Tolerance: a neglected dimension in diversity training?

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Tolerance: A Neglected Dimension in Diversity Training?

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To reduce discrimination and achieve a sustainable integration of an increasingly diverse workforce, organizations invest considerable time and money into diversity training. Despite these efforts, corporate diversity training oftentimes is not effective, as it does not sufficiently enable training participants to constructively deal with diversity. We specify the underlying barriers to learning that may cause diversity training to fail: The trainees’ tendency to keep quiet about their thoughts or to voice them in a dogmatic manner, which is likely to lead to latent or manifest conflicts, hindering learning. We also show why the currently dominant diversity-training models—labeled according to their objectives as “equal opportunities,” “integrating minorities,” and “inclusion via ‘me’ within ‘we’”—do not suffice to overcome these barriers to learning, largely due to dysfunctional beliefs of the trainers, as these shape learning processes, and thus, training success. Proposing that tolerance acts as a vehicle to overcoming the barriers to learning in diversity training, we introduce a training model focused on fostering tolerance and sustained by tolerance-supportive trainer beliefs. We discuss training measures that could aid the development of tolerance in trainees, limitations of our tolerance-centered diversity training, and venues for future research.

Many companies have recognized that workforce diversity, the differences among employees with respect to characteristics such as age, sex, race, or educational background, can benefit learning and creativity, but also can lower communication and cooperation and increase conflict (Jackson & Joshi, 2011). Diversity and the chances and risks associated with it are likely to rise further, given increasingly globalized economic processes and international migration. In addition, employees also work more and more interdependently with their coworkers, who may differ in nationality, language, culture, and religion. These workplace changes increase the requirements for companies—also from the perspective of legal standards—to integrate minorities, reduce discrimination, and promote a diversity climate focused on equality and fairness (McKay, Avery, & Morris, 2008).

Especially from the point of view of integration, large companies in the United States for instance invest considerable amounts of time and money in conducting diversity training (Anand & Winters, 2008). Companies oftentimes do so in the hope that when collaborative knowledge, abilities, and behaviors increase at an individual level—thereby
enabling employees to constructively deal with diversity—this will help integration at an organizational level. Underlying these efforts is the assumption that a successful integration ultimately also aids company success (Ely & Thomas, 2001).

In practice, three forms of corporate diversity training aimed at ensuring integration, labeled here according to their objectives as “equal opportunities,” “integrating minorities,” and “inclusion via ‘me’ within ‘we’,” prevail in the United States. In the 2008 Special Issue of the Academy of Management Learning & Education on diversity-training effectiveness, the contributing authors’ conclusion was relatively disillusioning. Following for instance Bell and Kravitz’ statement (2008: 307), “the field has progressed less than we would have hoped after two decades of concerted efforts and research.” Therefore, it is important to identify the causes of the frequent lack of success of these three forms of corporate diversity training in enabling a constructive solution to deal with diversity and ultimately achieving all employees’ successful integration, and to deduct consequences with respect to diversity training. This is the central focus of our article. In line with the existent literature that primarily refers to corporate diversity training instead of undergraduate, graduate, and PhD-level courses at business schools, we focus on corporate diversity training (in-house or offsite training).

Two barriers to learning cause many diversity-training interventions’ lack of success. First, dogmatic communication patterns occur quite frequently in training groups (Stewart, Crary, & Humberd, 2008). Second, trainees oftentimes voice what they believe they should say rather than what their thoughts are in anticipation of assumed political correctness (Avery & Steingard, 2008). We explain what influences these two mechanisms, as well as how they impair learning success in a training form that deals constructively with diversity. In particular, we clarify why the three currently dominant diversity-training models cannot adequately cope with these barriers to learning. This is largely due to the respective trainers who ignore, misinterpret, or inadvertently reinforce these barriers to learning given specific prejudices and beliefs, making the training’s lack of success bound to happen. Trainers have an important role in this regard, as they typically design the training, and thus, the learning processes by the nature of their belief-guided intervention. We detail which trainer beliefs are dysfunctional for overcoming the two barriers to learning and why they are dysfunctional in the three currently practiced diversity-training models.

As an alternative to the three currently practiced diversity-training models, we propose a tolerance-centered diversity training. We define tolerance as acceptance of (a) everyone’s right to sustain and express values even if these differ from others’ values, and of (b) the obligation to a dialogue-oriented practice of communication in which both actor and receiver abstain from superiority claims regarding their own values (cf. Berkovich, 2014; Buber, 1958). According to the first part of this definition, tolerance helps to reduce trainees’ not voicing their real thoughts and, as the second part of the definition describes, tolerance also counteracts dogmatic communication. We thus see tolerance as a vehicle to overcoming the barriers to learning in diversity training. Our central assumption is that a trainer who is guided by tolerance-supportive beliefs will foster tolerance on the side of the trainees; tolerance-centered diversity training should thus better overcome the barriers to learning than the three currently practiced training models. We expect that to the extent that corporate diversity training develops tolerance as a vital precondition of integration at the individual level, this will also increase the chance of a successful integration of the workforce at the organizational level.

We contribute to the diversity-training literature in several ways. First, by comparing these four corporate diversity-training models, we make plausible which trainer beliefs contribute to reinforcing rather than weakening the central barriers to learning, and why they do so. Our analysis of beliefs underlying diversity training delivers important starting points for trainers to consider their beliefs, and, if applicable, optimize what educational measures they employ during training, as these are likely to be guided by their beliefs. Second, we introduce a tolerance-centered corporate diversity training and explain why this training model may be more effective in overcoming the barriers to learning and fostering diversity-training success than the three currently practiced models. Third, because fostering tolerance among trainees requires its thorough explanation, we discuss the fundamental beliefs underlying tolerance (and intolerance; Hardy & Tolhurst, 2014), and on this basis, point out measures to develop tolerance-supportive beliefs. We thereby distinguish different tolerance-supportive learning processes and clarify which educational measures can foster them. We also elaborate on the limitations of our tolerance-centered diversity training and discuss directions for future research. Last, we complement our focus on corporate diversity training by providing a suggestion
regarding content and design of a MBA course for use at business schools, which also serves as a practical illustration of our tolerance-related insights for diversity training.

**ENHANCING DIVERSITY-TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS: A TOLERANCE-CENTERED MODEL**

In this section, we detail our theoretical assumptions regarding diversity-training effectiveness by elaborating on the following three questions. First, to what extent do the described barriers to learning hinder learning, and can tolerance as defined above—through overcoming the barriers to learning—give rise to specific learning processes that enable diversity-training participants to cope with diversity more constructively than before as a result of learning? (see Learning Conditions, Learning Processes, and Learning Outcomes in Corporate Diversity Training). Second, to what extent is our understanding of tolerance better suited than other notions of tolerance to facilitate integration, and what beliefs underlie our understanding of tolerance? (see Characteristics of Our Understanding of Tolerance and Underlying Beliefs). Third, to what extent do the beliefs of trainers that underlie the four diversity-training models hinder or foster successful learning processes as described in the first question? (see Comparison of Trainer Beliefs Across the Four Diversity-Training Models).

**Learning Conditions, Learning Processes, and Learning Outcomes in Corporate Diversity Training**

As the literature shows, the effectiveness of corporate diversity training is oftentimes limited. Anand and Winters (2008: 356) state that there is “a plethora of critics who are convinced that such efforts are a waste of time and money.” Other authors have also concluded that diversity-training effectiveness is not certain, and thus, not satisfactory (Bell & Kravitz, 2008; Bennett, 2010; Bezrukova, Jehn, & Spell, 2012; Ely, 2004; Hemphill & Haines, 1997; Jackson & Joshi, 2011; King, Gulick, & Avery, 2010; Naff & Kellough, 2003; Paluck, 2006; Pendry, Driscoll, & Field, 2007; Roberson, Kulik, & Tan, 2013; Rynes & Rosen, 1995). Compared to the relatively few reports of (partially) positive results (Hill & Angoustinos, 2001; Kalinoski, Steele-Johnson, Peyton, Leas, Steinke, & Bowling, 2013), a considerable number of studies show that diversity training was not only ineffective, but even counterproductive insofar that the exclusion of minorities increased (Anand & Winters, 2008; Stewart et al., 2008; Von Bergen et al., 2002). In addition, primary studies on diversity-training effectiveness often suffer from weaknesses of the effectiveness measures; for instance, 76% of the studies included in Kalinoski et al.’s (2013) meta-analysis measured affective, cognitive, and behavioral changes in student trainees on the last training day. Thus, the stability of potential changes remains unclear.

In an attempt to determine which mechanisms prevent diversity-training success, the literature mainly highlights two dysfunctional constellations, or barriers, to learning. On the one hand, the diversity literature refers to reciprocal accusations reflecting discrimination processes embedded in society (e.g., Anand & Winters, 2008; Stewart, Crary, & Humberd, 2008; Von Bergen, Soper, & Foster, 2002). Discrimination is still widespread (Hinsdale, 2015: 19f; Nkomo & Hoobler, 2014; see, e.g., the incidents of racial discrimination in Ferguson, 2014, and Baltimore, 2015, as well as at U.S. universities). Dogmatic convictions exist not only in the religious sphere (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), but also in the political (Janoff-Bulman, 2009; McAdams, Hanek, & Dadabo, 2013) and corporate spheres, for instance in the form of prejudice against minorities (Deitch & Hegewisch, 2013; Hinsdale, 2015: 19f; Konrad, 2003). We can thus expect discrimination and dogmatic attitudes also to exist in corporate diversity training (Nkomo & Hoobler, 2014). Against this background, we will not focus on diversity in general, but on the value diversity of those involved in diversity training (including the trainer). We understand values to be “guiding principles in the life of a person or group” (Schwartz et al., 2012: 664) and value diversity to be the degree to which the trainees differ concerning these principles. Value differences that are oftentimes associated with more overt forms of diversity (e.g., ethnicity; Ely & Thomas, 2001), may engender strong subgroups, separating those with dissimilar values (“separation,” Harrison & Klein, 2007). Given that values closely relate to a person’s identity (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008), the clash of differing values (e.g., with respect to religion) that is likely to become apparent in the course of a diversity training can easily induce feelings of exclusion instead of the envisaged feelings of inclusion (cf. Jackson & Joshi, 2011; Stewart et al., 2008). To realistically estimate a certain diversity-training model’s chances of success, it is thus useful to focus on value diversity.

On the other hand, the literature highlights self-censorship processes reflecting societal taboos
(Jaworski, 1993; Oliver, 2001) that result from societies’ established political correctness (e.g., Avery & Steingard, 2008). With respect to the first barrier to learning, a dogmatic and domineering form of communication characterizes the diversity training (dogmatic voicing of opposing/deviant views), whereas a non-voicing of opposing/deviant views represents the second barrier to learning (see Figure 1).

Dogmatic communication (Stewart et al., 2008) stimulates a spiral of conflicts (Weingart, Behfar, Bendersky, Todorova, & Jahn, 2015) that intensifies this way of communicating. By contrast, the non-voicing of opposing/deviant views can turn into a spiral of silence (Avery & Steingard, 2008; Bowen & Blackmon, 2003; Jaworski, 1993: 132f), reinforcing non-voicing. Hence, both the dogmatic voicing of deviant views that can lead to an exaggeration of differences and polarization within the training group (Harrison & Klein, 2007), and the non-voicing of deviant views are barriers to learning, because they hinder the emergence of a “zone of understanding” (Avery & Steingard, 2008: 276). Here, understanding means comprehending the other person’s view as reasonable, which in turn increases one’s motivation to engage in an exchange with the other. This is essential for a constructive climate of learning in the training group (Knowles, Holton, & Swanson, 2011: 217f).

We argue that a positive attitude concerning tolerance as we define it can help overcome the two barriers to learning, dogmatic voicing and non-voicing of opposing/deviant views. Mutual tolerance not only diminishes the two barriers to learning that impair a zone of understanding, but also implies mutual appreciation, thereby facilitating a zone of understanding directly. This underlines the dual relevance of tolerance for learning processes. These learning processes (Figure 1) comprise experiential learning, and thus, a reflection on concrete experiences (Fenwick, 2003: 22f; Merriam, Caffarella, & Baumgartner, 2007: 159ff); dialogue-oriented value inquiries (Harms, 1999: 65ff); relational learning as collaborative knowledge creation and coaction (Gergen, 2009: 250); model learning processes through feedback (Hoover, Giambatista, & Belkin, 2012); and unlearning (Hislop, Bosley, Coombs, & Holland, 2014). Over time, these learning processes that in turn benefit the zone of understanding can promote a positive attitude concerning tolerance, even though this attitude might not have—or might have only weakly—existed before. Through a feedback loop, the conditions for learning keep improving through the stepwise reduction of the two central barriers to learning. A positive attitude concerning tolerance is thus a condition and a consequence of tolerance-centered learning. Repeated cycles of this dynamic process may enable constructive dealing with value diversity, even if the respective values are highly salient to people’s identity and thus identity-relevant. “Constructively dealing with diversity is dealing with diversity in ways that serve the mutual growth of those involved and increases the change that people will be able to engage in a dialogue—even in the case of opposing values that are highly salient to people’s identities—as a means of preventing conflict. In our view, such constructive dealing with value diversity is an essential objective of diversity training (cf. Stewart et al., 2008), and can benefit employee integration, thus fostering fruitful cooperation and company success.

Characteristics of Our Understanding of Tolerance and Underlying Beliefs

The understanding of tolerance has shifted (Oberdiek, 2001). In its traditional sense, tolerance means to bear and put up with dissimilar values and behavior (Weissberg, 1998). More recently, however, the term has come to imply the demand to appreciate dissimilar values as positive and to endorse them. Following Oberdiek (2001), this shifted notion of tolerance has become commonplace in Western societies, such as in educational institutions and firms in the United States (Von Bergen, Von Bergen, Stubblefield, & Bandow, 2012; Weissberg, 1998).

According to the classical notion of tolerance, a person only had to put up with others’ values to be regarded as tolerant. He or she retained the right to sustain his or her values without justification (Taylor, 1992; Von Bergen & Bandow, 2010). With the shifting meaning of tolerance, however, people increasingly question this right and it has eroded over time. Today, individuals are expected to value as positive what they previously considered neutral or negative (e.g., a differing sexual orientation), but what they put up with (Oberdiek, 2001; Von Bergen & Bandow, 2010, 2012; Weissberg, 1998). This transformation from the demand to bear to the demand to endorse increases the likelihood that people consider any no-endorsement of different values intolerant and socially sanction it (see, e.g., Von Bergen et al., 2012; Weissberg, 1998). Under the regime of a shifted meaning of tolerance, individuals face the demand to adjust, or if not possible, to deny their own values. This reflects
a new form of intolerance evoking individuals’ resentment, manifest opposition (Oberdiek, 2001; Von Bergen et al., 2012), or façade of conformity (Hewlin, 2009).

If people suspect a superficial intention of specific interest groups (e.g., the majority group) behind the demand to endorse, specifically to silence opposing voices and to avoid conflicts, they may seek to restore the right of freedom of expression and counteract the attributed attempt to limit their rights through resisting (Brehm & Brehm, 2013). Hence, especially with respect to the already conflict-laden topic of discrimination and its discussion in the context of diversity training, the demand to endorse could result in polarizing patterns of argumentation, aggravating the spiral of conflicts. A façade of conformity that promotes silence is another possible reaction (Avery & Steingard, 2008). Instead of helping diversity-training success through enabling learning, the shifted understanding of tolerance is thus likely to aggravate learning by increasing the two barriers to learning (Figure 1).

Against this background, we suggest as an alternative that organizations in general and diversity training in particular foster tolerance as specified earlier. As a basis for a positive attitude concerning tolerance, we consider two beliefs relevant. The first is that one must interpret one’s own values as preliminary, socially constructed, and historically contingent rather than as definitive truth (Habermas, 2001; Hardy & Tolhurst, 2014; Toulmin, 1958). However, believing in the lack of ultimate justifiability and the irrevocable historical contingency of values could induce a destructive nihilism (Baghramina, 2004). The epistemological belief that values are constructed, and thus, historically contingent is therefore a necessary but insufficient condition for tolerance. Referring to past (i.e., Sartre, 1957) and current (i.e., Rorty, 1989) philosophical arguments, the second belief that we introduce is the construct “constructive irony,” which refers to an individual’s belief that the constructed character of values means an opportunity. The opportunity that perceiving values as constructed entails arises from the possibility of contributing to the development of values for oneself and others and of specifying those values that contribute to one’s personal growth. The will to use this opportunity while recognizing that these constructed values are ultimately not justifiable makes up a paradox that, from our point of view, justifies the use of the term “constructive irony” (Auster & Freeman, 2013). Here, we understand irony in the sense of existential irony rather than elegant-stylistic verbal irony (Hoyle & Wallace, 2008).

Only when both the trainer and the trainees interpret values as socially constructed, and therefore, as historically contingent, and when they interpret the constructed character of values as an opportunity, can the readiness for tolerance and the motivation to engage in a tolerance-based exchange of ideas increase among all involved (cf. Toulmin, 1958: 184ff). In this case, trainer and trainees interpret the absence of absolute criteria of meaning associated with perceiving values as constructed as part of the human condition instead of as a threat.

We assume intolerance results from the tendency to attribute definitive truth to one’s salient values. A person with this mind-set considers his or her values universally valid and unquestionably based on the epistemological assumption that values can be justified by rational argumentation (Hardy & Tolhurst, 2014). This justification may stem from religious revelation knowledge (Weber, 1963) and/or knowledge condensed in traditions and a shared history. If people only perceive one truth, their desire to consider tolerance, and thus, the possibility of articulating different values and engaging in dialogue-oriented communication will be low (Hintikka, 2007: 24ff). They are also likely to feel eligible or even morally obliged to deny others the right to articulate and sustain divergent values (Ayim, 1997: 100). This might become apparent in a patronizing-dogmatic form of communication (cf. Weingart et al., 2015).

Because we consider the above-mentioned beliefs the foundation of tolerance/intolerance, and therefore, assume that they influence diversity-training success in the form of constructive dealing with value diversity (Figure 1), we systematically compare the four above-mentioned diversity-training models with regard to these and other related beliefs that trainers of each respective diversity-training model are likely to hold.

**Comparison of Trainer Beliefs Across the Four Diversity-Training Models**

Classifications of diversity-training models are not valid or invalid per se, but must fit the research purpose (Ely & Thomas, 2001). Our classification of the four diversity-training models is learning process-oriented, and thereby differs, for example, from Jackson and Joshi (2011), who focus their classification on the outcomes of diversity training in the form of attitudes, awareness, and skills (comparable
taxonomies can be found in Bezrukova et al., 2014, and Kalinoski et al., 2013). We particularly focus on the beliefs of the trainers providing diversity training, because these are likely to influence the educational measures employed in diversity training, and thus, the learning processes that are critical for training success. A trainer whose training design is, for instance, based on the erroneous belief that the relations among trainees are in principal characterized by congeniality and consensus, will not, or will too late recognize latent conflicts that result from the described barriers to learning, hindering their own and trainees’ coping with these barriers. We therefore compare training objectives and trainer beliefs across the four training models from the viewpoint of the conditions for successful learning as specified in Figure 1. This allows us to make our assumptions regarding the relative effectiveness of the four training models plausible. Table 1 summarizes these objectives and beliefs.

In the following, we detail what these beliefs are and how the beliefs of trainers or their organizations influence the learning process. With respect to the 12 trainer beliefs (numbered as such) outlined in Table 1, we only highlight the particularly characteristic and relevant beliefs. Of course, we are aware that the four models we differentiate ultimately are abstractions given their overlap in practice (cf. Bezrukova et al., 2012).

**Model “Equal Opportunities”**

The diversity-training model “equal opportunities” is practiced in the spirit of a discrimination-and-fairness perspective (Ely & Thomas, 2001), where to ensure fairness and to avoid discrimination and a legal confrontation, minorities (e.g., women, people of color) are offered equal opportunities (Diamond, 1994). However, this training model may contribute to stabilizing the power of existing majorities, given that the discrimination-and-fairness perspective goes along with a (well-concealed) strategy of assimilation (Ely & Thomas, 2001), requesting minorities to submit to the majority’s values.

Based on a traditional supremacy, majority members are likely to take for granted their beliefs regarding the inferiority of minority values. Hence, these beliefs are likely to be interpreted as definitive truths that cannot be questioned and need no verification. The dogmatic character of these beliefs not only shows in the strategy of assimilation, but also in the interpretation of value diversity as a threat, resulting in its negative evaluation. For example, U.S. citizens may experience tolerance of divergent minority values as a threat to the American identity and as a betrayal of their history (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). The company representatives interviewed in Ely and Thomas’ (2001) research on diversity-management approaches stated that their companies oftentimes downplay de facto present value differences given that these entail the risk of dysfunctional conflicts. Indeed, research has shown that group diversity positively relates to conflict (e.g., Jehn, 1995). Organizations employing the “equal opportunities” model thus typically follow a diversity-related “color-blind” strategy. This undermines their ability to constructively deal with the threat of conflict, and thus, with diversity, and leads them to ignore differing social identities.

Instead of providing a training that allows for an in-depth exploration of value differences, organizations often provide 1-day obligatory courses where trainers explain the legal foundations and future duties of employees using lectures within a spirit of expertness, and the trainees must certify their attendance with their signatures (Anand & Winters, 2008). Additionally, there are specific qualification courses designed to open up career possibilities for minority members in environments dominated by majorities. In this model, value diversity and the existence of different social and personal identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) are likely to be made taboo (Ely & Thomas, 2001). Nkomo and Hoobler (2014) assume that this tabooing is an important reason for ongoing discrimination in the United States. Taboos and ignoring latent conflicts hamper the development of a zone of understanding (Figure 1). This explains why this training model has only limited effect (Pendry et al., 2007).

**Model “Integrating Minorities”**

Following Stewart et al. (2008), the mainstream diversity pedagogy implies that diversity-training participants learn about the objective situation and the subjective experience of socially disadvantaged minorities. Trainers illustrate the prejudices against these groups using lectures, group discussions, case studies, or theaterlike enactments of conflict constellations (Anand & Winters, 2008) to enhance awareness of social discrimination processes and possibilities to counteract them. Social identities shall be respected rather than ignored.

Concerning the beliefs of trainers engaged in this diversity-training model, trainers often favor passion
over reflection (Johnson & Thomas, 2008). Passion in the context of diversity training typically goes along with the belief that one’s own understanding of social justice implies a definitive truth—one wears it as a “mantra” (Anand & Winters, 2008: 359) and is obliged to fight for it passionately. In Johnson’s and Thomas’ observation that some diversity trainers seem to be on a crusade for social justice (Johnson & Thomas, 2008), religious impulses that strongly relate to dogmatism may further contribute to this passion (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992).

Being on a pedagogic mission in the sense of a “spirit of advocacy and/or crusade” (Baker, 2004: 697) prevents viewing one’s own actions from a distance. As a result, there is no room for tolerance-supportive constructive irony. However, we argue that the attribution of definitive truth in the model “integrating minorities” is embedded differently than in the model “equal opportunities,” where it largely arises from the claim to power and the historically derived majority-member identity (e.g., the historic-national identity of U.S. citizens). In the

<table>
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<th>Training</th>
<th>Equal opportunities</th>
<th>Integrating minorities</th>
<th>Inclusion via “me” within “we”</th>
<th>Tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Objective</td>
<td>– compliance with legal mandates</td>
<td>– social justice</td>
<td>– satisfying need for belongingness and need for uniqueness</td>
<td>– effective dialogue</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>– assimilation</td>
<td>– awareness of discrimination-related dynamics</td>
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<td>b) Content</td>
<td>– conveying legal knowledge</td>
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<td></td>
<td>– developing task-related abilities for minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td>– relation between individual and group</td>
<td>– value exploration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Trainer beliefs on:**

1. Own values as
   - definitive truth
   - definitive truth
   - definitive truth
   - historically contingent

2. Constructive irony (constructed as opportunity)
   - not a focus
   - not a focus
   - not a focus
   - main focus

3. How to evaluate diversity
   - as threat
   - not a focus
   - as resource
   - as chance and threat

4. How to deal with different identities
   - by ignoring
   - by respecting
   - by appreciating
   - by understanding

5. Spirit of teaching
   - spirit of expert
   - advocacy
   - relatedness
   - inquiry

6. Social structure of training group
   - latent conflicts
   - latent conflicts
   - high potential for consensus
   - manifest conflicts highly probable

7. How to prevent feelings of exclusion
   - via task-related assistance
   - fighting for minority rights
   - fostering commonalities
   - abstaining from superiority claims

8. How to help deal with value diversity constructively
   - not a focus
   - by conveying knowledge and concepts
   - by appreciating differences, enabled through ingroup feelings
   - by developing tolerance-supportive epistemological beliefs

9. Relation between “me” and “we”
   - not a focus
   - not a focus
   - highly compatible
   - compatible only if tolerance is high

10. Focus on values
    - not a focus
    - minority values
    - differences of values
    - opposing values

11. Type of learning
    - cognitive learning
    - case study
    - emotional learning within experiential learning
    - more reflection within experiential learning

12. Dialogue via
    - no dialogue
    - discussion of knowledge
    - affirmative exchange of experiences
    - critical inquiry of values
model “integrating minorities,” the attribution of definitive truth seems to stem more from moral and religious convictions.

Instead of benefiting the integration of minorities, which presumably is one of the major organizational goals of diversity-management activities such as diversity training (McKay, Avery, & Morris, 2008; Nishii, 2013), this sense of mission in the context of diversity training paradoxically often generates the contrary (Von Bergen et al., 2002). Under the influence of discrimination tendencies that exist in society and are displayed, for example, by parents, peers, mass media, or clerical institutions (Stewart et al., 2008), neither negative attitudes concerning affirmative action programs (Harrison, Kravitz, Mayer, Leslie, & Lev-Avey, 2006) nor concerning the value of diversity as such, nor sexist and racist attitudes are reduced. On the contrary, negative attitudes could increase as an expression of resistance against attributed indoctrination and accusation attempts (Anand & Winters, 2008; cf. Gebert et al., 2014; Stewart et al., 2008), hindering the development of a zone of understanding.

Model “Inclusion (Via ‘Me’ within ‘We’)”

Shore and colleagues (2011) discuss various definitions of inclusion and conclude that it is best defined by considering both the need for belongingness and the need for uniqueness; the authors thereby specifically refer to Ely and Thomas’ (2001) integration-and-learning perspective. Whereas in the model “integrating minorities,” the relation between groups is central, the model “inclusion” focuses on the relation between the individual and the group (Table 1). Another relevant difference is that the model “inclusion” focuses on the value-in-diversity perspective (cf. Homan, Van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007), whereas the model “integrating minorities” revolves around the value-in-equality perspective, the equality between majorities and minorities (we introduce the term value-in-equality perspective as an analogy to the established value-in-diversity terminology). Describing the inclusion model in more detail is important because theory and organizational practice increasingly discuss inclusion as an approach to managing diversity (Nishii, 2013; Shore et al., 2011).

The negative evaluation of value diversity in the model “equal opportunities” is opposed to the positive evaluation of (value) diversity in the model “inclusion.” Ely and Thomas (2001) emphasize the benefits associated with cultural diversity that include differences in culture-specific abilities and problem-solving strategies as well as in cultural values as a resource for organizational learning. Similarly, Chavez and Weisinger (2008: 332) emphasize the opportunity “to learn from each other so that organizational members can discover and appreciate multiple perspectives.” These multiple perspectives also refer to different values (cf. Polzer, Milton, & Swann, 2002). In this regard, diversity management is not a matter of the usual “management of diversity,” but of a “management for diversity” (Chavez & Weisinger, 2008: 337). The firm positive evaluation of (value) diversity as a value in and of itself corresponds with Chavez and Weisinger’s (2008) call for appreciating (rather than respecting) social and personal identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This appreciation of identities is consistent with the objective of Chavez and Weisinger’s (2008: 332) approach, which is described as follows: “Establish a relational culture within which people feel proud of their own uniqueness, while becoming socially integrated into a larger group by celebrating the ‘me’ within the ‘we.’”

The positive evaluation of diversity as a value as such—in our view the central meaning of the value-in-diversity perspective—may reflect a social program based on the belief of a definitive truth. As a program, the value-in-diversity perspective at least partly resembles the demand to not just tolerate, but also endorse different values. This holds the danger of establishing a new form of intolerance (Von Bergen et al., 2002) and if this interpretation is correct, the preconditions for constructive irony to emerge remain unfulfilled, thereby hindering a zone of understanding.

In general, trainer beliefs differ regarding whether they primarily attribute a high potential for consensus or a high potential for conflict to the training group. In the inclusion model (Chavez & Weisinger, 2008), the attribution of a high potential for consensus prevails, which becomes apparent in the model’s focus on fostering each individual’s integration into the larger group by celebrating the “me” within the “we.” This corresponds to an emphasis on fostering commonalities (e.g., through sharing food; Chavez & Weisinger, 2008: 340) concerning the belief regarding how to prevent feelings of exclusion. From the perspective of the similarity–attraction paradigm (Byrne, 1971), the sharing of food facilitates the detection of shared preferences, and therefore, of similarities so that everyone classifies all members as in-group members. This makes feelings of exclusion less likely. In addition, if there are not only
similarities, but some differences as well (e.g., regarding food preferences), training group members may interpret these differences—if ingroup feelings have been established—as evidence of uniqueness, promoting all members’ appreciation. Subsequently, participants within this training model may even appreciate differences in race, religion, social class, and politics. This explains why Chavez and Weisinger (2008: 340) conclude “that an appreciation for differences, based on a commonality, can be an effective training approach.”

Model “Tolerance”

As research shows, higher value diversity in a work group may lead to more relationship conflict in the form of emotional tensions between group members (Harrison & Klein, 2007; Jackson & Joshi, 2011). When values are communicated, the previously latent value diversity becomes manifest (perceived value diversity; Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998). On the one hand, social categorization processes according to perceived and/or attributed value-based similarities/dissimilarities may accompany this transition (Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007), and these can induce dysfunctional in-group–out-group relations (Brewer, 1999). On the other hand, the salience of value diversity is a precondition for diversity-training success (Chavez & Weisinger, 2008). Constructively dealing with value diversity requires that it be revealed as such (Chavez & Weisinger, 2008: 332). This shows that the required transition of latent to manifest value diversity can be problematic because the now-salient diversity of perspectives can indeed be “discovered” but will not necessarily be “appreciated” any more if the person communicating differing values is adjudged the status of an out-group member.

Especially in diversity training, manifest value diversity is likely to lead to relationship conflicts for two reasons. First, although a confrontation with, for example, culturally established differences in taste is usually not problematic, being confronted with identity-relevant value differences can lead to irritation or may even cause identity harm (Bowen, & Blackmon, 2003; Gebert et al., 2014; Petriglieri, 2011; Ragins, 2008). In our view, corporate diversity training should aim to enable a constructive dealing with this identity-related value diversity. Hence, our reliance on Schwartz and colleagues’ (2012) value definition that considers values as guiding principles in the lives of individuals and groups seems appropriate. This understanding of values aligns with the basic aim of diversity training, but also implies that such value diversity is likely to be conflict-laden (Petriglieri, 2011). Second, when discussing politically sensitive questions, not only value differences between races, sexes, and other majority and minority groups are an issue, but also related differences in interests are at stake (Harrison et al., 2006). Elusively referring to values may serve as an attempt to legitimize these differences, as in the context of social justice the prevailing political correctness prevents the articulation of substantial differences in interests. The attribution of a hidden agenda, however, further increases the chance of relationship conflicts (Tjosvold, 1997).

In conclusion, concerning the evaluation of diversity in the model “tolerance,” we believe that value diversity that has become manifest through its communication is not primarily an opportunity but an opportunity and a threat. Preventing the potential for learning and development associated with manifest value diversity from remaining unused, requires tolerance for a constructive coping with the threat (cf. Hobman, Bordia & Gallois, 2004). Therefore, we do not follow Chavez and Weisinger’s (2008) call to substitute a “management of diversity” for a “management for diversity.” Rather, we propose to intensify and extend the management of diversity, such that it incorporates the promotion of tolerance as one that involves understanding different social and personal identities, but not necessarily appreciating them blindly. Our model thus aims to protect social and personal identities from potential impositions that arise from some trainers’ manifold dogmas. Respectively, the educational goal is not to emphasize a “spirit of relatedness” but a “spirit of inquiry” (Baker, 2004: 697).

Diversity-training participants will put an emphasis on being valued and accepted by (at least part of) the training group, while simultaneously expressing their uniqueness (Ashforth et al., 2008; Polzer et al., 2002). In contrast to Chavez and Weisinger’s (2008) inclusion model that assumes compatibility of the “me” and the “we,” we base our model on the theoretically and empirically supported assumption of an incompatibility between the “me” and the “we” (Brewer, 1991; Kreiner, Hollensbe, & Sheep, 2006). People must avoid fulfilling one need at the expense of the other (Brewer, 1991). A one-sided focus on one’s personal identity (“me”) bears the risk of isolation; a one-sided focus on one’s social identity (“we”) bears the risk of depersonalization. Thus, the required balancing of needs (Kegan, 1982) and their fulfillment reflect a latent intrapersonal conflict that only mutual
tolerance can at least alleviate: The right to express differing values, which comes with the mutual obligation to dialogic communication and abstaining from superiority claims, facilitates individuals’ authenticity and belonging to the group.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING AND LEARNING

In this section, we elaborate implications that the theoretical assumptions underlying our tolerance-centered training model have for the design of the training and the respective learning processes. To promote the required learning processes (Figure 1), corporate diversity training must appropriately account for its target group: adults (Knowles et al., 2011: 10ff; Merriam et al., 2007). Adults consider experience reports—which are substantiated by the situation and biographical characteristics of the reporting individual—more stimulating and helpful than recommendations deduced from academic theories only (Fenwick, 2003: 139ff). Even more, an essential goal of many participants in training and education programs is to integrate their own experiences (e.g., as a minority-group member concerning education programs is to integrate their own experiences, identity crises, and from the respective coping behaviors that result from these (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Lazarus, 1991). Values and value changes often ensue from social inclusion and exclusion (Shore et al., 2011), and thus, from forms of identification with social groups or from emancipation processes from them (Meglino & Ravlin, 1998). To illustrate this, the trainer should act as a role model by using him- or herself as an example (Bandura, 1965; Herdman & McMillan-Capehart, 2010). In terms of educational measures, trainers should first clarify how their own biography has shaped their values. Second, the trainer should make plausible that (and how) these values can be questioned. Third, trainers should also illustrate that they nonetheless endorse these values (and how), as well as elaborate on how they feel in response to this (Berkovich, 2014). Through model learning, a joint reflection upon the trainer’s experiences could enable constructive irony as an attractive form of coping with life, rather than just a theoretical option or an escape from the inability to justify one’s values. Adopting such pedagogy is also in line with Whitehead’s (1947) request that a lively pedagogy requires trainers that exemplify the difficulties of coping with life by illustrating ruptures in their own lives (in our context). This is a precondition for effectively supporting the learners’ self-development (Whitehead, 1947: preface V, 55; cf. Dunkel, 1965: 149ff, or Oliver & Gershman, 1989: 162f)—the process of becoming (Evans, 1998: 23).

Fostering Constructive Irony: Reflecting on One’s Values as Constructed and as an Opportunity

Throughout the training, the diversity trainer has to point out that values are not necessarily “revealed,” but can result from the social environment, personal experiences, identity crises, and from the respective coping behaviors that result from these (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Lazarus, 1991). Values and value changes often ensue from social inclusion and exclusion (Shore et al., 2011), and thus, from forms of identification with social groups or from emancipation processes from them (Meglino & Ravlin, 1998). To illustrate this, the trainer should act as a role model by using him- or herself as an example (Bandura, 1965; Herdman & McMillan-Capehart, 2010). In terms of educational measures, trainers should first clarify how their own biography has shaped their values. Second, the trainer should make plausible that (and how) these values can be questioned. Third, trainers should also illustrate that they nonetheless endorse these values (and how), as well as elaborate on how they feel in response to this (Berkovich, 2014). Through model learning, a joint reflection upon the trainer’s experiences could enable constructive irony as an attractive form of coping with life, rather than just a theoretical option or an escape from the inability to justify one’s values. Adopting such pedagogy is also in line with Whitehead’s (1947) request that a lively pedagogy requires trainers that exemplify the difficulties of coping with life by illustrating ruptures in their own lives (in our context). This is a precondition for effectively supporting the learners’ self-development (Whitehead, 1947: preface V, 55; cf. Dunkel, 1965: 149ff, or Oliver & Gershman, 1989: 162f)—the process of becoming (Evans, 1998: 23).
To ensure that the trainees tentatively relate this understanding of “values as socially constructed” and “socially constructed as opportunity” to themselves, the trainer can use the following questions as educational measures: “What are the guiding principles in your life?”; “From your point of view, are those guiding principles linked to your biography or special experiences you made in your life?”; “Have your values changed over the course of your life?”; “Could you specify at which point in your development you have distanced yourself from the values of others (e.g., parents, peers, church)?”;

The second phase serves to question these values. This requires a trainer able to reframe values as plausible that may initially seem implausible, as well as those as implausible that at first might seem plausible. This kind of reframing (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014) renders the limits to the justifying one’s values as plausible and allows for a stimulating engagement with value dissimilarity.

Reflecting on Limits of the Justifiability of Values

One educational measure to make trainees reflect on the limits of the justifiability of values could be to raise identity-salient value-related issues that sooner or later matter to everybody, but can be handled in different ways. Examples include self-expression values, such as taking care of one’s parents at home or accommodating them in a nursing home, adopting an active or passive role in the children’s partner choice and marriage, accepting or rejecting divorce or adultery, favoring monogamy or polygamy, adopting prolife or prochoice positions on abortion, or seeing religion as given or chosen. Raising these issues could help highlight people’s culturally differing and thus socialization-based approaches to them. As a central educational measure, we suggest a systematic process of reframing. In the first phase, the objective is to discuss and discern the values that can explain differing attitudes toward the above issues. The second phase serves to question these values. This requires a trainer able to reframe values as plausible that may initially seem implausible, as well as those as implausible that at first might seem plausible. This kind of reframing (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014) renders the limits to the justifying one’s values as plausible and allows for a stimulating engagement with value dissimilarity.

If the trainees experience that even the opposite of their opinions is coherently justifiable (e.g., concerning divorce), self-critical thought processes can be evoked. As a result, previous tacit assumptions become explicit and hence reflexive (Kayes, 2002; Merriam et al., 2007: 172), and a tolerance-supportive distance to the trainee’s own justification can be promoted. As an educational measure, we therefore do not emphasize the confrontation with different values as such, but specifically with opposing values given that in our understanding diversity training should particularly teach the trainees how to constructively deal with these.

In this sense, Stewart and colleagues (2008) recommend assigning certain trainees the role of devil’s advocate. Doing so helps legitimate opposing positions, especially from minorities, which counteracts trainees’ belonging to a minority group feelings of exclusion. For minorities (e.g., Black women) who for years have suffered from the pressure to assimilate, to submit to the values of White men and be ashamed of the associated identity losses, to witness this process of loss and to be able to articulate it accordingly is especially important (Hinsdale, 2015: 19; Jaworski, 1993: 118f; Oliver, 2001: 61ff; 147ff). When trainees become trainers, the whole group becomes increasingly independent from the formal trainer, opening up the possibility to engage in self-directed learning (Knowles et al., 2011; Merriam et al., 2007: 122ff). To overcome political correctness that hinders constructive dealing with value differences, trainees then scrutinize their central assumptions. We also recommend that diverse teams of trainers (male and female teachers, teachers with different ethnic backgrounds, or scientists and practitioners) lead single training sessions. This allows showcasing positions opposing
that of the primary trainer or the dominant politically correct position in the teaching process. In our view, this strategy also instigates a critical evaluation of the value-in-diversity and the value-in-equality perspectives and enables an examination of implicit weaknesses of misunderstanding what tolerance means. All above-mentioned educational measures serve the purpose of facilitating reframing aimed at a value-related breaking up of formerly favored, socially imparted, and more or less taken-for-granted attributions of definitive truths (cf. Kayes, 2002).

The message that there are many truths (Baker, 2004) can serve a bridge-building function. In the inclusion model described by Chavez and Weisinger (2008), this message is already assigned veracity by documentation of the diversity of value-related traditions within the commonalities shown (e.g., sharing food or music). In our tolerance model, this message refers to the demand of relativizing one’s own position in light of irresolvable barriers regarding the justifiability of values. Compared to the inclusion model that is dominated by emotions and emotional learning (Chavez & Weisinger, 2008), the focus of our tolerance-centered training is more on (experience-based) reflective learning (Boud & Walker, 1991). Our training model may be particularly attractive for more highly educated groups, given their presumed higher willingness to deal with complex problems (Ramsden, 2003: 72f).

**Inquiring Differences for Personal Growth**

As shown in Figure 1, we assume that all learning processes in this step foster——through a feedback loop—a positive attitude concerning tolerance and are thus conducive to overcoming the barriers to learning. Necessary inquiry of value differences results from an understanding of tolerance that enables releasing the burden of endorsing others’ values. Inquiring occurs at the core of a dialogue, where potential for engendering learning would remain unused if the dialogue were reduced to an unquestioned exchange of ideas (Berkovich, 2014; Buber, 1958). We see the latter as a risk of the inclusion model, because according to Chavez and Weisinger (2008), it does not explicitly include critical inquiry and the possibility to say no.

Following Gadamer (1975: 326) and Harms (1999: 83), both parties’ open questions are imperative for a dialogue to occur. Openness is the process of exposing a matter to different alternatives; open questions thus refer to questions that leave their outcomes undetermined (Harms, 1999: 72). This undetermined nature of mutual questions enables a sufficiently deep inquiry and thus relational learning (Figure 1); that is, learning with and through the respective other (Gergen, 2009; Merriam et al., 2007: 173). Open questions clearly differ from questions asked for pedagogical reasons where the trainer provides the trainees with several response alternatives but already knows the correct answer. In fact, these pseudo-questions that trainers frequently pose to activate the learner, are the opposite of open questions, because they are based on the assumption of a definitive truth, to which the learner is carefully guided (Harms, 1999). Likewise, the training we target does not support the so-called Socratic questioning as described by Plato (Hintikka, 2007: 83ff). Plato (not Socrates) argued radically in favor of the existence of definitive truths, which—departing from certain premises—could be deduced using deductive reasoning. Plato thus applied a strategy where closed questions were used to imperatively guide the “disciple” to the “teacher’s” conclusion (definitive truth) based on the disciple’s acceptance of logical reasoning and avoidance of inconsistent arguing (Gergen, 2009: 250). “Socratic questioning” thus contradicts the concept of a dialogue employed here (Whitehead, 1947: 47).

Certain preconditions are necessary for both sender and receiver to experience an inquiring dialogue as attractive (Avery & Steingard, 2008). Both parties have to pose questions and answer authentically. At the same time, they must practice a high degree of sensitivity by considering the feelings of the other person. This requires authentic listening—not just listening out of politeness, for tactical reasons to motivate the trainee to continue speaking, or for reasons of narcissistic mirroring in the response of the trainee. Rather, trainers should listen because they consider the trainees’ responses potentially conducive to their own learning (cf. Fiumara, 1990: 143ff). This combination of high (content-related) authenticity and high (style-related) sensitivity enables a zone of understanding (Avery & Steingard, 2008: 276).

We put forward that this zone of understanding is more likely to emerge when more trainees are willing and able to practice tolerance, as the right to express values and the renunciation of superiority claims facilitate the psychological safety necessary for the inquiry of differences (Baker, 2004) (Figure 1). In this context, the literature points to the relevance of silence (e.g., Baker, 2004: 697). However, the meaning of silence is ambiguous (Ayim, 1997: 28f; Jaworski, 1992: 12ff). Silence can be caused by fear
and can, in turn, elicit fear, reflecting trepidation, which people sometimes try to drown in the “noisiness of idle talk” (Dauenhauer, 1980: 127). This hinders a real dialogue. Silence can however also reflect a meditative thoughtfulness and the listening to one’s inner voice, which prompts the individual to revisit his or her own problematic behavioral patterns (Zembylas & Michaelides, 2004). Such silence can mean the origin of new ideas and insights and thus promote dialogue (Dauenhauer, 1980: 140ff; Fiumara, 1990: 143ff). The trainer should minimize silence caused by fear that may dominate at the beginning of the training, and reinforce silence conducive to dialogue. Encouraging trainees to comment spontaneously may help achieve the latter, which requires mutual trust. This implies that the trainer takes a certain risk through the unpredictability of the training process, which stands in the way of many trainers’ wish to control learning processes (Argyris, 1994; Oliver & Gershman, 1989: 162f). Although taking this risk makes trainers vulnerable, it signals to the trainees a willingness for trust and dialogue (Baker, 2004: 697). This in turn supports the psychological safety required to enable the form of silence that is conducive to dialogue.

From the viewpoint of fostering a dialogue, we must elaborate on preconditions on the side of the trainees as well. Traits such as arrogance, complacency, narcissism, and fault finding may hinder a dialogue (Ayim, 1997). In contrast, open-mindedness (Rokeach, 1960) may foster a dialogue and critical self-reflection (cf. Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001). In addition, a dialogue requires trainees to possess specific competences (Roberson, Kulik, & Pepper, 2009). Based on the previous arguments, we consider the following competences conducive to dialogue: First, at the interpersonal level understanding the meaning of a dialogue and its behavioral implications constitutes an important competence, because it simultaneously fosters the willingness to behave dialogically. This competence refers to the three process components of a dialogue: questioning, answering, and listening. With respect to questioning, it comprises understanding the purpose of posing open questions and the negative effects of Plato’s closed-question strategy. Answering entails an understanding of the rules of dialogue-oriented answering (understanding, e.g., why using “correct” in response to one’s own remarks and “incorrect” in response to the remarks of one’s counterpart contradicts the idea of dialogic communication). Listening requires understanding the meaning of authentic listening and thus listening as a medium for learning rather than a discussion technique.

Second, the ability to act in ways that benefit dialogue is essential at the interpersonal level as well. In particular, the trainee’s ability to self-reflect and self-monitor (cf. Clore & Huntsinger, 2007) in the sense of emotional and cultural intelligence (Erez et al., 2013; Goleman, 1995) is important. With this, we stress the relevance of the ability to view—and, if required, to correct—one’s own questioning, answering, and listening (also nonverbally) from the perspective of the respective other through role taking (Bandura, 1965).

Third, in addition to these interpersonal competences, we consider the competence of understanding and accepting the basic rules of inquiring about values at the group level important. This competence comprises the understanding and acceptance of how desirable cooperative communication strategies are, such as equal opportunities to initiate or enter the discussion and how undesirable hierarchical communication strategies are, such as silencing minorities through disregarding their contributions, hogging of conversation, or rude interruptions (Ayim, 1997: 86ff). Because trainees provide one another with feedback—intended or unintended—with respect to their communication behavior, knowledge of basic feedback rules (e.g., to provide specific feedback; Shute, 2008: 177) and the willingness and ability to apply these rules form a vital part of the competence that trainees should acquire. Also, given the considerable potential for conflict in the context of diversity training, it should be of particular importance to raise the trainees’ awareness of the dangers of evaluative (instead of descriptive) feedback (Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Michaelsen & Schultheiss, 1988).

To develop the above-mentioned competences, reflection on concrete experience in the context of experiential learning seems to constitute a promising basis for learning (Merriam et al., 2007). The trainees can actively experiment with new verbal, nonverbal, and strategic (cooperative versus hierarchical) communication behavior and may use feedback to develop a new behavioral model through subsequent reflection on concrete experiences. There are indications that trainees will manage the latter more easily when they have been able to develop a mental model of the respective behavioral pattern ahead of time through observational learning from the trainer’s modeling (Hoover et al., 2012). This should be particularly relevant when the trainees’ learning requires an unlearning
in the sense of Hislop et al. (2014; see Figure 1). Hislop et al. (2014: 2) define unlearning in contrast to forgetting as a conscious and intentional process of abandoning previous beliefs and practices. Assuming that trainees intend to unlearn certain behavioral patterns in response to negative feedback, they will succeed more easily when they can learn new behavioral patterns from the trainer’s modeling to replace their old behavioral patterns.

In conclusion, we assume that the three steps nurture a positive attitude concerning tolerance in trainees, which should increasingly lower the initial barriers to learning (Figure 1). Based on the implications for training and learning that we have detailed for a tolerance-centered corporate diversity training, we provide a preliminary suggestion regarding content and design of a tolerance-centered MBA-course in Table 2 (see also Salas, Tammenbaum, Kraiger, & Smith-Jentsch, 2012, for evidence-based recommendations for effective training). This suggestion gives some practical illustrations of our arguments and may be useful for instructors at business schools, as it aims to provide consciousness-raising experiences and reflections (cf. Mirvis, 2008). Here, a stand-alone compact course (e.g., 2 days in an undisturbed setting) or an integration of the steps outlined in existing MBA courses (e.g., Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility; Organizational Behavior; Human Resource Management) appear feasible.

Notwithstanding the exact format, we assume that our considerations are particularly suited for MBA students given their academic training and work experience in an organizational setting. MBA students might expect a stronger focus on providing theoretically and empirically derived metaknowledge regarding diversity-training effectiveness and the distinction of the four diversity-training models. Another important difference from corporate diversity training could be that the aim of diversity training, constructively dealing with value diversity, could be less immediately applicable, as the training group, a given MBA class, will typically cease to collaborate after the MBA program. Providing metaknowledge on diversity-training effectiveness and making MBA students experience value diversity (e.g., through assignments in groups) could ensure both cognitive-reflective and experiential learning.

Diversity-training groups should be composed as diversely as possible with respect to race, gender, nationality, religion and, more generally, characteristics reflecting minority/majority membership (cf. Homan, Buengeler, Eckhoff, van Ginkel, & Voelpel, 2015). Last, in case of a compact course, participation should be voluntary, even at the risk that those who would need it most may not participate (Homan et al., 2015), because research has repeatedly documented some students’ resistance toward such programs (cf. Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; Stewart et al., 2008).

DISCUSSION

Corporate diversity training is often criticized for being unsuccessful (e.g., Roberson et al., 2013). Research has identified the discrimination-related dogmatic voicing of opposing/deviant views and the political correctness-related non-voicing as important barriers to learning (Figure 1) that may explain why diversity training is often ineffective (e.g., Avery & Steingard, 2004; Stewart et al., 2008). Against this background, we have introduced tolerance as a potential strategy to overcome these barriers. We have defined tolerance as accepting everyone’s right to sustain and express their own values and the obligation to engage in a dialogue on differing values without superiority claims, and we distinguished it from tolerance understood as pressure to endorse values that differ from one’s own values. We have argued that the latter intensifies rather than alleviates the problems of current diversity-training models (Brehm & Brehm, 2013).

We have defined constructive dealing with identity-related value diversity as a criterion of corporate diversity-training success. This success reveals itself when trainees cease to interpret even highly identity-relevant values as a definitive truth and cease to dogmatically judge standpoints that differ from their own as wrong. Rather, as an expression of their acceptance that the justifiability of any standpoint is limited, trainees will emphasize the importance of exchanging ideas to mutually enable further development of the respective standpoint, which reflects their orientation toward dialogue. Hence, training success becomes apparent in decreasing dogmatism and an increasing ability and willingness to open questioning, open listening, and open answering that allows trainees to bridge even opposing values.

We have made plausible that the beliefs of diversity trainers (see 12 beliefs presented in Table 1) tie to specific educational measures that foster or hinder diversity-training success, underlining the pedagogic relevance of distinguishing these beliefs. With this, we have developed a belief-related frame of reference that can help readers to reflect critically upon specific training models employed in practice.
## TABLE 2
Tolerance-Centered Diversity Training “Dealing With Value Diversity” for MBA Students in a Business School Setting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Pedagogic approach</th>
<th>Content and activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | Morning | Value conflicts       | Cognitive-reflective     | 1. What are value conflicts? Students deliver examples of value conflicts from their private and professional lives.  
2. What effects does dealing with value conflicts have? How do students explain positive or negative effects? Do these effects relate to their personal and social identity? Students report experiences concerning the outcomes of dealing with value conflicts.  
3. What can we learn from theories and empirical research on value diversity (e.g., associated with racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual orientation/differences) and inclusion (“me” within “we”)? What knowledge is, aside from its theoretical/empirical foundation, also helpful for us as learners? (Whitehead, 1947: 1ff, 49). The instructor presents a synopsis of findings and discusses them with the students. |
| 1   | Afternoon | Tolerance as opportunity | Experiential learning   | 1. The instructor authentically describes own experiences concerning living with constructive irony by reporting chances and risks. Students provide their view on constructive irony and share experiences.  
2. Minority members describe their experiences with the pressure to assimilate to majority values in private, community, or company life. Life stories are shared; understanding the calamities of others enables understanding the relevance of tolerance (cf. Brumbaugh, 1982: 4; Mirvis, 2008).  
3. Students’ differing understanding of tolerance and the respective implications are analyzed. |
| 2   | Morning | “Finding your own way”  | Experiential learning   | 1. Students report cases of self-directed emancipation from taken-for-granted values. Students report cases of decisions to go on in the traditional way.  
2. Students’ experiences with accepting/questioning identity-relevant (e.g., religious) values are discussed. How do students explain their values? |

(Selects continue)
To qualify the above, it is important to account for the differing training objectives of the four corporate diversity-training models; namely, “equal opportunities,” “integrating minorities,” “inclusion via ‘me’ within ‘we’,” and “tolerance.” This does not, however, preclude the possibility of the societally induced barriers to learning, dogmatic voicing and non-voicing (Stewart et al., 2008), becoming virulent in all four training models. This inhibits the attainment of goals not just in the tolerance-centered training, but also to a certain degree in all training models. Hence, from the perspective of a reduction of the barriers to learning, an analysis of beliefs as highlighted in Table 1 could also be helpful for those practicing the other training models.

Regarding the content of the aforementioned diversity-training models, our review of the literature has revealed that there are no detectable tolerance-oriented epistemological beliefs present in the equal opportunities, the integrating minorities, and the inclusion models of diversity training. On the contrary, a dogmatic spirit dominates the equal-opportunities model, whereas a sense of mission in favor of social justice prevails in the integrating-minorities model. The illusion of harmony that conceals the necessity of tolerance governs the inclusion model. As we have argued, a dysfunctional narrowing of perspectives may accompany these mental orientations. By contrast, accepting the requirement of tolerance as defined here corresponds more with the conditions that are likely to be present in diverse training groups in companies (i.e., the mentioned potentials for conflict, persistent discrimination tendencies, political correctness, and pronounced value diversity).

**Limitations of the Tolerance Model**

Because our aim was to conduct a reality-centered analysis of diversity-training models, it is important
to point out the limitations of the tolerance model as well. First, living with the idea that one’s own values are socially constructed and exhibit spatial-temporal limitations can be problematic because this relativization of one’s values can question prior certainties (Kegan, 1982: 114, 169f; Rorty, 1989), thereby inducing fear (Schwartz, 2000). Against this background, we must elaborate on the question of how likely to develop is a constructive irony-supportive attitude that implies an acknowledgment that values are socially constructed.

To live fully aware of constructive irony at least seems possible. In the religious sphere, many believers experience their faith as a risk and a personal decision, hence subjectively allowing for some existential uncertainty despite their faith (Wuthnow, 2007). A comparable argument comes from identity theory (Collinson, 2006). Following Alvesson and Willmott (2002: 626), “people are continuously engaged in forming, repairing, maintaining, strengthening or revising” their identities—induced by changes in the private and/or professional sphere—such that the resulting identity-relevant values and purposes can only be revealed to a limited extent. From this, we can at least presume that the belief that interpretations and values are often self-made and socially constructed rather than anchored absolutely reflects an already existing, quite frequent intuition that the trainer can build on. We also consider this assumption plausible because at least in Western societies, we can observe an increasingly rapid value change (Habermas, 2001) suggesting the interpretation of values as socially constructed. Besides, our training model does not exclude the possibility that a person still interprets certain values as (religiously) revealed, while experiencing other values as socially constructed.

With respect to the level of depth of the training intervention, the diversity training envisioned here does not depict a short form of an existentially/philosophically oriented psychotherapy (Fenwick, 2003: 27ff). Rather, our diversity training should primarily allow experiencing the boundaries of the justifiability of one’s own values through, for instance, making values that are opposed to one’s own values plausible, and experiencing constructive irony as a chance for a stimulating dialogue and for freeing oneself from stereotypes. Thus, diversity training should pave the way for a more constructive dealing with value diversity, for which many trainees are already prepared anyway through the increasing exposure to other cultures in the private and/or professional sphere. Despite these qualifying remarks that should help limit potential risks associated with our tolerance model, it is important to note that certain levels of education, but also an advanced stage of adult development by trainees may be an important precondition for training success.

Second, the first author had the opportunity to get to know the Indian formula of “unity-in-diversity” in the context of a teaching and research assignment in India. If an Indian person were in conflict with this formula, this would be considered a threat to political correctness (Gorrenge, 2005). The formula “unity-in-diversity describes a target status not reached yet and not strived for equally by all” (Gorrenge, 2005: 65). This could analogously apply to the value-in-diversity and the value-in-equality perspectives, as political objectives may also play a role here. To counteract the possibility that trainees adopt supposedly definitive truths without reflection, we have recommended that the trainer presents the two value-driven truths as political objectives may apply to the value-in-diversity and value-in-equality as set norms that are historically contingent and societally bound. As such, they do not represent definitive truths, but are nonetheless worth fighting for. However, the trainer is also part of this society, and hence, exposed to the “invisible hand” of the prevailing zeitgeist (Nietzsche, 1961), in particular, the prevailing notions of political correctness (Hinsdale, 2015: 16). As the trainer is not immune to this influence, and the trainees are not likely to consider him or her immune, the trainer may face difficulties in credibility when encouraging them to stand up for views deviating from what is deemed politically correct (Stewart et al., 2008). Even if trainers are confident about the unjustifiability of their values and express this openly, trainees might misunderstand their endorsement of these values, implied in the construct of constructive irony, as reflective of latent intolerance.

Third, another limitation of the tolerance model refers to the value of tolerance as such. In several European countries, supreme or constitutional courts have to decide, for example, whether Muslim women may wear a headscarf at work or a chador in public, or whether they can abstain from attending swimming lessons at school. Analogous lawsuits by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) are pending (Davidson, 2008). Diversity trainers have to reckon with convictions whose causes are deeply rooted in religion, social groups,
and organizational cultures (Schein, 2010), and family and/or national traditions. A look at Hofstede’s (1980) notions of cultural differences between nations appears helpful in this regard. The cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance may help explain differences in epistemological beliefs that we can expect to find between countries. High uncertainty avoidance indicates that people consider ambiguous situations and uncertainties a threat, as apparent in “not tolerating deviant ideas and behaviors, and believing in absolute truths” (Hofstede, 1980: 46; cf. Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006). Some of the trainees with cultural backgrounds characterized by high uncertainty avoidance could thus classify tolerance—a concept related to low uncertainty avoidance—as culturally biased.

This uncovers a dilemma that emerges when trying to deal with the statement that tolerance is a culture-biased value. When trainees present their tolerance-related doubts in a dialogical way, a fruitful conversation can develop. However, this may not happen before the end of a tolerance-centered diversity training or after. If a training participant presents his or her doubts in a dogmatic way, this becomes a problem for both trainees from Western cultures and the trainer who cannot accept an intolerant devaluation of tolerance. The limit of tolerance is the tolerance of intolerance because tolerating intolerance may destroy tolerance (Popper, 1945). Here, constructive irony’s function to bridge differences becomes particularly apparent. Regarding diversity trainers’ required qualification, this calls for pronounced balancing skills on the part of the trainer. However, the problem as such may also be smaller than expected, as it seems likely that most participants in corporate diversity-training courses held in open societies evaluate the value of tolerance positively (Meglin & Ravlin, 2008). These trainees, however, are not the ones who need diversity training the most (Homan et al., 2015).

Fourth, it is necessary to defer to potential risks associated with a constructive irony mind-set in firms. We can assume that with an increasing constructive irony mind-set, employees may scrutinize and question the culture of a firm (Schein, 2010) and its culture-related mission and vision as socially constructed. There is empirical evidence for critical comments regarding a firm’s mission and vision (De Luque, Washburn, Waldman, & House, 2008), which we can expect given an increasing prevalence of cynical attitudes (Gebert, Heinitz, & Buengeler, 2016). To what extent constructive irony additionally reduces the culture- and mission/vision-related consensus potential—or conversely increases it through a growing tolerance-induced willingness to compromise (Diamond, 1994)—is an open question and a potential venue for further research.

In terms of boundary conditions, we need to discuss under which conditions a tolerance-centered diversity training will be successful. Both personal and situational conditions may be relevant in this regard. Trainees with a high need for closure (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & DeGrada, 2006) may perceive the demand for tolerance to reflect intolerance toward their own uncertainty avoidance-oriented values, thereby harming their social identities. Need for closure refers to a person’s need for firm answers to avoid ambiguities and confusion (Kruglanski et al., 2006: 87). It positively relates to ambiguity intolerance (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995) and authoritarianism (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006). This pattern of closed-mindedness (Rockeach, 1960) is likely to foster the tendency to attribute and defend values as definitive truths, and is a mechanism for coping with the uncertainties of modernity (Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994; Giddens, 1991). Conversely, training is more likely to be successful with trainees exhibiting high open-mindedness (Rockeach, 1960). Similarly, a high need for cognition and thus an enjoyment of dealing with intellectually complex problems in trainees may prove useful for training success (Kearney, Gebert, & Voelpel, 2009), particularly for more highly educated groups.

In addition, a discussion of enthusiasm on the side of the trainer seems indicated. At least in the Western world, evaluations of enthusiasm are mainly positive. However, enthusiasm brings with it the danger of an inherent belief in a definitive truth. Furthermore, trainees may misinterpret a trainer’s enthusiasm, for example in favor of minority integration, as prejudicial or naive in light of persistent discrimination (Nkomo & Hoobler, 2014). Although enthusiastic trainers may “convince” trainees by means of emotional contagion processes (Erez, Misangyi, Johnson, LePine, & Halverson, 2008), they are likely to fail to stimulate the vital reflective discussion through unconscious and rather uncontrollable processes (Griskevicius, Shiotia, & Neufeld, 2010). Therefore, reflective conviction, philanthropic humor (Noddings, 1984: 176), and self-distance characterize our ideal trainer.

Concerning situational conditions, complementary organization-level measures are needed to
ensure the transfer of potential learning outcomes to the organizational context (Bezrukova et al., 2012). The management board’s clear and public articulation of tolerance as a desired feature, and its communication of respective norms (Herdman & McMillan-Carpehart, 2010), are important in this regard. Currently, many firms emphasize that diversity in and of itself represents an advantage for the employees and the organization (Scott, Heathcote, & Gruman, 2011). Unfortunately, this assumption flies in the face of empirical research (e.g., Jackson & Joshi, 2011) and of the experience of many employees (Stewart et al., 2008). First, the management board should emphasize that the fruits of diversity in general, and of value diversity in particular, can only be harvested under particular conditions; namely, under the condition of tolerance. Second, the management board could convey that tolerance does not mean to endorse others’ values, but that everyone has the right to sustain and articulate even deviant values if the condition of a dialogue-oriented communication is met. Third, the board can communicate that it will not accept any dogmatic signal of superiority of one’s own values, that is, any attempts to patronize or proselytize. To implement this, training of lower level supervisors is relevant as well, as this ensures their ability and willingness to practice the corresponding leadership behavior (Schein, 2010). Formal and/or informal value-related discussions may further instill tolerance in supervisors’ and employees’ mind-sets (Gehman, Trevino, & Garud, 2013).

**LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH**

It is important to note that we cannot unambiguously verify the characteristics and differences of the three models used for the comparison with our tolerance model in the quotations of the authors that we have cited. Rather, they reflect our interpretations of these quotations. Furthermore, the models presented reflect different emphases rather than opposites. This is especially the case with respect to Chavez and Weisinger’s (2008) inclusion model that was a particularly helpful point of reference given its clear illustration. In addition, some of the beliefs we used to differentiate the four models may overlap (but are nevertheless distinct by definition). We accepted this overlap to be able to specify the implicit and explicit assumptions of the different training models as unambiguously as possible. Last, we critically questioned whether the equal-opportunities and the integrating-minorities models could be combined into one training model. We decided not to combine them, because the two training models differ considerably, particularly in the beliefs with respect to how to deal with different identities, teach, and prevent feelings of exclusion.

A central assumption is that dealing constructively with value diversity requires experiencing a dialogue-based value inquiry as attractive. We have therefore described the characteristics of dialogue-oriented questioning, answering, and listening. However, listening training hardly takes place in practice (cf. Fiumara, 1990); at least in the realm of corporate diversity training, conviction-focused training programs, whose aims are hardly compatible with the understanding of dialogue employed here (Hinsdale, 2015; Noddings, 1984: 176), seem to prevail. Dialogue-oriented questioning, answering, and listening constitute core competences for constructively dealing with value diversity. Thus, further research may attempt to systematically observe and contrast successful and unsuccessful value-related dialogues during diversity training to further complement and differentiate the described criteria for dialogue-oriented questioning, answering, and listening. This may serve as a more concrete basis particularly for training the trainers in their function as role models.

This demand arises even more given that quite a few trainers tend toward the described crusade mentality (Johnson & Thomas, 2008) that relies more on persuasion attempts as used in the corporate world than on dialogue. Hence, it might be informative to systematically assess the dissemination and degree of tolerance-related attitudes of trainers. Interviews may give some indication of the extent to which attributions of definitive truths or tolerance-related attitudes prevail among the group of trainers with respect to the zeitgeist-defined value-in-diversity perspective and value-in-equality perspective, but also with respect to our understanding of tolerance—figuratively speaking a Litmus test for tolerance.

In addition, it is interesting to consider if and how a constructive dealing with identity-related value diversity—if attained at all in the context of training—may indeed be suitable to reduce discrimination and foster integration and inclusion in organizations, as we proposed in the beginning of this article. Defining inclusion following Shore et al. (2011) as improved balancing of the “me” and the “we,” our tolerance-centered training may be
helpful given that the conflict-laden relation between the “me” and the “we” is a priori accepted as a “given” and can presumably be mitigated through a focus on tolerance. From our understanding of tolerance as a counterbalance to discrimination and political correctness, we can also expect our training to nurture a constructive diversity climate in the sense of a social integration of underrepresented employees and the mutual respect of dissimilar values (e.g., Chrobot-Mason & Aramovich, 2013; McKay et al., 2008). Of course, both the relation between our tolerance-centered training and training success in the form of a constructive dealing with identity-related value diversity and the relation between the latter and organizations’ economic success require further analysis. Because mutual tolerance should through fostering trust, benefit open communication that in turn facilitates learning processes and creativity, one can at least make plausible that a company’s investment in tolerance-centered diversity training—also through the absence of conflict with the EEOC and other institutions enforcing equal employment opportunities—can benefit its economic success (Ely & Thomas, 2001).

CONCLUSION

We hope to have contributed to and inspired a critical reflection on the societal-level conditions, objectives, and implicit beliefs of current corporate diversity-training models, which may serve as an explanation for diversity training’s oftentimes-limited effectiveness. Aiming to improve diversity-training success, we have offered an alternative in the form of a tolerance-centered approach to corporate diversity training.

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