

Appendix

Tables and Figures

Table A1: Number of Days Between Election and Start of Data Collection

country	election day	experts	CSES
Australia	18.05.2019	2	16
Austria	15.10.2017	1	4
Canada	21.10.2019	4	1
Finland	14.04.2019	1	3
France	11.06.2017	1	2
Germany	24.09.2017	1	1
Great Britain	08.06.2017	2	18
Hong Kong	04.09.2016	2	2
Hungary	08.04.2018	1	15
Iceland	29.10.2016	2	1
Iceland	28.10.2017	2	2
Italy	04.03.2018	1	4
Lithuania	09.10.2016	1	33
Montenegro	16.10.2016	1	53
New Zealand	23.09.2017	2	3
Norway	11.09.2017	1	9
Portugal	06.10.2019	2	6
Sweden	09.09.2018	1	1

Note: Both the CSES and experts survey data have been collected after the election.

Table A2: List of Parties by Country and Election Year

country	year	party	in CMP
Australia	2019	Labor	x
		Greens	x
		One Nation	
Austria	2017	Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)	x
	2017	Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ)	x
		Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	x
		The New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS)	x
		The Greens	x
Canada	2019	Conservative Party	x
		Liberal Party	x
		New Democratic Party	x
		Bloc Québécois	x
		Green Party	x
Finland	2019	Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP)	x
		Finns Party	x
		National Coalition Party (KOK)	x
		Centre Party (KESK)	x
		Green League (VIHR)	x
		Left Alliance (VAS)	x
		Swedish People's Party of Finland (SFP)	
France	2017	La République En Marche (REM)	x
		Front National (FN)	x
		Les Républicains (LR)	x
		La France insoumise (FI)	x
		Parti Socialiste (PS)	x
Germany	2017	CDU/CSU	x
		SPD	x
		Alternative for Germany (AfD)	x
		Free Democratic Party (FDP)	x
		Die Linke	x
		The Greens	x
Hong Kong	2016	Dem. Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of HK (DAB)	
		Civic Party	
		Democratic Party (DP)	
		Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU)	
		New People's Party (NPP)	
		People Power–League of Social Democrats (PP/LSD)	
		Labour Party	
Hungary	2018	Fidesz	x
		Jobbik	x
		MSZP-Dialogue	
		Politics Can Be Different (LMP)	x
		Democratic Coalition (DK)	x
Iceland	2016	Independence Party	x

country	year	party	in CMP
		Left-Green Movement (VG)	x
		Pirate Party	x
		Progressive Party (FSF)	x
		Vioreisn (V)	
		Bright Future (SJI)	x
		Social Democratic Alliance (SJI)	x
Iceland	2017	Independence Party (IP)	x
		Left-Green Movement (VG)	x
		Social Democratic Alliance (SDA)	x
		Centre Party (CP)	
		Progressive Party (FSF)	x
		Pirate Party (P)	x
		Vioreisn (V)	
Italy	2018	Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S)	x
		Partito Democratico (PD)	x
		Lega	x
		Forza Italia (FI)	x
		Fratelli d'Italia (FdI)	
		Liberi e Uguali (LeU)	
Lithuania	2016	Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD)	x
		Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union	x
		Social Democratic Party of Lithuania	x
		Liberal Movement	x
		Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania	x
		Party Order and Justice	x
		Labour Party	x
Montenegro	2016	Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro	x
		Democratic Front	x
		Key Coalition	x
		Democratic Montenegro	x
		Social Democratic Party of Montenegro	x
		Social Democrats of Montenegro	x
		Bosniak Party	x
New Zealand	2017	National	x
		Labour	x
		New Zealand First	x
		Green Party	x
		Maori Party	x
Norway	2017	Labour Party (A/Ap)	x
		Conservative Party (H)	x
		Progress Party (FrP)	x
		Centre Party (Sp)	x
		Socialist Left Party (SV)	x
Portugal	2019	Socialist Party (PS)	x
		Social Democratic Party (PSD)	x
		Left Bloc (BE)	x

country	year	party	in CMP
		CDS – People’s Party	X
		People–Animals–Nature (PAN)	X
		Chega (CH)	X
		Liberal Initiative (IL)	X
Sweden	2018	Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP)	X
		Moderate Party (M)	X
		Sweden Democrats (SD)	X
		Centre Party (C)	X
		Left Party (V)	X
		Christian Democrats (KD)	X
		Liberals (L)	X
		Green Party (MP)	X
UK	2017	Conservative Party	X
		Labour Party	X
		Liberal Democrats (LibDem)	X
		UK Independence Party (UKIP)	X

Figure A1: Distribution of Affective Polarization




Table A3: Explaining Affective Polarization (controlling for perceived distance)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
intercept	3.04*** (0.11)	2.98*** (0.11)	3.22*** (0.11)	2.39*** (0.13)	2.57*** (0.09)
age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
gender (female)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
education	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
follows politics	0.10*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
strength of party ID	0.80*** (0.02)	0.81*** (0.02)	0.82*** (0.02)	0.84*** (0.03)	0.84*** (0.03)
perceived distance (l-r)	0.56*** (0.00)	0.55*** (0.00)	0.53*** (0.00)	0.52*** (0.00)	0.52*** (0.00)
own party negative tone	0.27*** (0.02)		0.23*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)
other party negative tone	0.60*** (0.01)		0.55*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.01)
own party targets the other		0.20*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)
other party targets own party		0.19*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.01)
own party in government				-0.27*** (0.04)	-0.27*** (0.04)
other party in government				-0.41*** (0.03)	-0.41*** (0.03)
own party extremism (cmp)				-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
other party extremism (cmp)				0.24*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)
own party single issue				0.47*** (0.07)	0.47*** (0.07)
other party single issue				0.65*** (0.03)	0.65*** (0.03)
tone (campaign)					-0.31 (0.17)
media attention (campaign)					0.70*** (0.16)
race competitiveness (campaign)					-0.17*** (0.04)
Log Likelihood	-147817.87	-148697.65	-147447.65	-123556.57	-123557.42
Num. obs.	65427	65427	65427	55010	55010
Num. groups: election_rgx:id	14498	14498	14498	13716	13716
Var: election_rgx:id (Intercept)	1.92	1.89	1.92	1.87	1.87
Var: Residual	4.21	4.36	4.16	4.06	4.06

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; \cdot $p < 0.1$

Table A4: Explaining Affective Polarization (using adjusted measures of negativity)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
intercept	3.35*** (0.13)	3.34*** (0.13)	3.67*** (0.13)	3.70*** (0.14)	4.38*** (0.09)
age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
gender (female)	0.07* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)
education	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
follows politics	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)
strength of party ID	1.12*** (0.03)	1.12*** (0.03)	1.12*** (0.03)	1.12*** (0.03)	1.12*** (0.03)
objective distance l-r (cmp)	0.60*** (0.01)	0.55*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.01)	0.49*** (0.01)	0.49*** (0.01)
own party negative tone (adjusted)	0.31*** (0.02)		0.24*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)
other party negative tone (adjusted)	0.78*** (0.01)		0.67*** (0.01)	0.59*** (0.01)	0.59*** (0.01)
own party targets the other		0.26*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)
other party targets own party		0.42*** (0.01)	0.42*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.01)
own party in government				-0.59*** (0.04)	-0.59*** (0.04)
other party in government				-0.59*** (0.03)	-0.59*** (0.03)
own party extremism (cmp)				-0.14* (0.06)	-0.14* (0.06)
other party extremism (cmp)				0.19*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)
own party single issue				0.71*** (0.08)	0.71*** (0.08)
other party single issue				0.91*** (0.04)	0.91*** (0.04)
tone (campaign)					0.43* (0.18)
media attention (campaign)					0.66*** (0.17)
race competitiveness (campaign)					0.10* (0.05)
Log Likelihood	-149444.43	-156032.17	-148224.34	-147749.96	-147750.81
Num. obs.	61838	64844	61838	61838	61838
Num. groups: election_rgx:id	15353	15576	15353	15353	15353
Var: election_rgx:id (Intercept)	2.16	2.21	2.25	2.24	2.24
Var: Residual	5.91	5.75	5.61	5.51	5.51

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; \cdot $p < 0.1$

Table A5: Explaining Affective Polarization (controlling for experts characteristics)

	Model 1	Model 2
intercept	4.23*** (0.14)	5.57*** (0.23)
age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
gender (female)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
education	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
follows politics	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
strength of party ID	1.11*** (0.03)	1.11*** (0.03)
objective distance l-r (cmp)	0.46*** (0.01)	0.46*** (0.01)
own party in government	-0.54*** (0.04)	-0.54*** (0.04)
other party in government	-0.60*** (0.03)	-0.60*** (0.03)
own party extremism (cmp)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
other party extremism (cmp)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)
own party single issue	0.73*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)
other party single issue	1.06*** (0.04)	1.06*** (0.04)
own party negative tone	0.23*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.02)
other party negative tone	0.57*** (0.01)	0.57*** (0.01)
own party targets the other	0.28*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)
other party targets own party	0.45*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)
share of domestic experts		-1.08* (0.44)
familiarity of election campaign (experts)		0.04 (0.22)
ease of questionnaire (experts)		1.25** (0.45)
l-r ideology (experts)		1.12*** (0.21)
share of female (experts)		-1.30 (0.97)
share of phd (experts)		0.22 (0.31)
number of experts respondents		-2.03** (0.78)
Log Likelihood	-154259.31	-154262.23
Num. obs.	64844	64844
Num. groups: election_rgx:id	15576	15576
Var: election_rgx:id (Intercept)	2.25	2.25
Var: Residual	5.38	5.38

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; $\dagger p < 0.1$

Table A6: Explaining Affective Polarization (only observations with AP ≥ 0)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
intercept	4.27*** (0.13)	3.55*** (0.13)	4.47*** (0.13)	4.49*** (0.13)	4.74*** (0.08)
age	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
gender (female)	0.05 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)
education	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
follows politics	0.10*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
strength of party ID	1.03*** (0.02)	1.03*** (0.02)	1.02*** (0.02)	1.02*** (0.02)	1.02*** (0.02)
objective distance l-r (cmp)	0.56*** (0.01)	0.53*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)
own party negative tone	0.32*** (0.02)		0.27*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.02)
other party negative tone	0.68*** (0.01)		0.60*** (0.01)	0.57*** (0.01)	0.57*** (0.01)
own party targets the other		0.27*** (0.01)	0.22*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)
other party targets own party		0.39*** (0.01)	0.37*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.01)
own party in government				-0.59*** (0.03)	-0.59*** (0.03)
other party in government				-0.60*** (0.03)	-0.60*** (0.03)
own party extremism (cmp)				-0.15** (0.05)	-0.15** (0.05)
other party extremism (cmp)				0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)
own party single issue				0.75*** (0.07)	0.75*** (0.07)
other party single issue				1.05*** (0.04)	1.05*** (0.04)
tone (campaign)					0.07 (0.17)
media attention (campaign)					0.33* (0.15)
race competitiveness (campaign)					-0.02 (0.04)
Log Likelihood	-149980.94	-149940.79	-148750.99	-148120.82	-148121.67
Num. obs.	63336	63336	63336	63336	63336
Num. groups: election_rgx:id	15471	15471	15471	15471	15471
Var: election_rgx:id (Intercept)	1.54	1.57	1.61	1.60	1.60
Var: Residual	5.57	5.54	5.29	5.17	5.17

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; \cdot $p < 0.1$

Table A7: Explaining Affective Polarization (Reduced Sample)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
intercept	3.97*** (0.25)	3.48*** (0.25)	4.15*** (0.25)	4.51*** (0.28)	4.85*** (0.16)
age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
gender (female)	0.07 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
education	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.01)
follows politics	0.11*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)
strength of party ID	1.16*** (0.04)	1.18*** (0.04)	1.18*** (0.04)	1.18*** (0.04)	1.18*** (0.04)
objective distance l-r (cmp)	0.55*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.03)	0.39*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.03)
own party negative tone	0.24*** (0.04)		0.18*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)
other party negative tone	0.54*** (0.03)		0.45*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.03)
own party targets the other		0.07** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
other party targets own party		0.54*** (0.03)	0.51*** (0.03)	0.56*** (0.03)	0.56*** (0.03)
own party in government				-0.56*** (0.06)	-0.56*** (0.06)
other party in government				-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.49*** (0.07)
own party extremism (cmp)				-0.34** (0.12)	-0.34** (0.12)
other party extremism (cmp)				-0.04 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)
own party single issue				0.83*** (0.19)	0.83*** (0.19)
other party single issue				0.83*** (0.08)	0.83*** (0.08)
tone (campaign)					0.37 (0.33)
media attention (campaign)					0.10 (0.27)
race competitiveness (campaign)					0.10 (0.09)
Log Likelihood	-34297.99	-34147.99	-34024.28	-33941.36	-33942.21
Num. obs.	14151	14151	14151	14151	14151
Num. groups: election_rgx:id	9102	9102	9102	9102	9102
Var: election_rgx:id (Intercept)	2.41	2.51	2.53	2.51	2.51
Var: Residual	5.34	5.11	4.98	4.90	4.90

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ' $p < 0.1$

Table A8: Explaining Affective Polarization (After Exclusion of Radical Right Partisans)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
intercept	4.09*** (0.13)	3.27*** (0.13)	4.26*** (0.13)	4.18*** (0.14)	4.58*** (0.09)
age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
gender (female)	0.09** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)
education	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
follows politics	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)
strength of party ID	1.09*** (0.03)	1.09*** (0.03)	1.09*** (0.03)	1.09*** (0.03)	1.09*** (0.03)
objective distance l-r (cmp)	0.61*** (0.01)	0.58*** (0.01)	0.50*** (0.01)	0.49*** (0.02)	0.49*** (0.02)
own party negative tone	0.31*** (0.02)		0.25*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.02)
other party negative tone	0.76*** (0.01)		0.66*** (0.01)	0.63*** (0.01)	0.63*** (0.01)
own party targets the other		0.26*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.01)
other party targets own party		0.41*** (0.01)	0.39*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.01)
own party in government				-0.44*** (0.04)	-0.44*** (0.04)
other party in government				-0.59*** (0.03)	-0.59*** (0.03)
own party extremism (cmp)				0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
other party extremism (cmp)				0.17*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)
own party single issue				0.68*** (0.08)	0.68*** (0.08)
other party single issue				1.05*** (0.04)	1.05*** (0.04)
tone (campaign)					0.24 (0.18)
media attention (campaign)					0.22 (0.16)
race competitiveness (campaign)					-0.05 (0.05)
Log Likelihood	-147438.25	-147718.43	-146393.72	-145882.14	-145882.99
Num. obs.	61468	61468	61468	61468	61468
Num. groups: election_rgx:id	14653	14653	14653	14653	14653
Var: election_rgx:id (Intercept)	2.00	1.99	2.05	2.05	2.05
Var: Residual	5.75	5.82	5.51	5.40	5.40

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; \cdot $p < 0.1$


Parties removed from the analysis are: Freedom Party of Austria (Austria), Finns Party (Finland), Front National (France), AfD (Germany), Fidesz (Hungary), Lega (Italy), Fratelli d'Italia (Italy), Party Order and Justice (Lithuania), Chega (Portugal)

Discussion on the Main Independent Variables

One could wonder whether the two independent variables “*own party targets the other*” and “*other party targets own party*” are not too correlated to be included in the same regression. Indeed, it is likely that when party A attacks party B, party B will respond. If the two variables are too correlated, it may not be possible to disentangle the effects of the two independent variables on affective polarization.

Figure A2 shows the relation between these two variables. Each point shows a different dyad between two parties of the same country. The graph is not symmetric around the diagonal because each dyad is only presented once (we used random selection to decide which party of the dyad is on the horizontal axis, and which one on the vertical axis).

Figure A2: Relation Between The Two “Attacks” Variables




The graph shows that the two variables are not perfectly correlated, and that it is not because one party attacks another that the former will automatically respond. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient equals 0.39 (p -value < 0.01).

Although less evident, the two variables “*own party negative tone*” and “*other party negative tone*” could also be correlated. Figure A3 shows the relation between these two variables. We see that no clear trend appears in this graph. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient equals 0.18 (p -value

< 0.01). Consequently, we believe that there is no reason to think that these two variables should not be included in the same regression.

Figure A3: Relation Between The Two “Tone” Variables



Another way to check whether there is too much correlation between two independent variables is to look at the effect of each of these variables without the other. Table A9 present the complete model of the main table (Model 5 in Table 1) in the first column. In columns 2 to 5, the same model is presented without *other party negative tone*, *own party negative tone*, *other party targets own party*, and *own party targets the other* respectively. All coefficients of interest remain positive and significant.

Table A9: Explaining AP (Multicollinearity Check)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
intercept	4.61*** (0.09)	4.31*** (0.09)	4.58*** (0.09)	4.62*** (0.09)	4.67*** (0.09)
age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
gender (female)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)
education	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
follows politics	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
strength of party ID	1.11*** (0.03)	1.11*** (0.03)	1.12*** (0.03)	1.12*** (0.03)	1.11*** (0.03)
objective distance l-r (cmp)	0.46*** (0.01)	0.49*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.01)	0.52*** (0.01)	0.49*** (0.01)
own party negative tone	0.23*** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)		0.31*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)
other party negative tone	0.57*** (0.01)		0.55*** (0.01)	0.58*** (0.01)	0.63*** (0.01)
own party targets the other	0.28*** (0.01)	0.38*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.46*** (0.01)	
other party targets own party	0.45*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.01)		0.61*** (0.01)
own party in government	-0.54*** (0.04)	-0.65*** (0.04)	-0.59*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.62*** (0.04)
other party in government	-0.60*** (0.03)	-0.84*** (0.03)	-0.62*** (0.03)	-0.67*** (0.03)	-0.32*** (0.02)
own party extremism (cmp)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.06)
other party extremism (cmp)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.35*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.21*** (0.03)
own party single issue	0.73*** (0.08)	0.71*** (0.08)	0.63*** (0.08)	0.69*** (0.08)	0.69*** (0.08)
other party single issue	1.06*** (0.04)	0.91*** (0.04)	1.06*** (0.04)	1.04*** (0.04)	0.98*** (0.04)
tone (campaign)	0.24 (0.18)	1.46*** (0.18)	0.80*** (0.17)	0.18 (0.18)	0.21 (0.18)
media attention (campaign)	0.26 (0.16)	-0.33* (0.16)	-0.12 (0.16)	0.29 (0.16)	0.21 (0.16)
race competitiveness (campaign)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.41*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
Log Likelihood	-154260.16	-155246.88	-154318.27	-154787.01	-154564.37
Num. obs.	64844	64844	64844	64844	64844
Num. groups: election_rgx:id	15576	15576	15576	15576	15576
Var: election_rgx:id (Intercept)	2.25	2.20	2.28	2.25	2.26
Var: Residual	5.38	5.60	5.38	5.49	5.44

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; \cdot $p < 0.1$