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Interventions in the new political geographies of the European ‘neighborhood’

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The new political geographies of the European ‘neighborhood’

Luiza Bialasiewicz

The past year has seen media attention on both sides of the Atlantic focussed on the question of the EU’s status as an internationa-actor and, especially, its increasingly important role in gov-
erning its immediate ‘Neighbourhood’. Indeed, European media and politicians have become visibly less reticent to speak openly of a ‘European geopolitics’ – or certainly of the need for a geopolitical vision for (EU)rope. This semantic shift has occurred even in the most traditionally Eurocentric national contexts such as the UK where it is becoming commonplace to speak of ‘European power’ – and even ‘European Empire’ (see, for e.g. the comments of Foreign Secretary David Miliband in Bruges in November 2007). Certainly, European foreign policy and the EU’s external role have always been conceived in very different ways by the various member states, strongly conditioned by national political (and geopolitical) cultures; these different national preoccupations and geopolitical visions (for Europe) are still present, evident for instance in the privileged place afforded to certain ‘Neighbourhoods’ rather than others – France and Italy see the Mediterranean as Europe’s key space of intervention, while Germany has traditionally looked East and South East (Rupnik, 2007).

The surge of popular and political attention reflects growing interest in this question among European academics as well, with a great deal of speculation devoted in recent years (by political scientists, IR theorists, political sociologists and, to some extent, political geographers) to the changing dynamics and nature of EU power. (EU)rope has been variously described as a ‘soft power’, a ‘civilian’ or ‘civil’ power, a ‘normative power’, a ‘transformative power’, or even an ‘ordering power’ (for reviews see Bachmann & Sidaway, 2009; Clark & Jones, 2008; Diez, 2005; Hettne & Soderbaum, 2005; Laidi, 2005; Manners & Whitman, 2003; Sidaway, 2006). What such labels translate into, both in terms of (geo)political posturing and concrete policies, is a much more difficult question to address, if only due to a persistent gap between the EU’s behaviour and its projected self-image.

The interventions in this special section do not attempt to directly assess what ‘sort’ of international actor the EU is (or hopes to become); rather, they trace some of the political geographies and geographical imaginations emergent within – and made possible by – the EU’s actions in its immediate ‘Neighbourhoods’. The short pieces that follow look to some of the new ‘geographical imaginations’ by which countries (and entire regions) are brought into Europe’s ‘orbit’; by which they are, to one extent or another, ‘Europeanised’. But creating new spaces of influence for Europe is also, inevitably, a bordering exercise: the interventions thus also query the variety of new spaces and spatial rhetorics through which belonging to Europe is delimited. These ‘hard’ expressions of European power – manifest in bordering practices, citizenship and right to entry regulations and a variety of new surveillance mechanisms – also no longer follow (only) the territorial logics of the past. As the interventions highlight, norms of European belonging shift, and Europe’s borders are no longer (only) where you would expect them to be. By looking at its harmonica-like ‘Neighbourhood’ spaces, as well as Europe’s shifting strategies of inclusion and exclusion, the contributions that follow thus try to trace some of the expressions of the “distinct aesthetics of European power” (Laidi, 2005: 40).

For all the novelty and ‘fluidity’, it is nonetheless a process from which ‘hard’ geopolitical logics have hardly disappeared. This is the second important point made by the contributions. Indeed, although the EU may pronounce itself a ‘soft’ and ‘civil’ power, its leaders are increasingly explicit about the fact that the EU’s various ‘soft’ initiatives – including the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP) – are aimed also (if not primarily) at protecting Europe from ‘hard’ threats. A report presented to EU leaders in early March 2008 by foreign policy chief Javier Solana and external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner envisions a key role for the
ENP as well as the EU-Africa Strategy and the Union’s Middle East and Black Sea policies in “preventative security”. In the face of uncertain and de-territorialised threats, the EU “must develop new regional security scenarios”, the document argues and, accordingly, new “security tools”. Such tools include new biometric border control mechanisms and a new, comprehensive, European Border Surveillance System (announced in February 2008) that will create a single electronic register designed to monitor all non-EU nationals within the Schengen zone. Indeed, as Marijke De Goede (2008: 175) points out, “with respect to technologies of government that play a key role in pre-emptive security practice”, in particular data gathering and retention and biometric border controls, the EU is in many ways “world leader rather than reluctant follower”. The European ‘difference’ lies not in an inherent opposition to the ‘politics of pre-emption’ and ‘securitisation’ she argues but, rather, in the insistence on the *legalization* of such measures: “in this sense, [European] law and [American] force are not opposites”, since Europe’s ‘difference’ lies rather in “its willingness to deploy the force in the insistence on the legalization of such measures: “in this sense, [European] law and [American] force are not opposites”, since Europe’s ‘difference’ lies rather in “its willingness to deploy the force of law to legalize a politics of pre-emption” (De Goede, 2008: 179).

The European ‘force of law’ (the expression comes from Derrida, 1992) manifests itself in other ways as well. The EU’s engagement in state-making in the Balkans over the past couple of years is perhaps its most visible expression. In Montenegro in 2006, and in Kosovo in 2008, the EU has specified and enforced the legal conditions for state-making (albeit not always in coherent or consistent fashion). The main remit of the 2000 strong EULEX force (made up of judges, police personnel, border guards and a variety of other civil servants and administrators) is to support KFOR’s military presence in an independent Kosovo is certainly ‘pacification and stabilisation’ but also – and above all – (norm)alisation: the incorporation of this region into the (EU)ropean normative and legal/regulatory space. The Kosovo example is an important one, both for its pressing political/geopolitical relevance but also because it provides a mirror to the political geographies of EU influence in its ‘Neighbourhood’ and some of the modes of incorporation ‘by law’ through which countries are brought into Europe’s ‘orbit’: through the creation of (semi)protectorates whose sovereignty is not denied but ‘creatively constrained’ (Zielonka, 2007).

A final point regards the broader geopolitical context for the EU’s influence. The place of Russia and the United States remains crucial to an understanding of the political geographies of European power, for as much as the EU may define its (geo)political distinction and its role in the world in opposition to its two key ‘geopolitical others’, these latter in many ways *still* determine the conditions of possibility for EU actions, as the events in Kosovo and more recently Georgia made clear. The creation and narration of the new spaces of European power and ‘actorness’ described by the interventions in this symposium is therefore far from a unidirectional and unambiguous process but plays out, rather, against a background of complex political geographies of sometime contestation but often tacit collaboration and collusion among competing ‘Empires’.

**Europe in its borderland**

Carl Dahlman

Debates surrounding the delimitation of the EU’s ‘geopolitical space’ have long been marked by the broader existential question of just what (EU)rope was to become. In such debates, the question of ‘what Europe is’ has, more often than not, served as a convenient geopolitical shorthand for ‘where Europe is (not)’ (Dahlman, 2008). The launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003 was aimed, in some ways, at responding to such anxieties, laying out a geopolitical hinterland, a ‘circle of friends’ who are not currently considered suitable EU candidates but who presumably share some common aspirations with the EU. The ENP was meant to extend the EU zone of stability and prosperity with built-in conflict prevention strategies, trade and investment liberalization, and security cooperation. Its primary purpose, however, was to ensure that Europe’s ‘Neighbourhood’ is not a source of conflict, immigrants, and illicit flows — intended, rather, to act as a buffer zone for the project of European Union (see Jones’ contribution here).

By creating spaces such as the ENP, meant “to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe” (European Commission, 2003: 4), the EU presumably aims to transcend the conventional (nation-state) distinction between inside/outside. Some have tried to capture these differential relationships through ‘concentric rings’ extending from a core of Schengen and Euro countries through to prospective states and the European Neighbourhood, outside of which lies the exterior world (Busch & Krzyzanowski, 2007). Rendering EU power as ‘integration-centered,’ however, assumes a hierarchy of places, rights, and access that are undifferentiated within each ring, which are in turn comprised of states according to their membership or association status. Yet this unnecessarily simplifies the European political context, where minority rights, capital flows, and novel polities like Kosovo confound distinctions between unincorporated ‘interior’, ‘Neighbourhood’, and ‘exterior’ spaces. Further research is needed into the mutually constitutive interactions that play out both the novel geopolitical spaces of the EU and the daily realities of persons living in Europe’s ‘twilight zones’. In particular, studying the ways in which local political actors accommodate, resist, and engage EU structures for illiberal purposes might also help us to better understand that European enlargement, integration, and EU power are not inevitable, unidirectional forces but prone to institutional and ideational reflexivity.

Through the borderlands of South-East Europe we might productively explore the work of the European Union as it seeks to incorporate the former Yugoslavia, whose wars cast a cold light on the European Union’s ‘transformative’ power. The legacy of the wars in the former Yugoslavia in many ways challenges the geopolitical efficacy and international identity of the European Union. Like many of its member states, the European Union measures its progress in how far it has come since the Second World War. Official memory of the European Union’s evolution is not yet an accounting of the full weight of Yugoslavia’s dissolution or its ideological position on the role of force. Nonetheless, the wars in South-East Europe cast a long shadow over the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and a sense of responsibility pervades its policies to the successor states of Yugoslavia. The European Union’s post-war ‘regional approach’ to reconstruction and stabilization became in 1999 the Stability and Association Process for the ‘Western Balkans’, offering the countries of former Yugoslavia a path to eventual membership.

But the role of the European Union in the former Yugoslavia is not so straightforward as to lead from patch-up to political union. The territories that emerged from the ashes of the former Yugoslavia are going through a complex, multidimensional transformation of which the ‘road to Europe’ is but one element. Post-socialist and post-conflict dynamics mean that EU interventions have the potential to produce very different outcomes than in the other new member states and candidate countries. The EU’s ‘transformative power’ that is credited with contributing to the transitions in Eastern and Central Europe has been notably less efficient at challenging ethnonationalism. States captured by ethnonationalist sentiments that produce ethnonationalist parties have achieved few of the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria. These parties have failed to embrace reasonable standards of democratization, human rights, and rule of law—not to mention
economic liberalization—except as gestural performances of statehood. The EU has poured almost €7 billion into the Western Balkans via its CARDS mechanism while local power networks have siphoned off enormous sums to fund partisan advantage. The aid that has directly targeted citizens, especially in the sector of refugee return and social services, has produced an archipelago of minority communities marked by EU donor plaques but surrounded by frequently chauvinistic and corrupt local and state governments (Dahlman & Ó Tuathail, 2005).

From the point of view of minority and disenfranchised communities, the EU investment in the future of these countries is of tremendous importance, primarily because their “European perspective” has not meant the defeat of ethnonationalist politics. Here, ethnocracies often operate in a symbiotic relationship with EU efforts, albeit in situated ways that take advantage of specific geographies. These local power dynamics raise significant questions about the effectiveness of programs meant to deliver humanitarian relief, promote political and economic liberalization, and eventually ‘Europeanize’ these polities. It is thus worth asking how EU liberalization has accommodated ethnonationalism and vice versa. Post-war Croatia and Bosnia, for example, have demonstrated that while belligerent parties eventually cooperated with some aspects of the peace plans in exchange for aid and trade, ethnopartisanal divisions did not necessarily disappear.

These problems are evident in the discriminatory citizenship and migration regimes put in place after the break up of Yugoslavia (Stiks, 2006). In most of these countries, minority protections are weak or non-existent. The European Union successfully pressured Macedonia for constitutional reforms to protect its minorities, but only in the face of rising violence in 2001. The other countries of former Yugoslavia have yet to deal substantively with minority rights issues, much less dismantle de facto exclusion along ethnic lines. Furthermore, the persistent displacement of large numbers of persons and the exclusionary policies they face remind us of the European Council’s 1996 statement at the end of the Bosnian war: EU policies are not “intended to deal with the questions at the heart of the conflict, i.e. minorities and frontiers” (Council of the European Union, 1996). Indeed, but how will the EU contend with the legacies of ethnic cleansing and demographic engineering? Can it foresee accession of states that were so recently created by anti-democratic nationalists who remain in government? How will it contend with the already enormous emigration pressures of individuals seeking to work in Europe or to relocate there permanently?

Finally, EU policy on Kosovo raises fundamental questions about how it will balance relations with the US and Russia while fulfilling expectations set under the now receding UN Mission. How will it build Kosovo into a viable state? There is no reason to suggest that Western Europe’s own post-war transition serves as the proper template to overcome the deeply politicized public institutions and media that now define Kosovo. How will it ensure the rights of Kosovo’s minority populations, especially Serbs now captured in enclaves subsidized by the Serbian government? These issues and the despairing poverty of Kosovo are as likely to change EU policy as they are to be changed by it. Indeed, to date only 22 of the 27 EU member states have recognized Kosovo’s declaration of independence and a number of diplomatic dilemmas persist, as Gian Matteo Apuzzo’s comments here attest. Understanding these dynamics requires scholarship engaged in the sites and communities where (EU)ropean policies are received – but also resisted, and reformulated.

**The ‘Kosovo test’ for Europe**

**Gian Matteo Apuzzo**

As Carl Dahlman argues above, the crisis in Kosovo is, in many ways, a significant example of the changing role of the EU in the global arena. It is also an excellent reflection of the Union’s struggle to affirm its aspirations as an international actor in the face of persistent internal contradictions but also a broader geopolitical context that invariably constrains its actions.

The EU’s role in an independent Kosovo has been made to appear as almost self-evident. Point six of the official ‘Declaration of Independence of Kosovo’ is, presumably, all about Kosovo’s ‘European’ future: “our future lies with the European family, [facilitating] full membership in the European Union as soon as feasible” (Assembly of Kosovo, 2008). Yet a more careful glance at the process leading to independence confirms that the EU was not the key actor in the process; what is more, the Union has faced continued difficulties in finding a common approach in its foreign policy towards the Western Balkans.

It is useful to recall a few key examples here. In 1991, at the time of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, in order to assess the readiness of the new-born independent republics prior to official recognition, the Badinter Commission was established in Brussels. Yet before the Commission could express its ‘expert’ opinion, Germany had already recognized Slovenia and Croatia. The presumed collective nature of EU policy-making, soon to be enshrined at Maastricht, was fundamentally challenged. From 1992 to 1999, Europe watched war rage at its gates, paralysed before events in Sarajevo, Mostar, Srebrenica and, later, Kosovo. European ‘norms’ were confronted by the hard ‘facts’ of its failures, of its hesitation to take a stand.

The Kosovo question has played out around a fundamental tension between respect for international law and a more ‘pragmatic’ vision of international relations. As far as international law is concerned, UN Resolution 1244 of June 1999 remains in force: entrusting Kosovo to an international administration and reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to which Serbia is now the recognized successor state. Following the terms of the original resolution, any change to the status of Kosovo should be subjected to a new UN Resolution. With regards to the specific role of the European Union, Margiotta (2008: 210) points out that on a purely legal basis, the Kosovo question has not changed substantively since 1992. The Badinter Commission’s work stressed the impossibility of a unilateral declaration of independence on the part of Kosovo, specifying independence only for ‘federative republics’. The EU members that have formally recognized Kosovo as an independent state thus find themselves in a contradictory position with regards to both the UN Resolution of 1999 and the principle established in 1992 by the EU itself.

On 18 February 2008, a day after the declaration of independence, aware that an open contradiction with the UN resolution was not appropriate, the EU reaffirmed its “adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, inter alia the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and all UN Security Council resolutions”, while at the same time underlining “its conviction that […] Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case which does not call into question these principles and resolutions” (Council of the European Union, 2008). The Ahtisaari Plan similarly had affirmed that Kosovo was “a unique case, that demands a unique solution” and that “does not create a precedent for other unresolved conflicts” (United Nations Security Council, 2007).

Some EU states have opposed independence, fearing that the Kosovo case would, indeed, create a precedent, as there were no clear specifications as to why this was a sui generis case. Such confusion risks furthering weakening the EU’s presumed role: if, up to now, the Union had been accused of being feeble and hesitant in its actions in the international arena, the Kosovo case has brought to light Europe’s hesitation in even outlining the principles of its actions. For on what principles will crisis situations be assessed by
the EU, if decisions are determined *sui generis*, by the particular circumstances and ‘uniqueness’ of every singular case? In this sense, the words of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov are acutely fitting: “Kosovo’s independence could be the beginning of the end for Europe” (*Ria Novosti*, 2008).

Lavrov’s assessment also points to another aspect of Europe’s failures in Kosovo. In managing the independence of the new state, the EU has substantially left the ground to a renewed competition between the two old superpowers, the US and Russia. This ‘miniature Cold War’ is evident in the declarations and icons that punctuate Kosovo’s everyday life, where the US and Russia are seen as the respective ‘saviours’ of each of the two homelands. The Stars and Stripes accompanied Albanian flags all around the province in the days before and after independence. In Serb-majority Mitrovica North, it was Russian flags and pictures of President Putin that covered the streets.

In such a context, the EU appears to hold a far-removed second place in popular hopes and perceptions. Speaking to the Rector of Pristina’s largest private university just days before the declaration of independence, I was struck by his affirmation that the American base nearby (currently the largest in Europe) would “solve all economic problems in the area”. Ordinary citizens similarly place their faith in external intervention, hoping in American money and ‘protection’ (and only then in the much more abstract notion of ‘European integration’).

In many ways, the contest over Kosovo has made Europe (once again) a strategic ‘chessboard’ for the two superpowers, rather than an independent and ‘powerful’ international actor in its own right (*International Crisis Group*, 2007). For both the US and Russia, the question of Kosovo enters into a much wider geopolitical contest over military presence in Europe (e.g. regarding the Eastern enlargement of NATO), economic partnership and energy supplies (*Caliari*, 2008). The EU’s actions – and pronouncements – must thus be cast against a geopolitical context where the key players are *other* powers. In Kosovo, the US presented Europe, in many ways, with a *fait accompli*: the revelations by the Slovenian newspaper *Dnevnik* of the specific directives given by the State Department to (EU)ropean leaders on the management of Kosovar independence are indicative here.

In the meantime, the EU proceeds in scattered fashion. The Union’s EULEX mission remains marked by incoherence – and by the particular ‘expert’ from countries that have not yet taken a formal decision regarding the recognition of Kosovo’s independence; what is more, key powers remain with the NATO forces in the region and the relationship between EULEX and UNMIK is not yet clear. The weakness of EULEX is very problematic, for it is effectively aimed at creating a European protectorate in the Balkans, affirming Kosovo’s complete dependence on the EU from an administrative, political and institutional point of view. In this sense, some observers consider Kosovo’s declaration of independence as simply an unconditional acceptance of the Ahtisaari plan, which does not substantially change the province’s status. As Albin Kurti, the leader of the Kosovar/Albanian ‘Levizja Vetevendosje Movement for Self-Determination’ commented to me in an interview in late February 2008, “Kosovo’s independence lasted just about the time of a coffee break between the end of the UNMIK mission and the beginning of EULEX mission” (*Kurti*, 2008). Such considerations make it even more urgent to answer the question of the EU’s role in the Balkans, beyond generic affirmations of a ‘common future in the common European home’. Europe’s difficulties are compounded by the re-emergence of new (and old) nationalisms – and the EU’s seeming incapacity to reconcile European integration and ethnonationalist aspirations (as Dahlman’s intervention points out).

There are two final considerations regarding a potential new role for the EU in the Balkans. The decision on Kosovo’s independence, although far from unanimous, allowed the Union to overcome the stalemate created by the need to ‘define standards before status’ and provided an immediate (although far from sufficient) response to the potentially violent demands of competing nationalisms. By engaging fully in the process of determining Kosovo’s final status and by pushing for what might be termed a ‘status with standards’ (*Serwer*, 2004), the EU can try to overcome its past failures, transcending a ‘regional’ approach in favour of a Europe-ization that maintains its ethical and normative content: ‘making states’ able to guarantee not only ‘security and stability’ but also the above mentioned ‘standards’. The challenge for the EU right now is to take full charge of the civil mission in Kosovo. For the first time in history, the EU has acted autonomously from the UN, moving to replace the UNMIK mission without a Security Council resolution. This step is a great challenge, but also a great opportunity for Europe.

**Scrolls and mirrors: scripting ‘Europe’, making the Black Sea region**

**Felix Ciuta**

Region-making has been one of the key ways in which new spaces of EU power have been narrated and created. But regions themselves are also, increasingly, active users and producers of ‘Europe’. Since 1990, political entrepreneurs in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe have enthusiastically embarked on ambitious region-making initiatives, with avid region-hopping – in and out of ‘the Balkans’, ‘South-East Europe’ or ‘Central Europe’, as necessary – suggesting the intense fluidity of all regional constructs. The EU’s ‘neighbours’, ‘partners’, ‘associates’ and ‘candidates’ have willingly thrown the mantle of ‘Europe’ over their regions for reasons as diverse as the meaning Europe has for them: sometimes a normative desideratum, sometimes a must-have label, sometimes a myth or a bargaining tactic.

Such region-making initiatives and their relevance for the processes of European integration (and, moreover, the EU’s integration of its immediate ‘Neighbourhood’) are compellingly illustrated by the recent evolution of the Black Sea region. To a significant degree, this region shares – it can even be argued, deliberately mimes (*Ciuta*, 2008) – several key features with many other region-making processes, for example in the Baltic Sea region and Central Europe. It too has developed in the shadow of European integration; it too seeks to become European by reproducing the logic of European integration, while at the same time seeking to demonstrate that it is, and *has always been* European. Yet there also are significant elements of novelty. Chief among these is the fact that the *production* of the region is seen as an essential prerequisite for the regional policies: the region becomes the condition of its own existence, and the condition of its own success.

What is most intriguing in this regional production is the role assigned to (EU)rope: not only a model to be mimed, or a ready-made blueprint to be applied locally, (EU)rope is also simultaneously the beginning, end and reason for region-building. Making regions is seen as a kind of European thing to do that confirms the European-ness of the region. This makes Europe a type of political practice. Europe is also the primary reason for the construction of the Black Sea region, whose coming into being (presumably) benefits Europe as a whole, including the region. This makes Europe an emblem of spatial bounded-ness and collective identification. Finally, Europe is also the end-point of region-making, which would see the region finally become Europe in the sense of either belonging to European institutions. This makes Europe a repository of institutions and policies.
It is perhaps unsurprising that political agents in the Black Sea region seek to conjure it up mostly through official texts, through official ‘scrolling’. The region is thereby written into European existence through the production of official and semi-official documents, which converge in their understanding that the Black Sea region can come into being only once it is on the NATO/EU agenda, and will only exist through the NATO/EU agenda (Asmus & Jackson, 2004; Black Sea Forum, 2006; European Commission, 2007; NATO, 2006). The Black Sea region's European identity thus depends on its attestation in ‘scrolls’ which are to be found in Brussels, not at the Black Sea – though once produced, these ‘scrolls’ become the paradoxical reason for action, by virtue of their power to establish the meaning of the Black Sea region.

What is most problematic here is the emergence of the troubling category of ‘disposable Europe’. In a more benign reading, even reduced to its institutions, ‘Europe’ still signifies an integrative and cooperative philosophy of politics and security, a mode of action that has become in time a mode of being. Institutional reduction changes not only the meaning of European Institutions – often reduced to instruments in the service of something else, for example ‘energy security’, or ‘geopolitical revisionism’ – but the meaning of Europe as a whole. Europe ceases to be a mode of being and becomes, simply, a political band-aid (and therefore, as Carl Dahlman and Gian Matteo Apuzzo point out, easily co-opted by local/regional elites). This is also very much in tune with the alarm signals raised by Alan Ingram in this forum regarding the emergence of what he calls the ‘biopolitical and parapolitical geographies of security’ in Europe. Both arguments point out not only that different understandings of Europe exist and are in conflict, but also that it is relatively easy to empty out ‘Europe’ from its ethical and normative content.

In other words, it is not only Europe’s potential ‘Imperial’ identity (as noted by James Anderson here) that we need to discuss and worry about. We should also be concerned that Europe is scripted by its citizens and by its ‘outsiders’ as an empty, ‘disposable’ form, rather than a process of productive interaction that constantly modulate the normative essence of Europe.

The projection of ‘EU’rope in the Mediterranean

Alun Jones

A number of explanations have been advanced in recent years for the inability of the European Union to present itself unambiguously on the international stage – and even in its immediate ‘Neighbourhood’. Many critiques have focussed on a perceived capability-expectations gap in EU actions; others have suggested that the EU simply manifests different forms of international ‘actorness’ and ‘presence’, making up an international identity which may be only partially formed at this stage (Manners & Whitman, 2003). Moreover, the EU’s international actorness and presence more often than not reflect the spread of contradictory ‘EU’ropean interests and activities, with a diversity of actors and processes involved in the construction of EU ‘international policy’ (as both Gian Matteo Apuzzo and Carl Dahlman note in the case of the former Yugoslavia). Such too is the reality of the EU’s engagement in the Mediterranean.

The projection of ‘EU’rope southwards has required the symbolic, territorial and institutional construction of the Mediterranean for region-building initiatives (Jones, 2006). These constructions facilitate and, crucially, justify the promotion of ‘EU’ropean ‘solutions’ outside of EU territorial space; in effect, the production of the Mediterranean region by European elites mobilizes the European project and permits its deployment politically and normatively in this new politico-geographic space.

However, the construction of the Mediterranean by ‘EU’rope is characteristically messy, problematised and highly contested and involves the construction of increasingly complex relations between political actors, scales, sites, and institutions. Region-making of this sort not only necessitates changes in political organization, but also changes in structures of meaning: in effect, the discursive production of a Mediterranean regional space for projecting ‘EU’rope. This creativity by ‘EU’rope is reflected in the growing belief among European political elites that a Mediterranean region can be ‘made’ – and a new horizon of EU action imagined there.

The conscious articulation and propagation of this creativity by EU political elites is witnessed in the ways in which the Mediterranean has been codified by European political elites as a geopolitical space without any significant degree of political or ideational collective identity and with a variegated socio-political complexity that is most striking between ‘North’ and ‘South’, but also within the ‘South’. Such territorial codifications not only support the rationale for region-making but also the case for the projection of ‘EU’rope. The making of the Mediterranean requires its symbolic construction by Europe since this furnishes a rationale for new supranational entrepreneurship. Symbolically, the Mediterranean is constructed by ‘EU’rope as the ‘near abroad’, a volatile quarter on the mutable map of the EU’s Neighbourhood depicted as posing new threats to Europe’s economies, security and liberal-democratic structures of government. The institutional blueprint from ‘EU’rope for Mediterranean regional construction thus enables the parceling and representation of Mediterranean geopolitical space on ‘EU’ropean terms.

The EU’s geopolitical efforts to make and regulate a Mediterranean region have a varied and chequered history. From 1960s the Mediterranean was cast as the most problematic flank of ‘EU’rope with a politically hamstrung EU only able to secure its regional objectives by concluding trade agreements that offered limited access to European markets, and which the EU by the early 1970s was prepared to confess could help very little towards attaining the objective of long term conditions for development and economic stability. This then prompted the emergence of a ‘EU’ropean discourse focused on the economic and social development of the Mediterranean and some coordinated EU actions to this end, though by the middle of the 1980s the expansion of the EU to incorporate Greece, Spain and Portugal not only shifted the centre of the gravity of the EU southwards but also served to emphasise the growing political and socio-economic diversity between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean and the urgency for a European-Arab dialogue.

The projection of ‘EU’rope through the making of the Mediterranean region began in Barcelona in November 1995 when the EU’s Member States signed the Euro-Mediterranean policy with 12 Third Countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey). Hailed as the boldest design and vision in European relations with the Mediterranean in the 20th century, it comprised three pillars around which the institutional mobilization of Mediterranean region-building would occur, involving a common area of peace and stability, shared prosperity and greater mutual cultural understanding. However, the 9/11 attacks and a deteriorating situation in Palestine prompted a critical European reassessment of the nature and means of projecting ‘EU’rope in the Mediterranean.

In response to these changed circumstances and the restricted possibility of EU expansion, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) inaugurated in 2003 was a manifest effort by ‘EU’rope to structure European relations with a binary Mediterranean ‘other’ and a confirmation of the EU’s geo-strategic interest in ‘outside’ political spaces such as the Mediterranean (Pace, 2004). A Mediterranean region was created by establishing standards around which actors’ expectations would converge; in effect, a ‘ring of friends’ around the EU with a commitment to ‘common values’ and
through this a strengthening of stability, security and well being for all concerned (see Carl Dahlman’s comments on this point). Beyond the elaboration of new collective understandings of the Mediterranean ‘Neighbourhood’ in European political exchange, however, the ENP has largely served to further expose the contradictions marking (EU)rope’s role in this region. For one, while the EU has sought greater linkage between the compliance of Arab States in Mediterranean region-making in exchange for access to greater financial privileges and concessions from the EU (in effect, the construction of a pyramid of privilege with ‘compliant’ states at the apex), this has only served to inject yet more instability and tensions into the region-making process, as such states jockey for privileged geopolitical relations, seek new or strengthened relations with particular EU States, and emphasize their ‘cosmetic’ privileged geopolitical relations, seek new or strengthened relations with particular EU States, and emphasize their ‘cosmetic’ commitment to EU’rean goals or their geographical significance to the projection of EU’rope.

The latest attempt at projecting (EU)ropean power into the Mediterranean is the Union for the Mediterranean. A brainchild of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, plans for what was originally to be called the Mediterranean Union were floated already in 2007, intended to further boost ties with the EU’s southern neighbours and create new forms of ‘close association’ that could provide a putative alternative to EU membership (for countries like Turkey in particular). The months of negotiations that preceded the official launch of the Union in July 2008 revealed, nonetheless, all the ambiguities marking (EU)rope’s role in the Mediterranean. While France originally saw itself as the leading partner in this initiative, pushing for the creation of a stand-alone co-presidency (shared by an EU and a non-EU Mediterranean country), the European Commission was quite clear in insisting that political control of the Union should remain in Brussels’ hands. Sarkozy’s plans also came under attack from other EU member states, concerned that the initiative would pit ‘Northern’ EU states against their ‘Southern’ counterparts, imposing a particular vision and a particular set of priorities on EU international action.

When the Union was inaugurated at a ceremony in Paris on July 13th, it was a very different creature from the one imagined by Sarkozy: now called the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ (a name that presumably held ‘softer’ geopolitical connotations), it brought together 43 countries, including all of the 27 EU member states, ‘Northern’ as well as ‘Southern’, effectively erasing the strong ‘regional’ dimension that France had hoped to grant the initiative. And although the ceremony was intended to confirm the potential of the Union in ‘bringing together’ the nations of the Mediterranean (featuring an embrace between Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli PM Ehud Olmert, and the announcement of the re-launching of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon), it also confirmed enduring divides among Arab States, in particular regarding relations with Israel – and persistent fears that the intended ‘Mediterranean integration’ would remain cosmetic at best.

Where are Europe’s borders?

Chris Rumford

The ambiguity that marks the EU’s engagement with its various Neighbourhoods is also reflected in – and is in many ways a reflection of – the ambiguous nature of Europe’s borders. The question of where Europe’s borders are to be found has, indeed, become relevant again in the context of Europe projecting its bordering processes beyond its formal limits, visible in the EU’s deployment of Frontex patrols in the Mediterranean, its use of the Neighbourhood Policy to develop borderlands on its eastern fringes, or the UK’s preference for offshore and juxtaposed borders (Rumford, 2008).

The question of Europe’s borders is also given fresh impetus by the fact that there are many Europes and hence a plurality of European borders. The borders of Europe constructed by the Council of Europe are not the same as those of the European Economic Area which in turn are not the same as those of Schengenland which are different again from those policed by the EU’s border agency, Frontex. But there exists yet another, and arguably even more important, reason for the contemporary relevance of the question of where Europe’s borders are to be found. This is that Europe may possess borders that not everyone will recognise as such or acknowledge as being important. By this I mean that the borders of Europe are not necessarily agreed upon by consensus; different institutions and peoples construe the location, meaning, and importance of Europe’s borders in different ways. These divergent understandings are visible in various region-building initiatives (such as those described by Alun Jones and Felix Ciutà), but also in the construction of different ‘topologies’ of (EU)ropean belonging (outlined by Ruth Wodak in the piece that follows). It is this aspect of Europe’s borders that I wish to elaborate upon in the following portion of this paper.

To exaggerate only slightly, there was a time, during the Cold War for instance, when everyone would have known, and agreed upon, where the borders of divided Europe were to be found, and which borders were the most important ones. This was not simply a product of the fixity of those borders or the political and military resources devoted to inscribing them upon the European landscape. The borders that divided Europe also divided the world; they marked the geopolitical division between East and West. For Balibar (2002) the fact that a border can have a significance that goes beyond its ability to mark territory in a particular location is a mode of ‘overdetermination’. The Iron Curtain both divided Europe, and, because this division was exported to other parts of the world, also worked as a global border. More importantly in the context of the present discussion, the division of Europe created a high degree of consensus – both locally and throughout the rest of the world – regarding where its borders could be drawn, and which were the key borders: we lived in a world with borders that everyone could recognise and agree upon.

Although the Cold War is no more the overdetermination of borders is still with us, but only up to a point. It can be argued that the border between Poland and the Ukraine now has a significance greater than during the Cold War, marking as it does the division between EU and non-EU (and possibly the limits of EU expansion in the East). However, individual cases of overdetermination no longer indicate a generalisable condition, and for the Poland/Ukraine border its geopolitical significance is quite possibly temporary. As such, the idea that borders are overdetermined does not have the same purchase in a post-Cold War Europe. Even the borders which divide Europe into EU/non-EU are provisional, shifted by successive enlargements and eroded by pan-European networks of communication and mobility which extend beyond EU member states; today’s borderlands may be tomorrow’s internal spaces. There is no longer the sense, as there was during the Cold War, of what constitutes the important borders of Europe. Then, both sides had a common interest in militarizing and securitizing the same borders. In contemporary Europe there is no way of knowing whether a border is important or not, in anything but a provisional and/or local sense and, as Balibar, amongst others, shows us, borders take many forms and can be found at so many different points within a society that they are all but impossible to classify and rank. The idea of overdetermination presupposes a world where nation-state borders are the most significant borders. The changes to the nature of borders outlined by Balibar, particularly the multiplicity of bordering points within a society, the shifting of the border ‘away from the border’ (Lahav & Guiraudon, 2000),
and the diffusion of the border throughout society undermine a conception of borders as national/European frontiers. Peter Andreas (2000: 4) writes about the securitized strategies of ‘rebordering’ developed in North America and Europe, designed to protect the national spaces opened up by the flows and mobilities associated with economic globalization: ‘borders are supposed to function more like filters that separate out the unwanted from the wanted cross-border flows’. That borders are increasingly discriminatory and designed to allow easy passage for some while forming a barrier to the movements of others (refugees, ‘terrorists’, and traffickers) has given rise to the idea of borders as ‘asymmetric membranes’ (Hedetoft, 2003); barriers that allow the free flow of certain goods and people while restricting the movement of others. In the current European context this means allowing the flows of capital, products and people associated with neo-liberal ‘goods’ while simultaneously restricting the movement of ‘bads’, whether they be refugees, the ‘global poor’, armaments, or drugs. A key feature of these ‘asymmetric membranes’ is that they not only require the construction of the border both at the edges of a polity and at strategic points within it too, but they also require that the border be projected at a distance. The diffusion of borders throughout society has given rise to the notion that ‘borders are everywhere’: in fact they can be elsewhere too, often remote from the national (or European) territory to be bordered.

This construction of ‘borders beyond borders’ is what Balibar has termed the ‘Great Wall of Europe’: ‘a complex of differentiated institutions, installations, legislations, repressive and preventive politics, and international agreements which together aim at making the liberty of circulation not impossible but extremely difficult or selective and unilateral for certain categories of individuals and certain groups’ (Balibar, 2006: 1–2). The ‘Great Wall of Europe’ is not positioned only at the outer-edges of the EU polity but in fact projected at a distance from Europe’s borders, and component parts of the ‘Great Wall of Europe’ include the Israeli-built walls dividing Israel–Palestine and the heavily fortified security fences guarding the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco. Frontex boats now patrol the Atlantic coast of West African states to intercept would-be migrants embarking on the perilous sea journey from Senegal and Mauritania to Europe via the Canary Islands. The UK has mirrored such approaches to securing its borders in recent years, and the policy approach currently favoured is to locate the UK’s borders ‘offshore’ rather than fortify them in the conventional way (Home Office, 2007).

One important consequence of Europe’s borders being ‘elsewhere’ is that not everyone will recognise them as Europe’s borders. For the majority of European citizens the fact that control over the movement of people into Europe is located at borders which are in some cases far removed from European territory – along the coast of West Africa, in the borderlands beyond Eastern Europe, or anywhere visas are issued in the case of the UK’s ‘offshore’ borders – renders them all but invisible. Such borders are truly ‘asymmetric’, not only blocking travel in one direction while allowing mobility for Europe’s elites, but constituting a formidable physical barrier to those beyond the border while hardly registering in the consciousness of most of those living on the inside.

**Defining (EU)rope: processes of inclusion and exclusion**

**Ruth Wodak**

The aim of this intervention is to consider some of the ways in which Europe is delimited not only at its physical borders but also through shifting (and often contradictory) processes of inclusion and exclusion of refugees, migrants and other ‘would-be Europeans’. The constitution of the political geographies of European belonging is, in great part, about the public management of such inclusion and exclusion. It is a multifaceted process, often a question of ‘grading’ and ‘scales’ (ranging from explicit legal and economic restrictions to implicit discursive negotiations and decisions), relying on the construction of differing topologies, i.e. group memberships, which sometimes might include a certain group, and sometimes not, depending on socio-political and situational contexts and interactions. My comments here address some of the current debates surrounding EU enlargement processes and, especially, citizenship and language tests as key sites for the definition of Europe’s political geographies – and the delimitation of Europe’s boundaries.

The construction of in- and out-groups necessarily implies the use of strategies of positive self-presentation and negative presentation of others. I am especially interested in the variety of discursive strategies which underpin the justification/legitimization of inclusion/exclusion. Such strategies involve *inter alia* ‘nomination strategies’ which construct and represent social actors, possibly functioning as in-groups and out-groups; hence, the choice of specific names and labels would be subsumed under this group of strategies. In British newspapers, for example, there has been a shift from clear-cut boundaries between asylum-seekers, refugees, and migrants to the use of a general label ‘migrants’ (or even ‘foreigners’), without distinguishing the status or cause of migration of these individuals. This leads to the construction of an overall threatening image of a ‘foreigner’ as the ‘other’ who – as almost all media reporting suggests – is not wanted ‘here’ (Krzyżanowski & Wodak, 2007).

Social actors as individuals, group members or groups as a whole, are also linguistically characterized through ‘predications’, i.e. through certain characteristics which are ascribed to them (foreigners described as ‘criminals’, drug dealers, etc.) Third, there are ‘argumentation strategies’ and a fund of *topoi* through which positive and negative attributions are justified. In these processes of discursive group (boundary) constructions, particular *topoi* acquire a central role and are frequently used to justify exclusion of migrants by quasi rational arguments (‘they are a burden for the society’, ‘they are dangerous, a threat’, ‘they cost too much’, ‘their culture is too different’, and so forth). In this way, migrants are constructed as scapegoats, they are blamed for unemployment or for causing general dissatisfaction (with politics, with the European Union, etc.), for abusing social welfare systems or are more generally perceived as threat for ‘our’ culture. On the other hand, some *topoi* can also be used in anti-discriminatory discourses, such as in appeals to ‘human rights’ or to ‘justice’ (an important part of the EU’s self-representation as the promoter of such values in its immediate ‘Neighbourhoods’).

Linked to the construction of in- and out-groups and collective identities is the so-called denial of racism. Recall the well known examples of justification discourses through standardized disclaimers, such as ‘I have nothing against... but’, ‘my best friends are Jewish/Turkish/Serbian, but’, ‘we are tolerant, but’ etc. By and large, speakers in such debates seek to justify the practice of exclusion without employing the related overt rhetoric. ‘Prejudice’ is to be denied or mitigated, as speakers for themselves claim an ethos of reasonableness and tolerance. Those who wish to criticize out-groups might employ variants of the rhetorical device ‘I’m not prejudiced but...’ (e.g. Rojo-Martin & van Dijk, 1997). In debates about immigration and religious difference in Europe, arguments about ‘culture’ are also important, depicting it as an essentially bounded entity whose integrity is threatened by the presence of residents unwilling to learn and adopt ‘our’ conventions and norms (see Richardson, 2004); in these argumentative sequences, ‘deictic elements’ (grammatical references to space and time) acquire salience.

In their research on the construction of European borders, Busch and Krzyżanowski (2007) depict Europe as a series of concentric
circles, representing the various scales of inclusion or exclusion operated by the countless legal treaties and agreements put into practice over the past 20 years. The concentric ring model presents, in a heuristic way, the more or less permeable borders constructed throughout Europe. Each ‘circle’ is based on a precisely defined set of laws; crossing these borders always entails permits, papers, visas. What is more, their heuristic powerfully highlights how the processes of construction and limitation of Europe have also given rise to the construction and reproduction of structural inequality/discrimination/exclusion between various social, cultural, religious, national and other groups living within Europe.

Indeed, alongside the bordering processes occurring at the EU’s external confines, we can witness a similarly ‘flexible’ discursive incorporation of the Union’s ‘outsiders’ into the EU’s ‘inside’. In interviews with members of the European Convention in 2002–2003 (Krzyzanowski & Oberhuber, 2007; Wodak, 2007, 2008), it was notable how members of the accession countries had accommodated and been rapidly socialized into Euro-speak and EU attitudes, reproducing a vision of Europe as ‘the (core) EU’, a vision integrating clear borders of Europe.

Belonging to ‘EU’rope is also delimited, however, by other bordering practices, ‘official’ norms and means through which exclusion is enacted. Language proficiency norms are one such example. As Dray’s (2006) research suggests, states that wish to encourage immigration (e.g. Romania, Poland, Hungary) will place less emphasis on language assessment, than states that perceive immigration as a problem (e.g. Austria, Finland, France, Germany). Language (and assessment procedures) may thus be employed as selective instruments of control with language tests being legally required of some ‘groups’ but not others. At present there is no consensus in the EU on the minimum level of proficiency in an acquired language. The current situation is therefore characterized by a patchwork of solutions to an array of perceived “citizenship” problems – and a differential geography of access (to ‘EU’rope) deliberated through language proficiency. Whilst there have been some attempts to regulate language tests for identity in the form of a set of guidelines, such tests address only those claiming rights on the basis of their ethnic heritage. This, however, is only one dimension of the way in which language may be used to determine citizenship.

The question of inclusion and exclusion cuts across all of the examples cited here, whether in media representations, in cyberspace, in everyday conversations, or in organizational discourses (Wodak, 2007). Yet inclusion and exclusion are not to be considered as static categories: the person who is excluded today may be included tomorrow, and vice versa. Nonetheless, while membership (in Europe) can always be redefined, a variety of ‘gatekeepers’ decide who will have access: specifying new laws, new ideologies, new languages, and new borders, as Chris Rumford argues here. These discourses – in all the forms briefly summarized above – are recontextualized from one public sphere to the next, from one genre to the next, and thus acquire a ‘life of their own’. They can be used to justify inclusion or exclusion whenever opportune. They are normalized and essentialized and, accordingly, rarely challenged. The desired ‘opening-up’ of the European Union must thus also contend with such everyday processes of inclusion and exclusion and the structural boundaries that continue to separate its ‘parallel lives’.

The EU and other empires: independence against hegemony

James Anderson

If we are to believe conventional wisdom, while the European Union is approaching par with the USA economically, it remains politically and militarily weak. But, as Alan Ingram shows in the next contribution, some see military weakness as strength. Ulrich Beck, for one, sees a cosmopolitan EU pioneering a new cosmopolitan world order against outdated national approaches – ‘move over America, Europe is back’. He echoes a European debate initiated by Jurgen Habermas who (in response to ‘Iraq’) called on ‘Europe’ to ‘counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the US’ with a cosmopolitan legal order based on a reformed United Nations (see Levy, Pensky, & Torpey, 2005: 3–13). However, such calls raise some disturbing questions. Is the present EU capable of counterbalancing US hegemony? How can it develop the capability? Would it use it progressively, and in what context?

Gravitating around the EU, Western Europe is becoming a singular entity for the first time since Charlemagne’s empire fragmented over a thousand years ago. The EU is a remarkable assemblage of national states partly sharing their sovereignties; it is an unprecedented though uncertain international actor (Bialasiewicz, 2008). Nevertheless, struggling to understand it, people fall back on more familiar pre-national historical metaphors: a ‘new medievalism’ of over-lapping and border-crossing authorities; an ‘empire’ of heterogeneous cultural and economic entities, moving at variable ‘speeds’, political power declining outwards from a core to a periphery of candidate or excluded states in its ‘Neighbourhood’. The EU does indeed have empire features, not least territorial expansion and a ‘civilising/modernising’ mission, not least in its ‘Neighbourhood’. It has rendered unstable ex-Soviet bloc countries safe for western investment, and a differentiated source of cheap migrant labour for Western Europe (Anderson & Shuttleworth, 2007), in the process encroaching on the Russian empire.

However, the EU is not ‘Europe’ and too much is claimed for it. The metaphors can thus be misleadingly self-congratulatory. The EU is a most peculiar empire lacking such basics as its own taxation system and military forces, with a weak central bureaucracy and parliament, and member states which retain all their nationalist trappings, including defenders of ‘national sovereignty’ who would wreck the EU. Chauvinistic ‘anti-EU’ and ‘anti-immigrant’ scaremongering, and attempts to delimit ‘Europe’ and the EU as ‘Christian’, could be the EU’s undoing. The ‘outside Others’ are already ‘inside’. The centrifugal pressures of heterogeneity, and territorial expansion becoming ‘imperial over-stretch’, have often been terminal empire failings.

The metaphors are also unintentionally revealing: medieval and empire politics are not good models for democracy, accountability or legitimacy. Falling turnouts in EU elections, and ‘No’ majorities when referendums are allowed, reflect not only the EU’s familiar ‘democratic deficit’ but also (as Ireland’s referendum campaign demonstrated) the lack of will or vision to ‘sell’ the EU as a popular project with a potentially crucial world role (Anderson, 2006). Before it can reform world governance, the EU itself needs reforming. Otherwise it will stumble on for narrowly economic reasons but politically incoherent and subservient to other powers, unloved and unwanted by its own populations. People don’t live by bread alone.

A historical perspective is suggestive: as Giovanni Arrighi (2005) has shown, over the last five centuries the world system has been managed by a succession of hegemonic powers – Spanish, Dutch, British, now American – with turbulent inter-hegemonic interludes. We are now approaching such a period. Some see China as potentially the next hegemon: Umberto Eco, for instance, arguing that Europe will be carved up unless it constitutes an alternative ‘third pole’ between the USA and the Orient (Levy et al., 2005: 14–20). Arrighi’s detailed analysis of recurring patterns and discontinuities in hegemonic and inter-hegemonic periods, has both worrying and hopeful implications as US hegemony unravels. I cannot do justice to it here, but three points are particularly worrying. Firstly, in the last three inter-hegemonic interludes it took major wars before
a new hegemony could eventually be established – Dutch hegemony only after the Thirty Year’s War, the British after the Napoleonic Wars, and the American after the two World Wars. Secondly, such inter-hegemonic turmoil was caused less by the new hegemon’s aggression than by the old hegemon’s unwillingness to adapt, or clinging on by military means. And thirdly, there is the USA’s vested interest in its own unprecedented military superiority, and a totally unprecedented and de-stabilising disjuncture between military and economic power – the US biased towards the former, the EU (plus Japan and others) to the latter. Arrighi’s historical-structural perspective is a good antidote to the foreshortening of time frames, and also to wishfully thinking that belligerent hegemony will go away once Bush’s ‘neo-cons’ depart or neo-liberals decline.

Yet Arrighi’s analysis also gives grounds for hope. It is not inevitable that US hegemony will be replaced by yet another hegemon. Indeed, the absence of credible hegemonic contenders is perhaps an opportunity to replace hegemony with safer, less militarist and more collective global governance. Hegemony no longer works in a world of largely informal empires which mostly operate indirectly through politically independent sovereigns, and often uncooperative, national states (see Carl Dahlman’s and Gian Matteo Apuzzo’s comments on the Balkans here). In this sense, the EU could play a significant role – but only if it develops the necessary capability to democratise itself and its ‘Neighbourhood’ relations.

The limits of transformative power Europe: geopolitics, biopolitics, parapolitics

Alan Ingram

Among the recent crop of books asserting the European Union’s special nature and global vocation, one of the most talked about in the Anglophone world has been Mark Leonard’s (2005) Why Europe will run the 21st century. Its appeal is not difficult to explain. For one, the book was written and published in an atmosphere of profound angst following European splits over the invasion of Iraq. This had been compounded by Robert Kagan’s (2003) Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the new world order, also considered required reading (copies were reportedly mailed to every EU diplomatic mission). Kagan argued that while Europe saw itself as a “Kantian” post-modern polity governed by law and negotiation, the US remained “mired” in a “Hobbesian” world where might still makes right. Leonard advances a more optimistic view. While US power is “shallow and narrow”, that of the EU “is broad and deep: once sucked into its sphere of influence, countries are changed forever” (2005: 3–4). The key is the EU’s ability to induce states to rewire their governance from the inside out (via the “invisible hand” of Europeanization). Thus, the EU has little need of coercion; it can rely on “passive aggression”: the prospect of being ignored is enough to ensure compliance and engagement. The effects of this transformative power can be seen, Leonard suggests, in many countries within and beyond the EU itself. Leonard, in a wry nod to Kagan and his erstwhile comrades, is proposing a “project for a new European century”.

Rather than offer a point by point critique, I outline three areas where limits to the idea of transformative power Europe are evident, posing problems for the idea of a universal mission of the kind proposed by Leonard and others. The first is geopolitics. Leonard writes that following the debacle over Yugoslavia, the EU began developing a “European way of war”, where “soldiers are deployed not to control other countries, but to remove the circumstances that led to war in the first place” (2005: 59). Thus, European thinking is based on humanitarian intervention, preventive engagement, and state-building. Europeans, Leonard claims, are already preparing for challenges in the “arc of instability”…stretching from Agadir on the Atlantic to Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea” (2005: 62). However, such language is arguably reminiscent of the classical geopolitical imagination that Leonard claims the EU is transcending.

Moreover, non-transformative power weaves through the fabric of member states in ways scarcely touched upon by Leonard. For example, though they may be developing a new way of war through EU institutions, many member states continue to offer basing points for US power projection, evident in recent efforts to extend ballistic missile defence systems and the part played by some European states in the CIA’s post 9/11 programme of “extraordinary rendition”. It is clear from investigations by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament that EU member states, accession countries and supposed partners in the Neighbourhood (or at least certain agencies and networks within them) were complicit in the programme, and that some provided more active support. The post-modern paradise was, it seems, woven into a coercive geography that made a mockery of “European values”.

Perhaps this is indeed a post-modern landscape. But although there have been some institutional responses to rendition within Europe, and while further investigations and legislation may make such practices more difficult to implement in the future, transformative power was (not for the first time) too limited to prevent outrages from happening in the first place.

It has been observed that the emergence of the global war prison (of which Europe, for a time at least, has been a part) represents an instance of biopower as well as sovereign power (Gregory, 2005). If we follow biopolitical approaches further, a second problem with the idea of Europe as transformative power comes into view: the neglect of the growing role of the EU in migration control and the surveillance of population. This forms an increasingly significant dimension of Europe’s role in its Neighbourhood and is evident in many initiatives conducted not in the name of Foreign and Security Policy but of the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security. Much of this agenda aligns with and is intended to complement member state policies aimed at the defence of Europe from unwanted human mobility, and its effects can be seen in the securitization of European borders, the dissemination of bordering practices throughout European territory, and their projection into the Neighbourhood and beyond (as Chris Rumford also notes).

The effects of European policies in this area are experienced most directly by people trying to enter Europe by dangerous routes, by people incarcerated in a proliferating archipelago of detention centres for “illegals” and by people living with ambiguous status in the shadowlands of the European economy. While Leonard notes that “The European dream almost died in a town called Srebrenica” (2005: 57), the deaths of people trying to enter Europe by crossing its border, their detention in camps within Europe or their deportation, are not part of his account. The biopolitical zone separating the European from the less-than-fully-European runs through political imaginations as much as the territory of the Union.

The biopolitical dimensions to European security become still more evident in light of recent proposals by the European Commission for border surveillance and control. From 2009, all EU passports will contain a digital fingerprint and photograph, and from 2011 all non-EU citizens applying for a visa will have to give biometric information to be entered into a Visa Information System (EU-VIS). Such measures are intended to enhance security against “high risk” undesirables and speed up travel for “low risk” travellers (whose progress through border controls could be automated) (European Commission, 2008a). In parallel, a proposed European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) would “support member states in reaching full situation awareness on the situation at their external borders and increase the reaction capacity of their law
enforcement authorities” (European Commission, 2008b: 4, emphasis in original). In the Commission’s vision this system would be integrated across the EU in real time, supported by satellite and unmanned aerial vehicles. Such developments indicate a further blurring of the lines between military, police, intelligence and border control functions and the further securitization of migration, but also a more intense stratification of humanity into different categories in order that liberal spaces may be insulated from presumed threats and risks. In this regard we might observe not the differences between “European” and “American” modes of power but their convergence. With this in mind, I would like to suggest a final conceptual avenue by which we might critique accounts of Europe’s transformative power. Though he adopts arguments to the effect that the EU, as a body largely concerned with technical and functional matters of transnational governance, possesses sufficient and appropriate legitimacy for what it does, Leonard acknowledges that the “democratic deficit” is something of a problem for the idea of Europe as transformative power. However, he argues that the Constitutional Treaty then on the table (since replaced by the Lisbon Treaty) is transformative power. However, he argues that the Constitutional Treaty then on the table (since replaced by the Lisbon Treaty) represents something of a solution to this, or at least an advance in the European “experiment of reinventing democracy for an age of globalization” (2005: 98). I would like to pose the issue in different terms, by suggesting that many of the problems around Europe’s role in the world can be understood in terms of parapologies: “a system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished” (Scott, 2003: xx). The scope of parapolitics has undoubtedly expanded of late, and while the EU can be considered a “laboratory for reinventing democracy” (Leonard, 2005: 95) it can also be considered a laboratory for diminishing it. Here we might bring together the kinds of practices evident in extraordinary rendition with the venue shopping of policy makers as they seek in European institutions policy vehicles that minimize democratic scrutiny and oversight. These practices are evident in some of the ways that migration control and population surveillance agendas are being forwarded, and are at least as much a danger to the values that are supposed to underpin the European project as the presumed threats upon which current security strategies are premised. I would agree that current ways of imagining power limit our understanding of European integration. But I would argue that the geopolitical, biopolitical and parapolitical perspectives outlined here highlight important dimensions of power that are missing from recent visions of Europe and its international role. I would also suggest that the European idea is not well served by an exaggerated sense of the extent to which the EU has transcended the political geographies of modernity, nor by habitual assertions of superiority over the US. Hubris is by no means a uniquely American trait.

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