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**Getting the vaccine now will protect you in the future! A pragma-dialectical analysis of strategic maneuvering with pragmatic argumentation in health brochures**

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# The function of pragmatic argumentation in health brochures

### 4.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, it was argued that the correctness conditions of the speech act of advising indicate what types of doubt or criticism a writer can anticipate concerning his advisory standpoint. This chapter examines what type of doubt or criticism can be addressed in health brochures using pragmatic argumentation to support an advisory standpoint. By considering pragmatic argumentation as a dialectical move in the argumentation stage aimed at reaching the dialectical goal of that stage, it is determined how this type of argumentation contributes to solving a difference of opinion. The chapter shows how pragmatic argumentation can be analyzed as a move in a *dialectical route* that serves to address a particular kind of doubt or criticism.

To explain how pragmatic argumentation can be used to justify health advice, Section 4.2 describes the characteristics of the pragmatic argument scheme from a pragma-dialectical perspective and connects these characteristics with the act of advising. Section 4.3 distinguishes the kinds of countermoves that the protagonist has to deal with in the argumentation stage. Section 4.4 explains how the protagonist can respond to these types of countermoves in order to reach the dialectical goal of the argumentation stage. To describe the routes that lead to this goal, a dialectical profile of the argumentation stage is introduced in Section 4.5. Four dialectical routes are distinguished on the basis of the kind of countermove the protagonist addresses, namely 1) removing doubt concerning the standpoint, 2) removing doubt concerning the propositional content of the argumentation, 3) removing doubt concerning the justificatory force of the argumentation, and 4) refuting counterarguments. Section 4.6 explains the role of pragmatic argumentation in each of the four routes. Section 4.7 provides the conclusion.

## 4.2 Using pragmatic argumentation to support an advisory standpoint

### 4.2.1 The argument scheme of pragmatic argumentation

As was argued earlier, the correctness conditions of advising in health brochures indicate which aspects of the speech may give rise to doubt and become an issue in the discussion. To explain how pragmatic argumentation can address anticipated doubt concerning the acceptability of a piece of advice, it is useful to examine the characteristics of pragmatic argumentation. In the pragma-dialectical theory, the term *pragmatic argumentation* refers to argumentation in which some course of action is recommended or discouraged in the standpoint and this recommendation is defended in the argumentation by pointing at the desirable or undesirable consequences of the course of action (Garssen 1996: 21).<sup>27</sup>

The term pragmatic argumentation stems from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969) account of a type of argumentation which "permits the evaluation of an act or event in terms of its favorable or unfavorable consequences" (1969: 266). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that the argumentation rests upon a causal link between an event and a consequence. In their typology, they classify the scheme, therefore, as argumentation based on a sequential relation, just as other types of causal argumentation.<sup>28</sup> In the case of the pragmatic argument, the standpoint contains an evaluation of an action and this evaluation is justified by referring to the positive or negative consequences of the action. So, the positive or negative evaluation of the consequences is transferred to the act that was supposedly the cause of the consequences.

In pragma-dialectics, types of argumentation are distinguished according to the underlying argument scheme, which is a "more or less conventionalized way of representing the relation between what is stated in the argument and what is stated in the standpoint" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 96). An argument scheme represents the inference rule on the basis of which the acceptability of the premise is transferred to the standpoint in a particular type of argumentation.

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27 Other terms used for pragmatic argumentation, although not all in the same sense, are instrumental argumentation, teleological reasoning, practical reasoning, and argumentation on the basis of advantages/disadvantages.

28 In *The New Rhetoric*, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) propose a division of techniques of argumentation based on processes of association, which bring elements together, and techniques based on processes of dissociation, which separate elements that are regarded as a whole. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish three categories of argument schemes that rest on association: quasi-logical arguments (based on a pretended logical or mathematical relation between premises and conclusion), arguments based on the structure of reality (based on a sequential or a co-existential relation), and relations establishing the structure of reality (based on a relation of example or comparison) (185-450). This typology is problematic for several reasons. For example, divergent criteria are used to distinguish the categories of schemes, not all schemes are clearly defined, and the examples are often unclear. See van Eemeren et.al. (1996: 93-128) for a discussion of *The New Rhetoric*.

In the pragma-dialectical typology of argument schemes, three main types are distinguished, namely: causal, symptomatic and comparison argumentation.<sup>29</sup> Pragmatic argumentation is classified as a subtype of the causal argument scheme.<sup>30</sup> In the causal argument scheme, the argument is presented “as if what is stated in the argumentation is a means to, a way to, an instrument for or some other kind of causative factor for the standpoint, or *vice versa*” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 97).<sup>31</sup>

In pragmatic argumentation, the standpoint that a particular action should be performed is justified by a premise which says that the action automatically leads to a desirable situation. The acceptability of the premise is transferred to the standpoint based on the general principle, usually reflected in the unexpressed or connection premise, stating that if an action leads to desirable consequences, then the action should be performed. Since the standpoint could also concern a statement in which a particular course of action is discouraged, a negative variant can be distinguished as well (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 96; Garssen 1997: 22; see also Schellens 1985, Walton 1996, Feteris 2002). In the negative variant it is argued that an action should not be carried out because of its undesirable effects. The underlying principle connecting the premise to the standpoint in this variant of the scheme is that if an action leads to an undesirable consequence, then that action should not be performed. The positive pragmatic argument scheme (Variant I) can be characterized in the following way (see Feteris 2002):

Variant I

Standpoint: Action X should be performed

Because: Action X leads to desirable consequence Y

(And:) (If an action leads to a desirable consequence, then that action should be performed)

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29 Hitchcock and Wagemans (2011) propose an alternative typology in which they differentiate between the schemes based on the way in which predicates are attributed to referents in the propositions. The problem with this approach is that the schemes are formalized in a way that makes them become too general to guide an adequate assessment procedure and the authors do not offer any examples of what the critical questions would be. It is therefore not clear in what way the typology proposed by Hitchcock and Wagemans (2011) improves the ‘traditional’ pragma-dialectical evaluation procedure.

30 In most other typologies of argument schemes, pragmatic argumentation is also categorized as – a subtype of – argumentation based on a causal relation (e.g. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Hastings 1962; Kienpointner 1992; Freeley 1993). Some authors have classified it as a separate category (e.g. Ehninger & Brockriede 1963/1978; Schellens 1985). However, the rationale for distinguishing argument schemes in these approaches differs from the pragma-dialectical rationale. In pragma-dialectics, the rationale behind distinguishing the three main argument schemes is that each scheme has different assessment criteria (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992).

31 In symptomatic argumentation the argument is connected with the standpoint by presenting the one as characteristic of the other and in comparison argumentation the one is presented as resembling the other (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 96-97).

The negative variant (variant II) of the pragmatic argument scheme can be characterized as follows:

Variant II  
 Standpoint: Action X should not be performed  
 Because: Action X leads to undesirable consequence Y  
 (And:) (If an action leads to an undesirable consequence, then that action should not be performed)

As was mentioned in Chapter 2, when using pragmatic argumentation one can choose to refer to any action and to any consequence in the premises. A fully explicit instantiation of the positive pragmatic argument scheme would be, for example ‘You should get vaccinated against HPV, because vaccination against HPV prevents cervical cancer and if vaccination against HPV prevents cervical cancer, then one should get vaccinated against HPV’. An example of an explicit instantiation of the negative variant of the scheme is ‘You should not drink too much alcohol, because drinking too much alcohol leads to long-term health problems and if drinking too much alcohol leads to long-term health problems, then one should not drink too much alcohol’.

Feteris (2002: 355) describes two additional variants of the pragmatic argument scheme, which in the current study are called Variant III and Variant IV for brevity’s sake. Variant III is used to defend the (sub)standpoint that some action X should be performed by arguing that the action does *not* have an *undesirable* consequence. Variant IV is used to defend the (sub)standpoint that some action X should *not* be performed by arguing that it does *not* have a *desirable* consequence. They can be schematically represented in the following way:

Variant III  
 Standpoint: Action X should be performed  
 Because: Action X does not lead to undesirable consequence Y  
 (And:) (If an action does not lead to an undesirable consequence, then that action should be performed)

Variant IV  
 Standpoint: Action X should not be performed  
 Because: Action X does not lead to desirable consequence Y  
 (And:) (If an action does not lead to a desirable consequence, then that action should not be performed)

Note that variants III and IV of pragmatic argumentation can be seen as specific applications of the pragmatic argument scheme: they do not have the same status as the regular positive and negative pragmatic argumentation because they

cannot independently constitute a sufficient defence of the standpoint. Variants III and IV always function as coordinative arguments which complement other (pragmatic) arguments. Feteris (2002: 360) gives an example of the use of variant IV as a coordinative argument complementing the positive form of pragmatic argumentation. In her example, which comes from a juridical context, a standpoint about the interpretation of a legal rule is supported by referring to the positive consequences of such an interpretation, and an alternative interpretation is rejected because of its negative consequences. Variant IV is applied here to reject the alternative interpretation. In the argumentation, the argument is a necessary complement, but not a sufficient defence for the standpoint. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 further explain what function these variants may have.

#### 4.2.2 The relation between pragmatic argumentation and advisory standpoints

In Chapter 3 it was argued that pragmatic argumentation can be used to indicate that a particular piece of advice is acceptable. How and why pragmatic argumentation functions as a means to justify a piece of advice can be further explained by referring to two particularities of the pragmatic argument scheme. On these two points, the scheme of pragmatic argumentation differs from other subtypes of the causal argument scheme. The first point is the nature of the standpoint that the argumentation is supposed to justify, and the second is the nature of the premises that constitute the argumentation.

The nature of the standpoint in pragmatic argumentation differs from the nature of the standpoint in the general causal scheme because pragmatic arguments are employed to defend a standpoint that expresses a *prescriptive* proposition, not a *descriptive* one.<sup>32</sup> In pragma-dialectics, three types of standpoints are distinguished: standpoints concerning a *descriptive*, an *evaluative* and an *inciting/prescriptive* proposition (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 159). Standpoints expressing a descriptive proposition describe facts or events ('75 % of the population is overweight'), those with an evaluative proposition express a valuation of facts or events ('it is wise to eat a lot of vegetables'), and those with a prescriptive proposition contain encouragement or discouragement to carry out a particular action or policy ('you should exercise more').

In the general causal argument scheme, the standard paraphrase for the standpoint is 'Y is true of X'. The standpoint can only be a descriptive statement,

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32 In the pragma-dialectical theory, pointing at desirable or undesirable consequences to support a descriptive claim is considered a fallacy called *argumentum ad consequentiam* (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 162). A discussant who defends a descriptive standpoint such as 'This cutlery is made of pure silver', by arguing 'because otherwise I would have spent far too much money on it', uses an inappropriate argument scheme and thereby violates a discussion rule.

which either describes current or future facts or events, such as: ‘Many girls get vaccinated against HPV’. The standpoint in the pragmatic argument scheme, on the other hand, can only be prescriptive and is paraphrased as ‘Action X should (not) be performed’. A prescriptive standpoint encourages the addressee to perform or refrain from performing a particular action and is expressed by means of a directive speech act such as an advice. Contrary to descriptive and evaluative standpoints, someone expressing a prescriptive standpoint will not only want the addressee to accept the standpoint (the inherent perlocutionary effect), but also to carry out the action referred to in the standpoint (the consecutive perlocutionary effect of advising).

The way in which such a standpoint can be expressed can be explained by referring to one of the speech act conditions of advising. Chapter 3 explained that the propositional content condition stipulates that the content of advice should be as follows: ‘S (the speaker) predicates a future beneficial act A of H (the hearer)’. A future action can be predicated of the hearer either by using the imperative mood of the verb or by using the modal verb ‘should’. According to the propositional content condition, direct advice can thus be expressed by a formulation like ‘Do A’ or ‘You should do A’.

In health brochures, a prescriptive standpoint will not always be formulated as above. Since discussants, in every move, try to maneuver strategically in order to be rhetorically effective while maintaining the standards of reasonableness, they may choose a different formulation in an attempt to make their case more appealing to the audience. The standpoint can, for example, also be paraphrased as an evaluative statement. Since advice in this context does not simply involve a future act of the reader, but a future *beneficial* health related act, advice could also be performed in an indirect way by expressing that some action is beneficial for the reader, for example ‘Action A is desirable’. The advice would then not be expressed by means of a prescriptive claim that indicates the directive character of advising, but by means of an evaluative claim that expresses the evaluation of the advised act. This claim then should be reconstructed as a prescriptive claim.

Choosing an indirect presentation of the standpoint can be considered as a way of maneuvering strategically in the confrontation stage of the discussion. An example of advice, mentioned earlier, given by means of an evaluative statement is ‘It is wise to get vaccinated against HPV’. The example shows that advice need not be expressed explicitly and directly, but can indeed be expressed indirectly if the writer thinks this might be more effective. In the case of an evaluative statement, advice is in fact expressed by affirming that one of the preparatory conditions of advising is fulfilled. As Fasold (1990) explains:

[...] since a condition on a felicitous act of advising is that the speaker believes the act will benefit the hearer, a speaker can exert the same illocutionary force by saying ‘I believe you would be better off eating lower-cholesterol food’ as

he or she would be saying ‘I advise you to eat lower-cholesterol food’. In other words, after hearing the former, I could justifiably report what had happened by saying ‘That person advised me to eat lower-cholesterol food’. (153)

According to Fasold, the speech act of advising can not only be performed by means of a performative verb, but also by expressing that one of its felicity conditions is fulfilled. In Fasold’s and in my example, advice is performed by using the first preparatory condition ‘W has some reason to believe A will benefit R’s health and the health of (part of) the population by curing, preventing, or detecting a health problem’. As van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1993: 95) explain, a speaker who performs a speech act can be held committed to the fulfillment of the felicity conditions of the act, and these commitments can function as virtual standpoints in need of defense. So, a writer who gives health advice can be held to the commitment that he believes that the act will benefit the reader’s health (see Chapter 3). By saying that action A is beneficial, it is indirectly expressed that the hearer should *perform* action A. From this we can infer that in cases where advice to perform a particular action turns into a standpoint, the standpoint can be plausibly reconstructed as a prescriptive claim in which an action is recommended.<sup>33</sup> This is also the case for an evaluative claim.

The second specific characteristic of pragmatic argumentation is the nature of the premises. Contrary to the other ways of using the causal scheme, the argumentation based on the pragmatic argument scheme always comprises two elements: an empirical element about the consequences of the action referred to in the standpoint and a normative element about the desirability of those consequences (see Feteris 2002). Just like the standpoint, one of the premises of pragmatic argumentation always contains an evaluative element, which sets this subtype apart from other ways of using the causal scheme. In the characterization of the argument scheme in the previous section, these elements are both made explicit: in the premise ‘Action X leads to desirable consequence Y’, the causal element is represented by the phrase ‘action X leads to consequence Y’, and the evaluative element by the adjective ‘desirable’.

Since the desirability of the mentioned consequence is in principle expected to be obvious in pragmatic argumentation, and in the context of health communication, in actual argumentative discourse the desirability statement

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33 In other approaches to the scheme of pragmatic argumentation, the standpoint is also considered as either a prescriptive or an evaluative claim. For example, in Walton’s account of pragmatic argumentation, which he calls ‘argument from consequences’, the standpoint is formulated as ‘A should (not) be brought about’ (1996: 76). Schellens formulates the standpoint as ‘Action A is desirable’ (1985: 155), whereas Kienpointer combines evaluative and appellative elements by formulating the standpoint as ‘Die Handlung ist mit X zu bewerten/ (nicht) zu vollziehen’ (‘the act should be evaluated as X/ should (not) be performed’) (1992: 341).

usually remains implicit. In the example about HPV vaccination, the standpoint ‘You should get vaccinated against HPV’ is supported by the pragmatic argument ‘because vaccination against HPV prevents cervical cancer’. In this argument, the desirability of the consequence of the advocated action is implicit. One could add the proposition ‘preventing cervical cancer is desirable’ to explicitly refer to the desirability, but in practice this is unlikely since the claim that preventing cervical cancer is desirable to the audience would be presumed to be evident. Because of the nature of the standpoint, which involves an inciting proposition, and the nature of the premises, which involve an evaluative element, pragmatic argumentation is particularly suitable for justifying a piece of advice by demonstrating that the advised action is beneficial for the addressee.

### 4.3 Types of countermoves in the argumentation stage

#### 4.3.1 Advancing arguments in anticipation of countermoves

In order to further explain the function of the variants of pragmatic argumentation in a discussion about health advice, it is useful to determine to which kind of critical reaction or countermove each of the variants of pragmatic argumentation is a reasonable response. This section specifies the types of countermoves a protagonist can expect in the argumentation stage.

According to the pragma-dialectical theory, discussants will choose the type of argumentation that in their view best enables them to realize their dialectical and rhetorical objective (van Eemeren 2010: 44). In the argumentation stage, the dialectical objective is to scrutinize the acceptability of the standpoint expressed in the confrontation stage on the basis of the starting points that were established in the opening stage. The task of the discussant acting as a protagonist is to advance argumentation in defense of his standpoint until all critical doubts expressed by the antagonist, or ascribed to the antagonist, have been dealt with satisfactorily. Discussants acting as an antagonist have to express their critical doubts regarding the protagonist’s standpoint and argumentation.

The rhetorical analogue to this aim is “to establish argumentation that constitutes an optimal defense of the standpoints at issue (by the protagonist) or to establish critical doubts that constitute an optimal attack on the standpoints and the argumentation (by the antagonist)” (van Eemeren 2010: 45). Strategic maneuvering in the argumentation stage thus comes down to building the strongest case by advancing (a combination of) arguments responding to all (anticipated) critical reactions from the antagonist by choosing the argument schemes deemed most effective in the particular context.

Every argument put forward by the protagonist is thus a move to respond to a (anticipated) critical reaction or countermove from the antagonist. To explain how the variants of pragmatic argumentation can be used to respond to such a

countermove, it is necessary to provide an overview of the types of countermoves that can be distinguished. Amjarso (2010: 39-43) describes the possible critical countermoves in a discussion on the basis of two distinctions. The first is between critical reactions to the standpoint and critical reactions to the argumentation. The second is between critical reactions that merely challenge the protagonist to give a response and critical reactions by which the antagonist not only challenges the protagonist, but also involves the antagonist's commitment to an opposite position with respect to the protagonist's standpoint or argument. Based on these distinctions made by Amjarso (2010), first countermoves against the advisory standpoint are specified and then countermoves against the argumentation.

#### 4.3.2 Countermoves against the advisory standpoint

Amjarso (2010: 39-40) distinguishes three countermoves against the standpoint: (1) casting doubt, (2) advancing a counter-standpoint, and (3) advancing a counter-argument against the standpoint. These three countermoves differ in the degree of commitment that they involve. In cases where the antagonist only casts doubt on the standpoint (1), he does not commit himself to any proposition and the dispute is non-mixed (Amjarso 2010: 40). When the antagonist expresses a standpoint of his own (2), he has the burden of proof for that standpoint. Advancing a counter-argument against the standpoint (3) also implies a commitment to a contradictory counter-standpoint. An argument attacking the acceptability of the initial standpoint functions as a defense for the acceptability of the contradictory counter-standpoint. This means that when the antagonist advances a counter-standpoint or a counter-argument against the initial standpoint, the dispute becomes mixed and the antagonist is obliged to take upon himself the role of protagonist of the contradictory counter-standpoint (2010: 42).

What these three countermoves might involve in the context of health brochures can be explained by looking at the kind of standpoint that is under discussion in this context. Since the initial standpoint in health brochures is advisory, the critical reactions relate to the acceptability of the piece of advice. In Chapter 3 it was argued that the correctness conditions of advising in health brochures indicate what aspects of the advice may give rise to doubt, and thus become an issue in the discussion. The countermove of casting doubt on the standpoint (1) thus concerns the fulfillment of one or more of the correctness conditions of the speech act of advising. In Chapter 3, the types of doubt concerning the acceptability of the speech act of advising were described as follows:

##### **1 The usefulness of the advice:**

- a. Does act A benefit the reader's health and the health of (part of) the population by preventing, treating, or detecting a health problem?
- b. Is the reader in principle willing to do A?

- c. Is the reader in principle able to do A?
  - d. Is the writer (a representative of) a health authority with knowledge of and/or experience with A and the effects of A?
- 2 **The necessity of the advice:**
- a. Would the reader not do A in the normal course of events?
  - b. Has the reader not yet done or is not yet doing A?
- 3 **The responsibility of the writer:**
- a. Does the writer want the reader to do A?
  - b. Does the writer believe that A is in the reader's best interest?

As was argued in Section 4.2, pragmatic argumentation is a means to address doubt concerning the benefit of the advocated act for the reader (1a in the overview). Pragmatic argumentation thus functions to address countermove (1).<sup>34</sup> Advancing a contradictory counter-standpoint (2) in this context entails that the antagonist adopts the position that the advice is not acceptable. Advancing a counter-argument against the initial standpoint (3) involves providing an argument as to why the advice is not acceptable by claiming that one of the correctness conditions is not fulfilled. This argument is in fact a defense for the contradictory counter-standpoint that the advice is not acceptable. To address such counter-arguments (3), variant IV of pragmatic argumentation can be used. This will be explained in Section 4.6. Pragmatic argumentation can also function as a means to address countermoves against the argumentation. These types of countermoves will be described in the following section.

### 4.3.3 Countermoves against the argumentation

Once the protagonist has advanced argumentation to remove doubt concerning the standpoint, the antagonist puts the argumentation to the test. The types of critical reactions to the argumentation have been studied by Snoeck Henkemans (1997). She distinguishes countermoves that consist of expressing criticism against the argumentation and the countermove of advancing a counter-argument against the argumentation. This section first addresses criticism to the argumentation and then the counter-argument.

In the pragma-dialectical theory the critical reactions that serve to test the acceptability of argumentation are reflected in the testing method for argument schemes. For each of the main argument schemes critical questions are proposed that serve as a tool for analysts and discussants to assess whether the scheme

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34 In this study, the focus lies on the doubt concerning the fulfillment of preparatory condition *a* (Does the act A benefit the reader's health and the health of (part of) the population by preventing, treating, or detecting a health problem?). Doubt concerning the fulfillment of one of the other correctness conditions is not dealt with here.

is correctly applied (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 1992; Garssen 1997). The criticism directed at the pragmatic argumentation that can be anticipated is represented in the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme. Garssen (1997: 22) explains that since pragmatic argumentation is a subtype of causal argumentation and partly relies on a causal relation, the assessment criteria for causal argumentation apply in principle to the pragmatic argument scheme. Due to the specific nature of the premises and the conclusion in pragmatic argumentation, in pragma-dialectics the critical questions pertaining to causal argumentation have been specified for pragmatic argumentation as follows:

1. Is that which is presented in the argumentation as the result, in fact, (un) desirable?
2. Does that which is introduced as cause indeed lead to the mentioned (un) desirable result?
3. Are there any other factors that must be present together with the proposed cause to create the mentioned (un)desirable result?
4. Does the mentioned cause have (un)desirable side effects?
5. Could the mentioned result be achieved or prevented by other means as well?  
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 102; Garssen 1997: 22; van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007: 166)

When employing pragmatic argumentation, the protagonist can, just as when using other forms of causal argumentation, expect criticism with respect to the causal link expressed in the argument. Questions 2 and 3 express this kind of criticism. To account for the fact that the consequence of an action is always positively or negatively evaluated, the questions are formulated as 'Does that which is introduced as cause indeed lead to the mentioned (un)desirable result?' and 'Are there any other factors that must be present together with the proposed cause to create the mentioned (un)desirable result?' A preliminary question that has to be added is whether the effect of the proposed action is indeed desirable, or, in case of the negative variant, whether the result of the discouraged action is indeed undesirable (Garssen 1997: 22).

Garssen (1997) explains that since pragmatic argumentation is usually employed in a specific context in which a decision has to be made about a particular course of action, measure or plan, additional critical questions are introduced to allow for a sufficient evaluation. Evaluating a plan not only involves questioning the causal relation between the proposed action and the expected result, but also the question of whether there are no additional negative effects to the plan. A plan will be much less appealing if the positive effects that the protagonist points to in the argumentation are outweighed by the accompanying negative consequences. That is why the following critical question is added: 'Does the mentioned cause have (un)desirable side effects?' Another issue is that the antagonist may accept the

causal link between the action and the effect, but might think that there are also other ways to achieve the desired effect. To take this issue into account, one more question is added: 'Could the mentioned result be achieved or prevented by other means as well?'<sup>35</sup>

According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 86), criticism against the argumentation can concern either the acceptability of the propositional content of the argument or the justificatory (or refutatory) force of the argument (see also Snoeck Henkemans 1997: 86). Questions 1, 2 and 3 all represent criticism with respect to the propositional content of the argument 'Action X leads to desirable consequence Y': they each represent doubt concerning the content of the argument. Critical questions 4 and 5 both represent criticism regarding the justificatory force of the pragmatic argumentation: they concern the sufficiency of the argument to justify the standpoint. According to Snoeck Henkemans, criticism concerning the justificatory force includes doubt concerning the relevance of the provided argument (1997: 86). In my view, the question of relevance also concerns the link between argument and standpoint: if the unexpressed or linking premise is expressed clearly, it should demonstrate the relevance of the argument to the standpoint. If the unexpressed premise is explicit and expressed clearly, the antagonist could still doubt whether this link between the argument and the standpoint is acceptable, but in that case the criticism is directed not at the relevance of the argument but at the acceptability of the unexpressed premise.

Besides criticism against the propositional content and the justificatory potential of the argumentation, the antagonist could also react critically by advancing a counter-argument. A counter-argument against the argumentation involves the claim that one of the critical questions cannot be answered satisfactorily. A counter-argument against pragmatic argumentation may be, for instance, that the advocated course of action has negative side-effects. In cases where an antagonist advances a counter-argument against the argumentation, the main dispute remains non-mixed. On a lower level the dispute becomes mixed because by providing an argument against the argumentation, the antagonist commits himself to the sub-standpoint that the argumentation is inadequate (see also

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35 In the literature, there is some variation in the proposed critical questions for pragmatic argumentation. The most salient difference between the pragma-dialectical approach and other approaches is that others include a question about the feasibility of the advocated act. Walton, for example, proposes a question about the addressee's (a) ability to perform the act A: 'Is it possible for a to do A?' (1996: 12). Schellens' questions address both the practical and the ethical feasibility: 'Is A practicable?' and 'Is A admissible?' (1987: 36). Ihnen Jory (2011) mainly follows Walton and Schellens in her amended version of the pragma-dialectical assessment procedure, taking stock issues as a starting point. In my view, the feasibility of the advocated action is a condition for the felicitous performance of the speech act, and not for the acceptability of the argument. As was explained in Chapter 3 and in Section 4.3.2, in this study the question about feasibility is considered as a type of doubt concerning the standpoint, instead of the argument.

Snoeck Henkemans 1997: 131-132). The types of countermoves an antagonist can carry out are summarized in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1 Types of countermoves**

	<b>Countermove by antagonist against standpoint</b>	<b>Countermove by antagonist against argumentation</b>
No commitment by antagonist	Casting doubt	Doubt concerning acceptability propositional content (critical question 1, 2 and 3)
		Doubt concerning justificatory potential (critical question 4 and 5)
Commitment by antagonist	Counter-standpoint	Counter-argument
	Counter-argument	

#### **4.4 Reaching the dialectical goal by responding to countermoves**

In the previous section it was argued that to reach the dialectical goal of the argumentation stage, the protagonist has to respond to the critical countermoves of the antagonist. Different types of countermoves, those against the standpoint and those against the argumentation, were distinguished and are summarized in Table 4.1. Based on the possible countermoves, the protagonist’s goal of responding to criticism can be further specified. To reach the dialectical goal of the argumentation stage, it is necessary that the following sub-aims are reached:

- 1) Removing doubt concerning the standpoint
- 2) Removing doubt concerning the propositional content of the argument(s)
- 3) Removing doubt concerning the justificatory force of the argument(s)
- 4) Refuting counterargument (in case of a mixed dispute)

To address expressed or anticipated doubt or criticism, the protagonist has to provide further argumentation until one of the discussion parties abandons his initial position. In this testing process the protagonist might need to advance complex argumentation, consisting of a constellation of multiple, coordinative, and/or subordinative arguments (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 86).

If a difference of opinion arises, the protagonist must always remove doubt concerning the standpoint (the first sub-goal in the argumentation stage). Doubt concerning the standpoint can be addressed by advancing argumentation in support of the standpoint. Doubt concerning an advisory standpoint typically involves doubt concerning the fulfillment of one of the correctness conditions of advising and can be removed by showing that these conditions are fulfilled. If the

antagonist then casts doubt on the argumentation and the protagonist thinks he can maintain his first argument regardless of the criticism of the antagonist, he will attempt to address the criticism by putting forward additional argumentation. The kind of argumentation that the protagonist advances depends on the kind of countermove he responds to. Snoeck Henkemans (1997) explains that if the protagonist tries to overcome the criticism regarding the propositional content, he can bring forward a subordinative argument to convince the antagonist of the acceptability of his first argument.

If the protagonist responds to criticism concerning the relevance of the argument, he may advance subordinative argumentation in support of the unexpressed or linking premise of the argument. If the protagonist responds to criticism with respect to the justificatory or refutatory potential of his argument, he can bring forward a coordinative argument that complements the first. If the protagonist responds to an antagonist who criticizes the sufficiency of the argument by mentioning a counter-argument, the protagonist can put forward a coordinative argument attacking the counter-argument (Snoeck Henkemans 1997: 89-90). As van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007: 194) explain, these last two responses of the protagonist result in coordinative argumentation, which means that the arguments can only constitute a sufficient defense when taken together. In the case of only removing doubt, the argumentation is cumulatively coordinative, while in the case of countering an objection, the argumentation is complementary coordinative. Table 4.2 summarizes the kinds of responses the protagonist can give to each of the countermoves by the antagonist that were distinguished in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.2 Types of responses to countermoves by the protagonist**

	Countermove by antagonist against standpoint	Response by protagonist to countermove	Countermove by antagonist against argumentation	Response by protagonist to countermove
No commitment by antagonist	Casting doubt	Advance argumentation	Doubt acceptability propositional content (Critical question 1, 2 and 3)	Advance subordinate argumentation
			Doubt justificatory potential (critical question 4 and 5)	Advance coordinative cumulative argumentation
Commitment by antagonist	Counter-standpoint	Advance counter-argument against counter-standpoint	Counter-argument	Refute counter-argument
	Counter-argument	Refute counter-argument		

## 4.5 Dialectical routes in the argumentation stage

### 4.5.1 Four routes leading to the dialectical goal of the argumentation stage

The choices that are made at a certain point in the discussion also influence what moves can be made in the consecutive turns. In van Eemeren and Grootendorst's words: "An argumentation scheme is a pointer to a certain dialectical route" (1992: 89). Each of the routes leads to a different result of the argumentation stage, but they may all be both dialectically reasonable and rhetorically effective in a particular context (van Eemeren 2010: 46). According to Snoeck Henkemans (1997), the arguer using a particular argument scheme is in "an analogous situation to the speaker who is defending a speech act whose correctness conditions are at issue" (1997: 157-158): both can be assumed to be aware of the kind of critical reactions they can expect and need to counter in order to provide a satisfactory defense of the standpoint. To understand why a discussant would choose to employ pragmatic argumentation, or in other words, why a discussant would think that a particular route would be dialectically successful in a particular argumentative situation, it is necessary to determine what the available routes are at a particular point in the discussion and how these routes lead to the goal that the discussant aims for. To shed light on the available routes, this study makes use of the concept of *dialectical profiles*.

As van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007: 17) explain, in the overview of the model of a critical discussion, the tasks of the discussants are only presented in a general way and the model does not include all possible discussion moves by which the particular tasks can be carried out. A more precise overview of the dialectically relevant moves that can be performed in the argumentation stage can be given in what van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006) refer to as a *dialectical profile*. A dialectical profile reflects the available routes that can be followed at a particular (sub)stage of the discussion to reach the dialectical goal of that stage. The notion of dialectical profile was inspired by Walton and Krabbe's (1995) idea of profiles of dialogue and was developed as a heuristic tool to specify what moves may be instrumental in realizing the tasks that need to be carried out by the discussants in the resolution process. The profiles represent a sequential pattern of moves and countermoves that are needed to reach the dialectical goal of the discussion stage (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007: 18; van Eemeren 2010: 75). A profile of the argumentation stage therefore represents all moves aimed at reaching the dialectical goal of testing the acceptability of the standpoints that were put forward in the confrontation stage.

Table 4.3 represents the dialectical core profile for the argumentation stage and is based on the profile as proposed by van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007: 195). The profile reflects that the first move by the protagonist in the argumentation stage consists of advancing argumentation in support of

the standpoint. In the next turn, the antagonist has several options to respond to the argumentation of the protagonist. One option is to accept the argumentation. When this move of acceptance is made, the goal of the stage is reached and the discussants can move on to the concluding stage. The other three options consist of critical reactions to the argumentation. For the course of the argumentation stage it is of importance what kind of critical reaction is given or anticipated, because each kind of criticism demands a different kind of response and the kind of responses that are given result in different argumentation structures.

With the help of the profile we can identify the dialectical routes that are relevant for the defense of an advisory standpoint. Four dialectical routes can be identified that lead to one of the sub-goals of the argumentation stage. In each of the routes, the protagonist at least expects doubt from the antagonist concerning the standpoint and the protagonist responds to this doubt by advancing pragmatic argumentation. Since argumentation is given in anticipation of criticism from the other party, the choice for the pragmatic argument scheme implies that the protagonist thinks that he can satisfactorily answer any critical question directed at the chosen argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 98). The four routes that are distinguished here differ with respect to the kind of critical reaction expressed by or ascribed to the antagonist that the protagonist is responding to. By addressing a particular countermove, each of the routes leads to one of the four sub-goals of the protagonist in the argumentation stage (Section 4.4). This results in the following four routes:

- Route 1) removing doubt concerning the standpoint
- Route 2) removing doubt concerning the acceptability of the argumentation
- Route 3) removing doubt concerning the sufficiency of the argumentation
- Route 4) refuting counterarguments

In each of these routes, the first move is the same, namely that the protagonist advances an argument in defence of the standpoint. In the following turn, the antagonist has four options in how to respond, which leads to four different branches in the profile representing the four routes. In the following, the options are explained further with the help of the specific dialectical profile of the argumentation stage, which is represented in Table 4.3.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> In the example it is assumed that the dispute is single and non-mixed. The overview of speech acts in a rational discussion in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 111) is also based on this starting point.



### 4.5.2 Dialectical profile of the argumentation stage

The dialectical profile in Table 4.3 only represents part of the argumentation stage. Since every argument and every newly adduced argument can be criticized, the testing procedure can carry on much further than the profile now shows. This profile presents the routes leading to the four sub-goals in the shortest way. The four routes are displayed by the columns in grey. The first two rows in the figure represent (part of) the confrontation stage in which the difference of opinion is established. In turn 1 the protagonist advances a standpoint and in turn 2 the antagonist casts doubt on the standpoint. In turn 3, in the argumentation stage, the protagonist advances an argument in defense of the standpoint. In turn 4 the antagonist responds either by accepting that argument – which obliges him to accept the standpoint – (route 1), or by making a countermove (routes 2, 3 and 4). In the profile in Table 4.3, the four kinds of critical reactions by the antagonist are represented. The first kind is expressing doubt with respect to the standpoint. In turn 4, the three kinds of countermoves against the argumentation are represented, namely doubting the propositional content of the argument, doubting its justificatory or refutatory force and advancing a counter-argument. In case of a counter-argument, the antagonist in fact defends a standpoint of his own, namely that the protagonist's standpoint is not acceptable. Since both parties have then assumed a standpoint, the dispute becomes mixed (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007: 193).

Turn 5 in the profile indicates in which ways the protagonist can respond to the move of the antagonist. The first option is to accept the criticism by the antagonist ('OK'). If the protagonist acknowledges the criticism with respect to his argument, he has no choice but to retract the argument. If he withdraws his argument and thinks that there is no other way to defend the standpoint, he has to withdraw his standpoint and this results in a resolution of the difference of opinion in favor of the antagonist. However, if he thinks he can still maintain his standpoint, he can bring forward a new argument in support of it (turn 6 in the profile). Since the protagonist then starts an alternative line of defense, the argumentation structure becomes multiple (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007: 193).

If the protagonist maintains his argument, he has to address the criticism of the antagonist. In route 2, the protagonist advances a subordinative argument to overcome the criticism regarding the propositional content. The sub-goal of removing doubt concerning the propositional content of the argument is reached if the antagonist accepts the subordinative argument in turn 6 ('OK'). In route 3 the protagonist advances cumulative coordinative argumentation in response to criticism with respect to the justificatory or refutatory potential of his argument.

The sub-goal is reached if the antagonist accepts the added argument in turn 6. Route 4 involves a response of the protagonist to a counter-argument. The sub-goal of refuting the counter-argument by advancing a complementary coordinative argument is reached if the antagonist accepts the argument in turn 6.

Each of the branches depicted in the profile represents one possible dialectical route. The simplest route, route 1, is that the protagonist brings forward an argument that is immediately accepted by the antagonist. This route only consists of two moves:

P: advances argument 1.1 for standpoint  
A: OK

A more complex route in the argumentation stage would be, for example, that the protagonist puts forward an argument 1.1, then the antagonist expresses doubt regarding the propositional content, then the protagonist puts forward a subordinative argument to support the acceptability of the argument, and finally the antagonist accepts it. This route can be represented as follows:

P: advances argument 1.1 for standpoint  
A: doubts propositional content argument 1.1  
P: advances subordinative argument 1.1.1  
A: OK

A route can also consist of a combination of branches, for example when the antagonist not only criticizes the propositional potential of the argument but also its justificatory force. The protagonist could then first bring forward a subordinative argument to remove the first kind of doubt. Then, when the antagonist is convinced of the acceptability of the argument but criticizes the justificatory force, the protagonist could put forward a coordinative argument.

The following section determines the function of pragmatic argumentation in each of the four main routes that are represented in the profile.

## **4.6 Using pragmatic argumentation to respond to countermoves**

### **4.6.1 Route 1: Removing doubt concerning the standpoint**

Route 1 is actually the shortest route and is aimed at directly attaining the dialectical goal of removing doubt concerning the standpoint. Choosing route 1 implies that the writer presupposes that the confrontation stage resulted in a non-mixed

difference of opinion and that he only has to address potential doubt towards the standpoint. Choosing this route implies that the protagonist does not anticipate criticism towards the argumentation. Based on the dialectical profile in Figure 4.3, route 1 can be represented as follows:

Route 1

P: advances argument 1.1 for standpoint

A: OK

In route 1, a protagonist can choose to put forward argumentation based on any of the argument schemes that are distinguished. The fact that choosing pragmatic argumentation can be seen as a relevant move for reaching the dialectical goal of this stage was clarified by the speech act theoretical approach to health brochures proposed in Chapter 3, where it was argued that in health brochures a potential disagreement revolves around the performance of the speech act of advising. If a brochure writer chooses route 1, he assumes that the advice he offers may give rise to doubt and therefore needs to be defended. Each of the correctness conditions of advising in health brochures may give rise to doubt. In anticipation of doubt with respect to the advice, a writer could, in principle, put forward arguments to show that for each of the correctness conditions of advising the condition is satisfied. In Chapter 3 it was argued that in health brochures it is very likely that a writer puts forward arguments to demonstrate that the first preparatory condition, the condition that the advised act should benefit the reader's health, is satisfied.

In Chapter 3 several examples from actual brochures were presented that contained arguments anticipating other types of doubt, such as doubt with respect to the ability of the reader to perform the advocated action (preparatory condition 3c). Thus, the ability to perform the advised action might be at issue, and might even be the only issue standing in the way of people accepting health advice. However, in the context of health brochures, where the discussion remains implicit, it is unlikely that people accept advice to do action X merely because they are *able* to do action X. Although this condition is necessary for accepting the advice, people will need to first believe that carrying out the advised action will be to their benefit. The correctness condition that the advocated or discouraged action should benefit the advisee is therefore a crucial condition for accepting a piece of advice, so a writer must make sure that he removes any potential doubt concerning the fulfillment of this condition. It is precisely to remove this kind of doubt that pragmatic argumentation is employed.

In the argumentation stage, the protagonist can either present the positive form (variant I) or the negative form (variant II) of pragmatic argumentation to remove doubt against the standpoint. The choice for the one move or the other depends on whether the advice provided in the brochure is positive or negative. An example of a brochure in which route 1 with the positive form of pragmatic

argumentation is chosen is the brochure ‘5 a day. Just eat more (fruit & veg)’: “Eating more fruit and vegetables may help reduce the risk of the two main killer diseases in this country – heart disease and some cancers” (NHS 2003). The brochure writer expects that the reader might doubt whether he should follow the advice to eat more fruit and vegetables. In anticipation of this doubt, the writer puts forward the argument that eating more fruit and vegetables will reduce the risk of developing heart disease and some cancers. The writer thereby anticipates doubt with respect to the effectiveness of the advice. By putting forward the positive form of pragmatic argumentation, the writer intends to show that carrying out the advised action indeed benefits the reader – in this case by preventing health problems.

An example of a brochure in which route 1 with the negative form of pragmatic argumentation is chosen is the following: “The NHS recommends that you should not regularly drink more than: 3-4 units of alcohol a day for men, 2-3 units of alcohol per day for women. If you drink more than this, the risks to your health and personal safety start to increase” (“Drinking, you and your mates. How much is too much?”, NHS 2007a). In this British brochure directed at young adults, it is advised not to drink more than the indicated amount of alcohol. Here, again, the pragmatic argumentation is meant to remove anticipated doubt with respect to the benefits of following the advice. With the negative form of pragmatic argumentation, the writer indicates that the reader should refrain from doing the discouraged action, because stopping unhealthy behavior eliminates risks. By arguing that drinking more than the recommended maximum amount of alcohol increases health risks and personal safety risks, the writer removes potential doubts with respect to the benefits of following the advice.

So, in cases where the brochure writer takes route 1, and thus only expects doubt with respect to the standpoint, both the positive and the negative form of pragmatic argumentation are dialectically relevant moves. These moves have the function of removing anticipated doubt with respect to the standpoint by indicating that the crucial preparatory condition about the benefits of the advised action is satisfied. This route thereby contributes to reaching the dialectical sub-goal of removing doubt against the standpoint.

#### 4.6.2 Route 2: Removing doubt concerning the acceptability of the argumentation

Besides just trying to remove doubt with respect to the standpoint, a writer can choose route 2, which entails that he does not only put forward arguments for his standpoint but also anticipates a critical reaction towards the acceptability of his argumentation. Route 2 consists, just as route 1, of an argument in direct defence of their standpoint. In addition, in route 2 the protagonist anticipates doubt with respect to propositional content of the premise and advances a subordinate

argument in support of the pragmatic argument. The route can be represented as follows:

Route 2

P: advances argument 1.1 for standpoint

A: doubts propositional content argument 1.1

P: advances subordinative argument 1.1.1

A: OK

In route 2, the protagonist expects doubt with respect to the advanced pragmatic argumentation in defense of the standpoint. Because he chooses this particular argument scheme, he should be able to address the critical questions associated with this scheme. In Section 4.3.3, it was argued that criticism concerning the propositional content of the pragmatic argument is represented by critical questions 1, 2 and 3. This means that when a brochure writer opts for route 2, he puts forward pragmatic argumentation and anticipates critical questions 1, 2 or 3. As was explained in Section 4.2, the pragmatic argument ‘Action X leads to (un)desirable consequence Y’ contains both an evaluative and a causal component. Question 1 concerns the evaluative component, while questions 2 and 3 concern the causal component. Whenever a writer expects this premise to be questioned, either with respect to the causal link between action and effect or with respect to the evaluation of that effect, he can put forward subordinative argumentation to support (one of the elements of) the premise. An example of route 2 would be the following:

P: You should eat fruit and vegetables regularly

(A: Why?)

P: Eating fruit and vegetables helps you achieve a healthy weight

(A: Does eating fruit and vegetables indeed lead to a healthy weight?)

P: Fruit and vegetables are low calorie and low sugar foods

(A: OK)

In subordinative argumentation, a writer can again opt for various argument schemes. In the case of sub-argumentation in support of the evaluative claim, he can choose any type of argumentation. In the case of the causal claim, the dialectically relevant options are restricted. Pragmatic argumentation, for example, cannot be applied correctly to defend a descriptive claim.

#### 4.6.3 Route 3: removing doubt concerning the justificatory force of the argumentation

Just as routes 1 and 2, Route 3 consists of an argument in support of the standpoint. In this route, however, the protagonist performs a move in anticipation of doubt with respect to the *justificatory force* of the argumentation. In anticipation of this kind of critical reaction, he puts forward an additional argument that together with the first argument is supposed to justify the standpoint. This route, resulting in coordinative argumentation, can be represented as follows:

##### Route 3

P: advances argument 1.1 for standpoint

A: doubts justificatory force of argument 1.1

P: advances coordinative argument 1.1b

A: OK

In route 3 the protagonist expects doubt concerning the justificatory force of the pragmatic argumentation. As argued in Section 4.3.3, doubt concerning the justificatory force of pragmatic argumentation advanced by the protagonist is specified in critical questions 4 and 5 associated with the pragmatic argument scheme. In route 3 the protagonist can advance an additional pragmatic argument to remove doubt concerning the sufficiency of the initial pragmatic argumentation. Critical questions 4 and 5 can be dealt with by using variants III and IV of pragmatic argumentation presented in Section 4.2.1. Critical question 4, 'Does the mentioned cause (X) have any serious undesirable side-effects?', can be countered by employing variant III of pragmatic argumentation. Critical question 5, 'Could the mentioned result be achieved or prevented by other means as well?', can be countered by using variant IV of pragmatic argumentation.

By means of variant III, the writer intends to address criticism that the reader might have concerning the advice. Such criticism comes down to an attack on the sufficiency of the argument to support the standpoint (see also Snoeck Henkemans 1997: 136): although the audience might accept that the advised action has a certain desirable consequence, they may not yet be convinced that the piece of advice meets the preparatory condition that the action is desirable since there are possible negative side-effects. Using variant III of pragmatic argumentation is dialectically relevant because it removes potential doubt concerning the sufficiency of the first argument advanced by the protagonist, which in this case is the positive variant of pragmatic argumentation. Although an argument based on variant III cannot in itself constitute a sufficient reason for accepting the standpoint – after all, the

absence of negative effects is no reason for accepting a piece of advice – it still contributes to the testing of the standpoint in the argumentation stage.

An example of the use of variant III in route 3 is the following:

P: You should get vaccinated against HPV

(A: Why?)

P: vaccination against HPV prevents cervical cancer

(A: Does vaccination not have any undesirable side-effects?)

P: Vaccination does not have any serious undesirable side-effects

(A: OK)

Another possible kind of doubt with respect to the sufficiency of the argumentation is critical question 5: ‘Could the result mentioned be achieved or counteracted by other means as well?’ When giving advice, a writer can anticipate a situation in which the reader asks whether there are no other means to achieve the desired result. To address such anticipated doubt, the writer can employ variant IV to deny that the preparatory condition of the alternative action is fulfilled. Again, such a move contributes to the dialectical process by removing potential doubt with respect to the argumentation in the argumentation stage. However, independently from other pragmatic arguments, variant IV, just as variant III, is not a relevant move; both constitute an extra argument to reinforce the defence. Together with either the positive or the negative form of pragmatic argumentation, they both cumulatively form coordinative argumentation.

An example of route 3 is the following:

P: You should get vaccinated against HPV

(A: Why?)

P: vaccination against HPV protects against cervical cancer

(A: Are there no other means to protect oneself against cervical cancer?)

P: Other methods do not protect against cervical cancer

(A: OK)

Due to the specific constraints that advancing an advisory standpoint poses on the argumentation, criticism concerning the sufficiency of the argumentation could also concern the performance of the central speech act, namely the speech act of advising. In health brochures, pragmatic argumentation is used to indicate that a crucial condition of advising is fulfilled. However, as explained earlier, the performance of the speech act may give rise to other kinds of doubt concerning the fulfillment of the felicity conditions as well. Since a speech act is only performed felicitously if all conditions are fulfilled, a writer needs to show that those other felicity conditions are also fulfilled. Consequently, in anticipation of this kind of doubt, he needs to complement his pragmatic argumentation with additional

arguments referring to the fulfillment of other felicity conditions. These arguments then form coordinative argumentation with the pragmatic argument because a speech act can only be considered to be performed felicitously if all conditions have been fulfilled. The arguments referring to the fulfillment of the conditions should thus all be taken together to constitute a sufficient defence of the standpoint (see also Snoeck Henkemans 1997: 160-161).

#### 4.6.4 Route 4: refuting counterarguments

In Route 4 the protagonist refutes the antagonist's counterarguments against the argumentation. Choosing route 4 entails that, in addition to putting forward argumentation as a direct defence of the standpoint, the brochure writer anticipates that the difference of opinion is mixed and addresses a potential opposing standpoint that he ascribes to the reader. In such a situation, the writer argues that the action promoted in the opposing standpoint is not desirable, because it lacks the favourable effects needed to accept the piece of advice. Employing variant IV of pragmatic argumentation is a relevant move in anticipation of this possibility. The route can be represented in the following way:

##### Route 4

P: advances argument 1.1 for standpoint

A: advances counter-argument against argument 1.1

P: refutes counter-argument (complementary coordinative argument 1.1b)

A: OK

In route 4 the protagonist can attack the counterargument by using variant IV of pragmatic argumentation: 'Action X should not be performed because Action X does not lead to desirable consequence Y (and if an action does not lead to a desirable consequence, then that action should not be performed)'. By using this variant a writer attacks the anticipated standpoint by showing that the alternative action does not lead to the goal of the action advocated in the standpoint. For an advice to be considered felicitous, all felicity conditions must be fulfilled. Therefore, showing that one preparatory condition is not met is sufficient to counter that standpoint. However, an attack on the other party's standpoint does not discharge the writer from defending his own standpoint: when both parties adopt a standpoint, both have a burden of proof. The choice for variant IV as an attack on the other party's standpoint can still be relevant for solving the difference of opinion because a successful attack forces the other party to withdraw his standpoint, thereby removing a threat to the writer's standpoint. As Snoeck Henkemans argues, this move can be seen as an indirect defense of the standpoint (1997: 131-132). Since attacking a counterargument does not constitute an independent defence of the standpoint but only complements the other arguments, route 4 results in complementary

coordinative argumentation. The function of pragmatic argumentation in each of the four routes is represented in Table 4.4.

**Table 4.4 The function of pragmatic argumentation in the four dialectical routes**

Route	(anticipated) countermove by antagonist against standpoint	Response by protagonist to countermove	(anticipated) countermove by antagonist against argumentation	Response by protagonist to countermove
Route 1	Doubt against standpoint	Advance pragmatic argumentation (Variant I or II)		
Route 2	Doubt against standpoint	Advance pragmatic argumentation (Variant I or II)	Doubt concerning acceptability propositional content (critical question 1, 2 and 3)	Advance subordinate argumentation (answer to critical question 1, 2 and 3)
Route 3	Doubt against standpoint	Advance pragmatic argumentation (Variant I or II)	Doubt concerning justificatory force (critical question 4 and 5)	Advance pragmatic argumentation Variant III (answer to critical question 4) or Variant IV (answer to critical question 5)
Route 4	Doubt against standpoint/ Counter-standpoint	Advance pragmatic argumentation (Variant I or II) / advance counter-argument	Counter-argument	Refute counter-argument (Variant IV)

## 4.7 Conclusion

The characterization of pragmatic argumentation makes clear how this type of argumentation is related to advice-giving. The standpoint to which pragmatic argumentation relates concerns advice, and pragmatic argumentation is a means to show that the advised action is indeed worth doing. To accept a piece of advice it is essential that the addressee thinks that the advised action is beneficial for him. In the case of negative advice, the same principle applies, namely that the reader should not perform a particular action because it would not be beneficial to him. Based on the positive and negative pragmatic argument scheme, two more variants of the scheme which may be used in coordinative argumentation have been distinguished.

This chapter has explained that pragmatic argumentation is a dialectically relevant move in a discussion about health advice because it contributes to reaching the sub-goals of the argumentation stage, which entail that the protagonist

removes criticism with respect to his standpoint and his argumentation. Four dialectical routes were distinguished that differ in the type of countermove that the protagonist responds to: doubt concerning the standpoint (route 1), doubt concerning the propositional content (route 2) or the justificatory force (route 3) of the argumentation, or a counter-argument (route 4). Pragmatic argumentation plays a role in each of these four routes.

In route 1 the protagonist only removes doubt with respect to the standpoint. Here, the positive and negative forms of pragmatic argumentation contribute to the resolution of the presupposed difference of opinion by showing that the preparatory condition for advising concerning the positive effect on the reader's health is fulfilled. In route 2 and 3 the protagonist not only employs variant I or II of pragmatic argumentation to remove doubt with respect to the standpoint, but he also assumes that he has to deal with criticism concerning the argumentation. The kind of criticism the protagonist can expect is represented by the critical questions associated with the pragmatic argument scheme. In route 2, the protagonist puts forward subordinative argumentation in anticipation of critical questions 1, 2 or 3, which concern the acceptability of the pragmatic argument. In route 3, the protagonist anticipates critical questions 4 or 5, which represent criticism concerning the sufficiency of the argumentation. The protagonist puts forward variant III of pragmatic argumentation to deal with critical question 4 about possible side-effects and variant IV to deal with question 5 about possible alternatives to the proposed action. In route 4 the protagonist employs variant IV of pragmatic argumentation to attack a counterargument, thereby giving an indirect defence of the standpoint.

The proposed pragma-dialectical analysis shows that there is a systematic connection between an advisory standpoint and potential countermoves, and a specific variant of pragmatic argumentation. However, the choices for particular moves as part of a dialectical route are not only made to reach a particular dialectical goal, but are meant at the same time to reach certain rhetorical objectives. The rhetorical aspect of choosing a particular route is analyzed in Chapter 5.