>
<td>7.72 (1.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.72 (2.06)</td>
<td>3.64* (1.71)</td>
<td>6.96 (1.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5.23 (2.22)</td>
<td>7.05 (2.10)</td>
<td>4.73 (2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>7.96 (1.65)</td>
<td>7.04 (1.94)</td>
<td>8.12 (.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.65 (2.37)</td>
<td>7.04* (2.00)</td>
<td>6.50 (2.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5.43* (2.13)</td>
<td>5.20 (2.72)</td>
<td>5.41* (2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>7.82* (1.59)</td>
<td>5.43 (2.35)</td>
<td>7.92* (1.30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Expel = willingness to expel Romanians from society. Only main effects are indicated; means with an asterisk in the same row differ from each other at the .05 confidence level.

**Prejudice.** A 2 (high vs. low morality) by 2 (high vs. low competence) between-subjects ANOVA on the prejudice score revealed a main effect of morality, $F(1, 89) = 49.39, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .36$. Prejudice was stronger for those participants in the low morality conditions than in the high morality conditions. This effect was further qualified by a morality x competence interaction, $F(1, 89) = 6.11, p = .05, \eta^2_p = .06$. Simple main effects analyses showed that the effect of morality on prejudice was stronger when competence was high ($F(1, 89) = 44.70, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .33$) than when competence was low ($F(1, 89) = 10.48, p = .002, \eta^2_p$
= .11). The means are presented in Table 6.2. There was no main effect of competence.

**Emotions.** To test if the type of trait dimension affected participants’ emotions, we submitted other-condemning, other-suffering emotions, and fear scores to a 2 (high vs. low morality) by 2 (high vs. low competence) between-subjects MANOVA. Results showed a significant multivariate main effect of morality, $F(3, 87) = 11.30, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .28$. There was no multivariate main effect of competence, nor any interaction. At the univariate level, the main effect of morality was significant for other-condemning emotions, $F(1, 89) = 31.25, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .26$. The means are presented in Table 6.3 and show that participants reported more other-condemning emotions in the low morality conditions than in the high morality conditions. Morality also had a significant univariate main effect on other-suffering emotions, $F(1, 89) = 8.18, p = .005, \eta_p^2 = .08$. Lower levels of other-suffering emotions were reported in the low morality conditions than in the high morality conditions. Finally, the univariate main effect of morality was significant for fear, $F(1, 89) = 7.46, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .08$. Participants reported more fear in the low morality conditions than in the high morality conditions.

### Table 6.3

*Means (and standard deviations) of the emotions (Study 6.1).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O-C emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Morality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* O-C emotions = other-condemning emotions. O-S emotions = other-suffering emotions. Only main effects are indicated; means with an asterisk in the same row differ from each other at the .05 confidence level.
**Mediation analyses.** Results thus indicated that morality, but not competence, affected both support for willingness to expel Romanians as well as the various emotions. In order to test if the emotions mediate the impact of morality on willingness to expel, we conducted multiple regression analyses. More specifically, we tested if other-condemning emotions would mediate the impact of morality on willingness to expel, but fear would not. First, a regression analysis with morality as predictor and willingness to expel as a criterion showed that morality was related to increased willingness to expel Romanian immigrants ($\beta = -.21, p = .048$), as indicated above. Second, morality was also related to other-condemning emotions ($\beta = -.51, p < .001$), fear ($\beta = -.27, p = .008$), and other-suffering emotions ($\beta = .29, p = .005$). Finally, we performed a regression analysis with morality and the three emotion clusters as predictors and willingness to expel as a criterion. Only the impact of other-condemning emotions was significant ($\beta = .53, p < .001$); other-suffering emotions were marginally related ($\beta = -.19, p = .060$) and fear was unrelated to willingness to expel ($\beta = -.01, ns.$). Importantly, the impact of morality became non-significant ($\beta = .11, p = .28$).

These results suggest that other-condemning emotions mediated the effect of morality on willingness to expel Romanians. Bootstrap analyses also suggested that the mediation through other-condemning emotions was significant, as the 95% confidence interval did not contain zero [-.85, -.18]. The intervals of other-suffering emotions [-.30, .01] and fear [-.11, .11] included zero, indicating that their indirect effects were not significant. The full mediation is depicted in Figure 6.3.
Finally, we conducted a series of regression analyses to test whether the emotions mediated the impact of morality on prejudice. First, morality was related to prejudice ($\beta = .58, p < .001$). Second, morality affected the emotions, as previously described. Third, we conducted a regression analysis in which morality and the emotions were simultaneously entered as predictors and prejudice was included as criterion. Results showed that other-condemning emotions ($\beta = -.23, p = .025$) and other-suffering emotions ($\beta = .34, p < .001$) were significantly related to prejudice, but fear was not ($\beta = -.04$). The impact of morality dropped but was still significant ($\beta = .36, p < .001$). Bootstrap analyses showed that the indirect effect of other-suffering emotions [.16, 1.13] was significant, but of other-condemning emotions [-.17, 1.59] and fear were not [-.21, .30]. This mediation is depicted in Figure 6.4.
General Discussion

In two studies we manipulated the morality and competence of a specific group (Romanian immigrant workers), and showed that perceived morality affects prejudice and the wish to expel Romanian immigrants, while perceived competence had a very modest impact. This difference between morality and competence can be explained by the intensity of the moral emotions associated with these two appraisals. When minority groups were portrayed as immoral, they evoked other-condemning emotions, and reduced levels of other-suffering emotions. Our second study showed that immorality also evoked fear. However, fear was unrelated to prejudice and willingness to expel Romanian immigrants when we controlled for the other emotions. This supports our idea that moral emotions are the main determinants of the impact of perceived immorality on prejudice and support for expulsion of the target group. Particularly other-condemning emotions had a strong impact, as they mediated the effect of morality on willingness to expel Romanians in both studies and on prejudice in
the first study. Other-suffering emotions also affected prejudice, when we controlled for the other emotions and morality, indicating that perceived immorality resulted in reduced levels of other-suffering emotions. These low levels of other-suffering emotions were associated with increased levels of prejudice.

Recently, Ufkes, Otten, Van der Zee, Giebels and Dovidio (2012) showed that portraying an out-group as incompetent can also result in the tendency to avoid that group. Interestingly, this effect was also mediated by an other-condemning emotion, i.e., contempt. Their findings are similar to our findings, but they focused on competence only. We assessed both competence and morality and the latter had a more pronounced impact on prejudice and discriminatory action than the former. This might be due to a number of differences between the two studies. First, Ufkes et al. manipulated competence and warmth of a fictitious group (i.e., aliens on an other planet), and did not include morality. Another difference with our study is that they focused on a more passive form of avoidance, and asked their participants if they wanted to leave the alien planet. In our study morality was related to whether participants wanted to expel immigrants, a more-pro-active behavioural tendency as compared to withdrawal tendencies assessed in the study by Ufkes et al.

Generally, both incompetence and immorality are associated with social distance and a wish to avoid individuals or groups with those characteristics. Immorality, however, is also associated with more active action tendencies, such as sanctions, punishment, and exclusion. Low levels of competence could be associated with both pity and contempt depending on the circumstances (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007). Immoral behaviour, on the other hand, is more strongly related to other-condemning emotions (such as contempt and anger) than incompetence. Our findings are in line with Haidt's (2003) work on moral emotions, and it might be worthwhile to investigate when and why incompetence can also result in the above action tendencies, and to what extent.

The design of our first study was set up to disentangle the effects of morality and competence. There is some evidence that these two dimensions are not completely independent (see Kervyn et al., 2010); the fact that in our first
study our morality manipulation also affected perceived competence, while the reverse was not the case, supports this. In our second study we cross-manipulated morality and competence, which allowed us to test for possible interaction effects between the dimensions. Interestingly, in the second study morality did not affect competence. Moreover, the effects of morality seemed even more pronounced than in the first study. A possible explanation for this difference could be that in the second study the importance of morality becomes more pronounced because it is contrasted with information regarding competence. The larger effect of morality on prejudice in the high competence conditions than in the low competence conditions supports this view. Thus, both studies show that immorality can have a profound effect on a general preference to exclude immigrants. Moreover, moral emotions tend to amplify this effect and have a direct effect on support for the expulsion of immigrants.