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Public images of right-wing populist leaders: the role of the media

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Publication date
2012

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Citation for published version (APA):

Bos, L. (2012). *Public images of right-wing populist leaders: the role of the media*. [Thesis, fully internal, Universiteit van Amsterdam].

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Appendix A Chapter 1 – Methodological concerns

Creating a stacked matrix

The analyses presented in Table 3 were conducted on a stacked data matrix. This way of structuring the data allows us to assess whether the determinants of preferences for a specific party are different from the determinants of preferences for the other parties. This research design is a variant of regression in time and space (Stimson, 1985). The created stacked dataset gives us the opportunity to combine the analysis of interand intraindividual variation by considering each preference score given by each respondent as a different case to be explained. In the matrix each respondent is thus represented by as many cases as there are parties included in the analysis (see Figure 1).

To create such a data reordering the non-party-specific variables, such as age and gender or political trust, first have to be linearly transformed with the following procedure (see also Tillie, 1995; Tillie and Fennema, 1998). First, in the original data matrix party preference for each party is regressed on each of these explanatory variables separately (categorical variables first have to be transformed into dummy variables). The predicted preference scores, the y -hats, are saved. These predicted values are linear transformations of the original independent variable. Since linear transformations are allowed and do not threaten the validity of the results, we may replace the original independent variable by these y -hats. These predicted scores contain two components: a component that consists of the explanatory power of the independent variable in question, and a component that reflects the popularity of the party in question that is generated on other grounds than by the independent variable. By eliminating the second component (which is done by centring the predicted scores) the remainders can be considered to reflect only variations caused by differences in the independent variable. These predicted and centred values (y -hats) are saved and stacked to yield a generic independent variable¹. As a consequence, the effects of these variables on generic party preference will be positive.

Figure A.1: Structure of a Stacked Data Matrix




Figure 1: Structure of a stacked data matrix

Missing data

We did not want to lose any respondents from our rather small sample, which is why we resorted to multiple imputation. For this we used Amelia II, a computer program developed by Honaker, Joseph, King, Scheve and Singh². Amelia produces five datasets in which missing values were imputed under different assumptions. These datasets were analysed separately. Through simple calculations the overall point estimate of the regression coefficients and the standard errors of these parameters were computed by the procedure developed by King et al. (2001). King et al. (2001) demonstrate on the basis of Monte Carlo simulations that multiple imputation methods (such as theirs) produce parameter estimates that contain less

bias and are more efficient than estimates that use listwise deletion. Their program produces results that are as good as alternative methods for multiple imputation. For our analysis in Stata® we made use of Ken Scheve's MI program to automatically compute the quantities of interest and the standard errors.

Fixed-effects approach

The structure of the stacked data matrix violates the assumptions of the OLS model. To avoid autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and heterogeneity of the dependent variable (Tillie and Fennema, 1998; Van der Eijk et al., 2006), we employ a fixed-effects model in Stata®. The substantive reason to apply this model is that it reflects optimally the causal process that generates preferences for different parties. The independent variables, including individual assessments of candidate traits, determine for each respondent how he or she evaluates each party. Therefore, we want to explain the intra-individual variation, which is what a fixed-effects model allows us to do.

A fixed-effects model is similar to conditional logit or LSDV (Least Squares Dummy Variable) regression. This approach is generally used to estimate panel data effects. In this case we are not dealing with data for each respondent (*i*) measured at *t* times, but we have data in which each respondent (*i*) is measured at *p* times, where *p* is the party component. We model:

$$y_{ip} = X_{ip}B + u_i + \varepsilon_{ip}$$

which allows us to take the individual unobserved effect u_i – the effect of the individual party-invariant unobservables – into account. The fixed-effects approach is most suitable for this purpose, because of the general assumption that the individual error component u_i (as opposed to the random error component ε_i) and the *X* regressors can correlate (Gujarati, 2003; Hsiao, 2003)³. A pooled regression (an OLS regression on the stacked data matrix) would assume that there is no correlation across individuals, nor across parties for any individual. This would ignore the individual effect u_i , which generates correlation between the values of $(u_i + \varepsilon_{i1}) \dots (u_i + \varepsilon_{ip})$ for each individual *I*, which leads to omitted variable bias. Consequentially, pooled regression does not make best use of the data:

Ignoring the individual or times-specific effects that exist among cross-sectional or timeseries units but are not captured by the included explanatory variables can lead to parameter heterogeneity in the model specification. Ignoring such heterogeneity could lead to inconsistent or meaningless estimates of interesting parameters. (Hsiao, 2003: 8)

Notes⁴

¹ The original regression equation is $y_i = a + b \cdot x_i + e_i$. In this equation the predicted value $\hat{y}_i = a + b \cdot x_i$. By substituting $a + b \cdot x_i$ with \hat{y}_i in the equation, the new regression equation (using the \hat{y}_i as predictors of party utility) becomes: $y_i = \hat{y}_i + e_i$. If one would estimate this new regression (using the y -hat as an estimator of y), the estimate of the intercept will be 0, the estimated slope will be 1, and e_i (which forms the basis for the computation of explained variance) is unaltered. When stacking the y -hats on top of each other in the stacked matrix, the newly constructed independent variable is not the predicted value (y -hat), but the deviation of the y -hats from their mean for each party. This still encapsulates the variance in party utility caused by the independent variable, but prevents differences among parties in the average level of utilities from being incorporated in the newly created independent variable. Such differences among parties in average utilities are caused by other factors besides x_i , and should hence not contribute to the variance in the newly created predictor. This procedure is also advocated by Iversen (1991) and by Snijders and Bosker (1999). For a more elaborate discussion, see van der Eijk and Franklin (1996, Chapter 20).

² See <http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia/>

³ The results of the fixed effects regression on the several imputed datasets show that the individual effect is significant ($rbo \approx .24$).

⁴ We have performed the Hausman test on model IV in one of our Multiple Imputation datasets, because it is not possible to carry out the test on the several imputed datasets simultaneously. The null hypothesis – that the fixed effects approach and the random effects approach do not differ significantly – had to be rejected. Consequentially it is better to use the fixed effects approach since the estimates of the random effects approach are significantly biased with high probability.

Appendix B Chapter 2 – Prominence measures

For newspapers we use the following formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 p(\text{leader})_{\text{newspapers}} &= \sum p(\text{leader}_a) \\
 &= \sum_{a \in \text{articles}} \frac{\frac{\text{total}(w)}{\text{mean}(w)} \cdot fp_{\text{newspapers}} \cdot \text{circ}(a)}{\text{average}_{p(\text{leader}_a)}}
 \end{aligned}$$

Where $p(\text{leader})_{\text{newspapers}}$ is the prominence for the party leader within newspapers within the period under study, which is dependent upon the attention for the party leader within each newspaper article $p(\text{leader}_a)$. The latter is based on the total number of words in the article divided by the mean number of words $\left(\frac{\text{total}(w)}{\text{mean}(w)}\right)$, the article salience $fp_{\text{newspapers}}$, which has a value of 2 if the article is on the frontpage and 1 otherwise and $\text{circ}(a)$, which is the circulation of the newspaper (in 2006) in which the article is published divided by the mean circulation of the included newspapers. The total is divided by the average prominence so as to achieve a mean of 1.

A similar formula was designed to assess the prominence of the party leaders in TV items and items in current affairs programs:

$$\begin{aligned}
 p(\text{leader})_{\text{TVitems}} &= \sum p(\text{leader}_I) \\
 &= \sum_{I \in \text{news\¤taffairs_items}} \frac{\frac{\text{total}(t)}{\text{mean}(t)} \cdot fp_{\text{TVitems}} \cdot \text{view}(a)}{\text{average}_{p(\text{leader}_I)}}
 \end{aligned}$$

Where $p(\text{leader})_{\text{TVitems}}$ is the prominence for the party leader within news and current affairs programs within the period under study, which is dependent upon the attention for the party leader within each TV item $p(\text{leader}_I)$. The latter is based on the total time of the item divided by the mean time $\left(\frac{\text{total}(t)}{\text{mean}(t)}\right)$, the item salience fp_{TVitems} , which has a value of 2 if it is the first item and/or the item is mentioned in the lead and 1 otherwise and $\text{view}(a)$, which is the mean number of viewers for the TV program divided by the mean number of viewers for all news and current affairs programs included in the analysis. The total is divided by the average prominence so as to achieve a mean of 1.

Because of the different measurement of attention for party leaders in items in infotainment programs, a partly dissimilar formula was constructed to measure the prominence of party leaders in these items:

$$\begin{aligned}
 p(\text{leader})_{\text{Infotainment}} &= \sum p(\text{leader}_{\text{Inf}}) \\
 &= \sum_{\text{Inf} \in \text{Infotainment_items}} \frac{fp_{\text{Infotainment}} \cdot \text{view}(a)}{\text{average}_{p(\text{leader}_{\text{Inf}})}}
 \end{aligned}$$

Where $p(\text{leader})_{\text{Infotainment}}$ is the prominence for the party leader within infotainment programs within the period under study, which is dependent upon the attention for the party leader within each infotainment item $p(\text{leader}_{\text{Inf}})$. The latter is based on the item salience $fp_{\text{Infotainments}}$, which has a value of 2 if the party leader is visible during the whole program and 1 otherwise and $\text{view}(a)$, which is the mean number of viewers for the TV program divided by the mean number of viewers for all infotainment programs included in the analysis. The total is divided by the average prominence so as to achieve a mean of 1.

Because of the division of each prominence measure by its mean we are able to compare the various prominence measures. Moreover, we can create an overall prominence measure by adding the distinctive measures.

Appendix C Chapter 3 – Descriptives of main variables

Table C.1: Descriptives of main variables

	Media coverage variables					Perceptions of party leaders			
	Prominence	Criticism	Heartland	Populism	Authoritative-ness	Effectiveness t-1	Effectiveness t1	Legitimacyt-1	Legitimacyt1
Right-Wing Populist Party Leaders									
Geert Wilders	-10.46 (1.18)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.05 (0.08)	0.32 (0.27)	0.32 (0.31)	5.87 (3.05)	5.63 (3.08)	6.43 (2.79)	6.46 (2.78)
Marco Pastors	-11.68 (0.80)	0.03 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.19 (0.31)	-0.21 (0.24)	5.14 (2.79)	4.92 (2.46)	6.53 (2.70)	7.07 (2.65)
<i>Average</i>	<i>-11.07 (1.18)</i>	<i>0.01 (0.08)</i>	<i>0.07 (0.08)</i>	<i>0.06 (0.39)</i>	<i>0.06 (0.39)</i>				
Mainstream Party Leaders									
J-P Balkenende	12.71 (7.42)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.39 (0.13)	0.03 (0.22)	10.71 (2.73)	11.27 (2.31)	10.17 (3.06)	10.27 (2.97)
Wouter Bos	16.01 (8.22)	0.09 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.12 (0.31)	-0.03 (0.17)	10.97 (2.19)	10.93 (2.26)	9.78 (2.90)	9.97 (2.86)
Mark Rutte	0.72 (4.14)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	0.30 (0.25)	0.09 (0.17)	9.10 (2.73)	8.48 (2.60)	9.37 (2.90)	9.67 (2.62)
Femke Halsema	-7.31 (2.45)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.00)	-0.16 (0.29)	-0.20 (0.24)	7.94 (2.75)	7.75 (2.92)	9.72 (2.71)	9.72 (2.71)
<i>Average</i>	<i>5.53 (11.13)</i>	<i>0.00 (0.08)</i>	<i>-0.03 (0.04)</i>	<i>-0.03 (0.37)</i>	<i>-0.03 (0.23)</i>				
Total	0.00 (12.01)	0.00 (0.08)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.38)	0.00 (0.29)	8.29 (3.51)	8.17 (3.55)	8.66 (3.24)	8.86 (3.15)

Note. Entries are means, standard deviations in parentheses. The media coverage variables were centred around their means to avoid multicollinearity, so that their means are always 0.

Appendix D Chapter 3 – Survey characteristics

The table shows that our respondent data mirror census data by and large in terms of age, gender and education.

	Dataset, $n = 703$	Census
Gender		
Male	50.1	49.0
Female	49.9	51.0
Age		
18-34	22.2	27.3
35-44	22.5	20.6
45-54	19.6	18.3
55-64	16.6	15.6
65+	19.1	18.3
Education		
Lower	33.7	32.0
Middle	38.6	40.1
Higher	27.7	28.0

Note. Census data concern 2006; Reference data were obtained from “Gouden Standaard”, which is the reference instrument of the Dutch Market Research Association (MOA); These reference data are collected by the Dutch National Statistics Institute (CBS); Not all columns add up to 100 percent because of rounding to decimal places.

Appendix E Chapter 4 – Stimulus material

(Translated from Dutch Original)

[Wilders (PVV)/ Blok (VVD)] supports governmental plan for new nuclear power station

The Hague – [PVV-leader Geert Wilders/VVD-chairman Stef Blok] is happy with the decision of the cabinet to build a new nuclear power station. He supports the change in course wholeheartedly. The previous cabinet resisted the build of nuclear power stations explicitly.

Control condition

“This cabinet ends the expensive climate policy and will pursue a sound energy policy”, said [Wilders/Blok].

The [PVV/VVD] politician stresses the urgency of solving the energy problem: “the fossil fuels run out and the Netherlands are increasingly dependent upon oil from the Middle East and Russia”. Windmills are too heavily subsidized and don’t make enough profit, according to him.

Wilders/ Blok: “We do our best for Borssele II. Nuclear power stations are the future.”

Populist style

“It’s time. This cabinet ends the way too expensive climate policy and will pursue a decent energy policy”, said [Wilders/Blok].

The [PVV/VVD] politician says we are “on the verge of disaster” when it comes to solving the energy problem: “the fossil fuels run out and the Netherlands are not able to do without oil from the Middle East and Russia”. Windmills “only turn on subsidies” and are unprofitable, according to him.

[Wilders/ Blok]: “I devote myself for 200% to Borssele II. We are not living in the Tsjernobyl era anymore. Nuclear power stations are the future.”

Populist rhetoric

“This cabinet ends the expensive climate policy of the leftist elite and will pursue a sound energy policy”, said [Wilders/Blok].

The [PVV/VVD] politician stresses the urgency of solving the energy problem: “the fossil fuels run out and the hardworking Dutchmen are increasingly dependent upon oil from the Middle East and Russia”. Windmills cost the taxpayer too much subsidy and don’t make enough profit, according to him.

[Wilders/ Blok]: “We do our best for Borssele II, unlike the subsidized climate fundamentalists. Nuclear power stations are our future.”

Authoritativeness

“This cabinet ends the expensive climate policy and will pursue a sound energy policy. A measure that saves half a billion on the governmental budget”, said [Wilders/Blok].

The [PVV/VVD] politician stresses the urgency of solving the energy problem: “research of TU Delft shows that fossil fuels will run out within decades, which leaves the Netherlands increasingly dependent upon oil from the Middle East and Russia”. Windmills cost two billion euro’s in subsidy annually and don’t make enough profit, according to him.

[Wilders/ Blok]: “We do our best for Borssele II. Nuclear power stations are the future: there is enough raw material to run the whole world on nuclear energy for thousands of years.”

Populist style + populist rhetoric

“It’s time. This cabinet ends the way too expensive climate policy of the leftist elite and will pursue a decent energy policy”, said [Wilders/Blok].

The [PVV/VVD] politician says we are “on the verge of disaster” when it comes to solving the energy problem: “the fossil fuels run out and the hardworking Dutchmen are not able to do without oil from the Middle East and Russia”. Windmills “only turn on subsidies from the taxpayer” and are unprofitable, according to him.

[Wilders/ Blok]: “I devote myself for 200% to Borssele II, unlike the subsidized climate fundamentalists. We are not living in the Tsjernobyl era anymore. Nuclear power stations are our future.”

Populist style + authoritativeness

“It’s time. This cabinet ends the way too expensive climate policy and will pursue a decent energy policy. A measure that saves half a billion on the governmental budget”, said [Wilders/Blok].

The [PVV/VVD] politician says we are “on the verge of disaster” when it comes to solving the energy problem: “research of TU Delft shows that fossil fuels will run out within decades, which leaves the Netherlands unable to do without oil from the Middle East and Russia”. Windmills “only turn on two billion euro in subsidies annually” and are unprofitable, according to him.

[Wilders/ Blok]: "I devote myself for 200% to Borssele II. We are not living in the Tsjernobyl era anymore. Nuclear power stations are the future: there is enough raw material to run the whole world on nuclear energy for thousands of years.”

Populist rhetoric + authoritativeness

“This cabinet ends the expensive climate policy of the leftist elite and will pursue a sound energy policy. A measure that saves half a billion on the governmental budget”, said [Wilders/Blok].

The [PVV/VVD] politician stresses the urgency of solving the energy problem: “research of TU Delft shows that fossil fuels will run out within decades, which leaves the hardworking Dutchmen increasingly dependent upon oil from the Middle East and Russia”. Windmills cost the taxpayer two billion euro’s in subsidy annually and don’t make enough profit, according to him.

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Populist style + populist rhetoric + authoritativeness

“It’s time. This cabinet ends the way too expensive climate policy of the leftist elite and will pursue a decent energy policy. A measure that saves half a billion on the governmental budget”, said [Wilders/Blok].

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without oil from the Middle East and Russia”. Windmills “only turn on two billion euro in taxpayers’ subsidies annually” and are unprofitable, according to him.

[Wilders/ Blok]: "I devote myself for 200% to Borssele II, unlike the subsidized climate fundamentalists. We are not living in the Tsjernobyl era anymore. Nuclear power stations are our future: there is enough raw material to run the whole world on nuclear energy for thousands of years.”

Appendix F Chapter 4 – Overview variables

Pre-test measures

Education

Six levels of education from lowest to highest (Dutch originals): (1) primary school, (2) intermediate secondary education, (3) higher secondary education/preparatory university education, (4) intermediate vocational education, (5) higher vocational education, (6) university.

Political cynicism

Political Cynicism was measured with the following four statements (Dutch originals) rated from 1 to 10 with higher values indicating more agreement: “Politicians consciously promise more than they can deliver”, “Ministers and junior Ministers are primarily self-interested”, “In enabling someone to become a member of Parliament, friends are more important than abilities”, “Politicians do not understand what matters to society”.

External political efficacy

External Political Efficacy was measured with the following four statements (Dutch originals); rated from 1 (“that is not true”) to 2 (“that is true”): “Public officials don’t care much what people like me think”, “Political parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion”, “People like me don’t have any influence on governmental policy”.

Post-test measures

Effectiveness

Effectiveness was measured with the following two items (Dutch originals); asked on a scale from 1 to 10 with higher values indicating more complicity: “Some politicians, whether or not part of the government, have great influence on governmental policy; others do not have a lot of influence. Could you indicate for [Geert Wilders/Stef Blok] whether you think he exerts a little or a lot of influence?”

(Responses could vary from (1) “Has very little influence on policy”, to (10) “Has a lot of influence on policy”), “Some politicians you don’t hear from, whereas other politicians exert a lot of influence on public debates. How important is [Geert Wilders/Stef Blok] in the public debate?” (Responses could vary from (1) “Does not shape the public debate”, to (10) “Shapes the public debate to a large extent”).

Legitimacy

Legitimacy was measured with the following two items (Dutch originals); asked on a scale from 1 to 10 with higher values indicating more complicity: “To reach their goal some politicians are willing to ignore important democratic rules, while others will comply with these democratic rules under all circumstances. Could you tell me whether you think that [Geert Wilders/Stef Blok] has always complied with the democratic principles? (Responses could vary from (1) “Doesn’t comply with the democratic rules”, to 10 “Always complies with the democratic rules”); “Sometimes people think a certain politician or party is dangerous. They are afraid that when that politician rises to power he will pose a threat to democracy. Others are of the opinion that this will not be the case. Do you think that [Geert Wilders/Stef Blok] could pose a threat to democracy? (Responses could vary from (1) “He could pose a real threat to democracy” to (10) “He could definitely not pose a threat to democracy”).

Appendix G Chapter 4 - Additional tables

Table G.1: Moderated Model with Educational Level as a Moderator; DV = Effectiveness

Variables	Model I	Model II	Model III
(Constant)	9.733 (0.161)***	9.736 (0.161)***	9.739 (0.161)***
Authoritativeness	0.465 (0.162)**	0.460 (0.162)**	0.455 (0.161)**
Populist Style	0.027 (0.162)	0.029 (0.162)	0.035 (0.161)
Populist Rhetoric	0.206 (0.162)	0.203 (0.162)	0.195 (0.161)
Wilders	4.163 (0.226)***	4.169 (0.226)***	4.156 (0.226)***
Wilders * Authoritativeness	-0.389 (0.226) [†]	-0.393 (0.226) [†]	-0.374 (0.226) [†]
Wilders * Populist Style	-0.237 (0.226)	-0.241 (0.226)	-0.245 (0.226)
Wilders * Populist Rhetoric	-0.398 (0.226)	-0.374 (0.226) [†]	-0.355 (0.226)
Educational level	0.182 (0.053)***	0.113 (0.081)	0.028 (0.102)
Wilders * Education	0.113 (0.074)	0.110 (0.074)	0.280 (0.145) [†]
Authoritativeness * Education		0.095 (0.074)	0.200 (0.106) [†]
Pop Style * Education		-0.028 (0.075)	-0.128 (0.106)
Pop Rhet * Education		0.074 (0.074)	0.241 (0.106)*
Wilders * Auth * Education			-0.205 (0.149)
Wilders * Pop Style * Education			0.196 (0.149)
Wilders * Pop Rhet * Education			-0.327 (0.149)*
Adjusted R ²	0.261	0.261	0.262

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; Standard errors between brackets; [†]p<0.10
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; n = 3,109.

Table G.2: Moderated Model with Educational Level as a Moderator; DV = Legitimacy

Variables	Model I	Model II	Model III
(Constant)	12.852 (0.171)***	12.851 (0.170)***	12.851 (0.170)***
Populist Style	-0.418 (0.201)*	-0.409 (0.201)*	-0.412 (0.201)*
Populist Rhetoric	-0.137 (0.201)	-0.140 (0.201)	-0.135 (0.201)
Wilders	-3.107 (0.242)***	-3.115 (0.241)***	-3.119 (0.241)***
Wilders * Populist Style	0.694 (0.281)*	0.691 (0.281)*	0.697 (0.281)*
Wilders * Populist Rhetoric	-0.152 (0.281)	-0.149 (0.281)	-0.157 (0.281)
Educational Level	0.181 (0.066)**	0.283 (0.090)**	0.304 (0.110)**
Wilders * Education	-0.328 (0.092)***	-0.322 (0.092)***	-0.363 (0.156) *
Pop Style * Education		-0.258 (0.092)**	-0.173 (0.132)**
Pop Rhet * Education		0.034 (0.092)	-0.089 (0.132)
Wilders * Pop Style * Education			-0.167 (0.185)
Wilders * Pop Rhet * Education			0.242 (0.185)
Adjusted R ²	0.121	0.123	0.123

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; Standard errors between brackets; †p<0.10

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; n = 3,109

Table G.3: Moderated Model with Political Cynicism as a Moderator; DV = Effectiveness

Variables	Model I	Model II	Model III
(Constant)	9.751 (0.161)***	9.752 (0.161)***	9.751 (0.161)***
Authoritativeness	0.419 (0.161)**	0.418 (0.162)**	0.416 (0.162)**
Populist Style	0.017 (0.161)	0.017 (0.162)	0.020 (0.162)
Populist Rhetoric	0.220 (0.161)	0.216 (0.161)	0.215 (0.161)
Wilders	4.143 (0.225)***	4.142 (0.226)***	4.140 (0.226)***
Wilders * Authoritativeness	-0.342 (0.226)	-0.337 (0.226)	-0.342 (0.226)
Wilders * Populist Style	-0.243 (0.226)	-0.241 (0.226)	-0.238 (0.226)
Wilders * Populist Rhetoric	-0.364 (0.226)	-0.364 (0.226)	-0.361 (0.226)
Political Cynicism	-0.464 (0.080)***	-0.396 (0.128)**	-0.423 (0.161)**
Wilders * Political Cynicism	0.636 (0.113)***	0.636 (0.113)***	0.701 (0.232)**
Authoritativeness * Political Cynicism		-0.097 (0.113)	-0.214 (0.160)
Pop Style * Political Cynicism		-0.040 (0.113)	0.113 (0.159)
Pop Rhet * Political Cynicism		0.000 (0.113)	0.024 (0.160)
Wilders * Auth * Political Cynicism			0.230 (0.227)
Wilders * Pop Style * Political Cynicism			-0.305 (0.226)
Wilders * Pop Rhet * Political Cynicism			-0.053 (0.227)
Adjusted R ²	0.260	0.260	0.260

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; Standard errors between brackets; †p<0.10
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; n = 3,115.

Table G.4. Moderated Model with Political Cynicism as a Moderator; DV = Legitimacy

Variables	Model 1	Model II	Model III
(Constant)	12.843 (0.169)***	12.844 (0.169)***	12.845 (0.169)***
Populist Style	-0.430 (0.199)*	-0.428 (0.199)*	-0.430 (0.199)*
Populist Rhetoric	-0.119 (0.199)	-0.118 (0.199)	-0.120 (0.199)
Wilders	-3.098 (0.240)***	-3.098 (0.240)***	-3.097 (0.240)***
Wilders * Populist Style	0.721 (0.279)**	0.706 (0.279)*	0.705 (0.279)*
Wilders * Populist Rhetoric	-0.182 (0.279)	-0.171 (0.279)	-0.169 (0.279)
Political Cynicism	-0.700 (0.098)***	-0.732 (0.138)***	-0.691 (0.168)***
Wilders * Political Cynicism	0.602 (0.139)***	0.599 (0.139)***	0.513 (0.243)*
Pop Style * Political Cynicism		0.239 (0.139) [†]	0.171 (0.197)
Pop Rhet * Political Cynicism		-0.164 (0.139)	-0.181 (0.197)
Wilders * Pop Style * Political Cynicism			0.138 (0.279)
Wilders * Pop Rhet * Political Cynicism			0.034 (0.279)
Adjusted R ²	0.132	0.133	0.132

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; Standard errors between brackets; [†]p<0.10
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; n = 3,115.

Table G.5: Moderated Model with External Political Efficacy as a Moderator; DV =

Effectiveness

Variables	Model I	Model II	Model III
(Constant)	9.688 (0.170)***	9.706 (0.170)***	9.703 (0.170)***
Authoritativeness	0.490 (0.170)**	0.490 (0.170)**	0.492 (0.170)**
Populist Style	0.076 (0.170)	0.062 (0.170)	0.067 (0.170)
Populist Rhetoric	0.243 (0.170)	0.232 (0.170)	0.229 (0.170)
Wilders	4.263 (0.238)***	4.244 (0.238)***	4.245 (0.238)***
Wilders * Authoritativeness	-0.443 (0.238)†	-0.440 (0.238)†	-0.441 (0.238)†
Wilders * Populist Style	-0.336 (0.238)	-0.323 (0.238)	-0.329 (0.238)
Wilders * Populist Rhetoric	-0.388 (0.238)	-0.378 (0.238)	-0.373 (0.238)
External Political Efficacy	0.374 (0.085)***	0.275 (0.131)*	0.298 (0.166)†
Wilders * External Political Efficacy	-0.194 (0.118)	-0.198 (0.118)†	-0.248 (0.234)
Authoritativeness * Ext. Pol. Efficacy		0.316 (0.118)**	0.287 (0.170)†
Pop Style * Ext. Pol. Efficacy		-0.040 (0.118)	-0.175 (0.170)
Pop Rhet * Ext. Pol. Efficacy		0.069 (0.118)	0.040 (0.170)
Wilders * Auth * Ext. Political Efficacy			0.056 (0.237)
Wilders * Pop Style * Ext. Pol. Efficacy			0.259 (0.237)
Wilders * Pop Rhet * Ext. Pol. Efficacy			-0.207 (0.237)
Adjusted R ²	0.257	0.258	0.258

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; Standard errors between brackets; †p<0.10
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; n = 2,840.

Table G.6: Moderated Model with External Political Efficacy as a Moderator; DV = Legitimacy

Variables	Model 1	Model II	Model III
(Constant)	12.821 (0.179)***	12.821 (0.179)***	12.820 (0.179)***
Populist Style	-0.383 (0.210) [†]	-0.378 (0.210) [†]	-0.385 (0.210) [†]
Populist Rhetoric	-0.150 (0.210)	-0.156 (0.210)	-0.149 (0.210)
Wilders	-3.122 (0.253)***	-3.122 (0.253)***	-3.121 (0.253)***
Wilders * Populist Style	0.656 (0.294)*	0.651 (0.294)*	0.661 (0.294)*
Wilders * Populist Rhetoric	-0.122 (0.294)	-0.120 (0.294)	-0.129 (0.294)
External Political Efficacy	0.593 (0.105)***	0.648 (0.146)***	0.661 (0.179)***
Wilders * External Political Efficacy	-0.621 (0.146)***	-0.621 (0.146)***	-0.638 (0.251)*
Pop Style * External Political Efficacy		-0.249 (0.146) [†]	-0.034 (0.210)
Pop Rhet * External Political Efficacy		0.127 (0.146)	-0.102 (0.210)
Wilders * Pop Style * Ext. Pol. Efficacy			-0.411 (0.293)
Wilders * Pop Rhet * Ext. Pol. Efficacy			0.438 (0.293)
Adjusted R ²	0.127	0.128	0.129

Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; Standard errors between brackets; [†]p<0.10
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; n = 2,840.