The academization of art

A practice approach to the early histories of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca

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Chapter Three

Bourdieu and Schatzki on social reality, practices, and modernity

3.1. Bourdieu and Schatzki

A reinterpretation of the relation between theory and practice, a dynamic and pluralistic notion of culture, and a different notion of subjectivity are the general and common features of theories of practice. However, these elements do not yet constitute a specific conceptual framework that can be used for interpreting the academization of art in sixteenth-century Italy. In order to construct such an interpretative framework it is necessary to examine theories of practice in more detail. In this chapter, mainly two of such theories are discussed and compared with each other, those of Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) and Theodore Schatzki (b. 1956). Their practice theories are the most elaborate and comprehensive ones available, in the sense that they place the notion of practice in a more general conceptual framework that serves to analyze social reality and social phenomena.\footnote{Although employed by other scholars, the notion of practice is usually less developed and defined itself, and also not explicitly related to a more general account or theory of social reality – or at least not to the extent that Schatzki and Bourdieu have done this. Foucault and Certeau, whose ideas are discussed at the end of this chapter, are examples of scholars who use the notion of practice in their analyses of culture and society, without placing it in an elaborate and explicit framework or theory.} This makes their theories highly suitable for the construction of a conceptual framework for studying the academization of art. However, as will become clear, their theories differ on essential points. This means that choices have to be made as to what parts of their work can be used for reconstructing the social practices of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca.

Bourdieu’s work contains several distinguishing characteristics, the most important of which are: the disregard of disciplinary boundaries – both between scientific and scholarly disciplines (e.g. anthropology, sociology, philosophy, art history, aesthetics) and between traditional academic divisions of labor (e.g. theory and methodology vs empirical research); his plea for reflexivity in science; his embellishment of the vocabulary of the human sciences with concepts such as ‘habitus’, ‘field’, and ‘cultural capital’; and, finally and most importantly in the context of this dissertation, his development of a general theory of practice, which
he carried out most explicitly in *Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique* (1972) and *Le sens pratique* (1980).\(^\text{141}\) These four points not only bind his work together but they are also intimately connected to each other.

Schatzki’s research interest lies in the field of social ontology, i.e. the investigation of the nature of social reality. He bases his theory mainly on the insights of Wittgenstein and Heidegger and, to a lesser extent, on those of Foucault, and his social ontology can be seen as a systematic elaboration of their views on social life.\(^\text{142}\) His main theoretical ideas are spelled out in two books, *Social Practices* (1996) and *The Site of the Social* (2002). In the first, he places social practices at the center of social life, and he gives an account of the social nature of individuals. With regard to this last theme Schatzki occupies a more radical position than most social theorists by holding the view that even such intuitively private and individual phenomena as emotions and thoughts are socially constituted. His second book is an extension of *Social Practices* on two main points. It gives an account of the role of non-human entities, such as organisms, artifacts (e.g. works of art) and things, in social life. Moreover, it discusses more elaborately the theme of social change and evolution.

In this chapter, Bourdieu’s and Schatzki’s theories are compared with each other on three main points: their general conception of social reality and the place of social practices in it; their views on the organization of practices, as well as on how personal identity and the meaning of objects are formed in practices; and their ideas about, and criticism of, the process of modernization. In the discussion of this last theme, the views of Michel Foucault and Michel de Certeau are also brought into play because they shed more light on the views of Bourdieu and Schatzki. Foucault has an additional relevance here since, as discussed above, Barzman uses his genealogical approach in her analysis of the Accademia del Disegno.

As a preface to the comparison between Bourdieu and Schatzki, some general remarks about their different academic backgrounds are in order, because they illuminate the theoretical disagreements between them. As a philosopher, Schatzki is mainly interested in the nature and constitution of social reality in general and *in abstracto*. He presents his

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141 In 1977 Bourdieu published an English translation (with revisions) of *Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique* under the title *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Bourdieu 1979) and in 1990 *Le Sens pratique* was translated as *The Logic of Practice*. See for a good systematical introduction of Bourdieu’s work Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992, 1-60. The first part of this book is written by Loïc Wacquant and can be seen as an authorized explication of Bourdieu’s theory.

142 To be precise, Schatzki uses the insights of the early Heidegger, the later Wittgenstein, and the later Foucault.
social ontological views in discussion with other theorists, making meticulous conceptual distinctions and thereby he places himself in a well-organized theoretical field. Bourdieu is one of the authors, who Schatzki frequently criticizes in his publications. As he himself admits, Schatzki does not show how his theory can be implemented in concrete empirical research, although the case studies that he develops in *The Site of the Social* are more elaborate illustrations of his theory than the examples in his first book.

Unlike Schatzki, Bourdieu does not develop an explicit social ontology. However, as will become clear below, it is possible to derive his ideas on the nature and basic elements of social reality from his theory. As a sociologist, Bourdieu is chiefly interested in understanding and explaining concrete social phenomena and problems. In his theoretical work he mainly deals with epistemological and methodological issues and he attempts to show how his concepts can be applied and made operational. This entails that his concepts are not as clearly defined as Schatzki’s and that he does not relate them as explicitly

143 See especially Schatzki 1987, 1996 (133-167), 1997, and 2003. However, it should be noted that Schatzki’s critique of Bourdieu does not – nor is it meant to – hide the fact that there are profound similarities between their theories, most importantly, of course, the focus on practice. Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory plays a similar role in Schatzki’s work. Other theorists he discusses in his publications are Bruno Latour, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, and Charles Taylor.

144 Schatzki (2002, xvi-xvii) distinguishes three ways in which a social ontology can by justified as superior to others: ‘through arguments against its rivals, through demonstrations of its compatibility with the social world, and through its ability to underwrite first-rate social investigation.’ Schatzki admits that he mainly employs the first two strategies and the third one only in a very limited way. According to Nicolini (2012, 179-180), the lack of empirical and practical application of Schatzki’s concepts is a serious weakness of his theory. Moreover, Nicolini holds that this is a common feature of practice theorists working in the Heideggerian or Wittgensteinian tradition, such as Charles Taylor, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Joseph Rouse, Barry Barnes, and Andrew Pickering. Nicolini favors pragmatic approaches such as Latour’s actor-network theory.

145 It should be noted that Bourdieu would not characterize his work as (social) ontology, because of the connotations of this term to traditional and old-fashioned metaphysics. This also holds for Foucault and Certeau. However, social ontologies can be derived from their works, insofar as they deal with the nature and basic building blocks of social reality. Moreover, Schatzki’s work also does not fall in the category of traditional (social) ontology, as the inspiration for his ontological ideas are the anti-metaphysical insights of Wittgenstein and Heidegger.

146 See, for example, Bourdieu 1998, 2: ‘my entire scientific enterprise is indeed based on the belief that the deepest logic of the social world can be grasped only if one plunges into the particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and dated, but with the objective of constructing it as a “special case of what is possible”, as Bachelard puts it, that is, as an exemplary case in a finite world of possible configurations.’ See also Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992, 5.
as Schatzki to those of other theorists. For this reason, the interpretative framework that is to be used to analyze the activities of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca in their early years is constructed mainly with Schatzki’s concepts. Bourdieu, in turn, contributes the focus on relations of power, which is missing from Schatzki’s theory.

3.2. Social reality and social practices

Bourdieu and Schatzki are ardent advocates of the view, discussed in the previous chapter, that the structure-agency debate can be dissolved by a turn to social practices. This means that on a basic ontological level they both attribute a crucial role to social practices in social reality. However, beyond this important point of agreement their conceptions of social reality diverge considerably.

Bourdieu employs geographical metaphors to illuminate his conception of social reality. In the first place and on the most general level, in his account social reality is a social space of objectively and hierarchically related positions. According to Bourdieu, ‘social space is constructed in such a way that agents or groups are distributed in it according to their position in statistical distributions based on the two principles of differentiation which, in the most advanced societies (…) are undoubtedly the most efficient: economic capital and cultural capital.’ In parenthesis, it should be noted that Bourdieu’s distribution of entities in social space according to two dimensions entails criticism of the Marxist tradition, in which the position in economic relations of

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147 For example, in his publications he never responded to Schatzki’s criticisms on his theory of practice. According to Bourdieu, theoretical concepts have a better chance of improving through a confrontation with new objects than through an intellectual polemic, a comparison, or a history of ideas, which, according to him, does not result in more than a ‘theoretical theory’, that is, an empty meta-theoretical discourse. Schatzki’s work, no doubt, falls into Bourdieu’s category of ‘theoretical theory’. Bourdieu contrasts ‘theoretical theory’ with ‘scientific theory’, which is ‘a program of perception and of action – a scientific habitus, if you wish – which is disclosed in the empirical work which actualizes it.’ See Wacquant’s (1989, 50) interview with Bourdieu. See, for criticism on Bourdieu’s lack of interest for ‘pure’ conceptual clarification, Pels 1989, 11-12.

148 Bourdieu and Schatzki have their own – slightly differing – categorizations of this debate. Bourdieu either uses the terms objectivism vs subjectivism or social physics vs social phenomenology, whereas Schatzki speaks about wholism vs individualism.

149 According to Bourdieu (1998, 6), the United States, Japan, and France are examples of such most advanced societies.
productions determines everything. Moreover, in his later work Bourdieu distinguishes even more dimensions within social reality and more forms of capital – e.g. social, scientific, religious, although he sometimes generalizes these as symbolic capital.

In any case, the central idea in Bourdieu’s conception of social space, the one that also forms the fundamental thesis of his *La distinction* (1979), is that to exist in social space means to differ or to be different. This entails that Bourdieu adheres to a structuralist conception of meaning and identity: what something is or who someone is depends on, or is determined by, the differences with, and relations to, other objects or persons. Not only individuals, groups (or social classes), institutions, and goods (including cultural products such as works of art), are hierarchically positioned in a field, but this also holds for practices. According to Bourdieu, ‘at every moment in each society, one has to deal with a set of social positions which is bound by a relation of homology to a set of activities (the practice of golf or piano) or of goods (a second home or an old master painting) that are themselves characterized relationally’.

According to Bourdieu, practices are intimately related to objective social conditions, such as price curves, income curves, chances of access to higher education, laws of the matrimonial market, employment rates, and the frequency of holidays. Practices and objective social conditions produce (and reproduce) each other. Bourdieu claims that these conditions can be gathered from regularities provided by statistical analysis, which is based on empirical investigations, i.e. questionnaires, polls, etcetera. With the help of these social science methods Bourdieu reconstructs the hierarchically related positions in social space, and this also explains his use of the term ‘objective’ to describe social space.

For his analyses of modern societies Bourdieu uses another (but related) geographical metaphor, that of the ‘field’. According to him, fields are ‘relatively autonomous spheres of “play” that cannot be collapsed under an overall societal logic, be it that of capitalism, modernity, or postmodernity’. Modern society or culture is an ensemble of such ‘spheres of play’ or fields, which have different and sometimes contrary logics and forms of capital. In other words, fields are subsets of social space with their own regulative principles. This makes

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150 Ibidem, 9.
152 Bourdieu 1998, 4-5.
153 See Bourdieu 1979, 21 and 85-86.
154 See for criticism Certeau 1984, 56-57.
Bourdieu’s theory of practice more pluralistic than most structuralist theories.

The concept of ‘field’ has two connotations for Bourdieu. It is simultaneously a field of objective forces and a field of struggles. Bourdieu uses the analogy of the magnetic field to illuminate the first connotation, because the ‘value’ or meaning of the objects, practices and actors are determined by their position in the field. Each field wields certain forces on the positions in it. This entails that the actors’ intentions and strategies depend on their positions within the field. Actors occupying dominant positions employ different, i.e. defensive, strategies than those in dominated positions.

For the second connotation Bourdieu uses the analogy with a battlefield. Actors struggle with each other for certain overall goods in a certain field, i.e. stakes or specific forms of capital. For example, in the artistic field this capital is cultural authority; it is scientific authority in the scientific field, and sacerdotal authority in the religious field. However, in the struggles not only the distribution of capital is at stake, but also what counts as capital in a field and, thereby, the location of its boundaries. Dominant actors have the advantage of enforcing the correct and legitimate ways of participating in a field and of determining what are the relevant qualities and resources of practitioners. Of course, their representations of the legitimate moves and relevant resources are congruent with their own actions and qualities. Dominated actors challenge these dominant representations and attempt to change the

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156 Ibidem, 17. Like economic (or material) capital, other forms of capital, which Bourdieu (1979, 171-183 and 1990, 112-121) sometimes generalizes as symbolic capital, are scarce and sought after goods. According to Bourdieu, modern economic theory misrepresents these material and symbolic forms of capital as strictly separated, that is, as the result of acts of ‘naked-self interest’ and ‘disinterested interest’ (e.g. cultural or aesthetic interest), respectively. He pleads for a ‘general theory of the economics of practice’, which treats as equal material (economic) and symbolic (cultural) exchanges without reducing them to one another. Instead of relegating symbolic interests, such as honor, the spiritual, and art to the realm of the economically irrational and incalculable, Bourdieu wants to ‘extend economic calculation to all the goods, material and symbolic, without distinction’. The equality of material and symbolic capital is expressed by their interconvertability. For instance, the accumulation of cultural capital (in the form of knowledge or education) is transformed economic capital, because the time necessary for in order to acquire it – prolonged schooling and delay into the labor market – is bought by economic capital. Cultural capital can be converted back into economic capital, but usually only in the long run. According to Bourdieu, the work that it cost to convert one type of capital into another and the different logics, according to which they are accumulated, means that they are not entirely reducible to economic capital, although economic capital ‘is at the root of all the other forms of capital’. Moreover, Bourdieu stresses that the work that goes into the conversion of economic capital to the other forms is necessarily concealed for it to function. Bourdieu 1986, 252-253 et passim.
structure and boundaries of the field. Finally, actors also struggle to determine the hierarchy and the ‘conversion rates’ of all forms of capital in the field of power. This can be seen as a ‘meta-field’, which partly encompasses the other fields (literary, economic, religious, scientific, etc.) as it consists of the dominant actors in those fields.

There are various practices carried out in a single field. For example, in the field of cultural consumption, people visit museums, listen to music, and go to the cinema. However, there is only one overall type of profit, one form of capital, which actors try to maximize in that field, namely cultural capital. The practices are homologously related to each other within the field. A certain taste in music, usually goes hand in hand with a predilection for a certain type of art and a certain type of movies. For example, people who like classical music also tend to watch art house films, whereas lovers of pop music favor blockbuster movies. Moreover, the expression and cultivation of these tastes distinguishes a person from others. According to Bourdieu, there exist a hierarchy of tastes, which is also based on the ability to make pertinent distinctions between works of art, composers, and movies. The goal in the field of cultural consumption is to accumulate cultural capital through the participation in these practices and through developing the abilities to make such distinctions.

Schatzki has a different view of social reality. According to him, social reality, or what he calls the ‘site of the social’, is composed of a ‘mesh of social practices and social orders’. The following section deals with his views on social practices. Social orders are material arrangements, that is, arrangements of entities, such as human beings,
non-human organisms, artifacts, and things. Schatzki’s distinction between practices and orders is analytical, that is to say, it is a theoretical distinction that is made to facilitate understanding. In reality, practices and orders are always intertwined, because practices are carried out by human beings with the help of, and in relation to, other entities. According to Schatzki, social orders do not exist self-standing or self-propagating but only in the encompassing context of social practices. It is only in social practices that entities are related to each other and have meaning.\footnote{Schatzki 2002, 59-60. See also Schatzki 2014, 21-22 where he uses art worlds or ‘art bundles’ as illustrations of the mesh of practices and arrangements.}

According to Schatzki, Bourdieu’s characterization of fields as self-propagating homologous bounded realms that consist of practices, in which a single overall type goal is pursued – i.e. the maximization of a certain form of capital – resembles the notion of society in wholist and structuralist ontologies. Schatzki argues that Bourdieu’s theory is not pluralistic enough, because the scope and scale of the fields are too large. This leads to the overunification of social reality.\footnote{Schatzki 2003, 191 and 196.} Schatzki favors a more pluralistic picture of social reality, in which practices are not ‘organized into large-scale united parcels’ that are essentially self-propagating. Instead, Schatzki’s social practices are relatively small and continuously evolving units of organized activity, which, although sometimes partially overlapping, can be distinguished from each other because different goals are pursued in them.\footnote{In this respect he is, as he himself acknowledges, a follower of the later Foucault, who conceptualized the social site as a convoluted, variegated and shifting mesh of practices and orders, which can neither be adequately theorized in reference to a overall unity as it is traditionally done (e.g. society or state), nor to general principles. Schatzki (2002, 153) even claims that one of the objectives of The Site of the Social is to ground these insights of Foucault. In this context he refers to Foucault 1991b.}

This means that from Schatzki’s perspective social scientific and scholarly research should consist mainly (if not exclusively) of the reconstruction and analysis of social practices. Although social practices and activity play important roles in Bourdieu’s (post)structuralist conception of social reality, they ultimately depend upon objective social positions – that can be determined by statistical and sociological research.\footnote{An important question, that unfortunately cannot be answered here, is to what extent the results obtained by sociological research are really objective. Furthermore the sociologist’s claim to objectivity is also a strategy to appear more like the natural sciences and, thus, more scientific.} Therefore, in his analyses, the emphasis lies on the reconstruction of the fields and practices play a less prominent role than
in Schatzki’s theory. This distinction has implications for their respective notions of social practices itself.

3.3. The organization of social practices

Bourdieu and Schatzki would both underwrite the definition of a social practice, presented in the previous chapter, as ‘an organized unit of routinized bodily and mental actions’. However, they disagree about what the organization of social practices consists of. According to Schatzki, organization is the different ways in which actions or, what he calls ‘bodily doings and sayings’, are linked to each other in a social practice. He holds three of these linkages to be most pertinent.166

The first way in which actions are linked to each other in a social practice is through practical understandings. It is expedient to start the explanation of this term by distinguishing it from the common conception of understanding. In general, understanding is conceived in the sense of theoretical or propositional knowledge. Examples are ‘I know that snow is white, 2 + 2 = 4, or “paard” in Dutch means “horse” in English’.167 Schatzki’s practical understandings, on the other hand, are certain abilities (or skills) that pertain to the actions composing the practice. Most relevant are three such abilities: knowing how to perform an action; knowing how to identify an action of others; and knowing how to prompt or respond to an action.168 Examples are knowing how to ride a bike or knowing how to make a drawing of a nude model.169

Moreover, this should not be understood as a reversal of the primacy of practice and theory, but rather as a different conception of understanding in general. For, practical understanding (ability, skill) is implied in every so-called ‘theoretical understanding’. For instance, understanding that ‘snow is white’, ‘2 + 2 = 4’, or ‘“paard” in Dutch means “horse” in English’ does not only entail the possession (and availability) of these propositions (in the mind), but also the abilities to identify snow, to calculate and to translate from Dutch to English.170 This

166 Schatzki’s fourth type of linkage, ‘general understanding’, is not directly relevant in this context.
167 This is also the type of understanding that expressed in axiom’s, definitions, and formula’s.
169 Other examples from the practice-theoretical literature that express (roughly) the same phenomenon as practical understanding are Michael Polanyi’s ‘tacit knowledge’, Hubert Dreyfus’s ‘skilled coping’, and Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’. See for this last concept below.
170 According to Schatzki (1996, 93), ‘[p]ropositional understanding is an inferior stand-in for, and thus not equivalent to, the nonpropositional conceptual understanding living in the practice.’
is an example of the interpenetration of practice and theory that was discussed at the end of the previous chapter in the context of the ‘demotion of practice’ in Western intellectual history. Schatzki emphasizes that although we do attribute understanding to individuals, it is not an intrinsic property they possess, but one they have as participants of a social practice. Recall the ‘thumbs up’ example from the previous chapter. Only within and against the background of the practice of giving someone a ‘thumbs up’ can it be said that someone practically understands, that is, knows how to give, to identify, and to evoke or respond to a ‘thumbs up’. To take an example from the world of art, the ability to draw a ‘realistic’ human figure on paper or canvas is not something an individual can acquire nor sustain without the existence of a social practice of drawing ‘realistic’ nudes, for the simple reason that without the existence of this practice what the artist would draw would not count as, i.e. would not be understood as, a realistically rendered human figure, nor would it make sense to him to draw it in the first place.

The second way in which actions are linked together in social practices, according to Schatzki, is through rules. According to Schatzki, rules are ‘explicit formulations, principles, precepts and instructions that enjoin, direct, or remonstrate people to perform specific actions’. Rules link the doings and sayings of a practice because people take account of and follow (or break) the same rules in that practice. Examples of rules in sixteenth-century artistic practices in Florence are the guild rules that specify how and when an artist could open his own workshop. But also the recipes for mixing pigments would count as rules in Schatzki’s sense.

Thirdly, according to Schatzki, actions are connected through teleoaffective structures. This composite term means that our actions and our emotions (in the broad sense of ‘affects’) are normatively and hierarchically ordered towards certain goals and ends (teleology) that are

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171 See section 2.4.
174 Incidentally, this raises questions about the origins and the transformation of a social practice. How do new practical understanding or skills emerge in a practice and how do they get recognized by the participants as part of the practice? Three ways in which this might happen are 1. Through the example of a participant with outstanding skills (e.g. Michelangelo in artistic practices, Federer in tennis practices, and Bourdieu in social scientific practices); 2. Through the overlap or combination of practices (e.g. artistic and anatomical practices in the sixteenth century: anatomists needed realistically drawn human figures and artists needed real corpses, for educational purposes) 3. By coincidence or accident (e.g. natural disasters or wars destroying the infrastructure of society, leading to new practices) – or through a combination of the above.
THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL PRACTICES

pursued in a social practice.176 Furthermore, a practice exhibits a set of projects and tasks that should or may be carried out for the sake of these ends. For example, one of the goals of sixteenth-century artistic practices was to make a living through the production and sale of art. In order to reach this goal, pigments were grinded, canvases prepared, and preliminary sketches made. These tasks could be carried out in different ways, but the goal itself should be pursued and the tasks performed if one was to be a participant in the practice.

According to Schatzki, the participants in a social practice have different degrees of mastery of its teleoaffective structure. That is to say, the ends, task and affectivities are unevenly distributed in the minds and actions of the practitioners. For example, in the sixteenth-century painting practice not every participant carried out and practically understood all tasks. Pupils and some assistants grinded colors and prepared canvases, whereas masters (and some advanced students) made preliminary sketches. Moreover, Schatzki holds that the teleoaffective structure of a social practice can be, and often is, the subject of controversy amongst participants.177 Participants argue about the goals of their practice and about how these should be pursued. An example from the artistic practice in sixteenth-century Italy is the disagreement among practitioners about the question whether artists should be content with just producing works of art or also engage in theoretical and philosophical debates about their professions.178

It should be emphasized that, according to Schatzki, like practical understanding and rules, ends and goals are not properties of individual actors but features of a social practice. Therefore, our habit of ascribing understanding, the following (or breaking) of rules and the pursuit of goals to individuals should be qualified by the realization that these understandings, rules and goals are principally features of social practices, namely of their organization and that their ascription to an individual only makes sense in so far as that individual partakes in the relevant practice(s).179 Moreover, for the interpretation of artistic and cultural phenomena this entails that the researcher should try to reconstruct the organization of a practice and relate it to the actions, intentions and products of individual actors.

176 See Schatzki 2002, 80-85. In the notion of ‘teleoaffective structure’ he combines the ends, projects or tasks (the teleological aspect) with emotions and moods (the affective aspect).
177 Ibidem, 80-83.
178 See Hughes 1986b, 51 on this disagreement in the Accademia del Disegno and other academies. See also Chapter Nine for a discussion of this point.
179 It should also be emphasized that these practical understandings, rules and teleoaffective structures are expressed by bodily doings and sayings, instead of existing as essences alongside these doings and sayings, e.g. in an abstract and ideal world.
Schatzki distinguishes two kinds of social practices: dispersed and integrative practices. As the term suggests, dispersed practices are widely dispersed among different sectors of social life. The examples Schatzki gives of dispersed practices are describing, ordering, explaining, questioning, reporting, examining, and imagining. According to Schatzki, dispersed practices are organized by practical understanding alone. Integrative practices, on the other hand, are more complex. Their organization consists of all three types of linkages: practical understanding, rules, and teleoaffective structure. Instances of integrative practices are farming practices, business practices, voting practices, teaching practices, celebration practices, cooking practices, recreational practices, industrial practices, religious practices, and banking practices.

Compared to Schatzki, Bourdieu has a far less developed and detailed concept of social practice and its organization. For instance, he never formulated a definition of the term. However, as mentioned, Bourdieu would probably underwrite the general definition that a practice is ‘an organized unit of routinized bodily and mental actions’. In order to learn more about his understanding of practice it is expedient to turn to his famous concept of ‘habitus’. According to Bourdieu, habitus is an embodied system of socially acquired dispositions – a sort of ‘second nature’ – that governs human activity in such a way that the objective conditions established by social practices are sustained and perpetuated. Or, in Bourdieu’s own words, habitus is the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, [it] produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus.

Thus, habitus is the medium through which the objective dimension of the social world is interdependently connected to the

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180 Schatzki 1996, 92.
181 Schatzki 1996, 98. Schatzki (1996, 99) notes that ‘[i]ntegrative practices are not assemblages of dispersed practices because dispersed practices can be transformed through their incorporation in integrative practices and some simple practices in integrative practices do not exist outside of these (such as the marking of ballots in voting practices).’
182 According to Nicolini (2012, 53), Bourdieu conceives of practice even more generally and straightforwardly as ‘what people do in everyday life’.
183 Bourdieu 1979, 78.
subjective, individual dimension (mentality and activity). Habitus, which entails both the ability and the disposition to carry out a certain action, is produced in individuals in and through their participation in practices. For example, visits to museums (i.e. participating in museum going practices) at an early age shapes both the child’s ability to identify and understand works of art and her disposition to return to the museum at a later age. In this way the practices are reproduced through the habitus. As mentioned in the previous section, according to Bourdieu, the practices, in turn, are related to objective social conditions. For example, parents who take their children to the museum almost all belong to the same social class and have similar levels of education and professions.

Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ is similar to Schatzki’s ‘practical understanding’ insofar as both concepts emphasize the reproduction of social practices through socialization. Moreover, they also concur that these concepts designate forms of embodied ‘know how’. Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ differs, however, from Schatzki’s ‘practical understanding’ insofar as habitus is determined by (and reproduces) the objective social conditions. This entails that someone’s habitus expresses her (class) position in social space. According to Schatzki, however, someone’s practical understandings only indicate in which social practices she was trained and is currently participating in. Schatzki does not relate practical understandings to objective social conditions. This also means that traditionally distinctive features of social reality such as class play no role in a Schatzkian analysis social or cultural phenomena.

Schatzki points out that it is not clear how the objective conditions can determine the habitus. He argues that social scientific research might reveal that, *de facto*, there is a correlation between objective conditions and the reproduction of practices through the habitus, as in Bourdieu’s example of the love of art, but this should not be confused with a causal relation. However, Bourdieu sometimes suggests the latter in his writings. In addition, he can be – and has been – criticized for his too strong focus on the reproduction of social relations and practices, whereby social change is obfuscated.

A second difference with Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ is that Schatzki’s ‘practical understanding’ does not determine what action to perform (disposition) or what action makes sense to an actor to perform. In his

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184 For this reason Bourdieu (1979, 72) calls habitus simultaneously the ‘internalization of externality’ and the ‘externalization of internality’. The objective social conditions are, for example, the ‘material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition’.


187 See, for example, Shusterman 1990 and King 2000.
theory this function is carried out by *practical intelligibility*. Practical intelligibility should be distinguished from the organization of a practice because it governs and induces actions rather than linking them, and because it is an individual phenomenon – instead of a feature of social practices:

Practical intelligibility is what makes sense to a person to do. It governs action by specifying what an actor does next in the continuous flow of activity. It also causes activity in the senses of formal and final – but not efficient – causality: it specifies what a person does; and the specification of what to do is usually orientated toward specific ends. (…) It is always to an individual that a specific action makes sense. Moreover, features of individuals, such as her ends, tasks, projects, mental conditions, and affectivity, are what principally determine what makes sense to her to do.  

According to Schatzki, practical intelligibility is non-individual only to the extent that those features of individuals are molded in and through practices. For example, through someone’s training as a professional painter, in which he has internalized the goals of the painting practice, it makes sense for him to make a sketch of a building, rather than a photo, which on the basis of his abilities (practical understandings) he could have also done. Making sketches is a task in the larger project of making a painting for the purpose (goal) of selling it.

What this means in the context of Schatzki’s theory is that Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ fulfills the functions of both practical understanding and practical intelligibility. It resembles practical understanding in that it is a bodily skill or capacity that underlies activity. It differs from practical understanding, and, for the same reason, resembles practical intelligibility, in that it determines what makes sense for people to do on particular occasions, i.e. governs activity or singles out which action to perform. In other words, Schatzki distinguishes the two functions that Bourdieu has brought together in his notion of habitus: whereas practical intelligibility singles out which actions to perform (governing), practical understanding executes them and, thereby, linking them to other actions in a particular practice (organization).

As far as the conceptualization of the organization of practices is concerned, in Bourdieu’s account it is habitus alone that organizes practices. In Bourdieu’s theory there are no counterparts to Schatzki’s explicit rules and teleoaffectional structure. This means that Bourdieu reduces the organization of practices to the structure of habitus.  

According to Schatzki, by neglecting explicit rules and teleoaffectional

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structures Bourdieu’s habitus lacks explanatory power, since it does not explain why an actor, on a given occasion, performs one sensible action rather than another.¹⁹⁰ Only in reference to practical understanding and explicit rules and an actor’s tasks projects, ends, emotions and moods, carried in the teleoaffective structure of a practice, particular actions can be explained. Furthermore, whereas for Bourdieu habitus is what unites different practices, for Schatzki practical understanding is one of the criteria – in addition to rules and teleoaffectivity – by which they can be distinguished from each other.¹⁹¹

Schatzki holds that normative and hierarchically ordered goals are features of a social practice, and that participants can and often do disagree about these goals. On Bourdieu’s account, the controversies over the goals of the practice are due to different social positions of the participants in social space in general, or in a certain field. The goals themselves are not features of a practice but of the larger fields. This should be related to the distinction discussed in the previous section, namely that between Bourdieu’s objective social reality with hierarchically related fields and Schatzki’s site of the social consisting of the mesh of social practices and material arrangements. The fact that Schatzki places more weight on social practices in his conception of social reality corresponds to his more developed and detailed discussion of the organization of social practices. Moreover, where Bourdieu places the ends and goals of practices outside of them, namely in the larger fields, Schatzki conceives these as part of their organization.

Bourdieu’s and Schatzki’s diverging conceptions of (the organization of) social practices also has implications for their views on personal identity and the meaning of objects and artifacts.¹⁹² For Schatzki human beings and inanimate objects alike have the meaning they have by virtue of their participation and function in a social practice. Who someone is depends what she does; and what she does depends, in turn, on the practices, in which she participates.¹⁹³ Schatzki uses the same argument for the meaning of artifacts: what something is – its meaning – depends on how it is understood; how it is understood depends, in turn, on its function in a social practice. Therefore, Schatzki argues that

¹⁹⁰ Schatzki 1996, 226 n. 16.
¹⁹¹ See Bourdieu 1998, 8, for the notion of habitus as unifying principle.
¹⁹² See, for an explanation of how the conceptions of the meaning of objects and artifacts and of subjectivity or personal identity are conceived in theories of practices in general, section 2.2.
¹⁹³ Of course, there is much more to say about Schatzki’s conception of identity. See Schatzki 2002, 47-53 and for a short summary of Schatzki’s views, Jonker 2008, 149-150.
personal identity and the meaning of artifacts is plural and changeable, because people participate and artifacts function in different practices.\footnote{Schatzki 2002, 54.}

Compared to Schatzki, Bourdieu works with singular and static notions of identity and meaning. This is a consequence of his conception of the habitus as essentially homogeneous as it unites various practices.\footnote{Bourdieu 1979, 80-84.} Furthermore, as discussed, in Bourdieu’s account people and artifacts receive their identity and meaning through their objective positions and their relations to each other in social space. This means that Bourdieu’s concept of identity is more uniform than that of Schatzki.

### 3.4. Social critique, power, and modernization

Another important difference between the practice theories of Bourdieu and Schatzki concerns their conceptions of power relations and the process of modernization. These issues are relevant for the study of the academization of art because they are closely connected to the question to what extent modern institutions such as art academies act in the interests of the economic and political elite, rather than being the politically neutral and meritocratic organizations they claim to be.\footnote{See section 1.3.1.} Moreover, this question is also related to the discussion of the ‘demotion of practice’ in Western history and to the emancipatory objectives of practice theorists, insofar as practice theorists have argued that the primacy of theory over practice has hindered the emancipation of certain professions and groups in modern societies.\footnote{See section 2.4.}

Schatzki’s position on these issues is easy to describe. His theory of practice does not have a social critical or emancipatory objective.\footnote{The Wittgensteinian background of Schatzki’s theory is manifested here. Like Wittgenstein, Schatzki’s aim is primarily to describe – or to make descriptions possible – and not to explain and criticize social practices. The latter approach is adopted by Bourdieu, who in this respect is primarily a social scientist rather than a philosopher.} It also does not contain conceptions of the process of modernization or of power relations in social life. Schatzki’s aim is to ‘to develop key elements of a general conception of social life that is equal to the interwoven complexity and lack of totality emphasized by recent writers (…)’.\footnote{Schatzki 1996, 10. It should be noted that Schatzki (ibidem, 11) places himself in a group of practice theorists (such as Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, and Charles Taylor), who ‘agree that practices are (…) pivotal objects of analysis in an account of contemporary Western society’. However, as mentioned, with his theory of practice Schatzki does not just want to give an account of contemporary Western society but of the social in general.} His social ontology is not developed in relation to a certain
historical period or with a historical process in mind. Indeed, Schatzki’s examples of integrative practices (farming, religion, cooking, business, celebration, etc.) are universal in the sense that in one form or another they are carried on in all cultures and societies. Of course, homonymous practices in different cultures can vary substantially, i.e. have different organizations. Moreover, this can occur to the extent that it would be better to speak of different practices, and even of cultural-specific ones. However, it should be noted that from Schatzki’s point of view such practices would be only contingently specific to a culture, in the sense that empirical research shows that they were only carried out in this culture (or in this region or era). They are not principally culturally specific, in the sense that they could have only been carried out in this culture, for example because of the general principles governing the culture.

Furthermore, Schatzki’s theory aims to be politically neutral. It is only indirectly and in a very general way that his advocacy for a practice turn in contemporary scientific and scholarly research can be related to a political and social agenda. That is to say, only if his plea for a different understanding of the relation between practice and theory is placed in the context of the criticism of the philosophical tradition of the ‘demotion of practice’, can his theory be seen as attempt to rehabilitate professions that are traditionally categorized as practical or mechanical over and against so-called intellectual professions.

Bourdieu’s theory of practice, however, is intimately related to conceptions of the process of modernization and of relations of domination in modern societies. Some of his key concepts such as ‘field’ and ‘cultural capital’ are developed in his empirical research on nineteenth- and twentieth-century societies, and especially France and Algeria. For example, in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* Bourdieu makes a distinction between primitive or pre-capitalist and advanced or capitalist societies. In contrast to modern Western cultures, in primitive and pre-capitalist societies, such as Kabylia (in Algeria), there are no strict distinctions between economy, religion, law, etc. In other words, there are not yet distinct fields.

The process of modernization entails, among other things, the autonomization of the economic field through the development of

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200 In *The Site of the Social* Schatzki (2002) works out in more detail two examples of social practices from the perspective of his theory: nineteenth-century herbal industry and contemporary day trading practices. However, these examples serve as illustrations for his theoretical concepts and are not meant to understand the culture from which they are drawn. Bourdieu, on the other hand, develops his theoretical concepts in direct relation to concrete sociological research problems. This difference is related to their respective academic disciplines (or practices).
capitalism. Subsequently, other fields are formed in reaction and in opposition to economic field and to the field of power.\textsuperscript{201} According to Bourdieu, a field is autonomous when it is ‘capable of formulating and imposing its own ends against external demands’.\textsuperscript{202} This means that the agents in the field struggle for a different type of capital. For instance, in the artistic field the agents struggle for cultural instead of economic capital, and cultural capital is (often) accumulated according to a logic that is contrary to that of the economic field. Authors and artists whose work is in high demand (i.e. appreciated by the general public) typically have a low position in the cultural field, i.e. they possess relatively little cultural capital. However, they have more economic capital than authors and artists whose products are esteemed by connoisseurs. Ultimately, the new field always remains in a relation of dependence to the economic field and to the field of power, which means that its autonomy is always relative to those fields.\textsuperscript{203} Moreover, different forms of capital are interconvertible, although this costs time and energy.\textsuperscript{204}

According to Bourdieu, there also are different modes of domination in primitive and advanced societies. In primitive societies, relations of domination are reproduced and transformed through the direct and personal interactions between individuals. For instance, it is in direct and personal contact that strategies are played out in marriage practices in Kabyle society. In modern cultures, however, the relations of domination are ‘mediated by objective, institutionalized mechanisms, such as those producing and guaranteeing the distribution of “titles” (titles of nobility, deeds of possession, academic degrees, etc.).’ This means that in capitalist societies institutions (universities, academies, law courts, the Church, etc.) mediate personal relations, and make it possible for people to ‘dispense with strategies aimed expressly (which does not mean manifestly) and directly (i.e. without being mediated by the mechanisms) at the domination of individuals.’\textsuperscript{205} This means that for Bourdieu institutions are inherently conservative as to the relations of power and domination within a field. However, it should be noted that they are not necessarily conservative as to products and actions that are

\textsuperscript{201} See Robbins 1991, 115.
\textsuperscript{202} Bourdieu 1989, 149. According to Bourdieu, this is also the moment when an aesthetic mode of perception comes into being. It is the condition for both the pure gaze of the consumer and the pure artistic intention of the producer. Although Bourdieu nowhere explicitly states when this autonomization of the artistic field occurred in Western culture – and he occasionally suggests that his notion of field could be applied to Quattrocento Florentine painting (Bourdieu 1983, 312) – his empirical studies seem to pinpoint this event in nineteenth-century Europe. See, for instance, Bourdieu 1993 and 1996.
\textsuperscript{203} See Bourdieu 1979, 183-197.
\textsuperscript{204} Bourdieu 1986.
\textsuperscript{205} Bourdieu 1979, 184 (original emphasis).
rewarded by them. For example, in the fields of science and fashion institutions stimulate permanent innovation, albeit in the manner that is stipulated by the dominant actors.\textsuperscript{206}

According to Bourdieu, through the foundation of such institutions both energy and time is saved because the ‘[o]bjectification guarantees the permanence and cumulativity of material and symbolic acquisitions which can then subsist without agents having to recreate them continuously and in their entirety by deliberate action’.\textsuperscript{207} However, this also means that the unequal conditions (social origins, level of education and job of parents, etc.) and the domination of individuals are reproduced. An important difference with pre-capitalist societies is that in modern cultures this reproduced domination is more concealed. For, according to Bourdieu, the process of modernization is accompanied by the emergence of charismatic and meritocratic ideologies that give false suggestions about the equality of rights and chances. No longer based on a personal ‘practical reason’ or a ‘feel for the game’, relations of domination are sustained by institutions, through high criteria for access and the distribution of titles.

According to Bourdieu, the field of art and culture is one of the most important places where the dominant ideologies mask and cover up the inequality of the social conditions. Whereas in primitive societies relations of power are euphemized through the denial of economy and economic interest – even within economic transactions – in the modern world these negations of economy can be found in the fields of art and culture.\textsuperscript{208} For example, one of the fundamental distinctions in the artistic field is that between commercial art and ‘real’ or ‘high’ art, i.e. art that is produced for art’s sake. The more commercial a product is, the more likely it will be disqualified as a work of art. It should be noted that this holds especially in that part of the field where works of contemporary artists are sold. The dominant actors in the field, i.e. the gatekeepers such as museums, important galleries, art critics, and academies accept or reject a something as a work of art. These apparently neutral and objective decisions are ultimately related to the actor’s or the institution’s position in the economic field and the field of power.\textsuperscript{209} Therefore, Bourdieu argues that the social scientist and historian of culture have to

\textsuperscript{206} See, for example, Bourdieu 2004, 35.
\textsuperscript{207} Bourdieu 1979, 184.
\textsuperscript{208} According to Bourdieu, in primitive societies purely economic, artistic, or religious acts are not possible, because the respective fields do not exist.
\textsuperscript{209} See, for example, Bourdieu’s (1996, 121-125) analysis of the literary field in Paris at the middle of the nineteenth century. It should be noted that in the part of the artistic field where works from established masters of the past reenters the market, or where books from classical authors are republished, the commercial and artistic value often coincides.
CHAPTER THREE: BOURDIEU AND SCHATZKI

‘include an analysis of the corresponding institutional mechanism’ in the ‘analysis of ideologies, in the narrow sense of “legitimating discourses”’ if they want to do more than ‘contribute to the efficacy of those ideologies’. For this reason he criticizes all ‘internal (semiological) analyses of political, educational, religious, or aesthetic ideologies’ because they succumb to a ‘complicitous silence’.210

Bourdieu’s account of the modernization process overlaps with those of Michel Foucault and Michel de Certeau. A brief digression into the views of these scholars – who also place practices at the center of their analyses, albeit not in a theoretical fashion – is expedient because it throws into sharper relief the differences between Bourdieu and Schatzki. The common ingredient in Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s work is the fundamental thesis that in modern Western societies calculative, instrumental, or strategic forms of reason have become increasingly dominant at the expense of practical knowledge and expertise.211

Moreover, this calculative rationality has been employed in and by modern institutions and practices – e.g. prisons, universities and academies, and scientific, penal and pedagogical practices – through which a new, modern type of subject is created.

Although the reigning ideologies describe this subject as freer and happier than ever, Foucault holds that it is an objectified, analyzed, and fixed individual, i.e. someone who through disciplinary technology (or disciplinary power) has become a ‘mute and docile body’.212 Disciplinary technology creates these individuals ‘not by crushing them or lecturing them, but by “humble” procedures of training and distribution. It operates through a combination of hierarchical observation, and normalizing judgment’.213 Moreover, according to Foucault, this disciplinary technology is the common ingredient of modern penal practices and human sciences such as criminology and psychology.214

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210 Bourdieu 1979, 188-189. Moreover, in modern societies objectivist thinking has won from practical logic. According to Robbins (1991, 116), Bourdieu wants to revolutionize thinking and bring about a revival of practical logic against the tyranny of distinction.

211 Incidentally, members of the Frankfurter Schule share this view of Bourdieu and Foucault.

212 According to Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, 160), Foucault’s modern individual is ‘the product of the complex strategic development in the field of power and the multiple developments in the human sciences.’

213 Foucault 1991a, 170.

214 See, for example, Gutting’s (2005, 94) interpretation of the parallels between Foucault’s Discipline and Punish and his History of Sexuality: ‘Just as the modern sciences of criminology define categories of social dysfunction (juvenile delinquent, kleptomaniac, drug addict, serial killer, etc.) that are simultaneously sources of knowledge and of control regarding their ‘subjects’, so the modern sciences of sexuality define
The previous explication of Bourdieu’s theory has shown that he has a similar conception of how modern institutions create and manipulate individuals by molding their habitus, while at the same time mask their true functions of reproducing the unequal status quo in society with the help of meritocratic ideologies. Moreover, like Foucault, Bourdieu also attributes an important role in this process to the modern social sciences and humanities. His theory of practice is explicitly developed against existing approaches in the social sciences – both on the agency and on the structuralist side – because, according to him, they contribute to this reproduction. Bourdieu’s remark, quoted above, about the ‘complicitous silence’ of most scientific and scholarly research on both contemporary and past ideologies should be recalled here. This means that from Bourdieu and Foucault’s point of view, scholarly research that lacks explicit analyses of power relations is not neutral, but reaffirms the status quo. This critique would apply to interpretations of society that are based Schatzki’s theory.215

Schatzki could respond to such a reproach by criticizing Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s analyses of culture and modernity. This counter-critique could follow the argumentation of Certeau. Although Certeau starts from the same fundamental presupposition as Bourdieu and Foucault, he criticizes their scientific approaches to cultural and historical phenomena. To reiterate, this presupposition is the thesis that modernity and modernization are synonymous with an ever-growing dominance of instrumental and strategic reason over and against technical-utilitarian activity and everyday practices.216 According to Certeau, modern institutions such as the mass media, the Church, education, and politics have become more and more independent of the everyday life-world. Or rather, they increasingly colonize, influence and control this world of everyday practices. Moreover, Certeau agrees with Bourdieu and Foucault that modern science is one of these institutions, and therefore, part of the problem.

categories of sexual dysfunction (homosexual, nymphomaniac, fetishist, etc.) that have a parallel role as power/knowledge.’

215 This is not surprising since Schatzki is mainly inspired by Wittgenstein and Heidegger, philosophers who have been criticized for similar reasons. See for critical charges against Wittgenstein’s alleged conservatism and quietism Shusterman 1990 and Bax 2009, 149-155.

216 Laermans 1996, 43-44. According to Laermans (ibidem, 63), Certeau here also implicitly follows the diagnoses of modernity of Weber, Adorno and Marcuse, in which the history of modern culture is described as a triumph of instrumental reason and the increase of power of bureaucracy and the culture industry, rather than the usually positive interpretations in terms of progress, e.g. more hygiene, higher wages, better nourishment, and more leisure time.
However, and here is where his critique comes in, Certeau argues that Foucault’s and Bourdieu’s analyses of culture do not escape this progressive colonization of the lifeworld and the control over individual subjects by strategic and instrumental reason. According to Certeau, both Foucault’s analyses of the procedures that are hidden in prisons, schools, factories, hospitals, and barracks and Bourdieu’s studies of different ways of spending leisure time and of consuming cultural goods among the different classes always have the same result or determinant: disciplinary power for Foucault and the habitus for Bourdieu. The problem lies in the fact that theories – even these social critical theories of practice – construct models of reality and thereby reduce different practices to these constructs or simulacra. According to Certeau, this is a problem that lies not only in the work of Bourdieu and Foucault, but also in the modern scientific enterprise in general, because it necessarily makes use of instrumentalist reason and disciplinary technology. It is for this reason that Certeau explores alternative, literary forms of writing in his scholarly work.

Furthermore, Certeau argues that Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s analyses lead to fatalist and cynic conclusions, because they ignore the various forms of resistance that are always already carried out. Therefore, his solution is to reveal how this silent and almost hidden resistance of the common man is present in ordinary practices such as walking in the city, reading a book, and shopping for groceries. Certeau attempts to show how in these activities an alternative and creative form of rationality is employed that resists and undermines the neatly arranged paths, which had been constructed by architects and city planners, authors and publishers, advertisers and supermarkets for common users. Against the ‘strategies’ of the official and dominant institutions, he places the creative and undermining ‘tactics’ of common consumers.

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218 Laermans 1996, 57.
219 Certeau’s criticism of Bourdieu is more severe than that of Foucault, although he does approve of the former’s anthropological field work in Algeria from the 1950s and 1960s.
220 These examples are from The Practice of Everyday Life, the first two from volume 1 (Certeau 1984) and the last from volume 2 (Certeau 1998).
221 According to Certeau (1988, 38), ‘strategies are actions which, thanks to the establishment of a place of power (the property of a proper), elaborate theoretical places (systems and totalizing discourses) capable of articulating an ensemble of physical places in which forces are distributed. (…) [t]hey (…) privilege spatial relationships. (…) Tactics are procedures that gain validity in relation to the pertinence they lend to time – to the circumstances which the precise instant of an intervention transforms into a favorable situation, to the rapidity of the movements that change the organization of a space, to the relations among successive moments in an action, to the possible intersections of durations and heterogeneous rhythms, etc.’
Certeau’s critical analysis of modern culture and science can be connected to what Rowan Williams calls ‘totalizing interpretations’ in a discussion of Wittgenstein’s reading of Freud. Williams writes that specific interpretations are always exercises in ignoring difference and uncontrollable converse; their danger lies in their potential for ignoring the fact of their ignoring. In principle, the critique is applicable to any totalizing interpretation, Marxist, sociobiological, religious schemes of some kinds; and it is important to realize that Wittgenstein is not rejecting interpretation as such in favor of a passive reception of what presents itself but is rather defending the pluriform vitality of interpretation.²²²

What Certeau seems to be after in his analyses of everyday practices is this ‘pluriform vitality of interpretation’. Indeed, Certeau’s relentless search for the ordinary inventiveness of common users shows that social and cultural practices are heterogeneous and multiform, rather than confirming the ever-increasing domination of calculative rationality in more and more sectors of society, as is expressed by critical scholars such as Bourdieu and Foucault.

Schatzki’s practice approach is better suited for the type of cultural and historical research that is advocated by Certeau than the work of Bourdieu and Foucault, because it acknowledges Williams’ ‘pluriform vitality of interpretation’. Schatzki’s social ontology does not lead to an all-encompassing, all-consuming interpretation that ignores others, but it provides a broad interpretative framework, within which objects, phenomena, actions, and people can be interpreted from different perspectives, i.e. different social practices. Indeed, Schatzki’s ontology provides a conceptual framework that is neutral as to any specific theses about the course of history, the fundamental characteristic of a particular culture, or the defining features of a period. This framework can be contrasted with Bourdieu’s theory, which does take more detailed positions on these issues. The fact that Schatzki omits discussions of the relations of power and domination from his ‘theory’ of practice does not necessarily mean that it serves to sanction the status quo. Rather, it entails that the types of power and its functions in a culture have to be analyzed one practice at a time. The work of Bourdieu, Foucault, and Certeau can offer inspiration and even serve as models for such analyses, as long as they are not generalized to stand for a whole period, culture, or even an institution.

²²² Williams 1988, 40. Williams’ examples show that by ‘totalizing interpretations’ he does not exclusively refer to scientistic approaches (sociobiology), but also certain historical (Marxist) or religious analyses.
3.5. Bourdieu, Schatzki, and the academization of art

As leading proponents of the ‘practice turn’, Bourdieu and Schatzki share certain conceptions concerning the relationship between theory and practice, the dynamic and pluralistic nature of society, and the social constitution of the subject with each other, as well as with other practice theorists. However, the comparison of their work in this chapter has made clear that there also exist fundamental differences between their views on social reality, practices, the meaning of objects and artifacts, and the process of modernization and relations of power. These differences can be summarized schematically (table 1). They can also be concretized by outlining what the analyses of the academization of art would look like from their perspectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General conception of social reality</th>
<th>Organization of practices</th>
<th>Conception of meaning of artifacts (and personal identity)</th>
<th>Modernization and power relations</th>
<th>General characterization of theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bourdieu</td>
<td>Social space, fields</td>
<td>Habitus</td>
<td>Positions</td>
<td>Differentiation of social space: emergence of fields and hidden power relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schatzki</td>
<td>Mesh of social practices and material arrangements</td>
<td>Practical understanding, rules, and teleoffective structure</td>
<td>Functions</td>
<td>No account of modernization process or power relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. General features of Bourdieu’s and Schatzki’s theories of practice

Although a Bourdieusian analysis of the academization of art would have certain merits, it would also run into similar problems as some of the studies discussed in earlier chapters. More specifically, to get an idea of what the interpretation of the academization of art would look like from Bourdieu’s perspective it is expedient to consult his publications on art and artists, even though these studies deal mainly with the nineteenth-century literary and painterly world in France. From these texts it becomes clear that the key element in a Bourdieusian analysis of art is the reconstruction of the ‘field of artistic practices’. In order to understand the art of a historical period, it has to be determined to what extent the artistic field is autonomous over and against the economic field and the field of power. This entails that the main question

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224 Bourdieu introduces his notion of the ‘artistic field’ to go beyond, on the one hand, the reduction of the ‘magical’ powers of art to something base as money or power (traditional sociology) and, on the other, of art as something intrinsically valuable and transcendent (charismatic ideology).
in an investigation of the academization of art from Bourdieu’s perspective would be whether the foundation of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca can be described in terms of the emergence of an artistic field and, thus, as an important moment in the autonomization of art (and the process of modernization).

In his studies on Manet and Flaubert, Bourdieu discusses several key elements in the emergence of the artistic field in nineteenth-century France that are also applicable to sixteenth-century Italy. In the first place, the formation of a field implies the formalization and objectification of social positions and relations. It is possible to describe the foundation of the Italian academies in these terms. For example, in Florence the Accademia del Disegno formalized and institutionalized the previously direct and personal patron-client relations between the duke and the artists in the city.\textsuperscript{225} Other signs of the autonomization of the artistic field, according to Bourdieu, are the development of the theory and the history of the field and of its practitioners, the canonization of great masters and their works, the emergence of art-critical journals and magazines, galleries and museums, and, finally, the foundation of art schools such as academies.\textsuperscript{226}

With the exception of art journals, all these phenomena can and have been found in the context of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca in the first years of their existence. Vasari wrote the first elaborate history of the profession and the biographies of its practitioners. Several academic artists composed theoretical treatises about their arts, in which they reflected on the essence of their arts and on how these should be taught. The incorporation of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca also meant that future generations of artists were trained with the help of these theoretical guidelines. These institutions canonized certain artists, most importantly, but not exclusively, Michelangelo and Raphael. Finally, it has been argued that the ephemeral works of art that were produced by young academicians on the occasions of the funeral of Michelangelo in 1564 and the wedding of Francesco I de’ Medici in 1565 not only had pedagogical functions but were also temporary public exhibitions and, thus, examples for future museums and art galleries.\textsuperscript{227}

Notwithstanding the similarities between the points discussed by Bourdieu about the autonomization of the artistic field and the academization of art in Italy at the end of the sixteenth century, there are also reasons why the application of his theory of practice in this study is

\textsuperscript{225} See section 10.3.1.

\textsuperscript{226} See, for example, Bourdieu 1977, 38 and 1983, 318-319.

\textsuperscript{227} See Waźbiński 1978.
problematic. The phenomena just mentioned were only starting to emerge and were not yet fully developed. This means that the autonomy of the artistic field in relation to the economic field and the field of power was very limited. (The economic field itself, as Bourdieu understands it, was not fully developed.) In most cases, art was still a commodity like others and did not have a special consecrated or charismatic quality (in the modern sense of the term). What is more, the struggle between actors (persons and institutions) for the monopoly to determine the legitimate categories of perception and appreciation – or to determine what counts as good art and what as bad – was not an important feature of the ‘artistic field’ in Florence and Rome in this period. In any case, it was not as pervasive as Bourdieu describes it in his analyses of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century artistic fields in France. More in general, there was no noticeable struggle between generations of artists (dominant versus newcomers), which also is a characteristic of Bourdieu’s artistic field.228

If carried out, the Bourdieusian analysis of the academization of art would overlap with existing interpretations, insofar as they work with similar conceptions of the process of modernization. For instance, as discussed, ideas about the process of modernization are present in the Pevsnerian and the cultural-politics tradition. However, such ideas are more explicit in studies that make use of social theories for understanding of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca. To reiterate, in Rossi’s conception the academization of art, the capitalization of economic relations and culture play an important role. Moreover, he sees the theoretical treatises that were written by (academic) artists in this period as ideological reflections of these transformations in the base.229 Therefore, Rossi argues that the analysis of these texts should include a critique of the political function of the aesthetic ideology of the academies. Bourdieu would agree, but he also would take one step further by arguing that scholars, who do not include an analysis of the relations of power that existed within the academies and between them and the state bureaucracy, contribute to the efficacy of the academic ideology.230

However, the Bourdieusian analysis of the academization of art would come closest to Barzman’s interpretation, in which Foucault’s conceptions of the birth of the modern subject and disciplinary technology in modern cultures are applied to early modern Florence and the Accademia del Disegno. Like Barzman’s interpretation, a

228 Bourdieu 1977.
229 See Rossi 1980, 94.
230 See Boime 1994 for such a critical stance towards the art academy. Although briefly referring to the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, his main targets are the Académie Royale in Paris and the contemporary American Academy in Rome.
Bourdieu's analysis would highlight the position of the academicians with respect to that of the duke in Florence and the pope in Rome in the relations of power. In this context, it would also show how the artists, as dominated subjects, comply with their domination, which severely limits their agency.

This means that a Bourdieusian analysis would run the danger construing an essentialist understanding of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca. Although, compared to other social theories, social space is more differentiated in Bourdieu's work, because it consists of multiple fields having their own logics and goals, ultimately a Bourdieusian analysis of cultural practices and products reduces their meaning to power relations. This holds even more for the cultural practices and products of pre-modern societies, such as sixteenth-century Florence and Rome, where there did not yet exist an (relatively) autonomic artistic field, but where this field was only just starting to emerge and emancipate itself from the field of power.

There are, thus, two problems with the Bourdieusian analysis of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, namely the application of the notions of artistic field and cultural capital to sixteenth-century Florence and Rome and the risk of reducing the art academies to their role in power relations. A possible way out of this form of anachronism is to turn the tables and instead of disqualifying the notions of field and cultural capital in an investigation of a premodern society because they are thought to be applicable only to modern, capitalist cultures, one could examine whether their application to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Italy is possible and, if so, argue that the process of modernization started earlier than expected by Bourdieu. Barzman uses precisely this strategy in relation to Foucault when she attempts to show that the modern subject was already born in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Florence in the context of the Accademia del Disegno, instead of around 1800 in France, England, and Germany. However, such attempts of antedating modernity make explicit the more general problem at the background these arguments. This is the problem of the teleological interpretation of history. By categorizing a culture as modern or premodern scholars apply a preconceived idea of the course of history to it, rather than analyzing it on its own terms. In addition, the labels ‘modern’ and ‘premodern’ also lead to homogenization because they reduce cultures to just a couple of underlying principles.

A Schatzkian analysis of the academization of art circumvents these problems. On the one hand, Schatzki’s social ontology is more difficult to apply to concrete social or cultural historical research problems, because more ‘translation’ has to be carried out from his
abstract concepts to the phenomena under investigation. On the other hand, since his theory is not constructed in relation to a particular society or culture, it is applicable to different historical epochs and cultures. From Schatzki’s perspective, the academization of art will not be (directly) linked to a modernization process. Instead, it would be seen as the result of, and at the same time catalyst for, transformations in various social practices. Any link with a process of modernization needs to be argued for independently, as it does not follow from the application of his interpretive framework.

Applying Schatzki’s social ontology as an interpretative framework has the following consequence for the study of the academization of art. Instead of looking for the artistic field, habitus and objective social conditions, the aim is to reconstruct the practices through finding out which practical understandings (or skills) were required from the participants of contemporary political-patronage, literary-theoretical, guild, educational, and religious-confraternal practices, which rules were observed (or transgressed), and what goals were pursued by the participants. This also has implications for the interpretations of artifacts and works of art. As mentioned, in Schatzki’s practice approach the meaning of an artifact is not conceived as related to its position in a certain field but as related to its function in a social practice. From Schatzki’s point of view objects can have different functions and thus different meanings in various practices at the same time.

3.6. Interpretative framework
The comparison between Schatzki’s and Bourdieu’s theories of practice has clarified the specific features of the practice approach that is adopted in this dissertation. The interpretative framework that is used for analyzing the early histories of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca consists mainly of Schatzki’s conceptions of social reality and the organization of social practices. One reason for this is that they are more coherent than Bourdieu’s comparable notions. The latter’s attempt to combine his theory of practice with poststructural conceptions of social space, personal identity, and the meaning of artifacts is problematic. In addition, Bourdieu’s notion of social space with homologuously bounded realms has wholistic and unificatory characteristics, which have been justly criticized by proponents of agency. By contrast, Schatzki’s conception of social reality with smaller and overlapping social practices is more pluralistic and, therefore, better suited for multi-causal explanations for actions, and for polysemantic analyses of actors, objects, and institutions.
Moreover, there are specific problems with the Bourdieusian analysis of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These problems are that of the anachronistic application of the notions of artistic field and cultural capital to sixteenth-century Florence and Rome and, thereby, the placement of these institutions in a preconceived idea of the process of modernization; and that of the risk of reducing the art academies to their role in power relations with the political rulers. Although this means that Bourdieu’s theory of practice is not suited to provide the general conceptual framework for this study, it can be used for understanding specific phenomena such as the employment of contrary logics and strategies for selling works of art as an example of the mechanism of distinction.\(^{231}\)

Since Schatzki’s theory is not constructed in relation to a particular society or culture, it is applicable to different historical epochs and cultures, and thus also to the academization of art in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Florence and Rome. From Schatzki’s perspective, the academization of art will not be (directly) linked to a modernization process. The interpretative framework that is based on Schatzki’s concepts helps to organize the material and provides the perspective for describing and analyzing the social practices that were carried out in and by the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca. This entails that the reconstruction of the social practices of the art academies takes place by identifying which practical understandings (or skills) were required from the participants of contemporary political-patronage, literary-theoretical, guild, educational, and religious-confraternal practices, which rules were observed (or transgressed), and what goals were pursued by the participants. The main questions in each of the following chapters is ‘what was the function of the Accademia del Disegno and the Accademia di San Luca in the practices that were carried out within their walls, and how, if at all, were these practices transformed as they were carried out within these institutions?’ This means that the role of these institutions and of the artist-academicians in these practices is highlighted.

However, this interpretative framework is completed by adding an element that is missing from Schatzki’s work, but that plays a central role in Bourdieu’s theory of practice. This is Bourdieu’s attention for power. Instead of reducing the meaning of practices and cultural products to power relations, paying attention to power here implies realizing that although it may play a role in all social practices, where and how it actually functions can be determined only after analyzing these practices.

\(^{231}\) See sections 6.4 and 10.2.
Thus, although power relations are obviously present in political-patronage practices, and the analysis of the functions of the art academies in these practices has to take these power relations into account, it is also possible that power plays an important role in religious-confraternal, guild, and educational practices. Furthermore, power can take different forms and should not only be conceived as a top-down relation. Instead of focusing only on how relations of power are reproduced through the internalization and reproduction of social practices by actors, who, thereby, contribute to their domination by others, also the ways in which they contest existing practices and attempt to change them should be taken into account. In general, in order to analyze and understand power, it is expedient to look for signs of resistance, struggle, and disagreement.232

232 This approach toward the interpretation of power is partly based on Bourdieu’s analyses of the different strategies that are employed by dominant and dominated actors in various fields – although applied more locally to practices instead of fields – and partly on Foucault’s method of analyzing power. See for instance Foucault 2000.