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de Jong, J.C.; Mügge, L.M.

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Political Representation and Intersectionality: Perspectives of Ethnically/Racially Minoritized Citizens

Judith C. de Jong* and Liza M. Mügge

How do ethnically/racially minoritized citizens feel represented by increasingly diverse parliaments? We approach this question intersectionally and study how ethnically/racially minoritized citizens (i) constitute and politicize self-identifications and interests, (ii) assess political representation, and (iii) discuss who represents them. We draw on twelve focus groups with Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese-Dutch citizens ($N=65$), and find that citizens' political self-identifications, rather than predefined group labels, are key to understanding assessments of representation. Citizens prefer politicians who act on their substantive concerns but feel that mainstream parties sometimes fail to do so. Parties led by ethnically/racially minoritized politicians and social movements fill this void by contesting the status quo. An intersectional perspective reveals that symbolic representation by descriptive representatives specifically matters for young women of color who lack role models.

The Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests in the United States triggered demonstrations in cities across the Netherlands, with protesters expressing solidarity and declaring that racism is a Dutch problem too. Politicians, activists, and political parties increasingly address the lack of ethnic and racial diversity in politics. This heightened attention raises new questions about how ethnically/racially minoritized citizens¹ make sense of, and assess, political representation. Who, in their view, represents them and why?

In unpacking this question, we provisionally identified minoritized citizens based on so-called “state categories” (Monk 2022)—predefined group labels often used in studies of representation and derived from government statistics and policies—of having a “migration background.”² We then asked minoritized citizens which political self-identifications and concerns they believed that politics should address. We aim to reveal how political self-identifications and concerns intersect within and between “migration background” state categories depending on gender, social class, religion, and age (cf. McCall 2005).

University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
*j.c.dejong2@uva.nl

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To understand how citizens assess representation, we draw on classical and constructivist representation theory. In her landmark work, Pitkin (1967) theorizes representation as a factual outcome of legislative politics. She distinguishes substantive (representatives acting in the interests of the represented), descriptive (a shared social background between politicians and constituents), and symbolic representation (symbols like flags that represent constituents because people believe they do) (Pitkin 1967). Constructivist approaches (Saward 2006) see representation as a claim. Representatives—inside or outside of parliament—claim to speak and act for the represented, and in doing so, *constitute* political groups and their interests. Despite their differences, political actors are central to both theoretical approaches. In this study, we put the spotlight on citizens (see also De Jong and Mügge 2023; Mügge, Özvatan, and De Jong 2021).

Drawing on twelve focus group interviews ($N = 65$), we compare citizens' assessments across three state categories: Dutch citizens with Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese "migration backgrounds." The Dutch proportional electoral system with preferential voting offers favorable conditions for the election of ethnically/racially minoritized candidates in comparison to other European democracies (Fernandes, Morales, and Saalfeld 2016).

We find that citizens' self-identified political groups do not always align with state categories that are often used in studies of representation. Citizens associated political concerns important to them with self-identified (intersectional) groups outside the scope of state categories (e.g. racialized Dutch). For most participants, racism matters more to their political self-identifications and concerns than migration background—the commonly used state category in scholarship on Europe.

In participants' assessments of political actors, representation emerges as a "mélange" of constitutive, substantive, symbolic, and descriptive representation (cf. Celis and Childs 2020). Participants care most about whether parties or politicians act on their self-identified group interests: substantive representation. But they feel that established parties sometimes fail to do this. In this context, many research participants see political parties led by ethnically/racially minoritized leaders, as well as activist groups, as claim makers who represent issues that mainstream parties neglect. Even if substantive representation is decisive for most participants, the symbolic presence of role models appears to be significant too specifically for those who are descriptively most underrepresented (young Muslim, Black or Persons of Color identifying women). Finally, participants experience "moments of ambivalence" (cf. Emejulu 2022) that illustrate dilemmas in assessments of representation.

Next, we develop a conceptual framework of political representation from the perspective of ethnically/racially minoritized citizens. Subsequently, we detail case selection and methods. The empirical body consists of three parts. First, we investigate how ethnically/racially minoritized citizens constitute and politicize self-identifications and interests. Second, we explore how citizens

assess parliamentary representation, and finally, we highlight the role of extra-parliamentary politics, taking BLM as a case.

Political Representation: A Citizen Perspective

Feminist theorists argue that historically disadvantaged citizens benefit from group-level representation to counter shared political obstacles (Williams 1998; Young 2000). Hence, recognizable social groups and their interests are central to conceptualization and measurement of political representation. To study representation empirically, researchers mainly identify a group based on proxy “state categories” used in social surveys, the census, or policy, like “women/men” or “African American” (Monk 2022) (hereafter: state categories). Subsequently, researchers often predefine what the political interests of this group are (Reingold and Swers 2011). Three critiques on predefining groups and interests inspire our approach to intersectionally study how citizens themselves constitute and politicize their self-identifications and interests, in relation to how researchers and political actors do so.

First, using predefined categories as proxy for sociopolitical groups overlooks the diverse ways in which citizens politically self-identify (Brubaker 2013) (hereafter: political self-identification or self-identified political group). While some citizens self-identify with state categories, others reject or redefine them (cf. Prins et al. 2013). Thus, citizens who fall in the same state category do not necessarily politically self-identify in the same way or share group-based interests (Lee 2008). Many European countries avoid ethnic/racial markers and categorize citizens based on “migration background.” By focusing on shared migration history, the migration background as a state category disguises group identifications and interests based on shared racialization. Given this limitation of predefined state categories, we ask ethnically/racially minoritized citizens: how do you politically self-identify, and what are your political interests?

Second, predefined state categories allow for measurement along one social axis (e.g. ethnicity/race), assuming that minoritized citizens’ political self-identifications and interests are uniform. This risks overlooking how minoritized citizens experience representation differently, depending on their gender, sexuality, age/generation, social class, or ability (Smooth 2011). We apply an intersectional framework to study how the perspective of individuals and groups in society is influenced by a range of interconnected structural positions (Crenshaw 1989; Collins 1990; Hancock 2007). This permits a more nuanced account of variation both “within” and “between” predefined state categories (McCall 2005). We adopt state categories provisionally to unpack how ethnically/racially minoritized citizens’ experiences vary within and between self-identified political groups.

Third, sociopolitical groups and interests are considered stable and transparent in classical representation theory (Pitkin 1967). Constructivist scholars (Saward 2006) stress how political actors construct groups and/or their

interests through claiming to represent them: *constitutive representation*. Constructivist researchers do not predefine groups and interests and instead investigate how political actors do so. But we cannot be sure whether minoritized citizens agree with how political actors constitute their self-identified political group and interests. Representative claims that constitute groups can speak on behalf of, but also against, a group (Siow 2023a, 2023b). Disadvantaged citizens may lack the resources or networks to object to claims. Citizens could also experience that politicians address their interests without mentioning their self-identified political group (Severs 2012).

To empirically study how citizens constitute their political self-identifications and interests, we draw on Young's (2000) argument that minoritized citizens share social perspectives derived from their structural intersectional social positions. Social perspectives become visible when a diverse group of minoritized citizens discuss their experiences (e.g. police harassment). From this, individuals constitute shared, but also diverse, (intersectional) political self-identifications and interests (Young 2000, 139). We explore how minoritized citizens constitute political self-identifications and interests in conversations.

To understand how citizens assess representation, we depart from Pitkin's (1967) three dimensions of representation. *Substantive* representation occurs when politicians act in the interests of the electorate, in a manner responsive to them. *Descriptive* representation refers to shared social backgrounds between citizens and politicians. *Symbolic* representation captures symbols (e.g. flags) that evoke people's relevant attitudes or emotions towards what they stand for, or what is being represented (here the nation).

While Pitkin foregrounds substantive representation, feminist theorists argue that descriptive representation by politicians who share citizens' experiences (e.g. of exclusion) is crucial for minoritized groups (e.g. Mansbridge 1999). Constructivists conceptualize representation as a claim by political actors consisting of constitutive, substantive, and/or other aspects (e.g. Siow 2023b). This fits Celis and Childs' (2020) proposition that citizens assess representation as an interrelated "mélange" of different aspects. Classical and constructivist theories inspire us to investigate how *citizens* assess representation, which aspects matter most, and to whom. Citizens may accept or reject claims, or they may be undecided or hesitant. Emejulu (2022, 3) talks about *ambivalence*, when "a range of opposite emotions about a person or a situation comingle." Moments of ambivalence allow us to study citizens' emotional or cognitive orientations towards political representation in relation to the prevailing social norms, and the raced, gendered, and other social structures underlying these tensions (Emejulu 2022).

To reveal who citizens believe represent them, the extant literature provides some pointers. Descriptive representation can advance minoritized groups' substantive and symbolic representation (e.g. Brown 2014). Minoritized politicians' presence in powerful positions can flip negative stereotypes by

showing that historically excluded groups are “able to rule” (Mansbridge 1999). A meta-analysis demonstrates that voters assess candidates with whom they share the same ethnic/racial background significantly more positively than candidates with whom they do not share this background (van Oosten, Mügge, and van der Pas 2023).

We expect ideological and intersectional variation in how citizens value descriptive politicians. Citizens may prefer descriptive representatives with stronger connections to their self-identified political group (Dovi 2002). Preferences for descriptive representatives intersectionally vary within and between self-identified political groups (Bejarano et al. 2021; Montoya et al. 2021), depending on the political context and issue (Bajpai 2019). How citizens value role models can also vary by age and gender, with role model discourses tending to be male centered (Danilova and Kolpinskaya 2020). At the same time, minoritized politicians can downplay their identity to conform to dominant party or societal norms (Murray 2016), triggering disappointment among citizens (Akachar 2018).

Next to descriptive MPs, ethnically/racially minoritized citizens might favor certain political parties. Historically, left-wing parties have been relatively open to minority rights and socioeconomic mobility, although they have become less vocal on these issues (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020). In this respect, the electoral system matters. Countries with open systems, like the Netherlands, allow greater space for new parties that take up minority interests to emerge (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013). Even if they are small and do not enter government, they can be influential through contagion effects (Cowell-Meyers 2017).

However, a study of parliamentary politics alone likely cannot distill who ethnically/racially minoritized citizens feel represented by. Ethnically/racially minoritized citizens may have interests that remain invisible in electoral politics because politicians and parties fail to address them (Childs, Webb, and Marthaler 2010). Furthermore, politicians may favor prototypical over intersectionally disadvantaged groups and interests (Reingold and Swers 2011). From a representative claim perspective, political actors include a broad range of players such as nongovernmental organizations, interest groups, and activists (Saward 2006). Social movements may provide substantive representation and create spaces where minorities politicize self-identified groups and define shared political priorities (Weldon 2011). To capture both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary avenues of representation, we ask ethnically/racially minoritized citizens who they believe represents them.

Case Selection and Methods

The Netherlands has a proportional electoral system. Political parties compose a party list and citizens can vote for a politician of their preference on

the list. It has no pre-set electoral threshold and a single, nationwide electoral district (Kranendonk et al. 2018). This has allowed the so-called “ethnic/racial minority” parties, led by ethnically/racially minoritized politicians with an explicit anti-racist agenda, to gain parliamentary presence.

In 2015, the first political party led by ethnically/racially minoritized politicians, DENK—meaning “think” in Dutch and “equal” in Turkish—gained seats in national parliament. The party is left-wing on economic issues with an anti-discrimination focus.³ In the 2017 and 2021 parliamentary elections DENK gained three seats (out of 150). In the 2021 national elections, the first party founded and led by a Black woman entered parliament: BIJ1. The BIJ1 program is intersectional, anti-racist, and decolonial.⁴ DENK and BIJ1 put marginalized anti-racist critiques on the political agenda (Loukili 2020). This breaks with the past, in which the dominant establishment often upholds an innocent self-image, denying racism and the continuing impact of colonialism (Wekker 2016), while small, ethnic/racial minority parties have significant impact by expressing political ideas, requesting parliamentary debates and by building cross-party coalitions to get legislative proposals accepted.

To explore citizens’ assessments of political representation we conducted focus groups. This design facilitates studying how citizens collectively negotiate, debate, and potentially (dis)agree over who represents them. By composing groups based on state categories, we looked at how participants politicize self-identifications and define group-level political issues in relation to how they are categorized (cf. Munday 2006). To explore the relationship between state categories and political self-identifications, we selected participants based on state categories: “non-western” migration backgrounds in the Dutch context.

We draw on McCall’s (2005) “intercategorical” and “intracategorical” operationalization of intersectionality, whereby ascribed (state) categories are taken as starting points before systematically unpacking the inequalities that are imbricated “within” and “between” categories. The intracategorical approach involves studying a single social category “to analytically unravel one by one the influences of gender, race, class, and so on” (McCall 2005, 1786). We study how ethnicity/race, gender, and social class intersect in individual’s experiences within the same migration background category. The intercategorical approach investigates relationships of inequality among predefined categories “as imperfect and ever changing as they are, and . . . explicate those relationships” (McCall 2005, 1784–1785). Similarly, we compare assessments of political representation between different “migration background” state categories. Among each migration background state category, two focus groups were of mixed gender, and one comprised women only—to reduce social heterogeneity and power inequalities among participants (Morgan 1996).

We selected Dutch citizens with Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese migration backgrounds: the largest electorates with “non-western backgrounds” and the most racialized and problematized in political debates (FRA 2017; Huijnk and Andriessen 2016). Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens arrived

as semi-skilled labor migrants in the late 1960, followed by family migration. Most Surinamese-Dutch citizens migrated after the independence of Surinam, followed by labor, political, and family migration. They are all diverse in ethnic/racial and religious terms. Dutch citizens with a Turkish background are largely Muslim, but also include secular and ethnic/racial and religious minorities including Kurds and Alevis. Surinamese-Dutch are mainly Afro-Surinamese and East Indian-Surinamese, descendants of African enslaved people and contract laborers from India, respectively. Moroccan-Dutch are predominantly Muslim, rendering them a religious minority in an increasingly anti-Islamic political context (Vermeulen 2014). Next to Moroccan-Arabic speakers, most Moroccan-Dutch descend from the Berber minority (Bouras 2012).

The focus group topic list aimed to generate discussions, while ensuring comparability between focus groups (see [Supplementary Appendix 1](#)). We instructed the moderators to pick up on political self-identifications and representatives that participants themselves introduced and started by asking what feeling represented means to them. Subsequent questions zoomed in on substantive, descriptive and symbolic representation, and representative claims, for example, “Does it matter to have a representative who is like you? If so, why?”

Data collection was undertaken between October 2020 and February 2021—a few months after the BLM protests in June 2020, and before the Dutch national elections in March 2021. The topics that participants brought up reflect this political context. The first author and research assistants recruited participants through their own extended networks, social media, neighborhood and ethnic/racial and religious minority organizations, flyers, and snowballing. To reach less politically engaged citizens, we offered a monetary incentive (a twenty-five-euro voucher). Interested participants filled out a survey and an informed consent form (see [Supplementary Appendix 2](#)). We finetuned the focus group composition based on interested participants’ profiles (political views, political engagement, religion, gender, age, and education).

The final sample consisted of sixty-five participants distributed over twelve focus groups: four comprised Dutch citizens with a Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese migration background; three per migration background state category were mixed gender, one was women only. Twenty participants were first generation and forty-five second generation, both were present in almost every focus group to study generational differences in the conversations. The sample was slightly skewed towards university-educated, politically engaged, and left-wing oriented participants (see [Supplementary Appendix 3](#)). We conducted one focus group with Moroccan-Dutch women aged over fifty—a particularly hard-to-reach profile—who knew each other and met regularly; most participants, however, did not know each other in advance. Except for the pre-existing Moroccan-Dutch focus group, the conversations were organized

online using Zoom due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants mainly joined from urban areas. Attendees ranged from three to six per group, a size consistent with recommendations for online focus groups (Morgan and Lobe 2015).

With participants' permission, we videorecorded the focus groups. Participants actively took part in the conversation. Conversations lasted between 90 and 180 minutes and were mainly in Dutch with occasional statements in Turkish or Arabic translated by the moderator. Two research assistants moderated the focus groups. One moderator was a veiled Muslim woman with an Egyptian migration background, the other a secular man with a Turkish migration background. The first author occasionally jumped in. She is a white secular woman without a migration background. All moderators took notes during the entire research process and discussed the focus groups together. All team members had the impression that participants, especially the Surinamese-Dutch groups, saw the first author as a white out-group member. Positionality of the team was dynamic (Ackerly and True 2010) and changed across and during conversations depending on group composition and topic (see [Supplementary Appendix 4](#)).

The research assistants transcribed and pseudo-anonymized each focus group. The first author coded the transcripts in Atlas.ti in three stages: indexing and data reduction, applying analytical codes, and refining concepts through constant comparison (Deterding and Waters 2021). First, we used the focus group autocoding tool to link demographics (e.g. state categories, political views) with participants' statements. We indexed the transcripts by broadly coding political issues discussed (i.e. poverty), representative actors (i.e. politicians), political self-identifications (i.e. Muslim), and conceptual themes (i.e. substantive representation). We identified recurring or notable aspects of the conversations. Together with notes on the research process and team meetings, these formed the starting point of the next stage of analytical coding. We coded the indexed segments in which participants discussed political actors in relation to the political self-identifications and interests they mobilized, and the reasons they felt represented by these actors. We made use of Atlas.ti's analysis tools such as code/document co-occurrence tables to explore similarities and differences within and between focus groups. Participants' names were replaced by pseudonyms to ensure confidentiality.

Identifications and Interests

What self-identified political groups and interests do participants constitute, and how do they relate to their ascribed state categories? The political issue that concerns nearly all participants are experiences with racism. When narrating these stories, participants sometimes adopt state categories, but in a reflexive way, mocking how state categories of non-white Dutch citizens

change, while still maintaining racialized distinctions. For instance, they jokingly ask what their “politically correct” label is nowadays (Turkish-Dutch all-women focus group). Participants redraw the rigid boundaries of state categories by eschewing the state logic that divides them into distinct Turkish, Moroccan, or Surinamese migration backgrounds, talking more generally of racialized Dutch citizens. Participants refer to citizens with “migration backgrounds,” but also to “minorities,” “non-white Dutch,” or “foreigners.”

Rachelle (Surinamese-Dutch mixed-gender group) notes: “[i]n the seventies, eighties, it was the Surinamese [who politics problematized], then it became the Antilleans, now it’s the Moroccans and soon we’ll have the Turks again.” Rachelle analyses how different racialized groups are commonly categorized and politically problematized in turn. She rejects state category divisions and highlights common experiences between ethnically/racially minoritized groups. In a similar way, Emir (Moroccan-Dutch mixed-gender group) refers to ethnic/racial profiling to illustrate shared injustice.

My two best friends are Black . . . one is Surinamese, and one is half Surinamese, and with them I sometimes talk about ethnic profiling. . . . That’s something that people who live in the *Gooi* region or *Barendrecht* or a very expensive neighborhood don’t understand, while for other people in my environment it’s a daily thing from the time you’re a teenager . . . yes, then at moments like that, you really see that it’s a sort of a minority problem.

Emir distinguishes himself from people who live in the *Gooi* showing how social class and ethnic/racial disadvantage intersect. Like Rachelle, he highlights common minority experiences across racialized citizens, rather than experiences from his migration background state category alone.

Socioeconomic inequality is another collective political issue that participants discuss, occasionally related to racism. They mention poverty and a lack of affordable public services such as housing and healthcare. Angela (Surinamese-Dutch mixed-gender focus group): “I didn’t know where to go after my [student] room contract [ended]. . . . I didn’t have parents who had a pot of money. . . . for me the right to exist is important, that everyone can develop themselves and use public resources.” Young participants mention economic pressures, some as first-generation students without familial financial support. Most believe that combating racism and socioeconomic inequality are collective interests that cut across migration background state categories. In self-identified political groups, ethnic/racial and social class intersect.

Participants mention political interests specific to their self-identified political ethnic/racial and/or religious group. Turkish-Dutch citizens mostly politically self-identified hybrid: Turkish-Dutch, occasionally intersecting with Muslim. In these focus groups, participants discuss how Turkish political self-identification and concerns arise from racialization; being quizzed about

loyalty to the Netherlands during job talks, for example, or if they support Turkish president Erdoğan. They also discuss Turkish political self-identification in terms of belonging to a Turkish ethnic group, which more closely corresponds to state categories. Here, participants differ in how they interpret Turkish ethnic self-identifications and interests, sometimes leading to debates. For some, political interests are transnational, not bound by borders, whilst for others Turkish ethnicity is a private matter with Dutch and Turkish political spaces and interests separated.

Deniz: I think it's very important that we leave Turkish issues in Turkey. . . . Let the Turks worry about their own politics.

Erve: But when there are issues in France, the Netherlands interferes with that too. Then we don't leave it in France either, right?

Deniz: Well, maybe we should. . . . there are more important issues, which should be urgent, which concern us primarily, because we live in this country [the Netherlands]. (Turkish-Dutch mixed-gender focus group)

Turkish self-identification differs across focus groups. Most saw racialization as Turks relevant to political self-identifications and concerns. The division over whether Turkish ethnic self-identification is a private or a political matter, contrasted with the *a priori* assumption in state categories that "Turkish migration background" politically matters to citizens.

In the Surinamese-Dutch focus groups, participants often talk about themselves as Black or person of color (POC) Dutch citizens. Some individuals self-identify as Muslim, Christian, Hindustani, or Afro-Surinamese, but these did not become collective political self-identifications in the conversations. Participants collectively discuss anti-Black racism as a deeply rooted institutional problem stemming from Dutch colonialism. This becomes apparent in the following statement by Jennifer (Surinamese-Dutch all-women focus group):

The history of slavery . . . what bothers me is . . . to approach it from the idea that it's about the other person. No, it's always about you. So, when it comes to street names [of former colonizers], it's [removing them] not because it hurts other people. . . . No, keep it to yourself and say, we [white people] have been responsible . . . and we still have some cleaning up to do.

POC/Black is the salient self-identified political group that formed the basis for common interests in the Surinamese-Dutch focus groups, illustrating that experiences of racialization matter to understanding their constitutions and politicizations of self-identified groups and interests rather than migration background. For most participants in the Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch

focus groups, self-identifying as Muslim trumps other political self-identifications. Politically, they discuss “Muslim” as a religious, but primarily as a racialized self-identification. They consistently talk about anti-Muslim racism and threats to the freedom of religious practice, such as countering attacks on mosques, negative stereotypes, and access to religious education.

Intersectional disadvantage becomes apparent in participants’ constitutions of intersectional self-identifications and political priorities. For Muslim-identifying women, especially those in all-women focus groups, religious/racial and gender minorization intersect negatively. In the Turkish-Dutch all-women focus group, Muslim-identifying women discuss a recent law that partially forbids face covering.

Sarah: I really didn’t feel represented at all by politics, because it’s decided for women what freedom means and what they want, and therefore, what they don’t want and therefore they’re deprived of a right to behave as they like. . . .

Arzu: Yes, I really agree with what Sarah says. Look, I don’t wear a headscarf myself unfortunately, but family members, just fellow Muslims, sisters of mine do. . . . In that kind of situation I don’t feel represented either.

This illustrates how intersectional racial/religious and gendered self-identifications, rather than Moroccan migration background state categorizations, matter to citizens’ constitution of political priorities and assessments of representation. Self-identifying as Muslim women, they disagree with the partial ban on face covering.

Young women participants across focus groups consider the political underrepresentation of ethnically/racially minoritized women—women of color, Muslim women, and Black women—problematic. Naomi (Surinamese-Dutch mixed-gender focus group) says:

If you grow up in the Netherlands and you see only white people in politics, in positions of power, it gives a kind of feeling like you’re a guest in the country while you are born there . . . children [should] see, you have it in you to be in politics and lead this country. That it’s not reserved for a certain kind of person.

Naomi describes underrepresentation in relation to intersections of ethnicity/race, gender, and age. Age/generational political issues matter in other respects too. Young participants mention the climate crisis as an urgent issue. Age/generational concerns intersected with migration history and social class when participants discuss the lack of government communication in non-Dutch languages.

The relationship between state categories and how citizens themselves constitute and politicize their self-identifications and political interests is fuzzy.

Generally, participants experience state categories as commonly divisive, politically self-identifying instead as ‘disadvantaged minorities’ that face economic inequalities and racism. To most, racialization as Turkish, Muslim, or POC/Black is more politically relevant than migration or ethnicity. This was more complex in the Turkish-Dutch focus groups, where Turkish ethnicity was political to some, irrelevant for others, and intersected with racial/religious political self-identification for the rest. The emphasis on racialization differs from common European research practice of referring to ethnicity or migration. In all cases, the (intersectional) political self-identifications that participants themselves constituted were key to understanding their political concerns.

Citizens’ Assessments of Representation

Focus group participants relatively agree over what representation means. The political interests that politicians and parties *constitute* should match their self-identified political interests. Then, politicians or parties should act on these self-identified political interests, concerns, or values, by making policy, or at least by speaking out on their behalf. We interpret this as *substantive representation*. Participants also discuss politicians with whom they share lived experiences stemming from intersecting race, class, gender, and other social positions in society: *descriptive representation*. Finally, participants discuss whether descriptive politicians make their self-identified political group “stand for” something positive. We interpret this as resembling *symbolic representation*. Participants thus discuss representation as a *mélange* (Celis and Childs 2020), but as we will highlight, prioritize some aspects of representation over others. In the following, we adopt participants’ understandings of constitutive, substantive, descriptive, and symbolic representation when referring to these concepts.

Parliamentary Actors

Most participants discuss three parliamentary actors as representing them somewhat: established progressive parties, ethnic/racial minority parties, and in both, descriptive representatives. We discuss how they evaluate these actors in turn and consider dilemma’s participants experience between them.

Most participants discuss established progressive parties such as GreenLeft (GL), Labor (PvdA), and Democrats 66 (D66) as substantively representing some important political concerns such as social class, education, and climate crisis. But most participants find established progressive parties inadequate in constituting, let alone substantively representing, their other concerns: anti-racism and religious rights.

The criterion that participants apply to evaluate descriptive politicians is mainly substantive representation. In theory, many hold that descriptive politicians’ experiential knowledge makes them more likely to substantively

represent them. However, opinions vary. Turkish-Dutch-identifying participants are more doubtful that descriptive politicians share their views due to the ideological diversity of their self-identified political group. Participants across focus groups regard descriptive MPs in established progressive parties as unable to substantively represent them, because they must toe the white party line: “If you as a Black man, Black woman, join parties like D66, GreenLeft, CDA, then you are polished [*mat geslepen*]. . . . They [descriptive MPs] are not at all concerned with their origins. . . . They try to be as Dutch as possible” (Sam, Surinamese-Dutch mixed-gender focus group).

Although most participants doubt whether descriptive politicians in established progressive parties substantively represent them, many still see them as symbolic representatives. In the following conversation in a Moroccan-Dutch focus group, participants discuss former Labor Party member and prominent house speaker Khadija Arib, a Muslim woman with a Moroccan background.

Karima: I think the [descriptive] representatives of my generation, the old generation, have mostly assimilated themselves. If you look at our house speaker [Arib], for example. . . .

Najar: I do think that she has a role model function . . . for anyone who identifies with her and the culture that she is a part of. That it is possible. That you can get there. . . .

Fatima: No, I don’t feel represented by Arib. Yes, I do see her as a role model. For me she hasn’t meant anything or contributed to discussion or whatever that affects me. [Karima nods].

Karima: Yes, I think it is very nice Fatima that you make that distinction. Because it is indeed role model and advocacy. So, in representation you want to see that your interests are represented. And that what you feel in your community is translated in a good way. . . . It’s about action, yes.

Participants discuss Arib as an example of an assimilated descriptive politician who does not represent them substantively by speaking or acting on their behalf. Karima sees this as exemplary of the first generation. Participants still consider Arib a symbolic representative: a role model. Nonetheless, most focus group participants prioritize substantive over symbolic representation in their assessments. Overall, to most, established progressive parties thus score high on substantive representation of some concerns (social class, student, climate issues), but low on others (religious freedoms, anti-racism). Many participants see these parties as constraining descriptive MPs, providing limited opportunities to substantively represent them. Although of secondary concern to most, participants nevertheless value them as symbolic representatives.

Participants discuss ethnic/racial minority parties as claim makers on their behalf: “When I think of diversity and someone who really fights for the

interests of minorities, I immediately think of BIJ1” (Naomi, Surinamese-Dutch mixed-gender focus group). Similar to the discussion about Arib, participants note how the second generation claims a position as equal Dutch citizens with distinct roots. Some participants place the emergence of ethnic/racial minority parties in this generational trend: “now you have another generation participating” (Aysun, Turkish-Dutch mixed-gender focus group).

Compared with established progressive parties, some participants are less satisfied with how ethnic/racial minority parties substantively represent economic, student, and climate issues. However, many value that these parties address—constitutively represent—other important concerns such as anti-racism, colonialism, and religious rights that established parties ignore or neglect. Despite their small size, most participants further argue that ethnic/racial minority parties substantively represent these issues, both directly and indirectly. Ethnic/racial minority parties at least speak out on their marginalized concerns. Layla (Moroccan-Dutch mixed-gender focus group) indicates feeling represented by minority party NIDA for this reason.

Political representation doesn't immediately have to lead to action ... in society, sometimes a dissenting voice is enough. The moment you only hear voices that don't represent your opinion, then it's already very nice to have one who presents a counter message, your voice.

Many participants see ethnic/racial minority parties as advocating for them on critical matters that established politics neglects, which directly influences the political debate. In addition to direct substantive representation by speaking out on their behalf, some perceive ethnic/racial minority parties' advocacy as having contagion effects on other parties, indirectly providing stepping-stones to policy-making. Benny (Surinamese-Dutch mixed-gender focus group) remarks: “I always say that if Sylvana [Simons, BIJ1 party leader] wasn't there, there wouldn't be so much change either.” Brigitte comments: “That's quite complicated ... to get done with one seat in parliament.” Brigitte adds that BIJ1 needs to work together with “larger parties to promote inclusiveness ... to contribute certain themes.” Participants in other focus groups similarly express that ethnic/racial minority parties' advocacy may lead established parties to constitutively and substantively represent these issues.

Benny applauds Simons for daring to stand up for marginalized issues. This reflects how most participants assess descriptive MPs within ethnic/racial minority parties more positively than those in established parties. Many consider them brave and outspoken, and as having more opportunities to substantively represent minoritized citizens. Participants thus assess ethnic/racial minority parties as constituting and substantively representing marginalized issues that established parties neglect. Most discuss descriptive MPs in these parties as more capable of speaking out on their behalf, next to secondarily seeing them as symbolic role models.

Up until this point, we described participants' assessments as quite clear and straightforward. However, this does not capture moments of hesitation, doubt, and trade-offs in participants' assessments towards parliamentary actors in the focus groups. In the following, we highlight ambivalence (Emejulu 2022) stemming from two main dilemmas of representation participants discuss.

Many participants positively assess substantive representation by established progressive parties on some issues (climate, education), and by ethnic/racial minority parties on other issues (anti-racism, religious rights). Hence, a first dilemma participants across focus groups discuss is having to choose between *partial* substantive representation by established parties on some issues versus by ethnic/racial minority parties on other issues. Many participants describe their intersectional political self-identifications and concerns as "split" between parties.

I think it [representation] is a bit [political] issue-dependent [Fatima and Najar nod]. When it comes to religious freedom, then specific representation is very important. So, I'm thinking a lot about this, especially now that [ethnic/racial minority party] NIDA is emerging, I'm thinking, gosh, why should a party represent itself so specifically, you know, and is that a good thing? But such a broad people's party as once the PvdA [Labor Party] is not quite right either [laughs]. So that's kind of my thought-struggle right now. . . . One moment you are a Muslim woman and the next you are a nurse who cares for the disabled. (Karima, Moroccan-Dutch all-women group)

Many participants state that they feel like they should support ethnic/racial minority parties because progressive parties fail to address racism or religious freedoms. At the same time, some state that ethnic/racial minority parties' anti-racist advocacy comes at the expense of substantive representation related to other political self-identifications and concerns. Emir (Moroccan-Dutch mixed-gender focus group) states: "I think that some economic measures should be taken regarding inequality. But I can't vote SP [Socialist Party] because, I see them as a bit xenophobic." Emir concludes that the SP and Labor Party "just seem to have completely given up in people with my profile." Others are more positive about established parties or prioritize climate or social class issues over anti-racism. Participants' ambivalence stems from a dilemma between *partial* substantive representation by either progressive parties or by ethnic/racial minority parties, reflecting a context of anti-minority hostility.

Most participants prioritize substantive representation. But young Muslim, POC, and/or Black-identifying women, whose intersectional raced/gendered political self-identifications are most underrepresented in politics, are an exception. For them, symbolic representation by descriptive political role

models weighs heavily, next to substantive representation. A second dilemma that these specific participants in all-women and mixed-gender focus groups consider is whether they should vote for a party that best represents their interests (substantive representation), or one that offers a role model (symbolic representation). Sandra and Naomi, two young women, and Brigitte, a more senior woman, discuss:

Sandra: I think so [that descriptive representatives matter] now because there are so few. Although I do think that representation is a bit more important than the [political] views but generally many people who look like me in politics have similar views, so I don't mind a few of my views being put aside for representation.

Naomi: . . . Indeed, I think that presence alone does something, just to show it is possible that someone of color reaches a high-ranking position. But at a certain stage, if enough people of color get into that position, I wouldn't necessarily be happy that that person with those [different political] views is there like I am now.

Brigitte: Yes, but that's also very important to keep looking at what the [politicians' political] position is. (Surinamese-Dutch mixed-gender focus group)

Participants state that having politicians who substantively represent them (should) matter most. Simultaneously, Sandra and Naomi value symbolic representation by descriptive politicians. They reconcile ambivalence by stating that descriptive representatives often share their views, and that substantive representation can be reprioritized once there are enough descriptive politicians. Young Muslim women-identifying focus group participants similarly hesitate between voting for the first Dutch candidate wearing a headscarf ever—Greenleft candidate Kauthar Bouchallikht—despite disagreeing with the Greenleft's, in their view, at times assimilationist politics, constraining descriptive MPs. Sara (Moroccan-Dutch mixed-gender focus group): “Do I want to vote for her [Bouchallikht] because she resembles me and represents me even though I don't completely agree with the party? . . . I still struggle with that.”

Most ethnically/racially minoritized citizens prioritize substantive representation in assessing parliamentary politics. Although many see established left/progressive parties as substantively representing some issues (social class, climate), ethnic/racial minority parties substantively represent other neglected issues (anti-racism). Participants mainly judge descriptive representatives by their capacity to substantively represent them. Many see descriptive MPs in established parties as constrained, and those in ethnic/racial minority parties as more likely to act. Participants' ambivalence (cf. [Emejulu 2022](#)) in the discussions reveals complex trade-offs within a context of structural racism. An

intersectional perspective exposes the specific importance of symbolic representation for young women of color, whose intersectional raced/gendered political self-identifications are nearly invisible in politics.

Extra-Parliamentary Representation

In addition to politicians and political parties, participants speak of several extra-parliamentary representatives, BLM being the most extensively discussed. We explore how participants assess representation by BLM and how they relate experiences of representation by the movement to parliamentary politics.

Participants assess representation by BLM in similar ways as they do ethnic/racial minority parties, namely constituting and substantively representing concerns such as racism and colonialism that are neglected by the mainstream. Romana (Surinamese-Dutch mixed-gender focus group) comments that: “There’s a real awareness ... Black Lives Matter, for example ... that the Netherlands ... colonized a lot of countries. And that simmers through in society.” Like Romana, participants note that racism and colonialism were publicly perceived as belonging to the past, and therefore, made invisible. BLM constitutes and advocates for these concerns, and by doing so, shifts the political agenda and makes the white majority attentive to their continuing salience.

Participants note how constitutive and substantive representation by BLM has a direct, positive effect on their everyday lives. For instance, by reducing racist imagery and instances of everyday racism: “I’ve talked to people who have changed their minds very much about *Zwarte Piet* [a blackface caricature that plays a prominent role in annual St Nicholas celebrations in the Netherlands] ... they just didn’t know” (Naomi, Surinamese-Dutch mixed-gender focus group). Like ethnic/racial minority parties, participants discuss how BLM’s constitutive and direct substantive representation furthermore indirectly triggers substantive representation by parliamentary actors through contagion effects.

Ishaan: Look we’re talking about Black Lives Matter ... that whole spectrum of engaging in protest has broadened. And so, you can call attention to the things that you consider important. ...

Rachelle: Yes, I also think you shouldn’t forget that politics is dragging behind.

Ishaan: Yes.

Rachelle: So, where politics used to be leading, now movements in society are leading. And on that basis, politics starts acting, speaking, shouting, jumping, you name it. I enjoy observing that the spectrum is changing. Because we see that the power isn’t, like you learn, with

politics [Samantha nods], no, the power lies with us. (Surinamese-Dutch all-women focus group)

Participants discuss BLM's constituted interests and claims as close to their own. The movement can push parliamentary politics to substantively act for them. To paraphrase [Weldon \(2011\)](#), to turn protest into policy. Some, however, emphasize that parliamentary politics still needs to respond to movements' demands: "So, these movements and then pushing people to the front to use this space in parliament" (Brigitte, Surinamese-Dutch mixed-gender focus group).

Most participants in the Surinamese-Dutch focus groups discuss BLM as an obvious and positive representative claim maker on their behalf. However, some argue that the movements' framing of injustice was polarizing. One Surinamese-Dutch participant did not feel represented by BLM for this reason. She introduced this view as "I am going to say something shocking," reflecting how BLM's claim is accepted by most. Most, however, agree that to succeed BLM's message needs to be clear and inclusive. Like ethnic/racial minority parties, Black/POC-identifying participants discuss BLM as engaging a younger generation that experiences insufficient representation by parliamentary politics. Rachelle (Surinamese-Dutch all-women focus group) says: "It often takes movements from the outside [of politics] to mobilize ... young people from a different cultural background than the native Dutch background for what really matters."

Experiencing representation by BLM applied across focus groups for most who politically self-identified as Black, *and* as a disadvantaged minority, thus highlighting the importance of studying political self-identification. However, there are differences within and between focus groups in how participants discuss BLM. Participants in the Turkish/Moroccan-Dutch focus groups who politically self-identify as a minority explain more to each other and to moderators why they experience representation by BLM. This suggests that they do not see themselves as self-evidently part of BLM's representative claim. Nevertheless, minority-identifying participants in the Turkish/Moroccan-Dutch focus groups note how racism and discrimination are shared concerns of Dutch minoritized citizens, who equally benefit from BLMs' constitutive and substantive representation. Ayşe (Turkish-Dutch mixed-gender focus group) narrates how the movement positively impacts her everyday life:

I think that since this movement has come to the fore, that, also with my [white] friends ... I can talk about it [racist microaggressions] more easily and they understand me better, because now they are aware of it. ... They can empathize more, because I can say, the comments that used to be normal are racist and discriminatory towards a group. And it's only now that that's becoming clear to some people. They're really getting a wake-up call.

In Ayşe's story, BLM represents her by constituting racist microaggressions as an issue, triggering positive everyday changes. Her comment further shows how politically self-identifying as a disadvantaged minority, and perception of shared interest on that basis, underlies her experience of representation by BLM.

All-women focus groups discussed BLM extensively. In the Turkish/Moroccan-Dutch all-women focus groups, participants relate BLM to the racism experienced by Muslim women wearing a headscarf. Nonetheless, participants sometimes hesitate whether BLM's representative claim should include them. This is reflected in the following conversation in a Moroccan-Dutch all-women focus group.

Karima: It does feel that way [being represented by BLM], because it's just an issue of being different against the establishment. . . . There are young people not being hired, because of their last name. . . .

Najar: When a minority group like Black Lives Matter receives the attention that they need to get, that's really needed, and I feel represented through that. . . .

Imane: A term like Black Lives Matter resonates more with me. . . . That has to do with the history, in which Black people were just seen as property. . . . First of all it should be about the Black community and then the other minority groups.

Karima: Yes, now that you mention it, I completely agree. . . . Then maybe it dilutes [BLM's impact], maybe. That you get that feeling [of being represented by BLM] because you are a minority yourself, [but] maybe not on a scale as bad as what the Black community is experiencing.

Participants initially see themselves as represented by BLM, because the movement constitutes and substantively represents issues such as discrimination that concern all those who politically self-identify as a minority. However, participants are ambivalent, as they indicate not being sure whether they should experience representation by BLM, which may come at the expense of addressing anti-Black racism and colonial continuities more specifically. Similarly, Ishaan, a Surinamese-Dutch participant who self-identified as Hindustani, comments: "Black Lives Matter for me very much concerns slavery history and Afro-Caribbeans . . . maybe I should not involve myself but support it and give others the space to talk." Ambivalence arises from how racism differently positions participants, creating hierarchies of privilege/disadvantage within the self-identified political group of disadvantaged minorities. How participants who politically self-identify as disadvantaged minority differently assess representation by BLM reflects their self-identified political group history and their perceptions of relative privilege and disadvantage.

In other cases, participants do not feel represented by BLM either because they do not politically self-identify as disadvantaged minorities, or because they do not see their own interests as shared with minoritized citizens generally. In the Turkish-Dutch all-women focus group, Hatice notes that she does not feel represented by BLM, explaining that she notices racism in her social environment, but does not experience it on a daily basis. The others try to convince her that she should care about ethnic/racial inequalities. Sarah: “I understand Hatice’s dilemma [*tweestrijd*]. . . . But I think you have to transcend that for the greater good [Hatice nods].” Arzu agrees: “I have to make myself heard because [BLM] is a minority and I am also a minority. . . . We have to support each other.”

A lack of common political self-identification or shared political concerns also arose in the Turkish-Dutch groups with regards to participation in BLM and *Kick Out Zwarte Piet*, an activist group against the racist blackface caricature.

Senna: What’s funny about *Kick Out Zwarte Piet*, I didn’t have anyone to go to the demonstrations with, so I went with my father . . . and he literally spent half an hour preaching to me, how come there are no Turks here, and Moroccans, and this and that. . . . because *Kick Out Zwarte Piet* and the Black Lives Matter demonstrations now stand as a sign for all anti-racism, anti-discrimination. Why aren’t we active in that?

Some participants thought that Turkish-Dutch are more concerned with Turkish politics, while others point to racism or lack of shared political self-identification between minoritized citizens as a barrier. Some Turkish-Dutch-identifying participants thus hold that they, or their self-identified political group, should experience representation by BLM. But for various structural reasons, including relative privilege, lack of shared political self-identification or interests, they do not experience being part of BLM, leading to ambivalent orientations.

Most Black/POC-identifying participants argue that like ethnic/racial minority parties, activist groups address, and advocate for, concerns that parliamentary politics neglects: constitutive and substantive representation. Pushing electoral politics into neglected spaces also increases the potential for substantive representation by parliamentary politics. Participants’ intersectional political self-identifications are important to understand assessments of representation by BLM. Participants who experience representation by BLM were not only those who politically self-identify as Black, but also as a disadvantaged minority. An intersectional analysis, focused on moments of ambivalence, contributes to understanding how participants assess representation differently by laying bare distinct self-identified group histories and relative privileges and disadvantages in racist structures among participants who politically self-identify as disadvantaged minorities.

Conclusion

Representation is about citizens. Yet, in empirical work on representation, the citizen's perspective is marginal. The perspectives of ethnically/racially minoritized citizens are often even absent, their political identities and interests *a priori* assumed, or only exist as socially constructed claims by political actors. Bringing citizens back in, we find that the relationship between state categories and ethnically/racially minoritized citizens' political self-identifications is fuzzy. Only in the Turkish-Dutch focus groups, Turkish ethnicity was politically relevant to some participants, triggering discussions between participants. Other participants mostly highlight socioeconomic disadvantage and racialization as a disadvantaged minority, Turkish, Muslim, PoC and Black in the constitution of their self-identified political groups and interests. The prominence of racialization in participants' conversations contrasts with much European political science, where state categories based on migration background or ethnicity are default descriptors. An intersectional perspective exposes overlapping religious, gender, age, and social class self-identified political groups and interests within and between 'migration background' state categories, as well as specific intersectional political self-identifications and interests, like the freedom to wear a headscarf among Muslim-identifying women.

In their evaluations, participants consider elements that roughly approximate constitutive, substantive, descriptive and symbolic representation. Citizens discuss representation as a "mélange" (cf. [Celis and Childs 2020](#)) of different aspects. However, most prioritize substantive representation in this mélange. Participants experience that established progressive parties represent them partially: they substantively represent their socioeconomic or climate concerns. But these parties sometimes fail to represent their other concerns: anti-racism and religious rights. Most participants hold that ethnic/racial minority parties fill this gap by putting these issues on the political agenda. Outside parliament, BLM similarly constitutes and substantively represents anti-racism and the continuing impact of Dutch colonialism. Participants sometimes discuss challenger parties and activism as part of a generational trend, in which the second generation claims a position as distinctive, but equal, Dutch citizens. Some hope that ethnic/racial minority parties and BLM's advocacy will lead established parties to act on these issues through contagion effects. Ethnically/racially minoritized citizens' substantive representation should therefore be regarded as multisited.

Participants primarily judge descriptive representatives by their likelihood to substantively represent their interests, again highlighting the importance of substantive representation in participants' assessments. Many consider descriptive MPs within established progressive parties as constrained, while those in ethnic/racial minority parties were felt to have more agency. Although secondarily to substantive representation for most, participants

nonetheless value descriptive representatives in both established and minority parties as role model symbolic representatives.

Some participants clearly favor representation by a particular party, and most prioritize substantive representation. Yet, many participants experience dilemmas of representation stemming from *ambivalence*: a comingling of opposite emotions or orientations (Emejulu 2022). In relation to parliamentary actors, participants experience dilemmas between substantive representation on some issues by established progressive parties, and by ethnic/racial minority parties on other issues. Moreover, despite the strong focus on substantive representation among most participants, young women of color, whose intersectional raced/gendered political self-identifications are nearly invisible in politics, specifically hesitate between substantive representation or symbolic representation by a descriptive role model. This echoes Mansbridge's (1999) argument that descriptive representatives create a social meaning of "ability to rule," which is crucial for historically subordinated groups. Finally, participants hesitate about experiencing representation by BLM due to differing self-identified groups, histories, interests, and privilege/disadvantage among those who politically self-identify as disadvantaged minorities.

We show that how ethnically/racially minoritized citizens themselves constitute political self-identifications and interests is central to comprehending assessments of political representation. The state categories that researchers and policy-makers frequently use are analytically weak, not least because they deny the subjectivity of European racialized citizens to constitute their own political self-identifications. Predefined state categories are often misaligned with citizens' political self-identification and prioritize ethnicity/migration over race, othering, and citizens' multiple, intersecting political self-identifications. An intersectional perspective is indispensable in analyzing how citizens "between" and "within" (McCall 2005) state categories assess representation differently. It reveals significantly greater nuance than single-axis approaches in variation in preferences of representation, and in evaluations of political actors.

Our bottom-up approach provides insights into how citizens assess representation as a "mélange" (Celis and Childs 2020). We contribute to this approach by delving into the relationships and relative importance of constitutive, descriptive, substantive, symbolic dimensions of representation as well as (extra)parliamentary claim makers, to (intersectional) self-identified political groups of citizens. We show that citizens' assessments are often not straightforward. Citizens carefully consider the options for representation available to them and discuss dilemmas of representation. Focusing on such moments of ambivalence towards representation and (extra)parliamentary actors reveals "the broader sociopolitical context which sets the terms of feeling in this moment" (Emejulu 2022, 8). Experiencing representation only partially, further highlights the need for citizens' assessments of representation outside of claim-making frameworks to be more rigorously explored (see Begum 2023). Only when minoritized

citizens' views are taken seriously can we get to the bottom of the meaning of equal representation.

Our study has several limitations that we hope future studies will pick up. First, our focus on political self-identification cannot simply replace state categories in measuring how citizens prefer to be represented in politics. Political self-identifications such as “foreigners” can be used by insiders or group members. But it seems unlikely that ethnically/racially minoritized citizens want to be constituted as such by others, such as researchers or majoritized politicians (see [Ryan et al. 2023](#)). Future research should consider asking citizens how they prefer their self-identified political group to be constituted by various political actors. Second, we focus on ethnically/racially minoritized citizens' prevailing assessments of representative claim makers. Yet, claims can change depending on context and audience ([Bajpai 2019](#)), and so could citizens' assessments, which may be further explored. Third, citizens' views on descriptive representation could be further investigated by intersectionally studying when citizens perceive MPs as “descriptive” and when and how shared, lived experiences with MPs matter to citizens' assessments of representation.

Supplementary Data

Supplementary data can be found at <https://www.socpol@oup.com>.

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Notes

1. Considering the fuzzy distinction between the ways ethnicity and race socially construct difference, we use the two concepts interchangeably (Hall 1989). We use “minoritized” instead of “minority” to emphasize that citizens are actively constructed as a minority by the dominant group (Williams 1998, 15–18). We use “ethnicity” only in cases where participants refer to group belonging based on shared (migration) history or culture.
2. The Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS) categorizes citizens with a migration background if they, or their parent(s), are born abroad. At the time of our study, the CBS distinguishes between “western” and “nonwestern” migration backgrounds, based on the socioeconomic position of the (parental) country of birth. See: <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/onze-diensten/methoden/begrippen/persoon-met-een-migratieachtergrond> (last accessed May 24, 2023).
3. DENK anders. Election manifesto 2021 DENK, <https://www.bewegingdenk.nl/verkiezingsprogramma/> (last accessed May 24, 2023).
4. Allemaal anders maar toch gelijkwaardig. Election manifesto 2021 BIJ1, <https://bij1.org/programma/> (last accessed May 24, 2023).

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