



UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

When and how norm violators gain influence

Dominance, prestige, and the social dynamics of (counter)normative behavior

van Kleef, G.A.

DOI

[10.1111/spc3.12745](https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12745)

Publication date

2023

Document Version

Final published version

Published in

Social and Personality Psychology Compass

License

CC BY-NC-ND

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

van Kleef, G. A. (2023). When and how norm violators gain influence: Dominance, prestige, and the social dynamics of (counter)normative behavior. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 17(5), Article e12745. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12745>

General rights

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

When and how norm violators gain influence: Dominance, prestige, and the social dynamics of (counter)normative behavior

Gerben A. van Kleef 

University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Correspondence

Gerben A. van Kleef, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 1001 NK, The Netherlands.
Email: g.a.vankleef@uva.nl

Abstract

The capacity to influence other people is key to success across domains of life, from personal to professional relationships, from the school yard to the retirement home, and from marketing to politics. Traditional approaches hold that people can gain influence in social collectives by behaving in line with prevailing norms. However, mounting evidence indicates that defying norms can enhance one's power, status, and influence. Here, I take stock of this literature and propose a new perspective that can explain seemingly inconsistent links between norm violation and influence. After discussing various social mechanisms that keep norm violators in check (negative emotions, gossip, social exclusion, formal punishment), I review evidence that violating norms can enhance the capacity for influence. I then integrate insights from the dominance/prestige framework of social rank with research on social responses to norm violations to develop a new model that illuminates when and how norm violators gain influence. I discuss implications for understanding the dynamic negotiation of leadership and influence and the maintenance versus decline of normative systems.

This is an open access article under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

© 2023 The Authors. Social and Personality Psychology Compass published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

KEYWORDS

dominance, influence, leadership, prestige, power, social norms, transgressions

1 | INTRODUCTION

For an ultra-social species like humankind, the ability to influence other individuals is vital to success across domains of life. From personal gatherings to organizational meetings, from marketing to politics, and from face-to-face encounters to online exchange, human interactions revolve around (attempts at) interpersonal influence. What enables people to successfully wield influence over others? Traditional approaches emphasize the importance of conforming to prevailing social norms, as doing so would allow one to make a positive impression, develop goodwill, and demonstrate one is worthy of standing and influence (Abrams et al., 2000; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Hollander, 1958). However, in contrast to this view, anecdotal evidence suggests individuals can gain influence by defying norms and expectations. News reports and popular media are rife with examples of politicians, businesspeople, and other influential characters who frequently step out of line and appear to become all the more popular and impactful by doing so—consider the conspicuous transgressions by the likes of Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, Elon Musk, and others. It is possible, of course, that people allow celebrities greater leeway to flout social conventions than they do mere mortals. It is also conceivable, however, that there is something in the act of breaching norms that enables people to amass influence. The current paper addresses this possibility, with the aim to provide insight into when and how norm violators gain influence.

The paper unfolds as follows. I begin by conceptualizing the nature and purpose of social norms in human societies, discussing how norms facilitate coordinated action and enable orderly coexistence. In relation to this, I discuss various social mechanisms that serve to keep potential violators in check and encourage norm abidance. Next I review emerging empirical evidence that, these mechanisms notwithstanding, individuals who violate norms sometimes not only get away with their violations but even profit from them by gaining influence. To illuminate how this works and when it happens, I integrate insights from the dominance/prestige framework of social rank (Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maner & Case, 2016) with recent findings on social responses to norm violations. This new synthesis helps explain when and how behaviors that appear undesirable can nonetheless enhance a person's influence via increased dominance and/or prestige. I conclude by discussing implications of this novel perspective for understanding the social-hierarchical consequences of norm violations and the preservation versus decay of normative systems, and offering suggestions for future research.

2 | CONCEPTUALIZING NORMS AND NORM VIOLATIONS

Social interaction poses critical challenges related to cooperation and coordination, from establishing fair transactions to caring for those in need to preventing traffic accidents (Bicchieri, 2006; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). The functioning of communities often hinges on the degree to which they succeed in aligning the behavior of individual members in ways that serve the interests of the community (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Van Lange et al., 2013). Such alignment is facilitated by behavioral guidelines and expectations that prioritize desired over undesired conduct (Axelrod, 1986; Cialdini et al., 1990; Feldman, 1984). These behavioral guidelines and expectations, known as social norms, may be explicitly stated in the form of rules or laws, but they are often more implicit and unwritten (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Morris et al., 2015). What is essential is that they are, to a considerable degree, endorsed by the members of a community. By virtue of that endorsement, norms create a common understanding of what is or is not acceptable within a particular context, thereby guiding behavior (Gelfand et al., 2011; Henrich, 2016; Van Kleef et al., 2019).

Social norms come in myriad shapes. They may pertain to aspects of interpersonal interaction (e.g., fairness, care), eating manners, dress styles, traffic behavior, organizational conduct, comportment in public spaces, etcetera—the list is near endless. Early sociological studies featured distinctions among customs, traditions, mores, rituals, fads, fashions, manners, and etiquette (Sumner, 1906), and among law norms, technical norms, norms of etiquette and fashion, and miscellaneous norms (Sorokin, 1947). Other work differentiated norms along various dimensions, including their distribution (e.g., extent of knowledge, acceptance, and application of the norm), enforcement (e.g., punishment vs. reward, severity of sanctions), transmission (e.g., socialization processes), and conformity (e.g., amount of conformity vs. deviance; Morris, 1956). In psychology, an influential distinction has been made between descriptive norms—which capture how most people behave in a particular setting—and injunctive norms—which capture how people believe one should behave (Reno et al., 1993; Schultz et al., 2007). In the field of morality, scholars have identified different “moral foundations” pertaining to care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation (Graham et al., 2013), which are reflected in associated norms (Van Kleef et al., 2019). Here, I adopt an inclusive approach, counting as social norms all those guidelines and expectations—be they explicit or implicit—that most people in a community believe should be adhered to and that most people actually do adhere to.

It follows from this pragmatic definition of social norms that norm violations are those behaviors that deviate from what most people in a community do and believe should be done. Logically, then, the spectrum of norm violations is as rich as the spectrum of norms. People may violate norms of social interaction (e.g., harm others or treat them unfairly), behave dishonestly (e.g., lie, cheat), act indecently (e.g., put their feet on the table, eat in an unmannered fashion), flout organizational norms (e.g., arrive late at meetings, ignore company dress codes), misbehave in public spaces (e.g., speak aloud during a screening in the movie theater, park their cars on the sidewalk), and so on—again, the list is near endless. Besides qualitative differences between various types of violations, norm violations vary along quantitative dimensions, such as (perceived) gravity and frequency (I return to this issue in the discussion).

Various factors can bring individuals to violate norms (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014; Van Kleef et al., 2015). For instance, people may violate norms for material gain (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Warren, 2003), to secure better outcomes for their group and improve their position in it (Thau et al., 2015), or to get a thrill (Yildirim-Yenier et al., 2016). People may also violate norms because they deem them useless (Havârneanu & Havârneanu, 2012) or because they are uncommitted to the group that endorses them (Blanton & Christie, 2003; Packer, 2008). Conversely, people may violate norms precisely *because* they care about the group and believe its norms are dysfunctional and need to be changed (Galperin, 2012; Packer, 2008) or because the norms are at odds with their personal convictions (Monin et al., 2008). Finally, people may violate norms because doing so allows them to express their individuality and uniqueness (Blanton & Christie, 2003; Imhoff & Erb, 2009). These and other factors are more likely to result in norm violations when people expect little or no backlash, for instance due to high power (Galinsky et al., 2008), low accountability (Gelfand & Realo, 1999), or weak sanctions (Gelfand et al., 2011). Given these (and other) forces toward deviance, human communities have developed various mechanisms to uphold social norms.

3 | MECHANISMS UPHOLDING NORMATIVE SYSTEMS: REWARD, PUNISHMENT, AND BEYOND

Reflecting the importance of many social norms for the functioning of collectives (Axelrod, 1986; Bicchieri, 2006; Henrich, 2016; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), behaviors that are in line with prevailing norms tend to be met with positive responses from observers, whereas behaviors that go against prevailing norms often invite negative responses (Balliet et al., 2011; Gülerk et al., 2006). Positive responses to normative behavior can take the form of tangible (monetary) rewards (Bartol & Srivastava, 2002), but they are often of a psychological nature. For instance, norm abiders may get approval from their social circles (Abrams et al., 2000; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), receive praise (Owen et al., 2012), and enjoy a favorable reputation (Philippe & Durand, 2011). Furthermore, individuals who embody the norms of their group are preferentially endorsed as leaders (Platow & Van Knippenberg, 2001), enabling them to have greater influence over others.

Conversely, people who violate norms often elicit unfavorable responses from others, such as negative emotions (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Kam & Bond, 2009; Molho et al., 2017; Ohbuchi et al., 2004; Stamkou et al., 2019), reprimands (Eriksson et al., 2017), gossip (Baumeister et al., 2004; Beersma & Van Kleef, 2012; Peters et al., 2017), social exclusion (Feinberg et al., 2014; Whitson et al., 2015), and various forms of punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b; Kakkar et al., 2020; Molho et al., 2020; Yamagishi, 1986). Such responses contribute to the maintenance of normative systems by discouraging future transgressions (Brauer & Chekroun, 2005; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a) and undermining norm violators' standing and influence in groups (Graffin et al., 2013; Stamkou et al., 2019). For instance, expressions of anger by fellow group members about deviant opinions can push deviants to conform to the group norm (Heerdink et al., 2013), gossip fuels adherence to norms of fairness and cooperation (Beersma & Van Kleef, 2011; Feinberg et al., 2014), and (altruistic) punishment of defectors sustains cooperative reciprocity (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).

Despite the importance of social norms for communities, responses to norm violators are not uniformly negative (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014; Popa et al., 2014; Van Kleef et al., 2015). One reason is that not all norms are perceived as equally beneficial by all the members of a community. Certain norms may be deemed dysfunctional or backward by some (Havârneanu & Havârneanu, 2012; Warren, 2003), in which case their violation constitutes an opportunity for greater efficiency (Morrison, 2006) or social change (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014). In some cases, breaking with established approaches is needed to prevent stagnation. This may result in group members extending "innovation credit" to future group leaders who challenge the group's norms (Abrams et al., 2008). Furthermore, norms are socially constructed (Carnes et al., 2015), which means they differ in nature and strength across groups and cultures (Gelfand et al., 2017). Consequently, reactions to norm violations vary as a function of the (cultural) context within which the violations occur (Stamkou et al., 2019). Finally, people may be differentially affected by norm violations. When individuals are not personally harmed by a norm violation, they are less likely to express disapproval or confront the perpetrator (Brauer & Chekroun, 2005). In fact, some norm violations generate benefits for others—material, financial, or otherwise—, thus inviting favorable reactions (Popa et al., 2014; Van Kleef et al., 2012).

These variable responses suggest norm violations do not invariably undermine perpetrators' influence, but may in some cases increase it. Indeed, evidence shows that norm violations can engender social perceptions and responses in observers that enhance the violator's capacity for influence. For instance, bullying behavior is positively associated with school kids' popularity (Sijtsema et al., 2009), artists who violate prevailing artistic norms are perceived as more impactful (Stamkou et al., 2018), and political candidates who evidently lie and cheat can win political elections (Hahl et al., 2018). Correlational evidence indicates that the dopamine transporter gene (DAT1) is positively associated both with rule breaking and with leadership role occupancy (Li et al., 2015). Finally, individuals who exhibited a tendency toward risk-taking—behavior that is counternormative in many settings—were, under particular circumstances, preferred as leaders over more risk-averse individuals (Van Kleef et al., 2021).

At first blush, these findings seem difficult to reconcile with the importance of norms for social collectives. If norms are vital to community functioning, why would norm violators be rewarded with standing and influence? Below, I draw on the dominance/prestige framework of social rank to address this puzzle and illuminate when and how norm violators gain influence.

4 | PATHWAYS TO INFLUENCE: THE DOMINANCE/PRESTIGE FRAMEWORK

The dominance/prestige framework describes two pathways to rank and influence: dominance and prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Dominance and prestige capture distinct suites of behaviors, which jointly govern the allocation of status and influence in social collectives (Cheng et al., 2013; Halevy et al., 2012; Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017; Maner & Case, 2016).

Dominance, on the one hand, encompasses behaviors that bolster one's hierarchical position through (threat of) force (Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Typical dominance behaviors include assertiveness,

aggression, coercion, intimidation, and the use of punishment and reward to attain or maintain influence. A typical response to dominance is submissiveness, which enhances the influence of dominant individuals (Cheng et al., 2013; Maner & Case, 2016). Indeed, meta-analytical evidence indicates that trait dominance predicts leadership emergence (Lord et al., 1986). Likewise, morphological features reflecting physical dominance, such as height and strength, are associated with leadership and influence (Judge & Cable, 2004; Stulp et al., 2013). With regard to actual dominance behaviors, some studies found positive effects on the acquisition of power and leadership positions (e.g., Cheng et al., 2013; de Waal-Andrews et al., 2015; Halevy et al., 2012), whereas other studies did not (Driskell et al., 1993; Lukaszewski et al., 2016; Ridgeway, 1987).

Prestige, on the other hand, refers to the respect and admiration a person enjoys in the eyes of others (Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Typical prestige behaviors involve the display of relevant knowledge, skills, and abilities that showcase one's value to the group. A typical response to such displays is freely conferred influence (Cheng et al., 2013; Maner & Case, 2016). Several studies revealed that proximal prestige-related characteristics such as intelligence, competence, and expertise (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b; Bottger, 1984; Driskell et al., 1993; Ridgeway, 1987) as well as more distal characteristics such as group commitment, ambassadorship, self-sacrifice, and pro-sociality (Flynn et al., 2006; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Scheepers et al., 2002; Van Kleef et al., 2012; Willer, 2009) are associated with various measures of influence, including perceptions of rank and leadership and impact on group decisions (Cheng et al., 2013).

Current evidence points to critical differences between the mechanics and consequences of dominance and prestige. Whereas prestige is rather consistently associated with influence granting, the effects of dominance are mixed and context-dependent. Dominance behaviors can help individuals claim influence (Cheng et al., 2013), but they tend to be less effective in eliciting voluntary deference (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009a). Accordingly, dominance and rank allocation can become decoupled over time (Redhead et al., 2019). People tend to dislike dominant individuals (Driskell et al., 1993), which hampers the free conferral of leadership and influence to people who display dominance and may even inspire coordinated efforts to resist their impact (Cheng, 2020; Keltner et al., 2008). Nonetheless, dominant individuals are often able to attain high-ranking positions and gain influence in groups and organizations (Maner, 2017; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), especially in the early stages of group formation (Redhead et al., 2019). Moreover, voluntary influence granting to dominant individuals increases with greater levels of inequality (Ronay et al., 2020) and in situations where dominant attributes are perceived as instrumental to group success (De Dreu et al., 2012; Van Kleef et al., 2021), such as economic uncertainty (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017) and intergroup competition (Laustsen & Petersen, 2017; Spisak et al., 2012). In short, important contingencies notwithstanding, both dominance and prestige can lead to influence. The next question, then, is how perceptions of dominance and prestige are shaped by (counter)normative behavior.

5 | HOW NORM VIOLATIONS SHAPE DOMINANCE AND PRESTIGE

Given that dominance and prestige are common routes to influence (Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Maner & Case, 2016), I argue we can better understand when and how norm violators gain influence by considering how norm violations shape perceptions of dominance and prestige. Below I develop theoretical arguments for effects of norm violations on both dominance and prestige, which I support with emerging empirical findings from different strands of research.

5.1 | How norm violations shape perceptions of dominance

That norm violations are often met with negative responses and punishment means they are not free of risk: Violators risk being confronted and sanctioned (Wanders et al., 2021). To the degree that violators are aware of possible

(negative) repercussions, the decision to violate a norm implies violators possess characteristics that enable them to successfully withstand such repercussions. This capacity to weather backlash and prevail in conflict is a characteristic of dominant individuals (Fessler et al., 2014), who do not shy away from using force when challenged (Cheng et al., 2013; Gordon et al., 2014). Thus, by virtue of the fact that norm violations carry risk of repercussions that dominant individuals are more prepared to bear (Van Kleef et al., 2021), norm violations may fuel perceptions of dominance. This argument resonates with costly signaling theory, which posits that behaviors that are more costly to perform constitute more reliable signals of underlying qualities, such as physical formidability and dominance (Bird & Smith, 2005; Zahavi, 1975).

Preliminary evidence for this hypothesized effect of norm violations on dominance comes from research showing that individuals who violated rules of bookkeeping, put their feet on the table, stole coffee from service personnel, arrived late for a meeting, or dropped their cigarette ashes on the floor despite the presence of an ashtray were perceived as more powerful than those who behaved normatively (Van Kleef et al., 2011; also see Stankou et al., 2016, 2019, Wanders et al., 2021). Although dominance and power should not be equated (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b), they can share important characteristics (e.g., coercion, control) and often go hand in hand (Maner, 2017), implying that violating norms may convey dominance. Other suggestive support comes from evidence that risk-prone individuals are perceived as more dominant than their risk-averse counterparts (Van Kleef et al., 2021). Given that risk-taking is counternormative in many (though certainly not all) settings and violating norms is in itself often risky due to the potential repercussions, these findings suggest that violating norms can spark perceptions of dominance.

More direct evidence comes from a recent series of studies on the link between norm violation and dominance (Van Kleef et al., 2022). An implicit associations test revealed mental associations between words capturing norm violation and constructs capturing dominance. An experimental study showed that a (physically fit) person who inappropriately parked in a parking spot for disabled people was perceived as more dominant and powerful than a person who parked in a regular parking spot. In another study, a student who violated the dress code of a university graduation ceremony was perceived as more dominant than a student who respected the dress code.

These emerging findings indicate that violating norms can fuel perceptions of dominance. Given that dominance enables individuals to claim influence in social collectives (Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), this work suggests norm violators can gain influence by radiating dominance.

5.2 | How norm violations shape perceptions of prestige

If norms are beneficial for community functioning, one would not expect norm violators to easily gain prestige. After all, prestige tracks the perceived value of individuals for social collectives (Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), and in many situations norm violations are likely to be perceived as undermining collective functioning rather than contributing value to the group. Thus, to the degree that particular norms are deemed relevant and instrumental to community functioning (Brauer & Chekroun, 2005), individuals who violate those norms should be unlikely to garner prestige.

At the same time, the value-tracking function of prestige implies that norm violators gain prestige when their behavior is perceived as providing value to the group. Evidence for this possibility is accumulating in different literatures. Some research suggests norm violators garner prestige because their behavior implies they have special privileges that allow them greater leeway to flout norms without being sanctioned (Piquero & Piquero, 2001; Vardi & Wiener, 1996; Vaughan, 1983). For instance, individuals who violated norms of professional attire were perceived as having higher status than those who conformed to the dress code (Bellezza et al., 2014), presumably because their apparent freedom to break these norms signaled special privileges worthy of respect. Conversely, job applicants with stronger qualifications were allowed greater leeway to violate professional dress norms compared to those with weaker qualifications (Ostrom et al., 2021).

Along related lines, norm violators may be perceived as having particular capacities that enable them to violate norms, which merits respect. To the extent that successful norm violations require competence and skill, violators can

thus amass prestige. Indeed, some hackers reportedly break into highly protected computer systems to demonstrate they have extraordinary skills worthy of respect (Tsukayama, 2011). Accordingly, individuals who manage to circumvent stringent protective systems aimed at deterring fraud are perceived by others as possessing sophisticated skills (McBarnet & Whelan, 1991), and those who exhibit creative forms of unethical behavior that signal competence are less likely to be condemned and more likely to be emulated than those who engage in noncreative unethical behavior (Wiltermuth et al., 2017). Other work indicates that individuals who creatively bend rules are perceived as more prestigious and are more likely to be granted leadership than those who follow the rules or non-creatively break them (Homan et al., 2022). These findings indicate that norm violations that reflect skills or predispositions that are valued by a community can fuel prestige.

Further evidence for this possibility comes from research on risk-taking (Van Kleef et al., 2021). A field study conducted during national elections revealed that political candidates who were perceived as risk-seeking (as opposed to risk-avoidant) were also perceived as prestigious, which in turn positively predicted votes for those candidates. Experimental evidence showed that individuals who were portrayed as risk-prone in LinkedIn profiles were perceived as more prestigious (and in some cases more suitable for leadership positions) than individuals portrayed as risk-averse, possibly because people's willingness to take risks signals they possess special qualities that enable them to take risks successfully.

Other work evidences that people can gain prestige by violating norms in ways that (appear to) advance the interests of the group. Research on gossip, counternormative behavior that is typically not appreciated, revealed that gossip is condoned when the gossiper apparently intends to protect the group against a defector (Beersma & Van Kleef, 2012). Likewise, whistleblowers are judged more favorably to the degree that they are perceived as acting out of a concern for the group (Rios & Ingraffia, 2016), which would render their behavior more likely to be construed as "constructive deviance" (Warren, 2003). Other research found that high-school students who habitually violated teachers' norms but abided by students' norms were more popular among their peers than were those who abided by teachers' norms (Van Kleef et al., 2022), suggesting that the prioritization of one's group's norms over other (possibly competing) sets of norms is a driver of prestige.

More direct evidence for the role of group benefit comes from a series of studies showing that individuals who violated norms in ways that advanced the interests of others were rated more positively and were more likely to be afforded influence than those who abided by the norms or violated norms in a selfish way (Van Kleef et al., 2012). In one study, a person who closed a window through which cold air was flowing into a waiting room was rated as more socially engaged and fit for leadership when closing the window was prohibited than when it was allowed, but only when others in the waiting room were visibly cold (in which case the behavior benefited them) as opposed to when they were hot. In a lab experiment, a confederate who took coffee from the experimenter's desk was perceived as more socially engaged and was more likely to be given control over resources in a subsequent task when taking coffee was not allowed than when it was allowed, but only when he also offered coffee to the participant as opposed to keeping it for himself (Van Kleef et al., 2012). Likewise, captains of sports teams who violated norms were evaluated more positively when they violated norms in the group's interest (Abrams et al., 2013). Finally, individuals who violated community norms to be able to abide by (conflicting) group norms were perceived as more prestigious than individuals who abided by community norms (Van Kleef et al., 2022).

These emerging findings indicate that violating norms can, under particular circumstances, enhance prestige. Given that prestigious individuals are preferentially granted influence in social collectives (Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), this suggests that norm violators can gain influence by amassing prestige.

6 | TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF NORM VIOLATION AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE

The foregoing discussion reveals several recurring patterns in the emerging literature on norm violation and influence. These patterns point to the contours of a theoretical model that can help interpret previous findings and inform future research. This model, depicted in Figure 1, highlights dominance and prestige as dual mediators of the effects




FIGURE 1 A theoretical model of the effects of (counter)normative behavior on influence via dominance and prestige. Norm violations generally increase perceptions of dominance (path a), and may increase or decrease prestige (path b) depending on first-stage moderation by perceived costs versus benefits for the collective. Dominance, in turn, increases or decreases influence depending on second-stage moderation by perceived costs versus benefits for the collective (path c), whereas prestige generally enhances influence (path d).

of norm violation on influence, and visualizes how their respective roles are shaped by first-stage and second-stage moderators that jointly determine when and how norm violators gain influence.

Regarding the first part of the model, the foregoing arguments and findings suggest the effects of (counter)normative behavior on dominance are rather consistent. Norm violations are risky in that they can bring about negative consequences for the violator (Kakkar et al., 2020; Molho et al., 2020). Individuals who nonetheless choose to violate norms thus signal they are not held back by fear of repercussions, which implies they possess dominant qualities that enable them to withstand such repercussions (Gordon et al., 2014; Van Kleef et al., 2021). Because of this, norm violators will generally be perceived as more dominant than norm abiders.

The effects of (counter)normative behavior on prestige, in contrast, are more varied and subject to critical first-stage moderators. In many situations, norm violations can be expected to undermine prestige, because norm violations are often not appreciated (Marques et al., 2001). Such negative effects of norm violation on prestige are likely to be amplified to the degree that norm violations are perceived as disruptive or costly, for instance because the norms that are violated are deemed particularly important to group functioning (Brauer & Chekroun, 2005). Negative effects of norm violation on prestige may be reduced or even reversed, however, to the degree that norm violations (appear to) entail benefits for the group (Popa et al., 2014; Van Kleef et al., 2012). Individuals who are prepared to break rules to serve their group's interests demonstrate their value and allegiance to the group and may thereby garner prestige (Van Kleef et al., 2022). In short, norm violators may win or lose prestige depending on the perceived costs and benefits their behavior yields to the group.

Regarding the second part of the model, the preceding discussion indicates that dominance and prestige are differentially related to influence. Prestige, on the one hand, is rather consistently associated with the capacity to garner freely conferred influence (except perhaps in contexts that put a premium on dominance; de Waal-Andrews et al., 2015). Prestige reflects the value individuals represent for social collectives, which is a positive predictor of influence (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Thus, individuals who amass prestige are in a good position to gain influence.

The effects of dominance on influence attainment, on the other hand, are more variable. Dominance can be effective in the forceful claiming of influence (Cheng et al., 2013), but constitutes a liability when it comes to eliciting voluntary deference (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009a). People are generally reluctant to confer influence to dominant individuals (Cheng, 2020), except when dominance is seen as an asset to the group. For instance, in situations of intergroup competition, conflict, or economic scarcity, preferences for dominant individuals increase (Halevy et al., 2012;

Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017; Laustsen & Petersen, 2017; Van Kleef et al., 2021), presumably because in such circumstances the anticipated benefits of allying with a dominant person outweigh the anticipated costs.

7 | IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

The novel integration of elements from the dominance/prestige framework with the emerging literature on social responses to norm violations offers new insights in the implications of norm violations for individuals' capacity to obtain power, status, and influence. The theoretical model displayed in Figure 1 highlights that norm violations can increase or decrease actors' influence, depending on the circumstances. This perspective underlines the importance of identifying moderators that govern the social dynamics and consequences of (counter)normative behavior. The effects of such moderators can be analyzed by considering how they affect (a) the effects of norm violations on dominance and prestige and (b) the effects of dominance and prestige on influence granting.

Regarding the former pathway, it seems plausible that norm violations that are more risky (e.g., because they are dangerous or punishable) engender stronger perceptions of dominance than those that are less risky (cf. Van Kleef et al., 2021). Conversely, norm violations that are difficult to enact (e.g., because they require specialized skills) may engender greater prestige than ones that are easier to perform (Wang et al., 2022). Furthermore, violations of norms that are deemed critical for collective functioning are likely to undermine prestige, whereas violations of norms that are seen as obstructing collective functioning may enhance prestige. Thus, individuals who defy norms that are perceived as dysfunctional, for instance because they stifle productivity or innovation or impede social change, may gain traction by gaining prestige. Importantly, such perceptions are socially constructed (Carnes et al., 2015; Gelfand et al., 2017) and may therefore be specific to local social spheres. By consequence, it may be possible for norm violators to amass local prestige by disrespecting norms that are endorsed by (rivaling) outgroups but not by the ingroup. It stands to reason that these links between norm violation and dominance and prestige are amplified to the degree that an actor exhibits more frequent violations, as the social signals cuing dominance and/or prestige would likely be reinforced through repetition.

Regarding the latter pathway, norm violations that induce perceptions of dominance are more likely to translate to power and influence in situations that befit a dominant approach. For instance, people may be more willing to vote for norm-violating political candidates in times of (perceived) outgroup threat, resource scarcity, or intergroup conflict, when chances of the ingroup prevailing may increase under the rule of a dominant leader. Conversely, the appeal of norm-violating candidates may decrease in situations that call for constructive dialogue, cooperation, and joint problem solving, when chances of success may increase under the guidance of a prestigious leader. If true, normative systems are more likely to be perpetuated in times of prosperity and cooperation than in times of crisis and competition.

Going forward, important steps can be made by considering how the social dynamics of (counter)normative behavior are shaped by characteristics of the norms involved and the broader context within which they exist. For instance, research could investigate whether people respond differently to violations of descriptive versus injunctive norms (Reno et al., 1993; Schultz et al., 2007), norms that are rooted in different moral foundations (i.e., care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation; Graham et al., 2013), or norms that differ in the degree to which they are stable, endorsed, valued, and sanctioned. Another question is whether positive norm violations—doing too much of a good thing (e.g., being much more helpful than other people in a group, which may reflect poorly on others)—engender similar social dynamics as more common negative violations. Future work could also examine how responses to (different types of) violations are modulated by perceiver characteristics such as ideology (Haidt, 2001), religion (McKay & Whitehouse, 2015), or social class (cf. Stamkou et al., 2016) and contextual factors such as inequality versus egalitarianism (Ronay et al., 2020) or culture (Stamkou et al., 2019). Awaiting such efforts, the conclusion seems warranted that dominance and prestige are instrumental in unraveling the social dynamics of (counter)normative behavior and illuminating when and how norm violators gain influence.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

No specific funding was awarded for the preparation of this article.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The author declares no conflict of interest pertaining to this article or any of the work described therein.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

ORCID

Gerben A. van Kleef  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0823-7654>

REFERENCES

- Abrams, D., de Moura, G. R., & Travaglino, G. A. (2013). A double standard when group members behave badly: Transgression credit to ingroup leaders. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 105(5), 799–815. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033600>
- Abrams, D., Marques, J. M., Bown, N., & Henson, M. (2000). Pro-norm and anti-norm deviance within and between groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 78(5), 906–912. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.78.5.906>
- Abrams, D., Randsley de Moura, G., Marques, J. M., & Hutchison, P. (2008). Innovation credit: When can leaders oppose their group's norms? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95(3), 662–678. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.3.662>
- Anderson, C., & Kilduff, G. J. (2009a). The pursuit of status in social groups. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 18(5), 295–298. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01655.x>
- Anderson, C., & Kilduff, G. J. (2009b). Why do dominant personalities attain influence in face-to-face groups? The competence-signaling effects of trait dominance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96(2), 491–503. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014201>
- Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. *American Political Science Review*, 80(4), 1095–1111. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1960858>
- Balliet, D., Mulder, L. B., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2011). Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 137(4), 594–615. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023489>
- Bartol, K. M., & Srivastava, A. (2002). Encouraging knowledge sharing: The role of organizational reward systems. *Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies*, 9(1), 64–76. <https://doi.org/10.1177/107179190200900105>
- Baumeister, R. F., Zhang, L., & Vohs, K. D. (2004). Gossip as cultural learning. *Review of General Psychology*, 8(2), 111–121. <https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.8.2.111>
- Beersma, B., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2011). How the grapevine keeps you in line: Gossip increases contributions to the group. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 2(6), 642–649. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550611405073>
- Beersma, B., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2012). Why people gossip: An empirical analysis of social motives, antecedents, and consequences. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 42(11), 2640–2670. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2012.00956.x>
- Bellezza, S., Gino, F., & Keinan, A. (2014). The red sneakers effect: Inferring status and competence from signals of nonconformity. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 41(1), 35–54. <https://doi.org/10.1086/674870>
- Bennett, R. J., & Robinson, S. L. (2000). Development of a measure of workplace deviance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 85(3), 349–360. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.85.3.349>
- Bicchieri, C. (2006). *The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bird, R. B., & Smith, E. A. (2005). Signaling theory, strategic interaction, and symbolic capital. *Current Anthropology*, 46(2), 221–248. <https://doi.org/10.1086/427115>
- Blanton, H., & Christie, C. (2003). Deviance regulation: A theory of action and identity. *Review of General Psychology*, 7(2), 115–149. <https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.7.2.115>
- Bottger, P. C. (1984). Expertise and air time as basis of actual and perceived influence in problem solving groups. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 69(2), 214–221. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.69.2.214>
- Brauer, M., & Chekroun, P. (2005). The relationship between perceived violation of social norms and social control: Situational factors influencing the reaction to deviance. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 35(7), 1519–1539. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2005.tb02182.x>
- Carnes, N. C., Lickel, B., & Janoff-Bulman, R. (2015). Shared perceptions: Morality is embedded in social contexts. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 41(3), 351–362. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214566187>
- Cheng, J. T. (2020). Dominance, prestige, and the role of leveling in human social hierarchy and equality. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 33, 238–244. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2019.10.004>

- Cheng, J. T., Tracy, J. L., Foulsham, T., Kingstone, A., & Henrich, J. (2013). Two ways to the top: Evidence that dominance and prestige are distinct yet viable avenues to social rank and influence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 104(1), 103–125. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030398>
- Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and conformity. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 55(1), 591–621. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142015>
- Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58(6), 1015–1026. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.1015>
- Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity and compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & L. Gardner (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (pp. 151–192). McGraw-Hill.
- de Waal-Andrews, W., Gregg, A. P., & Lammers, J. (2015). When status is grabbed and when status is granted: Getting ahead in dominance and prestige hierarchies. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 54(3), 445–464. <https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12093>
- De Dreu, C. K. W., Greer, L. L., Handgraaf, M. J., Shalvi, S., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2012). Oxytocin modulates selection of allies in intergroup conflict. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 279(1731), 1150–1154. <https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2011.1444>
- Driskell, J. E., Olmstead, B., & Salas, E. (1993). Task cues, dominance cues, and influence in task groups. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 78(1), 51–60. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.78.1.51>
- Eriksson, K., Andersson, P., & Strimling, P. (2017). When is it appropriate to reprimand a norm violation? The roles of anger, behavioral consequences, violation severity, and social distance. *Judgment and Decision Making*, 12(4), 396–407. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500006264>
- Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004a). Social norms and human cooperation. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 8(4), 185–190. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.007>
- Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004b). Third-party punishment and social norms. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 25(2), 63–87. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s1090-5138\(04\)00005-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4)
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. *Nature*, 415(6868), 137–140. <https://doi.org/10.1038/415137a>
- Feinberg, M., Willer, R., & Schultz, M. (2014). Gossip and ostracism promote cooperation in groups. *Psychological Science*, 25(3), 656–664. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613510184>
- Feldman, D. C. (1984). The development and enforcement of group norms. *Academy of Management Review*, 9(1), 47–53. <https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1984.4277934>
- Fessler, D. M., Tiokhin, L. B., Holbrook, C., Gervais, M. M., & Snyder, J. K. (2014). Foundations of the Crazy Bastard Hypothesis: Nonviolent physical risk-taking enhances conceptualized formidability. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 35(1), 26–33. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.09.003>
- Flynn, F. J., Reagans, R. E., Amanatullah, E. T., & Ames, D. R. (2006). Helping one's way to the top: Self-monitors achieve status by helping others and knowing who helps whom. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91(6), 1123–1137. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.6.1123>
- Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H., Whitson, J. A., & Liljenquist, K. A. (2008). Power reduces the press of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity, and dissonance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95(6), 1450–1466. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012633>
- Galperin, B. L. (2012). Exploring the nomological network of workplace deviance: Developing and validating a measure of constructive deviance. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 42(12), 2988–3025. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2012.00971.x>
- Gelfand, M. J., Harrington, J. R., & Jackson, J. C. (2017). The strength of social norms across human groups. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 12(5), 800–809. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617708631>
- Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, C., Duan, L., Almaliah, A., Ang, S., Arndottir, J., Aycan, Z., Boehnke, K., Boski, P., Cabecinhas, R., Chan, D., Chhokar, J., D'Amato, A., Ferrer, M., Fischlmayr, I. C., & Marquez, P. (2011). Differences between tight and loose cultures: A 33-nation study. *Science*, 332(6033), 1100–1104. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1197754>
- Gelfand, M. J., & Realo, A. (1999). Individualism-collectivism and accountability in intergroup negotiations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 84(5), 721–736. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.84.5.721>
- Gordon, D. S., Madden, J. R., & Lea, S. E. (2014). Both loved and feared: Third party punishers are viewed as formidable and likeable, but these reputational benefits may only be open to dominant individuals. *PLoS One*, 9(10), e110045. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0110045>
- Graffin, S. D., Bundy, J., Porac, J. F., Wade, J. B., & Quinn, D. P. (2013). Falls from grace and the hazards of high status: The 2009 British MP expense scandal and its impact on parliamentary elites. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 58(3), 313–345. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839213497011>
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 47, 55–130.

- Gürek, Ö., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006). The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. *Science*, 312(5770), 108–111. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1123633>
- Gutiérrez, R., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2007). Anger, disgust, and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors. *Emotion*, 7(4), 853–868. <https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.853>
- Hahl, O., Kim, M., & Zuckerman Sivan, E. W. (2018). The authentic appeal of the lying demagogue: Proclaiming the deeper truth about political illegitimacy. *American Sociological Review*, 83, 1–33. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122417749632>
- Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. *Psychological Review*, 108(4), 814–834. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814>
- Halevy, N., Chou, E. Y., Cohen, T. R., & Livingston, R. W. (2012). Status conferral in intergroup social dilemmas: Behavioral antecedents and consequences of prestige and dominance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 102(2), 351–366. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025515>
- Hardy, C. L., & Van Vugt, M. (2006). Nice guys finish first: The competitive altruism hypothesis. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32(10), 1402–1413. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206291006>
- Havârneanu, G. M., & Havârneanu, C. E. (2012). When norms turn perverse: Contextual irrationality vs. rational traffic violations. *Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour*, 15(2), 144–151. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trf.2011.12.003>
- Heerdink, M. W., Van Kleef, G. A., Homan, A. C., & Fischer, A. H. (2013). On the social influence of emotions in groups: Interpersonal effects of anger and happiness on conformity versus deviance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 105(2), 262–284. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033362>
- Henrich, J. (2016). *The secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution, domesticating our species, and making us smarter*. Princeton University Press.
- Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. (2001). The evolution of prestige: Freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 22(3), 165–196. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138\(00\)00071-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00071-4)
- Hollander, E. P. (1958). Conformity, status, and idiosyncrasy credit. *Psychological Review*, 65(2), 117–127. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0042501>
- Homan, A. C., Wanders, F., Van Vianen, A. E. M., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2022). *Better to bend than to break? Effects of rule abidance, breaking, and bending on dominance, prestige, and leadership granting*. Manuscript submitted for publication.
- Imhoff, R. & Erb, H.-P. (2009). What motivates nonconformity? Uniqueness seeking blocks majority influence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 35(3), 309–320. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208328166>
- Jetten, J., & Hornsey, M. J. (2014). Deviance and dissent in groups. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 65(1), 461–485. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115151>
- Judge, T. A., & Cable, D. M. (2004). The effect of physical height on workplace success and income: Preliminary test of a theoretical model. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 89(3), 428–441. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.89.3.428>
- Kakkar, H., & Sivanathan, N. (2017). When the appeal of a dominant leader is greater than a prestige leader. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 114(26), 6734–6739. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1617711114>
- Kakkar, H., Sivanathan, N., & Gobel, M. S. (2020). Fall from grace: The role of dominance and prestige in the punishment of high-status actors. *Academy of Management Journal*, 63(2), 530–553. <https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2017.0729>
- Kam, C. C.-S., & Bond, M. H. (2009). Emotional reactions of anger and shame to the norm violation characterizing episodes of interpersonal harm. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 48(2), 203–219. <https://doi.org/10.1348/014466608x324367>
- Keltner, D., Van Kleef, G. A., Chen, S., & Kraus, M. (2008). A reciprocal influence model of social power: Emerging principles and lines of inquiry. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 40, 151–192.
- Laustsen, L., & Petersen, M. B. (2017). Perceived conflict and leader dominance: Individual and contextual factors behind preferences for dominant leaders. *Political Psychology*, 38(6), 1083–1101. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12403>
- Li, W. D., Wang, N., Arvey, R. D., Soong, R., Saw, S. M., & Song, Z. (2015). A mixed blessing? Dual mediating mechanisms in the relationship between dopamine transporter gene DAT1 and leadership role occupancy. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 26(5), 671–686. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2014.12.005>
- Lord, R. G., De Vader, C. L., & Alliger, G. M. (1986). A meta-analysis of the relation between personality traits and leadership perceptions: An application of validity generalization procedures. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 71(3), 402–410. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.71.3.402>
- Lukaszewski, A. W., Simmons, Z. L., Anderson, C., & Roney, J. R. (2016). The role of physical formidability in human social status allocation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 110(3), 385–406. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000042>
- Maner, J. K. (2017). Dominance and prestige: A tale of two hierarchies. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 26(6), 526–531. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417714323>
- Maner, J. K., & Case, C. R. (2016). Dominance and prestige: Dual strategies for navigating social hierarchies. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 54, 129–180.

- Marques, J. M., Abrams, D., & Serôdio, R. G. (2001). Being better by being right: Subjective group dynamics and derogation of ingroup deviants when generic norms are undermined. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81(3), 436–447. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.3.436>
- McBarnet, D., & Whelan, C. (1991). The elusive spirit of the law: Formalism and the struggle for legal control. *The Modern Law Review*, 54(6), 848–873. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1991.tb01854.x>
- McKay, R., & Whitehouse, H. (2015). Religion and morality. *Psychological Bulletin*, 141(2), 447–473. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038455>
- Molho, C., Tybur, J. M., Güler, E., Balliet, D., & Hofmann, W. (2017). Disgust and anger relate to different aggressive responses to moral violations. *Psychological Science*, 28(5), 609–619. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617692000>
- Molho, C., Tybur, J. M., Van Lange, P. A., & Balliet, D. (2020). Direct and indirect punishment of norm violations in daily life. *Nature Communications*, 11, 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-17286-2>
- Monin, B., Sawyer, P. J., & Marquez, M. J. (2008). The rejection of moral rebels: Resenting those who do the right thing. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95(1), 76–93. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.76>
- Morris, M. W., Hong, Y. Y., Chiu, C. Y., & Liu, Z. (2015). Normology: Integrating insights about social norms to understand cultural dynamics. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 129, 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.03.001>
- Morris, R. T. (1956). A typology of norms. *American Sociological Review*, 21(5), 610–613. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2089098>
- Morrison, E. W. (2006). Doing the job well: An investigation of pro-social rule breaking. *Journal of Management*, 32(1), 5–28. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206305277790>
- Ohbuchi, K. O., Tamura, T., Quigley, B. M., Tedeschi, J. T., Madi, N., Bond, M. H., & Mummendey, A. (2004). Anger, blame, and dimensions of perceived norm violations: Culture, gender, and relationships. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 34(8), 1587–1603. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02788.x>
- Oostrom, J. K., Ronay, R., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2021). The signalling effects of nonconforming dress style in personnel selection contexts: Do applicants' qualifications matter? *European Journal of Work & Organizational Psychology*, 30(1), 70–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1359432x.2020.1813112>
- Owen, D. J., Slep, A., & Heyman, R. E. (2012). The effect of praise, positive nonverbal response, reprimand, and negative nonverbal response on child compliance: A systematic review. *Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review*, 15(4), 364–385. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10567-012-0120-0>
- Packer, D. J. (2008). On being with us and against us: A normative conflict model of dissent in social groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 12(1), 50–72. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868307309606>
- Peters, K., Jetten, J., Radova, D., & Austin, K. (2017). Gossiping about deviance: Evidence that deviance spurs the gossip that builds bonds. *Psychological Science*, 28(11), 1610–1619. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617716918>
- Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003). *The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective*. Stanford University Press.
- Philippe, D., & Durand, R. (2011). The impact of norm-conforming behaviors on firm reputation. *Strategic Management Journal*, 32(9), 969–993. <https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.919>
- Piquero, N. L., & Piquero, A. (2001). Characteristics and sources of white-collar crime. In J. P. Wright & N. Shover (Eds.), *Crimes of privilege: Readings in white-collar crime* (pp. 329–341). Oxford University Press.
- Platow, M. J., & van Knippenberg, D. (2001). A social identity analysis of leadership endorsement: The effects of leader ingroup prototypicality and distributive intergroup fairness. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27(11), 1508–1519. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672012711011>
- Popa, M., Phillips, B. J., & Robertson, C. (2014). Positive outcomes of social norm transgressions. *Journal of Consumer Behaviour*, 13(5), 351–363. <https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1483>
- Redhead, D., Cheng, J. T., Driver, C., Foulsham, T., & O'Gorman, R. (2019). On the dynamics of social hierarchy: A longitudinal investigation of the rise and fall of prestige, dominance, and social rank in naturalistic task groups. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 40(2), 222–234. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.12.001>
- Reno, R. R., Cialdini, R. B., & Kallgren, C. A. (1993). The transsituational influence of social norms. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 64(1), 104–112. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.64.1.104>
- Ridgeway, C. L. (1987). Non-verbal behavior, dominance, and the basis of status in task groups. *American Sociological Review*, 52(5), 683–694. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095603>
- Rios, K., & Ingraffia, Z. A. (2016). Judging the actions of “whistle-blowers” versus “leakers”: Labels influence perceptions of dissenters who expose group misconduct. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 19(5), 553–569. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430216638537>
- Ronay, R., Maddux, W. W., & Von Hippel, W. (2020). Inequality rules: Resource distribution and the evolution of dominance- and prestige-based leadership. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 31(2), 101246. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2018.04.004>
- Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A. (2003). Interdependence, interaction, and relationships. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 54(1), 351–375. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145059>

- Scheepers, D., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). The emergence and effects of deviants in low and high status groups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 38(6), 611–617. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1031\(02\)00506-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1031(02)00506-1)
- Schultz, P. W., Nolan, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J., & Griskevicius, V. (2007). The constructive, destructive, and reconstructive power of social norms. *Psychological Science*, 18(5), 429–434. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01917.x>
- Sijtsema, J. J., Veenstra, R., Lindenberg, S., & Salmivalli, C. (2009). Empirical test of bullies' status goals: Assessing direct goals, aggression, and prestige. *Aggressive Behavior*, 35(1), 57–67. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ab.20282>
- Sorokin, P. A. (1947). *Society, culture, and personality: Their structure and dynamics. A system of general sociology*. Harper.
- Spisak, B. R., Homan, A. C., Grabo, A., & Van Vugt, M. (2012). Facing the situation: Testing a biosocial contingency model of leadership in intergroup relations using masculine and feminine faces. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 23(2), 273–280. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.08.006>
- Stamkou, E., Van Kleef, G. A., & Homan, A. C. (2018). The art of influence: When and why deviant artists gain impact. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 115(2), 276–303. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000131>
- Stamkou, E., van Kleef, G. A., Homan, A. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2016). How norm violations shape social hierarchies: Those who stand on top block norm violators from rising up. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 19(5), 608–629. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430216641305>
- Stamkou, E., Van Kleef, G. A., Homan, A. C., Gelfand, M. J., Van de Vijver, F., Van Egmond, M. C., Boer, D., Phiri, N., Ayub, N., Kinias, Z., Cantarero, K., Efrat Treister, D., Figueiredo, A., Hashimoto, H., Hofmann, E. B., Lima, R. P., & Lee, I. C. (2019). Cultural collectivism and tightness moderate responses to norm violators: Effects on power perception, moral emotions, and leader support. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 45(6), 947–964. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167218802832>
- Stulp, G., Buunk, A. P., Verhulst, S., & Pollet, T. V. (2013). Tall claims? Sense and nonsense about the importance of height of US presidents. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 24(1), 159–171. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2012.09.002>
- Sumner, W. G. (1906). *Folkways: A study of the sociological importance of usages, manners, customs, mores, and morals*. Ginn and Co.
- Thau, S., Derfler-Rozin, R., Pitesa, M., Mitchell, M. S., & Pillutla, M. M. (2015). Unethical for the sake of the group: Risk of social exclusion and pro-group unethical behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 100(1), 98–113. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0036708>
- Tomasello, M., & Vaish, A. (2013). Origins of human cooperation and morality. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 64(1), 231–255. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812>
- Tsukayama, H. (2011). *Facebook hires PlayStation hacker George Hotz, aka GeoHot*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/faster-forward/post/report-facebook-hires-playstation-hacker-george-hotz/2011/06/27/AGt0o1nH_blog.html
- Van Kleef, G. A., Gelfand, M. J., & Jetten, J. (2019). The dynamic nature of social norms: New perspectives on norm development, impact, violation, and enforcement. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 84, 1–5. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.05.002>
- Van Kleef, G. A., Heerdink, M. W., Cheshin, A., Stamkou, E., Wanders, F., Koning, L. F., Fang, X., & Georgeac, O. (2021). No guts, no glory? How risk-taking shapes dominance, prestige, and leadership endorsement. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 106(11), 1673–1694. <https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000868>
- Van Kleef, G. A., Homan, A. C., Finkenauer, C., Blaker, N. M., & Heerdink, M. W. (2012). Prosocial norm violations fuel power affordance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48(4), 937–942. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.022>
- Van Kleef, G. A., Homan, A. C., Finkenauer, C., Gundemir, S., & Stamkou, E. (2011). Breaking the rules to rise to power: How norm violators gain power in the eyes of others. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 2(5), 500–507. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550611398416>
- Van Kleef, G. A., Wanders, F., Stamkou, E., & Homan, A. C. (2015). The social dynamics of breaking the rules: Antecedents and consequences of norm-violating behavior. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 6, 25–31. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.03.013>
- Van Kleef, G. A., Wanders, F., Van Vianen, A. E. M., Dunham, R. L., Du, X., & Homan, A. C. (2022). *Rebels with a cause? How norm violations shape dominance, prestige, and influence granting*. Manuscript submitted for publication.
- Van Lange, P. A., Joireman, J., Parks, C. D., & Van Dijk, E. (2013). The psychology of social dilemmas: A review. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 120(2), 125–141. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.11.003>
- Vardi, Y., & Wiener, Y. (1996). Misbehavior in organizations: A motivational framework. *Organization Science*, 7(2), 151–165. <https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.7.2.151>
- Vaughan, D. (1983). *Controlling unlawful organizational behavior: Social structure and corporate misconduct*. University of Chicago Press.
- Wanders, F., Homan, A. C., Van Vianen, A. E. M., Rahal, R. M., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2021). How norm violators rise and fall in the eyes of others: The role of sanctions. *PLoS One*, 16(7), e0254574. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254574>
- Wang, L., Homan, A. C., Lee, J., Kim, S., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2022). Doing bad to look good: A rank-regulation theory of rule breaking. Manuscript in preparation.

- Warren, D. E. (2003). Constructive and destructive deviance in organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, 28(4), 622–632. <https://doi.org/10.2307/30040751>
- Whitson, J., Wang, C. S., Kim, J., Cao, J., & Scrimpsire, A. (2015). Responses to normative and norm-violating behavior: Culture, job mobility, and social inclusion and exclusion. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 129, 24–35. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.08.001>
- Willer, R. (2009). Groups reward individual sacrifice: The status solution to the collective action problem. *American Sociological Review*, 74(1), 23–43. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240907400102>
- Wiltermuth, S. S., Vincent, L. C., & Gino, F. (2017). Creativity in unethical behavior attenuates condemnation and breeds social contagion when transgressions seem to create little harm. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 139, 106–126. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2017.01.006>
- Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51(1), 110–116. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110>
- Yıldırım-Yenier, Z., Vingilis, E., Wiesenthal, D. L., Mann, R. E., & Seeley, J. (2016). Relationships between thrill seeking, speeding attitudes, and driving violations among a sample of motorsports spectators and drivers. *Accident Analysis and Prevention*, 86, 16–22. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2015.09.014>
- Zahavi, A. (1975). Mate selection: A selection for a handicap. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 53(1), 205–214. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193\(75\)90111-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3)

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Gerben A. van Kleef is a professor of social psychology at the University of Amsterdam. His main research programs revolve around emotion, power/hierarchy, social norms, conflict, and cooperation. In studying these topics, he combines social-psychological approaches with insights from various other disciplines, including organizational behavior, evolutionary science, biology, behavioral economics, and law. In much of his work he adopts an interpersonal perspective, examining how individuals influence and respond to one another across different social and organizational settings, including personal relationships, group decision making, persuasion, conflict, negotiation, consumer behavior, leadership, and sports. Van Kleef has served as associate editor of *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *Cognition and Emotion*, and *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, and as guest editor of the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* and *Current Opinion in Psychology*, among other journals. He has held visiting positions at UC Berkeley, Columbia University, and Stanford University. He is an elected fellow of the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, and the Association for Psychological Science.

How to cite this article: van Kleef, G. A. (2023). When and how norm violators gain influence: Dominance, prestige, and the social dynamics of (counter)normative behavior. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 17(5), e12745. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12745>