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Old Europe, new Europe: for a geopolitics of translation

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This paper looks to the role of geographical metaphors in the ‘battle of words’ to describe Europe and its presumed identity. The facile adoption of banal cartographies such as those of a ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Europe highlights two concerns: first, that despite the imperial and isolationistic temptations of the current American administration, its geopolitical imagination remains firmly wedded to – indeed, cannot but define itself by – its relationship with the ‘Old Continent’. Secondly, it reveals an astonishing distance between such cartographic abstractions and the variety of non-territorial metaphors – in particular, those of mediation and translation – that are increasingly being invoked to inscribe possible futures for the European project.

Key words: Europe, geopolitics, transatlantic relations, neo-conservatives, Etienne Balibar, Jacques Derrida

Introduction

On the 15 February 2003, demonstrations swept the streets of cities around the world. The epicentres of the protest were, undoubtedly, European capitals, where millions turned out to manifest their anger and dismay at the Anglo-American decision to launch an attack against Iraq (and, in the Spanish and Italian case, the decision of the respective governments to lend support to the initiative). As many commentators noted, what this mass swelling of protest made evident, beyond the sheer strength of feeling against the war, was the coming together, the ‘crystallization’ of a European public opinion: the emergence, in practice, of that ‘European public sphere’ (to cite Jürgen Habermas’ 2004 assessment of the events) whose absence was long bemoaned by theorists of the European project and political leaders alike (see Habermas’ own considerations in 2001; also Fischer 2000).

The early European reaction against the war was, among other things, a strong stand against the American vision of the Middle East and the US’s role in that part of the world – but also the emergence of an alternative vision and geopolitical positioning for Europe. Europe and the United States have long been ‘mirrors’ to each other, in a play of co-dependence and co-constitution that has been going on since the end of the Second World War. We will comment more on this later, but suffice it to say that in the post-9/11 period, that game took on a radically different twist.

But the war also revealed some breaks in the European whole. The first was certainly the divide that made itself apparent between a significant part of the public opinion in the countries of the EU15 and popular feelings within the Eastern and Central European states, where an important majority proclaimed themselves much closer to the American position than the European one, with what has been
described as a mixture of ‘pragmatism and opportunism’ (to cite Polish ex-dissident Adam Michnik’s (2003) caustic assessment). Secondly, the war revealed a staggering democratic gap between a great majority of public opinion and the positions of some European governments – particularly evident in the case of the Spanish and Italian administrations, two of the leading promoters and signatories of the famous ‘United We Stand Letter of Eight’, pledging support to the American war effort.

That spring also saw a series of vociferous attacks on the European opposition to the war by American neo-conservatives. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld led the charge, proclaiming the emergence of a ‘New Europe’ (together with Britain, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain, largely corresponding to the Eastern European states and recent NATO members), willing to share the American burden and ‘rise to the challenge’ of the war – distinct from the ‘Old Europe’ (most markedly, France and Germany), cowardly and weak in its convictions.

Almost exactly one year later, on 11 March 2004, the Madrid bombings changed the course of the Spanish elections, with a staggering defeat for José Maria Aznar’s Partido Popular. Aznar had been one of the most vocal supporters of the Iraqi invasion: just weeks before the war, in the gaze of the global media, he had basked in the company of George W. Bush and Tony Blair during the so-called ‘War Summit’ at the Azores. Choosing to ignore the fact that Aznar’s electoral defeat was the result of a free and democratic vote, many American commentators launched another series of accusations of cowardice and appeasement, this time against the Spanish people, speculating on the ‘emotional’ nature of the vote and the ‘grave error’ on the part of the new Socialist government guided by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in announcing a withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. All the while, the new Spanish administration was welcoming ‘Spain’s return to Europe’ (a call that was one of the electoral slogans): welcoming Spain’s return to a full European belonging and giving voice to the feelings expressed by a large majority of the Spanish people in the year since the outbreak of the conflict.

Geographical metaphors and the European subject

We note these two important events as they offer some intriguing insights into the use of geographical metaphors in the ‘battle of words’ to describe Europe, its (political) consciousness – and its presumed identity. What Europe did Spain ‘return’ to? What Europe does Donald Rumsfeld refer to? They also point, moreover, to the persistence of Europe – and the place of Europe – as an unavoidable metaphor in writing the new world order. Indeed, despite much recent talk about Empire and a new American ‘project’, it appears that the US and Europe are still able to define themselves only with reference to each other.1

Indeed, the Iraqi war has been seen by many also as a battleground within which Europe’s role in the world was being decided. It is the Iraqi crisis that provided the context for the countless articles and polemics on the part of American neo-conservatives (but also European neo-populists) remarking on the ambiguity and weakness of the European role in the international arena, accounts depicting a cowering, doubtful Europe, lacking a clear sense of purpose and identity. But it was also the war that provided the occasion for some of the most original and wide-ranging initiatives aimed at re-imagining the European space and Europe’s political and cultural role. It was also the war (and, more specifically, its contestation) that allowed for the maturing of an awareness that re-imagining Europe meant also, and to a large degree, imagining a different Modernity, a different West – radically different from the essentialist and essentializing fundamentalism that has come to dominate mainstream US politics of late.

It is a challenge no less than recovering the legacy of European Enlightenment values – in a new, perhaps explicitly geopolitical key. This is a point that has been made in recent months by commentators as diverse as Jacques Derrida, Umberto Eco and even markedly pro-American Timothy Garton Ash. In one of his final public addresses, in May 2004, Derrida made an impassioned plea for a Europe that can show that another politics is possible, that can imagine a political and ethical reflection that is heir to the Enlightenment tradition, but that can also be the portent of a new Enlightenment, able to challenge binary distinctions and high moral pronouncements.

Garton Ash’s recent pleas for Europeans to come to the rescue of their ‘liberal cousins in despair’ (2004, 11) have similarly been phrased around a recovery of (European) Enlightenment values able to counter American fundamentalism. Popular progressive American social thinker and environmental economist Jeremy Rifkin has also recently published a book,
entitled *The European Dream* (2004), arguing how the European project presents ‘a radical new vision for the future of humanity’ – and ‘the world’s best hope for negotiating its shared global future’.

What are these new visions? What makes them ‘European’? In the paragraphs that follow, we would like to highlight some *alternative metaphors* emergent in recent European cultural and political debates that offer, to our mind, a way beyond the conceptual cages of binary divides such as ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe and the essentialist geographies within which ‘civilization warriors’ would like to inscribe the European – and global – political imagination. The battle for Europe is, as we have already suggested, a battle of words – but also a battle of ideas, of political imaginations: a battle that pits ‘power’ against ‘weakness’; identity (conceived as bounded and defined in the American neo-conservative rhetoric) against a plural (European) subject; a battle that pits decision against mediation; the idea(l) of the (perfect) map against (inevitably imperfect) translation. We will focus on some recent debates around the presumed ‘geography of weakness’ that European intellectuals and politicians have been accused of practising of late, wondering how and whether it can offer new spaces, new ways for saying Europe: new ways of imagining a new European subject that is fast taking shape but that is still searching for the proper language to describe itself. Why do these ideas, these geographical metaphors matter? First, because their adoption has been astoundingly widespread. Indeed, beyond Donald Rumsfeld’s by-now infamous provocation, quite a few other (eminently geographical) definitions fashioned by American neo-conservatives have crept into popular debates and mass media depictions of Europe, on both sides of the Atlantic. Secondly, these metaphors matter for they mark two very different understandings of the world – and Europe’s place in it; two distinct ‘geo-philosophies’ of Europe (to borrow Massimo Cacciari’s (1994) term).

One of the more influential voices in these discussions has certainly been Robert Kagan, with his vision of a ‘post-modern, Kantian’ Europe opposed to a ‘Hobbesian United States’, still ‘mired in history’ – and still with the burdens of ‘history’ on its shoulders. Kagan’s views were first elaborated in a highly influential piece entitled ‘Power and Weakness’ in the foreign policy journal *Policy Review* in June 2002 (the essay was published in slightly revised form in 2003 as a short volume, entitled *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*). Kagan’s argument focused, ostensibly, on the increasingly evident disparity between the American and European worldviews, particularly with regard to the conduct of international affairs. But the ideas presented here have been even more important for their role in shaping broader understandings of the ways in which the post-Cold War world ‘works’ – and the ‘proper’ place of America and Europe within the new global temperie:

It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace.’ The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. (Kagan 2002, 1)

Francis Fukuyama’s recent pronouncements of the end to a common Western culture, the fruit of a ‘clear and insurmountable ontological divide’ between America and (old) Europe (see Fukuyama 2002) or even Samuel Huntington’s latest opus (2004), calling for the revival of ‘values’ in American politics both trace a similar, fundamental break between the European and American political subjects. We mention here only several of the best known names in the debate, but the field is much broader: it would be easy to fill the pages of an entire book just citing the variety of popular and (pseudo) academic commentaries describing and deriding Europe’s ‘weakness’ and ‘decline’ – both as a political subject, as well as military ally.

In quite a few of these narratives, Europe figures as a heavily feminized subject, weak and hesitant, unwilling to commit itself to action, privileging (empty) rhetoric over military strength, ambivalent and loath to take a strongly moral stance. Decisive action and bombs are thus inscribed as the grammar of virile identity, marking a subject conscious of its historical mission, as Robert Kagan would argue – while diplomacy and dialectic are the attributes of the weak, ‘post-modern’ self, isolated in her opulent
paradise and condemned to an irreversible, effeminate decadence and decline. Much could be said here on how such accusations of decadence and decline recall, in quite disturbing ways, rhetoric dominant in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, as do the measures prescribed to combat such ‘decay’ and weakness: the strength of values, but also ideals of purification and moral commitment. It is not necessary to seek out the writings of Christian fundamentalists here; again, Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s most recent commentaries provide a case in point.2

Beyond Europe’s ‘old’ and ‘new’

Such characterizations have not gone unnoticed and have, indeed, provoked a storm of reactions and counter-discourses on the part of European intellectuals and politicians. In the late spring of 2003, Jürgen Habermas called upon several leading European cultural figures to voice their opinions on Europe’s place in the world and to begin to trace the contours of an emergent European identity. Habermas himself (writing jointly with Jacques Derrida), Umberto Eco, Fernando Savater, Gianni Vattimo, and a number of other European intellectuals published, on 31 May of that same year, a series of editorials in leading European newspapers, later translated and re-printed in numerous other media outlets.3

What all of the editorials noted was how the war made Europeans aware of the ‘need for Europe’ or, better still, the need to define Europe (and its world role) in much clearer terms. Also because if Europe did not define itself, someone else would do the defining (and indeed already was). A number of the authors also commented on how the war revealed some fundamental divides in the monolithic representation of ‘the West’, while also bringing to light fractures within Europe itself. While all the commentaries explicitly rejected the ‘old Europe’/‘new Europe’ divide, several did query what were the breaking points, how should ‘European’ difference be defined: in other words, what made Europeans European? Important questions were also raised, however, not only about the European attempt at self-definition, but also about Europe’s place in the world: Habermas and Derrida argued, for instance, that Europe could only define itself ‘internally’ by defining a ‘European project’, a ‘European model’ that transcended its boundaries:

a cosmopolitical order based on the recognition and protection of certain basic rights and the principles of international law [. . . ] being European should also mean rejecting certain practices, certain violations wherever they occur. (2003, 44–5; emphasis in original)

The on-going battle of words forced, in a sense, Europe to take a stand; to render explicit what it is that differentiates it, in a fundamental way, from the high moral pronouncements coming from across the Atlantic. And the attempt to inscribe Europe within the facile cartographies of ‘old’ and ‘new’, of ‘power’ and ‘weakness’ has been met with a number of alternative geographical imaginations that not only refuse such mappings, but that have begun to trace some of the preliminary outlines of a truly unique (geo)political subject. We cite only a few of these geographical imaginations here and limit our discussion, indeed, to a consideration of some recent writings of three of Europe’s leading ‘public intellectuals’: the late Jacques Derrida, political philosopher Etienne Balibar, and cultural theorist Tzvetan Todorov. The choice of focus is a deliberate one, for we believe that the ‘European imaginations’ of these prominent non-Anglophone theorists have been surprisingly absent from recent debates on Europe in English-language geography.

Our key point will be to note how all these imaginations share some common roots within European humanism; the ways in which they are all informed by ‘a political and ethical reflection that is heir to the Enlightenment tradition, but that can also be the portent of a new Enlightenment, able to challenge binary distinctions and high moral pronouncements’, recalling Derrida’s (2004, 3) plea once again. To counter the binary cartographies and essentialized identities of the new American right, some of these imaginations envision the European project within the metaphors of mediation and translation. They reclaim the notion of ‘weakness’ and render Europe’s ‘weak values’ precisely its ‘geopolitical originality’ (Foucher 2002). They re-imagine Europe not as a lesser power, but as a puissance tranquille (Todorov 2003, 42), a ‘tranquil’ power guided not by outcomes, but by process (‘an evolving, becoming order’ to cite Todorov); by mediation rather than decision; by an on-going (and always unaccomplished) process of translation rather than by the pure cartographies of power.

Paul Michael Lützeler’s (1997) reflections on the roots of European identity and, in particular, European multiculturalism, give us some interesting insights into how the current preoccupation with
‘weak values’ is marked by ideals that have formed the ethico-political bases of the European project from the very outset. Europe – the nascent European Community, that is – was born within the trauma of the Second World War and the resistance to Fascism. But already in first years of the twentieth century, Europe was seen by many as the only ‘antidote’ to nationalism and as the only viable alternative to the purification of identity – and space – that nationalism enforced. As Austrian playwright Franz Grillparzer would admonish in his popular drama Libussa, written in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, ‘the itinerary of modern culture goes from humanity to bestiality, passing through nationality’. Many of the first Europeanists shared Grillparzer’s concern: they saw modern history as the break-up of a universal, Latin, Humanist Europe and its progressive decline into chaos (see the discussion in Bialasiewicz 2003, as well as Lützeler 1997, Magris 1963 and Jonsson 2000).

Post-war imaginations of Europe, though certainly strongly wedded to the Christian Democratic ideals of its founding fathers (Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi and others) were, first and foremost, informed by a rejection of the nationalisms and totalitarianisms that had ravaged the continent during two European civil wars. On the occasion of the signature of the European Constitution in October 2004, many of the elder European leaders recalled how Europe was born as ‘a hope in the aftermath of war’ (Mauro 2004, 3).

The legacy of these ideals remains impressed upon a large part of the European population, and was expressed with vehemence on the streets of European cities on the 15 February 2003. Indeed, the widespread refusal of the culture of war advocated with considerable arrogance by the United States not only exposed the staggering divide in world-views between the Atlantic allies, but also revealed the strength of shared, pan-European values and beliefs. It also confirmed, as Habermas and Derrida have argued, ‘the memory of the moral foundations of politics [in Europe]’ (2003, 45).

Europe as ‘evanescent mediator’

In this last part of the paper, we would like to summarize what we believe are some of the most original contributions to a rethinking of the new European political subject. An important voice in these debates has been French political philosopher Etienne Balibar. In his 2003 book L’Europe, L’Amerique, La Guerre, Balibar explicitly rejects the essentialized political subjects inscribed by the geographies of ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’, but also by the idearity rhetoric of the ‘War on Terror’ more broadly. Pointing to the multi-layered and multi-lingual, hybrid Euro-Mediterranean relations, he notes how irrelevant – if not explicitly violent – are the ‘civilizational’ discourses adopted by the mass media when attempting to ‘geo-graph’ such a context. Balibar argues that it is this hybrid legacy, this interstitial role that Europe should (re)claim to become what he terms an ‘evanescent mediator’, a ‘mediator’ able to propose temporary, non-essentialized answers to situations of crisis emergent in the shaping of the new world order.

Europe’s role as mediator is, argues Balibar, its place in the world. It is the role already ascribed to it by many outside of Europe; political forces and populations who see in Europe the only possible alternative to American hegemony; the only possible mediator in the ‘clash of civilizations’ within which the current American administration seems to conceive the world. In constituting itself as a new political subject, Europe should then reflect, first of all, upon the play of ‘illusions and mirrors’ within which it is imagined by others – and imagines itself within others’ gaze (Balibar 2003, 22).

Europe can only be a mediator, continues Balibar, because there is no – and there cannot be – an European identity that can be delimited, distinguished in essential fashion from other identities. This is because there are no absolute borders between a historically and culturally constituted European space and the spaces that surround it. Just as there are no absolute confines to those values, beliefs and traditions that make up the ‘European’ inheritance: these are present to various degrees, and in various ‘reflections’, throughout the world. The question should then be not one of tracing the contours of a European identity, but rather that of recognizing Europe, in all its various expressions.

The reason Europe cannot have borders, Balibar (2003, 29) argues, is because it is itself a border(land) or, more precisely, a series of interweaving borders, of interweaving relations between diverse histories and cultures. This metaphor is beautifully deployed in Claudio Magris’ (1986) Danubio, as well as in Predrag Mavrijevac’s (1987) Mediteranski Brevijar, two masterful narratives of Europe’s spaces of contact and contamination. Now, conceiving Europe as a border, as a zone of contact between other spaces, has important consequences for its
constitution as a political subject. Certainly, it subverts the very notion of an absolute, autonomous subject, able to act – and, especially, exert power – separate from its context of constitution. Such an understanding of Europe has important consequences: it necessarily privileges, Balibar (2003, 30–1) argues, practice over identity; the deployment of European ideas, European ‘ways of doing’, rather than a ‘European identity’.

Balibar’s ideas find close resonance in the work of a number of other authors. Tzvetan Todorov’s (2003, 42) notion of Europe as a puissance tranquille, to which we have alluded already, is similarly based upon a fundamental reconceptualization of the relationship between politics and power. Todorov sees Europe as an ‘evolving, becoming order’, not ‘prescribable but existing in practice’ – or, better yet, in the multiple practices of Europeans (2003, 42). Todorov’s ideas also echo Derrida’s reading of Europe as something which gains unity through its ‘purposes, interests, cares and endeavours’ (1990, 75); a Europe, in Verga’s words, conceived in ‘being European’, ‘a process, not object . . . enacted, called into being, by the desire [to be European]’ (2004, 178).

But is it possible to identify what is European, while at the same time ‘dis-identifying, de-substantiating Europe’ (Balibar 2003, 31)? What is necessary here is a radical critique of the ‘theorem’ that binds current understandings of the relationship between politics and power. As Balibar argues, this ‘theorem’ presumes that effective action can only take place if, and only if, it deploys pre-existing resources that it controls in exclusive fashion (for example, financial, military or cultural resources), and if this endeavour is the action of a unified, unitary subject, as sovereign as possible, but certainly endowed with a stable and recognised identity. (2003, 31)

Europe, Balibar suggests, should pursue a radically different ideal, in which ‘power does not precede action but is rather its end result, according to diverse modalities depending on the objectives pursued’ (2003, 31). Only in this role, Balibar argues, will Europe be able to contribute in important fashion if not to transforming the world, then at least to influencing and orienting the processes of transformation that are taking place. With the understanding, however, that it will vanish, that it will ‘dissolve’ as a subject, as soon as its intervention, its mediation has run its course.

As Bertrand Ogilvie (2003) notes in his commentary on Balibar’s writings, this understanding challenges in a fundamental way our taken for granted ideas about sovereignty, politics and power – and the spaces within which these are exercised. In Balibar’s vision of the ‘evanescent mediator’, absence (or, better yet, a fading presence) becomes power of a different sort. Europe, in this reading, does not simply constitute itself as just another partner in a series of geopolitical strategies, but rather a space, a realm of possibilities within which conflicts can be transformed, from which they can emerge changed, modified. The idea of the ‘evanescent mediator’ is an attempt, Ogilvie argues, at abandoning the ‘obsession of substance: [the idea that] if Europe does not have “substance”, a single voice, its own cannons to counter American defence capabilities, clear borders etc. then it does not exist’ (2003, 59).

**For a geopolitics of translation**

But we cannot speak of ‘mediation’ without appeal to the notion of translation. Umberto Eco (1993) has long argued that the one and only ‘true’ language of Europe is translation. Here, we would like to extend Eco’s argument, adopting the notion of translation as a (geo)political paradigm: as a complex field of possibilities that requires an endless process of mediation and interpretation; that requires the capacity of living with always-temporary solutions, in the acknowledgement that the search for definitive answers is not only illusory but also inherently violent.

Translation as a (geo)political paradigm goes far beyond the simple necessity of communication: no translation is, in itself, innocent. Translation is therefore always a conscious ethical-political choice; a model of political action that not only presumes a respect for diversity but also an element of (not only linguistic) hospitality. Choosing the model of translation means accepting imperfection, accepting incompleteness, all the while striving for the best translation possible; it means an attention, an openness to the Other with whom we seek communication. It means respect of all the Others in the process of translation.

As we have already argued, the ideal of peace and the necessity of co-existence have shaped the European project from its very early days. Translation, as a metaphor of mediation and co-existence between diverse peoples and cultures, can yet prove Europe’s most original – and important – contribution.
It is in this way that we can understand, for instance, the appeal of the idea of Europe as a ‘Euro-Mediterranean subject’ – a political ‘constellation’ imagined not only by European writers (among others, Matvejevic 1998; Latouche 2000; Balibar 2003; Minca 2003; Todorov 2003), but also those writing about the European Union’s future ‘strategic’ directions (see, for example, Saint-Etienne 2003).

The Euro-Mediterranean idea(l) is based upon a set of suppositions that run directly counter to the power-political ‘theorem’, so dear to the prophets of the ‘War on Terror’. This is not to say that the Euro-Mediterranean space does not contain fractures, even painful ones; nor does it presume an absence of conflict. But mediation occurs precisely at these fractures, at this series of interweaving borders; borders which become points of encounter and the negotiated elaboration of common interests. It is here that Europe as an ‘evanescent mediator’ can perhaps offer the first realm of possibilities for the translation – and the transformation – of conflict.

The idea of Europe as mediator, as translator can also begin to capture, at least in part, that European ‘power-political ‘theorem’, so dear to the prophets of the ‘War on Terror’. This is not to say that the Euro-Mediterranean space does not contain fractures, even painful ones; nor does it presume an absence of conflict. But mediation occurs precisely at these fractures, at this series of interweaving borders; borders which become points of encounter and the negotiated elaboration of common interests. It is here that Europe as an ‘evanescent mediator’ can perhaps offer the first realm of possibilities for the translation – and the transformation – of conflict.

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