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In 1948 Vladimir Jankélévitch, professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne, claimed that the squandering of the opportunity to purge Paris properly of collaborationist elements after the Second World War would not be so tragic but for the fact that one was talking about Paris. As he put it, ‘it would be of no importance if France was Afghanistan. But France is France, Europe’s guide and the conscience of all free men in the entire world; what happens on the banks of the Seine, between the Hotel-de-Ville and la Concorde has a particular importance for man in general.’\(^1\) Jankélévitch’s remarks in the journal Les Temps modernes are a useful point of departure for this thesis in indicating the central place, but also the distinctiveness, of Paris in thinking about Europe in this post-war period. The unproblematic straight line that he drew between Paris, France, Europe, and the universal immediately invites critique, of course. But it also implied the question of the space of Europe in the sense of its scope. Europe was, then, to borrow and adapt Frederick Cooper’s argument about France, both less and more than itself.\(^2\) Ideas about Europe impacted on and were formed in micro-spaces such as the French capital just as in the wider non-European world. It was often the case that Paris, or spaces within Paris, were in a sense conceived of as a stand-in for Europe as a whole, while Europe was also imagined as constitutively depending on its presence and power in the non-European world.

An examination of ‘Europeanising spaces’ is taken to mean an analysis of spaces in Paris in which ideas about Europe were formulated, expressed, exchanged, circulated, and contested

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\(^1\) Vladimir Jankélévitch, ‘Dans l’honneur et la dignité’, Les Temps modernes (June, 1948), 2259.

during this post-war period, roughly between the escalation of the Cold War and the end of the Algerian war of decolonisation. The concept of space here is broadly conceived to include the physical urban space that Jankélévitch so usefully points to, but also academic scholarship, intellectuals and their interventions, political movements, cultural groups, cultural performances and institutions, journals, literature, manifestos, photographs, and pertinent images. The analysis includes not only explicit interventions about the continent, but also discourse that implicitly called into question the terms of thinking about the meaning of Europe and of Europeanness. ‘Europeanising spaces’ is also taken to have three idiosyncratic definitions: 1. Europeanisation as a process; 2. Europeanisation as the refusal of the closure of the concepts of ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’; and 3. Europeanisation as disclosure, acknowledgement or appropriation of the concepts of ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeanness’. These definitions will be elaborated on later in the introduction. First, though, the rationale for examining discourse about Europe not in Europe as a whole, but in a single European city, Paris, over a period of about fifteen years, is set out.

Rationale for the Examination of Europeanising Spaces in Paris

Looking at ideas about Europe in the post-war period up until at least the 1960s, one is struck by the confidence with which many took for granted that France was its highest embodiment. A recurring presupposition was that a Europe in which France did not take centre stage would be wholly implausible. And, crucially, by France was meant Paris. Frederick Cooper maintains that at least until the end of the period in question here, France was both narrower and

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3 One should note that this conflict was only recognised by the French state as being in fact a war as recently as 1999.
wider than the nation. Both culture and politics were highly centralised in Paris from where an ethos of universalism was projected by France the empire-state far beyond its hexagonal frontiers.⁴ Frenchmen from outside the capital were definitively provincial until they had been sanctioned by the approval of Paris. Only then was one admitted to share in this project of French universalism. It was in this spirit that Paris was often trumpeted as the de facto capital of Europe after 1945.

Yet Paris did not typify or sum up once and for all Europe’s image of itself. Since the Greeks first used the name, there have always been many Europes.⁵ But France’s self-image, and that held by others, was particularly pronounced in its claim to be the apotheosis of the European tradition. In terms of culture, the perception of Paris as the leader of Europe was longstanding. Erich Auerbach looked back to the seventeenth century when, ‘under Louis XIV the French had the courage to consider their own culture a valid model on a par with that of the ancients, and they imposed this view upon the rest of Europe.’⁶ In The World Republic of Letters, Pascale Casanova assesses that this perceived cultural supremacy was undiminished until at least the 1960s.⁷

Cultural pride combined with a sense of political exceptionalism to form a strong sense of the city’s universal importance. This political image can be traced back to the Revolution of 1789 upon which was based an idea of France as the champion of the oppressed everywhere. France was widely perceived to side automatically with liberty and justice – the epitome of what was valuable in the European tradition. Yet the universalism of post-revolution France was

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⁴ Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 171.
intertwined with European imperial interests. Awareness of this contradiction began to increase in the period in question here, however marginal it was prior to the Second World War.\(^8\) Here one can usefully draw from Immanuel Wallerstein’s distinction between an enduring limited ‘European universalism’ and a ‘universal universalism’.\(^9\) Raoul Girardet indicates how untroubled in French politics and society was this self-confidence when he points to a ‘conviction très profonde et à peu près unanime partagée de l’évidente primauté de la civilisation européenne – en vérité la seule Civilisation, – par rapport à toutes les autres sociétés humaines.’\(^10\) Since imperialism commanded a remarkable degree of European consensus, one can infer that Paris as an imperial capital was important to Europe as a whole. As Amit Prakash argues, ‘Paris was an effervescent center of art, politics, and intellectualism for much of the twentieth century, but it was also an imperial capital, its social and political architecture divided by colonial forms of racism.’\(^11\) It follows, then, that the second half of Prakash’s proposition was as significant as the first for thinking about Europe and Europeanness. Christoph Kalter’s study of French intellectuals and the Third World makes the case that the ‘discovery’ of the Third World was comparable to the discovery of America five hundred years earlier in the degree to which it prompted a reassessment of Europe’s place in the world.\(^12\) How was this kind of reassessment carried out in spaces in the imperial capital of Paris in this period?

\(^8\) According to the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, for example, the Algerian war required ‘perhaps for the first time since the Enlightenment, the coming to terms with the fact that French culture was not universal. Cited in James D. Le Sueur, Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the Decolonization of Algeria (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 5.


\(^10\) Raoul Girardet, L’idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962 (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1972), 89.


\(^12\) See Christoph Kalter, Die Entdeckung der Dritten Welt (Campus Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 2011). For an insightful review see Ian Birchall, ‘Third World and After’, New Left Review 80 (March-April, 2013), 151-160.
This historical patrimony contextualises the ease with which one could assert the pre-eminence of Paris in Europe in this period roughly between 1947 and 1962. These assumptions about the European tradition informed the common conviction of very different figures that Europe must be led by France. Robert Schuman hesitated not at all to make a direct connection between the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and France’s moves in 1950 towards the Treaty of Paris of 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Nor was this kind of proposition the preserve of career politicians. Régis Debray could still insist in 1977 that, ‘I have always really believed that France will bear the torch of revolution to the rest of Europe. I find the Jacobinism of 1792 and 1848 not only sympathetic but in a sense natural to me. I can conceive of no hope for Europe save under the hegemony of a revolutionary France, firmly grasping the banner of independence.’ To keep to the period in question here, in 1946 Julien Benda could propose the advancement of a common European language and take it as a given that this would be French. In the same year François Mauriac opined that it was France that would save what remained of Europe from the infernal circle of technology and destruction. Should France fall short, ‘humanity would have entered the age of the termite.’ When in 1950 he singled out the intellectual as a European institution under threat from Soviet Russia, it was Parisian intellectuals that he had in mind. Likewise, in 1949 André Malraux proposed to his audience that if it doubted that Europe was still defending the world’s highest intellectual values,

one should consider how quickly Paris would come to be a holy place in man’s memory if it were destroyed.\(^\text{18}\)

This sense of the paramount importance of Paris was not limited to French people. The prestige of Paris attracted intellectuals from all over Europe and beyond, as we have already seen in the case of Jankélévitch, who was of Russian Jewish background. When one talks about Eastern Europeans who figure in this period like Czesław Miłos, Mircea Eliade, and E.M. Cioran, it is important to bear in mind that they were formed in a world in which European culture was a certain French culture. Eric Hobsbawm traces the historical pattern of Eastern European national groups distinguishing themselves from their disdained neighbours by affiliating themselves to this Europe centred on the Île de France whilst refusing it to those at their borders: ‘No doubt proud Rumanians see themselves as essential Europeans and spiritual Parisians exiled among backward Slavs.’\(^\text{19}\) As such, it mattered profoundly to these Eastern Europeans that Paris should listen to what they had to say. It was this perception that fuelled the anguish of Eliade, the Romanian writer and philosopher at the École pratique des hautes études. He lamented in 1952 that, ‘L’Europe ne sent-elle pas l’amputation d’une partie de sa chair même? Car, au fonds, tous ces pays se trouvent en Europe, tous ces peuples appartiennent à la communauté européenne… Encore une fois, il ne s’agit pas de “nationalisme”: il s’agit de la stérilisation spirituelle de plusieurs peuples, en dernière instance d’un attentat contre l’intégrité spirituelle de l’Europe.’\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^\text{19}\) Hobsbawm, ‘On the Curious History of Europe’, 222.

Tony Judt situates the importance of the French capital after 1945 in light of the recent history of the continent. He argues that France’s leadership of Europe was reinforced in this era by default because of the utter absence of any countervailing intellectual or artistic authority elsewhere. Germany was in eclipse, Spain was isolated by Franco, Britain was as marginal as ever to European debates and Italy was absorbed by its own struggle to recover from fascism… Despite France’s own decline it was paradoxically more important, in proportion to the surrounding nations of old Europe, than at any time since 1815. Its intelligentsia was thus correspondingly dominant in the life of the European mind and would remain so for twenty years.21

As for individual thinkers, Hannah Arendt wrote that for intellectual Jews the fatherland was Europe.22 In the early twentieth century, a strong equivalence was certainly assumed between this experience of Europe and of a certain illustrious and cosmopolitan German intellectual life, as Tony Judt argues in his discussion of ‘The Jewish Europe of Manès Sperber’ (himself a Parisian émigré).23 But the hegemonic terms for thinking about Europe in the post-war period would be set further west in Paris. This was commonly the understanding of Spanish Republican exiles, for whom Paris was the radical heartland of their rather francocentric conception of Europe. Among their number was the writer Jorge Semprún, who identified another underlying aspect of this shift of weight in European intellectual life when he pointed to the post-war perception of the tainting of the German language itself with Nazism.24

As a point of clarification, the examination of connections that were drawn between Paris and Europe is not to diminish the importance that was staked in specifically French narratives in this post-war period. Nor is it to claim that the history of the city in these years is more properly

European than French. Apparently Jean Cocteau became irritated with Paris – ‘the city which talks about itself the whole time’.

This kind of self-regard of the French capital indeed should give one pause before overstating the degree to which ideas about Europe permeated life in the city. Nevertheless, the quantity and degree of conviction of discourse connecting Paris and Europe merit investigating further into the nature of that connection, and its significance within the broader context of how this post-war period was rationalised in various spaces in the city.

**Europeanising Spaces**

The concept of ‘Europeanising Spaces’ is explicated further in this section so as to bring into clearer focus the research questions and methodological approach of the thesis. As stated above, the most important sense of ‘Europeanising spaces’ refers to spaces in Paris in which ideas about Europe and Europeanness were formulated, implied, or implicated. Europeanising is a useful term because it encompasses not only explicit discourse about Europe but also spaces in which Europe was merely invoked tacitly. One of the underlying contentions of this thesis is that discussions of Europe that limit their sources to explicit invocations of Europe overlook a wealth of relevant and challenging material.

Certainly in the case of Paris in this period, urban, political, and cultural spaces all disclosed assumptions about what Europe and Europeanness were, or what they should be. In this regard, it is sometimes useful to draw on one possible nuance suggested by the distinction

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between the verb ‘Europeanise’ and the noun ‘Europeanisation’: Europeanise can suggest an active endeavour, whereas the noun form can connote more of a passive and sedentary process.\(^{26}\) There is of course an important difference between agents whose express intention was to say something about Europe or Europeanness, and spaces that did so inadvertently. The most obvious examples of the latter are the urban spaces that are examined in the first section: the Parisian café, the Parisian home, and the Parisian street. For example, on a daily basis café proprietors and customers might have had precious little awareness of, much less interest in, the discourse of Europe that suffused this Parisian institution, without it being any less significant for that.

Though historically there have been many different kinds of ideas of Europe, it is curious that the term ‘Europeanisation’ is by far most commonly associated with the institutional development of European political and economic integration since the Second World War.\(^{27}\) Often this has implied a crucial secondary sense of Europeanisation which suggests that the institutions involved in this process represent, as it were, more than themselves – they were not merely a contingent and pragmatic political development, but rather an expression of a deeper European identity. Europeanisation in this sense, then, signifies the fulfilment or redemption of not only political antecedents of European unity but also something like a historical and cultural European common linear tradition, if not essentiality. One can deduce from this that one common and persistent form of Europeanisation is the active conflation of Europe of the nascent EEC and Europe as a generic term. One might add that this understanding of Europeanisation has


\(^{27}\) Indeed, journals such as the *Journal of Common Market Studies* list innumerable contributions whose titles include the term ‘Europeanization’.
been so thoroughly appropriated by narratives of post-war European political integration that one is obliged to argue forcefully what should be a truism; namely, that there are many other Europes, and so other possible meanings of Europeanisation. Though any consideration of ideas about Europe in this period cannot ignore the rise of the European Economic Community, the latter is only considered tangentially in this work. This thesis aims to challenge its appropriation of the term ‘Europeanisation’ to examine how discourses about Europe were produced in other spaces. As such, Europeanisation is taken to apply to any space in which discourse about Europe was produced, explicitly or tacitly; so, not only political forums other than inter-governmental processes of European integration, but also cultural, and tangible urban spaces.

What are some of the assumptions of the conventional discourse of Europeanisation and discourse about Europe in general that this thesis aims to interrogate? One sense of Europeanisation is comparable with notions like globalisation or modernisation, in that it is a process named by its supposed endpoint. It is a short jump from here to some of the most common characteristics of discourse about Europe, whether with reference to political Europe, or to Europe in a more abstract general sense of its historical and cultural characteristics; namely, teleology and doing history backwards.

To keep to examples relevant to this period in Paris, one thinks of the laudatory commemoration of the historian of the idea of Europe, Denis de Rougemont, in October 2006. De Rougemont, a Swiss historian based in the French capital, claimed to trace contemporary conceptions of Europe back to the time of Hesiod. It is therefore fitting that he be appropriated for celebrations of an inexorably ever closer union. Likewise, the establishment esteem with

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28 Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 96.
29 Both of these problems are discussed in Frederick Cooper’s discussion of ‘globalization’. See ibid., 91-112.
which Altiero Spinelli is held today as a former member of the European Commission and father of the European parliament can lead one to misunderstand his political positions in his early career. His radical ideas about Europe as a Second World War resister, and his contribution to the Paris-based Mouvement socialiste des états-unis d'Europe (MSEUE), should not be retrospectively flattened into points on his trajectory towards respectability.\(^{31}\) Indeed, in his critique of ‘doing history backwards’, Cooper notes that even more important than trying to illuminate the present is ‘what one does not see: the paths not taken, the dead ends of historical processes, the alternatives that appeared to people in their time.’\(^ {32}\) Most of the case studies and examples considered in this thesis articulated understandings of Europe that differed from or even opposed those of what Alan Milward ironically termed the ‘European saints’ like Schuman and Jean Monnet.\(^ {33}\) Nor can they be understood by any attempt to read back into them assumptions about Europe today.

Another common trait of discourse about Europe is its self-congratulatory tone. Of course, one needs to distinguish between political rhetoric and media commentary on the one hand, and academic scholarship on the other. But it still true that there is a certain general tendency, as Hayden White argues, to try to identify a ‘Europe that is good and noble.’ He writes that ‘the current quest for Europe’s true “identity” is the manifestation in public discourse of an effort to invent a new identity for “Europe” but in such a way as to mask the sleight of hand involved in pretending that Europe has been, if only secretly and in part, good and noble all along the course of its history.’\(^ {34}\)

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\(^{31}\) See ibid., 484.

\(^{32}\) Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 18.


\(^{34}\) Hayden White, ‘The Discourse of Europe and the Search for a European Identity’, in Strath, Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, 67.
Conversely, others are disturbed by what is seen as a trend of masochism in discourse about Europe. In France notable examples include Pascal Bruckner who excoriates European Third Worldism in general, and Jean-Paul Sartre in particular who, so Bruckner charges, was himself naively and incorrigibly Eurocentric.\textsuperscript{35} In other words, the critique of Europe by many European progressives was, in Bruckner’s eyes, itself parochially European. There is a kernel of truth in Bruckner’s argument with which one can engage, while eschewing the rather flimsy polemical texture of his work as a whole, and without making concessions to his politics that are characteristic of a sharp rightward turn in French intellectual life from the 1970s. Indeed, by the early 1980s Paris was, according to Perry Anderson, ‘the capital of European intellectual reaction.’\textsuperscript{36} The thesis, then, seeks to navigate both the pitfalls of unthinking congratulation and of contrarian denigration of Europe, while seeking to historicise them where they are found in the period in question.

Types of Europeanisation

So far we have considered conventional uses of the term ‘Europeanisation’, and its primary usage in this thesis to refer to spaces in which ideas about Europe and Europeanness were produced in Paris at this time. Besides these, three supplemental definitions of

Europeanisation are proposed here which inform the analysis of some of the different case studies.

1. Europeanisation as Process

In one sense it is hardly controversial to insist that Europeanisation is a process. Even conservative advocates of Europe would find it a useful term, in the sense of an understanding of Europe roughly analogous to certain kinds of nationalism. In this way, Europe is conceived, just like the nation, as always coming into being but not yet fully itself, hence the need to be educated about itself. On the other hand, it has always existed and its people are connected with one another in a linear fashion through history, hence the need for Europe’s past to be vindicated.37

Yet Europeanisation can be conceptualised as a process in a more probing and heterodox sense. This would include Julia Kristeva’s analysis of European culture as the birthplace of the quest for identity, but which has also never ceased to expose its own futility as well as ‘its possible (if interminable) overcoming.’ ‘This is the paradox’, she continues,

there is an identity—mine, ours— but it is infinitely constructible and deconstructible, open, and evolving, which confers its puzzling fragility and its vigorous subtlety to the European project as a whole and to European cultural destiny in particular. Therefore, do not expect me to propose a definition of European culture other than this: as a counterpoint to the modern cult of identity, European culture is a quest for identity that is indefinitely reconstructible [sic] and open. And it is

37 This point is adapted from Richard Seymour, ‘The British have invaded 90% of the world’s countries. Ha ha?’, The Guardian (6 November, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/nov/06/british-invaded-90-percent-world
precisely its status as counterpoint that renders European culture—and consequently the European project in and of itself—interesting, valuable, and also difficult.38

One can go one level further back than this to maintain that discourse about Europe not only refers to a process, but is itself formulated in the course of a process. It is indeed one virtue of the term Europeanisation that it constantly reminds one that the production of discourse about Europe needs to be understood as a process rather than a stance – a point that Cooper argues is understated in historiography generally. Understanding any historical actor, he argues, requires asking 'how people put their thoughts together; in other words scholars must make an effort to get out of their own categories.'39 Following Cooper, part of the burden of this thesis is to trace and explain shifts in discourse about Europe and Europeanness in post-war Paris. To this end, by restricting the study here to eight case studies, the thesis is better placed to undertake a detailed analysis of the nature of ideas about Europe, rather than attempting to survey comprehensively ideas about Europe in the French capital in this period. The premise here is that by focusing attention on a handful of examples one can more easily analyse in requisite detail the complex dynamics of formulating ideas about Europe in terms of specific circumstances, pressures, and motivations. Of course, the common threads that link the various expressions of Europe in these different spaces are also considered.

Cooper’s recommendations, furthermore, highlight at once the difficulty and opportunity of a study of Europeanising spaces in Paris. Difficulty in the sense that, besides problems of using appropriate methodology and taking a convincing historiographical approach, conceptualisations of Europe in Paris at this time were inextricably interwoven with issues which often instantly prompt an emotive reaction – Communism, the Cold War, a recent history of

39 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 11.
fascism and catastrophe both inflicted and suffered, imperialism, colonial war, political violence. They also demand of the scholar special attention to the problems of differentiating history from memory.\textsuperscript{40} Opportunity in the sense that it is in precisely such a historically complex field of enquiry that one can most convincingly shift the historical goalposts to the kind of scholarship that Cooper aims for. As such, the thesis aims to go beyond what was said about Europe to explaining why and how it was said whilst remaining always attentive to the complexities and shifts in the historical process.

This explanatory framework must also take account of the form in which Europe was invoked in these spaces. Cooper remarks on the overuse of the term ‘identity’, and suggests nuances that allow us to distinguish between different kinds of identity claims: identification and categorisation; self-understanding and social location; and commonality, connectedness, and groupness.\textsuperscript{41} Likewise, the thesis aims to account for different kinds of invocation of Europe both in the sense of the intended or implied meaning of the actors in these spaces in Paris, and in the analysis of that discourse. We will see Europe or Europeanness represented variously as an idea, an identity, in terms of consciousness, as a commitment, in terms of faith, as a style, as a ‘seriality’, in various degrees of openness, availability, or restriction, as a geographical space, a civilisation, as an inward looking ethnic group, as an entity necessarily in excess of itself, and so on.

At this point we will examine two sub-categories of this definition of Europeanisation as a process. These are particularly useful in analysing the processes in which discourse about


\textsuperscript{41} Cooper, \textit{Colonialism in Question}, 73-77.
Europe was formed. The first of these is a model of competition which draws from Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the field. Then, it is argued that while indispensable, an understanding of the formation of ideas about Europe solely in terms of competition can be quite misleading. As such, Michael Rothberg’s concepts of memory are borrowed and adapted to propose the concepts of ‘knotted Europes’ and ‘multidirectional Europes’.

i. Paris and Competing Conceptions of Europe

Often ideas of Europe or discourse about European identity are examined in isolation without sufficient attention to, in the first place, underlying constraints and pressures on how actors are inclined to formulate certain ideas about such issues, and on the degree of plausibility accorded to their ideas by their intended audience; and secondly, without sufficient appreciation of the relational context in which actors make claims. What they have to say about Europe is not made in a political and cultural vacuum but instead has to factor in comparable claims made by other actors.

It is one of Pierre Bourdieu’s key arguments in his *Language and Symbolic Power* that any claim for identity or an idea of groupness is not made in isolation. It is not neutral or disinterested because it is necessarily made within the confines of a competitive field. This field of competing claims involves ‘different struggles over classifications, struggles over the monopoly of power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the division of the social world and, thereby, to make and
In these terms, any claim about the meaning of Europe made in Paris in this period must be understood as having been articulated within a field of competing claims about Europe. These include not only claims made within Parisian circles but also comparable claims wherever they were made. Nor would this include only different conceptions of the meaning of Europe but also explicit and implicit assertions that Europe was, in fact, unimportant compared with other categories of belonging or human organisation like class, nation, or the universal.

Ideas about Europe varied hugely in Paris. The thesis will work from the position that one can at once conceptualise a general field of claims for Europe, within which Paris held a privileged position, and also a sub-field of claim-making about Europe within Paris itself. Both involved the competition between actors in the field to make their claims for Europe believed and accepted. These two levels while distinct were of course also interconnected. Moreover, integral to the field are certain pressures that tend towards or shape conclusions in a certain way. However little they are openly acknowledged or recognised they must be accommodated in some way. The argument here is that when thinking about Europe in Paris certain considerations imposed themselves on actors in the field either to a greater extent than would have been the case elsewhere in Europe or as considerations that would not have arisen elsewhere at all. The multifariousness of the elements that constituted ideas about Europe leads us on to discuss how such ideas were formed in ways other than through competition.

ii. Knotted Europe and Multidirectional Europe

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Looking at competitive processes is indispensable to an examination of ideas about Europe. However, this tells us little about what constituted ideas about Europe, and how the constituent elements of these ideas related to each other. As such, the analysis of the idea of European unity by the theorist of nationalism, Anthony Smith, is a useful point of departure. Smith poses the question of what is common to Europeans. He suggests that such is the extent of differences among Europeans that one can never reach a satisfactory answer. And yet this does not preclude the fact that there are indeed shared European traditions though not all Europeans share in them, or share in them to the same degree. ‘But,’ he continues, ‘at one time or another all Europe’s communities have participated in at least some of these traditions and heritages, in some degree.’ Smith compares this family of European cultures with Wittgenstein’s concepts of ‘family resemblance’ and of the ‘language game’. Here a ‘family’ of elements or defining characteristics overlap and figure in a number of examples, but not all examples.43

To take up the analogy, the family of elements that constituted ideas of Europe in Paris in this post-war period often included the rather canonical elements Smith points to, such as traditions and heritages like Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism, rationalism and empiricism, romanticism and classicism.44 However, more striking were demarcations of Europe that were contingent to that particular historical moment. Among the most common of these delimiting features were those that referred to what Europe was not. Of course, the Other as a constitutive concept of notions of Europe is hardly unique to Paris. But in representations of Europe at this time in the French capital, its Others can be said to have been particularly numerous, and especially strongly

44 Ibid.
contrasted to itself. These included America, China, Asia, Africa, the Third World, the USSR, and residents of immigrant background. Moreover, it also included more abstract Others such as Nazism and fascism or their legacy, barbarism, capitalism, Communism, violence, irrationality, tradition or, in some ways or forms, modernity.

However, it is argued here that Smith’s useful model for thinking about ideas of Europe can be further refined. By way of illustration, in his engagement with Michael Rothberg’s concepts of ‘knotted memory’ and ‘multidirectional memory’, Jim House points to the work of Monique Hervo who lived and worked in a shantytown, or bidonville, populated by North African immigrants in the northwestern Paris suburb of Nanterre. House situates her solidarity with, and activism on behalf of, these residents in the context of her formative experience as a sixteen-year old girl helping to stretcher the survivors of Buchenwald as they arrived in Paris.\(^\text{45}\)

The connections Hervo made between this experience, the policy of resettlement camps in Algeria, and her work in the bidonville are for House an important example of multidirectional memory or ‘noeuds de mémoire’, concepts that have been developed as a conscious development and critique of the French historian Pierre Nora’s collective project, Les lieux de mémoire.\(^\text{46}\)

Since all those experiences which were formative for Hervo are also key to the constitution of ideas of Europe and of European identity, one can talk about multidirectional or knotted Europes. In this way we can perceive the schematic nature of notions of Europe fashioned solely in relation to America, or to empire, or to its history of violence, or to its own internal history, or whatever else, and grasp that these are actually interconnected in myriad

\(^{45}\) Jim House, ‘Memory and the Creation of Solidarity during the Decolonization of Algeria’, Yale French Studies 118-119 (2010), 33-34.

\(^{46}\) See the special edition on ‘Noeuds de mémoire: multidirectional memory in postwar French and francophone culture’ in Yale French Studies 118-119 (2010); also Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory. Remembering the Holocaust in an Age of Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). The Algerian camps referred to here were part of a French policy of resettlement of the rural Algerian population during the Algerian war.
dynamic ways, disabusing us of any notion of a single, settled and uncomplicated idea of Europe. This resonates with Smith’s development of his concept outlined above by his employment of Wittgenstein’s concepts to represent Europe in which a ‘family’ of elements or defining characteristics overlap and feature in various but not all constellations.\textsuperscript{47} The advantage of the notion of a multidirectional Europe over Smith’s model, besides its sharper emphasis on dynamism, is its location of Europe in popular memory and lived experience, and its emphasis on intrinsic complications that perhaps call more for management than analysis alone.

An additional advantage of the concept of multidirectionality ties into the limitations of the competitive model of ideas examined above. While that analytical tool is indispensable, its use can nonetheless obscure the fact that making sense of concepts of human belonging like Europe cannot look only to competition. A core claim of Rothberg’s \textit{Multidirectional Memory} is that memory is too often considered as a zero-sum struggle between different experiences so that recognition of the one necessarily detracts from that of the other. Rothberg instead suggests that memory can be ‘productive and not privative.’\textsuperscript{48} This is to say that the juxtaposition of different memories need not be at the expense of either, and can in fact be mutually reinforcing and open each other up to being understood in novel and productive ways. This is a key point to bear in mind in this thesis as one considers the elements of experience which lay at the base of various understandings of Europe. What is more, this provides the theoretical apparatus to validate the methodological aim outlined above not to attempt to hijack various Parisian and French histories in order to claim they were European after all. Indeed, it is far more the case that the mutual imbrication of narratives of the French capital and the French nation state on the one hand, and narratives of Europe on the other, is stressed and unpacked rather than overridden.

\textsuperscript{47} Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’, 70.
\textsuperscript{48} Rothberg, \textit{Multidirectional Memory}, 3.
2. Europeanisation as the Refusal of the Closure of Europe

In the April 1953 edition of *Esprit*, the editor Jean-Marie Domenach inveighed against ‘La fausse Europe’. He denounced the false Europe of six states brought together in the process of economic integration, and called instead for a true Europe against the twin hegemony of the superpower blocs, and particularly against American hegemony expressed through its German client.\(^{49}\) Domenach’s intervention exemplifies another useful idiosyncratic sense of Europeanisation highlighted in this thesis – the refusal and rejection of certain ideas about Europe, and opposing them with alternative ideas. This included disputing Europe’s putative universalism, or suggesting alternative understandings of the universal, and how Europe would fit into this. Or, it could also include what is termed here ‘self-ironic Eurocentrism’: Eurocentric discourses that also expressed a sense of their own partiality and inadequacy.

The concept of ‘knotted Europes’ is also useful in suggesting this second supplemental use of ‘Europeanisation’ in this work. It offers the advantage of foregrounding the unpredictability of processes of discourse about Europe. After all, the metaphor of a knot connotes elements of ideas about the continent that are almost inextricably intertwined, and connect to each other in barely fathomable ways. This has something in common with Mireille Rosello’s use of the concept of ‘creolisation’ to examine discourse about Europe and Europeanness. In her account, creolisation denotes the unpredictable results that arise from contacts between cultures, and is particularly interesting in regard to those that are taken to be

\(^{49}\) Jean-Marie Domenach, ‘La fausse Europe’, *Esprit* 21/201 (1953), 513-529.
non-European. Creolisation is defined not by disorder but unpredictability, and it is this sense that it differs from the term ‘métissage’. Rosello suggests that the concept of creolisation is thus a useful analytical tool to contest consensual definitions of Europe and to think more rigorously instead about perceptions of European hybridity, the non-Europeanness of Europe, the possibility of a non-Eurocentric Europe, and Europeanisation itself as an unpredictable process. This approach also alerts us to the dangers of passing over uncritically closed and exclusivist notions of Europe. Indeed, in his discussion of ‘nœuds de mémoire’, Rothberg suggests that a core purpose of that concept is to take to task the still very current practice of disavowing cosmopolitan impurity.

The calling into question of a fixed and closed understanding of Europe also has parallels with Dipesh Chakrabarty’s project of ‘provincializing Europe’. By Europe Chakarabarty does not mean the region of the world. Rather, he is talking about habits of thought that permeate the social sciences, particularly as they apply to his scholarly specialism of South Asia. Specifically, his work investigates the repertoire of academic concepts that include historicism, capitalism, modernity, and Enlightenment. In this sense, attention is paid to discourse about Europe in Paris in the post-war period which disputed or raised questions more generally about the universal claims made for Europe, and the corollary ‘denial of coevalness’ of non-Europeans. By the same token, Europeanisation in this sense includes ideas that dispute, to borrow Wallerstein’s terms, European universalism in the name of universal universalism. At the same time, the analysis seeks to circumvent the weaknesses of Chakrabarty’s important work. Cooper argues

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51 Ibid., 2-3, 6-7.
54 Here Chakrabarty is borrowing the phrase of Johannes Fabian.
that Chakrabarty’s case is overstated and as such reveals ‘how far the Europe that he wants to “provincialize” is from any Europe that existed. Instead of looking at the conflicting ways in which inhabitants of this province actually thought, he has been content to let the most simplistic version of the Enlightenment stand in for the European province’s much more convoluted history.’\textsuperscript{55} As such, following Cooper, the very convolutedness of discourse about Europe in Paris must be with grappled with and not minimised.

3. Europeanisation as Disclosure, Acknowledgement or Appropriation

A third related supplemental definition of Europeanisation is the disclosure of, or insistence on, the relevance of the category of Europe to places where it had previously not been obvious or acknowledged. Likewise, Europeanisation can be understood as the insistence on the Europeanness of various actors or spaces whose Europeanness was denied or devalued. One thinks immediately of Mircea Eliade’s lament quoted above. In some cases this kind of Europeanisation is roughly equivalent to the philosopher Jacques Rancière’s concept of ‘political subjectivization’. Politics in this sense is, Rancière maintains, not a sphere but a process. Where Europe or Europeanness was invoked as a means of exclusion, this politics involved the demand of the excluded, or the ‘part of no part’, for inclusion in the polity on the basis of equality.\textsuperscript{56}

Furthermore, we will see that one notion of Europeanisation signified norms and criteria that were applied to immigrants in Paris in this period, either to make them more European or to

\textsuperscript{55} Cooper, \textit{Colonialism in Question}, 122.

\textsuperscript{56} Jacques Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, \textit{The South Atlantic Quarterly} 103/2-3 (Spring-Summer, 2004), 305.
extend European control over the non-European. Conversely, immigrants sometimes responded with a kind of counter-Europeanisation in their reluctance to be determined by such schemes of containment and in their contestation of their devaluation as non-Europeans, indeed of their de-Europeanisation and the baggage that entailed. This Europeanisation foregrounded what and who was considered to be European, and what and who was considered not to be. But it did so in the spirit of critical interrogation and irreverence, rather than deference to a Europe that had already been made, and whose terms of belonging had already been set.

Chapter Plan

The first set of three chapters examines the city of Paris itself as a Europeanising space. To this end it examines concrete spaces in the French capital, and how these were implicated in thinking about Europe. These chapters are an adaptation and in large part a critique of the French historian Pierre Nora’s multivolume edited collection, *Les lieux de mémoire*. This work examines diverse spaces in French history ranging from rituals, festivals, songs, flags, monuments, buildings, and various kinds of symbols. In his review of this endeavour, Tony Judt comments on the lack of any entry on either Bonaparte in all the volumes, finding this to be a rather implausible gallocentric curtailing of France’s entwinement with the history of Europe as whole.\(^{57}\) Another consistent criticism of this collective work has been its inattention to the history

of French imperialism and of immigration. In engaging with these two critiques, these chapters examine how precisely these histories, though not only these, were intertwined with discourse about Europe in some of the city’s spaces.

Chapter 1 takes as its point of departure the critic George Steiner’s citation of the café as an essential marker of the idea of Europe. It then reviews the café’s place in Paris as part of an image of European cosmopolitanism and as a forum in which discourse about Europe was produced. It then considers the implications of the centrality of the café for non-European Parisian residents given the institution’s putative quintessential Europeanness. Here particular attention is paid to Algerians and black Americans. Further, the serenity of the café is juxtaposed to the experience of violence that often underscored discourse about Europe, particularly in regard to the Algerian war of decolonisation and the Cold War. Finally, the chapter considers the function of the café in the image of Jean-Paul Sartre, and its connection to his output on the question of Europe.

Chapter 2 examines the connections between discourse about Europe and, in its broadest sense, the Parisian home. The reconfiguration of the urban space of the city in the wake of the experience of the Second World War, and its impact on the habitability of the city, is examined as an exercise that was undertaken with Europe as a guiding standard. The dual affective and concrete senses of home were particularly relevant in regard to the influx into metropolitan France of both European Algerians and Algerian Muslims. Europe and Europeanness are identified as key terms in the attempt to rationalise their absorption into Paris and to manage their accommodation. Europeanness is further explored as a term of ethnicisation of more and

less desirable inhabitants in the city, and which impacted especially on Algerian immigrants. Furthermore, discourses of Europeanness and non-Europeanness are analysed in terms of their application to devalue areas of the city populated particularly densely by these North Africans.

The Parisian street is examined as a Europeanising space in Chapter 3. Here the politics of street names is examined in relation to contemporary reflections on Europe, as are demonstrations and confrontations in the streets of the capital. Specifically, the reaction in Paris to the Soviet invasion of Budapest in 1956 and the notorious killings of some up to 200 unarmed Algerian demonstrators on 17 October 1961 are considered in terms of underlying convictions about the meaning of Europe and Europeanness. The Paris street wall is then examined as a forum on which graffiti denouncing this violence connected to wider concerns about justice as a defining element of Europe’s self-image.

The second section of the thesis comprises two chapters that look at political Europeanising spaces in Paris. Chapter 4 analyses the *Mouvement socialiste des états-unis d’Europe* (MSEUE). Founded in 1947 and based in Paris, this was an independent movement of socialists from throughout the continent. The point of departure of the chapter is the under-examined, ambiguous relationship between socialism broadly conceived, and ideas about Europe. The analysis picks up on the Movement’s attempts to advocate a coherent and viable political project of European integration within the guiding framework of socialist traditions, values, and aims in the context of the post-war world of Cold War and European imperial conflict.

Chapter 5 examines the *Fédération des étudiants nationalistes* (FEN). For this important and very visible far-right wing student group founded in 1960, Europe and its defence were
central terms of reference, even obsession. The group was active in French student politics, producing and distributing journals, contesting student representative positions, organising political meetings and demonstrations, and revelling in street fights. The FEN concerned itself with a whole range of subjects from trivial issues of student life to grand theories of hierarchy in world politics. Its brand of nationalism was located within a vision of an integral Europe. Indeed, a nation was reckoned to be a European privilege and the notion of non-European nationalisms was as outrageous as it was dangerous. As such, Europe was only of value to the group to the extent that it extended to the non-European world. Should decolonisation be carried to its conclusion and Europe reduced to its European geographical limits, Europe would be worth very little at all.

The third set of chapters looks at cultural Europeanising spaces in Paris. One should note that the distinction made in this thesis as a whole between chapters looking at political Europeanising spaces and those which examine cultural Europeanising spaces is principally an analytical differentiation. It is not intended to suggest that these categories are radically separable, or to imply a priori that actors within these categories were likely to formulate widely differing expressions of Europe. In fact, the politicisation of these cultural spaces in terms of Europe is precisely one of their notable characteristics.

Chapter 6 examines the cultural activities of Spanish exiles from Franco’s regime in the French capital in this period. It analyses a range of cultural groups and figures within this community, notably the writer Juan Goytisolo, Pablo Picasso, Jorge Semprún, and the cultural supplement of *Solidaridad obrera* – the important organ of the anarcho-syndicalist labour organisation, the *Confederación nacional del trabajo*. The chapter pays particular attention to the politicisation of the cultural activities of the exiles, and also how they drew from themes which
permeated Spanish history in particular, but were also timely to any consideration of contemporary Europe as a whole: quixotism; the relationship between civilisation, culture and violence; and the implications of discerning insiders and outsiders.

Chapter 7 looks at the ideas of Europe of the Orientalist Jacques Berque in this period of French decolonisation. It emphasises two events in particular: Berque’s inaugural Collège de France lecture in 1956, and his dialogue in the course of an evening at the Sorbonne in 1960 with one of the most distinguished Orientalists of the previous generation, Louis Massignon. The Collège de France lecture set out his vision of Europe and the Arab world and was a point of reference for all Berque’s future stances. The chapter examines Berque’s understanding of Europe in relation to the Arab world in relation to his vision of a Mediterranean community and his engagement with concepts such as rationalism, modernity, alienation, faith, justice, violence and reconciliation.

Chapter 8 considers the photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson and how Europe was represented or interpreted in his work. It looks at the contradictions, problems and capacities of the photographic medium for the representation of Europe, and how these corresponded with Cartier-Bresson’s political, social, and aesthetic commitments. To this end it examines three spaces and their reception by their Paris audiences: first, his exhibition at the Musée des arts décoratifs in the Louvre (1955), which displayed his work from both Europe and the non-European world. Second, it looks at Cartier-Bresson’s record of the culmination of the Chinese Civil War and its subsequent presentation in a collection of 1954 – D’une Chine à l’autre. This is contextualised in terms of the representation of Europe in terms of its Others. Third, it analyses his 1955 work Les Européens in which Cartier-Bresson’s impressions of his European travels were presented.
Chapter 1. The Paris Café as a Europeanising Space

In his address on ‘The Idea of Europe’, George Steiner remarks on the power of Pierre Nora’s notion of lieux de mémoire. He then proceeds to invoke a handful of criteria of Europe. First among these is the café:

Europe is made up of coffee houses, of cafés. These extend from Pessoa’s favourite coffee houses in Lisbon to the Odessa cafés haunted by Isaac Babel’s gangsters. They stretch from the Copenhagen cafés which Kierkegaard passed on his concentrated walks to the counters of Palermo. No early or defining cafés in Moscow which is already a suburb of Asia. Very few in England after a brief fashion in the eighteenth century. None in North America outside the gallican outpost of New Orleans. Draw the coffee-house map and you have one of the essential markers of the ‘idea of Europe’. 1

Stimulating as Steiner’s observation is, his argument about the idea of Europe is in general problematic. If he allows that the definition of Europe’s frontiers is tricky and debatable, by the same token he suggests that there is an unproblematic and settled core of Europe. It is in this sense that his reference to Nora’s Lieux de mémoire is instructive, since this reference to the café fits into a consensual, settled, and canonical idea of Europe in which internal conflict and contradiction are minimised. There is of course much in the history of the Paris café in this period which would not trouble this understanding of a European space: Rosemary Wakeman, for instance, refers to the central place of the café as a crucial site of recreation for Parisians, and to the masses of Parisian spectators who filled the city’s cafés like their co-Europeans across the continent to watch the coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953. 2

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1 George Steiner, The Idea of Europe (Tilburg: Nexus Institute, 2004), 17.
Without dismissing the significance of such phenomena in post-war European social history, perhaps the Parisian café can be productively examined as a site of contestation of Europe, or as a place in which events unfolded which responded to European actuality, and shaped it in turn. An analysis of the Parisian café at this time as a site of disruption and insurrection in relation to Europe, is not to claim that this is what most typified this venerable institution. It is merely to suggest it has an alternative or additional history that avoids the any easy consensus and the inauthentic domestication of history. Steiner’s invocation of Walter Benjamin in his depiction of the café as a sort of European museum piece is symptomatic of this tendency.³

This chapter will first survey some of the café-frequenting individuals and groups that contributed to discourse of Europe in post-war Paris, and how the discourse of Europe was invoked in relation to the city’s cafés. Second, this Paris institution is examined as a space that, contrary to its purpose as a space of leisure, was implicated in the violence of politics that impacted on thinking about Europe; namely, imperial war and the Cold War. Third, the discussion moves to a more extended analysis of the café in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre – the archetypal café intellectual – and his substantial discourse about Europe.

Europe and the Cosmopolitanism of the Paris café

Walter Benjamin wrote that, ‘Paris is a counterpart in the social order to what Vesuvius is in the geographic order: a menacing hazardous massif, an ever-active hotbed of revolution. But just as the slopes of Vesuvius, thanks to the layers of lava that cover them, have been transformed into paradisal orchards, so the lava of revolution provides uniquely fertile ground for

³ Steiner, The Idea of Europe, 18.
the blossoming of art, festivity, fashion." The radical Parisian spirit described here was historically strongly represented in the cafés. Andrew Hussey notes that ‘the cafés of Paris were, quite rightly, regarded with suspicion by all government authorities, who were all too aware of the role they had played, from 1789, as carriers of the virus of revolution.’ Benjamin’s comparison also captures the tone of Janet Flanner’s eulogy to the old Café Rotonde which was being razed after the city’s intellectual scene shifted in the post-war period from Montparnasse to Saint-Germain. She listed among its illustrious frequenters ‘Cocteau, Radiguet, Modigliani, Max Jacob, Foujita, Picasso, Braque, Honegger, Henry Miller, Bromfield, Utrillo, and in a class by themselves, Lenin and Trotsky, who used to sip their cafés-crèmes there in 1915, when in exile.’ The Paris café in these accounts was perhaps better understood as a forum for universal culture and politics with a heavy European element – an accurate reflection of how universalism was for the most part conceived in Paris and in Europe generally in this period. Elsewhere, though, the Paris café was a forum for more direct invocations of Europe.

The Spanish novelist Juan Goytisolo traces part of his longstanding commitment to questioning and confronting the notion of a closed Europeanness to his experiences as the sole European in Algerian cafés in the Barbès quartier after his arrival in the French capital in 1956. Europe was also a fundamental term of reference in the circles of Parisian Surrealist intellectuals, for whom the experience of the First World War had instilled a militant, enduring disgust for

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7 Maya Jaggi, ‘Scourge of the New Spain’, *The Guardian* (12 August, 2000), [http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2000/aug/12/internationalwriting.books](http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2000/aug/12/internationalwriting.books). Goytisolo’s important contribution to scrutinising the notion of a pure and orthodox Europe in terms of ethnicity, culture, and sexuality is examined in chapter 6 on ideas of Europe in the culture of Spanish exiles.
European civilisation. This was manifested in the group’s radical and early anticolonialism, and it is striking that in the course of the Algerian war their stance was formulated and clarified in a document entitled ‘Texte lu au café suite aux réunions suscitées par la Déclaration des 121’. This concerned the problem of negotiating an appropriate path between commitment to their rejection of a Europe of imperialism and unconditional support of the Algerian Fédération de libération nationale (FLN). Part of the issue at hand for the group in lending its support to the FLN was whether there was a clear enough distinction between anti-colonial nationalism and the bourgeois European nationalism that the group scorned.

The importance of the café in the group’s deliberations here should not be overstated. After all, the document was not disseminated, and the café in the title could be conceived as incidental. On the other hand, Wakeman argues that the urban spatial imagination of Parisian Surrealists was remarkably acute, open to the spatial undertones of ‘identity, meaning, and value’, and to the ““topography of subjectivity””. That the invocation of the café in the Surrealists’ statement was meaningful, and that it was an appropriate forum in which to articulate their militant objections to Europe, thus seems an unforced argument once Wakeman’s point is taken into account.

Given the cosmopolitan nature of Paris, the café was of course also a forum for the political and cultural activity of non-European residents. Eric Hobsbawm remarks on the ‘Paris café Maoism’ of Pol Pot, while Benjamin Stora suggests that Algerian national consciousness

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9 Carole Reynaud-Paligot, ‘Les surréalistes et la guerre d’Algérie’, French Cultural Studies 13(2002), 44 n. The declaration of the 121 was a highly important 1960 manifesto against France’s war in Algeria. This in part was framed with Europe as a key term of reference: ‘Need we remind you that 15 years after the destruction of Hitler’s regime, French militarism, in meeting the demands of this war, has re-established torture and made it once again a European institution?’ See ‘The Declaration in Support of Those who Refuse to Fight in Algeria’, New Left Review I/6 (November-December, 1960), 41.
10 Leclercq, La rançon du colonialisme, 337-338.
11 Wakeman, The Heroic City, 189.
was in fact largely formed in the city’s cafés. It is interesting, then, that if the Parisian café was a quintessentially European institution, it was also a forum in which strategies to overturn the Europe of imperialism were formulated. This did not go unnoticed by the French state. In September 1955 the new Minister of the Interior, Maurice Bourgès-Manoury, laid out the rationale for an extensive surveillance of North African cafés in Paris: ‘drinking establishments, restaurants, and canteens held by French Muslims have become one of the habitual centers of nationalist agitation. Anti-national slogans are peddled there, indeed made there... it is unacceptable that these public spaces, ruled strictly by legislation, and where the police have a permanent supervisory mission, should be the centers of a separatism that becomes more arrogant with each day.’ Of course, in the café life of the Parisian intellectual set, these anti-colonial activists would find many sympathetic Europeans. Besides politics, the city’s cafés constituted a certain European-Oriental divide in the common refusal of service to Algerians. Amit Prakash notes that in the early 1950s, the police were asked by various private individuals and groups to enter the La Goutte d’Or area to keep North Africans out of ‘Parisian’ cafés.

The Paris café is also a much-noted aspect of the lifestyle of expatriate black Americans in this period, most famously in the case of figures like Richard Wright, James Baldwin, and Chester Himes, who frequented establishments like Café Tournon near the Luxemburg gardens and Café Monaco, also on the Left Bank. Indeed, black Americans congregated principally around the Latin Quarter and Saint-Germain-des-Prés. They were attracted to the French

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14 Ibid., 135.
capital in the first place by its reputation for tolerance, in contrast to their formative experiences of racism back home.

One interesting aspect of this scene was its interconnection with contemporary Cold War politics and black internationalist politics. In her study of ‘Black Paris’, Bennetta Jules-Rosette outlines how the cafés that black Americans frequented buzzed with American journalists, correspondents and expatriate artists, whilst they were reputed to be a meeting place for American government agents and spies looking to finger suspected Communists in the expatriate community. Moreover, the café functioned as a forum that facilitated the promotion of black internationalism, as contacts were fostered between black American intellectuals and African and Antillean writers. Of course, these are issues in themselves which impacted on discourse about Europe in this period, as its place in a decolonising world was increasingly questioned.

One striking and unsettling aspect of the black Americans’ experience in Paris, which became a point of discussion of in the café – the only place they could congregate – was their recognition of the maltreatment of Algerians, who occupied the lowest rank in the social hierarchy. In this sense, the Europe of equality that they had romanticised was shown to be in reality a variant configuration of the exclusionary society that they had left, but in which they occupied a higher position in the social order. This was part of a broader contradictoriness of their European refuge, upon which Richard Wright commented at the first International Conference of Black Writers and Artists at the Sorbonne in 1956: ‘The men of Europe seem prone in their actions to achieve results that contradict their motives. Europeans have a genius for calling things by wrong names; they seek to save souls and become involved with murder; they

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17 Ibid., 60.
attempt to enthrone God as an absolute thought and they thereby establish the prerequisites for science and atheistic thought.’

Moreover, in spite of the personal liberation that the esteem and interest of Parisians represented for the black American community, not only the Marxists among them would have understood well the unsatisfactoriness of any liberation that was not general. Guilty feelings about having abandoned fellow blacks in the United States were accentuated by their own prioritisation in Paris over Algerians. James Baldwin recalled being in Paris in 1956 to cover the same Sorbonne conference. Whilst walking along the Boulevard Saint-Germain he saw photographs at a news kiosk of fifteen-year old Dorothy Counts being spat upon by a mob as she made her way to school in North Carolina. He recounted that,

It made me furious, it filled me with both hatred and pity, and it made me ashamed. Some one of us should have been there with her! I dawdled in Europe for nearly another year, held my private life and my attempt to finish a novel, but it was on that bright afternoon that I knew I was leaving France. I could, simply, no longer sit around in Paris discussing the Algerian and the black American problem. Everyone was paying their dues, and it was time I went home and paid mine.

It is suggestive that the Algerian and black American problems are conjoined in his account of his Paris experience. One might then speculate that his decision to return to the United States was not due to a prior conviction that the injustices in his homeland took precedence over those of Europe, but that it was precisely those injustices that he had encountered in Europe which induced him to rethink his stand on the Civil Rights movement at home.

The black American expatriates’ unease about deferring politics at home was exacerbated by their recognition that their European base in Paris was not radically different from, to use

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Jacques Rancière’s term, the ‘police order’ that they could not bear in America.\textsuperscript{21} Rather, it was a strikingly similar variant, in which they might have a part of sorts in the social polity, but others clearly did not.

The Paris Café, Violence, and Europe

In his review of several books about Parisian intellectual life, Christopher Prendergast writes of Peter Lennon’s \textit{Foreign Correspondent: Paris in the Sixties} that ‘whole stretches… take us out of the café into the streets and the world of violent confrontation, first (and most seriously) in connection with the Algerian crisis.’\textsuperscript{22} It is interesting that Prendergast makes such a sharp demarcation between Parisian café life and the arena of the Algerian war, for, in fact, the two were interconnected in certain ways. This in turn connected the café to questions of Europe and Europeanness, given the stake of the French-Algerian war in such issues. Here we will elaborate on this connection between the café, violence, and Europe not only in the case of wars of decolonisation but also in the context of the Cold War.

Olivier Todd recollects his work to help the Jeanson network, a group of leftist militants led by Francis Jeanson who helped the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in the metropole, notably by transporting money and papers.\textsuperscript{23} He noted that Francis Jeanson insisted they meet in ‘posh literary bars, in the middle of Saint-Germain, even when the police were after

\textsuperscript{21} Oliver Davis explains succinctly the significance of Rancière’s term. What is conventionally thought of as politics is termed by Rancière ‘the police’. Davis continues, ‘This includes the institutions and processes governing the organization and representation of communities, the exercise of power, the way social roles are distributed and the way that distribution is legitimated. See Oliver Davis, \textit{Jacques Rancière} (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 76.


him. “They won’t look for me here,” he would say, “it’s too obvious.” Todd emphasised the recklessness of this, and suggested that Jeanson’s decision making in this regard might well have been fuelled by drink. A more charitable analysis might conceptualise this tactic along the lines of Michel de Certeau’s concept of détournement – if the Europe of imperialism deeply implicated the European bourgeoisie, he would appropriate the latter’s cherished public sphere and use it against the former. Naturally, the two interpretations are not mutually exclusive.

The place of the Parisian café in the Algerian war is also apparent in Hamon and Rotman’s classic study of the Jeanson network, Les Porteurs de valises. This network was itself a kind of practical objectivation of a militant European consciousness, in that its work necessitated continual back and forth trips between Paris and France and Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. If Europe was a set of borders, the group aimed to appropriate this feature to turn it against the imperialism that defined it no less. According to Stora, they did so with notable success: ‘A handful of porteurs de valises awoke the French and European left, raised the question of state terrorism… and faced the problem of new relationships between the West and the Third World.’

Hamon and Rotman recount a police raid on the Tambour de la Bastille café on the Place de la Bastille, which was frequented by members of the network. The comparative restraint of these operations against the network did not compromise their effectiveness, as key members of the network were apprehended and brought to trial in 1960. This contrasted starkly with other Paris police operations against cafés frequented by immigrant Algerian communities during and

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26 See Hamon & Rotman, Les Porteurs de valises, passim.
27 For a discussion of this conception of Europe see Joep Leerssen, ‘Europe as a Set of Borders’, Yearbook of European Studies 6 (1993), 1-14.
28 Quoted in Rod Kedward, La Vie en Bleu. France and the French since 1900 (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 348.
even before the war, and also with its negligence in the face of OAS attacks on those spaces.\textsuperscript{29} The discrepancy between the treatment of the French militants and the Algerians (militants and civilians) was a concretisation of demarcation according to what Judith Butler terms the distribution of human vulnerability.\textsuperscript{30} That is to say, the classifications French and non-French, European and non-European, were underscored in the perceived difference of appropriateness of the exposure of each group to violence, and indeed of enacting violence on the two groups.

It is also interesting how the connection between violence and Europe was manifested in the Parisian café, sometimes in quite inconspicuous ways. This emerges in relation to the hit film of 1958 \textit{Les Tricheurs}, which reflected and spawned much debate about youthful corruption and urban disintegration. Wakeman describes the film thus: ‘in it the optimism of \textit{Paris populaire} has been exchanged for the image of an unforgiving place where youth and the future are out of control.’\textsuperscript{31} The director Marcel Carné defended the film’s portrayal of youth against public outrage. Insisting on the authenticity of its depiction, he described his interactions with these types of young men and women, who were for the most part students who had abandoned their studies. They frequented the café Bonaparte in Saint-Germain, quite different from the regular student cafés in the Latin Quarter. Superficially, the café life of these young people seemed simply an expression of their ennui and apolitical cynicism. But Carné insisted that this needed to be understood in the context of the Cold War reality in which existence could be liquidated at any time.\textsuperscript{32} Here one thinks of Jean-Paul Sartre’s remarks in the context of his denunciation of French colonialism, which, as we will see, was intimately tied to his conception of Europe. In


\textsuperscript{31} Wakeman, \textit{The Heroic City}, 262.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 261.
September 1958 he wrote, ‘since Hiroshima, we have been threatened, angered and worried the whole time. I imagine that in every mind there is a scar which is nothing less than terror at rest. Many people today could repeat Hobbes’s words of three centuries ago: “The one and only passion of my life has been fear.”’ The image of Sartre himself is of course invariably intertwined with the Paris café, and at this juncture we will turn to a discussion of how this played into his discourse about Europe.

Sartre, the Café, Europe

It would be hard to name an intellectual who is more associated with the café than Jean-Paul Sartre. In keeping with this image, the front cover of Anna Boschetti’s study of Sartre and Les Temps modernes shows Sartre and his circle in discussion in a café. Sartre was also very much a European figure, not only in his intellectual importance and influence across the continent but also in terms of his direct engagement with the question of Europe. Yet, the rare commentary on these interventions belies their prominence. What, then, is the connection between the café and his Europeanism? In approaching this question, this account will first review Sartre’s ideas about Europe. Second, it will engage with Pierre Bourdieu’s argument about the structural determinants of Sartre’s dominant position in the Parisian intellectual field. It will be argued that each of Bourdieu’s arguments can be substantiated by locating the function of the café. Of course, the concomitant implication is that the conditions Bourdieu identifies, and the function of the café in these, facilitated the impact of what Sartre said and wrote about Europe. The café did not so much shape Sartre’s discourse about Europe as enhance its authority.

In the first place, it is worth reiterating the extent of Sartre’s intellectual presence throughout Europe in this post-war period. Mark Poster argues that he was probably the most popular writer in the continent, and figures as diverse as Juan Goytisolo, Alain Badiou, or Jürgen Habermas refer to him as an important influence in their youth. One also thinks of Sartre’s influence on Pier Paolo Pasolini in the context of Europe’s responsibility in struggles in the Third World. And if György Lukács was strongly critical of Sartre, it is significant in itself that he felt the need to prioritise a rigorous engagement with, and critique of, his work. In a much less positive emphasis on Sartre’s trans-European importance, Tony Judt indicts Sartre for making a real contribution to daily oppression in Eastern Europe. However, writing in 1963, George Lichtheim assessed that Sartre had ‘an enthusiastic following in Poland,’ a popularity which Poster notes increased after 1956. Janet Flanner’s report in her Paris journal on the 1949 Wroclaw trial also notes that the guilty were, according to the lawyers, led astray by Sartrism.

Europe was also a theme which continually resurfaced in Sartre’s own work, whether implicitly or directly. As for the former, Andrew Hussey points to the degree of interest in his famous 1945 lecture, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, as symptomatic of ‘the defining mood of a generation of young people who had survived the war but who were deeply sceptical of the so-

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36 See Poster, *Existential Marxism in Postwar France*, 121-125
39 Flanner, *Paris Journal*, 114. The Wroclaw trial involved four French nationals, a German, and a Pole charged by the Polish authorities with espionage and sabotage.
called benefits of Western civilization.'\textsuperscript{40} If this was a mood instilled in large part by the recent experience of war, that experience in turn coloured Sartre’s own view of Europe. ‘The word “Europe”,’ he wrote in 1947, ‘formerly referred to the geographical, economic, and political unity of the Old Continent. Today, it preserves a musty smell of Germanism and servitude.’\textsuperscript{41}

But what is particularly striking in Sartre’s use of the term Europe was his juxtaposition of its (re)constitution in the new Cold War world with a Europe defined by its imperialism. These two contexts of Sartre’s work have tended to be artificially separated in discussions about him, or conjoined unsatisfactorily. It is telling that Sartre omitted mention of Nazism altogether as a motive for writing his 1959 play about torture, \textit{The Condemned of Altona}, despite the Nazi context of the plot. Instead he remarked that, ‘for me, \textit{Altona} is tied up with the whole evolution of Europe since 1945, as much with the Soviet concentration camps as with the war in Algeria.’\textsuperscript{42}

The Europe that is depicted in works like \textit{What is Literature?} and \textit{Black Orpheus} is one besmirched by its cooption by fascism in the recent past, and drastically undercut in the present by a decadent bourgeoisie bereft of ideas, confidence, and legitimacy. His preface to Frantz Fanon’s \textit{The Wretched of the Earth} argued that Europeans had to accept that ‘in the past we made history and now it is being made of us.’\textsuperscript{43} Whether via the reconfiguration of the distribution of global political dominance to the benefit of the United States and the USSR, or in the context of the anti-colonial movements which were then gathering pace, Europe was now an object rather than a subject. It is quite striking that Sartre took such an interest in colonialism as a \textit{European} phenomenon. This contrasted to many of his fellow Frenchmen and women who

\textsuperscript{40} Hussey, \textit{Paris}, 389.
\textsuperscript{43} Sartre, ‘The Wretched of the Earth’, 171.
conceptualised the Algerian conflict as a French national drama, even if critical of France’s actions in the war from 1954.\textsuperscript{44}

The stark reality of this global actuality left no place for indifference or disengagement – one was necessarily ‘situated’ in this new Europe. Sartre’s interventions through the 1950s and the early 1960s, particularly in relation to colonialism, reinforced the image of a moribund Europe on its last legs. Yet he refuted the obvious sentiment of resignation to this condition. The corollary of his tenets of commitment and engagement was that Europe could be remade, however noxious it might currently be. Hence his advice to European readers to heed Fanon’s irrefutable charges against Europe in \textit{The Wretched of the Earth}, even if his book was not written for them.\textsuperscript{45}

In this sense, Sartre was less an advocate of Europe than of Europeanisation. If ‘existence precedes essence’, it followed that an account of Europe in terms of its historical pedigree or elemental characteristics was at best uninteresting, and at worst an alibi for indifference to what existed or was done in Europe’s name in the present. As such, in \textit{What is Literature?}, Sartre emphasised that discourse about Europe took on its significance through active engagement in the present: ‘As for socialist Europe, there’s no “choosing” it since it doesn’t exist. It is \textit{to be made}.’\textsuperscript{46} This same work was a bridge between the theoretical and practical for Sartre – his unpublished notes in Simone de Beauvoir’s \textit{La Force des choses} state that it led him to the \textit{Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire} (RDR).\textsuperscript{47} A key aim of the short-lived RDR in

\textsuperscript{44} By the same reasoning, the historian of the idea of Europe, Denis de Rougemont, was scathing in his review of Sartre’s preface to Fanon’s \textit{The Wretched of the Earth}, arguing that Sartre projected onto ‘Europe’ the provincial concerns of French intellectuals with the Algerian war. See Denis de Rougemont, ‘Sartre contre l’Europe,’ \textit{Arts: beaux arts, littérature, spectacles} (17 January, 1962).

\textsuperscript{45} See ‘The Wretched of the Earth’, in Sartre, \textit{Colonialism and Neocolonialism}, passim.

\textsuperscript{46} Jean-Paul Sartre, \textit{What is Literature?} (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001), 227. Emphasis in the original.

1948-1949, in which Sartre invested both energy and money, was to advocate a socialist Europe standing apart from both the Soviet Union and the United States.\textsuperscript{48}

Bourdieu on Sartre

In \textit{Postwar}, Tony Judt laments the decline of the ‘venerable European institution, the public intellectual.’ He continues: ‘the previous \textit{fin-de-siècle} had seen the first flowering of politically engaged intellectuals – in Vienna, in Berlin, in Budapest, but above all in Paris.’\textsuperscript{49} A fuller understanding of this European institution, however, would take into account how intensely guarded and contested was its role and status, and nowhere more than in the French capital. Anna Boschetti places Sartre squarely within the context of such battles dating back to at least the time of the Dreyfus affair. In her approach to Sartre’s work, Boschetti is heavily indebted to Pierre Bourdieu’s methodological and theoretical apparatus. Bourdieu’s own analysis of Sartre suggests the structural conditions which explain the latter’s success in the particular intellectual context of post-war Paris.

The case is made in the remainder of this chapter that the café played a specific function in the conditions that Bourdieu outlines. Of course, it is important to consider that the café had a symbolic as well as practical function. As such, Sartre could still be thought of as a café intellectual beyond the point when he had largely moved away from the cafés of Saint-Germain-des-Prés by the late 1950s, when the area had become too touristy – the by-product of the implementation of a quite different vision of a Europe of tourism.

\textsuperscript{48} See ibid., passim.
We should also note that the label of the café was, and is, also sometimes used precisely to discredit figures like Sartre – the PCF in particular scorned café intellectualism, which was indicative of a petit-bourgeois lifestyle and the seedy Americanisation of Saint-Germain. André Malraux was no less disdainful of ‘ces gens du Café de Flore’. Likewise, today the café is often invoked in denunciations of Sartre: the title of Todd’s discussion of the Jeanson network is taken from an encounter with Sartre in a café in which he had ‘a glass of whisky in one hand and Lenin in the other’. This kind of intellectual café scene is thus condemned retrospectively as at once far too frivolous and much too serious, dismissed as self-indulgent irresponsibility conjoined with unacceptably radical political advocacy.

Bourdieu, of course, emphasises the relational and competitive aspects of intellectual production, conceiving its actors as operating in a common field. Consequently, Bourdieu is sceptical of the image of Sartre as a free-floating intellectual, self-fashioned and scornful of the institutional affiliations and responsibilities of his leading intellectual competitors that characterised, for instance, Claude Lévi-Strauss. Incidentally, Lévi-Strauss had much to say about Europeans and Europeaness, from a structuralist perspective, explicitly opposed to Sartre’s existentialist and phenomenological approach. Against the Sartrian notion of the total intellectual who could not be reduced to any determination, Bourdieu insists that we inquire into the conditions and structures which in fact made his dominance feasible and sustainable. However, it is vital to make the point that it is not necessary to implicate actors in self-conscious or deliberate strategising to sustain Bourdieu’s theory of a field defined by relations of force, and whose actors strive to accumulate more symbolic capital than their competitors. Hence Bourdieu

51 Todd, ‘A Glass of Whisky in One Hand and Lenin in the Other’.
notes: ‘Faire publier ce que j’aime, c’est renforcer ma position dans le champ – cela que je le veuille ou non, que je le sache ou non, et même si cet effet n’entre en rien dans le projet de mon action.’

Following on from this, we will attempt to locate the place of the café as a point of leverage within the competitive and relational Parisian intellectual field, without claiming that Sartre deliberately or knowingly utilised it as such. What is at stake here is not a comparative textual exegesis to evaluate the intrinsic strength of Sartre’s ideas (including his ideas about Europe), nor of those of his competitors. The preponderance of any actor’s discourse over that of his or her competitors does not derive from making his or her case particularly charismatically. The performative power of the speech act is integrally related to Bourdieu’s notion of ‘capital’ and, specifically, the kind of capital that an actor has within a particular field. So what is important in discourse, including discourse about Europe, is not some power inherent in the language or the force of the idea per se, but the kind of legitimacy with which it is backed. In his conception, certain competitors are better endowed with symbolic capital to make claims, to the extent that some can carry priest-like authority to do so; discourse here can be understood as

a *religious* act performed by the person invested with the highest authority, the *rex*, whose responsibility it is to *regere sacra*, to fix the rules which bring into existence what they decree, to speak with authority, to pre-dict in the sense of calling into being, by an enforceable saying, what one says, of making the future that one utters come into being… Even when he merely states with authority what is already the case, even when he contents himself with asserting what is, the *auctor* produces a change in what is: by virtue of the fact that he states things with authority.


If, as according to Boschetti, Sartre held intellectual dominance in post-war Paris to an extent unparalleled since Voltaire, Bourdieu suggests why this was so by first posing these questions:

What if Sartre had been only the ideologist of the intellectuals, confident that they would recognise themselves in the image he reflected back to them, that of the total intellectual who cannot be reduced to any determination? What if Sartre, who reigned unchallenged over the whole intellectual universe, was totally dominated by what he dominated? What if the free intellectual were actually the most determinate of intellectuals, unaware as he is that the determinations attaching to his social position lie precisely in the illusion of the absence of determination?\(^{55}\)

There are three main points in Bourdieu’s account of Sartre’s dominance of the Parisian intellectual field at this time. Here we will review his arguments and in each case suggest how an analysis of the café as a forum for Sartre’s work, or at least in the image of Sartre, adds to the force of the Bourdieu’s case, and how in turn this helps us to understand Sartre’s interventions and ideas about Europe.

First, Bourdieu locates Sartre’s intellectual dominance necessarily within the specific historical conjuncture of post-war France: ‘To understand the ‘Sartre phenomenon’ more fully would require an analysis of the social demand for intellectual prophecy for intellectuals, and an account of the conditions at the time, the sense of breakdown, tragedy and anxiety associated with the collective and individual crises stemming from the war, the Resistance and the Liberation.’\(^{56}\) Boschetti, for her part, extends this time frame to encompass the breakdown of

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\(^{55}\) Bourdieu, ‘Sartre’, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v02/n22/pierre-bourdieu/sartre.

\(^{56}\) Ibid.
European civilisation through economic crisis then war, through to the Cold War and colonial wars.\textsuperscript{57}

If Sartre’s success and influence depended on this historically contingent moment, what role did the café play? The café connotes something quotidian, social, convivial, and free of institutional commitment and subordination. As such, it was an excellent forum in which to expound a philosophy which flourished precisely in the context of the kinds of issues that arose in the recent history and contemporaneity that Bourdieu and Boschetti point to: questions of freedom and domination, personal responsibility, political and social ties and engagement. When every gesture was a commitment, as Sartre argued on reflecting on the experience of German occupation, it was more appropriate that it be made or articulated publicly in such a social setting than, say, in an inaccessible, elitist dusty library or lecture hall. The relevance of this point becomes clearer when one is reminded of how contested was Sartre’s thought at this time, particularly in the context of French and European colonial wars. As Stora reminds us, a large majority of universitaires were supportive of the cause of maintaining Algérie française and remained so until near the end of the war.\textsuperscript{58} The statement of support for French Algeria signed by twenty-six Sorbonne professors that appeared in Le Monde in May 1956 was indicative of this now overlooked imperial consensus.\textsuperscript{59} The same goes for Le Figaro’s queasiness about the Sorbonne hosting the First International Congress of Black Writers and Artists in September 1956. ‘A tam-tam is lying about on a table in the hall of the Sorbonne’, it sniffily reported.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} Anna Boschetti, \textit{Sartre et “les Temps modernes”: une entreprise intellectuelle} (Paris: Minuit, 1985), 34.

\textsuperscript{58} Benjamin Stora, \textit{La guerre des mémoires. La France face à son passé colonial. Entretiens avec Thierry Leclère} (Paris: L’Aube, 2007), 47.


\textsuperscript{60} Cited in Julien, ‘Terrains de Rencontre’, 159.
The café also perhaps played another role in the competitive and relational nature of intellectual production that Bourdieu points to, specifically as a counterpoint to Heidegger. Indeed, Bourdieu argues that other intellectual competitors would insist that Sartre’s work was merely derivative of Heidegger’s and so merited no attention in its own right. Furthermore, Heidegger’s name was commonly mobilised to denigrate Sartre’s work, as opponents issued polemical reminders of the similarities between their works to taint Sartre’s with the mark of Germanism or fascism. Sartre, then, in articulating his own ideas about Europe, needed not only to mobilise his intellectual credentials and make space for his ideas, but also needed to distance himself from the wrong kind of Europe. The latter was the Europe that enthused those right-wing French intellectuals in the 1930s that Sartre denounced in *What is Literature?* – a Europe that smacked of ‘Germanism’. The café facilitated this double movement: apart from the connotation of institutional freedom that we identified, the image of the café intellectual was a point of distinction from Heidegger. Here one could contrast an image of urban authenticity against the ruralness favoured by the German philosopher – a stifling environment suitable for the cultivation of provincial reactionaries and fascists, a prejudice confirmed by the successes of Pierre Poujade in the French province. Interestingly for our analysis here, this division between countryside and city is pertinent to the history of ideas about Europe. In these terms, Sartre as the archetypal café intellectual was predisposed to an image of a Europe of urban cosmopolitanism.

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63 Sartre, *What is Literature?*, 218.
65 Poujade was a right-wing populist politician who enjoyed significant if ephemeral electoral successes in France at the national level in the 1950s.
and sophistication, as opposed to a notion of Europe as a collection of introverted, provincial communities rooted in the land.⁶⁶

Second, Bourdieu insists that, far from indeterminate, Sartre’s success cannot be separated from the Parisian institutional mechanisms of granting intellectual legitimacy. In this world, institutions like journals, coteries, publishers, academies, competitive exams, khâgnes, and the École normale supérieure policed authority and its reproduction. As such, ‘the demand for the prophetic intellectual, and the ‘masterly self-assurance’ needed in order to satisfy it, can be seen as springing from the heart of the educational system on which intellectual prophecy apparently declares war. That demand and self-assurance are rooted in the very places which produced Jean-Paul Sartre, with his attitudes of mind and his qualifications, i.e. with all the symbolic capital he was to invest in his early intellectual strategies.’⁶⁷ The authority of what Sartre said about Europe, then, at once depended in large part on his education credentials and the dismissal of them. His clout was sustained by his contempt for authority, by his being able to hold authority in contempt. And when Bourdieu points to Sartre’s reference to himself as a mere petit-bourgeois intellectual, in strategic terms this is to be understood as self-deprecation and self-aggrandisement in a stroke, thereby according himself the authority that comes precisely from renouncing one’s own authority. Once more, the lack of institutional affiliation of the Paris café brought these points to the fore, and could only have been foregrounded as a forum for Sartre’s work by his professed disinclination to take a position at the Collège de France, and his refusal of the Nobel Prize in 1964.

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⁶⁶ The distinction between a rural and urban based Europe is discussed in Eric Hobsbawm, ‘The Curious History of Europe’, in On History (London: Abacus, 1997), 295. One thinks also of Max Weber’s argument that the city as we know it is a product of Christian Europe.

Third, the most forcefully articulated part of Bourdieu’s analysis of Sartre is his critique of the latter as a ‘total intellectual’ – ‘active on every front, as philosopher, critic, novelist and dramatist.’ Bourdieu asks what the enabling conditions of this condition were, and it is a question both he and Boschetti tackle in their respective works. Both point to Sartre’s achievement in combining, and appropriating the prestige of, both the figure of philosopher and of writer. Boschetti substantiates this thesis by arguing that this manoeuvre was itself made possible by the shifting relations between the two vocations in the preceding years in Parisian intellectual life. In this reading, Sartre struck an effective balance between conformity to the rules of the intellectual field, and novelty as a total intellectual appropriating and combining the symbolic capital of both philosopher and writer, and it is argued here that the café was again an auspicious base from which to make this move. As Eric Hazan shows in his history of Paris, there was a certain marked division of labour in the history of the Paris café; the literary and political scenes tended to be each territorially confined to distinct cafés. One might say that the significance of Sartre’s combination of the disciplines of philosophy (which of course informed his politics) and literature was doubly underscored by their mergence in one forum in the Café de Flore or Les Deux Magots.

Furthermore, it is not just any Parisian café which is to be understood as a Europeanising space, but a particular kind. Indeed, Bourdieu argues that a precondition of the Sartrian total intellectual was left-wing commitment. As a point of contrast, the poet and writer Léon-Paul Fargue could write of Saint-Germain-des-Prés in 1939 that, ‘the place lives, breathes, throbs, and sleeps by virtue of the three cafés more famous today than the institutions of state: the Deux

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68 Ibid.
71 Bourdieu, ‘Sartre’.
Magots, the Café de Flore, and the Brasserie Lipp.\textsuperscript{72} How different post-war Paris was: the attention paid to the intellectual scene around the Flore and Deux Magots contrasted utterly with the discredited and enfeebled right-wing intellectual stronghold of the Brasserie Lipp just across the street, tarnished as it was by the Europe of Germanism. The radical credentials of the Flore could only have been strengthened by the adage that Germans had not set foot in it,\textsuperscript{73} in contrast to cafés around the Champs-Élysées which, Eric Hazan argues, ‘was the major axis of Paris collaboration, following an established tradition.’\textsuperscript{74} As such, Steiner’s invocation of a generic café as a European space, whether in Paris, Vienna, Copenhagen or Palermo would have had little currency in this Parisian intellectual scene, which saw itself and was seen by others as the trailblazer of ideas in Europe, but in which clear distinctions were drawn between different kinds of Europeanism according to political affiliation, whether explicit or concomitant.

Conclusion

If the café was a marker of Europe, the history of the café in the French capital in this period invites the question: which Europe? It was a forum for the radical questioning of ideas of Europe just as much as their assertion, as exemplified by circles like the Surrealists and black American intellectuals, and by figures like Goytisolo and Sartre. Nor was the café merely a rarefied institution. The café was a certainly a forum of escapism and leisure, but it was not detachable from the pressing international issues in the context of which Europe was conceptualised, notably imperial conflicts and the Cold War. This examination of the café, particularly regarding Sartre’s questioning of Europe, also lends weight to the position that the

\textsuperscript{72} Cited in Wakeman, \textit{The Heroic City}, 246.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Hazan, \textit{The Invention of Paris}, 231.
strength of ideas, including ideas about Europe, must be examined in relation to the forums in which they were produced, the kinds of symbolic capital these lent, and the nature of the historical conjuncture in which that capital could be wielded.
Chapter 2. The Parisian Home as a Europeanising Space

By May 1945 there were perhaps forty million uprooted people in Europe.¹ As the immediacy of the Second World War receded, the anxieties in Europe about home, both in the sense of a tangible abode and of belonging and security, did not. Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Jacques Soustelle suggested that the recent experience of cities in flames was a key locus of the distinctive psychology of the French and European peoples.² One might surmise that, in large part, this lay behind what Leif Jerram describes as a “‘cult’ of home in post-war Europe.”³ A key point of European commonality after the war was an insufficient housing stock, and across the continent housing was a desperate popular aspiration and priority of government.⁴ Tony Judt notes that in post-war opinion polls, ‘housing’ always topped the list of popular concerns.⁵

The home, then, concerned Europeans both in the sense of material shelter and affective belonging and security. Preoccupation about procuring lodgings was compounded by the task identified by Marshal Berman – and surely exacerbated in a time of continental cataclysm – of making oneself at home in the modern city.⁶ But how did Paris fit into this shared post-war European experience? And in what ways was discourse about Europe connected to the Parisian

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⁵ Ibid., 282.
home in a stronger sense than merely being a priority shared by Europeans in general? This examination of the Paris home reveals that in various ways a strong equivalence was drawn between Europeanisation and modernisation. This chapter connects the home in the French capital to the discourse about a renewed Europe after the Second World War and through the period of decolonisation, and to the reconfigured understandings of Europe and Europeanness these prompted. In particular, it picks up on Étienne Balibar’s observation that ‘the question of giving an endogenous, self-referring definition of “Europeans” has only come up very recently. Until the middle of the twentieth century, the principal meaning of this name referred to groups of colonizers in each of the colonized regions elsewhere in the world.’ This chapter will place particular emphasis on the immigration of both European Algerians and Algerian Muslims, as they were termed, to examine the Parisian home. For the home is a particularly useful space to examine the dynamics of the turning point in understandings of Europe and Europeanness, to which Balibar alludes.

First, urban planning is identified as a post-war operation that was applied to Paris with an underlying vision of the city’s place in the new Europe. The reconfiguration of the French capital in turn had implications for the city as a home, and this could be seen to be rationalised in part by notions of the Europeanness of Parisians. Second, Europe and Europeanness are identified as tropes in the reception and housing of Algerian immigrants – that is to say, both European Algerians, and Algerian Muslims. Further, Europeanness is investigated as a guiding

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8 An obvious omission here is the settlement of Algerian and North African Jews in France. In large part this is because, in comparison with the reception of Algerian Muslims and pieds noirs, notions of Europeanness do not appear to have been widely invoked. This of course also contrasts with discourse about earlier waves of Jewish migration to Paris. This may be connected to the argument that the integration of North African Jews in France in this period was comparatively unproblematic. See Michel Abitbol & Alan Astro, ‘The Integration of North African Jews in France’, Yale French Studies 85 (1994), 248-261.
term in housing policy as applied to these immigrant groups, to the point where one can talk about state ethnicisation of supposed Europeans and non-Europeans. Finally, the shantytowns, or bidonvilles, that housed many of the Algerian immigrants are examined in terms of how discourses of Europe connected to physical urban space.

One claim of this chapter is that discourse about the Parisian home commonly invoked two registers of Europeanness. In this sense, the chapter extends to the French metropole Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda’s argument that in European colonial history there was no single fund of rhetorical devices to characterise relations of power between Europeans and their Others. In the case of French Algeria, for instance, several discourses flourished simultaneously. Discourse proliferated that accommodated the ideological underpinnings of the mission civilisatrice, but it coexisted with popular pied noir vocabulary which often emphasised instead an irreconcilable opposition between Islam and the West.9 Similarly, one of the registers of Europeanness used in relation to the Parisian home consisted in a binary opposition of European and non-European. The second register can be likened to Timothy Garton Ash’s observation that in the East, Europe just fades away.10 Likewise, one trope implicitly held Europeanness to be a graded scale that faded away without any clear point of demarcation where one might conclusively delineate the European and the non-European. What is more, it is not only the case that discourse about the Paris home shifted back and forth between these registers. They were also sometimes invoked simultaneously and contradictorily. This was symptomatic of an acute tension between Europeanness and universalism, inclusion and exclusion, which ran through

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9 Julia Clancy-Smith & Frances Gouda (eds.), Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998), 9.
10 Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), 391.
housing policy, as well as other aspects of the welfare state of the French Republic.

The Paris Home and the Legacy of War in Europe

The place of Paris was ambiguous within the common European experience of a post-war yearning for security embodied in the home. The city, and thus Parisians’ homes, had not been bombed to anywhere near the extent of other European cities, though notoriously Hitler had given orders to flatten it, which were disregarded. Yet this survival came at the price of a shoddy compromise. So, one might equally surmise that beneath this attitude lay some sense of survivors’ guilt, and a concrete reminder of its complicity with a certain Europe of Germanism, to use Sartre’s phrase.\(^\text{11}\) Despite pageantry such as de Gaulle’s famous address from the Hôtel de Ville after the Liberation that laid the foundations of the myth of resistant France, that Europe of Germanism would linger in various ways.

Leora Auslander demonstrates how this was the case for Jewish Parisian returnees who were given a limited opportunity to claim restitution of the dispossession of their homes and belongings. Auslander finds that in their claims forms, applicants were instructed only to list their material possessions for which they were making a claim. However, the procedure was often used as an opportunity to refuse retrospectively the denial of their right in that Europe to a political, social, and material home in Paris and France.\(^\text{12}\)


\(^{\text{12}}\) Leora Auslander, ‘Coming Home? Jews in Postwar Paris’, *Journal of Contemporary History* 40/2 (April, 2005), 237-259. On the importance of the idea of Europe in Vichy and occupied France see Julian Jackson, *France: the Dark Years, 1940-1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), passim. Andrew Hussey also notes that Paris was the centre for collaborationist intellectuals, who ‘saw themselves as launching a moral crusade that would lead
In the following years the continued neglect of housing in Paris brought it more into line with those European cities that had been destroyed in the war. Wakeman details the extent of the impoverishment of the French capital in this regard. And she notes that slums, dirt, and grimness characterised the city in those years more than the stereotypical image of the ‘City of Light’, reflected in the famous contemporary photographic work of Robert Doisneau or Henri Cartier-Bresson. She remarks that from end to end, Paris seemed to be a ‘strange hallucination of postwar Europe in crisis, nothing but urban debris.’ According to Andrew Hussey, in the early 1950s, almost ninety percent of homes in Paris lacked basic amenities. Slums and soup kitchens proliferated alike, while dingy, cheap hotels or hostels passed as a home for a significant proportion of the city’s population. Although Paris had survived the war largely intact, it was impacted by the greater destruction of other parts of France and the attendant flood of refugees into the cities who populated such hotels and makeshift shelter, and of course accentuated the problem of over-crowding.

Urban Planning and Europeanising Spaces in Paris

Urban planning of course was a general European priority necessitated by the legacy of war. In Paris it is notable that some discourse about urban planning and the renovation of homes

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in the city had a European dimension. There was certainly a strong European flavour to the 1947
*Exposition internationale de l’urbanisme et de l’habitation* in which, as Wakeman describes it: ‘nine European countries displayed the revolutionary urban-planning techniques that would rebuild a shattered world.’\(^\text{16}\) In both senses, the universal assumptions of Europe were on show. Interestingly, though, the previous year the Grand Palais hosted the *Exposition des techniques américaines de l’habitation et de l’urbanisme*. Here Parisian attendees were introduced to ‘the American way of living.’\(^\text{17}\) The *Ministère de la reconstruction et de l’urbanisme* (MRU) also built fully equipped American houses in the Paris suburbs in an unwitting admission of the difficulty of demarcating the image of Europe from that of the United States. Indeed, this was an uncomfortably complicated task given the mutual dependency of their post-war fortunes. This exhibition can be contextualised by Victoria de Grazia’s thesis about the Americanisation of Europe. She locates the origins of US hegemony as a market empire precisely in Europe, which functioned as a core space of post-war American cultural and commercial expansion and as an American laboratory for the implantation of modern consumer practices.\(^\text{18}\) Europe was thus not only constituted by, but also constitutive of, an America that often fascinated but was equally often scorned by its peoples, particularly in France. One might surmise that it was precisely this intertwining of post-war America and Europe that underscored the depiction of a radically Other America, and that the frequently incensed tone of this representation was fuelled precisely by their similarities and interconnections.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^\text{16}\) Wakeman, *The Heroic City*, 290.
\(^\text{17}\) Ibid., 289-290.
\(^\text{19}\) For notable contemporary discussions of the relation between Europe and America see André Malraux’s speech ‘Man and Artistic Culture’ at the opening session of UNESCO at the Sorbonne in 1946 in *Reflections on Our Age: Lectures at The Opening Session of UNESCO at the Sorbonne* (London: Allen Wingate, 1948), 84-99; and his 1956 postface to *The Conquerors*, trans. Stephen Becker (London: Journeyman, 1983), 179-198.
There was also a European dimension to the Parisian home in relation to the United States via the commitments of Cold War partisanship. The shoddiness of Parisian homes was often explained as a by-product of the priority of European strategic commitment to the East-West conflict. The housing crisis was sometimes blamed on the Cold War generally, and the Americans in particular. This geopolitical situation was seen as siphoning off funds which otherwise could have been invested in housing. In February 1963, for instance, responding to complaints about the conditions of the bidonvilles in his municipality, the deputy mayor of the French Communist Party (PCF)-controlled suburb of Nanterre contrasted the lack of availability of funds for housing, and the ease with which money could be found for projects like the atomic bomb.\textsuperscript{20} The common PCF complaint about the depletion of social funds by the prioritisation of Western militarism was often put the other way around, of course. The Seine prefecture insisted in 1952, for instance, that the housing crisis could be tackled but for the financial burden of counteracting international Communism.\textsuperscript{21}

Europe was also a watchword in urban planning in regard to the renovation of Parisian housing in this period, as well as the city’s maintenance and regeneration more broadly. In 1946 the Seine prefect, Marcel Flouret, enjoined urban planners to offer a vision of the future and to ‘prepare our Capital for the role it will play in Europe and the world of tomorrow.’ Moreover, he warned that, ‘if we are not careful, in twenty or thirty years, London, Berlin and the other European capitals, which experienced such destruction during the war, will be rebuilt, while

\textsuperscript{20} Institut de l’histoire du temps présent. Fonds Monique Hervo (Hereafter FMH). ARC 3019 -2. 2. Dossier général thématique. Letter from the deputy mayor of Nanterre to Hervo, February 15, 1963. For similar complaints at Paris municipal level see Melissa Byrnes, \textit{French like Us? Municipal Policies and North African Migrants in the Parisian Banlieues, 1945-1975} (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2008), 91, 163. We should note that the French atomic bomb was not merely a European question in the sense of its connection to Europe’s place in the Cold War, but was also connected to the idea of French ‘grandeur’.

\textsuperscript{21} Wakeman, \textit{The Heroic City}, 137.
Paris, which by some miracle escaped the storm nearly intact, will become the most backward of capital cities.

Parisian urban planning retained this European perspective in the 1950s. In his article ‘At the Hour of Europe’ in the Revue urbanisme in 1957, the Commissaire à la construction et à l’urbanisme de la région parisienne, Pierre Sudreau, reiterated the necessity of demolishing the slum conditions that were still rife in Paris. He connected this task – or ‘the conquest of Paris’ as he termed it – with French entry into the European Common Market. He measured the French capital’s progress not on its own terms or as an end in itself, but in comparison with the resurrection of Berlin and West Germany. As such, the task of urban renewal in Paris assumed a European imperative: ‘it is no longer a matter of being the capital of a country, but that of a continent.’

However, urban planning encompassed more than just housing, and so the status of the home in the city could just as easily be sidelined as promoted in this Europeanist vision for the French capital. Wakeman describes how state urban planning from the early 1950s was intent on promoting commercial and business services that ‘would make Paris a capital of Europe.’ This went hand in hand with dispersing the city’s masses, along with their trade and industry. The preservation of these quartiers populaires was often subordinated to the regulation and ‘rationalisation’ of space, and their inhabitants were increasingly separated from the city centre and their places of work. By 1956 the centre of Paris was zoned for the three functions of administration, commerce and banking, and intellectual life. These were the prestigious cosmopolitan activities that were to secure Paris’s position among the modern European

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22 Ibid., 302.
23 Cited in ibid., 320.
capitals. This sanitisation of Paris was also connected to the importance of the city as a tourist
destination. This occurred in the broader context of the emergence of a Europe of tourism, which
was assuming such importance that by 1964 Raymond Aron remarked that, ‘For the tourist,
Europe is a unit. Never in the past has such a number of Frenchmen, Germans, Belgians,
Dutchmen and Englishmen found it so natural to cross their own frontiers and travel abroad.’

Even as early as the summer of 1949, Janet Flanner remarked on the spectacular boom in
European travel, noting that the Paris tourist season in turn was the best in the entire continent.

Furthermore, she implied that this phenomenon was not merely a reflection of rising prosperity,
but also said something about the recent experience, and so the self-understanding, of Europeans:

This summer’s mass travel in Western Europe was probably a logical enough result of its recent
history. For six years, almost nobody travelled except soldiers and those segments of the
population that made an exodus in fright or in fatal, forced emigrations. Some people travelled
then because they were ordered to, while others, shut in, yearned in vain to move about. And
there were not enough trains, food, or, most important, money, all of which now seem to abound.
It is difficult to believe that Europe could change so miraculously and become the great,
pleasurable, money-making and money-spending touring ground that it has been this season,
exactly one decade after the war season of 1939.

These various ways in which the city was reconfigured in accordance with ideas about
the affiliation of Paris and Europe nevertheless also had implications for the city as a home. As
the cultural supplement of the Spanish exile journal Solidaridad obrera insisted, there was more
than one Paris. The Paris of tourism was not that of the Parisian worker. To borrow Henri
Lefebvre’s formulation, one might say that the Europeanisation of Paris correlated to an

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24 Ibid., 316.
27 Ibid., 106.
abrogation of ‘the right to the city’.\textsuperscript{29} As Wakeman describes it, the dispersal of the city’s working class from the city centre was underscored by its stereotype as ‘alien and dispensable, or at least the conviction that it suffered from backward qualities to be rooted out by technocratic elites.’\textsuperscript{30} Such sectors of Paris society were admittedly European, but somehow not European enough to be suitable to reside in this new post-war European capital. Just as Garton Ash’s Europe fades away in the East, so here it was more exactly the centre of Paris that was conceived as the European capital, whilst the Europeanness of the city faded as one approached the city’s margins – above all, the working class suburbs.

This quasi-colonial management of the population of the French capital parallels Paul Rabinow’s influential thesis about the interconnection of government in the colonies and forms of space, power, and knowledge in the French metropole.\textsuperscript{31} It is important to connect this kind of policy to a further important driving force behind the urban reconfiguration of Paris that encapsulated consumerism and modernisation – the curtailment of radical politics. It is notable that urban planning in Paris was often carried out with the express aim of breaking up traditional strongholds of the PCF in ‘Red Paris’.

Furthermore, this coercive housing policy was in a sense a continuation of a tradition of representation that conflated the European popular classes and non-Europeans\textsuperscript{32}, though ultimately distinctions between the two were usually allowed. Similarly, Matthew Connelly suggests that it is probable that Louis Chevalier’s seminal 1958 work, \textit{Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle}, was influenced by his

\textsuperscript{30} Wakeman, \textit{The Historic City}, 317.
work on North African demography,\textsuperscript{33} as part of which he warned in 1947 of ‘a real invasion and berberisation in whole neighborhoods in Marseilles and Paris.’\textsuperscript{34} The rhetorical use of terms of Europeanness and non-Europeanness to refer to those who lived in Paris had to give way to a more serious questioning of these terms in the post-war period, however. The end of empire, in particular the end of empire in Algeria which was nominally an integral part of metropolitan France, raised problems precisely in terms of those categories. We now turn to examine their implications for Paris as a civic home and as a space in which to secure a material home.

The Paris Home, Europe, and the Europeans of Algeria

French Algeria differed from other colonies by the extent of its settlement by a European population. Indeed, settlers originated not only from France but also Malta, Alsace, Spain, and Italy. Of course, the French-Algerian war called their place in North Africa into question. However, as Todd Shepard shows, until very late in the war, very few in France expected the European settlers to leave Algeria to resettle in France. Rather, it was assumed that they would remain in an independent Algeria, and domicile in France was guaranteed to them only for the purpose of reassuring them that they did not have to leave. This was a serious miscalculation, as indeed the European community quickly began to depart. Shepard dates the start of the exodus to the April 1962 arrest of Raoul Salan, former general and leader of the OAS. This influx was barely acknowledged officially before the summer of that year, however. As such, the problem

\textsuperscript{33} Matthew Connelly, ‘Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence’, \textit{American Historical Review} 105/3 (June 2000), 743n.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 743. Sartre also notably compares the devaluation of the European working class and colonial peoples in his introduction to Fanon’s \textit{The Wretched of the Earth}. See Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘The Wretched of the Earth,’ in \textit{Colonialism and Neocolonialism}, trans. Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer, & Terry McWilliams (London & New York: Routledge, 2006), 160.
demanded speedy solutions. These, as it happened, were underscored by a premise of Europeanisation in two senses.

First, as Shepard puts it, the French state, ‘when confronted with the unexpected “exodus” of upwards of one million French citizens fleeing Algeria, embraced familial and ethnic descriptions to explain why some French citizens (“Europeans”) could be repatriated home to continental France, while others (“of Muslim origin”) should stay put in Algeria.’

This meant that the French Republic discarded its post-1889 commitment to legal definitions of citizenship that ignored ‘ethnicity’ or ‘race’ and embraced a definition of national belonging limited to ‘Europeans.’

This alteration of the codes of membership in the French nation effectively reconfigured the Mediterranean as a boundary separating Europe and North Africa, rather than, as the common saying had it, dividing France just as the Seine divided Paris. Part of the rationale for doing so was that the alternative was fully to integrate Algerians as equal French citizens, which would in turn entail crippling welfare provision and adjustment of living standards.

Accordingly, when pressed at a certain point the French Republic, that saw itself as universal and in this sense exceptional within Europe, would defer back to the notion of Europeanness as a get-out clause to withhold rights and status it was not prepared to grant universally.

The most obvious losers of this policy were the Algerian harkis – Muslim Algerians who served as Auxiliares in the French army during the war – who likewise fled to France, largely in

36 Ibid., 346.
37 Ibid., 357.
38 The argument about the prohibitive expense of empire was made famously by Raymond Cartier. Up until his interventions in Paris Match in August and September 1956 he was known as a stern defender of empire in the name of the defence of the West. Similarly, Raymond Aron turned against maintaining French Algeria on the grounds that it was unsustainably expensive. See Aron’s La Tragédie algérienne (Paris: Plon, 1957) and L’Algérie et la République (Paris: Plon, 1958).
fear of reprisals for their role in assisting the French administration and military in Algeria to oppose independence. Arriving in their tens of thousands in France at the same time as the pieds noirs, their reception was starkly different. When they were allowed to stay they were denied their legal rights as French citizens, treated as foreign ‘refugees,’ and eventually asked to re-apply for the French citizenship that they had been born with.\(^{39}\) They were far more likely to languish for years in camps than to make a home in Paris or anywhere else.

The second sense in which Europeanisation was seen to be needed was ironically in regard to these ‘Europeans’ themselves. After all, de Gaulle himself considered the pieds noirs barely more French than Algerian Muslims.\(^{40}\) Likewise, general French metropolitan disdain for the pieds noirs was acute, particularly from the later years of the Algerian conflict, and the condemnation and disavowal of the European Algerians drew freely on Orientalist stereotypes of sexual deviance, misogyny, savageness, irrational chauvinism, and criminality. Indeed, comparable stereotyping of Muslim Algerians and the pieds noirs held them both responsible for crime in the Paris area.\(^{41}\) Moreover, it is particularly interesting that Nora’s own intervention in his 1961 work *Les Français d’Algérie*, questioned the pieds noirs’ collective label as ‘Europeans,’ allowing at best that theirs was a diminished Europeanness that was ever fading away. They had cut themselves away from their ‘European anchorage’ and largely lost their ‘Western essence.’\(^{42}\) “‘European,’” he argued should connote a ‘technological civilization, energetic and Nordic;’ the reality of what the term referred to in Algeria was ‘some Andalusian or Calabresian worker closer to an Egyptian fellah than the worker of 1848 or the Alsatian. The

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40 Ibid., 349.
term “European,” he lamented, ‘groups together in a community and ennobles’ this mishmash of
degraded humanity. As such, he rejected its use.⁴³ Nora here seems to invoke at once both of the
registers of Europeanness we identified at the start of this chapter. Having suggested that the
pieds noirs’ European quality was of a real but degenerative kind, Nora then reverted to
discarding their label as Europeans in an implied preference for the schema of binary opposition
between the qualities of Europeanness and non-Europeanness.

The image of the pieds noirs on the right was not necessarily more favourable.⁴⁴ The
chief of the Paris police Maurice Papon wrote to the Minister of the Interior to express his
concerns about the security of the state, and as such lobbied to prevent the housing of repatriated
European Algerians in Paris. For a man who largely subscribed to a Manichean vision of a
besieged Europe resisting the non-European world, he seemed here to recover a sense of the
degrees of Europeanness in the sense of standards of comportment.⁴⁵ While it was considered
impossible to make such a prohibition, it was still considered desirable to prevent any large
conglomeration of the pieds noirs in the city, given that they were considered to be particularly
prone to rioting.⁴⁶ Perhaps one was particularly sensitive to this problem in a Paris whose

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⁴³ Ibid., 197.
⁴⁴ Some like the far right student group examined in chapter five, the Fédération des étudiants nationalistes,
considered the returning pieds noirs to have been sacrificed and made a scapegoat for the convenience of a
scandalous abdication of Europe, or at least Europe in any meaningful sense. Accordingly, its members were
couraged to meet and greet them at Paris airports in a gesture of solidarity in the context of its broader ongoing
mission to restore European supremacy. See Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Centre d'histoire de
l’Europe du vingtième siècle. Fonds ‘Étudiants Nationalistes’ (Hereafter abbreviated to F. EN), 1, dossier 2, FEN
⁴⁵ Papon’s ideas about Europe will be examined in greater depth in chapter three.
⁴⁶ Yann Scioledo-Zürcher, “‘Paris les a pris dans ses bras !’ La politique d’accueil des Français d’Algérie dans le
département de la Seine”, in La France en guerre 1954-1962: expériences métropolitaines de la guerre
Hausmannian boulevards were constructed with the logistics of managing disturbances by the city’s dubiously European dangerous classes in mind.47

It is in the light of these kinds of views about the degenerate Europeanness of the French settlers that, once the exodus was acknowledged and accepted, French policy stressed forcefully that these Europeans of Algeria were indeed part of the same family as metropolitan French people. It followed that it was appropriate that they settle in France – a view that came to be supported by significant sections of the press.48 It is interesting that this drive to promote the European credentials of these ‘Europeans’ focused so heavily on the discourse of family and sexuality. It was stressed that those arriving were reassuringly heterosexual and family-oriented. This contradicted earlier widely publicised media portrayals of ‘European’ Algeria as a male homosocial society whose perversion bred male violence, of which the OAS was symptomatic.49

On balance, between the discourses of their Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation, the pieds noirs were still an object of suspicion, but they certainly enjoyed an advantage in the social hierarchy of immigration, in that they were prioritised in housing over Muslim Algerians.50 These ‘repatriates’ could also initially invoke their Algerian status to take HLM slots reserved for Algerians while their European origins saved them the intervening stay in the transit camps.51 Similarly, special provisions were undertaken to insure that these displaced European Algerians

47 Eric Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries (London: Abacus, 2007), 296. One should note that this commonly held view of one of the main purposes of the design of Hausmannian Paris is disputed in Bernard Marchand, Paris, histoire d’une ville (XIXe – XXe siècle) (Paris: Seuil, 1993), 116-117.
49 Ibid., 353, 354.
51 Byrnes, French like Us?, 182. Byrnes explains that initially the pieds noirs could claim both Algerian and French status although they soon had to choose.
did not end up in the Paris bidonvilles, as subsistence money and lodgings were provided to this end.\textsuperscript{52}

The crucial point, though, is that the Europeanness of the pieds noirs was certainly not taken as self-evident and by implication undermined any claims to a clear and timeless lineage of a European people. Shepard demonstrates the pervasiveness of a certain narrative of the French nation to rationalise Algeria’s decolonisation – namely, ‘a France within Europe and made up of people of “European” origins.’\textsuperscript{53} But if one’s Europeanness could diminish because one had lived in North Africa, why should those immigrants of non-European background in Paris be considered definitively non-European? More broadly, this contradiction implied the contingency and mutability of the term ‘European’, potentially undermining its power for any strong invocation of identity. The emerging EEC was another institution that was often buttressed by claims of a historically constant European people, and so it is instructive that Shepard suggests that these reformulations of membership and belonging at the time of decolonisation could help us rethink the history of the ascendancy of the contemporary development of European political institutions.\textsuperscript{54}

The Parisian Home, Algerian Muslims, and Europeanisation

In his 1954 account of Paris life, the novelist and journalist Henri Calet recollected his experience with a homeless Algerian immigrant, Ahmed. He reported that “Presque tous les hôteliers refusent de loger les Musulmans,” m’avait dit Ahmed, “mêmes s’ils sont bien

\textsuperscript{52} Scioldo-Zürcher, ““Paris les a pris dans ses bras””, 456.
\textsuperscript{53} Shepard, ‘Making French and European Coincide’, 357.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
habillés.”

Such incidents were no doubt common. Besides hotels, which were of course a common form of long-term accommodation, Algerians confronted prejudices when trying to acquire housing generally. However, too strong a focus on such interpersonal instances of racism can perhaps overshadow the French authorities’ much more robust, systemic discourse of Europeanness and non-Europeanness which made it problematic for Algerian Muslims to make a home in Paris.

This was certainly true in the course of the Algerian war in the French state’s battle against the Algerian FLN in the metropole. Amelia Lyons demonstrates how housing policy was a fundamental part of the French government’s waging of the war in the French capital. It was based on the idea that terrible living conditions in slums and shantytowns were a breeding ground for the FLN. Besides tackling the ongoing housing crisis in Paris, part of the impetus to build HLMs was to take Algerian migrants out of these conditions so as to remove them from the influence of Algerian nationalism and instil in them the belief that they had a stake in the universalist French Republic. The latter was a project that continued beyond the end of the war in 1962. A 1956 report of Cahiers Nord-Africains emphasised that this battle for hearts and minds included inculcating in Algerian Parisians an appropriate conception of Europe. Isolated single men in the bidonvilles were supposed to be particularly susceptible to various kinds of immoral behaviour, subversive propaganda, and ‘hostilité irraisonnée envers la civilisation européenne’.

56 Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France’, 76.
57 Ibid., 73-74.
This policy of targeting living conditions was, however, self-thwarting because of the categorisation of many of the Algerians who had lived in demolished bidonvilles as too ‘un-evolved’ – in effect, insufficiently European – to move immediately into HLM apartments and mix with the general population. As such, first they had to live in cités de transit (transit centres), which were de facto spaces of Europeanisation.\(^{59}\) Indeed, European immigrants, for instance those from Eastern Europe and the Iberian peninsula who were preferred and sought out by the Ministry of Labour after 1962,\(^ {60}\) were notably exempt from the obligation to acculturate in these low standard and shoddily maintained lodgings.\(^ {61}\) Despite the steadfastness of such Orientalist convictions about the unsuitability of Algerians to inhabit Paris, there were occasional admissions of the apriorism of this reasoning. Melissa Byrnes cites a Paris housing official who assumed that Portuguese families would be ‘relatively easy to rehouse, given their degree of evolution, their resources, and the stability of their employment, that is their occidental civilization.’ In fact, Byrnes points out, Portuguese workers often turned out to be perceived as more problematic for the housing officials than North Africans.\(^ {62}\)

A core part of transit camp life was compulsory education in which occupants were taught the skills supposedly needed to adapt to modern life, so as eventually to be able to mix with the general population.\(^ {63}\) In a disavowal of the liberty promised by modernity to define oneself, modernisation was here unreflexively equated with Europeanisation.\(^ {64}\) This corresponds

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59 SONACOTRA construction of the first transit cities began in 1959 with the first completed in 1960 and 1961. They were all located adjacent to existing bidonvilles. Prakash, *Empire on the Seine*, 287. The Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs was the successor to SONACOTRAL – the Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs algériens. See Marc Bernardot, ‘Chronique d’une institution: la SONACOTRA (1956-1976)’, *Sociétés contemporaines* 33-34 (1999), 39-58.
61 On the conditions of the cités de transit see Prakash, *Empire on the Seine*, 287.
to Todd Shepard’s argument that from the later years of the Algerian war, officials reframed their civilising mission as a “modernizing mission”. The ‘normal’ citizen that the Algerian immigrant was to become would eschew radical politics, embrace nuclear family life, pay rent regularly and respect property, spend time outside work looking after family responsibilities and the pursuit of the comforts of the booming consumer society. Once again, then, housing policy linked Europeanisation with depoliticisation. An additional advantage of Europeanisation as a rationale for the transit centres was that the long years in which North Africans were left in them were self-justifying: the longer they were confined there, the more they could be said not to have Europeanised, thus legitimising their continued residence and the prolonged existence of such centres. This was a variation, brought home to the metropole, of what James McDougall describes as European imperialism’s externalisation of its own violence onto its victims.

The educational aims of the transit camps fitted into a broader discourse about the need for Algerian migrants in particular to Europeanise. This stressed domesticity and adherence to standards of housekeeping, cleaning and ‘dirt’, the acquisition and use of French furniture, cooking skills, childcare and management of the household budget. Also, in a parallel to the Europeanisation of the pieds noirs, the standards by which these migrants were judged included adherence to standards of sexuality and assimilation to European family norms, especially in

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65 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, 6.
66 Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France’, 75; Prakash, Empire on the Seine, 274.
67 Amit Prakash notes that families were supposed to ‘transition’ out of these centres on the outskirts of Paris after a maximum of two years. However, many families actually remained there for between ten and thirteen years and emerged angry at the French state for their isolation and abandonment. See Prakash, Empire on the Seine, 288.
regard to the size of the family.\textsuperscript{70} While it was true that North African families tended to be larger, it was disingenuous to imply this was a natural point of cultural demarcation between European and non-European. As Byrnes argues, ‘during the interwar years, similar concerns had been raised regarding a “Spanish invasion;” small families were not necessarily an occidental tradition.’\textsuperscript{71} What is more, in the immediate post-war years Algerian women were actually awarded medals for the number of children to which they gave birth as part of the French state’s drive to regenerate the nation’s population.\textsuperscript{72}

Neil MacMaster argues that French policy on domestic behaviour was characterised by a rigid opposition between modernity and tradition.\textsuperscript{73} If this opposition was equivalent to the binary of European and non-Europe, it co-existed contradictorily with the scales of adaptation to Eurocentric domestic norms against which immigrants were measured – in effect a scale on which Europeanness faded away as one went down from the criteria of the normal French citizen.\textsuperscript{74} What each register had in common, though, was that they corresponded to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s observation about various forms of European and indeed non-European discourse, in which the non-European world is perennially required to catch up with Europe, and its correlative characteristics of modernity, progress and reason.\textsuperscript{75} One can add to Chakrabarty’s argument that this was the case not only for non-European nations but also for what were deemed non-European peoples living in Europe. Such discourse seemed more an example of

\textsuperscript{70} Algerians were not the only immigrant group subjected to stereotypes and behavioural norms according to sexual and familial stereotypes. See for example Felix Germain, ‘Jezebels and Victims: Antillean Women in Postwar France, 1946-1974’, \textit{French Historical Studies} 33/3 (Summer, 2010), 475-495.
\textsuperscript{71} Byrnes, \textit{French like Us?}, 186.
\textsuperscript{73} MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 88.
\textsuperscript{74} Prakash, for example, points to the deployment of social councilors in the \textit{bidonvilles} that categorised the degree of assimilation of families on a scale running from ‘A’ to ‘D’. See Prakash, \textit{Empire on the Seine}, 281.
Aimé Césaire’s reference to Europe’s propensity for self-congratulation than an accurate diagnosis of the situation and needs of Algerian immigrants. As one exasperated inhabitant of the bidonvilles in Nanterre exclaimed in a refutation of the notion that Algerian migrants relished backward living conditions: ‘il parait que nous voulons habiter dans la boue et que nous refusons de nous ouvrir au progrès.’ In this regard, it is telling that Amelia Lyons argues that responsibility for integration was placed entirely on the Algerian immigrants whose objections could only be problematic, never valid, and from whom the French authorities had nothing to learn. Or, more precisely, exclusion had to be self-inflicted since by definition it could not be a product of the universalist French Republic.

Another form of habitation that was made available for Algerian immigrants was the SONACOTRA foyers. These dormitory-style lodgings were populated by single, male workers, predominantly from North Africa and later from West Africa. This approach was likewise undercut by the contradictory approach of French housing policy. As Amit Prakash points out, these foyers were paradoxically intended to stem anti-colonial sentiment by offering Algerian men much needed accommodation and ease their transition into French society. But in practice they were segregated away from the rest of the French population on the outermost peripheries of Paris. Though regulations and restrictions were tight, including the prohibition of protests or meeting of a political character, residents were not required to attend classes to Europeanise their comportment, as in the transit cities. However, a certain Europeanist ideology permeated

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78 Prakash, *Empire on the Seine*, 268-269.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 272.
the institutions through the recruitment of ex-military personnel to manage the foyers. As late as 1972, out of 151 foyer directors, 95 percent had military backgrounds, serving in Indochina, Africa, or North Africa, during which they had been instilled with a sense of the urgent need to defend the West. Many residents unsurprisingly testified to having preferred living in *bidonvilles* rather than transit cities or foyers that were encircled with chain-link fencing, governed by authoritarian regulations, and monitored by ex-paratrooper concierges.

French social workers, whether ex-military or otherwise, as such occupied a privileged place as agents of Europeanisation. As François Villey, the head of the Public Health and Population Ministry’s office for demographic, social, and familial policies, expressed it: with the long-term help of specialised social workers, these Muslim women could adapt to the western way of life. Gradually and patiently these workers might be able to instil ‘everything the lady of the house and mother of a European family needs to know.’ As Lyons summarises this approach, ‘in order for the Muslim woman to become European, she had to accept the ways of those more “enlightened” than herself – those who guarded the knowledge and practice of daily life in France.’ Indeed, a disproportionate amount of attention was paid to Algerian women who were entrusted with the work of transforming their husbands and the next generation. One should note that here that Lyons suggests that in the eyes of the French state, Algerians could in principle become European. Europeanised here would thus mean achieving definitive Europeanness rather than being made more European. But this sits uneasily with notions of race

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81 For an analysis of how the discourse of the French military, including a certain kind of Europeanism, impacted on Paris in relation to the management of North African migrants, see chapter 3.
83 Ibid., 290. See chapter 3 for a discussion of the paratrooper as an emblem of, depending on one’s viewpoint, the defence of Europe or the savagery of imperial Europe.
85 Ibid., 492.
86 Ibid.
that Lyons also notes were retained by French government officials, even if they did not voice them publicly.\textsuperscript{87}

MacMaster outlines how such stipulations about the family connected to a traditional European imperialist obsession with Muslim women. He writes that, ‘French colonial ideology during the period from 1900 to 1962 was obsessed with the hegemonic project of invading, conquering, and ‘liberating’ the last bastion of Algerian cultural and social resistance, the Muslim woman, as well as the sealed-off domestic space that she inhabited.’\textsuperscript{88} Lyons concurs that this kind of longstanding colonial policy was recycled in the metropole in this period. What is more, the instruction of Algerian women facilitated access to the home which provided intimate knowledge about this space and a kind of control previously unattainable.\textsuperscript{89} This is a crucial point since it suggests that the French authorities did not consider non-Europeans to be inherently objectionable or problematic, as long as they were controlled. In fact, the presence, even production, of non-Europeans had a distinct value in terms of the paradoxes of the universalism on which the French Republic prided itself. As Moustafa Bayoumi argues in his discussion of the \textit{Grande mosquée} of Paris, ‘you will always need to produce non-French Muslims to show how successfully assimilationist the French creed is.’\textsuperscript{90} This suggests another important sense of ‘Europeanisation’: the aim not to make European what is not, but rather the extension of European control over, or domestication of, the non-European.

The embracing of non-European difference did not extend to enthusiasm for mixed couples, however. That Algerian men would marry metropolitan women was a continual worry

\textsuperscript{87} Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France’, 76.
\textsuperscript{88} MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 82.
\textsuperscript{89} Lyons, ‘The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole’, 492.
\textsuperscript{90} Bayoumi, ‘Shadows and Light’, 288.
and, if never publicly pronounced as such, was clearly not favoured. Moreover, the disproportionate presence of single male Algerian workers was a constant concern for the French authorities, and welfare policy was designed to promote their integration into the French community in the framework of family life. Part of the impetus for the social welfare policy for Algerians revolved around the priority of putting an end to single male worker migration and encouraging family settlement that would stabilise and depoliticise the population, and also ensure that Algerians did not intermarry with metropolitan French women in large numbers.

These standards of Europeanisation were often problematic for Algerian immigrants who often experienced HLM housing in Paris as both deeply alien and alienating, despite French boasts about its cutting edge rationalism. Sometimes residents would try to alter or adapt an apartment to alleviate this feeling and restore the familiarity of their own inherited domestic habits. However, such actions often fostered an image of incoherence and impoverishment of the house “that simply confirmed the French social worker and official perceptions of the “uncivilized” nature of the migrants.” But why should French officials care about seemingly trivial issues like, for instance, using a bedroom as a kitchen or to store a motor scooter? One thinks here of Stoler’s argument about the inordinate attention colonial authorities paid to boundary zones in order to police and reaffirm the distinction between coloniser and colonised, European and non-European. In the same way, we can understand the disconcerting effect of Algerian migrants creatively combining perceived traditional and modern norms, appearances,

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93 MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 87.
94 Ibid., 86.
and behaviour, and in doing so displacing received understandings of European and non-European.\textsuperscript{96} Instances of this would include examples of those both dressing traditionally and lacking any grasp of the French language, and yet consuming and enjoying modern domestic appliances.

French social workers also often ‘suspected that conformity to official regulation and norms was a skilful ploy, an instrumental enactment of “correct” behavior, to gain strictly pragmatic and material goals.’\textsuperscript{97} This does not necessarily contradict or qualify Prakash’s assessment that policy aimed at educating immigrants on cultural forms and behaviour separated thought and action, so that only conformity was asked for, not belief.\textsuperscript{98} On the other hand, this might suggest that it was not only imperative that Algerians Europeanise, but they truly believed in the Europeanisation that they underwent. This plausibly connected to the image of Algerian fanaticism in their independence struggle. This was perhaps a projection of a certain inadequacy in Europe’s self-definition, since the Europe of the \textit{trentes glorieuses} did not for all its pragmatic success inspire or even require a great deal of belief. The depoliticisation of the post-war consumer society of Europe manifested less a consensual belief in the status quo than a distinct lack of belief.\textsuperscript{99} This was indeed a concern for those like the Congress for Cultural Freedom which advocated an idea of Europe alongside the notion of the end of ideology.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{96} MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 88.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Prakash, \textit{Empire on the Seine}, 280.
\textsuperscript{99} One can in part account for French reactions to Algerian, OAS, and \textit{pied noir} militancy in relation to this pragmatic post-war Europe. To borrow Terry Eagleton’s argument, besides the obvious primary reason of the obscene consequences of their violence, it was so disturbing because exposure to the violence of those who, as it were, believed in too much induced a recognition precisely of a European paucity of belief. See Terry Eagleton, \textit{Holy Terror} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). To draw another parallel with the Europe of the Cold War, one might surmise that the contemporary invocations of totalitarian regimes that instituted complete mind control was tenable, in spite of the scarcity of evidence, precisely as a projection of the lack of belief, beyond pragmatic adherence, to the contemporary image of Europe. See Hobsbawm, \textit{Age of Extremes}, 393.
If the provision, albeit delayed indefinitely, of a home was the carrot of French housing policy during the Algerian war, surveillance was the stick. In fact the two went hand in hand. We have seen how this was the case in terms of the personnel and requirements in state-provided accommodation, but it was also reinforced by the role of the Paris police, whose approach to the Algerian immigrant community was informed by a certain understanding of Europe that oriented its leadership by Maurice Papon. This is not to say that the rank and file of the Paris police concurred unthinkingly with Papon’s worldview in which Europe was besieged by upstart African and Asiatic peoples. In fact there were significant instances of resistance to it. \(^{101}\) But it is still the case that his conviction of the need to counter aggressively this non-European threat filtered through into the professional culture of the Paris police. This will be examined in more depth in Chapter 3 given the significance of the encounter between Algerian migrants and the police in the city’s streets. But in terms of the home, it is worth noting that in the summer of 1958, Papon’s Europeanist ideology informed an operation that remained in force until the end of the conflict. Codenamed ‘Opérations meublés’, the putative aim of this initiative was to check the legality of rent levels and living conditions and to compel landlords to carry out improvements to the lodgings of Algerian immigrants. In reality, the purpose of the initiative was to collect information on individual Algerians, establish a census of each lodging house, and to chart the location of suspected groupings of FLN supporters or militants. \(^{102}\) Moreover, after each of the operations, pro-French Algeria leaflets were distributed that pointed to, as one example, the manipulative designs of two of Europe’s irredeemable Others – Moscow and Nasser. \(^{103}\)


\(^{102}\) Ibid., 72.

\(^{103}\) Prakash, *Empire on the Seine*, 172.
In sum, Algerians were to be Europeanised, and the terms in which they were to be so related to conceptions of modernity, political affiliation, gender, family, sexuality. This was reinforced by an impressive repertoire of administrative and surveillance techniques. Though this section has suggested as much, it is worth expanding on the argument that criteria of Europeanness and un-Europeanness were produced by the French state.

Housing Algerians and Ethnicisation

In considering these initiatives at various levels of the French state, it is important not to project backwards the disconnection that is commonly drawn today between the French Republic and French imperialism, each of which are rather distinct in the kinds of ideas of Europe they tend to be aligned with. Françoise de Barros demonstrates that French housing policy in this period of decolonisation was constituted through the importation, reconfiguration, and, crucially, the strengthening of colonial terms of reference and management. Amongst these the notion of ‘Europeanness’ was paramount. For de Barros the understanding of racialism from the period in which French officials were often formed in the 1930s, and the broader axiom inherited from the nineteenth century of the incommensurability of Algerians with the ‘European race’, was more reworked than rejected in post-war France. This judgement is supported by Lyons’ work on welfare provision to Algerian immigrants and the perpetuation of a colonial mentality in the metropole in the same period. In de Barros’ account, housing was one of the areas in which in the continuity of both imperial management and mindset was most continuous before and after

Algerian independence in 1962. This contradicts conventional narratives in which Europe and Europeanness arose as priorities at this moment precisely because the historical moment of imperialism had passed.\(^{106}\) This was not a simple one-to-one reconstitution of imperial personnel, categories and mentalities in the metropole, however, given the diffuse and contradictory functions of French government agencies and personnel. A particularly interesting phenomenon was the perpetuation and neglect of predominantly Algerian-populated shantytowns by left-wing local authorities, rather than a generic ‘colonial state.’\(^{107}\) Moreover, Byrnes demonstrates that there were significant differences between different municipal authorities in their policies towards North Africans in Paris.\(^{108}\)

An important nuance of de Barros’s argument is that housing policy and discourse had an active ‘ethnicising’ effect on the conceptualisation of immigrants which induced a sharp demarcation between European and non-European. She notes that the administration charged with ‘affaires musulmans’ or ‘affaires nord-africaines’ was itself a powerful producer of the ethnicisation of Algerian immigrants. It was an institution of government which produced ‘une frontière infranchissable entre les Algériens et les “Européens”.’\(^ {109}\) Accordingly, we can talk here about a performative administrative discourse of both Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation. French housing policy in fact produced the difference that it purported to be merely observing objectively and administrating accordingly. This was all the more striking as a

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\(^{106}\) Emblematic of this line of thought is the anecdote of Anthony Eden telephoning Guy Mollet, who was in a meeting with Konrad Adenauer, to call a halt to Britain and France’s 1956 Suez offensive. Adenauer then told Mollet that European nations had to unite against an America that might otherwise divide up the world with the Soviets. ‘Europe will be your revenge’, promised the German Chancellor. See See Matthew James Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 121.


\(^{108}\) Byrnes. French like U s?, passim.

policy given that Algerian Muslims in France were juridically equal French citizens, at least until 1962. Étienne Balibar argues that ‘in fact it is the state qua nation-state which actually produces national or pseudo-national “minorities” (ethnic, cultural, occupation). Were it not for its juridical and political intervention, these would remain merely potential. Minorities only exist in actuality from the moment when they are codified and controlled.’  

The significance of this is that the state is not something standing above and mediating in a disinterested fashion between ‘Europeans’ and ‘non-European’ immigrants, but that discrimination or racism is ‘a relationship to the Other mediated by the intervention of the state.’  

Rancière also notes how this categorisation of ‘immigrants’ by the state replaced the term ‘worker’, which was a term that could have articulated a politics of equality. Algerians, as such, were as non-European immigrants legislated out of a claim to an equal right to the city that was proclaimed to be the capital of Europe.

Europeanisation and the Paris Bidonvilles

In terms of the spatial dimensions of the bidonvilles and their connection to Europe, de Barros notes that strong distinctions were drawn in physical space between Europeanness and non-Europeanness. This was true not only of the bidonvilles, of course. A 1957 Le Monde report on the area of la Goutte-d’Or, for instance, referred interchangeably to ‘Parisiens de souche’ and ‘les Européens’, who were supposedly fleeing the area in the face of its alarming

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11 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
Arabisation. Prakash notes that these Parisians of ‘stock’, which is to say native Parisians, were in fact for the most part of provincial or European migrant origins. The historical fractures that had accompanied the entry of these groups into Paris were forgotten here, and replaced by a stark opposition of Europeans to Arabs.

Such concerns about the congregation of North Africans were voiced in regard to the allocation of HLM slots as well. Byrnes highlights the remarks of Jean Vaujour, the Director General of SONACOTRAL, who warned in 1961 that unless allocations were carefully apportioned, ‘instead of “Occidentalizing” the Muslims, a reverse “Arabization” of the French would occur.’ His remarks echoed contemporary prevalent theories about the inherent conflict or disequilibria between Europe and the Orient. If in this section we examine discourse about Europe and Europeanness only in relation to the bidonvilles, it is not because they were unique in terms of the spatial representation of these categories, but that the distinction between European and non-European was drawn most starkly with reference to these settlements. For, as MacMaster emphasises, the shantytowns ‘served the function of the lowest denominator, the form of immigrant housing that was most in opposition to the model of society that social workers shared.’

The bidonvilles were informal, makeshift settlements that peppered the outskirts of Paris and other French cities from the early post-Second World War years, and were not completely

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114 ‘Heures chaudes dans le “medina” de Paris’, Le Monde, (21 June, 1957). Prakash notes how such representations were overstated given that a police report of 1952 put the Algerians inhabiting the area at 10.2% of the population. The Algerian population thereafter increased slightly in the 1950s, before beginning to decline after the early 1960s. See Prakash, Empire on the Seine, 132.
115 Prakash, Empire on the Seine, 137.
117 See Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, passim.
118 MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 85.
removed until the 1970s.\textsuperscript{119} It is important to note that shantytowns in France also housed Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and indeed French, as well as North African residents. However, the latter were disproportionately represented in the most deprived of these settlements.\textsuperscript{120} Moreover, de Barros notes that in the 1950s the term \textit{bidonville} designated French Algerian Muslims just as much as the terms ‘casba’ or ‘gourbi’.\textsuperscript{121} In the same vein, predominantly Portuguese inhabited \textit{bidonvilles} were often referred to in other terms. Nor was there evidence of a perception of a parallel between the Algerian settlements and the ‘zone’ on the periphery of Paris in which provincial and European, especially Belgian, Polish, and Italian, migrants lived in ramshackle dwellings well into the 1940s.\textsuperscript{122}

In this section two kinds of discourse of Europeanisation will be examined as they related to the \textit{bidonvilles}. The first inferred that the shantytowns were constitutively non-European and as such irredeemably out of place in Paris. This rested on some dubious premises, but also relied on a certain degree of collusion from the \textit{bidonvilles} residents in their own devaluation. The second form of Europeanising discourse about these settlements consisted in a limited but real refusal of this devaluation of the residents of the settlements. This is an example of Europeanisation as a refusal of the closure of the terms of Europe or Europeanness, which in this case involved an insistence on being no less a part of this Paris that was reckoned to be a European capital.

\textbf{Europeanisation as Rejection of the \textit{Bidonvilles} from Paris}

\textsuperscript{120} Moroccans and Tunisians tended to arrive in France in greater numbers later in the 1960s.
\textsuperscript{122} Prakash, \textit{Empire on the Seine}, 228.
In terms of the spatial dimensions of the bidonvilles and their connection to Europe, de Barros notes that strong distinctions were drawn in physical space in terms of Europeanness or non-Europeanness.\(^{123}\) Accordingly, the bidonville was conceived not merely as a place where Algerian immigrants lived, but as an expression or manifestation of their character, as a non- or anti-European space that was more than the sum of its non- or anti-European parts. Sayad described the bidonville as ‘une ville rejetée par la ville... une ville qui n’est pas ville... une ville qui ne sera jamais ville lors même qu’elle est au sein de la ville.’\(^{124}\) One can add to this that it was accordingly a non-European or indeed anti-European supplement to de Gaulle’s ‘de facto capital of Europe’.\(^{125}\)

This sense of neglect and rejection was expressly felt by many inhabitants of the bidonvilles. Interestingly, given our examination of Paris as a sanitised European space for tourism, Sayad quotes the frequent wish of the bidonvilles inhabitants that foreign tourists would come to see the settlements, to examine their impoverishment and photograph it to shame the French authorities who perpetuated this impoverishment.\(^{126}\) On the other hand, a former bidonville inhabitant, Mohammed Kenzi, recollects anger at foreign tourists who photographed what were taken to be quaint Third World enclaves on the edge of Paris.\(^{127}\) But this merely confirmed the point that the space was taken to be a non-European anomaly in the post-war European capital. Accordingly, in referring to the bidonvilles, allusions were made to Casbahs,

\(^{124}\) Sayad & Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, 15-16.
\(^{125}\) Wakeman, The Heroic City, 343.
\(^{126}\) Sayad & Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, 88.
\(^{127}\) Mohammed Kenzi, La menthe sauvage (Lutry: Éditions Jean-Marie Bouchain, 1984), 47.
Medinas, Calcutta, or American Indian reserves. Similar references to non-European space were employed to highlight most Parisians’ detachment from and indifference to their neighbours in the shantytowns. As the journal *Pax Christi France* described the *bidonvilles*, ‘bien que géographiquement proche de nous, ils sont psychologiquement aussi loin que les plus lointains pays. Pour bien des Parisiens, les bidonvilles de Nanterre ou de la Campa sont-ils plus proches que Zanzibar ou le Rwanda?’ One should add though that not all the shantytowns were treated in the same manner at government level. The Portuguese *bidonvilles* of Champigny in the eastern suburbs, for instance, benefited from joint municipal-FAS projects to ‘humanise’ the settlement by providing electricity, water, and trash collection. As Byrnes notes, ‘no such projects were launched in the region’s predominantly North African bidonvilles.’

This performative discourse of segregation was closely connected to the common idea that the *bidonvilles* residents ‘chose’ to live there, or that, in what amounted to the same thing, they lived there because they were irredeemably feeckless. As the journal *Pax Christi France* put it, ‘combien de personnes… pensent que les bidonvilles ne sont habités que par des asociaux, des chômeurs constitutionnels, des incapables, des irrécupérables se complaisant dans la saleté et la misère?’ *Bidonvilles* residents in fact commonly expressed resentment about the idea that they chose to live there. Furthermore, it was a notion that connected to the idea that the *bidonvilles* were not strictly speaking a Parisian space at all, but rather a foreign, North African importation.

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130 Byrnes, *French like Us?*, 184.

131 Ibid.

132 ‘Un monde “à part”.’ The article went on to argue that the reality was quite different from this perception.
It is in this sense that one can critique the historian Leif Jerram’s recent interpretation of the shantytowns. It is curious that as part of his plea for attention to the micro-unit of history as a point of scholarly precision, Jerram’s analysis of the bidonville is quite ahistorical. In his reading, the HLM that surround Paris have been unfairly denigrated, since they were certainly an improvement over the shantytowns from which many of its occupants had come. This is all the more noteworthy since Jerram is especially attentive to the secondary obscure or subtle manifestations of power in European urban history, for instance prerogatives of the welfare state which were not merely intrusive but also techniques of biopolitical government. He documents how the right to acquire a flat built for social housing purposes in European cities from the 1950s was explicitly linked to conformity to norms of heterosexual relations and family life. Yet he accepts at face value the pure intentions of the French state with regard to its policy towards the bidonvilles and their inhabitants, going as far as to credit its ‘passion to alleviate suffering.’ Jerram’s claims are not wrong, but unsatisfactory. Indeed, there were many sincere and committed French social workers. House and MacMaster even demonstrate how the resistance of social workers to state violence proved problematic for Papon’s direction of the police targeting of Algerians which culminated in the killings of 17 October 1961. But Jerram’s point is incidental to de Barros’s more probing analysis of the permeation of colonial discourse and exclusionary invocation of Europeanness in the systemic political logic of housing policy. Furthermore, Jerram’s rush to defend the moral fibre of welfare officials as individuals has the ideological effect of obscuring the fact that the existence of the bidonvilles was in the first place not a neutral fact or zero point for French civil servants to administrate.

133 Jerram, *Streetlife*, 372-373, 377, 384. Jerram also omits the difficulties, discrimination, and delays involved in bidonvilles residents securing a place in the HLM.
134 Ibid., 300.
135 Ibid., 373.
Though Jerram never alludes to their origin, the Paris bidonvilles were in fact symptomatic of a constellation of trends within post-war European imperialism and capitalism.\textsuperscript{137} Their inhabitants’ ranks were swelled with Algerians escaping the French military campaign in Algeria, notably the policy of uprooting indigenous communities and resettling them in camps.\textsuperscript{138} Immigration in general, including into the bidonvilles, was further prompted by European capital accumulation processes that powered the trentes glorieuses, which required cheap foreign labour and, as Judt argues, the deliberate imposition of insecurity on foreign workers.\textsuperscript{139} That the shantytowns were as such not a non-European intrusion was appreciated by those who campaigned on behalf of the residents. The President of the Amitié Nord-africaine de Nanterre (ANAN) argued that these residents were ‘des gens qui pour bien des raisons sont presque en droit de l’exiger de nous, société, qui portons à tous les échelons la responsabilité de cet état de chose.’\textsuperscript{140}

But more typically the bidonvilles were represented as archetypically non-European or anti-European, when in fact they were symptomatic of the complicated intertwining of various modes of European violence. In this sense, Slavoj Žižek’s differentiation and discussion of these modes is illuminating: ‘subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that also includes two objective kinds of violence. First, there is a “symbolic” violence embodied in language and its forms, what Heidegger would call “our house of being”… Second, there is what I call “systemic” violence, or the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of

\textsuperscript{137} Apart from the housing of Algerian migrants in relation to the ongoing war, Amelia Lyons also points to French official preoccupation with the competition with other core Europeans states for cheap non-European or peripheral European labour. See Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France’, 84.
\textsuperscript{138} MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 74.
\textsuperscript{139} Judt, Postwar, 337. It is ironic in this regard that Algerian workers in the metropole had even fewer rights as French citizens prior to 1962 than they had thereafter when the new Algerian government demanded certain safeguards in their employment. See Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France’, 83.
\textsuperscript{140} Report of J. Bellanger, the president of Amitié Nord-africaine de Nanterre. 1957 in FMH. ARC 3019 -2. 1. Dossier général chronologique.
our economic and political systems."\textsuperscript{141} Having taken no account of the visible subjective violence of police repression of Algerian immigrants in the integral policy of moving them from bidonvilles to the HLMs, Jerram unsurprisingly also takes no account of the ‘symbolic’ violence of their labelling as excluded non-Europeans, nor of the objective violence of European capitalist and colonialist systems which manifested themselves in the acceptance of Algerians as a particularly disposable and exploitable population.

The Bidonvilles, the Gaze, and Europeanisation

In a televised debate with Alain Badiou in May 2010, the French philosopher Alain Finkelkraut reproached Muslims in France over the issue of the veil. French society is defined by ‘the exchange of looks,’ he insisted.\textsuperscript{142} It is curious that an important formative experience in postcolonial France, with which Finkelkraut is so uncomfortable, was precisely that of the look. Indeed, the experience of the gaze, whether at the North Africans’s muddy appearance in public or while they hauled cans of water from outside communal taps, was one of the most commented upon aspects of bidonville life, as well as of one of the most painful to bear.\textsuperscript{143} A key distinction of this experience from Finkelkraut’s invocation of the look was the absence of the reciprocity and equality that he presupposes.

Mud, which as Sayad notes was the quintessential mark of bidonville life,\textsuperscript{144} perhaps functioned here as an alibi for the looks of contempt that Parisians extended to those inhabitants.

\textsuperscript{142} See http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xddsqw_badiou-finkielkraut-debat-part2_webcam#
\textsuperscript{143} Sayad & Dupuy, \textit{Un Nanterre algérien}, 43.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 45.
In an age in which, as Frederick Cooper argues, racial justifications were no longer explicitly serviceable, the muddied appearance of the bidonvilles residents served as a material disavowal of Fanon’s observation that it is the racist who creates his object.\textsuperscript{145} To the extent that one had something tangible to point to, rather than refer back to expired racial ideas, the French observer expunged him or herself of (neo)colonial guilt. One thereby confirmed a practical understanding that the superior place of the European in Paris was obvious, natural and unimpeachable rather than arbitrary and unjust.

The experience of being gazed at by the neighbours of the settlements was consistently remarked upon as engendering a deep sense of shame and humiliation. In November 1965, France-Soir republished a letter from a former resident of the La Folie settlement in Nanterre as part of a series in the newspaper examining bidonvilles in the French capital: ‘I am writing to you on the subject of your campaign against the bidonvilles… I wouldn’t go back there for all the money in the world, not even for a week. I know all about the corvée d’eau… we were subjected to the most contemptuous looks from so-called “normal” neighbors as the tap was located on a main road.’\textsuperscript{146}

This shame, which was induced by pitying and contemptuous looks alike, could even take on a corporeal sense, as powerfully described by a Moroccan couple interviewed by Hervo. The husband regretted that every time he performed this task he was ashamed, that he would hide his body from view if he could. Indeed, his wife remarked that ‘he always lowers his head.


\textsuperscript{146} Thérèse Nadji, ‘Je sors de l’enfer des bidonvilles, voilà ce que c’est.’ France-Soir, November 13, 1965 in FMH. ARC 3019 -2. 1. Dossier général chronologique. The corvée d’eau was the process of collecting water from common outside taps.
If he could put it in a hole he’d do so because he is so ashamed [il a trop de honte]. Likewise, another testified that he was quite aware that he was lowly, nothing admirable like a doctor or a lawyer. And yet still, it ‘makes you suffer when you feel from their look they are always marking a difference… that they always manage to make you understand that you’re not of their world.’ Seemingly, then, this momentary practical gesture was as powerful a means of discourse as any to objectivate a barrier between the European and non-European.

In his study of the suffering of immigrants, Sayad analyses the impact of the increasingly felt sense of distance from the country of origin. This also arises in the memoirs of bidonville residents. The experience of the look was in a sense a reminder of this detachment and displacement. For the shame it engendered contrasted utterly from Sartre’s encapsulation of the rising mood of self-empowerment in the non-European world and the reversal of European hegemony in his ‘Black Orpheus’ of 1948:

Here are black men standing, looking at us, and I hope that you – like me – will feel the shock of being seen. For three thousand years, the white man has enjoyed the privilege of seeing without being seen… Today, these black men are looking at us, and our gaze comes back to our own eyes; in their turn, black torches light up the world and our white heads are no more than chinese [sic] lanterns swinging in the wind.

In his preface to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, Sartre reminded his reader that for Marx shame was a revolutionary sentiment. The bidonvilles residents were heavily involved in the demonstrations on and around 17 October 1961, one aim of which was the restitution of dignity. But this claim to dignity was out of joint with the experience at being

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147 Monique Hervo & Marie-Ange Charras, Bidonvilles: l’enlisement (Paris: Maspero, 1971), 36. This work contains transcripts of interviews conducted with the residents of La Folie from between 1965 and 1968, but one can surmise that the experience described by the resident here was comparable to that of residents in the 1950s and early 1960s.
148 Sayad & Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, 50.
149 See for example Kenzi, La menthe sauvage, 36-37.
looked at, which seemed better to correspond to the disabling sense of shame Fanon pointed to in his *White Skins, Black Masks*, which is a useful text to make sense of the experience of the *bidonvilles* residents. Fanon’s advance over the early Sartre’s phenomenological approach was to insist that in the colonial situation the gaze is not merely the gaze of an Other, that there is also a relationship of mastery and superiority and inferiority, whether real or imagined.\footnote{Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 138n.} The testimonies of the *bidonvilles* inhabitants immediately recall Fanon’s succinct summary of the lived experience of the Black man or woman in a white world: ‘shame. Shame and self-contempt. Nausea.’\footnote{Ibid., 116.} Robert Young explains that from Sartre’s account of how a lack of self-worth is mediated by the look of the Other, Fanon developed an insight into the mechanics of how colonialism was able to produce a sense of inferiority in colonial subjects, how the colonial gaze turned the subject into an object.\footnote{Robert J.C. Young, “Preface. Sartre the “African Philosopher”,”, in Jean-Paul Sartre, *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*, trans. Azzedine Hadrou, Steve Brewer, & Terry McWilliams (London & New York: Routledge, 2006), xiv.}

Fanon also analysed the importance of appearance in these kinds of phenomenological power relations. He described how the objectification of the Black differs from that of the Jew, in that the latter can sometimes pass unnoticed in terms of his physical appearance. The appearance of the North African inhabitants of the *bidonvilles* was doubly marked: in the first instance because of their Maghrebian features, and in the second because of the public appearance of carrying water or the pervasiveness of the inescapable and distinctive mud and dirt of *bidonville* life. A water carrier from the Souf area described the humiliation of being looked at when carrying water, the mocking smiles, the assumption that they North Africans were equivalent to worms or rats, and the sense of superiority that permeated the French people’s gazes. But, instructively, he added ‘between us, they’re right. They are on the right side [ils sont du bon
This was an unexceptional example of the phenomenon of inhabitants of the bidonvilles colluding with the terms of the justification of their disenfranchisement, and the corresponding hierarchy between the French and immigrants, Europeans and non-Europeans. Often the extreme sense of ‘shame of oneself,’ as Sayad describes it, was coterminous with a distinct sense in which its inhabitants often accepted their disenfranchisement in the social hierarchy. They thus limited their claims to a minimal relief of their material impoverishment, and drew short of attacking the pathological constitution of the division between European and non-European, for which Fanon’s work held out hope.

Spatialisation, and (De-)Europeanisation

It is argued here that the gaze of the French neighbours of the bidonvilles was more than a gesture of contempt. Rather, it had a further value in terms of identity and placement in the sense of instilling social hierarchy. That is to say that this practice of looking at the bidonvilles and their residents had a powerful effect of inculcating a distinction in terms of Europeanness and non-Europeanness. In his discussion of the Paris Grande mosquée, Bayoumi argued that ‘its putative purity of North African form within the fifth arrondissement was an attempt to force the presence of colonial North African subjects into visibility and containment.’ In part the gaze at the shantytowns was an attempt to achieve some degree of comparable control, though the autonomy of the settlements did not permit this to the extent of the mosque, which was constructed and regulated by the French state.

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154 Sayad & Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, 54-55.
155 Bayoumi, ‘Shadows and Light’, 41.
To understand this, it is useful to turn to the work of Jacques Rancière, particularly in terms of his theories of spatialisation and fixing people in their place. Rancière invokes a scene from Roberto Rossellini’s film *Europa 51* to examine the bourgeois outsider encountering and being turned by the experience of an alterity which then transforms and converts the outsider. But it is suggested here that its outlining of the process of spatialisation can usefully be appropriated to explicate processes of (de-)Europeanisation at work with regard to looking at the *bidonvilles* and their residents. Rancière writes,

Of course, those narratives were an appeal to fear and pity. I would assume, however, that this was not the main point. The first concern was not provoking fear and pity. It was localizing. Horrible as the underworld may be, it is still a world. It is a place where you can find the disease of society, designate and touch it with your fingers. People are pitiful or dreadful but they are there, clinging to their place, identical to themselves – and all the more identical to themselves as they have less self, as their ‘self’ is hardly distinct from the dirt and mud which is ‘their’ place. The descent into hell is not simply a pitiful visit to the land of the poor – it is also a way of making sense, a procedure of meaning... Frightening as it might seem, it was still reassuring to envisage society as threatened by a power lying beneath it, in the underground. Because the main threat would lie in the discovery that society had no underground: no underground because it had no ground at all. The enigma and threat of democracy is not the army of the shadows in the underground. The enigma and threat of democracy is merely its own indeterminacy. This means that people have no place, that they are not ‘identical’ to themselves: that indeterminacy in fact is a permanent challenge to the rationality of policy and the rationality of social knowledge. Spatialization is a way of conjuring with the challenge of safely grounding reasonable democracy and rational social knowledge.156

Sayad, of course, noted the various ways in which the *bidonville* residents were revealed as, or made to feel, out of place. But, to borrow and adapt Rancière’s argument, in another sense they were very much in their place. If the *bidonville* was considered quintessentially non-

European or anti-European, to go to it or to see it was also to place it, to fix it and its inhabitants in their place. Here ‘it was there, identical to itself because it was identical to the occupation of space.’ The spatialisation of the bidonvilles corresponded to the de-Europeanisation of its inhabitants and the reaffirmation of the Europeanness of those who were not of the bidonvilles. It was a re-inscription of a division between de Gaulle’s capital of Europe and the bidonville as casbah in a representation of opposition as stark as Fanon’s famous depiction of the colonial city. As such, it is instructive that Sayad notes that the feeling of humiliation and shame that the gaze induced was, in fact, all the more pronounced in situation of anonymity when it was aimed randomly at any resident as a collective reaction against the bidonville as a whole.

To continue the analogy with Rancière’s analysis, the bidonvilles might be regarded by Parisians as primitive and frightening, but a bidonville in its non-European place was less frightening than not being able to locate the contours of the societal hierarchy of European and non-European. And certainly less disturbing than the notion that that society’s hierarchy was arbitrary and artificial or even ephemeral – a fear which was all the more present in an age when the certainties of Europe’s imperial place in the world were quickly exposed as credulous and complacent. The contestation and defence of Europe and Europeanness in this period was indeed closely connected to this question of social rank and place.

The according of place that Rancière describes here correlates closely to the experience of the Paris bidonvilles in terms of the notion that the residents chose to live there. For if they were in ‘their place’ in the bidonvilles, this was all the more self-evident if they chose to be

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157 Ibid., 32.
159 Sayad, *Un Nanterre algérien*, 43.
160 One thinks immediately of Fanon’s depiction of the instilling of hierarchy between European and non-European in the use of ‘pidgin-nigger’ or patois French to speak to Antilleans or Francophone Africans. This was to express the sentiment that ‘‘You’d better keep your place.’’ Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 34.
there. Of course, the feelings of the Algerian residents were mixed. Some suffered enormously from the material deprivation; others found the settlements convivial nonetheless. But the point here is that the notion that they chose to live there was an *a priori* dismissal of their claims. In Rancière’s terms, to say they chose to live there was to say there was no ‘part of no part.’ De Gaulle’s Paris, the capital of Europe, did not systematically preclude any part from equality, all parts were counted.\(^{161}\)

Rancière’s thought is useful to understand the experience of gaze to which the *bidonvilles* residents were subjected in two ways, then. First, it functioned as a process of spatialisation in which their non-European residents were put in their place in a reinforced social hierarchy. This connected, secondly, to a contradictory notion with which it coexisted: the residents chose to live there, thus preempting any claim to equality and to dispute their abjection in this capital of Europe in which the ‘police order’ denied that any part was excluded.

Europeanisation as Validation of the *Bidonvilles*

Despite many instances of internalising the rationalisations of their depreciated status in Paris, there was also a sense in which the *bidonvilles* were alternatively Europeanised. That is to say that alternative discourses disputed the invocation of Europeanness to exclude the Algerian residents of the shantytowns from an equal right to the city. Furthermore, in doing so, these implied an interrogation of the very meaning of Europeanness as it was conventionally used.

\(^{161}\) A particular perverse instance of this axiom was Papon’s claim that Algerian migrants were transparently equal as demonstrated by their possibility of enlisting in the *harkis*, who, as we have seen, aggressed inhabitants of the *bidonvilles* and Algerian immigrants in general. House & MacMaster, *Paris 1961*, 78.
Recent work has juxtaposed the experience of the Algerians in Paris generally, and the *bidonvilles* in particular, with the Jewish experience of segregation under European fascism. Michael Rothberg points to figures like Marguerite Duras and her November 1961 article in *France-Observateur*, ‘Les deux ghettos,’ as an example of multidirectional memory. Accompanied by a photograph of the appalling conditions of a *bidonville* in Nanterre, the article centred around two interconnected interviews: the first with two Algerian workers and the second with a survivor of the Warsaw ghetto. The juxtaposition of the two memories does not imply competition but rather is seen by Rothberg as representing an impetus to mutually productive reflections.\footnote{162}{See Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), chapter 8.} Rothberg further argues that the ideological and policy shifts that Shepard describes in terms of the relation between France and Europe, Frenchness and Europeanness, indeed disenfranchised racialised minorities. Yet the ideological incoherence of these shifts also created a space in which intellectuals and activists like Duras ‘could link the contemporary crisis to past events that had not yet received their due.’\footnote{163}{Ibid., 245.} Given the integrity of the experience of fascism and colonialism to Europe, it follows that work like Duras’s can be thought of as a Europeanising space, in the sense of ‘Europeanisation’ as the contesting of any closed understanding of Europe, and disclosing and foregrounding other histories that needed to be accounted for in any attempt at articulating the meaning of the continent.

One might add another thread to these entangled histories by pointing to the fact that some Algerian inhabitants of the *bidonvilles* were Second World War veterans, and considered themselves to have contributed to the liberation of Europe. As such, their habitation in the *bidonvilles* was felt to be an unjust depreciation of their contribution to the continent in which they now found themselves so devalued. Of one particular resident in the *La Folie* shantytown,
Hervo noted that, ‘sous le drapeau francais, il s’est battu pour libérer l’Europe,’ but that as an
‘indigène’ received half the war pension of a ‘métropolitain.’

Another mode by which the European credentials of the bidonvilles were re-asserted was
to insist on their spatial proximity to the centre of Paris. If Paris was reckoned to be the capital of
Europe, it followed that these settlements, often only a few kilometres from the Champs-Élysées
as it was constantly repeated, could not plausibly be subtracted from this Paris. As one Nanterre
resident expressed it succinctly, ‘mais après tout, le bidonville, c’est français; c’est à Paris qu’il
se trouve, c’est quelque chose d’ici.’

Also, if the Paris authorities and Parisians deduced from the abject conditions of the
bidonvilles an essential lack of Europeanness in their residents, it was in fact the case that the
conditions of the Parisian bidonvilles were expressly felt by the inhabitants to be an injustice and
they were offended by notions that they were charity cases. Residents repeatedly objected that
such living conditions could still exist in the twentieth century. French authorities might have
continually emphasised the need to instil modern European values into North African migrants,
but it was in terms of their expectations of modern civilisation that the bidonville residents
indicted the French authorities and their lack of dynamism in facilitating decent accommodation.
Furthermore, the contradictoriness of the conflation of Europeanness and universalism was
highlighted when residents insisted on the equality of human beings as a rationale for the
provision of decent housing. As a former resident of the La Folie settlement in Nanterre put it to
Sayad: ‘habiter, c’est être parmi des humains, c’est vivre avec eux, c’est vivre entre eux; c’est

164 Hervo, *Chroniques du bidonville*, 104.
165 Ibid., 50.
166 Daniel Gordon, “‘A Nanterre, ça bouge”: immigrés et gauchistes en banlieue, 1968 à 1971’, *Historiens et
Géographes* 385 (2004), 77, 84.
Likewise, in his memoir of bidonville life, Brahim Benaïcha recalls the incorrect assumption of French people that
the bidonvilles residents refused to countenance progress. See Brahim Benaïcha, *Vivre au paradis: d’une oasis à un
vivre en hommes, vivre humainement, dans les conditions normales des hommes, c’est vivre au milieu d’eux, de la même manière qu’eux, donc dans les mêmes logements qu’eux.\textsuperscript{168} One thinks here of Rancière’s definition of politics as the ‘part of no part’ standing in as the universal to claim equality within the polity.

Similarly, one core premise of Hervo’s work in the \textit{bidonvilles} was to insist on the equality of the residents, to refuse the segregation of its residents along with their habitat. Accordingly, a letter from her and her colleague Brigitte Gall insisted that ‘en fait, il semble bien que ces habitants des bidonvilles désirent – à quelques exceptions près – ce n’est pas une aumône… C’est tout simplement le droit de vivre comme les autres.’\textsuperscript{169} In an entry in her chronicle for October 1961, in what can also be seen as an invocation of a multidirectional Europe, Hervo rhetorically leveraged the spatial integrity of the \textit{bidonvilles} to Paris so as to refuse this colonial objectivation of spatial segregation and inequality of material wealth and recognition: ‘Paris. Sur le trottoir, une foule de passants, le pas pressé, longe de vitrines aux brillantes enseignes lumineuses, exposant, bien présentés, des objets de luxe. Dans les faubourgs de la Ville Lumière, je pense au bidonville, enclave du Tiers-Monde où la guerre sévit. D’un côté les nantis, la joie. De l’autre, dénuement, mort, tortures. Quinze ans après la Second Guerre Mondiale…’\textsuperscript{170} These various examples of a refusal of separation, the counter-factual insistence that they were no less a part of the city and thus no less European a space, offered an interruptive counter-understanding of how one thought about Paris.

The extent of the refusal of the disjuncture of the \textit{bidonvilles} and their rhetorical disconnection from the city though significant and under-estimated, should not be overstated

\textsuperscript{168} Sayad & Dupuy, \textit{Un Nanterre algérien}, 41.
\textsuperscript{170} Hervo, \textit{Chroniques du bidonville}, 218.
however. There was a sense in which that segregation was appreciated by *bidonville* residents themselves, at least before 1962. As MacMaster notes, the radical segregation of the shantytowns often provided a sense of protection against a hostile and dangerous outside world. Moreover, the general feeling of solidarity and community cohesion was strengthened during the Algerian war and so it was an ideal terrain for the spread of Algerian nationalism.171

Counter-intuitively though, even when the segregation of the shantytowns was embraced or accepted, there were still ways that they could be said to have been Europeanising spaces. This is most interesting in the case of the criteria of the far right who invoked the *bidonvilles*, especially in Nanterre, as a quintessential symbol of the menace of immigration and the degeneracy of non-European peoples. Yet the remarkably autarchic internal economy of the settlements, based on logic other than accumulation and emphasising solidarity, ironically resembled to a great extent the kind of non-capitalist and socially cohesive market economy that the far right held up as a template for Europe.172

Furthermore, on reflection on her *bidonville* co-residents, Hervo noted that, ‘nous, Occidentaux, nous ne pouvons pas mesurer l’ampleur de ce cette solidarité tant elle est ancrée dans le cœur des Arabes. L’étranger qu’on reçoit est considéré comme “l’hôte de Dieu.”’173 If on one hand this set the shantytown residents, and North African immigrants generally, apart from European Parisians, on the other they embodied what were esteemed to be the most precious characteristics of Europeans – what the Orientalist Louis Massignon considered to have been so valuable and so tragically lost from Europe – ‘le patrimoine abrahamique, la parole donnée, le

171 MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 76-77.
172 See for example ‘La capitale des bidonvilles’, *Cahiers universitaires* 22 (February-March, 1965), 22-23. This was the journal of the far right student group the FEN. Issues are available EN. 1, dossier 3. On the economy of the *bidonvilles* see ‘Entretien avec des syndicalistes algériens’, *Vérité Liberté: cahiers d’information sur la guerre d’Algérie* (September, 1960); & J.P. Imhof, ‘Le “bidonville” du Petit Nanterre,’ *Cahiers Nord-Africains* 89 (May, 1962).
droit d’asile.’ In these ways, the homes of North Africans in Paris in this period can be thought of as Europeanising spaces, and indeed anticipated Balibar’s point that the sociability of immigrants of non-European origin in fact often overrides their lack of regional affiliation to appear as ‘quintessential Europeans.’

Conclusion

Just as there were many Europes, there were various kinds of Paris, each of which was impacted by those various invocations of Europe, many of which were underscored by a putative equivalence between modernisation and Europeanisation. The Parisian home, both in the sense of material shelter and civic belonging and affective security, was impacted by the way the city’s development was underscored by and interpreted in the light of diverse notions of Europe: a shared European vision of recovery that derived from the experience of its cities being destroyed in the Second World War; Paris as sanitised and zoned European capital; the Europe of the Cold War; the Europe of tourism; the quickly reconfigured understandings of Europe and Europeanness prompted by French decolonisation; the ethnicisation of Algerian immigrants and its implications for housing policy; the linking of urban space and discourse of Europe; and counter-inferences that if this Paris was a capital of Europe, those who were excluded from it or devalued within it were in fact no less a part of it.

The right to a home in the city relied to a significant extent on criteria of Europeanness. These criteria were far from coherent and consistent, however. Europeanness might be invoked

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merely in an underlying disdain for the city’s working classes. Or it might entail years for Algerian and other migrants in transit centres where they were to be Europeanised in their comportment and outlook, notably including the curtailment of radical politics. Furthermore, discourse about Europeanness reverted between two registers of a clear binary opposition of European and non-European, and a graded scale on which Europeanness gradually faded away. Sometimes both were appealed to at once. This incoherence was compounded by the lack of a clear view about what Europeanisation of immigrants entailed. Sometimes it seemed to convey the making European of the non-European, whereas at other times it was implied this was implausible, and so Europeanisation instead signified the extension of European control over the non-European. A crucial point is that this incoherence was a symptom of this pivotal point in post-war French and European history – decolonisation. Indeed, a perennial dilemma of imperialism was brought home to the metropole, namely, the dual impulse of exclusion and inclusion – the striving for a universalist polity on the one hand, and on the other a means to refuse the extension of full equality which that universalism promised. Hence the universalist aspirations of French Republican housing policy were blatantly self-thwarting in that they ethnicised and segregated populations that they strove thereby to integrate; while conversely the appeal to Europeanness facilitated the converse and simultaneous impulse to deny the rights and provision that the French state’s universalism promised.
Chapter 3. The Paris Street as a Europeanising Space

The sense of connection between Paris and Europe is perhaps most obviously experienced in the quartier de l’Europe in the 8th arrondissement around the gare Saint-Lazare. Here twenty-four of the names of the most important European cities adorn the signs of the eponymous streets that surround the place de l’Europe. But how did the Parisian street connect to thinking about Europe in a more rigorous sense, in which its very definition and scope were interrogated? In this chapter the case is made that Europe emerged in the Paris street in this period in direct and indirect ways that derived from the weight of recent history or the urgency of ongoing political concerns.

The chapter will proceed as follows. First, street names are examined in terms of their implications for thinking about Europe at this post-war conjuncture. Second, perceptions of the political affiliations of Paris streets are analysed with regard to their implications for thinking about the continent. The third section examines how the discourse of Europe was implicated in street demonstrations in the French capital, paying particular attention to those in Paris that followed the Soviet invasion of Budapest in 1956, and the march of 17 October 1961, which culminated in the police killing of somewhere between 30-200 unarmed Algerian protestors. Finally, the street wall is examined as a space for discourse, with particular attention to denunciatory graffiti that were placed on the Paris street wall in the aftermath of October 17 and its connection to discourse about Europe.

1 It is also worth noting the mark in the city of inter-war Europeanism. After the death of Aristide Briand in 1932, a peace neighbourhood was laid out in the suburb of Suresnes with the boulevard Aristide Briand intersecting with that of Gustave Stresemann. See Rod Kedward, *La Vie en Bleu. France and the French since 1900* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 221.
Three core arguments are made in the chapter. First, various explicit and implicit understandings of Europe were expressed and developed in the Paris street. But it was also a forum for its rejection as much as for its defence or reformulation. Paris streets were symbolically appropriated in political ideologies, and by the same token deliberately transgressed by their opponents. The street was thus a forum for ordering and transgressing these contesting positions, including opposing formulations of the meaning of Europe and Europeanness. The left-right political divide in large part dictated the terms of this contestation, though one cannot read off formulations of Europe according to this political spectrum in a completely transparent and direct way. Second, articulations of Europe in Paris were often seen to take on additional significance precisely because they were formulated in the French capital. This connects to the third argument, that Paris was often seen to be the fundamental centre-point of Europe which in turn was the core region of the world. Universalism, then, derived from Europe, which in turn derived from Paris. The stakes being so high, it was all the more damaging when the Parisian streets were seen to be the locus of supporters or perpetrators of violence, which was carried out in part with a certain underlying understanding and advocacy of Europe.

Europeanising Street Names in Paris

As we have seen, Pierre Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire is recognised as a vastly successful project, but also criticised as a patently ideological one.² Perry Anderson argues that this

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collection was a product of the contemporary hegemonic moment of French liberal ideology. In this regard the inclusion in the collection of a chapter about street names is ironic, since it was also an interest of Antonio Gramsci who, Anderson suggests, would have been fascinated by the entire project.\(^3\) Though innumerable street names in Paris connect to ideas of Europe, the discussion will be limited to those inaugurated in or directly related to the period in question here.

While taking care not to exaggerate the extent of Parisian consciousness of colonialism as a European issue, it is nonetheless true that colonialism always necessarily impacted to some degree on definitions of Europe, which historically had been so interconnected with the practice. Robert Aldrich picks up on the chapter on street names in *Les lieux de mémoire* to analyse the prevalence and significance of colonial names in Paris streets.\(^4\) He notes the scarcity of street names dedicated to anti-colonial figures, but overlooks the streets renamed after Henri Martin by Paris municipalities.\(^5\) Martin became an iconic figure on the French (particularly Communist) left after his conviction for treason in 1950 for propagandising against the ongoing French war in Indochina, whilst serving there in the French navy. Jean-Pierre Bernard demonstrates the vital place that Martin held in post-war French Communist Party (PCF) culture in the capital.\(^6\) Streets named after him related to Europe in a negative sense, though. His canonical status served more the rejection by implication of the Europe of imperialism. It was also assimilated into that

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broader francocentric PCF culture which was deeply suspicious of contemporary European political integration.

If fascism had in large part prescribed a vision of an integral Europe whilst stripping it of its Enlightenment heritage, this Europe was in turn rejected in the renaming of street names after the liberation in Paris. Rosemary Wakeman invokes Michel de Certeau’s argument in *The Practice of Everyday Life* that street names are ‘part of a broader discourse of “local authority” that creates habitability outside prevailing functionalist discourses. It creates a poetic geography that eludes systematization. Spatial topoi are instead organized on superstition, legend, memory and dreams. They embellish local topography with fantasy, with recollections and stories.’

In the post-war years these topoi were characterised to a significant degree by a discourse about the Resistance and Liberation. In effect, this was a rejection of the Europe of fascism, or as Sartre put it, the Europe of ‘Germanism’. With the help of the Soviet ambassador, the place de la Villette was renamed Stalingrad in honour of the Red Army’s victory. Perhaps in doing so the longstanding problem of the European credentials of Russia was again raised, a question that was only thornier in a time of Cold War. The avenue Victor-Emmanuel III was renamed for the American President Franklin Roosevelt so as to wipe out any urban reference to Italy’s fascism. The rue Henri Heine in the 16th arrondissement had been dejudaisé under the German occupation to become the rue Jean-Sébastien Bach. Pressure from the street’s residents persuaded the municipal council to rechristen it for the ‘anti-Prussian’ poet Heinrich Heine. In turn, a street in the 13th arrondissement named for a collaborationist councillor, George Prade, was given Bach’s name. The expression of the rejection of European fascism in street names

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7 Wakeman, *The Heroic City*, 99.
also was a source of satisfaction to Paris’s Spanish exile community, as municipalities with heavy Spanish contingents such as Saint-Denis renamed streets to honour Spanish Republican heroes.\textsuperscript{10}

If Europe retained a presence in the names of Paris streets, its coordinates were deliberately reconfigured. Naming streets in capital cities after leaders or events elsewhere in the world is not peculiarly French, of course. But it is nonetheless significant that the naming of streets inscribed on the city a practical sense of the contingency of Europe. The naming and renaming of streets in accordance with shifting estimations of European fascism, colonialism, democracy and liberation surely suggested to Parisians that any understanding of what Europe signified was itself shifting and historically contested.

Europe and the Political Affiliation of the Paris Streets

As part of his evaluation of the inadequate purging of collaborators after the end of the Second World War, Jankélévitch employed the imagery of the Paris street. The Parisian bourgeoisie that had thrown in its lot with the German occupiers and their New Europe had regrouped and had ‘retaken possession of the boulevard’.\textsuperscript{11} This Parisian bourgeoisie – as it happened, ‘la plus intelligente, la plus méchante, la plus aggressive et la plus corrompue de l’Europe’ – anticipated Henri Lefebvre’s call for ‘the right to the city’, at least in insisting on its


\textsuperscript{11} Vladimir Jankélévitch, ‘Dans l’honneur et la dignité’, \textit{Les Temps modernes} (June, 1948), 2258.
right to this part of the city, free of un- or anti-European Jewish and Communist elements.\textsuperscript{12} They could reminisce about the occupation years undisturbed: ‘Ah! les beaux dimanches franco-aryens du palais de Chaillot! et la belle musique européenne qu’on faisait alors aux Français!...’\textsuperscript{13}

It is worth recapitulating Jankélévitch’s case for the universal importance of the Paris street, and thus the gravity of what was represented in them. After all, he and many others considered the city to be ‘le guide de l’Europe et la conscience de tous les hommes libres du monde entier; ce qui arrive sur les rives de la Seine, entre l’Hôtel-de-Ville et la Concorde, a une importance particulière pour l’homme en général.’\textsuperscript{14} Of particular importance was the Champs-Élysées. Jankélévitch reminded his readers that crowds there had acclaimed Hitler in expensive cinemas, and that in 1938 women had celebrated the victory of Deladier by shouting slogans about the need to get rid of Communists and Jews: precisely the parameters of that Europe of Germanism.\textsuperscript{15} These ‘Versaillais’ might have justifiably feared for their future, given the stakes of the recent conflict and their submissive pro-German Europeanism during it. But they could rest assured that the post-war settling of accounts had run out of steam. Consequently, ‘ces familles bien nourries ont retrouvé toute leur assurance du bon vieux temps, du temps où les Champs-Élysées, les bains de mer et la Côte d’Azur étaient à elles.’\textsuperscript{16} They could once again reaffirm their preferred conception of Europe: ‘enfin l’on retrouvait le droit de parler ouvertement du Komintern, comme aux temps heureux du docteur Goebbels et de l’exposition “Le bolchevisme contre l’Europe”. Tout rentrait dans l’ordre. La saine alliance contre

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 2254 & passim.  
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 2250.  
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 2259.  
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 2254-2255.  
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 2257.
l'U.R.S.S., voilà ce que, pour tout renouvellement, la France s’est offert à elle-même. The connection between Europe and ‘order’ here is instructive. To a significant degree, the Europe articulated in the Paris streets was retrenched by the call for order and challenged in turn by the transgression of that order. The latter was just as likely to entail a rejection of Europe as a plea to reformulate it.

Nor were the cases that Jankélévitch pointed to the only examples that linked the Champs-Élysées to a Europe of reaction. While we should not at all entertain the idea that enthusiasm for imperialism was distinctive to the French political right, it was nevertheless the case that it utilised the Paris street particularly visibly to express its support for colonial France, and by extension the assumptions about Europe this entailed. As we have seen, the defence of Algérie française was often linked to a certain idea of Europe, undoubtedly represented amongst those who paraded down the boulevard on numerous occasions in defence of French ownership of its North African departments. To take one example, the far right Jeune Nation was central in the anti-government rally on the Champs-Élysées that immediately followed the storming of government headquarters in Algiers on 13 May 1958. This organisation was the most prominent neo-fascist organisation in France in the 1950s and expressly advocated a version of Europeanism defined by anti-Semitism, rejection of American and Soviet imperialism, racial hierarchy, and the construction of a Europe that extended ‘from Narvik to Cape Town, from Brest to Bucharest.’ In this view, the continent was delineated by the western frontiers of the Soviet Union, and an imperial presence overseas was not a supplement to Europe but rather a constitutive element of it. It was on the Paris street that Jeune Nation invested much of its energy

17 Ibid. The exhibition ‘Le bolchevisme contre l’Europe’ was launched in March 1942 at the Salle Wagram. On its first day alone it drew 10,000 visitors.
in articulating its values of European supremacism and its warning against ‘the immense perils threatening the white civilisation of Europe and France.’\textsuperscript{20} This practice was carried on by one of the group’s offshoots which we will examine in a later chapter: the \textit{Fédération des étudiants nationalistes}. The street would likewise be a recurrent arena in which this student group expressed its radical rightist Europeanist convictions in brawls.

The presence of paratroopers was also a perpetual presence in the French capital, displaying in its streets a bellicosity that derived from their proud self-image as defenders of a beleaguered West – a myth with which they were inculcated in the colonial arena. The Italian observer Alberto Arbasino recorded the agitation that permeated Paris around the time of the \textit{fête nationale} celebrations: ‘The place is swarming with paratroopers…. They have taken possession of the city…. They are amassing in Paris for the great Sunday morning parade down the Champs-Élysées; 14,245 men, 123 planes, 60 tanks, 32 cannon, 377 military vehicles, 415 horses, and they are taking advantage of their free time in their occupied capital.’\textsuperscript{21}

Paratroopers were certainly a figure of French national sentiment. Arbasino noted how they were ‘welcomed with enthusiasm as good saviors of a nation in difficulty.’\textsuperscript{22} But the street presence of the paratrooper had a particular importance in terms of spatialising certain conceptions of Europe, and depending on one’s perspective, they exerted either an impressive or intimidating presence in recurrent political demonstrations on the Paris streets, as Arbasino’s account suggests. For Surrealists, the paratrooper was emblematic of the European values and civilisation that they attacked with iconoclastic zeal.\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Jeune Nation} quite agreed, but glorified

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 94.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Wakeman, \textit{The Heroic City}, 157.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
this symbolic function.24 The ‘dictionnaire du militant’ in the May 1963 edition of Europe-Action, a journal of the Fédération des étudiants nationalistes, gave a succinct definition of the parachutiste: ‘Symbolise les vertus viriles et le réflexe vital de l’homme européen.’25 Also, one of the European components of the French Communist painter André Fougeron’s 1953 work ‘Atlantic civilisation’ was a poster of ‘parachutistes coloniaux’. His collage was an indictment of modernity, here represented as a synthesis of French colonialism, German militarism, and American capitalism.26

24 Shields, The Extreme Right in France, 94. Shields notes that Jeune Nation glorified the army in general as part of its hatred and rejection of the French republic’s parliamentary democracy, in particular the parachute regiments of the Foreign Legion.
26 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 34. Interestingly, André Malraux referred to the idea that Europe was becoming part of the Atlantic civilisation in his 1956 postface to The Conquerors. He suggested that this was preferable to the Soviet Union, and did not imply any dilution of Europe, since ‘the Atlantic civilization invokes, and deep down, respects Europe as a culture; the Soviet Union scorns its past, hates its present, and accepts only a future Europe empty of all that Europe was.’ André Malraux, The Conquerors, trans. Stephen Becker (London: Journeyman, 1983). 189.
The reactionary advocacy of Europe in Paris also drew from racially focused observations on the streets. Roland Cavalier complained in the far right periodical *Fidélité* that, ‘Il est permis de maltraiter un chrétien, un communiste et à plus forte raison un fasciste, mais les surhommes à peau d’èbène qui défilent sur nos boulevards accrochés au bras de leurs blanches conquêtes sont à classer définitivement dans la catégorie des “Intouchables”.’ 27 The discourse of Europeanness was indeed often strongly invoked in relation to the issue of mixed couples. It violated the reactionary sense of order which Jankélévitch referred to. *Fidélité* was only an

extreme example of the widespread reconstitution of imperial attitudes and terms of reference in post-colonial France and Europe, often in terms of (non-)Europeanness.

In his discussion of ‘the man of colour and the white woman’, Fanon notes that ‘the Europeans in general and the French in particular, not satisfied with simply ignoring the Negro of the colonies, repudiate the one whom they have shaped into their own image.’

Again, Rancière’s analysis that we examined in relation to the bidonvilles is useful here. To adapt his argument, the denigration of the black or non-European was not an end in itself, but rather formed part of a broader order of meaning. They might have been repulsive and degenerate, but as such had a place in the social order. More unsettling than their wretchedness would have been a lack of order at all. This was the threat of their partnership with European women, and the attendant conclusion that notions of Europe and Europeanness were indeterminate. For it followed that to the degree that those notions were exposed as arbitrary and contingent, so too, to the same degree, were the hierarchy and privilege that they underwrote. This is plausibly a key reason why, as Ann Stoler shows, such a disproportionate amount of attention was paid by colonial authorities to boundary groups such as mixed couples.

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A recurring trope in Eric Hazan’s *The Invention of Paris* is the importance of the Parisian barricades of 1848 and 1871 for Europe as a whole. But we have seen here that, in fact, in this period, the right was just as notable for its symbolic appropriation of the city’s streets. In this sense, its message, including the value it placed on the idea of Europe, was both expressed in and fortified by the Paris street. If political identities drew from the city’s streets, though, by the same token it was in those streets that they could be contested.

The Paris Street, Political Transgression, and Europe

In her work on the Popular Front years in France (1934-1938), Jessica Wardhaugh examines the earlier spatial division of the capital between political left and right. She argues that whilst the city’s spatial divisions were well defined, they were also subject to significant challenges. Both the political left and right deliberately crossed sensitive boundaries in provocative attempts to further their own support and develop their identity. Similarly, Danielle Tartakowsky shows how the place de la Concorde was disputed between left and right throughout the twentieth century. These political boundary crossings were also a feature of this post-war period and had implications for discourse about Europe. The Paris street in this sense was both a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic space for political ideologies and their concomitant ideas about Europe.

Some Communists, for instance, were not content to leave the Champs-Élysées to the political right that Jankélévitch depicted, and made a point of according it canonical status in the Paris of which they were so proud.\textsuperscript{34} Furthermore, several street demonstrations or instances of street violence unfolded in which the PCF was a key component. These were connected to issues which touched on the party’s understanding of contemporary European political integration as a nefarious scheme to the benefit of the United States and an ideologically unreconstructed Germany. Disturbances erupted in 1950 along the Champs-Élysées during a Communist demonstration against \textit{Le Figaro}’s serial publication of a memoire of the former SS commander Otto Skorzeny. Likewise, Dwight Eisenhower was dubbed the general of German rearmament by the left, and so during his visit to the city in January 1951 thousands marched down that most famous of Paris boulevards as part of the PCF’s protest. In late November 1951 German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and General Hans Speidel visited Paris, and this in turn led to street protests and clashes. Although the march was banned, tens of thousands proceeded along the route of the triangle of the place de la République, the place de l’Opéra, and the gare Saint-Lazare. More than seven thousand police congregated along the Champs-Élysées.\textsuperscript{35} It is noteworthy that Speidel was invoked in 1957 by the Surrealist intellectual Gérard Legrand in the journal \textit{Le Surréalisme même}. His article, ‘Europa Über Alles’, conveyed common doubts about the credentials of the new post-war Europe which was reintegrating a militarised Germany. In a nod to the radical sentiment in which imperial Europe was conjoined to fascist Europe, Legrand remarked that ‘l’Euroafrika, c’était déjà le rêve hitlérien.’\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} For example, Pierre Courtade, the USSR correspondent of \textit{L’Humanité}. Cited in Bernard, \textit{Paris Rouge}, 62.
\textsuperscript{35} Wakeman, \textit{The Heroic City}, 123.
\textsuperscript{36} Gérard Legrand, ‘Notes: Europa Über Alles’, \textit{Le Surréalisme même} 2 (Spring, 1957), 165. We should note that after 1935, the Surrealists opposed the Communist movement from the left in its rejection of Stalinism, a rupture that is generally dated to the June 1935 International Conference of Writers for the Defence of Culture. See Gérard Roche, ‘Le Surréalisme et le rejet du Stalinisme en Europe (1935-1956)’, \textit{Mélusine} 14 (1994), 223-239.
In a different vein of transgression, Hatmon and Rotmon remark that the director of the publishing house Éditions de Minuit, Jérôme Lindon, rented billboards on the Champs-Élysées to publicise Henri Alleg’s hugely important work of 1958, *La question*. Banned by the French government almost immediately, this work detailed Alleg’s own torture by French paratroopers. There was, then, a certain audacity in placing this advert for this soon-to-be banned testimony in the natural constituency of the right and of support for colonialism. It was a rejoinder to the very prominent presence of paratroopers in demonstrations on the Champs-Élysées during colonialist and anti-communist demonstrations, and also to the broader right that had laid exclusive claim to the western districts of Paris for their defence of France and Algeria. More broadly, it prompted reflection on the nature of contemporary Europe in relation to the legacy of fascism, and in this respect contrasted notably with the expression of Europe in the VE day parade in the city in May in the same year. Wakeman notes that *Le Figaro* reported that, though in the past the day had been celebrated without much enthusiasm, it now took on the passions and urgency of the moment of the Fourth Republic’s demise. She remarks on the sizeable right-wing military demonstrations that took place in the city and the spectacular value and the extravagant gesture of colonial troops in their regalia.37

All these examples indicate that the political affiliations of the Paris streets gave them a certain symbolic value, but by the same token it was precisely in those streets that that political affiliation was vulnerable to contestation. Challenging these associations as they pertained to the place of Europe in these ideologies, therefore, took on an extra power by transgressing or hijacking these spaces. In a dialectic of power and resistance, to appropriate a space for a vision of Europe was also to offer a target for contestation.

37 Wakeman, *The Heroic City*, 158.
Paris Street Demonstrations and Europe

Wakeman argues that post-war Paris street demonstrations must also be understood in the context of the profound political unrest which characterised the French Fourth Republic. She notes that this was marked by a dispersion of political power across the spaces of Paris.\(^{38}\) She adopts Bakhtin’s phrase of a ‘grotesque symposium’ to characterise the diversity of protests, marches, parades and riots that pervaded the streets of the French capital in these years.\(^{39}\) Two instances of this symposium are examined here because of the multifarious and contradictory ways they connected to ideas about Europe, while of course they could not be reduced to that. These were respectively the reaction in Paris to the Soviet invasion of Budapest in 1956, and the 17 October 1961 killings of unarmed Algerian demonstrators.

The Paris Street and the Soviet Invasion of Budapest, 1956

The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 was a watershed in European political and intellectual life. Not least, coming on the back of Khrushchev’s leaked speech from the twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, it was a major impetus to the creation of a European New Left

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 107.
\(^{39}\) Ibid.
which irrevocably rejected a Stalinist Europe.\textsuperscript{40} In this they were at one with French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau’s denunciation of the PCF for its defence of the Russian aggression in the National Assembly.\textsuperscript{41} Their shared principles ended here, however; the New Left was sceptical about the 1957 Treaty of Rome that Pineau helped to engineer, and scathing of the Europe he defended in his role in the Suez crisis of 1956.\textsuperscript{42}

But what is particularly interesting about Budapest 1956 for our discussion here is that reactions to it were expressed intensely on the Parisian street. So it is not merely the case that there was much reflection about the Hungarian situation in Paris, but that it prompted activity in the street in which, to some degree, ideas about Europe were contested. As Jean-Pierre Bernard puts it, ‘Novembre 1956 à Paris est un mois rude et funèbre. Les consciences et la rue bougent. L'espace public et l'espace privé de la manifestation s'interpénètrent.’\textsuperscript{43}

In part this was due to the death of the French photojournalist Jean-Pierre Pedrazzini, who was fatally wounded while documenting the unrest in the Hungarian capital before dying back in Paris. \textit{Paris-Match} reproduced a photo (figure 2) attributed to Pedrazzini in its 10 November issue which became an iconic image.

\textsuperscript{42} Recent research indicates an additional Europeanist aspect to the Suez expedition. It has been known since the 1980s that at that time Guy Mollet suggested to Anthony Eden that France join the Commonwealth. Christian Pineau in 1989 downplayed the seriousness of the idea, but the historian Denis Lefebvre suggests that indeed it was seriously considered, and also endorsed by prominent Europeanists such Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi. See Denis Lefebvre, \textit{Les secrets de l’expédition de Suez 1956} (Paris: Librairie académique Perrin, 2010).
\textsuperscript{43} Bernard, ‘Novembre 1956 à Paris’, 70.
Indeed, Ester Balázs and Phil Casoar maintain that it ‘became an allegory of those turbulent times.’ They trace its widespread use for journalistic documentation both in the West and in communist Hungary. In each case the photo’s meaning was appropriated for political purposes. Furthermore, they suggest that in fact the photo had been taken by a Paris-based American photojournalist, but that the attribution of the photo to the deceased Pedrazzini only added to its emblematic status in Paris, where his funeral, itself a public event, took place on 9 November at Saint-Phillipe du Roule in the 17th arrondissement. His death brought the Budapest street even closer to Parisians; indeed, it transfigured the street into a kind of trans-European space.

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44 Balázs & Phil Casoar, ‘An Emblematic Picture of the Hungarian 1956 Revolution’, 1241. Balázs and Casoar also point out that the photo appeared in Jean-Luc Godard’s 1960 film Le Petit Soldat. The film was banned until 1963 on account of its portrayal of a French intelligence officer in Switzerland, and its underlying themes of the situation in Algeria, including the practice of torture. Ibid., 1259.

45 Balázs and Casoar note that in 1989 at the beginning of the political transition in Hungary, the Austrian Franz Goëss, who worked for Paris-Match in 1956, launched an investigation via a Hungarian journal to search for ex-insurgents who appeared in the pictures of Paris Match journalists during the revolution. He succeeded to a degree, but the identity of the couple in the Paris Match photo remains unknown. They note that he was motivated in his endeavour by ethical concerns relating to the profession of photojournalism, to reconstruct press history, and ‘last
In his examination of that month in 1956 in Paris, Bernard identifies 7 November as the apogee of street disturbances. He details the demonstration in support of the Hungarian people that started on the Champs-Élysées in the early evening. This was organised by various political organisations, youth groups, and war veterans’ associations. A range of national and Parisian political figures took part, including members of the French government in the process of accelerating European political union: among others, Guy Mollet, François Mitterand, Georges Bidault, Robert Schuman, René Pleven, and Paul Reynaud. Both French and Hungarian flags dotted the crowd and calls for the liberation of Budapest were interspersed with denunciations of the PCF. The congregation proceeded up to the Arc de Triomphe where wreaths were laid on the tomb of the Unknown Soldier whilst the Marseillaise was played.\textsuperscript{46} In itself this episode demonstrates the difficulty of distinguishing a Parisian European sentiment or consciousness from exclusivist or self-concerned French patriotism, even jingoism.

\textit{Le Monde} reported that at the close of the demonstration, a group of some three thousand young people formed, including uniformed paratroopers. Their chants served to incite an assault on the PCF.\textsuperscript{47} This was presumably the spirit the FEN had in mind when its foundational manifesto of 1960 reminded its readers that, ‘à Budapest en 1956, à Alger et à Paris depuis quatre ans, ce sont les jeunes qui sont en tête des manifestations et des insurrections.’\textsuperscript{48} Serious street fighting ensued at PCF headquarters and at that of its mouthpiece, \textit{L’Humanité}. In Bernard’s assessment, though the PCF successfully defended its buildings that night, the victory was bought at the price of the awareness that it no longer had a base in Paris proper since it had but not least, it was a gesture for the reunification of Europe’. See ibid., 1248. Of course, the interest of this anecdote should not obscure the danger of doing history backwards when we consider conceptions of Europe in 1956.

\textsuperscript{46} Bernard, ‘Novembre 1956 à Paris’, 72-74.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 73.
\textsuperscript{48} EN, 1, dossier 1, \textit{Manifeste de la classe 60}, 12.
only been able to repel the assault by calling in reinforcements from the banlieues, whose distance from central Paris underscored the perpetual pushing outwards of key demographic sections of support for the party. In a sense, the pitched battle also entailed colliding conceptions of Europe – the PCF scepticism about European political integration versus the Europe of the assailants, in which there was no room for Communism or anti-imperialism. Discourse about European integration often invoked the opinion of the man of the street. Though this incident did not necessarily imply any widespread approval among Parisians for confrontational right-wing politics, it nonetheless made it harder for the PCF to maintain that it represented the vox populi of the Parisian street.

What were the implications of these scenes on the streets of the French capital in terms of conceptualising Europe? Bernard notes that part of the emotional impact on the Parisian street during the Budapest crisis was exacerbated by the sense that the Hungarian capital was just a day’s drive from Paris: a journey that a number of Hungarian refugees managed to make in the other direction, and whose reception centres in the capital would incidentally be used a few years later in the logistical operation of integrating repatriated Europeans from Algeria.\footnote{Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, ““Paris les a pris dans ses bras !” La politique d’accueil des Français d’Algérie dans le département de la Seine”, in \textit{La France en guerre 1954-1962: expériences métropolitaines de la guerre d’indépendance algérienne}, eds. Raphaëlle Branche & Sylvie Thénault (Paris: Autrement, 2008), 455.} There are two points to make about the perceived significance of Budapest being only a day’s drive away.

First, it suggests that conceptions of Europe in this period owed as much to changing technology or, rather, the emerging mass availability of that technology, as to multilateral summits and political treaties. Kristin Ross argues that French culture of the 1950s and 1960s reflected the proliferation of car ownership and in turn the altered popular perceptions of time and space that that entailed. It follows that it also reconfigured perceptions of Europe and of
attendant judgments of empathy and solidarity, according to the sense of proximity, in such circumstances as November 1956 in Hungary.\textsuperscript{50}

Second, for those who condemned the invasion of Budapest in the name of a Europe of universalism (whether implied or explicit), the closeness to Budapest by car was a problematic rationale. It was hard to square the commitment to universalism or the rights of man, so commonly invoked in public meetings and the press with regard to Budapest, with an empathy borne of proximity.\textsuperscript{51} To borrow and adapt the argument of the philosopher Alain Badiou, if one’s values and engagements were properly universal, the place of residence of the victims that one championed was unimportant.\textsuperscript{52} Arguably the contradictions of this assertion of this universalism were underscored by the Suez expedition, which, since it was nearly exactly contemporaneous with the Budapest uprising, functioned as a rare historical control. Flanner wrote that as soon as Nasser nationalised the Suez canal (controlled by the Suez Company headquartered in the French capital), ‘Paris was scandalized and disgusted… The most unexpected feature of the Suez crisis has been the continuing lack of nuance in the way the French react to it. Uncharacteristically, all the French seem to have imagined a real union, for once – all militant, aroused, convinced, and all behind the government in its taking of what it openly calls its “extremely firm stand” of being prepared for military action, if necessary.’ Communist dissent aside, ‘Paris is united principally by what it calls “the Munich complex.”’\textsuperscript{53}

In an example of the multidirectionality of the process of making sense of Europe, the analogy of

\textsuperscript{50} See Kristin Ross, \textit{Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture} (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1995). Referring to two works, Sartre also suggested how perceptions of space generally, and of Europe in particular, were altered by developing technology: ‘\textit{Gallant Europe} is the nullification of countries by the railroad; \textit{Nothing but the Earth}, the nullification of continents by the aeroplane’. Sartre, \textit{What is Literature?}, 149.

\textsuperscript{51} As one important example of the linkage between Europe and the Rights of Man, see Robert Schuman, \textit{Pour l’Europe} (Paris: Nagel, 1963), 27-28.

\textsuperscript{52} Alain Badiou, \textit{L’Éthique: essai sur la conscience du mal} (Caen: Nous, 2003), 53.

Paris’s experience of the Europe of ‘Germanism’, then, was drawn upon to defer to a Europe of imperialism. This in turn was much less contested in the city’s streets than the Europe that was divided by the Cold War. For as Flanner describes it, ‘the French feel that, in crushing Hungary, Soviet Russia has destroyed not only Budapest but is own tentative place in civilized European history.’

17 October 1961

One of the particular strengths of House and MacMaster’s Paris 1961 is its argument for the longer-term context of the police killings of unarmed Algerian demonstrators on 17 October, 1961. Rather than a short-term breakdown in police control or lapse in composure, they show that the targeting of Algerians in the Paris streets was express long-term police policy, which then escalated in the months before October 1961. They note that as early as 1949, colonialist modes of operation were reproduced and refined in the French metropole to manage the Algerian community and the emerging Algerian nationalist movement. They stress the particular importance of the formative work between 1951 and 1953 of the Paris Prefect of Police, Jean Baylot, along with his lieutenant Maurice Papon. This involved an aggressive and concerted

54 Ibid., 331.
55 For an excellent discussion of the historiography of recent works on French colonial violence in the France and in Algeria, including works on 17 October 1961, see Joshua Cole, ‘Massacres and their Historians. Recent Histories of State Violence in France and Algeria in the Twentieth Century’, French Politics, Culture & Society 28/1 (Spring, 2010), 106-126.
56 Papon was later put on trial between 1995 and 1998 for his role in deporting Jews from Bordeaux during the Vichy regime. See Richard J. Golsan (ed.), The Papon Affair: Memory and Justice on Trial (New York: Routledge, 2000). For an analysis of his career as a civil servant, see Stephanie Hare, Death, Duty and the Republic: The Career
effort to crush the nationalist movement, which included stop and search in the street and arbitrary arrest of Algerians who were targeted as an undifferentiated group in an attritional exercise of daily harassment.\textsuperscript{57} As one illustrative example, and also as an interesting example of how this policy contributed to trans-European political radicalisation, Niek Pas points to the experience of the Dutch student leader and influential proponent of Third Worldism, Ton Regtien. During a visit to Paris in 1956, Regtien made an Algerian acquaintance who explained the French-Algerian conflict to him in the course of long walks by the Seine. In what was to be a formative political moment for Regtien, one evening near the gare d’Austerlitz, policemen abruptly stopped their car, bundled the Algerian in and whisked him away.\textsuperscript{58}

Furthermore, from 5 October 1961 Algerians were subject to a curfew. K.S. Karol’s description of this in the British weekly \textit{New Statesman} was obviously disconcerting for contemporaries who insisted on the exceptionally democratic credentials of France and Europe: ‘So far as I know, this is the first occasion on which a so-called democracy has denied to a section of its citizens the right to walk the streets at night – and has handed over to the police the authority to decide whether or not citizens should lose this right purely on the colour of their skin.’\textsuperscript{59} Karol noted that, indeed, the Nazis had resorted to such methods during the Occupation, but that this had rightly been condemned as barbarous.

Monique Hervo gives the example of an Algerian man from the Nanterre \textit{bidonville} of La Folie who had no means except a wheelbarrow to transport his wife to hospital as she went into


labour. He recalled his fear having to wheel her through the streets after curfew, and also his feeling of loneliness and abandonment in the deserted city night.\textsuperscript{60} In an illustrative example of the interconnection of understandings of Europe, existential angst of this kind immediately evokes Sartre. It is curious that one situation for his radical interrogation of freedom in \textit{Being and Nothingness} centred precisely on the implications of choosing to walk the Paris streets after the German-imposed curfew during the occupation.\textsuperscript{61} Furthermore, it was the course of this war that prompted Sartre to rethink his understanding of freedom and political commitment; a reconsideration that would lead into his post-war denunciation of imperialism and his radical critique of Europe.

Police attacks on Algerians in the street tended to target areas of the body that would not leave visible traces, such as the testicles and stomach. Such assaults were usually committed in largely Algerian-populated districts ‘where there were few potential European witnesses who might lodge a complaint’.\textsuperscript{62} Or, the Parisian police might distance themselves from these actions by subcontracting them to \textit{harkis}. Besides the obvious function of covering their tracks, this suggests a certain degree of concealment and distancing, perhaps indicating at least a degree of compunction or reticence on the part of the Paris police officers. How does this affect our understanding of the extension of this conflict of decolonisation into the French capital, pitting European against non-European? Again, there is a connection to Sartre in terms of his discussion of similar public reactions to violence in Algeria. But he saw these sentiments only as further damning evidence against Europe:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} Hervo, \textit{Chroniques du bidonville}, 226.
\item \textsuperscript{61} McKenzie Wark, \textit{The Beach beneath the Street: The Everyday Life and Glorious Times of the Situationist International} (London & New York: Verso, 2011), 57.
\item \textsuperscript{62} House & MacMaster, \textit{Paris 1961}, 80.
\end{itemize}
a few years ago, a bourgeois colonialist commentator found only this to say in defence of the West: ‘We aren’t angels. But we, at least, feel some remorse.’ What a confession! Formerly our continent was buoyed up by other means: the Parthenon, Chartres, the Rights of Man or the swastika. Now we know what these are worth; and the only chance of our being saved from, shipwreck is the very Christian sentiment of guilt. You can see it’s the end; Europe is springing leaks everywhere. What then has happened? It simply is that in the past we made history and now it is being made of us. The ratio of forces has been inverted; decolonization has begun; all that our hired soldiers can do is to delay its completion.63

This background context leads us to the night of 17 October 1961, during which the French police attacked a peaceful march of unarmed Algerian immigrants who were protesting against the ongoing war in Algeria, against racism, and for Algerian independence. The march was also motivated by a collective determination to reassert their pride and dignity in the face of the circle of terror and racist humiliation imposed on them by Papon, who by this time had been promoted to Prefect of the Paris police.64 Casualty figures are inexact, but it is generally estimated that between 30 and 200 were killed; many of whose bodies were thrown into the Seine. It is also estimated that over one hundred people died over the next two days whilst detained by the police, either in police stations or detention centres, including the Palais des Sports, the Coubertin Stadium and the prison at Vincennes.65

House and MacMaster maintain that 17 October was ‘the bloodiest act of state repression of street protest in Western Europe in modern history.’66 But beyond this, of what significance is that infamous date in terms of thinking about Europe and Europeanness? After all, if it was at first a French non-event in that it was remarkably inconspicuous in the public sphere, it has since

64 House & MacMaster, Paris 1961, 1, 112.
65 For a discussion of figures of casualties and the issues of the debates surrounding them see ibid., introduction.
66 Ibid., 1.
been reinstated as a distinctly French tragedy in the context of France’s decolonisation and post-war history generally. Four arguments will be made here.

First, the event had obvious significance for Europe in terms of, as it were, the scene of the crime. Jankélévitch’s point above, about the supplemental importance of Paris to anything that was said and done, is only all the more pertinent. As House and MacMaster remark, this was a turning point in the fall of European colonialism being played out ‘in the streets of a city that stands as a symbol of European enlightenment and civilization.’

Second, an express aim of the demonstration that evening was to break the spatial segregation of Paris, to transgress the central boulevards and for the Paris Algerians to manifest themselves there to both Parisians and tourists as a visible community in the French capital. The route of the march was indeed calculated precisely to intersect the Paris as capital of European tourism in order to impact on international opinion. The Europe of the grands boulevards, that Jankélévitch indicted and on which the left transgressed, does not seem to figure expressly in FLN thought about the demonstration, but is significant nonetheless.

To assert their presence in this Paris of European tourism and bourgeois conservatism that was often queasy about the presence of non-Europeans, was also significant in the Rancièrian sense of visibility, and in terms of his concept of dissensus in contradistinction to the consensus ideology found to permeate Nora’s Lieux de mémoire. In Rancière’s concept of the distribution of the sensible, visibility is equivalent to recognition as an equal speaking being in

67 Ibid., 21.
69 In a later interview, Papon noted one aspect of his reaction to his discovery of the plans of the march, and of his preparations to counter it: ‘I could just imagine the shops on the Champs-Élysées pillaged’. See Hare, Death, Duty and the Republic’, 205.
the polity. Those who are invisible are, as it were, the ‘part of no part’ with no stake in the existing order, or at most a diminished stake. Dissensus is the act of politics in Rancière’s use of the term, whereby one insists on equality in the polity, or, what amounts to the same thing, insists on one’s visibility. One should bear in mind this double meaning of visibility in considering the statement of an Algerian female resident about the 17 October march and the important Algerian women’s march that followed it on 20 October: ‘maintenant on parle des bidonvilles parce que nous sommes sortis dans la rue. Depuis 6 années que nous vivions dans des baraques infectes et qu’on nous laisse pourrir dedans, personne ne voulait en parler.’

Conversely, the brutality of the clamp-down on the marches can be understood in terms of Rancière’s notion of the police order which opposes politics. House and MacMaster illustrate how this violence was understood by the police as something other than an operational necessity, which in the event might have been excessively executed. Indeed, they argue that the expression of pride and dignity amongst the demonstrators was insufferable to Papon and his lieutenants, and they were determined to punish it. In Rancière’s sense of the word, the intention here was to ‘police’ the Algerians back into their place. If, as Stoler argues, in the colonial arena Europeanness was often a fluid and negotiable category, in this time of war Papon’s force activated a violently rigid division between European and North African French citizens. Yet, this Europeanist vision was not hegemonic in broader French society. Rancière claims that the 17 October demonstrations produced a split in the French nation when Frenchmen and women supported those Algerians killed in their name; unable to identify with those who had been disappeared, they dissociated themselves from the state that had killed them. This is

70 Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 215.
corroborated by Elizabeth Sloan’s survey of the disgust and recrimination engendered amongst Parisian citizens, including social service workers, administrators, teachers, association members, priests and pastors, and political and union representatives in the aftermath of the event, and in light of the wider police violence.\textsuperscript{73}

Third, 17 October had a European importance – limited but real – in terms of the reaction it provoked. Indeed, negative reflection on the massacre, including its implications for Europe, was not limited to France. Writing in the British journal \textit{New Statesman}, K.S. Karol highlighted the exposure of Western double standards by the lack of a formal condemnation of the massacre: ‘the West as a whole will ultimately have to pay the price for the Paris Pogrom.’\textsuperscript{74} Daniel Gordon notes that contemporary commentary pointed out that if the massacre had taken place in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, it would have attracted considerably more coverage and much harsher condemnation.\textsuperscript{75} And if certain conceptions of Europe, especially in Paris, demarcated it from the United States, they were strained by the resonance of René Dazy’s observation about 17 October: ‘c’est l’intrusion de Jacksonville ou de Little Rock en plein Paris’.\textsuperscript{76} Again, however, we should note the problematic sense of ‘en plein Paris’, as if such actions were more appropriate when carried out along the bidonvilles on the city’s outskirts, or any less demeaning to Europe when assassinations were undertaken out of view of Europe’s most treasured monuments. Furthermore, the non-European world situated the massacre squarely within European imperialism as an integral whole. A telling example, and also additional weight for the multidirectional Europe thesis, was the Paris-based, Francophone Africa-targeted journal,

\textsuperscript{73} See Elizabeth Caitlin Sloan, \textit{Welfare and Warfare: Social Action for Algerian Migrants in Metropolitan France during the Algerian War} (PhD dissertation, Stony Brook University, 2012), 207, 216-220.
\textsuperscript{74} Karol, ‘The Paris Pogrom’, 596.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
Afrique Action. Its issue that reported on the massacre featured on its cover a photograph of Portuguese soldiers carrying the head of a decapitated Angolan. The image was reproduced in the important French anti-war journal Vérité-Liberté.77

Fourth, the most direct connection between the killings and Europe lay in the place of the management of the city’s Algerian population and the international politics of decolonisation. This was particularly the case because money compulsorily collected from Algerians in Paris was a major source of funding for the FLN to pursue the war. In this sense, the killings were symptomatic of counter-revolutionary strategy, particularly of ‘guerre révolutionnaire’, and corollary assumptions about Europe. The guerre révolutionnaire ideology held that race and social Darwinism were crucial factors in international affairs. It emphasised that Europe and the West had to guard against both Communism and the teeming hordes of the Third World, of which Mao was a particularly emblematic figurehead. These non-Europeans were typically distinguished by their irrationality, fanaticism, and violence. It is also interesting that one of Nora’s own contributions to his collection is a chapter of the space or realm of a generation.78 The concept becomes relevant here in a quite different sense. Matthew Connelly describes how figures like Papon were formed in the 1930s in which visions of Europe and race war had great currency. Now grown to maturity, this outlook found expression in senior police and military circles.79

The self-understanding of the Paris police in terms of this kind of operational necessity, in which local policing was inextricably interconnected with international politics was reinforced

77 Ibid., 3.
79 See Matthew Connelly, ‘Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence’, The American Historical Review 105/3 (June, 2000), 752 & passim.
by the exchange of personnel, which crucially included figures like Papon. Papon had read an article by his political patron, René Mayer, about the Bandung conference and the dangers to the West from growing Third World solidarity. In May 1955 he wrote to Mayer (who, as it happened, from that year until 1958 would preside over the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community) to express the impact that his analysis had made on him, and sent him a copy of his own reflections: ‘Perspectives géopolitiques. Destin de l’Europe’. Following House and MacMaster’s argument that 17 October cannot be explained as a spontaneous and excessive outburst of violence, it is worth reviewing Papon’s ideas about Europe’s place in the world in this key document to understand the ideological basis or requirements for such killing. This is not to claim that the police action was simply a clinically deductive enactment of this Europeanist ideology, but rather that such an act became exponentially more thinkable given the exposure of the police ranks to such a worldview. It is worth quoting Papon at length here to grasp the conjunction of European supremacism and sense of vulnerability and defensiveness. This combination of elements was mutually reinforcing and particularly propitious for the naturalisation of violence.

Ces perspectives ne peuvent que convaincre les nations européennes d’abandonner leurs querelles subalternes, fautes de quoi ils ne leur resteraient pas même le choix de la sauce à laquelle elles pourraient être mangées.

Divisées, leur disparition est inscrite dans l’évolution du monde. Unies, leur puissance comptera encore sans doute assez pour sauvegarder la liberté d’un choix, par conséquent, la liberté d’action pour construire un destin. Sans compter que cette intégration des nations

81 Maurice Papon, ‘Perspectives géopolitiques: Destin de l’Europe’. Available online at http://www.maurice-papon.net/doc-alg/europe.pdf. Matthew Connelly notes that it was written in roughly early 1952, and is in the Archives nationals in the René Mayer papers. See Connelly, ‘Taking Off the Cold War Lens’, 752n. Curiously, Stephanie Hare does not examine this document in her study of the career of Papon. This is a particularly problematic omission as one of her core arguments is that scholars have exaggerated the colonialist nature of Papon’s worldview, since he adhered to Republican values and admired Islam. See Hare, Death, Duty and the Republic, passim.
européennes au sein de l’unité européenne, serait de bon exemple et servirait l’autorité de l’Europe, hors du continent qu’elle occupe, pour aider les autres à surmonter les maladies infantiles du nationalisme, autrement que par les procédés expérimentes avec succès en U.R.S.S.

Ce destin, en l’an de grâce 1952, c’est celui de nos propres enfants, et non point celui plus ou moins vagues de nos arrières petits neveux. Et il s’agit, aussi bien, des enfants de M. Smith, ou de M. Muller ou de M. Dupont.82

Hobsbawm argues persuasively that violence in the twentieth century was both far more easily imaginable and legitimated against those ‘whose perpetual inferiority is a datum of nature, especially when made manifest by skin colour’.83 Papon’s remarks suggest that this was even more the case in a time of crisis of empire, and in the light of a growing colonial presence in the metropole. To the extent that one can maintain that the Paris police represented a practical carrying out of Papon’s worldview, its propensity for violence seems to have been compounded by an almost apocalyptic tone in which Europe was affronted by those fit only for domination.84

But, it is argued here, although this kind of Europeanist ideology of guerre révolutionnaire included defensive racism, it was also irreducible it. Mathieu Rigouste argues that it was in terms of this logic that such a demonstration as that of 17 October could be so drastically misrecognised as ‘une opération de défense en contexte de guerre totale’.85 He adds weight to Hobsbawm’s argument that the corollary of the notion of total war is the overriding of sensitivity to barbarism in the prioritisation of eliminating a supposed apocalyptic threat.86

84 For an analysis of this kind of mindset in the context of the international politics of the Algerian war, see Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, passim.
Moreover, this total war approach was reinforced by its biopolitical character. Indeed, Rigouste argues that this ‘pourrissement rouge et vert’ was consistently represented in explicitly medical or surgical terms. This cancerous axis of ‘Islamocommunisme’ purportedly threatened to encircle France and Western Europe and, as such, endangered ‘le monde libre.’\textsuperscript{87} Papon himself regularly resorted to such metaphors, and it is interesting to situate his advocacy of ‘guerre moderne’ beside the definition of biopolitics as the very basis of modernity in the work of figures like Foucault and more recently Giorgio Agamben. As Mark Mazower describes it, ‘Once, sovereignty basically resided in the right to put to death. Since the late eighteenth century, though, it has come to mean both the right to “let die” and—rather more importantly for Foucault—the right to “make live”; the state is now concerned not merely with disciplinary effects on individual bodies but on the management of an entire population.’\textsuperscript{88}

To adopt these terms, but with care not to exaggerate the point, to the extent that the Paris police force was formed by and permeated by the ideology and culture of \textit{guerre révolutionnaire}, the killings of 17 October can be understood as an operation that involved a shift of emphasis from the ‘letting die’ – killing – of Algerians to making Europe live. To elaborate on this, European violence in this time of decolonisation was abetted by this biological or scientific discourse. Brutality and barbarism are more conceivable and palatable if they are seen as a technical or operational requisite, rather than an emotive or tribal preference. Furthermore, Rigouste argues that the coding of this threat in terms of the colours red and green facilitated its conceptualisation in biopolitical or surgical terms. As supporting evidence he points to the map below, presented at NATO headquarters in Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium at the conference on ‘les missions de l’armée française dans la guerre révolutionnaire d’Algérie’ in November 1957.

\textsuperscript{87} Rigouste, ‘Le pourrissement rouge et vert’, 63.
It is a particularly striking representation of a Europe whose foundation must exceed its own limits. Europe here radiates out from Paris to protect the continent as a whole from collapsing under external threats.


To recap, demonstrations and confrontations in the Paris street, such as those after the Soviet invasion of Budapest and on 17 October 1961, drew on ideas about Europe, even if they
were irreducible to these. The streets of the capital were also a space for discourse about Europe in the form of reflections on such encounters, notably in inscriptions on street walls.

The Paris Street Wall as a Europeanising Space

This section will examine how the Paris street wall connected to discourse about Europe with particular reference to a single famous photo related to the events of 17 October. Captured in an emblematic image, in the aftermath of that bloody night a quay by the Seine was adorned with the words ‘ici on noie les algériens’.
The graffito can be translated in English as ‘here we drown Algerians’, or ‘here we drown the Algerians’. The double meaning is significant since it connotes that in a stroke one massacred Algerians as people, and also their aspirations to peoplehood – a particularly vicious, macabre articulation of the axiom that nationalism was exclusively European, as Papon and the ideology of guerre révolutionnaire tenaciously maintained.

Street wall graffiti in Paris are of course closely associated with the events of May 1968, but their prominence in the course of the Algerian war is generally underestimated. If for

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89 Kristin Ross points to the limitations of graffiti as a source for the events of 1968, as accounts tend to interpret this in a way that reduces the events of that summer to a few poetic phrases. In this way 1968 has been rendered to a certain 1980s discourse, as represented indeed by Nora in his Les lieux de mémoire, in which the events of that year have been rendered into a 1980s social vision of a society free from archaic conflict and social confrontation.
Bernard the Budapest revolution was a battle of images and historical references, for the historians Vincent Lemire and Yann Potin the Algerian war in the metropole could be described as a ‘guerre des murs.’ They argue that this was initiated in the first instance by the OAS even before the attempted putsch of 24 April 1961, and that the battle was taken up by anti-fascist militants and pacifists thereafter. We should note this battle included posters as well as graffiti – to take two pertinent examples, those of the FEN and the Mouvement contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme, et pour la paix (MRAP). The former invoked a Europe of colonialism, while the latter, whose members were largely of Central European Jewish extraction, explicitly referenced the Holocaust in response to the targeting of Algerians, the implications of which for any invocation of Europe were clear.

The exact origins of the ‘ici on noie les algériens’ graffito are unclear, and the image is perhaps all the more powerful for that. But Lemire and Potin attribute it to the Comité du quartier Seine-Buci. Centred on the bar Le Old Navy on the boulevard Saint-Germain, this was a collective of politically engaged artists and actors. The ‘ici on noie’ graffito was only the most “spectaculaire” of their anti-war actions. Lemire and Potin’s allusion here to Guy Debord’s philosophy of the spectacle is no accident. Various figures in the group had grown out of, and were influenced by, Debord’s circle. Jean-Michel Mension, for instance, cut his radical intellectual teeth in the Lettrist International before splitting from Debord on bad terms. Around

See Kristin Ross, ‘Establishing Consensus: May ‘68 in France as Seen from the 1980s’, *Critical Inquiry* 28/3 (Spring, 2002), 656. In the same way, this suggests that one should analyse the graffiti in this chapter with a degree of caution.


92 Lemire & Potin, “‘Ici on noie les algériens’”, 159.

93 Ibid., 160.
the time of the split, his political consciousness was raised by the escalation of the Algerian war and his perception of the timidity of the PCF in that context. Lemire and Potin also point to the central role of the Russian-born Armenian playwright and translator, Arthur Adamov, and his insistence on the importance of the concept of ‘situations’ to the theatre. Strongly influenced by Brecht, Adamov’s art was distinctly politicised. Accordingly, he joined other Parisian intellectuals in signing the 1960 Manifesto of the 121, itself containing a Europeanist element as part of its argument in support of insubordination in the Algerian war: ‘Need we remind you’, declared the undersigned, ‘that 15 years after the destruction of Hitler’s regime, French militarism, in meeting the demands of this war, has re-established torture and made it once again a European institution?’ Incidentally, Adamov went on to publish a play in 1966 entitled Sainte Europe.

It was of course common knowledge that graffiti were considered an act of vandalism and, as such, illegal. However, the juxtaposition of this knowledge and the gravity of the denunciatory message of this particular graffito, might well have prompted those who saw it to question the justice of the French state, to ask whether it was not in fact quite arbitrary; scandalously so when one would be more likely to be prosecuted for inscribing graffiti than for having participated in the crime to which it referred. Indeed, as part of the enforcement of his policing of Paris, which as we have seen was underscored in part by a certain Europeanism, Papon was supportive and even encouraging of extra-judicial police violence against Algerians,

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94. ‘The Declaration in Support of Those who Refuse to Fight in Algeria’, New Left Review I/6 (November-December, 1960), 41. The reproduction of the manifesto in this British journal arguably contributed to the consciousness of the trans-European importance of the Algerian war.
and in a moment of immoderation during a police funeral in early October 1961 he announced that ‘for every blow received, we will render ten.’

In the case of France there was an obvious pertinence to the concepts of justice and injustice, given the significant shadow the Dreyfus affair still cast in French public life. In one sense, the graffiti seem utterly inadequate as a means to redress the injustice of 17 October, something more like a nuisance incursion against the French state. However, though we should not exaggerate its power since it was quickly removed, the ‘ici on noie’ slogan is a striking example of a certain power of judgement that could be appropriated from the Paris street wall.

Graffiti were in fact an example of the Situationists’ technique of détournement, and it is instructive that Lemire and Potin argue that by writing this graffito after 17 October, its authors in effect hijacked the wall which served as a tribune against the very state whose property it was. The ‘Ici on noie les Algériens’ slogan was reproduced on walls in central Paris, sometimes alternating the *les* with *des*. This was a transgression of the order of the French state found to be culpable. And the graffiti could arguably be situated within a trend of perceived injustices on a European scale that were deeply felt or passionately represented in Paris. To situate the action of these intellectuals within Parisian cultural representations of justice and European consciousness, one thinks of the popularity among Czech émigrés of André Gide’s adaptation of Kafka’s *The Trial* for the Paris stage in 1948, the same year as the Communist putsch in their homeland. Likewise, filmed partly at the gare d’Orsay (and incidentally

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95 House and MacMaster note that Papon’s announcement here was a reiteration of the loi de talion that had been deployed by the army under his command in the Constantinois region of Algeria when groups of ten hostages were liquidated as a reprisal for FLN actions. House & MacMaster, *Paris 1961*, 104.
97 Lemire & Potin, “‘Ici on noie les algériens’”, 160.
98 Flanner, *Paris Journal*, 85. Interestingly, Flanner notes that this was a rather newfound interest since Kafka was traditionally unpopular among Czechs since ‘he wrote in the hated German language’.

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employing a number of Hungarian actors besides its star, Orson Welles), the 1962 film adaptation of Kafka’s *The Trial* was timely in a Europe seen to be stained by judicial injustice.\[^{99}\]

In turn there was a certain congruity with the Parisian reaction to the Kafkaesque East European show trials. The editor of *Esprit*, Emmanuel Mounnier, wrote that the Bulgarian politician Nikola Petkov, executed after a blatantly fraudulent show trial in 1947, would haunt Europe.\[^{100}\] Also important was the significant impact in Paris of trials of dissidents in Franco’s regime. Or to cite judicial controversies that prompted a European consciousness nearer in time to the graffito campaign of the *Comité du quartier Seine-Buci*, the importance of the trials of OAS activists in 1962 was undermined by the exile of many of its key figures, notably in Spain, and would soon be even more so by amnesties. We have also seen how the Jeanson network, on trial in 1960 – scandalously according to some, under conditions of excessive leniency for others – was defined by its European scope.\[^{101}\]

Conclusion

In his chapter on street names in *Les lieux de mémoire*, Daniel Milo notes that they are undeniably a rich subject, but there is a danger that the historian approaching it can reduce it to charming anecdotes.\[^{102}\] The point extends to the Paris street in general. This chapter has sought

\[^{99}\]The film in fact can be situated in a certain tradition of collaboration in European film, as it was coproduced by Paris – Europa Productions (Paris), HISA – Films (Munich), and FL.C. IT (Rome).


\[^{101}\]Incidentally, Jeanson would later run as a candidate in the European elections in 1994 on the list ‘L’Europe commence à Sarajevo’ as an offshoot of his advocacy for the Bosnian cause. Again, with such examples one must guard against doing history backwards.

\[^{102}\]Milo, ‘Street Names’, 363.
to go beyond these temptations in examining how Europe was understood and articulated in the French capital’s streets in this period. It has analysed Paris street names, the political affiliation and appropriation of Paris streets, street demonstrations and the graffiti on the street wall. In doing so it has shown that discourse about Europe was expressed in a whole range of ways, many of which were unexpected or made unexpected connections across space or time. What is more, the Europes expressed in the street of the French capital were not merely multifarious but, crucially, contradictory and contested. While all of these sections locate very specific expressions of understanding or contestation of the continent, there are several common threads which run through many of them. First, Europe was often related to a notion of order and, in turn, to transgression. This encapsulated formulations of ideas about the continent, reformulations and also rejections. Second, discourse about Europe in Paris, or action that necessarily impacted on the image or understanding of the continent, was seen to take on additional importance precisely because of their location in Paris. Third, the spatial location of Paris was often understood as extending to global or universal importance via Europe.
Chapter 4. Europeanising Spaces and the Mouvement socialiste des états-unis d’Europe, ca. 1947-1954

In its June 1954 issue, Gauche européenne celebrated the eighth year of the organisation for which it was the organ – the Mouvement socialiste des états-unis d’Europe. A cartoon depicted a building site where iron girders formed a structure heading ever upward. Listed on each one, from bottom to top, was each successive conference of the Mouvement, from 1947 in the Paris suburb of Montrouge, 1948 in the Paris suburb of Puteaux, 1949 in Paris, before moving to Strasbourg in 1950, Frankfurt in 1952, Liège in 1953, Milan in 1954. The journal recapped that the Mouvement had been born between the conference at London in February 1947 (in fact a conference of the British Independent Labour Party (ILP)) and the conference in Montrouge in the same year. In fact, prior to 1948 the organisation was named the Mouvement des états-unis socialistes d’Europe (MEUSU). Though the movement has been given little attention in historiography of European integration, the inclusion of prominent Europeanists in its circles indicated that its importance was not negligible; to cite just a few examples: Altiero Spinelli, Paul-Henri Spaak, André Philip, and Guy Mollet. Furthermore, in his study of early post-war socialist Europeanism, Benjamin Heckscher argues that the importance of the MSEUE’s contributions to mobilisations, debate and planning warrant further examination, not only in the context of the history of socialism, but also in the historiography of the European Union.

Those years of 1947 to 1954 are propitious bookends to examine this movement between its origins and the burial of the plan for the European Defence Community (EDC). This proposal for a pan-European defence force was put forward by René Pleven in 1950, and was strongly supported by the MSEUE, before it was finally sunk in the 7th arrondissement in the Assemblée nationale in August 1954. Robert Frank suggests the importance of this event in post-war European history when he writes that, ‘ce “crime du 30 août” traumatise tous les Européens convaincus et marque le mouvement à jamais.’

It should be noted that the archives of the MSEUE contain many highly detailed public policy ideas and formulations. This chapter only analyses this material to the extent that it was indicative of the movement’s understanding of Europe as a whole. As a further point of clarification, the centrality of Paris to the MSEUE’s discourse about Europe varied. Some examples only related to Paris loosely in the sense that the movement to which they were a contribution operated from the French capital. Others connected much more strongly to Paris, either in the sense of being formulated in conferences or meetings in the city, or contributing to and competing in the Parisian field of intellectual and political debate about Europe.

What is more, it should be emphasised that the MSEUE’s understanding of Europe was only relatively coherent. After all, it stressed that it was not a party but a movement. In this way it facilitated many degrees of adherence and involvement, since it was in no sense highly disciplined or hermetically sealed. As a loose and broad organisation of European socialist activists, it encapsulated the complexities and contradictions that that trend of political thought and activism implied. And of course making sense of Europe was a similarly problematic

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exercise. As the MSEUE delegate Sébastien Constant put it: ‘L’Europe finit ainsi par être un monstre hybride qui simultanément signifie la paix et la guerre, la liberté et l’esclavage, la prospérité et la misère, une sorte d’espoir menaçant que chacun prétend appeler de ses vœux et qu’il écarte dès qu’il la rencontre.’

Yet, certain regularities can be identified in the MSEUE’s discourse, as it grappled with this equally indispensable and confounding concept of Europe. In tracing these debates and formulations, the movement needs to be situated within the wider and under-examined tradition of thinking about Europe within the left. The evolution of the MSEUE and its practical and theoretical precepts concerning socialism and Europe are laid out in this context. The notion of equilibrium is then located and examined as a recurring motif in the movement’s understanding of and advocacy for Europe. This connected to a certain strain of leftist Christianity in the movement, and informed its understandings of Europe and capitalism, Europe and the nation, and Europe and the superpowers. Equality was the other core motif of the movement, and connected in particular to the movement’s deliberations on Europe and rights, and Europe and colonialism.

The MSEUE, Socialism, and Europe

The MSEUE followed in the line of a perhaps under-examined, long and ambiguous tradition of thinking about Europe within the political left, broadly conceived. In his survey of political movements for European integration in 1948, Jean-Marie Domenach invoked a leftist tradition for which the idea of a European federation was key: the revolutionaries of 1848, the

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Communards, Victor Hugo, the syndicalist movements, Jaurès, Briand, and, during the Second World War, the journal of the Catholic left for which he wrote, *Esprit.*

Perry Anderson indicates that the ideas, contributions, and debates about Europe on the left were not merely a French peculiarity. Certainly he situates figures like Saint-Simon, Hugo, and Proudhon in this lineage; but also Bakunin, Mazzini, Kautsky, Trotsky, Luxemburg, and Lenin. According to Domenach, this Europeanist spark had faded from the left, so that federalism was now the watchword of European capital and reactionary figures like de Gaulle and Churchill.

Similarly, capital and political reaction were chief concerns of the nascent MSEUE – phenomena that were associated with the recent association of Europe with Hitlerism, as acknowledged at the Montrouge conference in June 1947. Anderson concludes his own survey by pointing to the 1941 Manifesto of Ventotene as ‘a final spectacular expression’ of the revolutionary tradition of conceptualising a United States of Europe. This was composed by a leading figure in the post-war MSEUE, Altiero Spinelli, alongside his co-resister Ernesto Rossi. As such, it is an illuminating reference point to measure the MSEUE against Anderson’s description of this socialist manifesto for post-war Europe: ‘The manifesto… is without question the most powerful vision of continental unity to emerge from the European resistance – libertarian and Jacobin

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7 Jean-Marie Domenach, ‘Quelle Europe?’ *Esprit* (November, 1948), 652.

8 Not all of these figures invoked an idea of Europe positively, however. Lenin and Luxemburg, for instance, instead offered a strident critique of the concept.

9 Domenach, ‘Quelle Europe?’, 652.


motifs fused white-hot in a synthesis that is testimony to the fluidity of ideas possible before the Iron Curtain fell.\textsuperscript{12}

Evincing the waning prospect of constructing socialism, or even the plausibility of belief in radical change, a key member of the MSEUE, Hermann Brill, made the case in 1952 that ‘depuis 1945 la conception de l’internationalisme socialiste a complètement changé.’\textsuperscript{13} In like fashion, the MEUSE’s initial aspirations to an anti-Communist but revolutionary socialist conception of European unity were soon frustrated. Wilfred Loth explains that the movement’s initial refusal to co-operate with ‘bourgeois’ associations for European unity was soon reconsidered. After the Congress of Europe in May 1948 in The Hague, the idea of a European parliamentary assembly began to take shape in negotiations between the British and French governments. As the French Socialist party (SFIO) and the British Labour party were engaged in discussions based on this project, it was felt that there was no longer any prospect of a Europe-wide socialist association in opposition to that dominated by the ‘bourgeoisie’. Loth emphasises that the organisation’s alignment with mainstream movements for European political integration was motivated by a disinclination to dwindle into a faction without any influence, and thereby abandon the European cause to its ideological opponents. The decision to compromise with ‘bourgeois’ forces of course meant renouncing hopes of a socialist transformation of Europe in the near future, and most members of the Committee accepted it resignedly. In November 1948, the Committee appointed at Puteaux conference reconciled itself to seeking full membership of the European Movement. At the same time, the MEUSU changed its name in an indication of

\textsuperscript{12} Anderson, \textit{The New Old World}, 484. Robert Frank points to the historiographical controversy initiated by the work of Pieter Lagrou about the importance of the legacy of the resistances during the Second World War in Europeanist movements in the post-war period. See Frank, ‘Les contretemps de l’aventure européenne’, 89-90.

this new limitation of its hopes. Rather than the ‘Mouvement pour les États-Unis socialistes d’Europe’, the group left Puteaux as the ‘Mouvement socialiste pour les États-Unis d’Europe.’

After the Puteaux congress and the turning point that it represented, members of the left wing of the SFIO drew away from the movement, and their place was taken by prominent deputies from the SFIO executive, including the former economic minister, André Philip, who subsequently assumed the presidency of the organisation. Around this time, national sections came into being, statutes were adopted, and a permanent organisation created with its headquarters in Paris. It is notable that the reason for basing itself there was stated as its favourable geographical location, almost as if the city’s revolutionary symbolic capital were an embarrassment, or at least something to be held at a safe distance.

Subsequent to its change of policy regarding the Council of Europe, the MSEUE’s principal aim was to work for the creation of federal European structures, and this was reflected in its adherence to the emerging consensus around functionalism. This is the context in which the movement maintained that advocacy of socialism was less urgent than the establishment of a politically integrated Europe. The Spaniard Enrico Gironella had said that the Westminster conference demonstrated that there was not one Europe but two: liberal and socialist. Philip reflected that, ‘nous ne sommes pas d’accord sur tous les points. Mais moi, socialiste, j’aimerais mieux une Europe libérale que pas d’Europe du tout, et je pense que nos amis libéraux

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18 Robert Frank & François-Xavier Lafféach, ‘André Philip et l’Europe’, in Chevandier & Morin, André Philip: socialiste, patriote, chrétien, 409. Gironella was based in Paris as secretary-general of the Movement from 1948. He was a former member of the Spanish Communist party POUM.
aimeraient mieux une Europe socialiste que pas d’Europe du tout.\textsuperscript{19} Three years later, Gironella told the movement’s 1952 conference in Frankfurt-am-Main that this stance had since been vindicated and affirmed that, at least amongst the political and social left, the MSEUE had been the most mindful advocate and most determined defender of the Schuman Plan, and as a result had attracted all those on the social and political left who understood what the plan could mean for the future of Europe.\textsuperscript{20}

The MSEUE’s impeccably mainstream position here was guided by the belief that Europe was a necessary, if insufficient, condition of socialism. Sometimes it was insisted that socialism was conversely the condition of Europe, since the old verities of bourgeois European nation states were moribund. Perhaps because this position was somewhat harder to sustain through the 1950s, when the self-destruction of the capitalist system no longer seemed imminent, it was conceded that various Europes were possible, if not as desirable: a clerical Europe, a German Europe, a liberal Europe, an American Europe, a Europe of the cartels.\textsuperscript{21}

A socialist Europe remained the core aspiration of the movement, of course. But in the meantime the task at hand was to support European political integration as it actually existed, rather than insist on how it should be. Meanwhile this process might be leveraged to the greatest possible extent towards the aim of socialism, now deferred over the horizon. This was a practical retreat from the movement’s theoretical hope in the establishment of socialism on a world scale. In this vision, a socialist Europe was conceived as an intermediate stage before the eventual

\textsuperscript{19} Cited in Frank & Lafféach, ‘André Philip et l’Europe’, 409.
\textsuperscript{20} MSEUE, 4. 5\textsuperscript{o} congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. E. Gironella, ‘Rapport d’activités’, 4. For an argument on the importance of Philip’s role in pushing forward European integration, see Matthias Kipping, ‘André Philip et les origines de l’Union européenne’, in Chevandier & Morin, André Philip: socialiste, patriote, chrétien.
\textsuperscript{21} MSEUE, 4. 5\textsuperscript{o} congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. S. Constant, ‘Vers une gauche européenne’, 13.
triumph of socialism globally. Both as a Europeanist and socialist organisation, then, the MSEUE aimed to put itself out of business. That is to say that its sights were set on a world order in which socialism, having been established, no longer needed to be fought for, and Europe would as such be transcended so that it would signify nothing more than a geographical label. In the meantime, the MSEUE did not shy away from commending the distinctive attributes of Europe and Europeans, above and beyond the Europe that they hoped to push forward in terms of political institutions. In a preparatory document for the June 1947 Montrouge conference, the movement’s Committee for Study and Action stated that until the start of the twentieth century Europe was ‘le coeur et la tête du monde.’ This attractive mix of the Hellenic, Latin, and Christian civilisations of the Mediterranean had made Europe the prime mover in the world – economically, socially, and politically. Europeans were further singularly praised as ‘cultivés, actifs, ambitieux, techniquement expérimentés.’

These kinds of claims can be understood as an admission of the indelibly cultural element of politics. Contingent political arrangements, including those for European integration, are not particularly inspiring, however impeccably rational they are claimed to be. Popular legitimacy must rest on something more than this, and as such political Europeanism immediately reveals its needs for culture, an idea of European commonality or identity to which different European peoples can sign up to. There is a certain overlap here with the notion, most systematically set out by Antonio Gramsci, that political hegemony can never be secured without appealing to the affections of those subject to it; leadership is, after all, much more about consent than...
domination. It is in this sense that one can understand the common deliberate conflation of ‘Europe’ and European political integration.

Even if the apocalypse of a self-combusting capitalism was no longer on the cards, the threat of Communism led the movement to emphasise that the European project was not simply about building a desirable future, but also about averting a detestable present. As Philip put it, ‘En réalité, le choix n’est pas entre l’unification de l’Europe et le statu quo. Nous sommes dans un état de dégradation permanente et accélérée qui nous conduira rapidement au seul choix clair: unification européenne ou triomphe du communisme. Il ne s’agit pas, comme nous le reprochent certains, de faire un saut dans l’inconnu, mais bien un saut hors du trop connu dont nous savons par avance à quelle catastrophe il nous conduira.’

The MSEUE’s pragmatic line, as endorsed notably in the movement’s commission for the study of constitutional texts in Paris in December 1952, was not only shaped by competing Europeanist movements, but also by popular opinion. This was evident in its function as a Europeanising rather than a European movement. The point of this distinction is to illustrate that it tended not to consider that a significant and developed Europeanist sentiment simply lay amongst the popular masses, dormant or not, awaiting political expression. This was so either in the sense of subscribing to pragmatic political European integration, or in the more abstract sense of believing in an integral coherent Europe whose peoples’ histories and lives were obviously linked, or should be linked. Hence the French section of the movement highlighted the need to ‘dégager une conscience socialiste européenne.’

26 MSEUE, 6. 5° congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. ‘Résolutions votées par le congrès national français’, 3.
MSEUE delegates acknowledged that the various European peoples needed to be inculcated with a sense of the necessity of transcending national divisions. In setting out his view of the necessary path for European integration, Sébastien Constant remarked without illusions at the 1954 Milan congress, ‘Pour cela, il est vrai, il faudrait une mesure d’esprit de solidarité, un esprit européen qui pour le moment n’existe pas encore.’\textsuperscript{27} In this sense, the MSEUE meets Robert Frank’s specific definition of European consciousness and commitment – a sense of the vital necessity of making Europe.\textsuperscript{28}

If Europe was not merely desirable but necessary, the MSEUE was nonetheless prepared to compromise within certain limits, as we will see below, with precisely those forces that were perceived to endanger it: capitalism and nationalism. This was a concession to popular ideology, a reminder that Europeanisation as a top-down technocratic affair – a concern voiced in the resolution of French national congress in 1952 – was never unmediated in the contest for political hegemony.\textsuperscript{29}

Having laid out the trajectory of the movement, what were its core theoretical tenets? In his survey of post-war European movements, Domenach noted that Communism and Marxism were commonly conflated as a single antithetical Other of Europe.\textsuperscript{30} If the MSEUE avoided the most polemical varieties of this rhetoric, it was nonetheless true that Marxism was not invoked with enthusiasm, at least after 1948.\textsuperscript{31} Like most European social-democratic organisations, attitudes on the subject were ambivalent, a point that might seem trivial, but is nonetheless

\textsuperscript{27} MSEUE, 14. 7\textsuperscript{e} congrès, Milan. 9-11 juillet 1954. Sébastien Constant, ‘Les tâches permanentes et pressantes du M.S.’, 15.
\textsuperscript{28} Frank, ‘Les contretemps de l’aventure européenne’, 84.
\textsuperscript{29} MSEUE, 6. 5\textsuperscript{e} congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. ‘Résolutions votées par le congrès national français’, 3; Neal Ascherson, ‘Memories of Amikejo,’ \textit{London Review of Books} 34/6 (22 March, 2012). \url{http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n06/neal-acherson/memories-of-amikejo}
\textsuperscript{30} Domenach, ‘Quelle Europe ?’, 647.
noteworthy given the common historiographical narrative of a facile division in European socialism of revolutionary Marxism pitted against reformist social democracy.\textsuperscript{32}

The MSEUE’s theory correlates closely to Donald Sassoon’s argument that post-war social democratic movements tended to pride themselves on pragmatism. At the 1952 conference in Frankfurt, Henri Brugmans remarked that socialism was not defined by a homogeneous sociological doctrine, but that since the victory of Marx over Proudhon ended in the victory of the former within socialism broadly conceived, ‘des catastrophes devenaient inévitables.’ Unfortunately, international social democracy had abandoned Marx without returning to Proudhon and without finding anything better: ‘crise doctrinale, par conséquent.’\textsuperscript{33}

Yet, the paucity of the MSEUE’s theoretical repertoire did not imply that it was uninterested in the themes that preoccupied contemporary European theorists. Technology in particular was a point of reference for the movement. The fears that the movement expressed about the power of technology to subjugate man were compatible with the contemporary arguments of the Frankfurt School about the dialectic of Enlightenment. In Montrouge in 1947, for instance, it was noted that, ‘Les conquêtes de la science et de la technique offrent à l’homme la possibilité de s’émanciper de l’esclavage économique et social. Mais, en même temps, la centralisation économique et politique nécessaire pour organiser ces conquêtes menace de substituer à la vieille domination une nouvelle forme d’oppression l’État totalitaire.’\textsuperscript{34} This is suggestive indeed of Adorno and Horkheimer’s thesis that the Enlightenment principle of man’s domination over nature dialectically rebounds, so that men come to be considered objects among other objects to be instrumentalised.

\textsuperscript{33} MSEUE 5. 5\textdegree congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. Henri Brugmans,’Quelle sera la gauche européenne ?’, 2.
\textsuperscript{34} MSEUE, 1. Dossier sur la Deuxième Conférence/le Premier Congrès, Paris -Montrouge. 21-22 juin. Documents pour la Conférence, 20.
The parallel did not run very deep, however. The MSEUE was soon characterised more by a rehabilitated, albeit attenuated, adherence to the notion of progress. Its aspirations were seen to be achievable gradually within the European status quo – an outlook derived in large part from confidence in the development of technology, including atomic power. Philip, for one, placed his faith in technological revolution to deliver a peaceful Europe. Elsewhere at the 1947 Montrouge conference, atomic energy (along with the colonies) was cited as the very condition of possibility for Europe. This is an important point, since there is perhaps a tendency to overestimate the extent of the state of disrepair of the belief in progress as a core and constitutive feature of Europe in the post-war period. We will return to this point below in an examination of the movement’s understanding of Europe in relation to capitalism, and to European colonial territories and the Third World generally.

For all these convergences between the movement and other European social democratic parties and organisations in relation to the concepts of both socialism and Europe, there were still important divergences. This was apparent in the expression of two constant priorities for the movement – equilibrium and equality.

The MSEUE and Equilibrium

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The recurring emphasis on equilibrium as a guiding principle and aim derived to a certain extent from currents of social Christianity in the MSEUE.\(^{37}\) This was especially important to Philip, who, though a Protestant, was also influenced by the left Catholic Personalism of Emmanuel Mounier.\(^{38}\) In their discussion of Philip, Robert Frank and François-Xavier Lafféach assert that, ‘à ses yeux, le christianisme est le fondement principal de l’identité européenne.’\(^{39}\) His understanding of Christianity in turn presupposed a balance between the real and the ideal. For him, equilibrium was ‘une notion typiquement européenne’, and an equilibrium of elements was a preferable outcome to a dialectical synthesis. As Philip himself explained, ‘Pour moi, la définition de l’Europe, c’est l’antinomie de la culture, c’est l’acceptation, dans l’âme même de la valeur, d’une contradiction… qui oblige à chaque instant à établir entre les forces contradictoires des équilibres, à inventer des compromis qui ne sont jamais que des compromis passagers.’\(^{40}\)

Equilibrium might have been a particularly European characteristic, but it was also a particularity of Europe that in this period it was particularly difficult to achieve; such was the implication of Gironella’s report on the 1952 Frankfurt conference:


\(^{37}\) On the MSEUE’s deliberations about the relationship between religion and socialism, see MSEUE, 2. ‘Rapport de la deuxième conférence international pour les états unis d’Europe, Paris - 21 et 22 Juin, 1947’, 33; MSEUE, 4. 5\(^{e}\) congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. S. Constant, ‘Vers une gauche européenne’, 5-7; MSEUE, 4. 5\(^{e}\) congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. ‘Commentaire sur le rapport Constant’, 2.

\(^{38}\) Mounier himself was an attendee at the 1947 Montroûge conference.


\(^{40}\) Cited in ibid., 406.

This section will now attempt to discern the contours of the problem of achieving equilibrium in such a multifaceted actuality, by examining three prominent motifs in the discourse of the MSEUE, which of course interacted and overlapped in various ways: capitalism, the nation (including nationalism and the institution of the nation state), and the global system of the two blocs.

Capitalism, Europe, and Equilibrium

In its formative period, the movement subscribed to the general European consensus famously described by A.J.P. Taylor in November 1945: ‘Nobody in Europe believes in the American way of life – that is, in private enterprise; or rather those who believe in it are a defeated party and a party which seems to have no more future than the Jacobites in England after 1688.’ Indeed, as Sassoon points out, between 1945 and 1950 no pro-capitalist liberal party succeeded in becoming the main party of government anywhere in Europe. As such, it is unsurprising that the movement particularly emphasised anti-capitalism in the period before its change of name and direction. Its first congress in Montrouge in 1947 highlighted the propensity of capitalism to crisis, and capitalist class relations were criticised as divisive, not merely hierarchical. In this conception, trusts were inherently detrimental to the European peoples.

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42 Cited in Maier, ‘The Two Postwar Eras’, 327.  
Mistrust of capitalism endured in the movement, though it was tempered by the reassurances of the Keynesianism that had filled the European ideological void left by pre-war capitalism. The 1949 conference in Paris insisted on the threat of cyclical economic crises, and of course of unemployment. At the February 1952 conference in Frankfurt, capitalist anarchy was mentioned in the same breath as totalitarianism as an adversary of Europe. ‘Boom and bust’ was noted as a concern at the 1953 conference at Liège, and it was notably suggested that harmonisation was a contradiction in a capitalist society. At the Milan 1954 conference, Stalinist totalitarianism and capitalist oppression were again mentioned together as dangers to Europe. At the Montrouge conference in 1947 it was proposed that, ‘we are in the presence of a new phenomenon of a capitalism incapable of living. This phenomenon is precisely the relation between a capitalism which has become more and more powerless and a socialist government which has not been able to conquer power.’ One is reminded here of Gramsci’s well-known aphorism: ‘the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.’ Gramsci, of course, was talking about the interwar period, and Charles Maier argues that, although in the period immediately following the Second World War it was considered likely that the two post-war

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45 Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 140-141.
46 MSEUE, 3. 3\textsuperscript{e} congrès Paris. 5-7 novembre 1949. Bulletin de discussion, Juillet 1949, Numéro 1, 11.
47 MSEUE, 6. 5\textsuperscript{e} congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. Résolution votée par le congrès national belge du mouvement socialiste pour les états-unis d’Europe, le 13 octobre 1951, 2.
periods would resemble each other, in fact the remarkable feature of the second was the emergence of stability.\textsuperscript{51}

It was this stability which underlay the MSEUE’s avowed pragmatism. Capitalism for the MSEUE was, as it were, on constant probation having disgraced itself in Europe. Though to some degree it would always be suspect, it was provisionally acceptable if it delivered the equilibrium without which Europe could not survive, let alone flourish. While it sustained a satisfactory level of prosperity and stability, the strongest indictments of capitalism – that its relations of production were constitutively unjust and exploitative – could be shelved. Philip notably took the view that ownership had become unimportant, and that the fundamental problem of socialism was the distribution of power between social groups.\textsuperscript{52} The MSEUE largely signed up to the European social democratic consensus that emerged in the 1950s, as described by Sassoon: ‘The new revisionism tried to find a way out of the impasse between a tradition which appeared to have come to a standstill (socialism) and a thriving reality (the popularity of capitalism); it did not seek to establish a rigorous doctrine but, rather, gloried in pragmatism.’\textsuperscript{53}

As mentioned above, the MSEUE had to fashion its advocacy of Europe with one eye on this ideological position of the popular masses to which it appealed. Sassoon further argues that this European socialist revisionism entailed a drastic rethinking of the generally held socialist position immediately after the Second World War. Namely, capitalism would not possibly recover, could not possibly deliver constant growth. Renewed expectations about the capacities of capitalism and the regeneration of the ideology of progress went hand in hand. Indeed, Sassoon goes as far to say that in the 1950s ‘this belief translated into an overwhelming

\textsuperscript{52} Sassoon, \textit{One Hundred Years of Socialism}, 247. It should be noted that Philip was speaking here as a member of the SFIO rather than in the context of the deliberations of the MSEUE.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 244.
consensus, especially among economists.’ He qualifies this, though, by pointing out that for socialists, a belief in perpetual capitalist growth did not at all necessarily mean progress, and indeed could well facilitate barbarism.\(^{54}\) The MSEUE did not align itself with that pessimistic prognosis, even if its ranks were not filled by full-blooded apologists for a vision of history inexorably on the up. Much closer to its general tenor was Philip’s contention that ‘la révolution technique et sociale… assurera seule le salut de l’Europe et la paix.’\(^{55}\) Walter Benjamin’s excoriation of the social democratic and socialist belief in progress in the pages of *Les Temps modernes* in 1947 had little currency in this milieu.\(^{56}\)

Equilibrium, Europe, and the Nation

Nationalism was a culture which the MSEUE generally held in disregard, though perhaps it was with one eye on the popularity of the doctrine that the movement sometimes drew back from condemning it forthrightly in its discourse about Europeanisation. For the movement had to contest hegemony in the broader field of left-wing politics, which in France included a powerful Communist party. Indeed, as late as the European Defence Community (EDC) debates of 1954 it was ‘le premier parti politique français.’\(^{57}\) In December 1955, a month before forming and leading the French government, Guy Mollet quipped that ‘French Communists are not Left, they are East.’\(^{58}\) In doing so, he exemplified the common accusation that the PCF was in effect a foreign, Russian outfit. But it was in fact decidedly nationalistic, and this could not be ignored,

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\(^{54}\) Ibid., 245-246.


\(^{57}\) Philippe Buton, ‘La CED, l’Affaire Dreyfus de la Quatrième République ?’, *Vingtième siécle. Revue d’histoire* 84 (October-December, 2004), 44.

perhaps all the more so as the MSEUE would make no concessions to the Communists’ virulent condemnations of contemporary European political integration. Interestingly, the PCF deputy for Paris, Georges Cogniot, urged a continuation of popular resistance to the EDC in subsequent plans for European integration. In referring to contemporary political integration, Cogniot constantly used quote marks to refer to ‘Europe’ and ‘European’, thereby disputing that there was anything natural about these concepts. Instead, this ‘Europe’ was solely a reification of a contingent arrangement between a few states dominated by Germany and the United States in the interest of capital.\(^59\)

Perhaps it was in the context of the peak of the PCF’s power in 1947 that it was noted at the Montrouge congress of that year that ‘internationalism is not anti-nationalism’, and the analogy was made that, in terms of the guarantee of security and liberty, Europe was to the nation what socialism was to man.\(^60\) Likewise, the Provisional Committee from the Montrouge conference held that,

Internationalism has nothing in common with anti-nationalism. One cannot ignore or minimize the concrete forms of national cultures and traditions. One of the great riches of Europe is the immense diversity of national characteristics. Without national autonomy, other liberties signify little. This liberty, threatened today from all sides, will find its greatest safeguard in a voluntary European federation. Human liberties can only be established and safeguarded by a libertarian and democratic socialist society.\(^61\)

Sometimes the doctrine of nationalism was condemned quite frankly. Logically enough, given that the movement intended to be supra-national rather than international. This was less a matter of preference than necessity: ‘si le Malthusianisme nationaliste l’emporte, c’est la FIN DE


l'EUROPE’, whilst a socialism whose roots were dug in national soil would be one of austerity rather than abundance. Constant portrayed the choice between nationalism and Europeanism in starkly competitive terms at the 1952 Frankfurt conference; if Europe were to succeed, it had to make a clean break with sclerotic national traditions and ways of thinking – ‘l’Europe ne continue pas – elle commence.’ Though it was occasionally repeated that various kinds of Europe were possible, the possibility of a continent based on nationalism was dismissed at the Second Congress at Puteaux in 1948. Henri Brugmans, for instance reported that ‘as a matter of principle, the alternative between a Churchillian and a socialist Europe was a false one: it was a question of European concentration versus the perpetuation of nationalist chaos.’ A January 1952 resolution of the Belgian section of the MSEUE pledged to fight against nationalism in all its forms. Even as late as 1954, when the institutional foundations of European integration had been laid, the risks of a nationalist ‘solution de repli’ were still highlighted.

The MSEUE did not simply hold that socialism had to contend with nationalism, but that socialism was itself impoverished by its confinement to the national level. As such, Philip remarked cynically in 1952 that, ‘la seule nationalisation que nous autres socialistes ayons réussi complètement à réaliser a été la nationalisation des partis socialistes.’ Though he differed from him in every other respect, Philip in effect fully endorsed Trotsky’s repudiation of the prospect of establishing socialism in one country. Socialism in Europe would be on a European scale, or

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65 MSEUE, 6. 5e congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. ‘Résolution votée par le congrès national belge’, 1.
not at all. Accordingly, the MSEUE condemned national socialist parties that would not think beyond the limits of their national political constituency. The British Labour party came under particularly heavy fire, unconvinced as it was of a need to forge links with Europe and the continental socialists. At various times the SFIO was also criticised for national myopia – a rather embarrassing point of tension, given the MSEUE’s base in Paris, perhaps all the more so because the SFIO executive had thrown its weight officially behind the MSEUE at the time of its change of name and reconfiguration. In his contribution to the Milan conference in 1954, Raymond Rifflet, for example, regretted the French chauvinism that led to disasters like Dien Bien Phu. He contrasted the frustratingly chauvinistic French concern with its own ‘grandeur’ with the internationally endorsed, sensible Europeanism of Frenchmen like Philip, Jacquet, Schuman, and Teitgen. Indeed, he lamented ‘une détérioration graduelle de l’idée européenne en France’, which he did not see being reversed any time soon. In this regard, Rifflet was particularly vexed about French intransigence over the EDC. In any case, it was a reminder that if Paris offered many advantages as a Europeanising space, its pivotal place within a proud French national and nationalistic culture also presented distinct limitations.

The nation state itself was also seen as an inherent source of disequilibrium for the new Europe. One of the key points made at the 1947 Montrouge conference was that history had supplanted the era of the nation state: ‘The outworn principle of national sovereignty’ was

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72 MSEUE, 15. Rapport par Raymond Rifflet sur le mouvement belge, 8, 6. Underlining in the original.
condemned as a generator of hatred, misery and war.\textsuperscript{73} It was a transitory phenomenon, and thankfully so.\textsuperscript{74} Quite apart from its dubious moral fabric, national sovereignty was deemed obsolete in this new atomic era.\textsuperscript{75} More generally, the emerging world system dominated by ‘continent-states’ rendered political and economic solutions on the national level at best ineffectual or delusional. At worst, national approaches would only exacerbate the propensity of that system to generate war. As such, at the 1952 Frankfurt conference it was argued that socialists must at all costs oppose the reconstitution of European national armies.\textsuperscript{76}

Its antipathy towards the nation state underpinned several of the MSEUE’s concrete policies. The allocation of Marshall Plan funds on a national basis was seen as fundamentally shortsighted, for instance.\textsuperscript{77} But the most pressing concern about the inadequacies of the nation state and the threat of nationalism was in relation to Germany, whose militarism was naturally seen as catastrophic for any measure of European equilibrium. One should not underestimate the extent of Germanophobia amongst Parisians at this time. Reflecting on the Six Power conference in London in the summer of 1948, Janet Flanner suggested that upon talk of a united Germany, ‘Parisians can hear, like an echo of the rhythm of the Nazi feet along the Champs-Elysées. No sooner was the Six-Power London accord announced than the Communists plastered the boulevards with a Party poster… l’Allemagne d’abord? Non!’\textsuperscript{78} Conversely, Philippe Buton

\textsuperscript{73} MSEUE, 1. Dossier sur la Deuxième Conférence/le Premier Congrès, Paris -Montrouge. 21-22 juin. Documents pour la Conférence, 67.
\textsuperscript{74} MSEUE, 7. 5\textsuperscript{e} congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. Commission A sur les principes d’un socialisme européen. Projet de résolution.
\textsuperscript{75} MSEUE, 1. Dossier sur la Deuxième Conférence/le Premier Congrès, Paris -Montrouge. 21-22 juin. Documents pour la Conférence, 41. Interestingly, Maurice Papon made this same argument from a very different political position. Part of his plea for European unity lay on the conviction that the national unit made little sense in international relations in the age of the atomic bomb. See Maurice Papon, ‘Perspective géopolitiques: Destin de l’Europe’, http://www.maurice-papon.net/doc-alg/europe.pdf.
\textsuperscript{76} MSEUE, 6. 5\textsuperscript{e} congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. ‘Résolution votée par le congrès national belge’, 3.
\textsuperscript{77} MSEUE, 13. 7\textsuperscript{e} congrès, Milan. 9-11 juillet 1954. André Philip, ‘Pour une politique d’unification économique’, 10.
\textsuperscript{78} Flanner, Paris Journal, 88.
points to Germanophobia as a prominent reason for support of the EDC.\textsuperscript{79} Germanophobia, then, was the common currency of partisans and opponents of European political integration alike.

Germany was of course always necessarily a point of reference for the MSEUE, just as for other Europeanist movements, in that they were formed by the experience of the Second World War. Germany’s comportment in the war also inevitably weighed on discourse about Europe thereafter, as indicated by the peremptory remark of former Communist minister François Billoux in the first parliamentary debate on the European Defence Community: ‘L’Europe, c’est une idée de Hitler.’\textsuperscript{80}

For the MSEUE specifically, Germany remained a central concern even after the abandonment of any hope of a federal pact of like-minded countries after the disappointments in 1950. For, the ‘functional’ partial organisations that the MSEUE focused on encouraging thereafter, notably the ECSC and the EDC, necessitated no less the focusing of attention on the German problem.\textsuperscript{81} We have already noted how the MSEUE made a point of advertising the extent of its commitment to the landmark agreements of European integration, as well as its role in bringing them about. Its advocacy in this regard often ran up against a significant body of Parisian and French opinion, including that of the French left. A particularly striking example was the EDC issue, described by Raymond Aron and others as the Dreyfus Affair of the Fourth Republic on account of the rancour it incurred on all sides.\textsuperscript{82}

At the inaugural Congress in Montrouge in June 1947, a lengthy appeal to the German people was issued in addition to a general resolution. In a reiteration of the organisation’s commitment to integrate Germany with Europe on the basis of respect and equality, it warned

\textsuperscript{79} See Buton, ‘La CED, l’Affaire Dreyfus de la Quatrième République ?’, 53-54.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{82} Cited in Buton, ‘La CED, l’Affaire Dreyfus de la Quatrième République ?’, 43.
that it was Germany that was most at danger in the emerging Cold War world of two blocs. Indeed, it was noted elsewhere that Soviet policy was precisely about tearing Germany away from Europe.\textsuperscript{83} While insisting on the ultimate responsibility of the German people, the statement at Montrouge also conceded that the interwar policy of the Western democracies had pushed Germany in the direction of Nazism. Furthermore, it warned the German people ‘against the mentality and the methods which during twelve years of the Hitlerian régime penetrated deeply into large sections of German opinion.’\textsuperscript{84} The MSEUE here in effect suggested the necessity for the German people of a crash refresher course of Europeanisation – the more intensive the better. Here again, the movement made a rare but revealing allusion to the need for European political institutions to rest on a popular sense of Europeanness which, crucially and contrary to much Europeanist rhetoric, they did not necessarily imply.

Germans of course contributed amply to the MSEUE, both as individual members from 1947, and in the framework of a national section from 1950.\textsuperscript{85} As such, they joined the movement’s consensus that conquered Germany must be integrated promptly in a supranational European community of states on the basis of equal rights.\textsuperscript{86} This was not a matter of indulgence, but rather a belief in the impossibility of the unification of Europe without Germany. This unification would be even further impeded if retributive policies such as dismantling German factories were implemented. These could only serve to intensify nationalist opinion, already exacerbated by the nation’s defeat. It was imperative that policy not be led astray from the requirement that a democratic Germany be integrated in the European Community, followed by a

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 279.
waiver of part of her sovereignty. In sum, it was not merely preferable but necessary that Germany be included in Europe. Germany would be Europeanised or there would be no Europe to promulgate in the first place.

Equilibrium, Europe, and the Superpowers

The concept of equilibrium was also fundamental for the MSEUE with regard to the Cold War confrontation between the USA and USSR. The two superpowers were important to the movement in another sense as well. It was admitted at the 1947 Montrouge conference that the victors of the Second World War had of course been from outside Western Europe. This was significant since it tied into generally held fears about what this implied for Europe’s place in the new post-war world. The MSEUE was no less afflicted with the common worry about Europe’s loss of control of its own destiny. Sartre expressed this powerfully in the same year as the MSEUE was founded. In What is Literature?, he argued that the European proletariat and bourgeoisie were equally disenfranchised of control over their destinies, that ‘Europe is conquered and ruined; she is no longer master of her destiny; and that is the reason why her ideas can no longer make their way.’ Moreover, ‘The present situation, revolutionary by virtue of the fact that it is unbearable, remains in a state of stagnation because men have dispossessed themselves of their own destiny; Europe is abdicating before the future conflict and seeks less to

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prevent it than to range itself in advance in the camp of the conquerors. As a further illustration of this generalised preoccupation, in her Paris diary entry for 1 October 1946, Janet Flanner wrote that:

The new balance of power in Europe is now being balanced by a couple of powers that are not European – Russia and the United States... Because of sheer size, they have become the world’s bosses. They have set up the chimera of absenteeism as the new order for Europeans, some of whom may be the most civilized creatures on earth but all of whom are now reduced to sitting quiet and worried in their cities or on their land and nodding like yes men to a pair of enormous, newly grown up outsiders. Europe has lost the right to maintain her own power balance because no sooner had it been reestablished by peace, after one war, than uncontrolled Germany upset it and the world by rushing us all into battle again... The earth’s surface is changing. Europe is contracting; the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. areas of influence are expanding. It is as if Europe were slowly entering a new ice age.

How did the MSEUE propose to deal with this predicament? In the first instance, the constraints that this represented for a European movement were recognised without illusions. Ultimately neither power was prepared to ‘visualize any European organization apart from their influence. And yet it is evident that no hope remains for the present generation of Europeans apart from a federated socialist Europe.’ If the movement’s socialism was to be attenuated by political European integration, this political Europe in turn was to be attenuated by the exigencies of the Cold War.

Within this conjuncture, the Europe for which the MSEUE strove would be a force for counterpoise, both doctrinally and in terms of mitigating the practical dangers of international politics. The former since the MSEUE’s vision of Europe was demarcated from the blocs by a

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90 Ibid., 224-25.
commitment to both liberty and socialism. The latter because a cohesive and purposeful Europe could alone be a counteracting force against the drift to a new world war that was inherent in the status quo. A related fear in terms of maintaining equilibrium was that Europe would be colonised by either bloc if it failed to integrate itself, the battleground of a third world war, or left simmering as an atomic wasteland.

Occasionally, the case was made that Europe could be more than merely a maintainer of an uneasy status quo and an upholder of peace, that it could actually guide the Cold War world system towards a more satisfactory new form of human civilisation. But given Europe’s recent history and the ongoing tension in international affairs, projections of a pacified future were usually overshadowed by the pressing concern of warding off a renewal of catastrophic armed conflict. So, even in 1954, when one might think that attitudes might be cooler and more sober after the paranoia of the early Cold War and the death of Stalin, fear was still invoked as a fundamental point of European commonality. At the 1954 Milan conference, Sébastien Constant remarked that,

la masse des Européens (qui ne se dit pas “Européens” de quelque manière) est dominé par la peur. L’Europe subit les peurs et les espérances, réelles ou imaginaires que lui inspirent les fluctuations de la tension internationale. L’idée et l’action européennes en suivent les hauts et les bas, la placidité suit l’affolement; à moins que les peurs contradictoires ne se neutralisent pour se concrétiser dans un naturalisme et méprisant des réalités.

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To borrow Sartre’s term, Constant’s remarks here suggest a European ‘seriality’. There is a bond between these Europeans – albeit a negative one – so that it is not invalid to talk of a category of Europeans in the first place. But these Europeans do not intentionally conceive of themselves as Europeans in any relationship of reciprocity, but are thrown together, or ‘serialised’, by a sense of external pressure or danger. Interestingly, Wakeman cites European integration alongside the Cold War and decolonisation as a source of post-war fears and uncertainties in Paris.

If this fear of catastrophe was not to be confirmed, Europe was irreplaceable in securing the equilibrium that was precluded by the almost constitutive antagonism between the two blocs – their deference to Franco’s Spain being an exceptional point of consensus guided by cynical power politics, and roundly condemned as such by the MSEUE. The movement made an important point of stressing that it was not a rampart between the two blocs, but something more like a bridge. Wilhelm von Humboldt made the case in 1821 that, ‘Where two beings are separated by a total gap, no bridge of understanding extends from one to the other; in order to understand one another, they must have in another sense, already understood each other.’ To connect to the questions of availability and intelligibility that are identified as vital to Jacques Berque’s sense of Europe (see chapter 7), Europe was in this instance the precondition of mutual translatability of the USSR and the USA. The danger of the analogy was that it could easily be appropriated by the kind of Manichean rhetoric of Cold Warriors, hectoring about eternally

100 Ibid., 139. Likewise, Europe was described as ‘non pas un rempart mais un trait d’union entre les deux puissances.’ See MSEUE, 1. Dossier sur la Deuxième Conférence/le Premier Congrès, Paris -Montrouge. 21-22 juin. Documents pour la Conférence, 21.
conflicting and irreconcilable foes, especially if Europe was dismissed by them as irrelevant. This kind of secular religious world view and its attendant reckless politics were thus an important source of the fear common to Europeans that we identified above. In this regard, the bellicosity of figures like General MacArthur was contrasted to the kind of conflict mediation Europe was compelled to undertake.  

The priority of equilibrium of course did not imply that the MSEUE’s prescribed Europe stood equidistant from the two superpowers. 1947 was a key year in the escalation of the Cold War, and this was reflected at the conference in Montrouge in June. It was asserted that there could be no neutrality between the two blocs and a retreat to a national position was equally impossible.  

The movement, then, endorsed Sartre’s maxim that one was necessarily situated and must choose, but also inferred that his choice for a truly neutral socialist Europe between the two blocs, as represented by the Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire (RDR), was not a valid option.  

The MSEUE’s preference for the United States, however, did not at all imply wholehearted deference to its hegemony or an enthusiasm for its society. Besides distaste for what was perceived as its vulgar capitalist essence, the movement made clear that it had no illusions about its imperialism.  

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102 MSEUE, 5. 5e congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. Gérard Jacquet, ‘Rapport sur quelques problèmes d’actualité’, 2. Incidentally, if the Soviet Union was considered by the French public to be the greater danger, 36% of respondents to a July 1954 poll still considered the United States a danger for peace. Buton, ‘La CED, l’Affaire Dreyfus de la Quatrième République ?’, 52.  


adamant that a European army must be properly European, and not subordinated to the United States within a putative Atlantic coalition.106 This connected to broader questions about the nature of the Europe that the movement was working for. Anticipating de Gaulle’s quandary a decade later, the MSEUE consistently raised the question of whether Europe was developing into a European Europe or an Atlanticist Europe. Which was another way of asking whether the United States was a negation of Europe, or the condition of it. The balance of opinion within the movement considered that Atlantic solidarity and European independence were not necessarily antithetical. At the same conference, Philip argued that,

L’Europe ne se fera qu’avec l’aide et sous la pression américaine, une Europe neutraliste ne se ferait jamais. Le socialisme doit donc accepter la coalition atlantique avec le capitalisme progressiste américain, tout en luttant d’une part avec les syndicats des E.U. pour renforcer l’influence ouvrière général dans la coalition, d’autre part entre nous, pour créer rapidement une force Européenne capable de réaliser avec les E.U. une coalition égalitaire.107

The enslavement of Eastern European countries, on the other hand, only confirmed that the Soviet Union could not contribute to Europe, that it could only use it.108 This Soviet repression was condemned in unambiguous terms. A caption in the June 1954 Gauche européenne for example read: ‘Juin 1953: L’Armée rouge tire contre nos camarades, les ouvriers libres de Berlin-Est. Juin 1954: Nous n’oublierons jamais.’109 The Soviet threat, it was noted,

106 MSEUE, 6. 5e congrès européen du MSEUE, Frankfurt am Main. 15-17 février 1952. ‘Résolutions votées par le congrès national français’, 1-2; ‘Résolution votée par le congrès national belge’, 3.
contributed in no small measure to the Europeanisation of public opinion.\textsuperscript{110} But this did not translate into a general readiness for the movement to be used as a tool against Russia.\textsuperscript{111}

There was also a sort of retroactive endorsement of the essential Europeanness of Eastern Europe. The inclusion of the suggestion in the official report of Montrouge that its states were ‘half European, half Asiatic’ was as such an anomaly.\textsuperscript{112} Much more indicative of the MSEUE’s general position on this issue was the fundamental rejection of the system of blocs as a point of principle. For it separated the countries to the east of the iron curtain and west of Russia ‘from the natural community of which they form part, namely Europe.’ Furthermore, with reference to the Soviet-held eastern bloc countries, ‘Europe, unless it desires to acquiesce in its own division, is inconceivable without the totality of the peoples which have constituted its historical community.’\textsuperscript{113}

The MSEUE and Equality

The other key motif in the discourse of the MSEUE was equality, a value that it understood as a core precept for European political integration and the appropriate yardstick of Europe’s relations with the world. Accordingly, in 1954 it was reiterated that it was no coincidence that the privileged and the PCF – groups which supposedly mirrored each other in upholding inequality and elitism – were set against European political integration.\textsuperscript{114} The two

\textsuperscript{111} MSEUE, 1. Dossier sur la Deuxième Conférence/le Premier Congrès, Paris -Montrouge. 21-22 juin. Documents pour la Conférence, 35.
\textsuperscript{112} MSEUE, 2. ‘Rapport de la deuxième conférence international pour les états unis d’Europe, Paris - 21 et 22 Juin, 1947’, 67.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid. 65.
most prominent instances of the application of the notion of equality in relation to Europe are examined in this section: equality and rights, and equality and colonialism.

Europe, Equality, and Rights

From its conference in Montrouge in 1947, the movement appealed to The Rights of Man as the common heritage of the West. Furthermore, delegates stipulated the need for ‘a charter of common rights of citizens and of the European peoples.’ This would guarantee national freedoms, and individual freedoms of expression, of meeting, of press, and of religion. What is more, the third congress of the MSEUE in Paris in 1949, passed a resolution on citizenship stating that,

The establishing of a double citizenship, national and European, imposes itself immediately on the constitution of the European Authority both from a juridical and moral point of view.

In order to demonstrate clearly the solidarity of the European peoples and to give to the refugees from the totalitarian countries of Europe a legal status, it is decided that European citizenship will be conferred upon them. This will be a clear proof to the popular masses that a decisive step has been taken towards European federation.

This was certainly an imaginative and proactive plan to tackle the pressing problem of refugees in post-war Europe. Hannah Arendt, of course, noted that refugees were treated as if they carried ‘the germs of a deadly sickness’, since their mere existence threatened the authority of nation states. The question arises, then, whether this constitutional proposal to include East

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118 See also Henri Cartier-Bresson’s reference to the issue of European refugees in chapter 8.
European refugees was adequate to counteract such ingrained negative predispositions to uprooted peoples. On the contrary, it could be argued that the endowment of European citizenship to these refugees might have inscribed a two-tier Europeanness; given the importance often placed on the nation state and nationalism as quintessentially European institutions, those endowed with this special European citizenship could ironically be considered less European than holders of European national citizenships.

The question becomes even more complicated if we take a step back and interrogate both this appeal to the centrality of the Rights of Man and the proposed endowment of European citizenship, particularly with regard to demarcating or grading Europeanness. To be precise, this sense of Europeanisation appears in a stroke as both a means of inclusion and of erecting a border of exclusion. Jacques Rancière argues with reference precisely to appeals to political subjectivity based on the Rights of Man that ‘Political subjects are not definite collectivities. They are surplus names, names that set out a question or a dispute (litige) about who is included in their count.’119 This is to do with Rancière’s concepts of the ‘police order’ and ‘politics’. Police, in his meaning, ‘is not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the social. The essence of the police is neither repression nor even control over the living. Its essence is a certain manner of partitioning the sensible.’ He explains further that,

this partition should be understood in the double sense of the word: on the one hand, that which separates and excludes; on the other, that which allows participation. A partition of the sensible refers to the manner in which a relation between a shared ‘common’ and the distribution of exclusive parts is determined through the sensible. This latter form of distribution, in turn, itself presupposes a partition between what is visible and what is not, of what can be heard from the inaudible.120

119 Jacques Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, The South Atlantic Quarterly 103/2-3 (Spring-Summer, 2004), 303.
What does this imply for the MSEUE’s recommendations for state legislation of Europeanness based on the Rights of Man? Its importance as a discourse lies in structuring the social body in which each ‘European’ has a part in the polity. Excluded from this is a supplement of a non-European ‘part of no-part’, unseen and unheard in the sense that its claims are not so much dismissed as not even registered.

Rancière’s idiosyncratic sense of politics, on the other hand, refers to a contestation of this police order. It indicates the phenomenon where those who are not counted in the social order, or, at most, have a subordinated place in it, demand inclusion as equal speaking beings. In doing so, this part presents itself as ‘the immediate embodiment of society as such, in its universality, against the particular power interests of aristocracy or oligarchy.’ The movement plausibly adumbrated this form of politicisation with regard to Europe in a reference to threatened liberties or oppression of peoples in Berlin, Eastern Europe, in Spain, or in Greece as ‘the vanguard of the new Europe.’ But it had not the slightest inkling of any comparable politicisation of putatively non-European peoples in its base in Paris. This was not because this simply was not a pressing issue. Many groups were impacted upon by either legislated non-European status, or in terms of a lack of recognition, so that they were devalued as either dubiously or less European, or non-European. The movement’s call for the regulation of labour migration flows, for instance, might have been pointed to as an example of the loss of ‘le droit d’asile’ in Europe, which, as we will see in chapter 7, Louis Massignon so lamented. Likewise, it is unclear how the MSEUE would have related to non-white permanent residents of

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Paris, or those like *pied noirs* whose cultural European credentials were seen as ambivalent; far less how it would have gauged the Europeanness of Parisians who belonged to what Stoler terms boundary groups. To take an example from the key year of 1954: repatriates in Paris from Indochina, including Eurasians and Asian Catholics.\(^\text{124}\)

Europe, Equality, and Colonialism

The most immediate sense in which the MSEUE was concerned with colonisation was its anxiety about being colonised by either the USSR or the USA, which at some level in turn necessarily called into question European colonialism.\(^\text{125}\) There is arguably a trace of such a sentiment in a declaration submitted to the 1947 Montrouge conference: ‘This second conference of the U.S.S.E. expresses its complete solidarity with all peoples who are struggling for their independence, for genuine democracy and European unity.’\(^\text{126}\) Perhaps the last part of the statement indicated that it was uttered with the Eastern bloc in mind, but it also hints at the question of the appropriate relation between Europe and the third world. The same goes for the remarks of the *Comité d’étude et d’action pour les états-unis socialistes d’Europe* in a May 1947 communiqué: ‘nous ne voulons pas d’une Europe colonisée par un bloc ou un autre, que ce soit sous la forme d’une Europe passive et asservie ou sous celle d’une Europe militarisée et casquée au service de l’un des deux impérialismes.’\(^\text{127}\) One should not overstate the extent to which the question of US or Soviet colonialism stimulated reflection on European colonialism, though,

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\(^{125}\) Étienne Balibar makes precisely this point. Cited in Don Reid, ‘Etienne Balibar: Algeria, Althusser, and Altereuropéanisation’, *South Central Review* 25/3 (Fall, 2008), 68.


given the extent of entrenchment of the ideology of European imperialism. We will return to this point below in an examination of the limits of the MSEUE’s professed vision of equality between Europe and the non-European world.

It was nonetheless the case that European colonialism was critiqued in terms of an underlying normative standard of equality in international affairs. This presumably lay behind the invitation to Montrouge of various political leaders from the non-European world, including Jawaharlal Nehru, George Padmore, and Ferhat Abbas. Nor did the anti-colonial leanings of French figures like Sartre and André Breton in any way dissuade the organisers from extending invitations to them as well.¹²⁸

The movement distanced itself from imperialism and instead advocated cooperation, solidarity or free association with colonial subjects. This was deemed to be a necessary foundation for the properly global scope of socialism. Likewise, delegates spoke in positive terms of the colonised’s right to independence. Colonial intransigence on the part of European powers was conceptualised as myopic nationalism that was in fact detrimental to Europe, rather than a quintessentially European enterprise. As late as June 1954, on the eve of the Algerian war, the movement’s organ, Gauche européenne, reiterated its commitment to ‘la pratique constante d’une politique d’égalité entre la métropole et les territoires et déplacements d’outre-mer, de manière à permettre à ces derniers de participer aux institutions européennes dans la mesure de leurs moyens et de leurs intérêts propres.’¹²⁹ Accordingly, the French section of the movement condemned ‘la politique qui a exclu les pays d’outre-mer de la C.E.C.A. et de la C.E.D. et

demande que le Parlement et le Gouvernement français considèrent en toutes circonstances l’outre-mer comme partie intégrale de la République Française, elle-même intégrée à l’Europe.\footnote{Ibid.} Philip, likewise, identified one of the tasks of the movement as the affirmation of a European policy on relations with these overseas territories.\footnote{MSEUE, 11. 6e congrès, Liège. 29-31 mai 1953. André Philip, ‘Les tâches du MSEUE’.}

Yet, connecting colonies to Europe as a whole rather than to European nation states did not circumvent the fundamental tension at the heart of the European imperial enterprise. Fanon held that once one talked of equality, the colonial settler no longer had any interest in remaining. But the granting of equality also placed strain on the colonial system at the metropolitan end. Frederick Cooper convincingly argues that the crisis of European imperialism arrived precisely in this post-war period when European states were dissuaded by calls for equivalence as much as by those for independence. The inegalitarianism of racism was no longer serviceable, and extending the rights of the European welfare state to colonial subjects was considered unviable.\footnote{See Frederick Cooper, \textit{Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), passim.}

There was a certain presupposition within the MSEUE that its advocacy of equality could be reconciled with a gradual approach to altering European colonial relations. But if equilibrium and equality preoccupied the movement, it was ultimately the former that took priority. This gradualism was increasingly out of tune with the emergent wave of anti-colonialism, as made evident at the June 1948 Puteaux meeting. As Domenach described it,

\begin{quote}
Ce congrès fut marqué par les interventions véhémentes des délégués des peuples colonisés d’Afrique et d’Asie qui reprochèrent aux socialistes de chercher dans la Fédération européenne un moyen de se sauver seuls avec leur bonne conscience. La violence avec laquelle ces envoyés d’Outre-Mer [sic] revendiquèrent leur émancipation nationale déconcerta quelque peu les
\end{quote}
But there is little to suggest such conceptions of colonialism were drastically revised thereafter. In this sense, the judgement of the theoretical paucity of the movement mentioned above might be qualified; for the movement followed closely Comte’s doctrine of progress in order.\(^\text{134}\)

The limitations of the MSEUE’s commitment to equality between Europe and the non-European world were particularly starkly expressed by Guy Mollet. To come back to André Philip’s insistence that any Europe was better than no Europe, it is interesting that Mollet took a rather different tack at the congress of the French national section of the MSEUE in June 1954: ‘nous ne voulons pas de n’importe quelle Europe. Il nous est impossible d’accepter un marché commun qui ne serait pas que l’extension à l’échelle européenne, du “laissez-faire”, principe fondamental d’un libéralisme économique périmé.’\(^\text{135}\) What Mollet certainly did not consider obsolete was the European colonial system, and his conception of the appropriate relationship between Europe and the developing world seemed to cut against the grain of the MSEUE’s rhetoric on equality. Mollet addressed the SFIO in 1950 on the topic of ‘L’heure de l’Europe’, in which he insisted that Europe as a third force must ‘dépasse ses frontières géographiques.’\(^\text{136}\) Socialists too, then, subscribed to an idea of a Europe that must exceed itself, that was constituted by its imperial supplement. He argued quite frankly that, left within its continental frontiers Europe was not viable, but that supported by the British Commonwealth and French and other European colonies, it was so. He spoke with no sense of contradiction as a socialist,
critical of the capitalistic United States, about the immense markets these imperial holdings provided for Europe.\textsuperscript{137}

If Mollet was a key figure in French social democratic circles, he was also a catalyst in its perceived moral degeneration.\textsuperscript{138} His Algerian policy was notably disavowed by Philip in the letters page of \textit{Le Monde} in November 1956, before he resigned from the Socialist Party in January 1957. His excoriation of Mollet was systematically laid out in his work of the same year, \textit{Le socialisme trahi}. Yet, on closer inspection, Philip and the MSEUE’s record on colonialism is rather more ambiguous. True, Philip passionately opposed Mollet’s direction of the war, but he had supported the granting of special powers in April 1956 and had backed firm action against Nasser.\textsuperscript{139} And there was no trace of any discomfort on his part, or on that of the movement in general, with regard to Mollet’s 1950 comments on the integral importance of colonialism to Europe. Indeed, those remarks correlated closely to those of the movement’s \textit{Comité d’étude et d’action} in May 1947. Here it held that Europe was a viable and coherent economic unit on account of the possibilities of atomic energy and, crucially, the availability of raw materials from its colonies.\textsuperscript{140}

Likewise, Rifflet’s indictment of France’s policy at Dien Bien Phu was followed by the advice that instead France should turn to Europe where its ‘grandeur’ would be further advanced

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{138} Interestingly, Rancière points to the experience of being part of a generation that came into political consciousness at the time of Mollet and for whom as such ‘l’histoire de la gauche est celle d’une trahison perpétuelle.’ See ‘Rancière: “L’élection, ce n’est pas la démocratie”’, \textit{Le Nouvel observateur} (23 April, 2012). \url{http://bibliobs.nouvelobs.com/tranches-de-campagne/20120418.OBS6504/jacques-ranciere-l-election-ce-n-est-pas-la-democratie.html}. More generally, on the formative and negative importance of Mollet on French socialists see Martin Evans, \textit{Algeria: France’s Undeclared War} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
\textsuperscript{139} Evans, \textit{Algeria}, 199.
\textsuperscript{140} MSEUE, 1. Dossier sur la Deuxième Conférence/le Premier Congrès, Paris-Montrouge. 21-22 juin. Documents pour la Conférence, 16.
by drawing on the resources of its overseas territories.\textsuperscript{141} This was a general pattern in which talk of the rights of non-European peoples did not allow much space for the notion that they would subsequently be significantly less dependent on Europe. The contradictoriness of these sentiments was symptomatic of a view in which Europe was, in Michael Rothberg’s formulation, a ‘normative progressive narrative’ or as ‘the telos of civilization’.\textsuperscript{142} This axiom was quite resilient to professions of good intent of equitable treatment, however sincere. This is not to revert to a claim that the MSEUE’s policies on colonies could be read off uncomplicatedly according to a colonial calculation of economic profitability, but it at least infers that its rhetoric on equality should be read with particular caution and close attention to the ideological context of post-war European socialism.

Conclusion

The fluidity of leftist ideas about Europe, exemplified for Anderson by the Ventotene Manifesto, indeed diminished after the formation of the Iron Curtain. By the time of the sinking of the EDC in Paris in August 1954, it was clear that the Europe that the MSEUE talked about and fought for was characterised less by creativity than constraint and contestation. Equilibrium had to be secured, and so Europe was to be fashioned by accommodating forces not deemed inherently conducive to its prosperity – capitalism, the nation, the two bloc system. Likewise, the values that were to characterise the movement’s preferred sense of Europe were constrained by

\textsuperscript{141} MSEUE, 15. 7\textsuperscript{o} congrès, Milan. 9-11 juillet 1954. Raymond Rifflet, ‘Rapport au congrès national belge du M.S.E.U.E.’, 8.

\textsuperscript{142} Michael Rothberg, \textit{Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization} (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), 80. See also Chakrabarty, \textit{Provincializing Europe}, passim.
the perdurability of mechanisms and ideologies of hierarchy and exclusion that were subtle and sturdy enough to withstand genuine commitment to a Europe based on equality. Insistence on a Europe based on equality of rights was undoubtedly progressive, but could not foreclose the problematic and more preliminary question of who counted as European in the first place. Likewise, European imperialism might be considered disreputable (though, as we have seen, not always), but that did not imply a more fundamental interrogation of Europe as the normative standard of progress and development, and the corollary assumptions of the continued reliance of the colonial and non-European world on Europe. Furthermore, the MSEUE had to contest what Europe was in the first place. It was the gambit of advocates of European political integration that ‘Europe’ was coterminous with these contingent political treaties and agreements. In the Parisian intellectual and political field, however, organisations like the PCF countered that this was a reification and mystification of an unpropitious and avoidable trajectory of the continent in the new post-war world. Much of the discursive energy of the MSEUE, then, was spent either tacitly or explicitly, on denying, explaining, or minimising this embarrassing disjuncture between Europe of contemporary political integration, and Europe as it was understood by the European peoples. Given the movement’s base in Paris, that disconnect was of course all the more awkward when it applied to the French people.
Chapter 5. Europeanising Spaces and the Fédération des étudiants nationalistes 1960-1963

The Fédération des étudiants nationalistes (FEN) was formed by Parisian university and lycée students in 1960.¹ It would prove to be one of the intellectual forerunners of the French and European New Right, including such groups as GRECE, whose membership extended to Italy, Germany, Britain, Belgium, Sweden, Spain, Austria, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia.² The foundation of the FEN was in part a hostile reaction to the call of the Union national des étudiants de France (UNEF) at its 1960 annual conference for the French government to engage in negotiations with the FLN, for the purpose of ending the conflict in Algeria.³ The establishment of the Fédération was not simply an impulsive decision after this UNEF resolution, however. It had been conceived prior to this conference as a response to two longstanding concerns: first, to provide an organisation for young intellectuals who defended the cause of French Algeria and were disillusioned by the Fifth Republic; and second, to offer a legal structure for reviving those groups of the far right that had been deprived of legality.⁴

It is striking just how pervasive Europe was in the group’s discourse, as is apparent in two foundational manifestos of the group, which remained constant touchstones: the Manifeste de la classe 60 (1960) and Pour une critique positive (1962). In the former we learn that

⁴ Joseph Algazy, La Tentation néo-fasciste en France de 1944 à 1965 (Paris: Fayard, 1984), 192-193. The FEN functioned in part as a student wing and legal cover for the group Jeune Nation which was forbidden by government decree in May 1958 after a series of attacks and violence, culminating in the 13 May insurrection by French settlers in Algeria.
members aspired to become ‘le Français de type nouveau sur lequel la Nation et l’Europe s’appuieront pour revivre et assumer leur destin.’\(^5\) In the latter the group complained about the lack of coherence of the French nationalist right and noted that Europe meant different or contradictory things to its various groups.\(^6\) So, what did it mean to the FEN? Before tackling this question one should guard against projecting into the group too great a degree of coherence and unity. After all, ideological divisions between factions advocating a nationalism grounded in a Europeanist ideology on one hand, and a francocentric understanding of nationalism based on a certain nineteenth century tradition on the other, led to a split in the group in 1964.\(^7\) The FEN is also contextualised within the history of the broader French and European far right, and its ideas about Europe. An emphasis is placed on the idea that the FEN’s discourse of Europe was produced in an intellectual and political climate in which they were widely considered to be on the wrong side of history.

The chapter identifies and examines four senses of Europe that suffuse the group’s archives and publications. First, an idea of a Europe of nationalism. Second, a Europe of imperialism, which was in fact integral to a Europe of nationalism. The contemporary consensus that Europe should decolonise and reconstitute itself as a self-contained unit was vehemently rejected. It is argued that in doing so, the FEN revealed that its highest priority was of a Europe of imperialism, a conviction that is conceptualised and theoretically examined in this chapter as an idea of a Europe in excess of itself. Third, the group proposed an idea of Europe in terms of its relation to the perceived fundamental importance of hierarchy, both within Europe and

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\(^5\) EN, 1, dossier 1, *Manifeste de la classe 60*, 2.

\(^6\) EN, 1, dossier 1, *Pour une critique positive*, 11.

between Europe and the non-European world. Finally, the FEN’s vision of Europe was defined by a rejection of materialism and a counter-proposal for a Europe redeemed through its youth.

**Background of the FEN**

Of what significance is it to examine the actions and thought of the FEN, who were a marginal force in post-war French politics? It is argued here that the FEN represented a segment of a broader far right-wing tendency, in France and throughout Europe, which attached tremendous importance to the idea of Europe. Historians such as Mark Mazower have pointed to the Eurocentric character of fascism, especially in comparison with capitalism or Communism. But historiography in general has addressed the problem of the definition and variations of fascism more than its Europeanist component.⁸ Eric Hobsbawm points to the strong attachment to a European ideal in the history of fascism, and suggestively notes that indeed this is ‘a phase in the development of the European idea on which historians of the post-war European community do not much like to dwell.’⁹ By critically analysing the use of Europe in the discourse of the FEN, this chapter aims to contribute to the redress of this neglect. As such, the relevance of the group to the historiographical debate about the precise nature and distinctiveness of fascism in relation to other far right politics is beyond its scope.

A second interesting point of departure in examining the discourse of the FEN lies in the fact that the currency of such ideas and ideologies was utterly depleted by the end of the Second

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World War. As Mazower remarks, ‘Such was the shock of being subjected to a regime of unprecedented and unremitting violence that in the space of eight years a sea-change took place in Europeans’ political and social attitudes, and they rediscovered the virtues of democracy.’

The FEN was, furthermore, the inheritor of a broader far right that had lost its confidence that its idea of Europe and conceptualisation of European identity were to be vindicated in history. Robert Brasillach – a canonical source of inspiration for the organisation – concluded dejectedly in August 1943 that ‘there is no longer a fascist Europe.’ In 1945 the rightist novelist, Roger Nimier, drearily took stock of recent history: ‘Nos amis sont morts. Nos espoirs sont ruinés. Ceux qui rêvaient à l’ordre nouveau connaissent la fraternité des ruines, le déchirement des nations pauvres et les seuls Européens du siècle dans la personne des cadavres sur les décombres.’ Likewise, the Romanian émigré Emil Cioran’s 1949 memoir, written in exile in Paris, traced his path from a devotee of the cult of the irrational and admirer of Hitler and Codreanu in the 1930s to a disillusioned cynic.

What is more, there was a strong consensus that the kind of Europe that the FEN promulgated as a name in which to defend colonialism generally, and French Algeria in particular, was, so to speak, on the wrong side of history. Todd Shepard demonstrates the swift emergence and prevalence of the discourse of ‘le courant de l’histoire’, or the tide of history, in French political life at the close of the Algerian war, according to which decolonisation came to be accepted as inevitable. This is borne out by numerous irritated references to precisely this idea in the FEN archives and journals. General opinion had shifted a long way quickly from Mendès-

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10 Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 143.
11 Ibid., 152.
France’s insistence before parliament, uncontroversial in 1954, that Algeria was France. As a *Paris Match* editorial advised rejectionists of Algerian independence in February 1962, ‘History can not be changed when History has already been written.’

This brings to mind Reinhart Koselleck’s remarks about the implications of historical failure: ‘The historian on the winning side is easily inclined to interpret short-term success in terms of a long-term ex-post teleology. Not so the defeated. Their primary experience is that everything happened otherwise than hoped or planned. They have a greater need to explain why something else occurred… in the short run history may be made by the victors. In the long run the gains in historical understanding have come from the defeated.’ The question arises whether Koselleck’s insight is useful in making sense of how the FEN articulated its vision of Europe – an idea that incorporated regret and yet also an enduring commitment to a positive project. On the other hand, perhaps the FEN’s Europe corresponded better to Perry Anderson’s counter-hypothesis: ‘for all its force, Koselleck’s argument is one-sided. In pointing to the epistemological advantages of the defeated, it overlooks their temptations. First among these are the lures of consolation.’ One might also add delusion. Either way, to examine the FEN’s conception of Europe is to look into the self-understanding of a historical actor with its back against the wall. Evidently the FEN was itself constantly sizing up its future prospects. In the *Manifeste de la classe 60* it reflected that,

Il est impossible au Français lucide de ne pas évoquer l’avenir avec appréhension. L’inadaptation politique, technique et sociale de la France est flagrante. Entourée par des forces qui se développent prodigieusement elle recule. Le doute, le désarroi et une morne résignation ont

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16 Ibid., 316.
remplacé la fogue, l’esprit entreprenant et créateur qui jadis la caractérisaient [sic]. La plupart des nations de l’Europe occidentale semblent souffrir avec plus ou moins d’acuité des mêmes maux.\(^{17}\)

It should be noted however, that Koselleck’s thesis is cited as a point of contextualisation and a justification of examining the subject, rather than a thesis to test. To do so adequately would require an analysis of much more than merely the FEN’s discourse on Europe, however central this was in its ideology. As such it is beyond the scope of this chapter.

One should also be careful not to overstate this defeat of the reactionary right. Richard Vinen notes that the far right-wing press in post-liberation France provided institutional continuity to the movement and achieved surprisingly high circulation levels.\(^{18}\) In his study of neo-fascism in the post-war France, Joseph Algazy concludes that in fact there was an increased openness to fascist ideas in France between 1958 and 1963, in the context of the Algerian war.\(^{19}\) Nor should being on the wrong side of history be confused with insignificance; the FEN was highly visible, not least because of their confrontational public style. One of the most striking aspects of the group’s archives and journals is their constant and unapologetic reference to the group’s role in violent altercations. For example, during the group’s first annual national conference in Paris in 1960, its success in organising a violent counter-demonstration against an October 1960 UNEF initiative for a ‘day for peace in Algeria’ was recapped at length.\(^{20}\) In the course of that same conference, according to the FEN’s journal *Cahiers universitaires*, confrontations in the street resulted in 2000 arrests.\(^ {21}\)

\(^{17}\) EN, 1, dossier 1, *Manifeste de la classe 60*, 3.
\(^{19}\) See Algazy, *La tentation néo-fasciste en France de 1844 à 1965*, in particular chapter 4, 133-244.
\(^{21}\) EN, 1, dossier 3, *Cahiers universitaires* (February, 1961), 25.
Europe of Nationalism

There are instances when the nationalist ideology of the FEN seemed insular, almost indifferent to anything happening outside of France. The report of their second annual conference in Paris in 1961 states that, ‘nous sommes nationalistes français: nous avons dit ce qu’était la conception nationaliste de l’homme et de l’existence. Nous disons encore que nous sommes français, c’est-à-dire que notre existence humaine n’a de signification que dans le contexte français: au sein de la nation française.’\textsuperscript{22} Taken as a whole, however, the FEN archives and publications reveal a distinct stress on Europeanism, and so, at least qualify Raymond Aron’s assessment in 1964 that consciousness of the nation remained infinitely stronger than a sense of Europe.\textsuperscript{23} The core FEN idea of a Europe of nationalism will be examined in two parts. Firstly, we will examine the consciousness of Europe that derived from the mutual practical support and connections between the FEN and equivalent far right nationalist student groups throughout Europe, and the appropriation of events throughout Europe to the cause of revolutionary nationalism. Secondly, we will analyse the FEN’s idea of a Europe in which nationalism was not only Europe’s principal characteristic, but its sole prerogative.

Trans-European Connections and Points of Reference

Pour une critique positive reflected with satisfaction on its trans-European connections, noting that ‘de nombreux contacts, des échanges d’idées, des conférences communes, ont montré une convergence de conceptions chez tous les militants européens.’ Indeed, the FEN’s sense of the importance of Europe was fostered in large part by developing mutual links with equivalent far right student groups throughout the continent. Moreover, it took sustenance from their support, and also from the examples of the broader past and present European far right, as well as from movements like the Budapest uprising of 1956.

Comparable European far right nationalist student movements regularly attended FEN conferences, and each edition of Cahiers universitaires devoted a section to news from such groups. Special full-length articles were also devoted to these groups’ problems and prospects, and articles were shared and translated in each group’s respective publications, so FEN members were conscious in particular of comparable movements in Sweden, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium. A report in FEN presse in January 1962 succinctly encapsulated this trans-continental far right consciousness: ‘Le Dr Giacamo Gagliardi, représentant des associations nationales italiennes à Paris, a consacré à la F.E.N. un long article très sympathique publié dans les colonnes de “Réao” de l’organe “La Nation Belge”.’

Further, the European horizons of the FEN were a source of sustenance in hard times on the domestic political battlefield. At the second FEN national conference in Paris in 1961, the case was made for upholding faith in nationalism as a force for radical change. For, ‘un seul militant qui possède à fond ces deux atouts peut redresser une situation catastrophique (renvoyer

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24 EN, 1, dossier 1, Pour une critique positive, 32.
l’exemple de Qeippo de Llano.) Conversely, it was noted, the consequences of lacking such resolution and resilience were only too clear – such was the experience of the Spanish Falange after the death of its founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Elsewhere, the defeated uprising of Budapest in 1956 was enlisted as a tragedy in the cause of the same struggle of European revolutionary nationalism, while General Franco, Colonel Mascardo and his son were also transposed into the FEN’s struggle. In return, the FEN supported equivalent far right youth movements throughout the continent in the name of a common European project of nationalism. Listing groups in Belgium, Italy, West Germany, and Spain, the report for the 1962 annual conference notes the suggestion to send ‘un autre communiqué affirmant notre solidarité avec tous nos Amis d’Europe qui luttent pour le Nationalisme et la Civilisation occidentale.’ The FEN defined the West as European in soul, and as an extension of the European genius to the wider world through colonialism. It is difficult to square this definition of the West with the group’s disdain for the United States, however.

The kinds of trans-European networks and shared goals of the groups noted above did not in themselves constitute the FEN’s understanding of what Europe actually was, however. As such, we now turn to examine the FEN’s theoretical articulation of a Europe of nationalism which informed and drew from the practical convergence of these groups.

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26 EN, 1, dossier 2, Bulletin d’informations confidentielles. Rapport sur la seconde conférence nationale’, 7. Qeippo de Llano was a Spanish army officer celebrated for his achievements in Franco’s campaign in the Spanish civil war.
27 Ibid. José Antonio Primo de Rivera was executed by the Spanish republican government in the course of the country’s civil war.
28 EN, 1, dossier 2, FEN presse (no date but from early 1964), 4. Colonel Mascardò is known for his role in Franco’s army in the siege of Alcázar where his forces held out for 70 days against Republican forces. These then captured his 16 year old son and threatened to shoot him if Mascardò’s forces did not surrender. On the phone to his son, he instructed him that he must die like a patriot.
Theoretical and Ideological Basis of a Europe of Nationalism

The FEN saw France, and European nations in general, as beset by the same problems - political, technical, social lethargy, resignation and disarray. This was unbecoming of a Europe formerly characterised by creative energy and spirit. According to the Manifeste de la classe 60, this awareness led to the intention to participate at the student level in working towards the goal of ‘la reconstruction de la France et de l’Europe de demain.’ But this was not European construction as conceived along the lines of increasing intergovernmental cooperation: ‘ce ne sont pas les accords économiques qui unifieront l’Europe, mais l’adhésion de ses peuples au Nationalisme.’ In this form of the nation, the FEN drew from the repertoire of populism to deploy the notion of ‘the people’ against the state. This connected back into the group’s attack on a Europe based on materialism, and its enthusiasm for spiritualism and creativity. It is also notable that while on the one hand the group insisted that the European nation was a timeless given, on the other hand its own discourse undermined any attempt to reify the nation. The nation that the FEN advocated was a particular transnational nationalist, fascist form. But in conceding that the nation was not a given and had to be grasped in the framework of some kind of form, the FEN conceded in a stroke that other forms of Europe were possible.

It was a point of doctrine for the FEN that, far from being in tension with each other, nationalism and Europe implied each other. In the aftermath of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War, the FEN would react to American counsel that Europe should renounce nationalism with the insistence that nationalism was Europe’s very basis. The Manifeste de la

30 EN, 1, dossier 1, Manifeste de la classe 60, 3.
31 Ibid., 2.
32 EN, 1, dossier 1, Pour une critique positive, 19.
classe 60 advocated: ‘la défense de la pré-éminence européenne et la définition d’une forme nouvelle de vie politique fondée sur les conceptions nationalistes de l’existence.’ Of course, the idea had deeper roots than short-term US policy or the vagaries of contemporary global politics. The canonical authority of the preceding generation of the French far right was invoked to make this same point: ‘Drieu la Rochelle en doctrinaire et Robert Brasillach en poète contribuèrent à montrer le caractère européen du nationalism.’

Crucially, nationalism for the FEN was not something which merely originated in Europe, or something whose best examples were in Europe. Nationalism was nothing less than a European prerogative and a defining characteristic of Europe. Non-European nationalism was thus a contradiction in terms. Cahiers universitaires attacked the idea that the nationalism of Angolan terrorists, Syrians, or Nasser, could claim commensurability with the Mazzini’s paradigm of a Young Europe of nationalisms. FEN national conferences reiterated how local chapters should instruct their members to refute the claim of ‘“le réveil” des peuples de couleur.’ The notes for the second annual conference in Paris in 1961 refer to colonial ‘pseudo-nationalismes’ which would fail sooner or later, since they lacked any historical foundation. ‘Ce ne sont en fait que des séparatismes,’ petulant and ungrateful ones at that, one was led to believe. This was a doctrine that was maintained beyond the moment when French and European decolonisation had largely been completed. So in 1964 the FEN remained steadfast in its dismissal of the possibility of non-European nationalism, thereby insisting that nationalism was a defining element of Europe, which might at most be shared by peoples whose origins could be traced to Europe: ‘La mutation politique a imposé au Nationalisme une dimension

33 EN, 1, dossier 1, Manifeste de la classe 60, 6.
34 Ibid., 8.
36 EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et Organisation 1960’, 13. See also EN, 1, dossier 1, Pour une critique positive, 13.
occidentale. Le Nationalisme doit être compris comme la philosophie politique des peuples blancs.’ In the same instance the permanence of Western civilisation was contrasted to ephemeral ‘pseudos-civilisations colorées’.\textsuperscript{38} This aversion to non-European nationalism was laying the ground for the FEN’s opposition to decolonisation, since independence movements took the nation as the form which decolonisation would lead to after independence. This leads us on to the group’s conception of Europe in terms of imperialism.

Europe of Imperialism

Another aspect of the FEN's advocacy of a Europe of nationalism was its integral relationship to imperialism. Indeed, it is argued here that for the group, imperialism was not considered supplemental to a Europe of nationalism. On the contrary, it was unconditionally integral to it. What were the implications of a Europe that interlinked nation and empire in this way?

Imperialism and a Europe of Nationalism

For the FEN, imperialism was constitutive of Europe, and however much it lauded France’s imperial feats and conquests above all, these were considered part of a common

\textsuperscript{38} EN, 1, dossier 2, \textit{FEN presse} (April 5, 1964), 7. Underlining in the original.
European enterprise which required mutual solidarity. In the *FEN presse* report on the second annual conference in Paris in 1961, one could read that,

> la France est une nation impériale par excellence, elle seule a su éliminé [sic] les pires maladies d’Afrique et elle seule a su civiliser des populations à l’état primitif. Quand nous disons elle seule, nous le comprenons comme nation faisant partie de l’Europe et de ce fait nous savons le grand rôle colonisateur joué par le Portugal et la Belgique, notamment, en Afrique.  

If many thought of Portugal as a European periphery, for the FEN it was considered the last standing bulwark of the West by December 1962, because it stood alone against decolonisation and pursued its war in Angola.  

It is true however, that the cause of French Algeria occupied a disproportionate amount of the group’s energies. It was, after all, the initial *raison d’être* of the movement and its defence was, as the *Manifeste de la classe 60* put it, the ‘problème politique français numéro un’.* But its prioritisation should not give the impression that the war was conceptualised as solely a French issue. Rather, it was understood as a European concern, an issue which touched on the definition of Europe itself. At the FEN’s 1960 annual conference the audience applauded a speaker’s invocation of *Algérie française* and its fundamental place in the West.* This was a notable deviation from successive French governments’ pleas, under international pressure, that the Algerian question was an internal French one; and it also contrasts with the continuing memory of the conflict as a French national drama.* In comparison with the European intellectual and dissident left, this right-wing Europeanist aspect of the Algerian conflict is less

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41 EN, 1, dossier 1, *Manifeste de la classe 60*, 13.
noted. In its first edition, *Cahiers universitaires* reported with satisfaction on student demonstrations and initiatives in Portugal, Italy, and Belgium on behalf of the defence of French Algeria and Western Civilisation.\(^\text{44}\) In response the journal noted: ‘Nous saluons nos amis et nous sommes heureux de constater que toute la jeunesse européenne prend conscience de tous les problèmes que se posent désormais à elle, et celui de la sauvegarde de l’Algérie française est actuellement son point de cristallisation.’\(^\text{45}\)

Europe of Nation and Empire

What were the theoretical implications of thinking of imperialism as integral to an idea of a Europe of nationalism? In a review of a book about Atatürk and Turkish nationalism in *Cahiers universitaires*, its author was reproached for just one thing: he made ‘une distinction entre “impérialisme” et “nationalisme” qui nous semble sans fondement.’\(^\text{46}\) There are two points to be made here. First, the reproach for distinguishing between imperialism and nationalism was representative of a consistent position of the FEN: a Europe of nationalism was to be understood as encompassing, or more exactly depending on, inclusion of its imperial possessions. Moreover, to link nationalism and imperialism so unproblematically evoked a Europe of stable domination. That this status quo was challenged was due only to colonial upstarts, encouraged by decadent European intellectuals and unchecked by weak-willed and irresolute politicians of ‘the regime’. In a period when the ‘tide of history’ argument was so strongly advocated as a reason to leave

\(^{44}\) EN, 1, dossier 3, *Cahiers universitaires* (February, 1961), 19-20.
\(^{45}\) Ibid.
Algeria, the FEN’s vision offered a Europe and Europeanness that were stable, ordered and accepted.

Cooper and Stoler argue, however, that far from providing any settled sense of Europeanness, European imperialism depended on a ‘grammar of difference’ that had to be continuously and vigilantly reiterated and refined.\(^47\) Moreover, imperial practice never corresponded to a simple one-way projection of will and power, as the FEN suggested with its invocation of the heroic feats of colonels in the colonies. Rather, it continually wavered between incorporation and differentiation, at once binding specific groups to the colonial states whilst curtailing the aspirations of the ruled.\(^48\) Elsewhere, Cooper argues the crisis of European imperialism arrived precisely in this post-war period when it was overwhelmed by calls for equivalence as much as for independence – again, an important nuance that the FEN could not perceive.\(^49\)

It was no longer feasible to justify racial rule in the aftermath of Hitler’s Germany, or to extend newly demanded and expected social democratic provisions and the welfare state to the European empires.\(^50\) Cooper argues that this is a fundamental development that has been overlooked in historiography of imperialism. For there has been a tendency to fetishise independence and ignore the ways colonial domination was challenged within the imperial unit, by calling for the fulfilment of the promise of equality. The FEN archives reveal traces that

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\(^{47}\) Cooper & Stoler, ‘Between Metropole and Colony’, 3.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 10.


\(^{50}\) Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 202. See also Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 27. In his book, Connelly also demonstrates extensively that if explicit racist justifications were no longer acceptable, they were nonetheless common and important behind official closed doors.
support Cooper’s argument, though the organisation drew short of realising the same kind of conclusion. They show a clear sense of having to work within a political field which was decreasingly open to overt and crude racism. Accordingly, with exceptions, anti-Semitism was muted though apparent with references to cosmopolitan capitalism and invectives against the Rothschilds, just as books were included on lists of recommended literature with no mention of their unabashed anti-Semitic conceptualisation of Europe, such as the work of Henry Coston.\footnote{EN, 1, dossier 2, \textit{FEN presse}, ‘Bulletin d’informations confidentielles. Rapport de la seconde conférence nationale F.E.N (II), 2. Typical of Coston’s work is his \textit{L’Europe des banquiers} (Paris: Librairie française, 1963). Curiously, it is notable that more overt examples of anti-Semitism tended to appear more frequently in \textit{Cahiers universitaires} than in the FEN archives and the internal \textit{FEN presse}.} Though there was less reticence about denigrating Africans and other racial groups, it was suggested, as a point of tactics, that it was advisable to refrain from the use of derogatory terminology such as ““métèques”, les noirs etc.’\footnote{EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation 1961 (1)’, 17.} The quotation marks in references to the term ‘racist’ indeed implied frustration about the lack of currency of a deep-seated yet respectable antipathy to these groups.\footnote{EN, 1, dossier 3, \textit{Cahiers universitaires} (February-March, 1965), 23.} As for social democratic provisions, the group denounced any state support that was extended to African students, a point of contention that was dealt with in annual conferences and aired in their journals, for instance, in an article ‘Les étudiants d’Afrique noire en France.’\footnote{EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Exposé de politique et de doctrine prononcé à la réunion de la première conférence nationale de la Fédération des étudiants nationalistes’, 11; EN 1, dossier 3, \textit{Cahiers universitaires} (March, 1961), 7-12.}

Second, the positing of nation and empire as unproblematically linked in a conceptualisation of Europe is particularly interesting in the case of French Algeria. Not only was it invoked as of special concern for Europe but it differed from other colonies in that it was treated as an integral part of French national territory. Shepard’s work \textit{The Invention of Decolonization} demonstrates how French colonial policy in Algeria agonised over constitutional...
and legalistic formulae, in an attempt to navigate the contradictions of incorporation and differentiation of French citizen and colonial subject.\textsuperscript{55} Shepard demonstrates that finally the settlement of the Algerian conflict gave rise to a constitutional understanding of who was French in terms of a much more rigid and differentiated ethnic European character, a conclusion that Matthew Connelly also reaches in his important study of the Algerian war.\textsuperscript{56}

Revealingly, this was absolutely no consolation whatsoever for the FEN, which retained the ambition to regain Algeria and its empire, just as Alsace-Lorraine had been a temporary loss. Referring to the loss of Algeria its notes on method and organisation for 1963 lamented that ‘Nous n’avons plus rien à défendre, plus rien à conserver… plus d’Occident. Plus rien. Nous sommes au-delà de la défense.’\textsuperscript{57} The significance of this understanding and defence of imperialism is that the Europe that the FEN invoked was necessarily and constitutively in excess of itself. That is to say that if Europe was to be worth anything at all, it had to extend to and dominate in the non-European world. Europe only emerged in this imperial, non-European surplus, otherwise it signified nothing more than, as Jean-Paul Sartre described it in a different context, ‘un accident géographique’.\textsuperscript{58} Accordingly, one need not read literally the FEN’s apocalyptic prognosis of a decolonised Europe routed and subjugated by the Soviets or the masses of the Third World.\textsuperscript{59} Not once did it try to make a serious argument for the strategic and defensive value of its colonies. Instead, this was symptomatic of the extent to which it staked European identity on expansion.

\textsuperscript{55} Shepard, \textit{The Invention of Decolonization}, 19-55 and passim.  
\textsuperscript{56} Connelly, \textit{A Diplomatic Revolution}, 285.  
\textsuperscript{57} EN, 1, dossier 1, Méthode et organisation 1963 (1), 1.  
Europe and Original Violence

If for the FEN the idea of Europe was validated by this tight connection between nation and empire on the one hand, it problematised it on the other. According to Étienne Balibar, ‘in a sense, every modern nation is the product of colonization.’

Likewise, Dipesh Chakrabarty refers to Eugen Weber’s classic work *Peasants into Frenchmen*, citing his argument that the modernisation of France was something akin to ‘internal colonialism’. However, as Chakrabarty reads it, for Weber the foundational violence of the state was justified and redeemed in a teleological reading of history, an argument that the FEN was precluded from making, since it rejected this as the very basis of the arguments of those advocating leaving Algeria, as we have seen.

The FEN insistence on linking nation and empire so tightly was revealing of the kind of argument that Balibar and Chakrabarty make. And highlighting the foundational violence of the nation was hardly conducive to the idea of a Europe the FEN painted – one of natural, timeless nations, unproblematically ordered and essentially peaceable. This was problematised all the more in time of colonial war, particularly in the context of the Algerian war and the violence to which it gave rise both in Algeria and the mainland. To borrow and adapt Terry Eagleton’s reasoning, one reason why colonial violence was so disturbing for France and Europe was that it reminded one of the violence that lay at the heart of one’s own state. It is argued here that the

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60 Cited in Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization*, 17.
common thread of violence that connected nation and empire in the FEN’s Europe lay behind the group’s markedly ambiguous attitude towards violence, as it arose as an issue which had to be accommodated in their conception of Europe. At times it was glorified and exalted in satisfied reports of attacks on other student groups, and in citations of figures like Drieu la Rochelle and Georges Sorel and their ideas on the role of force. Many references were also made to the necessary connection between violence and civilisation. And one can surmise from its reverence for Drieu that the group would have approved of his remark in 1927 in his *Le Jeune Européen*: ‘Nothing is ever accomplished without bloodshed… I look forward to a bloodbath.’ Furthermore, Joan of Arc was quoted on the front cover of *Cahiers universitaires*: ‘la paix on ne l’aura qu’au bout de la lance.’ Likewise, the journal dismissed the supposed opposition of French people to violence as non-existent and mocked calls for non-violence.

At other times, however, violence seemed much more a source of embarrassment. Belgian colonial violence in the Congo was widely considered to have been the most reprehensible example of European imperialism, and so the FEN references to this episode are instructive. They did not so much justify Belgian colonial atrocities as deny them. Colonialism in general was ‘n’est pas du tout une extermination scientifique de tout ce qui est non-blanc! C’est tout simplement Brazza conquérant le Congo sans un coup de fusil.’ Moreover, the group insisted that blacks in the Congo were dying out before the arrival of the Belgians, so that contrary to whatever Lumumba and his decadent European supporters might say, the Congolese were much indebted to Europe and Europeans. Likewise, the killings of October 1961 in Paris

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64 Cited in Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 21.
67 For just one of many examples, this one interestingly directed at a royalist group see EN, 1, dossier 2, *Fen Presse*, 'Bulletin d’informations confidentielles. Rapport de la seconde conférence nationale F.E.N. (II), 4.
69 ‘Rapport sur la seconde conférence nationale’, 5.
were completely ignored, while those of protestors at Charonne in February 1962 were downplayed and compared unfavourably with the sufferings of fascists in Paris in February 1934.\textsuperscript{70} Tellingly, although it recommended the literature of its apologists and lauded its activists, the FEN continually distanced itself from the OAS.\textsuperscript{71} The FEN instructed its members that if they were called fascists it only went to show firstly how baseless were the arguments of their opponents, and secondly one should either respond by laughing or kicking them.\textsuperscript{72} It is precisely the transparent contradictoriness of this advice that can be read as a sign of how the group was self-consciously undercut in its advocacy of its idea of Europe by its ambiguity towards violence.

Europe of Hierarchy

Naturally colonialism was a system predicated on hierarchy. But the extent of the importance of hierarchy in the FEN discourse about Europe – not only between Europe and the non-European world but also within Europe – merits an examination of the concept in its own right. The \textit{Manifeste de la classe 60} unambiguously laid out its place as a central tenet of the values of the FEN: ‘Nous rejetons la conception démocratique de l’homme, individu anonyme qui abdique de sa personnalité et de sa valeur devant l’absurde et injuste loi égalitaire par laquelle un Bigeard est rabaisé au niveau du dernier balayeur du quartier, un Pasteur à celui

\textsuperscript{70} EN, 1, dossier 3, \textit{Cahiers universitaires} (March-April, 1962), 26. On 6 February 1934 an anti-parliamentary street demonstration was instigated by far right forces that culminated in a riot on the place de la Concorde, and the police shooting into the crowd. 16 people were killed and around 2000 injured.
\textsuperscript{71} See for example EN, 1, dossier 2, \textit{FEN presse} (October 5, 1962), 7; EN, 1, dossier 2, \textit{FEN presse} (5 April, 1964), 15. Joseph Algazy notes that in fact the group was implicated in OAS activity. See Algazy, \textit{La tentation néo-fasciste}, 192.
\textsuperscript{72} EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation [1960]’, 8.
d’un analphabète originaire du Congo et la mère de la famille à celui de la prostituée.\textsuperscript{73} Within national borders the commitment to hierarchy stressed a rejection of democracy and the existence of a natural hierarchy devoid of class conflict. In terms of what was significant about hierarchy and the conceptualisation of Europe, we will examine two aspects: the hierarchy of European nations within a composite Europe; and the hierarchy of Europe and the non-European world.

Europe of Internal Hierarchy

For the FEN, Europe itself was a composite unity, to be sure, but it was one in which France occupied the most important position. One might conjecture, incidentally, that the group’s contempt for Vichy’s ‘Révolution nationale’ stemmed from dissatisfaction with the Nazi Europe in which French fellow-travellers had deludedly insisted on France’s central importance to the reconfigured continental order.\textsuperscript{74} We have already seen how France was seen as the European imperial power \textit{par excellence}, though this did not preclude respect for and admiration of other European imperial nations. Similarly, while other European student nationalist groups were warmly welcomed at the FEN conferences, it was noted with satisfaction that the Belgian delegation recognised that France was the greater nation.\textsuperscript{75} This was a self-image cultivated by the FEN. The \textit{Manifeste de la classe 60} referred to the remarks of (unnamed) foreign poets and

\textsuperscript{73} EN, 1, dossier 1, \textit{Manifeste de la classe 60}, 5. Marcel Bigeard was a highly decorated French military officer who had served in the Second World War, Indochina and Algeria.

\textsuperscript{74} See the entry for ‘Révolution nationale’ in EN, 2, dossier 2, ‘Dictionnaire d’un militant’, \textit{Europe action} (May, 1963), 76. On French fellow traveller hopes for France in the the New Nazi Europe, and the lack of German reciprocation, see Julian Jackson, \textit{France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), passim.

\textsuperscript{75} EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation 1963 (2)’, 21.
thinkers: “L’Europe sans la France serait un corps sans tête et peut-être aussi sans Coeur”, and “Dans une Europe réconciliée, la France reprendra sa mission de nation-chef.” Moreover, potential contributors to party organs were instructed that ‘si vous citez des auteurs connus, réservez votre recherche aux auteurs français; il y en assez qui ont dit de bonnes choses chez nous.’ Members were told that ‘l’aventure révolutionnaire de la seconde partie du XXème siècle en Europe se joue en France, et les acteurs sont des Français.’ Such statements were indicative of the FEN’s assertions of the appropriate place of France within the ranks of European nations.

Hierarchy of Europe and the Non-European World

FEN statements and publications stressed natural order and hierarchy, and this was never more apparent than in its conceptualisation of the non-European world. We have already seen that nationalism was defined as solely a European possession. *Pour une critique positive* added that the organisation of humanity was the responsibility of European man. The group continually repeated that non-European nationalism was a delusion and contradiction, thoughtless iconoclasm and the option for anarchy and war over peace and order. Naturally, such nihilism was encouraged and exploited by Soviet Imperialism, and high finance and rootless big capital.

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76 EN, 1, dossier, 1, *Manifeste de la classe 60*, 9.
78 EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation 1963 (1)’, 2.
79 EN, 1, dossier 1, *Pour une critique positive*, 15.
This kind of rhetoric was directed outwards at non-Europeans, but such classifications rebounded to the metropole, and inflected how one conceptualised and understood Europe. In this sense, the quote above from the *Manifeste de la classe 60* in which a street sweeper, a Congolese and a prostitute are conflated, supports Cooper and Stoler’s contention that class categorisation was ‘racialized to the core’. Incidentally, it can be taken that the aspect of social critique in Henri Cartier-Bresson’s photograph of black street sweepers on the Champs-Élysées would have been lost on the group.

Moreover, the example reveals an ambiguity between a natural and stable hierarchy on the one hand, and a hierarchy that was amenable to, and could be refined by, purification, on the other. Menial work like sweeping roads was necessary in Europe and those who performed these functions should know their place, without Marxist illusions more suited to credulous non-Europeans. But the invocation of the Congolese and the prostitute suggested foreignness and dirtiness, each amenable to sanitisation. In this instance, the aggressive championing of Europe and Europeanness by the FEN paradoxically flourished through what it denounced as non-European. It called for a Europe to come that thrived on its own incompleteness. In borrowing Balibar’s argument about the dynamics of racism, and by situating it next to the FEN’s continual warnings of the internal enemy, we can conclude that the FEN championed not Europe as such, but perpetual Europeanisation. Balibar argues that,

the racial-cultural identity of ‘true nationals’ remains invisible, but it can be inferred (and is ensured) *a contrario* by the alleged, quasi-hallucinatory visibility of the ‘false nationals’: the Jews, ‘wogs’, immigrants, ‘Pakis’, natives, Blacks… In other words, it remains constantly in doubt and in danger; the fact that the ‘false’ is too visible will never guarantee that the ‘true’ is

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81 I am grateful to Claude Cookman for this reference, personal correspondence.
visible enough. By seeking to circumscribe the common essence of nationals, racism thus inevitably becomes involved in the obsessional quest for a ‘core’ of authenticity that cannot be found, shrinks the category of nationality and de-stabilizes the historical nation.84 The paradox that Balibar presents here is one whereby racism undercuts the nation by reducing the ‘true’ inhabitants of the nation. At the same time, the multiplication of categories will end up rebounding and attacking those within the nation who are said to belong. In other words, locating the true, European French is a fruitless task. This dialectical movement undercut the task, laid out for this new youth elite in the Manifeste de la classe 60, to work for the unity of the nation that would lead a new Europe, as they conceived of it.85

The idea of a Europe that exists in a steeply hierarchical position in relation to the non-European world as rigorously asserted by the FEN, was arguably defended all the more because of the group’s ambiguity towards violence that we examined above. For often, violence in the name of Europe against non-European peoples was facilitated and legitimated by precisely that categorisation. As Cooper and Stoler argue, ‘social taxonomies allowed for specific forms of violence at specific times. How a person was labeled could determine that a certain category of persons could be killed or raped with impunity, but not others.’86 If, then, Europe and non-Europe and the European and non-European were to be redefined, and the taxonomies that had defined them overturned, Europe risked accepting retrospective culpability for its violence against non-Europeans that those previous and now discredited categorisations had facilitated.

One implication of the FEN’s sense of Europe’s place in the world was that what was objectionable was less inferior rank than the upstart or parvenu. Indeed, far more energy was spent in denigrating the idea that non-Europeans should aspire to have a nation, thus disrupting

85 EN, 1, dossier 3, Cahiers universitaires (September-October 1962), 9.
established order, than in demonstrating their supposed racial inferiority. In this regard Hobsbawm’s analysis is instructive:

Social revolution, and especially colonial rebellion, challenged the sense of a natural, as it were a divine or cosmically sanctioned superiority of top people over bottom people in societies which were naturally unequal, whether by birth or by achievement. Class wars… are usually conducted with more rancour from the top than from the bottom. The very idea that people whose perpetual inferiority is a datum of nature, especially when made manifest by skin colour, should claim equality with, let alone rebel against, their natural superiors, was an outrage in itself. If this was true of the relation between upper and lower classes, it was even more true of that between races.  

Hobsbawm’s point suggests a useful refinement in analyses of ideas of Europe and of European identity: to look not only at what is said but in what terms and with what degree of commitment and investment. One cannot properly understand the FEN discourse about Europe without noting how high it raised the stakes of the survival of the continent as an imperial force, indeed a Europe in excess of itself. It is thus instructive to pick up one point of the Marxist analyses that the group so despised and which informed much of the anticolonial critique they dismissed. As The Communist Manifesto had it, world-historical conflicts ended ‘either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.’ Such was the degree of the FEN’s disdain for social inferiors that one has the impression that the group would prefer the second option were it not for the fact that a reconstitution of world society, and Europe’s place therein, was already by definition ruin. Rancière’s concept of ‘dissensus’ is again useful in understanding this situation. The premise of colonial peoples as represented by decolonising movements was that they were capable of managing their own affairs through the

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independent nation form just as Europeans were able to, thus producing an equalisation that was disruptive of the hierarchies established by European colonialism and nationalism.

Europe of Anti-Materialism and Europe of Youth

This section first analyses the theme of the rejection of materialism in the FEN’s idea of Europe, which set the continent apart from, and in opposition to, both the United States and the Soviet Union. Secondly, it examines its notion of a vanguard of European youth in the fight for the Europe that the group counter-proposed.

Europe of Anti-Materialism

Ostensibly the FEN’s insistence on hierarchy coexisted with a commitment to humanism, albeit of a particular ‘virile’ kind. This underpinned the FEN’s hatred and rejection of ‘hyper-materialism’, whether liberal American or Soviet Communist, both of which, they contended, were contemptuous of man. Cahiers universitaires thus expressed the following sentiment: ‘Nos vœux à nos Amis d’Europe qui combattent, chacun dans leurs pays, pour que se réalise cette Europe, libérée du démocratisme libéral, véritable berceau de la civilisation vis-à-vis des

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89 EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation 1963 (1)’, 2.
deux blocs matérialistes américain ou soviétique.  

This self-destructively liberal Europe contrasted to the Europe of nationalisms as the ‘porteur des valeurs créatrices et spirituelles de l’occident.’ Liberal and Marxist materialisms were seen as offshoots of the Enlightenment, which the FEN rejected in varying degrees from the crass to the more nuanced. On one instance, *Cahiers universitaires* noted that the Portuguese academic establishment had been battered by the nefarious influence of Enlightenment thought. Happily, though, the country’s institutions of higher learning were now recovering under Salazar’s fascist regime.

For the FEN, liberal democracy and Marxism were equally guilty of reducing man to his economic activity, amputating him of a part of himself. In doing so, both violated ‘tendances fondamentales de la vie humaine et de la culture.’ This was linked to the group’s critique of technocracy as coercive and deforming uniformisation, underpinned by inauthentic cosmopolitanism which was an attack on Europe rather than a variant interpretation of it.

Accordingly, *Cahiers universitaires* devoted the best part of its December 1962 edition to attacking these characteristics that they perceived as being institutionalised in the emerging European political community. Under the title ‘Ce qui cachent les institutions européennes’, the FEN suggested that this Europe of the political status quo was not any kind of Europe at all. To this crass conception of community, the FEN counter-proposed that the task was to subject the economy to a ‘printemps européen’.

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92 EN, 1, dossier 1, *Pour une critique positive*, 9.  
95 EN, 1, dossier 1, *Pour une critique positive*, 18.  
97 EN, 1, dossier 1, *Pour une critique positive*, 17.
it also indulged in rhetoric of a timeless European identity. For the *Manifeste de la classe 60* had so loaded its rhetoric as to claim ‘l’homme ne prend sa signification qu’au sein d’une communauté naturelle qui, pour nous Français, revêt la forme privilégiée de la Nation.’\(^98\) If man only had meaning in a natural community, it followed that man was absolutely insignificant if communities were arbitrary and constructed. The FEN staked everything on denying the original flaw that undermined its claim to a Europe of nationalisms which was natural and timeless.

Another key aspect of this rejection of the Enlightenment was the French Revolution and the democratic tradition. To this effect the group pointed to the damage wreaked by the Jacobin legacy,\(^99\) and scorned the slogan of ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’ as ‘autant de mythes et de plaisanteries à éliminer.’\(^100\) Democracy was constantly invoked as an idea that cut the ground under the feet of a Europe worthy of the name, by facilitating and inciting challenge to natural order. In the FEN vision of Europe these ideologies were not deemphasised but rather judged incommensurable – ‘entre la démocratie et les nationalistes il s’établit ainsi un dialogue des sourds.’\(^101\) Further, ‘on ne peut voter chaque soir pour savoir, chaque matin, à quel pays on appartient, car la nationalité n’est pas un fait volontaire. Nous la trouvons dans notre berceau en naissant.’\(^102\)

The archives demonstrate many instances of resentment of the label fascist as a term of denunciation. Yet members of the FEN were told not to refer to themselves as fascist more on tactical grounds, rather than a principled rejection of this anti-Enlightenment tradition.\(^103\) In fact

\(^98\) EN, 1, dossier 1, *Manifeste de la classe 60*, 5.
\(^99\) EN, 1, dossier 3, *Cahiers universitaires* (February, 1961), 5.
\(^100\) EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation 1963 (2)’, 28. See also EN, 1, dossier 3, *Cahiers universitaires* (May, 1962), 5.
\(^101\) EN, 1, dossier 3, (May-June, 1961), 6.
\(^103\) EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation 1963 (2)’, 28.
it was often invoked quite positively despite these instructions. A review of what became a canonical text of the European far right, Maurice Bardèche’s *Qu’est-ce que le fascisme?*, in *Cahiers universitaires* in 1962 argued that the public was scandalously misinformed about the nature and achievements of this movement. If its history was not flawless, on balance it was an honourable foundation on which to imagine and to build Europe.¹⁰⁴

The ‘materialist’ notions of Europe that the FEN scorned, then, were to be countered by a form of nation that would constitute a creditable Europe. The task of European youth was to fight for a Europe characterised by traditional aesthetic categories of Romanticism – spiritual essence, creativity, organic community.

Europe of Youth

As an antidote to the Europe of materialism that the FEN rejected, the group proposed putting faith in the revolutionary and redemptive role of youth to renovate France and Europe.¹⁰⁵

A report on method and organisation for 1960 reiterated that the FEN aspired to be the vanguards of such a movement. It noted that the group was not ‘un simple regroupement passager dû aux circonstances, mais bien la concrétisation de l’aspiration profonde de la jeunesse française à la vie, acceptant en pleine lucidité le combat qui, seul, éliminera les forces destructrices de la Nation et de la Civilisation. Le rôle de la Fédération des Etudiants Nationalistes dans l’avenir

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¹⁰⁴ EN, 1, dossier 3, *Cahiers universitaires* (March-April, 1962), 29. Bardèche’s work was a landmark text in the evolving thought of the French and European far right, in which an attempt was made to repackage fascism in a respectable form, which involved distancing it from its Nazi and Italian Fascist legacies. J.G. Shields, *The Extreme Right in France: From Pétain to Le Pen* (London: Routledge, 2007), 101-102.

¹⁰⁵ EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation [1960]’, 1.
doit être déterminant… c’est d’elle que sortiront les jeunes cadres de la Nation et de l’Europe rénovées.\textsuperscript{106} We saw earlier that the support of European youth for French Algeria was applauded. The same article continued: ‘C’est la consécration dans les faits de toute une génération qui saura s’unir demain par-dessus les plans, les marchés, les trusts et sans qu’il y ait besoin d’être une assemblée européenne.’\textsuperscript{107} Moreover, explicitly rejecting the hugely popular film \textit{Les Tricheurs} and its representation of ennui stricken and nihilistic teens in St-Germain-des-Prés,\textsuperscript{108} the FEN pointed instead to a European youth of common resolve, heroism, dynamism and taste for action shown on the streets of Budapest, Algiers and Paris.\textsuperscript{109} After defeat of the French Algerian cause in 1962, internal notes for 1963 demonstrate the retention of the goal of ‘l’édification d’une Jeune Europe unitaire des politiques nationalistes.’\textsuperscript{110}

The extent of the importance attached to youth was demonstrated by the group’s warning that to network with older activists, even of comparable far right political convictions and suitable conceptions of Europe, was ‘semé d’embuches et c’est avec la plus grande circonspection qu’il faut s’y aventurer.’\textsuperscript{111} When making this case for the role of youth the rhetoric was intensified accordingly, as shown in one example from \textit{Cahiers universitaires} in 1961: ‘Les luttes gigantesques de l’antiquité et du Moyen Age, celle de David et Goliath, de Siegfried et du Dragon sont à la mesure des seuls jeunes. Les ainés sont là pour les aider et les soutenir.’\textsuperscript{112} Likewise, members were instructed that youth had always proved of great importance in determining periods of French history. A list of corroborating names included

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} EN, 1, dossier 3, \textit{Cahiers universitaires} (February, 1961), 19-20.
\textsuperscript{109} EN, 1, dossier 1, \textit{Manifeste de la classe 60}, 12.
\textsuperscript{110} EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation 1963 (1)’, 2.
\textsuperscript{111} EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation [1960]’, 21.
\textsuperscript{112} EN, 1, dossier 3, \textit{Cahiers universitaires} (May-June, 1961), 6.
‘Jeanne d’Arc, Condé, Louis XIV, Corneille, Bonaparte, le Duc d’Aumale, les Généraux de la Révolution, les conquérants de notre Empire.’ By May 1962 when it was clear France was on its way out of Algeria, Cahiers universitaires included on the inside cover Hubert Lyautey’s invocation of French youth and the recognition that ‘dans l’Histoire des peoples, des batailles plus perdues encore ont été regagnées. Et je me sens plein de courage.’ One thinks back to Koselleck’s thoughts about being on the wrong side of history, but the FEN’s rather apocalyptic evaluation of Europe’s prospects would lead one to qualify Koselleck’s conclusion about the possibilities that defeat entailed for understanding history.

Conclusion

What is particularly characteristic of the discourse of the FEN, is its invocation of Europe with regret rather than expectation, and yet also with a sense of purposefulness that this regret might be channelled into a positive project, as they conceived it. We have seen that the core FEN idea of a form of a nationalist Europe combined practical trans-European connections and networks and points of reference, a guarded and jealous invocation of the exclusiveness of nationalism as defining Europe and also, more importantly, as its exclusive possession. Imperialism was unconditionally integral to this Europe of nationalism which in turn insisted on a rigid sense of hierarchy both within a composite conception of the continent, and between it and the European world. Finally, we examined the rejection of materialism not only as a basis of an idea of Europe but as radically incommensurable with a populist version of Europe’s natural

113 EN, 1, dossier 1, ‘Méthode et organisation [1960]’, 7.
114 EN, 1, dossier 3, Cahiers universitaires (May, 1962).
characteristics and place. Ultimately the vanguard in the struggle for this Europe was European youth, within which the FEN conceived of itself as an elite example.

The chapter has argued that these were not different conceptions of Europe but the same core Europe of nationalism. However, it has also contended that of these various strands, by far the most important for the FEN was a Europe based on imperialism, a Europe defined paradoxically by the very condition of being in excess of itself. It is interesting that the FEN put such rhetorical weight on this specific point. To do so was a gamble in the sense of retaining its credibility as a force to fight for a certain conception of Europe, should the disaster it foresaw emanating from decolonisation not come off. This was quite possibly a factor in the group’s dissolution by 1967. After all, it was somewhat implausible that its members could bear the weight of this kind of rhetoric for very long in a France absolutely determined to put its imperial past behind it: ‘Ainsi la jeune Europe, fondée sur une même civilisation, un même espace et un même destin, sera-t-elle le foyer actif de l’Occident et de l’ordre du monde. La jeunesse d’Europe aura de nouvelles cathédrales à construire et un nouvel Empire à édifier.’

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115 EN, 1, dossier 1, *Pour une critique positive*, 20.
Chapter 6. Cultural Europeanising Spaces of Spanish Exiles in Paris

José Ortega y Gasset famously held that ‘Spain is the problem, Europe is the solution.’ By the time of his death in 1955, there was a large Spanish community in Paris for whom Europe was if not necessarily a solution, certainly an important question or term of reference. For Republican exiles, their very presence in France stemmed from a Spanish war that was in certain ways considered to be a European affair by Spaniards and non-Spaniards alike. In her obituary about Léon Blum on 22 March 1951, Janet Flanner noted that Blum’s refusal to intervene in the Spanish civil war had ‘soured many European idealists.’¹ In turn, Santiago Carrillo, exiled in Paris with the rest of the leadership of the Partido Comunista de España (PCE), indicted the supposedly democratic European powers for their failure to come to the aid of Spain.²

The culture of the Parisian Spaniards connected to Europe not only in the development of international connections in what might be understood as a weak sense of Europeanisation, but also in their theoretical engagement with the idea of Europe. This question was posed and answered in different and often conflicting ways. These are examined in this chapter, and are contextualised in the contemporary Parisian intellectual field, and compared with the formulation of comparable ideas within it.

² Santiago Carillo [sic], Demain l’Espagne. Entretiens avec Régis Debray et Max Gallo (Paris: Seuil, 1974), 75. One should also note that Spaniards and Spanish exiles in Paris were well represented in various movements for European political integration. This was the case for the Mouvement socialiste des états-unis d’Europe, examined in chapter 4. Similarly, Spanish Republicans attended the journées nationales de la Résistance, organised by the Conseil National de la Résistance, in Paris from 10-14 July 1946. See Pieter Lagrou, ‘La Résistance et les conceptions de l’Europe, 1945-1965. Le monde associatif international d’anciens résistants et victimes de la persécution devant la Guerre froide, le problème allemand et l’intégration europénne’, in Le rôle des guerres dans la mémoire des européens: leur effet sur la conscience d’être européen, eds. Antoine Fleury & Robert Frank (Bern: Peter Lang, 1997), 142-143.
This chapter, which takes both culture and exile in their broadest sense, will firstly survey pan-European cultural interactions in Paris involving the Spanish exiles.\(^3\) Then the following are identified and examined as theoretical concerns which repeatedly informed this community’s cultural production and activity: the place of Spanish culture within European culture; the relationship between civilisation or culture and violence and its implications for thinking about Europe; and a particular historically grounded interest in the theme of insiders and outsiders in Spain and, by extension, in Europe. Particular but not exclusive attention will be paid to four cultural pillars of Spanish exile circles in Paris for whom the question of Europe was important in various ways: Pablo Picasso, the writers Jorge Semprún and Juan Goytisolo and the literary edition of *Solidaridad obrera* – the organ of the anarcho-syndicalist labour organisation, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), that was itself banished from Franco’s Spain.

**European Dimensions of the Culture of the Spanish Exiles in Paris**

The cultural life of Spanish Republican exile circles comprised many activities and interactions with French and other nationals. This implied at least a weak sense of Europeanisation through the cultivation of trans-European links without necessarily signing up to and propagating a certain idea of Europe or Europeanness. Indeed, Geneviève Dreyfus-Armand argues that a distinctive feature of Spanish Republican exile life in France was its success in both preserving its own cohesive identity and cultures, and cultivating an openness to other European

\(^3\) For a discussion of the different kinds of experiences of Spanish exile from the voluntary to banishment, see Juan Goytisolo’ and ‘Jorge Semprún’, in Karl Kohut, *Escribir en París. Entrevistas con Fernando Arrabal, Adelaïde Blasquez, José Corrales Egea, Julio Cortázar, Augustín Gomez Arcos, Juan Goytisolo, Augusto Roa Bastos, Severo Sarduy y Jorge Semprún* (Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert, 1983), 77-102, 157-192.
cultures, particularly French culture. Furthermore, it is instructive that in his memoirs Juan Goytisolo indicates a sense in which Parisian intellectuals were considered to be something of a European institution. Thus he refers to building bridges between Spanish dissidents and intellectuals and ‘the European intelligentsia’, to ‘European intellectuals’, and his ‘European colleagues’.  

Dreyfus-Armand schematically divides the cultural institutions of Spanish exiles into five categories: associations of intellectuals, athenaeums, institutions based on regional Spanish identities, cultural-commercial institutions, and cultural committees of political parties or trade unions. Notable examples included journals with which Spanish and French writers and intellectuals collaborated, or in which attention was paid to both Spanish and French culture. One can point to Independencia, Galería (the first illustrated cultural review of Spanish emigrants anywhere in Europe, to which Albert Camus contributed), and Cénit (with which both Camus and Bertrand Russell collaborated). Camus’s collaboration is particularly significant since, according to John Oswald, Spain, and in particular the Spanish civil war and its legacy, informed his idea of Europe. Indeed, his work in such journals and his work with Spanish exiles and on issues relating to Spain generally were surely informed by the kind of sentiments he expressed in preface to the 1946 work L’Espagne libre. Here Camus articulated his outrage that Europe could claim to have fought for liberty while ignoring Franco, and suggested that Franco’s Spain was a

7 Ibid., 49.
wound within Europe that had dangerous implications for democracy. Moreover, a Europe from which Spain was cut off would be seriously impoverished: ‘Que serait la prestigieuse Europe, en effet, sans la pauvre Espagne?’

A particularly interesting case was the journal *Solidaridad obrera. Suplemento literario* (SOSL). This cultural supplement transcended the very narrowly circumscribed politics and editorial priorities of its namesake, *Solidaridad obrera*. Founded by libertarian socialist militants in the Paris region in 1954, the journal continued until 1961 when it was banned by the de Gaulle government at the behest of the Franco regime. Dreyfus-Armand argues that the journal fulfilled its founding ambition to be a ‘fenêtre ouverte à toutes les inquiétudes culturelles, hispaniques et universelles.’ In this way the journal not only opened its columns to intellectuals from throughout Europe and Latin America, but also engaged with the question of Europe and of Europeanness, implicitly and explicitly.

Antonio Soriano’s Librairie Espagnole, just off the boulevard Saint-Germain on the rue de Seine, was another important support for Spanish exile culture. Not only did it sustain and propagate Spanish literary culture, including supplying banned or rare publications, but also served as a forum for social interaction, where memories or morale-boosting words were exchanged. Additionally, it developed extensive links with French academic institutions and specialists on, or enthusiasts for, Spanish culture. The station Radio-París also provided a means to keep up to date with developments back home. One topical example was a broadcast in

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10 Ibid., 11.
11 All translations from SOSL are mine.
12 After this point the journal was re-launched under the name *Umbral* and ran until 1969. Dreyfus-Armand, ‘Les cultures de l’exil en France’, 50.
13 Cited in ibid., 49.
1962 that examined the opinions of Spaniards on the European Common Market and indeed, concomitantly, about Europe in the abstract.\textsuperscript{15}

French cultural institutions were a support for Spanish exile culture in terms of publicising and elucidating the issues with which they were most concerned. Journals such as \textit{La Nouvelle critique} and \textit{Europe} devoted special issues to Spain in 1956 and 1958 respectively, the latter taking as an express aim the opening of its columns to Spaniards for the purpose of constructive dialogue.\textsuperscript{16} Similarly, public conferences were forums for interaction, such as the December 1964 discussion at the Mutualité in which Jorge Semprún discussed ‘Que peut la littérature?’ alongside several figures including de Beauvoir and Sartre.\textsuperscript{17}

In terms of specifically political culture, we have already examined how street signs were implicated in European consciousness, and indeed Paris municipal authorities acknowledged the presence of Spanish migrants with the dedication of street names to important figures in Spanish Republicanism. This was notably the case in areas with heavy Spanish settlement such as the suburb of Saint-Denis.\textsuperscript{18} Spanish Republican political activity also drew from the cultural capital of important Parisian intellectuals. In February 1952, Sartre, Camus, and Breton shared a platform at a meeting organised by the \textit{Ligue française des droits de l’homme} in support of a


\textsuperscript{17} Bertrand, \textit{Paris rouge}, 84.

group of trade unionists sentenced to death by Franco.\(^{19}\) This was not a priority for all Europeanist institutions in Paris, of course; Ignazio Silone was the only big name from the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) who joined with intellectuals of the French left in demonstrations against Francoism.\(^{20}\) This was a particularly conspicuous omission on the part of the Congress, given the prominence of the theme of Europe in its work and propaganda, and in that of its members as individual intellectuals. Indeed, Pierre Grémion describes the CCF’s organ, *Preuves*, as ‘une revue européenne à Paris’,\(^{21}\) and the Congress’s honorary presidents included the Spaniard Salvador de Madariaga, a leading historian of the European idea and president of the cultural section of the *Mouvement Européen*.\(^{22}\)

The cultural capital of both French and European intellectuals in Paris was also drawn upon for the cause of Spanish Republican exiles in the USSR who could only obtain entry to Francoist Spain. Camus drafted an appeal for the creation of a committee of support for these exiles’ right to travel to a safe alternative country such as France. When it was published in *Solidaridad obrera* on 20 August 1949, Camus’s appeal included the signatures of Gide, Mauriac, Sartre, René Char, Silone, Carlo Levi, Claude Bourdet, Breton, Orwell, and Pablo Casals.\(^{23}\) Camus was in fact a particularly prominent figure in Spanish Republican events in general. A particularly useful example, since it revealed the interwoven strands that constituted the terms of reference for thinking about Europe at this time, was Camus’s appearance on 30 October 1956 at an event for Madariaga’s seventieth birthday. In his speech to honour this

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\(^{22}\) Madariaga’s reflections on Europe are voluminous and span several decades. For a sample see his ‘What is Europe?’, *The Fortnightly* 158 (1945); ‘That European River, The Rhine’, *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 4 (1956); ‘The Unity and Diversity of Europe’, *The Listener* 58 (1957); ‘Towards the United States of Europe’, *Orbis* 6 (1962); ‘Don Quijote, europeo’, *Revista de Occidente* 2 (1964); his preface to Henri Brugmans, *L’Europe prend le large* (Liège: G. Thone, 1961); and his *Portrait of Europe* (London: Hollis & Carter, 1952).

foremost Europeanist’s life and achievements, Camus alluded to the ongoing insurrection in Hungary.\footnote{Ibid., 589.} In the chapter on the Paris street as a Europeanising space we have examined how the events of Budapest resonated in Paris as a European event. The intertwining of the insurrection in Hungary and Spanish exiles was also exemplified by the appeal from Hungarian students to Picasso, asking him to do for them what he had done for Guernica and Korea.\footnote{David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 586. The letter referred to his work condemning US intervention in Korea, ‘Massacre in Korea’ (1951). Both works of course were heavily indebted to Goya, another illustrious Spanish exile.}

Communists like Picasso were also an important element of Spanish exile life in Paris, to whose political commitments the likes of Camus and Madariaga were bitterly opposed. Madariaga’s Europeanism, like that of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, was defined in very large part by opposition to Soviet totalitarianism, which of course also implied disdain for the PCF. Yet there was also a European aspect to Communist cultural life in the French capital. Held every year until 1956, the Fête de l’Humanité was the pivotal event in the cultural calendar of ‘Paris rouge’. The report of the 1945 event by this organ of the PCF celebrated the stands there to represent Spaniards, Czechs, Yugoslavs, Portuguese, and Italians.\footnote{Cited in Bertrand, Paris rouge, 152.} Incidentally, enthusiasts for contemporary intergovernmental European political integration would have been little pleased by the ‘massacre game’ at the 1949 event in which contestants could finish off a Robert Schuman doll.\footnote{Rosemary Wakeman, The Heroic City: Paris, 1945-1958 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009), 98. Other dolls included figures of Jules Moch, Paul Ramadier, and Charles de Gaulle.} Manifestly not all Europeanisms were compatible.

The corollary of the required commitment and marked militancy of Communist culture in the French capital was an environment that lent itself to the forging of social contacts. In an October 1944 interview Picasso commented on his attachment to the Communist Party: ‘I have always been an exile, and now I am one no longer; until Spain can at last welcome me back, the
French Communist Party has opened its arms to me… I am once more among my brothers.’

Richard Cobb noted as well that an appreciation of its sociability and conviviality was vital to understanding of Communist culture in Paris. He referred to those who found respite there from the crushing anonymity and loneliness of metropolis life. One assumes that Picasso was not the only Spaniard in Paris for whom this was true, alongside other immigrant groups represented in the PCF – Italians, Armenians, and Eastern European Jews, for instance. Togetherness was not necessarily a very satisfactory compensation for exile, however. In his study of Communist Paris in these years, Jean-Pierre Bertrand points to a certain melancholic Spanish exile communist culture of sitting around in cafés reminiscing about past exploits. This was indeed a point of European commonality among refugees of all political persuasions in the French capital.

**Culture and Civilisation and Europe**

One strand of Spanish exile culture in Paris was the insistence on the leading place of Spanish culture within that of Europe. An article by Isabel del Castillo in *SOSL* in February 1954, ‘Elegy to Those Without a Land: The Exodus’, argued that the exile of the Spanish Republicans was all the more tragic precisely because of the glorious historical achievements of Spain, and as the country occupied such an important role in the development of European culture: ‘these were the people who held the torch of culture highest when the whole of Europe

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31 Ibid., 150. Juan Goytisolo likewise refers to ‘leaden, stodgy comrades in exile, whose never-ending nostalgia for Spain sounded over the years like an old unbearable scratched record’. Goytisolo, *Forbidden Territory and Realms of Strife*, 237.
lived in ignorance and darkness.

Likewise, in ‘Eugenio D’Ors – the European’ in the December 1954 edition, *SOSL* mourned the Spanish Catalan writer’s multilingualism, his supreme rationalism, and associations with the Sorbonne and the Collège de France – all attributes, so it was suggested, of a profound Europeanism. This virtue was valued so highly as to override D’Ors’s sympathy for the Franco regime: ‘today we forgive him his mistakes – who has not made them?’ Yet, the article insisted ‘one must not think that as a man of Europe [un hombre europeo] he ceased to be Spanish – the Spaniard is also European even if Unamuno proclaimed our Africanism.’

One detects here a sense of wounded pride, an objection to the kinds of notions, exemplified by Denis de Rougemont, in which Europe effectively meant a West European core. On the contrary, the article insisted that the geographical and cultural peripheries of Europe were not at all coterminous.

The three hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Cervantes’s *Don Quixote* in 1955 was a propitious occasion to foreground Spanish culture and its relation to Europe. Camus chaired a commemoration of the occasion on 23 October in the Richelieu amphitheatre of the Sorbonne, an event in which the rector of the University of Paris participated. It was organised by Camus’s friends at *Solidaridad obrera*, and its sponsors included Madariaga and Pablo Casals. In his speech Camus connected the themes of *Don Quixote* to his very obvious concerns about contemporary Parisian intellectual life, which of course were pervaded by international affairs, which in turn implied competing conceptions of Europe.

Picasso’s interpretation of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza was published on the front cover of the 18-25 August 1955 edition of *Les Lettres françaises*, a journal which, as it
happened, frequently celebrated the great figures of Spanish literature.\textsuperscript{35} Picasso’s appropriation of this canonical figure in European culture was inevitably controversial. As recent scholarship has shown, the cultural Cold War was indeed no less polarised and contested than its political counterpart, of which it was considered an extension.\textsuperscript{36} \textit{SOSL} reminded its readers in July 1954 that François Mauriac considered the Andalucian painter to be ‘el diablo’, presumably on account of his fellow travelling with the PCF and the Soviet Union. In 1950 Mauriac had of course singled out the intellectual as a European institution under threat from Soviet Russia, and he had Paris intellectuals specifically in mind.\textsuperscript{37}

Picasso’s deference to the Soviet Union was periodically repaid with scorn, however, as his artistic approach deviated from party orthodoxy. André Malraux explained the Soviet attacks on Picasso in terms that contradicted Mauriac. Malraux himself had come to feel repugnance toward Stalinist cultural policy and this, argues David Caute, ‘undoubtedly affected his re-evaluation of Western, or European values.’\textsuperscript{38} In his exposition on European culture defined against America and the Soviet Union in his postface to a subsequent edition of his work \textit{The Conquerors}, Malraux opined in 1949 that: ‘It’s no accident that the Russian communists are attacking Picasso. His painting throws doubt on the fundamentals of their system; it is willy-nilly a most intensely European presence… The spirit of Europe is a danger to a Pharaonic industry. Moscow’s rebuke to Picasso is no accident: it represents a defense of the five year plans…’\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{35} Bertrand, \textit{Paris rouge}, 152.
\textsuperscript{38} Caute, \textit{Communism and the French Intellectuals}, 244.
\textsuperscript{39} André Malraux, \textit{The Conquerors}, trans. Stephen Becker (London: Journeyman, 1983), 186. Incidentally, Malraux had laid out a case for a distinct European culture at the inaugural session of UNESCO in Paris in 1946. See his ‘Man and Artistic Culture’, in \textit{Reflections on Our Age: Lectures at the Opening Session of UNESCO at the Sorbonne} (London: Allen Wingate, 1948), 84-99. The admission of Franco’s Spain into UNESCO was in turn a point of bitter
Cervantes was in any case a frequent point of reference in Spanish exile journals in general, and *SOSL* was no exception. In October 1955, the journal dedicated an edition to Cervantes and included articles that located his work in the history of European culture and insisted on its universal quality by, amongst others, Madariaga, Ortega y Gasset, and Jean Cassou. One article by J. Bickermann argued that the English did not and could not grasp what was essential in the figure of Quixote ‘simply because all quixotism, that is to say any attempt or wish to reform or improve the world [todo intento de querer reformar o mejorar el Mundo] is something unusual and strange.’ As Britain was often conceived of as a kind of internal other to Europe, most famously in the discourse surrounding de Gaulle’s veto of Britain’s EEC application in 1963, one might infer from Bickermann’s article that that the positive imperative of Cervantes’s masterpiece to reform and change the world extended to characterise Europeans.

It is interesting though that Bickermann interprets quixotism in this way rather than in its more pejorative sense of delusion, which was perhaps the most common way it was related to Europeanist ideas. Indeed, *La Grande illusion* in Jean Renoir’s classic film was now something like common sense given the discrepancy between Europe’s self-confidence in the early twentieth century and the results of its recent three decades of catastrophe. One might risk here pushing the analogy between quixotism and Europe further to suggest there was a sense in which just as Don Quixote’s death was hastened by his eventual disillusionment, so did the very life of Europe depend on its illusions. That is to say that there was a sense that if any cultural energy was to be successfully mobilised for a positive invocation of Europe in the post-war period, it

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42 The possibility of Quixote standing as a synecdoche for the European is also suggested by Madariaga in his article ‘Don Quijote, europeo’, and by Dominique de Villepin in Jorge Semprún & Dominique de Villepin, *L’Homme européen* (Paris: Plon, 2005), 14.
could not simply refer to Europe as it stood. In a nod to the notion of a multidirectional Europe, then, one might answer Aimé Césaire’s question of how Europe could exist with a clean conscience by borrowing Primo Levi’s refrain, however inherently unsatisfactory and inadequate, that ‘if we were capable of taking in all the suffering of all those people, we would not be able to live.’

If this proposition was not suggested in Bickermann’s interpretation of *Don Quixote*, it would surely have been grasped by his compatriot and veteran of Buchenwald, Jorge Semprún, whose own reading of Cervantes’s classic in German was indicative of his proud Europeanism. He recently looked back at Europe’s unprecedentedly violent twentieth century to propose that ‘notre héritage européen n’a de signification vitale que si nous sommes capable d’en déduire un avenir.’ The interesting aspect of the Spanish exiles’ championing of *Don Quixote*, then, was a correspondence with a notion of culture well described by Terry Eagleton, and which would have made excellent sense in Paris and Europe in this post-war period. Eagleton explains that one definition of culture is the imagination of social life as it should be rather than how it is. He goes on to suggest three further and more precise definitions: culture as a utopian critique, culture as a way of life, culture as artistic creation. He then asks what the connection between the three is, and suggests that ‘the answer is surely a negative one: all three are in different ways

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43 Levi was of course referring here to Anne Frank. The full quote reads: ‘One single Anne Frank moves us more than the countless others who suffered just as she did but whose faces have remained in the shadows. Perhaps it is better that way; if we were capable of taking in all the suffering of all those people, we would not be able to live.’ Interestingly, according to France-Soir, the two most widely read books in France in April, 1958 were *La Question* and Anne Frank’s diary. See Donald Reid, ‘The Question of Henri Alleg’, *The International History Review* 29/3 (September, 2007), 574. Here were juxtaposed the Europe of colonialism and the Europe of Nazism, the connection of which scandalised successive French governments.


reactions to the failure of culture as actual civilisation – as the grand narrative of human self-
development.”

Culture and Civilisation, Violence, and Europe

If Bickermann’s article unwittingly brought into relief a connection between Europe, culture and violence, we will now turn to examine examples of Parisian Spanish exile culture that raised the question much more directly. Culture was an especially highly valued affair in the life of the Spanish exiles in Paris since the very stakes of their conflict with Franco was rationalised to a significant degree in cultural terms. Francoism was understood as cultural barbarism above and beyond its political tyranny. Such was the rationalisation of the regime’s censorship, burning of books, and stifling conservative Catholic conformism that Picasso had reviled as ‘black Spain.’ This was one reason why, Dreyfus-Armand argues, culture amongst the Spanish exiles was a mass phenomenon and not restricted to elites. It was, then, natural that one of the cultural problems that SOSL interrogated was the relation between culture and civilisation and violence. The question was consistently posed as to whether Franco was historically exceptional, or if he rather stemmed from a certain Spanish tradition. This interrogation of the relationship between violence and culture of course corresponded to various reflections and interpretations of this very question across Europe after 1945.

46 Ibid., 20.
48 See for example J. Cañada Puerto, ‘¿Existe una crueldad española?’, SOSL (January, 1955), 10-11.
Similarly, a constant productive problem in Semprún’s grappling with the question of Europe was the spatial proximity between the Buchenwald concentration camp, where he had been interned, and Weimar, the home of Goethe. This post-war preoccupation about culture and violence was something more than a rationalisation of Europe producing violence on the one hand, and culture on the other; rather the crux of the problem lay in something more like an anxiety that each was implicated in the other. Culture became exactly coextensive with violence for Semprún, in that writing about his experiences in Buchenwald became a sort of living death. His first important work was his 1963 work *Le Grand voyage*, but the camp has hung over all his subsequent political and cultural output and his understanding of Europe. Indeed, in 2005 he wrote that ‘c’est dans les camps nazis que s’est forgée la première ébauche d’un esprit européen.’

The connection between culture and civilisation, violence, and Europe was also invoked in an article in the October 1954 *SOSL*, ‘Europe - peninsula of Asia [Europa, peninsula asiatica]’. The article lamented that ‘The Europe that expanded through the globe is seriously wounded internally [Europa, que convirtió todo lo suyo en mundial, está gravemente herida por dentro.]’ Moreover, ‘European thought is no longer so elevated [el pensamiento europeo ha perdido su vuelo, su altura]. This is the clearest evidence that Western civilisation is in chaos.’ Sartre had already referred to the reduction of Europe to a geographical accident in ‘Orphée noire’ in 1948, as ‘la presqu’île que l’Asie pousse jusqu’à l’Atlantique.’ Although the *SOSL* article noted that the non-European world had still not liberated itself from the shadow [presión] of Europe, its author’s conception of Europe resonates with Sartre’s contention that the machine of European

50 See ibid., passim.
colonialism was boomeranging in a dialectical twist. Yet the article was disparaging towards Sartre’s current influence and specifically disparaged the trend of existentialism as a symptom of Europe’s demoralised condition after a thirty-year civil war.\textsuperscript{54}

The putative equivalence of Europe and civilisation was similarly critiqued in the July 1954 edition of \textit{SOSL} by Germán Arciniegas. For the Colombian essayist and historian, the currents of thought that postulated the decline of Europe before the war had only been vindicated since. It was now an opportune moment to challenge the self-confidence of a Europe that was complacent about its Enlightenment credentials, unreflective in its championing of progress, and unabashed in its extension of this abstraction to its barbarous others. In a rhetorical flourish that nonetheless contained much truth, he contrasted three centuries of peace in the Americas to the miserable record of European nations, none of which had gone longer than seventy-five years without a war. Belief in the singular greatness of European civilisation, Arciniegas suggested, should be tempered with a healthy dose of humility, given the very real possibility that it might well last no longer than previous civilisations. This was significant less for the sake of non-European resentment than for its implications for the notion of civilisation. There was now greater space to talk about civilisations in the plural, contrary to the dubious maxim inherited from the French Encyclopedists that ‘it is clear that civilisation means only one thing: Europe’.\textsuperscript{55}

Such a position was not, then, limited to the likes of Claude Lévi-Strauss, who would rise to

\textsuperscript{54} Cosani Sologuren, ‘Europa – península asiatica’, 16. As we will see below, Goytisolo made a similar argument about Spain anticipating Europe in the reversal of its imperial power and subsequent degeneration. See Juan Goytisolo, ‘L’Espagne et l’Europe’, \textit{Les Temps modernes} (July, 1962), 136-137. Of course, Goytisolo was at this time personally and intellectually close to Sartre and the group around \textit{Les Temps modernes}. Indeed, he recalled writing this piece at the behest of either de Beauvoir or another member of the editorial board of \textit{Les Temps modernes}. See Goytisolo, \textit{Forbidden Territory and Realms of Strife}, 233.

general public prominence the following year in France with his travel narrative, *Tristes Tropiques*.\(^{56}\)

One might suggest that the Spanish exiles’ exposure to and the memory of the violence of Franco’s regime predisposed them to a greater acceptance of the disconnection between Europe and universalism, as suggested in the Arciniegas piece. Semprún, for example, pointed to the book by his compatriot in Paris, Juan Goytisolo – *La reivindicación del Conde don Julián*. One of the themes of the work is the battle against the Spanish language as the language of the Empire. Semprún recalled that when Catalan was banned by the Franco regime, posters everywhere stated ‘here one speaks the language of the Empire.’ The language that Francoist officers wanted to impose, he explained, was not the Castilian of Madrid but that of the Empire, of Hernán Cortés and the conquerors of Mexico. It was not incidental, then, that the word *hombre* always connoted the carrier of universal values.\(^{57}\)

Goytisolo himself quoted approvingly Simone de Beauvoir’s similar remarks about language and Europe in his 1962 piece ‘L’Espagne et l’Europe’. De Beauvoir pointed to the drawing of linguistic equivalences in ideas about Europe:

> Aux yeux des penseurs de la droite le privilégié est seul doué d’une véritable existence. En langage bourgeois le mot *homme* signifie *bourgeois*. L’Europe, l’Occident, c’est la bourgeoisie d’Europe, d’Occident; ou plus exactement c’est l’Idée que s’en forge le penseur bourgeois d’Europe, d’Occident. Quant au non-privilégié on le désigne d’ordinaire sous le vocable: les masses et on ne lui concède qu’une réalité négative.\(^{58}\)


This leads us to another aspect of the ideas of Europe of Spanish exiles: who counted as a European, and who did not, or did not in a full sense.

Insiders and Outsiders in the Europe of the Spanish Exiles

Historically criteria for Europeanness have stressed distinctions between insiders and outsiders, and Spain was something of a continuing historical prototype.\(^59\) Henry Kamen writes that the cultural consensus in Franco’s Spain interpreted history as a tragic encounter between what was Spanish and what was ‘alien’ or ‘anti-Spain.’\(^60\) In this sense, the genealogy of notions of Europe and Europeanness which were closed and emphasised purity, could be located in Spanish purges and practices of exclusion of its Jews, Moors, and the Romani. In contrast to a certain parochialism of the main newspaper *Solidaridad obrera*, its eponymous literary supplement demonstrated an inclusiveness which extended to those whose Europeanness, or whose place within Europe at all, was denied. As a point of qualification, though this was the case with its coverage of Islam and Judaism, the journal overlooked the historical place of the

\(^{59}\) Indeed, Ernst Jünger expressed disdain for official Hitlerian racism as a new inquisition. Jünger was of course later assigned to an administrative position in Paris during the German occupation. Gopal Balakrishnan describes his vantage point from there thus: ‘fatalistically inclined to view Nazism as a force accelerating the nihilistic destruction of all Old European values, he would comfort himself with the belief that it might be clearing the ground for some transvaluation to come.’ See Gopal Balakrishnan, *Antagonistics: Capitalism and Power in an Age of War* (London & New York: Verso, 2009), 201. Raymond Aron, moreover, likened the Moscow show trials to the Spanish Inquisition, and posited the Soviet regime that orchestrated them as the antithesis of Europe and Western civilisation. See Iain Stewart, *Raymond Aron and the Roots of the French Liberal Renaissance* (PhD dissertation, University of Manchester, 2011), 107

Romani people. This group was, however, a source of cultural productivity for figures like Goytisolo in the challenging of prevailing orthodoxies about culture and belonging.61

The May 1954 edition included both an article by the Spanish anarchist Felipe Alaiz ‘Iberian Israel. Wedding [nupcial] in Salonica’ and a piece by Bertrand Russell, ‘Islamic cultura and Philosophy’. Alaiz’s previous work included his 1948 La zarpa de Stalin sobre Europa [Stalin’s claw on Europe]. His piece here recounted the history of the expulsion of Jews from Portugal and Spain in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and their subsequent settlement in Salonica. He noted that the region itself lies on the area of the shifting boundaries of Ottoman Empire, thereby underlining the impermanence and ambiguities of the boundaries of both Europe and Europeanness.62 Of course, the city was emblematic of the kind of disastrous practical enforcement of casting out perceived outsiders from insiders that was particularly characteristic of what Hobsbawm describes as an ‘age of catastrophe.’63 The piece by Russell was in fact a very slightly adapted version from the corresponding chapter in his 1946 History of Western Philosophy. As such, one can reasonably conjecture that it was selected for the purpose of complementing and reinforcing the piece by Alaiz. Russell emphasised the crossings and borrowings between the European and non-European world in the Middle Ages, pointing to currents like Aristotelianism and figures like Avicenna and Averroes, as well as Jewish thinkers like Maimonides. It is noteworthy, however, that Russell saw Islam as important only in terms as a transitory phenomenon at a particular point in medieval European history. The underlying

61 For similar reasons, the Romani were of interest to the intellectual couple Guy Debord and Alice Becker-Ho. See Andy Merrifield, Guy Debord (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), 100, 102, 143.
common assumption was that the time when the Arab world had something to teach Europe had passed.

In addition, the December 1954 edition included a piece by P. Bosch-Gimpera, ‘Hebrew Culture in Catalonia’. This exposition of the contribution of Jews to the region in the Middle Ages was similar in tone to a piece in the February 1956 issue by Enrique Rioja, ‘Science during Arab Rule’. There was then a gap of some four years before a similar historical narrative piece appeared with José Peirats’s ‘Aspects of Spanish Judaism’ in November 1960. The February 1956 edition also included an article by Fernando Valera entitled ‘The Libertarian Tradition of Islam’.

Residing in Paris from 1946, Valera was a writer as well as Minister of Justice for the Spanish Republic in exile. His article made an overtly political statement atypical of the direction of the journal in general, and of the other articles dealing with Judaism or Islam. In short, he diverged from a discussion of culture to attack the regressive character of the Arab League in terms resonant of contemporaneous rhetoric by the European imperial powers about Nasser, who was commonly compared to Hitler. He contrasted libertarian versions of Islam with that of the governments of the Arab League – ‘the greatest enemy of modernisation and progress.’

Europe and the Arab world were conceived as profoundly different, but not incorrigibly so if the latter’s structures of feudal privilege and cultural stagnation could be cast off. It was conceded, however, that Franco’s Spain was comparably pervaded by such retarded social structures, its ‘idolatrous superstitions’ were perhaps a tragic correspondence with the Arab world within Europe. To be sure, Valera’s article contains no hint of serious criticism of European imperialism, and ominously just months before the Suez invasion he celebrated the canal as having ‘contributed in

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no small measure to the renaissance of the North African nations.’ The Orientalist motif of the redemption of the West by the East was here triumphantly inverted in a celebration of Europe-induced progress.

It is perhaps instructive that Valera and Camus’s paths crossed in Spanish Republican circles and the former’s evident admiration for the *pied noir* writer extended to a comparable complacency about European colonialism.65 Camus’s flaw in this regard is noteworthy since his political stance was always informed by his understanding of universalism, as he expressly refused to choose between injustices. Camus is often now generally compared favourably to Sartre. But in this instance it is suggested that Sartre’s insistence on ‘situatedness’ and self-conscious engagement as a European in the polemical battles over decolonisation can be understood as a self-ironic Eurocentrism that is preferable to the kind of universalism proffered by Camus and Valera, the abstraction of which amounted to not much more than platitudes and pieties. Self-ironic Eurocentrism implies an unwillingness to dispense with European terms of reference but a resistance to its naturalisation, and the cultivation of a keen ability to be able to reflect critically on itself.

The article ‘Europe – Peninsula of Asia’ subscribed to the proposition of its title; first, in roughly the sense that Sartre meant: besides a geographical label it was a rapidly emptying signifier, since the driving force of world history was now to be located elsewhere. The second sense was to suggest that Europe was permeated by alien and degenerative Asiatic thought, of which Communism, Fascism, and Nazism were indicative. In its condemnation of Communism

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in these terms, the article was at one with a certain conservative axiom of its non-Europeanness. Of course, no fine distinction from a generic red menace would have been made for the anarcho-syndicalism of the paper in the Europeanist prejudices of bourgeois Paris, as described by Vladimir Jankélévitch in reference to the occupation. Indeed, Spanish ‘reds’ were roughly equivalent to Jews, both of which were superfluous to a Europe pitted against Bolshevism. Even in the post-war period the tone of the article resonated with the polemics that characterised much of the conservative press, especially with regard to Communism. In far right circles the argument was pushed further to draw an anti-Semitic equivalence between socialism and Jewish or Asiatic degeneracy, as we saw in the analysis in chapter 5 of the *Fédération des étudiants nationalistes*.66

Yet several parts of the article, though crude, are suggestive of the creative dissonance of Europe’s internal others. It mentions in particular Marx, Freud, and Einstein who, it argued, added Semitic thought to the European culture to which they were fully attached. Conversely, it referred to the origins of Christianity in Jewish thought. The article noted, though, that at the present historical conjuncture Europe was compelled to create new ideas, and yet seemed quite incapable of doing so.

This constellation of remarks might be interpreted as an undeveloped parallel to the later ideas of Isaac Deutscher and Edward Said. Said points to Freud’s analysis of Moses and the non-Jewish origins of Judaism, and the *SOSL* article suggests the usefulness of this kind of idea to account for those non-European origins of Europe it pointed to. In Said’s reading in *Freud and the Non-European*, Freud’s highlighting of the radical originary break or flaw in identities cannot be resolved in the way that so many forms of identity politics demand, and certainly cannot be

reconciled into any single identity. Likewise, the article resonates with Deutscher’s concept of the non-Jewish Jew, on which Said of course drew. Deutscher writes about great Jewish thinkers who, although in one sense heretics, transcended Jewry and still belonged to a Jewish tradition. Of the likes of Spinoza, Heine, Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky, and Freud he argues that, ‘They were a priori exceptional in that as Jews they dwelt on the borderlines of various civilizations, religions, and national cultures. They were born and brought up on the borderlines of various epochs. Their mind matured where the most diverse cultural influences crossed and fertilized each other. They lived on the margins or in the nooks and crannies of their respective nations above their times and generations, and to strike far into the future.’

This is interesting to consider in light of the common European imperial preoccupation of policing fault lines between the European and non-European. The analysis of the SOSL article, supplemented by Said’s and Deutscher’s analyses, would suggest that Europeanness was in any case a necessarily flawed concept; that the continual quest to assert the historical purity of the concept was, to extend our discussion of the term, indeed quite quixotic. Furthermore, it hinted that contrary to that European imperial culture it was precisely on those fault lines that some of the most fertile and creative conceptions of Europeanness could be found, and there that the vibrant originality that the article found so lacking in contemporary Europe could be enlisted.

Juan Goytisolo is a particularly productive writer in terms of thinking about the relation between the notion of Europe and insiders and outsiders, and the implications of this relationship. Intellectually and politically shaped in Paris where he settled in 1956 to escape the stifling intellectual atmosphere of Franco’s Spain, Goytisolo is today commonly referred to as

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Spain’s greatest living author. Eschewing the common preference of Spanish exile intellectuals for Latin America, he was drawn to the French capital by what he describes as its oldest and truest tradition – its instinct for cultural and political subversion.\(^{69}\) He established himself in the French capital as a reader for the Gallimard publishing house whilst pursuing his literary interests and penning anti-Franco articles for French newspapers. His early years in Paris in the period under examination here were formative to his ongoing intellectual engagements. One of his key preoccupations has been to castigate a Spanish tradition of cutting itself off from its Jewish and Moorish roots, and this informs his broader condemnation of European insularity. Goytisolo first became conscious of his Europeanness as the only European in Arab coffee houses in the Paris quarter of Barbès.\(^{70}\) In this context his developing sense of Europeanness was connected to the question of sexuality. As Edmund White argues, ‘like Genet and Pasolini, Goytisolo is a gay European drawn to the Third World through his erotic tastes but who … developed that impulse both through political activism and artistic innovation.’\(^{71}\)

Indeed, Goytisolo’s 1962 article on Europe and Spain in *Les Temps modernes* questioned the very inclusion of Spain within Europe. Here Goytisolo critiqued a recent piece by Enrique Ruíz García that made a case on progressive grounds for Spain joining the European Common Market. Goytisolo argued that for two centuries in Spain progressive and reactionary political forces had corresponded to being pro- and anti-European. Accordingly, for the former, ‘l’Europe était la révolution de 1789 et la Déclaration des Droits de l’homme, l’industrialisation et la réforme de nos institutions et de nos lois.’\(^{72}\) Spanish conservatism, on the other hand, clung on to the past and to the notion of ‘la continuité de notre mission historique; hostile aux tendances

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\(^{71}\) Ibid.
politiques et idéologiques modernes, il attribue tous les maux dont souffre l'Espagne à la contamination européenne.'\textsuperscript{73}

Goytisolo then moved to note that the alignment of these positions had reversed, so that now conservative forces aligned themselves with Europe, in the form of the ongoing process of European economic integration. He suggested that this was simply because the meaning of Europe, rather than conservatives, had changed. The post-war passion of Christian Democrats for Europe, so he charged, was the same as that with which ten years earlier the right had thrown itself into the arms of Hitler and Mussolini. Moreover, he questioned what kind of Europe this was that excluded the USSR and the Eastern bloc.\textsuperscript{74}

The case was then made that, \textit{pace} Ruíz García, accession to Europe was not in the interest of, nor favoured by, the Spanish people. Rather, it was promoted by and in the interests of banks and oligarchs.\textsuperscript{75} Ultimately, the capitalist Europe of contemporary economic integration was could not be distanced from a decidedly dreary and imposing image of what the European powers indelibly represented: ‘camps d’extermination nazis, Hiroshima, persecutions raciales du nord au sud de l’Afrique, assassinat de Lumumba.’\textsuperscript{76} This degenerate Europe romanticised a backward romantic Spain precisely because it sought there the soul it had lost.\textsuperscript{77} What is more, there was a certain irony that one was discussing the merits of Europeanising Spain while it was Europe that was in fact ‘Spanishtising’. This was particularly in terms of colonialism as Spain had

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 130.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 138.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 140-141.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 137.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 145.
shown Europe the way with its decolonisation in the nineteenth century, and in its subsequent decadence. ⁷⁸

As such, Goytisolo questioned whether Spain should aspire to be part of this Europe at all. Rather, it might do well to take seriously Unamuno’s injunction for Spain to ‘Africanise’ itself, to proclaim proudly the slight that ‘Africa starts at the Pyrenees’. Perhaps in the future Spain should reconsider forging ties with Europe. But at this point in time as an under-developed country its fate was tied up with the Third World whose rise contrasted with Europe’s fading spirit of liberty and progress. ⁷⁹

In what became a much commented upon polemical exchange, Francisco Fernández Santos used the forum of the Paris-based paper *Tribuna socialista* to critique Goytisolo’s argument. Fernández interrogated Goytisolo’s singular conception of Europe by asking what in fact one meant by ‘official European culture’. Did it mean theories of neo-capitalism, the stultifying civilisation of gadgets, fascism and racism, an insular Eurocentrism [la mentalidad pequeñoeuropea], the pseudo-philosophy of western moral values as an antidote to Marxist culture? Or did this Europe also encompass authentic democratic values [los valores democráticas reales], the Marxism of Gramsci and Lukács, the existentialism of Heidegger and the dialectical philosophy of Sartre, the Sorbonne and Heidelberg, sociology and psychoanalysis, Surrealism, and so many other facets of European culture that in fact constituted in large part modern universal culture? If one meant the former, then Fernández agreed that Spaniards should resist it. ⁸⁰ But it did not follow that Africanisation would hold any appeal for the Spanish people. For, Fernández held, Spain was in its underdevelopment already African in the worst sense. In

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⁷⁸ Ibid., 136-137.
⁷⁹ Ibid., 146, 136.
his account, then, a move towards Europe was objectively progressive for Spain.\textsuperscript{81} Goytisolo later conceded that Fernández’s critique hit its target.\textsuperscript{82} And yet, his conception of Europe still resisted the extent to which Fernández conflated European and universal culture.

It is notable that one aspect of Goytisolo’s discourse on Europe runs counter to the dominant sentiment among the Spanish exiles: that Francoism was an aberration from the true Spain, a betrayal of the Spain anchored squarely in the centre of European tradition and culture. Goytisolo, on the contrary, locates certain parallels between the Franco regime and Europe as a whole. He points to the example of the refusal to recognise that Cervantes might have been a ‘new Christian’, that is to say a converted Jew or Muslim, quite apart from the manifest influence of Arabic culture in his work, as symptomatic of a broader failure to acknowledge the Arabic role in the European novel. When he says that ‘Kundera was right to say the modern novel began with Cervantes. Don Quixote combined the western and Arabic traditions’, Goytisolo reveals the kind of Europe to which he remains committed. His gauge of the strength of a culture is its ability to absorb alien influences, and the more it can absorb the better. It is this principle that has informed his commitment live as ‘a kind of a European with knowledge of other areas of the world.’\textsuperscript{83}

If Goytisolo was in this sense Europeanised by his residence in Paris, in another sense it also instilled in him a developing conviction about the need for de-Europeanisation. In chapter 2 we examined post-war aspirations to make Paris a kind of de facto capital of Europe, and to reconfigure its cityscape accordingly. Indeed, as the article ‘The Paris that Labours’ in the March

\textsuperscript{81} Goytisolo, \textit{Forbidden Territory and Realms of Strife}, 235.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
1954 *SOSL* reminded its readers, there were many kinds of Paris, most unseen by tourists.\(^8^4\) It was of course the Paris of tourists that was intended as this capital of Europe. Goytisolo, though, felt this to be quite out of sync with the city he knew living in the Sentier district. As Andrew Hussey explains, ‘this is where the revelation had come to him that the idea of a European capital – made and inhabited only by Europeans – is not just an anachronism but a dangerous myth that must be destroyed. The reason for this, he said, is that a purely European idea of the city does not correspond to the reality of the streets.’\(^8^5\)

Goytisolo explained that the sounds of languages he heard at his window – Arabic, Swahili, Kurdish, Hindi, Chinese, as well as several varieties of non-European French – were the true sound of contemporary Paris. Arciniegas suggested in his *SOSL* article that the Enlightenment was merely a thin veneer on Europe. In a more optimistic use of the same metaphor, Goytisolo suggests that the veneer of the sanitised tourist Paris as the capital of Europe thinly concealed a much more satisfying space. As such, the city of Paris today has to be ‘de-Europeanised’ in order to make space for new, dissident voices.\(^8^6\) If sanitisation equated to Europeanisation in Goytisolo’s understanding, it is suggested that his call for de-Europeanisation does not imply the negation of Europeanness, but rather something like a provincialisation of it, to borrow Dipesh Chakrabarty’s term. This implies that the European qualities of Paris are only enhanced by the absorption and juxtaposition of its non-European elements, or better that the two are blurred without ever being undone or negating each other. He suggests that Europeanness or non-Europeanness is one false choice; while the assumption that each category necessarily exists transparently and definitively or not at all, is another. His self-ironic Eurocentrism, as we have

\(^8^4\) Michel Ragón, ‘El París que trabaja’, *SOSL* (March, 1954), 16, 3.
\(^8^5\) Hussey, *Paris*, 432.
\(^8^6\) Ibid., 433.
used the term, in this way precludes both a shapeless cosmopolitanism in which any kind of identity is dissolved, and an unreconstructed blinkered and rigid Eurocentrism that reconstitutes itself in the process of positing Europe’s essential and unique feature to be its universal capacity to subsume every other culture.  

Conclusion

That the culture of Spanish exiles in Paris was a mass affair and not at all limited to intellectual elites is indicative of its valued place in Republican life. It was highly politicised but not so as to preclude fruitful contacts with French and other nationalities in the cultural life in Paris, in forums such as associations of intellectuals, bookshops, journals, universities, conferences, public meetings and many other activities and events besides. Trans-European connections forged at the time of the Spanish civil war were thus extended into this post-war era when the gap in time after that conflict was becoming ever more conspicuous. The European dimension of the Spanish exiles’ presence in the capital was characterised by more than trans-national connections, however. Indeed, the relationship between Spain, Europe, and universalism was a constant touchstone in their cultural output. Discourse about Europe often drew on themes which permeated Spanish history in particular, but were also timely to any consideration of the contemporary continent as a whole: quixotism, the relationship between civilisation, culture and violence and the implications of discerning insiders and outsiders. Of course, their conclusions were anything but unanimous, ranging from the most staid and canonical of definitions of Europe to much more interesting articulations, such as those that were characterised by self-
ironic Eurocentrism and the notion of a certain simultaneous Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation.
Chapter 7. Europeanising Spaces in the Work of Jacques Berque

Jacques Berque was one of the leading European Islamic scholars of his generation. Born in 1910 in Molière in provincial Algeria, he was the son of Augustin Berque, a distinguished Arabist and member of the elite in the *pieds noirs* community. His mother’s roots lay in the *petits blancs* community and, further back, in Spain. Berque studied at the Sorbonne which he detested, and he was unhappy in the Paris of the time. He spent his early career as a colonial administrator in Morocco while continuing his studies.\(^1\) In 1947 Berque became a Middle East expert for UNESCO. Under its auspices he was sent to Egypt in 1953, an experience that was fundamental to the formation of his world view and his engagement with the post-war wave of decolonisation. In 1955 he returned to Paris and was appointed director of Muslim Sociological Studies at the École Pratique des Hautes Études. Berque was elected the following year to the Collège de France where he held the Professorship of Social History of Contemporary Islam. He remained in this post until his retirement in 1981. What makes Berque such an interesting figure to examine in an analysis of ideas of Europe is that he was a foremost representative of Oriental studies – a discipline historically intertwined with European imperialism – at the time when European imperialism was manifestly coming to an end. Moreover, he was engaged both personally and academically with Algeria – the focus or source of so much Parisian debate about the meaning of Europe and Europeanness, as we have seen.

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It is difficult to pigeonhole Berque’s thought. He was both loyal to the French and European Orientalist tradition and deeply critical, at once a defender of European imperialism and one of its most damning critics in this period. Moreover, although never stale and unoriginal, Berque’s subtle ideas of Europe and Europeanness correlated with those of other Parisian figures in this period, and not only in the imperial context. For this reason there is a strong comparative aspect to this chapter and Berque’s Europe is analysed beside ideas of Europe that invoked its imperialism, its relation to the United States, and its struggle to manage its recent history. His views are compared to the ideas of Europe of figures like like Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Renoir, Louis Massignon, and Manès Sperber. This comparative perspective highlights that Berque’s conception of Europe involved critique, proposition, and faith.

The core arguments of this chapter are as follows: firstly, that it is justified to talk about an idea of Europe and Europeanness in Berque’s thought even though the term itself was seldom used. Indeed, the case is made that there was a strong trend of thought in post-war Paris that was unfavourable to explicit use of what was seen as a discredited label. Circumventing explicit use of its name, Berque nonetheless retained an adherence to a conception of Europe and European values. Secondly, one can delineate a vision of Europe within his conception of the Mediterranean as a whole which involved neither a tacking-on of the Arab world to Europe, nor a transcendence of it. It is a fulfilment of Europe that nonetheless leaves it integral. Thirdly, his conclusions about the Arab world that derived from his scholarly concerns about modernity and authenticity also implied a vision of Europe and Europeanness. In this vein he rejected, to a large degree, the significance of religion to an understanding of contemporary Europe or the Arab world. And yet he reinstated an amended conception of religion via his advocacy of Europe, specifically the Europe that embraces its Oriental Other, through faith. This idea of Europe that
drew from faith was descriptive, but more importantly necessitated a commitment. Similarly, this did not involve a tacking on of faith to a European self-image based on its rationalism but an enrichment of an otherwise inadequate conception of the continent as it related to its Oriental Other.

In terms of sources, the chapter draws from Berque’s works in this period generally and also his memoirs. In particular it analyses two pieces: Berque’s inaugural Collège de France lecture in 1956, and his dialogue with Louis Massignon at the Sorbonne in 1960. The first set out the vision he had of Europe and the Arab world and was a point of reference for all his future stances. The second is particularly interesting because it represents an inter-generational dialogue between two formidable Orientalists, each having invested great personal and intellectual commitment to discussing the nature of Europe and the Orient and their relationship to each other.

Jacques Berque and Europe

Berque’s work is profitable for the exploration of the concept of Europe for three reasons: firstly, the significance of the tradition of Orientalism for reflecting on the meaning of Europe, and its special relevance for conceptualising Europe precisely at the time of the decline of European power in the Islamic and Arab worlds. Secondly, the significance of the discourse of Europe prevalent throughout colonial society of which Berque was both product and analyst. And thirdly, the significance of ideas of Europe and European identity in Algeria in particular, which was the focus of much of Berque’s attention in these years. These last two reasons might seem peripheral to our purpose of an examination of Europeanising spaces in Paris but for Ann
Stoler’s reminder that just as European culture and class politics resonated in the colonial setting, so too did discourse about Europeanness in the colonies reverberate in the metropole.²

In a general sense, a study of Berque derives its importance from the historical centrality of the Orientalist tradition of thinking about the meaning of Europe and of European identity. In his seminal work *Orientalism*, Edward Said outlined how the process of European self-definition has historically drawn in large part on its imagination of an Oriental Other.³ What is more, Said described the privileged part that France and French scholars played in what he describes as modern Orientalism. This is an institutionalised way of thinking that began in earnest with Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt and whose French examples include the collective enterprise of the *Description de l’Égypte* and a line of great scholars from Silvestre de Sacy, Ernest Renan, Sylvain Lévi, to Louis Massignon. The prominence of French scholars in Oriental studies should not be taken to mean that France and French imperialism were separate from what was, after all, a conscious common European undertaking that was no less so for usually being competitive and often underwritten by strident nationalism.⁴

Said’s *Orientalism* leaves its examination of the European Orientalist tradition at precisely the moment Berque’s generation came to prominence. This makes sense in terms of Said’s central thesis about academic Orientalism’s intricate and symbiotic relation to political

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⁴ Fredric Jameson notes that the definition of imperialism as a relation between Europe or the West and the Third World is a relatively recent development. In classical Marxist theories, on the contrary, imperialism designated the rivalry of imperial and metropolitan nation states among themselves. See his ‘Modernism and Imperialism’ in Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, & Edward W. Said, *Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 47.
power. For in the post-war world, European empire and influence in the Middle East yielded to the ascending political hegemony of the United States, and so it was to American scholars that Said turned his attention in the final section of his book.

An examination of Berque then, allows us to pursue a question that Said omitted: if Orientalism has traditionally defined an ascendant Europe, how might one of its foremost representatives represent and define that same Europe being stripped of that power and control? We should stress here that stripped is meant in the sense of an ongoing process rather than a finalised condition. Perhaps a danger in the narrative of Said’s *Orientalism* lies in a somewhat abrupt transition to an examination of American Middle Eastern and Islamic studies which might incline one to overestimate the speed and ease with which the European order crumbled. As Matthew Connelly shows, France doggedly resisted this demise until at least the conclusion of the French-Algerian war. As such, Berque had to negotiate his position on Europe in the context of an ongoing challenge to its authority that was often painted in apocalyptic terms. To add urgency to his task, this confrontation took place not in sheltered academic institutions in Paris but at the forefront of the world stage in, for instance, the Algerian war, at the Bandung conference of 1955, or at the Suez debacle in 1956. Furthermore, as Frederick Cooper argues, ‘looking back at the scholarship of the early 1950s, one cannot escape its political engagement, the sense among intellectuals that what they said mattered.’ It follows that what figures like Berque had to say about Europe or Europeanness is not merely interesting in a dusty, antiquarian

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6 See Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, passim. This kind of discourse is further analysed in relation to the Paris police in the chapter 3.  
kind of way, but because of this very urgency and their insistence on real concrete stakes for Europeans and non-Europeans alike.

Berque’s specific position as a professor at the Collège de France – the heart of the Western Orientalist establishment – also bound him to a certain tradition and commitment to think, via the Oriental Other, Europe. Moreover, he took up this position at a time when the Algerian crisis imposed itself on the French consciousness. Although by no means reducible to questions of Europe and European identity, this conflict entailed and highlighted these concepts. Conversely, the prestige of his position conferred him with, to borrow Pierre Bourdieu’s term, the symbolic capital to endow his ideas of Europe and Europeanness with distinct authority.

In colonial society the notions of Europe and of European identity have an importance which is at once transparent and often overly simplified. Ann Stoler demonstrates the importance of the discourse of Europeanness as a means of buttressing the authority of local colonial power in ways that related to shifting markers of race, class, and sexuality. As an instance of the policing of boundaries between the European and the non-European in the empire, Stoler argues that French government concern for ‘the métis problem’ was out of all proportion to the number of people who actually fell into that category.

The primary purpose of the distinction drawn between European and native was the upholding of hierarchy, privilege, and power within a particular colonial territory. The expression of colonial authority was constantly reformulated, and reformulated in particular ways in different European colonies. Nonetheless, Europeanness was term of reference shared by

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8 Benjamin Stora makes the interesting point that a novel feature of the Algerian war was the ambiguity of the private and public in French consciousness which derived in large part from the resistance to calling the conflict a war at all. He argues that death was exclusively a private affair, it was ‘exclu de la vie publique.’ See his La gangrène et l’oubli. La mémoire de la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1998), 73.

9 See Stoler, ‘Making Empire Respectable’.

10 Ibid., 648. Métis refers to those of mixed race.
European colonial states. In relation to one specific but representative example from the earlier twentieth century Stoler remarks that,

This rethinking took the form of asserting a distinct colonial morality, explicit in its reorientation toward the racial and class markers of ‘Europeanness,’ emphasizing transnational racial commonalities despite national differences – distilling a *homo europeaus* of superior health, wealth and intelligence as a white man’s norm. As one celebrated commentator on France’s colonial venture wrote: ‘one might be surprised that my pen always returns to the words *blanc*… or “European” and never to "Français"… in effect colonial solidarity and the obligations it entails allies all the people of the white races.’

Nor were ideas of Europe and of Europeanness in the colonies uncontroversial. They were often vigorously opposed to their equivalents in the metropole, and each one’s ongoing process of definition echoed in the other. Furthermore, Stoler argues that discourse of Europe not only imputed superiority across societies but monitored hierarchy and comportment within them. In sum, colonialism was deeply implicated in discourse about Europe and Europeanness, which in turn was inherently tied up with political power. The question thus arises how Berque conceptualised this mutual relationship between French colonialism, discourse of Europe and Europeanness, and political power.

In this era there was inevitably a marked inclination to receive what French Orientalists had to say in light of the ongoing conflict in Algeria. Berque himself remarked that he suspected one factor in his appointment to the Collège de France was the current public predisposition to inquire into the reasons for France’s failures in the Near East and the Maghreb. Importantly for our purposes, the Algerian war drew attention to a French territory that emphasised the question of Europe particularly heavily.

11 Ibid., 645.
12 Ibid., 651.
Indeed, there was a consistent historical trend to invoke Europe or Europeanness in discussion of Algérie française. Douglas Johnson notes, ‘The French largely failed to integrate themselves or their economy to Algeria. They behaved as if they believed one of the ideas of the 1840s, that Algeria naturally had a European rather than an African destiny.’\(^{14}\) This was fostered by Algeria’s sheer proximity to Europe, to the fact that it was a comparatively extensively settled colony, and that it was in fact incorporated into the French metropole as three départements. Conor Cruise O’Brien saw Albert Camus as an ‘intensely European’ intellectual, in large part because, as a French Algerian, he ‘belonged to the frontier of Europe.’\(^{15}\) By extension so were the pieds noirs as a whole. Indeed, Algerian – that is European settler – identity inherited a tradition of self-understanding in terms of a Latin European and Christian culture.\(^{16}\)

Additionally, there was necessarily at least a weak sense of European consciousness in Algeria that derived from the pan-European origins of its settler population. France aside, waves of emigrants came from various European territories such as Malta, Alsace, Spain, and Italy. In many cases they continued to arrive on the southern shore of the Mediterranean well after the First World War.\(^{17}\) We should not overstate this argument, however. Just as in the Europe they had left, antagonisms proliferated along the lines of different social interests, sectors, and classes, and often did so to an extent bound to frustrate seemingly lofty notions of European cosmopolitanism.

From another perspective, ambiguity about the very Europeanness of the petits blancs in colonial discourse could only have reinforced their defensive affiliation to the label. Stoler shows how poor Europeans were treated with, at best, ambivalence in the colonies generally, and were

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\(^{15}\) Conor Cruise O’Brien, *Camus* (London: Fontana/Collins), 84.

\(^{16}\) Tyre, From Algérie française to France musulmane,’ 279. See also Patricia M.E. Lorcin, ‘Rome and France in Africa: Recovering Colonial Algeria’s Latin Past’, *French Historical Studies* 25/2 (Spring, 2002), 295-329.

often seen as an outright threat to the image of European superiority. Moreover, she traces a shift in metropolitan attitudes whereby the focus on otherness was not limited to indigenous populations but also extended to colonials themselves. Again, given Algeria’s large-scale settlement by poor Europeans in a way that was unacceptable and unpermitted in, for instance, French Indochina, the question of Europe and Europeanness is all the more salient.

However, the label ‘European’ induced a stronger degree of attachment as a mode of distinguishing between the European settlers and the non-European indigenous Arab and Berber populations. The French Algerian writer Jules Roy recalled being instilled with the value that, ‘the Arabs belonged to a different race, one inferior to my own… “They don’t have the same needs we do…,” I was always being told. I was glad to believe it, and from that moment on their condition could not disturb me. Who suffers seeing oxen sleep on straw or eating grass?’

Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is useful in making sense of such ideas – an ethos so inscribed in the general culture as to be internalised as natural, something that went without saying. As such, it is reflected in the thought of even socially committed and engaged liberal humanists like Albert Camus. Berque would come to concur with a certain postcolonial critique of Camus’s work, who otherwise shared Berque’s interest in Europe and passion for the Mediterranean. Namely, that Arabs are either absent in a land in which they were the overwhelming majority, or else depicted as a shady, anonymous people. We should add that the

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Europeanness of repatriated pieds noirs after Algerian independence was a pressing and thorny question (see chapter 2).

In sum, understandings of Europe and Europeanness permeated French settler society in North Africa. As such, as an Orientalist in the Paris academy, Berque was obligated to engage with the questions they posed.

**Berque’s Europe between Paris and Universalism**

The purpose of this section is to take a step back and delineate precisely the grounds for considering ideas of Europe and Europeanness in Berque’s work. After all, one of its manifest traits was to alternate between the terms France, Europe, the West, and universalism. In fact Europe was probably the least used of these terms. But it is suggested here that if we consider these terms in turn, and consider the relation between them, it is reasonable to conclude that a certain concept of Europe is profoundly connected to Berque’s thought.

In the first instance let us clarify the relationship between Paris and France. Frederick Cooper reminds us that France, at least until the end of the period in question in this thesis, was both less and more than itself.²² Both culture and politics were highly centralised in Paris from where an ethos of universalism was projected by France the empire-state far beyond its hexagonal frontiers. In his discussion of the idea of Europe, Hobsbawm also points to the romanticising of peasants but notes that this also often implied that they were backward and so perhaps not fully European – accordingly, they were the quaint subject of ethnographic museums

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²² Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 171.
in the continent’s cosmopolitan cities. Herman Lebovics shows the importance of exhibitions in Paris in displaying the exoticness of French folk cultures and non-Europeans alike. Whether Berque paid attention to such phenomena is less relevant than the fact that the terms of talking about France in relation to its non-European Others were unfailingly centred on Paris.

It is apparent that Berque often referred to France, not Europe as such. Some of his articles of this time mentioned the Europeans of Algeria, but overall they read more as prescriptions for how political France might resolve the crisis. Similarly, his concluding remarks in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in December 1956 stand out:

Proclamer l’avenir de la chose franco-arabe, au moment où beaucoup, parmi les autres et parmi nous, le déchirent, l’audace semble paradoxale. Je soutiendrai ce paradoxe… Province d’étude ou champ de réalisations, ces pays ont été, sont encore pour nous le lieu de notre orgueil et de nos larmes. Dans l’action comme dans la connaissance, l’œuvre française y porte un long héritage d’affirmation humaine. Puisse-t-elle longtemps le soutenir.

However, of crucial importance was Berque’s accompanying assessment that, ‘le français, j’ose le déclarer même aujourd’hui, reste l’hellénisme des peuples arabes.’ From this we can infer that Berque’s references to France did not reflect a conviction that it was radically distinct in its nature as a European imperial power. Instead it was the highest representative of a common Hellenic, European civilisation.

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26 Jacques Berque, ‘Perspectives de l’Orientalisme Contemporain’, Revue de l’Institut de Belles Lettres Arabes 20 (1957), 238. This is in fact Berque’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France on 1 December 1956.
27 Ibid., 237.
This point was highlighted in Berque’s exchange with Louis Massignon in a public conversation at the Sorbonne in 1960 mediated by Jean-Marie Domenach. The premise of the occasion was a discussion of Berque’s book *Les Arabes d’hier à demain* (1960). In the context of his understanding of the unfolding of modern history, Berque referred to ‘les Occidentaux’, who took the initiative in the promulgation of ‘la civilisation technique’. This was in fact one of Berque’s central scholarly concerns. For him this manifest European commonality had structured the globe materially and also existentially. Accordingly, any adequate account of how Europeans and Arabs alike defined the self had to take account of this history.

Fundamental to Berque’s vision of the leading role of France and French culture in the West’s relation with the Arab world was his conviction that this was so in the eyes of the Arabs themselves. We have seen how he set out this case in his inaugural Collège de France lecture, and again in his exchange with Massignon. Although he remarked on the Arab world’s disappointment with France six years into the Algerian war and in the wake of Suez, he still maintained, ‘Je reviens à ce que je disais tout à l’heure des responsabilités de notre pays qui, aux yeux des Arabes, constitue le vrai Occident et peut-être la vraie culture… Le désespoir monte et nous sommes responsables en partie de ce désespoir.’

If we can accurately qualify Berque’s Paris-centred West as an idea of Europe, it is on account of his profound scepticism about the United States as an appropriate agent for non-coercive dialogue and exchange in the Islamic world. In his inaugural lecture, Berque commented on the ‘image néfaste’ of the traditional colonial administrator, but asked ‘préfériez-vous celle de l’aventurier évasive que chanta Lawrence, ou celle, plus moderne, de l’affairiste

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29 Ibid., 1506.
30 Ibid., 1509.
31 Ibid., 1517.
The reference to T.E. Lawrence suggests that European imperialists had not been disinterested participants in Middle Eastern affairs, but Berque still maintained that the European sensibility for its Others was superior to crass and impersonal American commercialism. Accordingly, he reflected ominously on the meeting between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud in 1947 – a threshold for the rise of the *Pax Americana* in the region. He finished the thought with a suspicion of some bitterness: ‘Cinq ans après, l’Europe occidentale dépendait du plan Marshall et le tiers monde du point IV de Truman.’

One might suggest here that Berque left himself vulnerable to being read as regretting less American hegemony’s consequences for the Third World than the decline of Europe and the imperialism which defined it.

Berque was also very dubious about the intellectual methods with which the United States was to impose itself on the Arab world – its crude ideas about modernisation were scant compensation for its utter inexperience there. In his memoirs he recalled his stint working in Egypt under the auspices of UNESCO – an organisation he described as being ‘alors dominée par le triomphalisme américain.’

Moreover, he felt that the importance in the Arab world of the reciprocity between past and present, and its dilemma regarding revolution and authenticity were completely unappreciated; this was the case even in as systematically researched a thesis as Daniel Lerner’s *The Passing of Traditional Society* – an archetypal work in post-war American modernisation theory. As we will see, Berque did address these questions and in doing so went some way towards expounding a vision of Europe.

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32 Berque, ‘Perspectives de l’Orientalisme Contemporain’, 221.
33 Berque, *Mémoires de deux rives*, 151.
34 Ibid., 150.
Berque’s thought about Europe in relation to the United States was quite orthodox in post-war Paris, and drew sustenance from a remarkable agreement as to the otherness of America. Tony Judt argues that historically the French exhibited in their acutest form the mixed feelings of Europeans towards the Americas, and in this context, he notes the relevance of the infusion of German thought into French circles which manifested itself in a Heideggerian distaste for ‘technical civilization’, a term very important to Berque’s own thought about both the European and non-European worlds.36

If America was characterised by vulgar materialism and modernity, a lack of polish of centuries of national and popular culture, it was all the same conceived as Europe’s Other not in kind but degree. It was different, to be sure, but not radically so. This is crucial to bear in mind in reflecting on what it meant to talk about America in terms of an idea of Europe or of European identity. As such, Jean-Paul Sartre condemned ‘that super-European monster, North America’ in his condemnation of European colonialism in his preface to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth.37 In this particular kind of idea of Europe, abhorrence of America at one moment was reinforced in the next by its very familiarity. Scorn was a compensatory mechanism for a distinction that was uncomfortably slight. Such was the significance of Claude Roy’s assessment: ‘In the forties and fifties, America was not very much liked by Europeans, and by the French in particular… Europeans detested America because they detested themselves.’38 Berque however, was steadfastly optimistic in his vision of Europe, and so it is symptomatic that his distaste for America never approached the extent, itself not at all untypical in post-war Paris, of a 1952 editorial in Esprit by the mediator of Berque and Massignon’s conversation.

38 Cited in Judt, Past Imperfect, 187.
Domenarch wrote that, ‘Dès le début, nous avons ici dénoncé la mise en tutelle de la politique française, et les dangers mêmes que faisait courir à la santé de notre pays une culture américaine qui attaque à leurs racines l’originalité et la cohésion mentale et morale des peuples européens.’

Having set out the arguments as to why Berque’s ‘West’ is to be properly thought of as Europe, with France playing a leading role therein, let us turn to investigate the relation and distinction between this idea of the continent and universalism. The salience of the question is shown by James Le Sueur’s discussion of the declining capital of French universalism during, and as a result of, the Algerian War. He argues that hitherto this ideology commanded assent across the political spectrum and transcended endemic conflict between Communists, non-Communists, Marxists, non-Marxists, liberals and non-liberals. In fact, Berque retained a belief in the notion of universalism but approached it cautiously and critically, which is not to say unproblematically. Above all, in an age of decolonisation he considered that it behoved Europeans to reconsider their ‘patterns of existence’, and the West to question its insistence on its hegemony and universalism.

Immanuel Wallerstein’s distinction between a partial and distorted ‘European universalism’ and a ‘universal universalism’ is useful here. He identifies the former with the legitimisation of the powerful in the modern world system since at least the sixteenth century. In one sense this captures the direction and sense of Berque’s thought. However, Berque was also alert to the limitations of challenges to the rhetoric of the powerful which reproduced in a different form the Eurocentrism they took to task. Berque’s discourse about Europe, then,

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39 Jean-Marie Domenach, editorial in Esprit (June, 1952), 1034.
involved critiquing the inadequate ideas of others as well as setting out his own. Let us illustrate with the examples of Jacques Soustelle and Sartre.

Jacques Soustelle was Governor General of Algeria in 1955 and 1956. Le Sueur argues that he ‘unquestioningly privileged the French nation as a bearer of progress and civilization… he believed that French technology, progress, science and rationality was superior to the Algerians’ indigenous culture and religion.’

Consequently, he professed that Algerian Muslims were capable of being true citizens because they were slowly being westernised by French civilisation. His interlinking of France and the West exemplifies a world view derived from the Enlightenment and French Revolution. That is to say, an idea of Europe’s meritorious potential fulfilled by France – its highest example in Europe itself and best hope for proselytisation of that spirit outside of Europe. As a darling of the pieds noirs community that had initially distrusted him, one risks too easily dismissing Soustelle as an uncomplicated French chauvinist. Disappointed by de Gaulle’s rejection of his advocacy of ‘intégration’ of the French and indigenous communities in Algeria, and the subsequent direction of the war towards Algerian self-determination, Soustelle lambasted French Jacobin parochialism. His remarks in support of the idea of ‘Eurafrique’ are a useful reminder that Eurocentrism is not expelled merely by its acknowledgement and a professed aversion to it:

Pour construire une France eurafricaine fédérale, il eût fallu que la métropole jouât le jeu. Et elle n’a pas joué, en grande partie parce qu’elle redoutait, en vertu d’une conception jacobine de sa souveraineté, que fussent créés, comme il était naturel, des pouvoirs fédéraux qu’Européens et Africains auraient exercés à égalité… On aime mieux, en somme, rester entre vieux Français… et cultiver le petit pré carré des ancêtres, que de courir l’aventure avec des Africains, des Arabes, des Kabyles, voire des néo-Français qui, si patriotes qu’ils soient, n’en ont pas moins le tort de s’appeler Hernandez. Jacobinisme? Sans doute. Il y a aussi, chez certains, un racisme sans doute

44 Ibid., 109.
inconscient qui leur fait préférer une petite France bien pure à une grande France trop mêlée du point de vue des sangs et des religions.45

Like Soustelle, Berque was also unapologetic in retaining his belief in progress – a view that many in post-war Europe no longer found tenable. Likewise, its standing in historiography in the 1950s was at a particularly low ebb.46 Yet, one of the core tenets of Berque’s work was the historical transition of the world from sacred to historic time, to a temporality driven by the notion of technical progress.47

Berque too, had worked as a colonial administrator and whilst the experience reinforced Soustelle’s colonial certainties, Berque’s impressions were quite different. Consequently, his notion of universalism would differ from Soustelle’s in two key ways. Firstly, Berque was profoundly troubled by the domination and violence which underwrote the colonial enterprise; it distorted human relations and cut the ground from under universalism’s own feet.48 It is important to note, however, that he did not see violence as necessarily constitutive of imperialism – we will return to the implications of this for the representation of Europe below. Secondly, like Soustelle, he professed the necessity and merits of European science, rationality, and technology. But he qualified his enthusiasm with the judgement that though necessary, they were insufficient to know the colonial Other. And so by the same token he disrupted a European self-image based on its universalist capacity to understand the world.

47 Sacriste, Germaine Tillion, 168.
48 Berque, Mémoires de deux rives, 143.
Berque’s developing sense of Europe made him no less sceptical with regard to other ideas of universalism, even when they derived from sources quite opposed to the likes of Soustelle. In relation to the ideas of figures such as Sartre, Berque felt that claims to universalism, radical or not, often did not leave their own borders. They were ideas of Europe, or ideas of what Europe should be, projected elsewhere. In his memoirs, Berque reflected that Sartre’s ‘conclusions procédaient moins de l’analyse des situations et des spécificités en cause que d’une problématique centrée sur l’Occident.’\textsuperscript{49} He assessed Sartre’s support for the FLN as ‘européocentrique’ since ‘le FLN ne faisait qu’entamer une nouvelle révolution universelle, c’est-à-dire française.’\textsuperscript{50}

Wallerstein suggests how one might begin to define and approach a ‘universal universalism’, and cites as a point of departure Léopold-Sédar Senghor’s notion of the ‘rendez-vous du donner et du recevoir.’ As a member at once of the Académie française and an exponent of negritude, Senghor was an ideal exponent of the appealing idea of a space of giving and receiving that Wallerstein sees as the basis of a ‘universal universalism’.\textsuperscript{51} There are certain parallels between this and Berque’s thought, examined below, about the possibilities and conditions of genuine exchange between Europe and the Arab world.

The Form and Substance of Berque’s Europe

As a point of contextualisation and comparison we will continue the examination of Sartre’s understanding of Europe. The key point to be made here is that Berque necessarily had

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\textsuperscript{49}Berque, \textit{Mémoires de deux rives}, 200. For a contemporary critique along these lines see Denis de Rougemont, ‘Sartre contre l’Europe’, \textit{Arts: beaux-arts, littérature, spectacles} (17 January, 1962).
\textsuperscript{50}Berque, \textit{Mémoires de deux rives}, 180.
\textsuperscript{51}Wallerstein, \textit{European Universalism}, 79-80.
to take account of a strong current of opinion at this time in post-war Paris that strongly critiqued any positive invocation of Europe. This leads us to examine Berque’s conception of the Mediterranean where he articulated a community of Europe and the Arab world. It is argued that his academic preoccupation with modernity and authenticity in the Arab world revealed an underlying conception of Europe.

To borrow again Bourdieu’s concept of a field in which claims about identity confront each other, any conception of Europe could not ignore or avoid the impact of other ideas of Europe, or for that matter claims that Europe as a label of belonging or organisation was actually unimportant. In this period, Sartre, as France’s most famous intellectual, carried considerable symbolic capital to make such claims and to a significant extent set the terms of debate about Europe, and he did so scathingly.

Sartre’s universalism derived from his philosophy of freedom and understanding of history. Europe is an idea that appears repeatedly in his work of this period, in the context of both the Cold War and of Europe’s imperial commitments. As we have seen, Berque preferred to keep Orientalism out of politics at least in the sense of it being the direct academic and spiritual arm of European political hegemony. But like Césaire and Fanon, Sartre was more intent on showing how, as far as the idea and ideals of Europe were concerned, culture was immersed up to its neck in the sordid politics of European imperialism:

The European elite set about fabricating a native elite; they selected adolescents, marked on their foreheads, with a branding iron, the principles of Western culture, stuffed into their mouths verbal gags, grand turgid words which stuck to their teeth; after a brief stay in the mother country, they were sent back interfered with. These living lies no longer had anything to say to their brothers; they echoed; from Paris, from London, from Amsterdam we proclaimed the words ‘Parthenon!
For Sartre, Europe here was worth exceedingly little – it was nothing more than a transient phase to be transcended in a higher unity. And for him so much the better since Europe was a term sullied by its own behaviour, and all the more so for its protestations of its high ideals. Sartre makes a damning summary of this state of affairs:

In the past, our continent had other devices to keep it afloat: the Parthenon, Chartres, the Rights of Man, the swastika. We now know what they are worth: and now the only thing they claim can save us from shipwreck is the very Christian sentiment of our guilt. This is the end, as you can see: Europe is taking in water everywhere. What then has happened? Quite simply this: in the past we were the subjects of History, whereas we are now its objects. The balance of power has been reversed, the process of decolonisation is in progress; all that out mercenaries can attempt is to delay its completion.53

For Sartre, in any context Europe was a term which connoted so strongly domination and illegitimate hierarchy as to override all else. ‘The word “Europe”,’ he wrote in 1947, ‘formerly referred to the geographical, economic, and political unity of the Old Continent. Today, it preserves a musty smell of Germanism and servitude.’54 Elsewhere in the intellectual field, the dominance of Lévi-Strauss signified that after his Race and History (1952) it was somewhat more difficult to appeal to staid notions of European superiority. In this work, Western industry and science were presented to a wide audience as merely ‘the outcome of chance combinations at the roulette table of time, rather than any inner historical dynamic.’55 In any case, the key point is

53 Ibid., 170-71.
that to the extent that Berque thought in terms of Europe, he was obliged to formulate it taking into account a prestigious body of thought which insisted at best that the concept’s importance was exaggerated, or at worst that it was barely serviceable. What, then, did Berque wish to retain in an idea of Europe, and how was he to circumvent the discrediting of the label by the likes of Sartre, and, as Berque saw it, their parochialism?

A core idea in Berque’s thought is the Latin Mediterranean. This is particularly interesting in the context of Todd Shepard’s observation that today the Mediterranean Sea has become a definitive border of Europe, whereas decades ago it was projected as a bridge that would facilitate the conjoined construction of Europe and Africa as a replacement for European colonial domination. Various influential Parisian figures expounded on the concept of the Mediterranean in this period, notably Albert Camus and Fernand Braudel. So what was the nature of Berque’s vision and how did it connect to Europe? He later contrasted the authentic and creative kind of community this Latin Mediterranean might represent with the uninspiring mercantile actuality of Western Europe – a sort of ‘grosse Suisse bouffie.’ He posed the question: ‘Dire qu’entre la latinité, c’est-à-dire aussi l’hellénisme, et l’Islam méditerranéen nous devons forger une synthèse, est-ce là une irréalisable utopie? Utopie je veux bien. Mais irréalisable non pas! Ce qui depuis un siècle monte autour de la mer commune, et s’aime et se bat, et se cherche en l’autre, et par et contre lui, peut nous mener, si nous y travaillons, à des Andalousies nouvelles.’

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57 Interestingly given the subject of this chapter, Carole Reynaud Paligot examines the Orientalist underpinnings of the work of Braudel and his fellow annaliste Lucien Febvre, both of whom were important influences on Berque. See Carole Reynaud Paligot, ‘Les Annales de Lucien Febvre à Fernand Braudel: Entre épopée coloniale et opposition Orient/Occident’, French Historical Studies 32/1 (2009), 121-144.
59 Ibid., 308.
There are two arguments to be made as to how this expressed an idea of Europe, albeit of course a particular and differentiated variant. This section will proceed as follows: firstly, we will examine the nature of his conception of the Mediterranean and equivalent terms to make the case that these encompass a particular way of conceptualising Europe. His terminology emphasised self-identification by Othering, but in a dialogical, not reactionary and xenophobic, sense. Secondly, the case will be made that, contrary to Sartre’s formulation, there was to be no transcendence of Berque’s Europe. Europe was a component of the Mediterranean world and yet not constitutively dependent on it. If he talked about a synthesis of new Andalusias, this was something to struggle for in the long term, and could not be prematurely declared by radical philosophy. If this was true at the time of his closing Collège de France lecture, it was even more so at the time of the bloody French-Algerian war.

To be clear, when Hourani writes that Berque ended his career by affirming his faith in the Mediterranean community in his closing Collège de France lecture, it is not to say that this was a departure from his earlier thought. Rather, Berque completed his academic career having unswervingly upheld his commitment to such an idea. Of course, if Berque meant that Europe as a whole was less important than its own southern, Mediterranean region then it would be unpersuasive to talk about an idea of Europe, or of European identity, at all. But a regional and detached Latin Mediterranean sits at odds with Berque’s insistence that ‘notre monde n’est plus cantonal.’60 Throughout his career, in fact, Berque used several different terms as equivalent to this Latin North Mediterranean: as we have seen, in his inaugural lecture in 1956 he maintained that the French language was still, and would remain, ‘the Hellenism of the Arab peoples’; and in his exchange with Massignon in 1960, he spoke of wanting to convey a ‘Greco-Oriental message’, of an Asiatic Mediterranean and of the Greek figure Heraclitus as representative of

60 Berque, ‘Perspectives de l’Orientalisme Contemporain’, 218.
this ethos. These various labels should be interpreted as a common sentiment – a certain vision of Europe among others. Again this correlates with the argument we will set out that this understanding of the idea of Europe is a commitment as much as a description. After all, Berque was too subtle a scholar to collapse the history of Medieval Andalusia with Ancient Greece together on the one hand, and on the other all the histories and societies of the Mediterranean Arab world; nor to idealise them beyond what serious scholarship could sustain in good faith. We might better understand this Europe as part historical analysis and part program. His historical analysis reiterated that however flawed, there was a real and important historical legacy of coexistence and mutual and profitable exchange and interaction between Europe and its Oriental Other, despite his insistence on the pronounced difference in their respective trajectories of material development.

Yet his choice of terminology leaves the impression that Europe is a word so loaded with negative connotations of domination and exploitative hierarchy that it cannot uphold its own positive aspects. It is as if he had to ditch the name to save the content of his idea of Europe, in contrast to the enthusiasm for the term of, for instance, Denis de Rougemont. It is as if Europe was torn between the condemnations of the Sartres on the one side, and the appropriation of the label by the likes of Soustelle and Maurice Papon to defend the colonial status quo on the other. It is not plausible to suggest that Berque’s ‘Asiatic Mediterranean’ was not European at all. Rather the use of the expression Asiatic suggests compensation as if even to use the label Europe would be to prejudice the very attributes in that idea of Europe he wished to mobilise. By this point Berque saw decolonisation as inevitable as well as desirable. But the implication was that even when the current subjective overt violence of the Algerian war should cease, the label

Europe would retain an insidious connotation of illegitimate hierarchy and violence, surreptitiously distorting relations between Europe and the Arab world. In other words, even when the outward manifestations of imperial hierarchy and violence were removed, the very term Europe retained a loaded association with these negative qualities. It still implied a subtle, intricate Eurocentric interest significant enough to undermine the theoretical goal of a ‘universal universalism’.

Secondly, unlike Sartre’s conception of the universal, Berque’s Europe was not transcended into a higher unity. His Europe is a constituent part of the Mediterranean, but no less integral and self-contained for that. But neither is this Mediterranean merely a tacking-on of the Orient to Europe; the articulation of the former fulfils the latter while each remains integral. Herein lies the value of Berque’s Europe as Latin Mediterranean as opposed to, say, de Rougemont’s idea of a Europe with its heart in the western part of the continent. In Berque’s terms, de Rougemont’s Europe is not inaccurate, merely impoverished. Berque counter-proposed this Latin Mediterranean as a more enriching basis for Europe.

Berque might have thought that most differences between Europe and the Orient were historically contingent, but differences they remained. And though formulae for a quick resolution or synthesis of the contradictions of the colonial situation might have been comforting, they were actually disabling. What would become of ‘la “chose franco-arabe”’, and by extension European and Arab mutual understanding, would be worked out over the long wave of history.

Interestingly, there is a certain parallel in Berque’s conception of Europe and the anticolonial theory of Frantz Fanon. Berque knew Fanon, discussed his work with him, and

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64 Berque, ‘Perspectives de l’Orientalisme Contemporain’, 225.
65 Berque, Mémoires de deux rives, 180.
admired him, whilst not sharing what he saw as his strain of morbidity and masochism.\textsuperscript{66} Said surmises that Fanon drew from Lukács’s classic analysis of subject-object relations; ultimately though, Fanon refused Lukács’ promise of transcendence. According to this analysis, for the Martinican psychiatrist there was no higher unity to be reached between coloniser and colonised, the relation was cemented by mutual exclusivity. But contrary to the way in which he is often read as celebrating violence as an end in itself, Fanon was aware that anticolonial nationalism was in itself no solution to colonialism. Indeed, if it was not to lapse into a repetition of the European colonialism it defeated, anticolonial nationalism must quickly transform itself into a consciousness of social and political needs.\textsuperscript{67} Berque’s lived experience among the Arabs instilled in him a sense, complementary to Fanon’s formulations, that history could not be reduced to formulae nor willed away into a tidy totality. Rather, it was something to work through and he retained a vision of Europe that would engage this challenge in a mutually sustained and equal dialogue. Through this, the mutual and self-definitions of Europe and the Arab world would incorporate precisely these social and political needs that Fanon pointed to, rather than tired labels of identity or spurious promises of utopian resolution. Next to Fanon’s theoretical exposition of colonialism, Berque added a personal anecdote that evinced a comparable absence of transcendence of Europe and the Arab world despite the possibility of mutual and fruitful coexistence within the Mediterranean community: ‘Jamais mes amis afro-asiatiques ne m’auront demandé même par insinuation, de renoncer à mon açâla [Berque


translates this as authenticity or identity]. Les Arabes tiennent trop à la leur. Et l’*açâla* commande la réciprocité. 68

If Berque allowed the relation of Europe to the Arab world or of Occident to Orient to sit as it was, he did not suggest that either was timeless and unchanging, much less that Europe was superior. Each label was in fact of secondary importance; for both Berque and Sartre ‘politics begins not ends with identity.’ 69 An idea of Europe or of European identity as an end in itself did not interest Berque; rather it was a historically accessible frame of reference to further his cause of mutual understanding and profitable exchange. One might argue that this is something like, to borrow and adapt Gayatri Spivak’s concept, unintentional strategic essentialism. Spivak’s concept entails the idea that though differences might permeate certain groups, for the purpose of pursuing certain goals it is worth essentialising themselves. 70 By analogy, Berque perhaps suggests a Europe he should not believe in as a hard identity, but whose deficiencies or contradictions are overridden by its potential for human exchange and understanding. Indeed he assured his audience in his inaugural lecture that his understanding of the Occident/Orient relationship differed from that of Kipling, nor was it comparable to Herodotus’s irredeemable opposition between Greeks and Barbarians. Interestingly, Berque then cited the Egyptian scholar Ah’mad Amîn who, ‘dans un de ses livres, niait d’abord que cet Orient et cet Occident formassent deux entités différentes. Il les définissait plus justement comme deux styles, voire comme deux phases de la même civilisation.’ 71 Berque drew back from fully endorsing the idea, but one has the impression he was tempted by it nonetheless. Europe as a style, as opposed to an

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70 For her discussion of the term and how it has been used by others see Sara Danius & Stefan Jonsson, ‘An Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’, *boundary 2* 20/2 (Summer 1993), 24-50. One should note that Spivak later renounced this concept.
71 Berque, ‘Perspectives de l’Orientalisme Contemporain’, 225.
identity or essence, suggests something more provisional, even something aesthetic. But conversely, it risks being inadequate to carry the kind of analytical weight Berque wanted for it in both senses of his idea of Europe as description and commitment.

**Modernity and Authenticity**

One can extrapolate Berque’s ideas about the nature of Europe and the meaning of Europeanness from his scholarship of the Arab world, specifically his inquiry into its struggle with the issues of modernity and authenticity. As Hourani describes it, ‘at the heart of his concern has been the problem of alienation: how can men and women repossess a world which has grown alien to them, and to do so without losing their authenticity? How can they avoid the two dangers of a stagnant reassertion of an identity inherited from the past, and a cosmopolitan and futureless modernity?’

Modernity was indeed a constant preoccupation in Berque’s thought, and fundamental to his conception of what defined and drove Europe and the Arab world respectively. This derived from his understanding of history in which Europe had taken the lead whilst the Arab countries embarked on modernity no earlier than the First World War, and not really until the Second World War. In his inaugural lecture, Berque suggested a working definition of modernity by which to understand the current situation in which relations between Europe and the Orient were framed:

Les derniers siècles ont été pour nous des siècles de conquête de la matière, tandis qu’en Orient subsistaient les modes du passé: agriculture somnolente ou marchandages agiles. Une telle

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73 Berque, ‘Perspectives de l’Orientalisme Contemporain’, 223.
As such, Berque’s conception of what both Europe and the Arab world were, and what they could be, stemmed from an appreciation of their histories. Berque insisted on the enduring relevance of history, and of the historian as mediator, to an understanding the European self. In his 1960 dialogue with Massignon he reflected that, ‘je serais tenté de croire, comme vous, que l’avenir, pour les Arabes comme pour nous, consiste dans la vivification du passé. L’avenir est à beaucoup d’égards le passé vivant, le passé revivant, revécu, et non pas ce passé pourri auquel se cramponnent les conservateurs.’

Later in his life, reflecting on his career, Berque made a fleeting and unexamined but telling point about the nature of history. He remarked that in Algérie française ‘le souvenir des traumatismes subis au XIXe siècle et la persistance de la domination éluaidaient le gros des effets créateurs du contact des cultures.’ Against the grain of a certain trend of conceiving of Europe as starting again from a tabula rasa after the Second World War, Berque hinted at the continuing determinacy of violence to distort societies, though not irreparably so, provided it is acknowledged and worked through. Though Sartre might disapprove of the invocation of history as the alibi of inauthenticity, he would add to this that it is not only the society of the victims of violence that is distorted. So too is the Europe that perpetrates violence: ‘Pas un français ne sera en sécurité tant qu’un Juif, en France et dans le monde entier, pourra craindre pour sa vie.’

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74 Ibid., 225.
76 Berque, ‘Le veilleur de la nuit coloniale’, in Une Cause jamais perdue, 27.
Furthermore, Berque’s invocation here of the continuing presence of the past draws our attention beyond one’s stance on Europe to process – how such ideas are formed. In one sense Berque’s Europe derived from an understanding of the *longue durée* nature of history, and in this regard he made explicit his debt to figures like Lucien Febvre and Fernand Braudel. However, this historical consciousness was not so settled as to be unaffected by the unraveling events of decolonisation. Berque’s intellectual trajectory correlates to Frederick Cooper’s observation about how quickly the acceptance of imperialism as a fact of a life was completely overturned in a matter of a couple of decades.\footnote{Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 54.} Berque himself credited his espousal of the cause of anticolonial nationalism to his short-term work in an Egyptian village in the 1950s.\footnote{Berque, *Mémoires de deux rives*, 159, 164.} One might make a case here for the potential of travel as a means of rethinking even longstanding and entrenched notions of the European self.\footnote{See Jacques Rancière, ‘Discovering New Worlds: Politics of Travel and Metaphors of Space,’ in *Travellers’ Tales: Narratives of Home and Displacement*, eds. George Robertson et al (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), 29-37.} Sartre, on the other hand, reminds us not to confuse such arguments with self-congratulatory worldliness which cancels through into a European imperialistic mindset – one thinks here of Soustelle’s remarks above. In his preface to Henri Cartier-Bresson’s collection *D’une Chine à l’autre* (1954), Sartre maintained that tourists were the later equivalent of irritated missionaries and soldiers, and more generally a culture of war and ‘a refusal to understand the enemy’.\footnote{Sartre, ‘From One China to Another’, in *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*, 22. Interestingly, Stephanie Hare points to Papon’s formative travels while an administrator in the Muslim world and his subsequent interest in Islam. In what is a non-sequitur, Hare finds this largely to preclude any colonialist rationale for Papon’s actions, including in his role as an administrator in Algeria and as head of the Paris police at the time of the 17 October 1961 killings. See See Stephanie Hare, *Death, Duty and the Republic: The Career of Maurice Papon from Vichy France to the Algerian War* (PhD dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008), 81-82 & passim.} 

Berque’s idea of Europe thus intermixed chronic and acute causation, long-term structural consistency and short-term contingency. This question of the precise nature of
historical time that informs ideas of Europe and of Europeanness is complex but important, since it implies that one needs to examine them also in terms of the struggle to imagine them, which cannot be reduced to a smooth progressive development.

The idea of Europe’s modernity has historically been a justification for its universalism, and its science and technology a legitimisation of its rule over non-Europeans.82 The ambiguity and problematic nature of the discourse of modernity has detracted from this not at all.83 Indeed, Wallerstein reminds us that historically Occident to Orient was often presumed analogous to modernity to tradition.84 With regard to his conceptualisation of Europe, here we will look at two ways in which Berque dissented from this orthodoxy and one way in which he upheld it.

Firstly, Berque was frustrated by colonial inertia which sat at odds with the image of a modern and dynamic enterprise. Equally, he was appalled by reactionary colonial violence.85 Such concerns stand at odds with the influential Foucauldian notion of ‘governmentality’ as characteristic of modern Europe.86 Upon close examination, an assertive European identity or idea of Europe was unpersuasive when it based on an imperial enterprise whose capacity for adaptation was so clunky and limited. Indeed, whether in North Africa or in Palestine or anywhere else, European empires so often failed to do anything substantive by way of political reform when they needed to and were still able to, and only attempted to do something when it was too late to do anything.

83 See Frederick Cooper’s discussion of modernity in his *Colonialism in Question*, 113-149.
84 See Wallerstein, *European Universalism*, 75-76.
85 Berque, *Mémoires de deux rives*, 143. See also Albert Hourani’s similar contemporary analysis of colonial violence and inertia and the European consciousness in Hourani, ‘The Decline of the West in the Middle East I’, *International Affairs* 29/1 (January, 1953), 22-42; Hourani, ‘The Decline of the West in the Middle East II’, *International Affairs* 29/2 (April, 1953), 156-183.
Secondly, in his inaugural lecture, he concurred with H.A.R. Gibb about the difficulty of penetrating the Arab world.\textsuperscript{87} However, this is not to be taken as a further endorsement of the traditional notion of the unfathomable, mysterious, and irrational Oriental Other, but a comment on the limits of the knowledge upon which Europe had defined and prided itself: its modernity and technical mastery were less awesome that Europeans would like to think. After all, in the same lecture Berque explicitly invoked the inadequacy of present research methods:

N’est-il pas difficile, voire impossible, de se pencher sur l’Islam d’aujourd’hui, avec les précautions, mais aussi les exigences de l’histoire? En une matière aussi vivante, aussi brûlante, aussi souffrante, les moyens habituels de la science ont leur valeur, immense, mais qui ne saurait suffire. Il faut vivre au contact de ces hommes, rechercher leur familiarité, presque une connivence… Mon sujet exige de qui veut l’étreindre, non seulement la rançon habituelle de l’étude: longues années de lectures poudreuses, enquêtes prolongées sur le terrain – mais un pacte de sympathie, d’engagement.\textsuperscript{88}

This call for a pact of sympathy and commitment are crucial to an understanding of Berque’s conception of Europe. We will return to a fuller examination of this idea below.

On the other hand, in his reflection upon his career Berque remarked on his intellectual affiliation to the bureaux arabes – a classic institutional example of colonial modernisation.\textsuperscript{89} However, he recalled in his memoirs that to a greater and greater extent he repudiated not the prestigious tradition of the bureaux but its ‘dégénérescence, son inadéquation.’\textsuperscript{90} This is a very important point in terms of ideas of Europe and of European identity. _Pace_ Sartre then, for Berque there were good and bad _colons_; it was possible to separate the positive benefits of colonialism from its exploitation and violence – regrettable, even shameful, but contingent and unnecessary phenomena. Of course, the value of the distinction is most obvious in the case of

\textsuperscript{87} Berque, ‘Perspectives de l’Orientalisme Contemporain’, 230.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 218-219.
\textsuperscript{89} Berque, ‘Introduction’, in _Une Cause jamais perdue_, 7.
\textsuperscript{90} Berque, _Mémoires de deux rives_, 141.
those nostalgic for a Europe of imperialism. But it applies all the same to other visions of Europe; an idea of Europe either starting again from a tabula rasa, or an idea of Europe siphoning out the bad and stressing the good in the manner of, say, Robert Schuman, is chastened by the reminder of the possibility of the inextricable intertwining of the two.

This ties in to differing narratives of the end of French and European empires. Sartre argued that the innate logic of empire was boomeranging on itself. Berque on the other hand saw decolonisation as the fulfilment of the ideal of European imperialism, and in no way necessitating a repudiation of Europe. On the contrary, after independence France would continue to help Algeria and the Arab world precisely in accordance with the best French tradition and authentically European imperial values.

Religion and Faith in Berque’s Europe

Parallel to Berque’s wish for Orientalism, religion too was something which in theory might stand aloof from politics yet in practice was implicated in it, particularly in the colonial context. After all, a generation earlier, President Clemenceau had invoked the crusades at the Versailles conference in 1919. Similarly, Sartre made a point of condemning the complicity of

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93 See Sartre, ‘Colonialism is a System’, in Colonialism and Neocolonialism, 9-19.
95 Hourani, ‘Decline of the West in the Middle East I’, 32.
religion in imperialism.⁹⁶ And referring to the colonised, Fanon of course charged that ‘no priest has ever stepped in to bear the blows in his place or share his bread.’⁹⁷

In fact the question of religion is directly connected to modernity in Berque’s work. However, since it occupied such an important place in his thought a separate section is devoted to its analysis here. One of Berque’s key theses was what he termed the passage in the Arab world from the sacred to the historic. This was the basis of his work Les Arabes d’hier à demain. In raising the issue, he also posed the question of the relationship between religion, modernity, and his understanding of Europe.

This section will approach religion in three ways, each of which relates to how Europe was perceived: firstly, religion in the formal sense of the three monotheisms. Here we will expand on Berque’s core thesis about of the diminishing relevance of religion and analyse its implications for Europe. Secondly, religion in its appropriated metaphoric sense. And thirdly, in terms of the concept of faith which, though not strictly speaking synonymous with religion, overlaps considerably and is at the core of Berque’s vision of Europe.

As we have seen, the point of departure for Berque’s historical consciousness and world view was the history of Europe-led modernisation. It was in accordance with this that he dissented from Louis Massignon’s view of the continuing importance of the interaction between the monotheistic faiths. Instead, Berque spoke of ‘la profanation du monde’ or what he also refers to as ‘le passage du sacré à l’historique’.⁹⁸ This was not to suggest that observation of sacred rites would no longer shape Arab society, but the major driving force behind its

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development would come from its submission to the historical process of modernisation that had defined Europe: industrialisation, mass technology, revolutionised communications.⁹⁹

Massignon and Berque’s differences on religion were laid out in their 1960 dialogue. Throughout his career, Massignon’s understanding of Europe was defined by a view of a familial relationship between Christianity and the Jewish and Islamic faiths as they existed in the non-European world and it was in accordance with this ethos that Massignon distanced himself from contemporary apologetics for imperialism. Massignon reaffirmed this kind of vision in the course of his exchange with Berque in 1960. As such, he saw the dispute between Arabs and Jews in terms of Semitism – a fratricidal hate between ‘Israël et Ismaël’;¹⁰⁰ Europeans and Europe came into the equation in their function as representatives of Christianity and he was disappointed at the extent to which they fell short of this standard of conduct.

While Massignon conceded that perhaps the definitive experience of Europe was now modernisation, he did so grudgingly and suggested that it had detracted from what was valuable in Europe and vital in the European peoples. Feeling that his belief in the possibilities for mutual definition and development between Europe and Islam had been disappointed, he reproached Europeans for ‘notre rage laïque de comprendre, de conquérir, de posséder’ and their abuse of ‘l’hospitalité sacrée’.¹⁰¹ Similarly, in the 1960 exchange with Berque, Massignon complained of the ‘mécanisation du monde musulman à notre image’ which was ‘une chose qui nous fait toucher du doigt le côté infernal de la technocratie’. Contrary to Berque, he denied any

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⁹⁹ Later in his life he would concede that he had overestimated this phenomenon not only in the Arab world but also in Europe, pointing, for example, to European deference to Israel as in large part motivated by a quintessentially European Christian sense of original sin regarding its role in the Jewish Holocaust. See Berque & Suha Sabbagh, ‘The Pen and the Sword’, 114. For a discussion of his revision of his thesis of the passing from the sacràl to the historic, see Berque’s closing lecture at the Collège de France in Jacques Berque, Andalousies (Paris: Sindbad, 1981).


distinction between ‘la technocratie’ and ‘la civilisation technique’ and suggested ‘en ce moment même en France, nous sommes au stade de l’étranglement.’\textsuperscript{102} One is reminded here of the later Max Horkheimer’s thesis of the sanctuary of religious spirituality as an addition to his protest against a blind belief in historical progress.

However, despite Massignon’s passionate advocacy of friendship between Occident and Orient he did not depart fundamentally from a certain axiom of European Orientalist thought. In the final analysis, he reaffirmed an essential imaginary divide between Orient and Occident. Moreover, as Said suggests, Massignon steadfastly adhered to ‘the entire nineteenth century tradition of the Orient as therapeutic for the West’, although ‘in Massignon it was joined to a sense of Christian compassion’, whereby Europe could take from the Orient what it had lost in spirituality and traditional values.\textsuperscript{103} In the 1960 dialogue, Massignon argued, ‘Justement, je crois qu’actuellement la France a le devoir de se pencher sur le problème arabe avec le plus grand respect fraternel, car il y a chez eux des valeurs uniques au point de vue humain que nous avons perdues, qui étaient nôtres: le patrimoine abrahamique, la parole donnée, le droit d’asile.’\textsuperscript{104} His idea of Europe, then, was one that was diminished from it should be, what it had been in the past, and what it could be again by dint of the Orient. Herman Lebovics demonstrates a commensurable but more pessimistic interpretation of this train of thought in the late work of Jean Renoir, who found in India personal solace and cultural compensation for a political ideal of Europe in which he could no longer believe.\textsuperscript{105}

However, for Berque, this drawing on the Orient was problematic. He could agree with Massignon’s call for mutual hospitality but was even more rigorous in its application. As

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102} Berque & Massignon, ‘Dialogue sur “Les Arabes”’, 1515.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Said, \textit{Orientalism}, 271.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Berque & Massignon, ‘Dialogue sur “Les Arabes”’, 1519.
\item \textsuperscript{105} See Herman Lebovics, ‘Jean Renoir’s Voyage of Discovery. From the Shores of the Mediterranean to the Banks of the Ganges’, in \textit{Imperialism and the Corruption of Democracies}, 34-59.
\end{itemize}
Hourani put it, ‘for him Islam is the “other”, to be apprehended and accepted in itself.’  

Again Berque was insistent on an idea of Europe in which dialogue between it and the Orient was undistorted by force or any ulterior desire or self-interest. 

Ideas of Europe and Europeanness in this period also drew from the metaphoric invocation of religion and could only reinforce Berque’s desire to distance his conception of the continent from religion. In this usage, Christianity became less a theological designation than an identity claim, and call to rigid exclusion. Matthew Connelly draws attention to this rhetoric of religion in the course of the Algerian war, an underestimated phenomenon in what is conventionally depicted as a conflict between two nationalisms. The second connotation of religion as metaphor is the raising of the stakes to a zero-sum game, of two sides embattled with religious intensity and zeal. One could read both overtones in the example of a French officer engaged in the Algerian war who peremptorily declared that ‘there is no true war but religious war.’ 

Hobsbawm uses the term religion in the second sense and he explains its historical implications in a discussion of barbarism in the twentieth century, which is worth reiterating here:

What made the cruelty which is the natural result of religious wars more brutal and inhuman, was that the cause of Good (i.e. of Western great powers) was confronted with the cause of Evil represented, most commonly, by people whose claim to full humanity was rejected. Social revolution, and especially colonial rebellion, challenged the sense of a natural, as it were a divine or cosmically sanctioned superiority of top people over bottom people in societies which were naturally unequal, whether by birth or by achievement.

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107 Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, passim.
109 Hobsbawm, ‘Barbarism: A User’s Guide’, 48. One manner in which this attitude was manifested was the denial of the validity of non-European, and especially, Algerian nationalism. Berque’s contemporary, the Orientalist Charles-André Julien resigned from the SFIO in light of the way his expertise on Algeria had been ignored. One
Berque illustrated this kind of usage in his description of the current state of affairs in the Algerian war. He argued that, ‘entre la revendication politique et le ressentiment barbare qui la soutient, entre le droit français et la violence qui la protège, personne plus, au fond, ne distingue. Le primitivisme l’emporte. De part et d’autre, le recours à ces “démons”, dont parlait Dostoïewski, ensanglante et déshonore le débat.’\textsuperscript{110} We have seen that Berque aspired to replace non-negotiable conceptions of a superior Europe with a self-image formulated in mutual equality with its Oriental other. As such his Europe was predicated on a resounding rejection of this metaphorical sense of religion that traversed colonial discourse, manifesting itself not only in ultras but among the commonplace dogmatic dismissal of the very possibility of Algerian nationalism.

Another understanding of religion is closely connected to the broader concept of faith. As outlined above, Berque commented in his inaugural lecture that Oriental scholarship, science, and reason were inadequate if not complemented by sympathy and commitment. Also, Hourani made a point of remarking on Berque’s faith in the larger Mediterranean. Accordingly, these points suggest that Berque’s Europe was somewhat different from the sort Dipesh Chakrabarty wants to provincialise – a Europe characterised by a triumphalist and pervasive post-Enlightenment secular rationalism.\textsuperscript{111} But what alternative Europe did Berque’s concepts suggest?

It is the contention here that Berque’s conception of faith is not to be thought of as something tacked onto reason, just as his Arab Mediterranean is not something tacked on to

\textsuperscript{110} Berque, ‘L’Algérie et les faux dilemmes’, 704.
Europe. In both cases the latter permeates the former whilst leaving it self-integral; neither is dissolved. The implications of this for ideas of Europe are significant. For once one concedes Berque’s contention of the necessity of faith to validate reason as opposed to being a supplemental benefit to it, it is possible to push the argument to the extent of saying a self-image of Europe based on its reason, science, and technology alone is not merely inadequate or partial, but a neurosis.

On the other hand, much as there was something appealing about his vision of Europe within a cooperative Mediterranean, there was something initially unsettling about the invocation of faith. It suggested that Europe might never fully know itself, never be secure, having lost the confident reasoning certainty of its self. But a more positive and creative interpretation of what Berque might have intended in terms of faith and Europe and Europeanness is suggested by Terry Eagleton’s analysis of the concept. It is argued here that Eagleton’s contention about the nature of faith on the interpersonal level captures Berque’s sense of the faith and empathy that should form the basis of the relation between European and non-European worlds. Eagleton writes that, ‘it is only by having faith in someone that we can take the risk of disclosing ourselves to him or her fully, thus making true knowledge of ourselves possible. Intelligibility is here closely bound up with availability, which is a moral notion.’

Moreover, faith in this sense also ‘articulates a loving commitment before it counts as a description of the way things are. That it also involves an account of the way things are is clear enough, just as moral imperatives do… Faith cannot be reduced to the endorsement of certain propositions which cannot be proved.’

113 Ibid., 119.
Likewise, Berque’s idea of Europe was not reducible to taking stock of recent European history, nor of the ongoing war in Algeria in the name of European civilisation. It also involved a prior commitment not to accept this status quo, to insist unswervingly that a plural Mediterranean of Europe and the Arab world was never a lost cause. For faith here is not credulous romanticism but the correlative of the twinning of knowledge and virtue, and, Eagleton explains, for this reason love alone, which is implied by faith, ‘can achieve the well-nigh impossible goal of seeing a situation as it really is, shorn of both the brittle enchantments of romance and the disheveled fantasies of desire.’ It is in this vein that Berque dismissed criticisms of his advocacy of, for example, ‘une synthèse possible entre la France et l’arabisme en Algérie’ as unpersuasively idealistic, insisting instead that those advocating the colonial status quo are, in fact, thoroughly Panglossian, recklessly jeopardising ‘Mediterranean humanism’ and the role Europe has to play in this mutually profitable, cooperative undertaking.

The parallels between the Europe of Berque and the Europe of Manès Sperber – also based in Paris in the post-war period – are compelling, despite the wide differences in their backgrounds. Raised in Austrian Galicia, Sperber’s thinking about Europe was necessarily inflected by his experience of pre-war Germanic intellectual cosmopolitanism. Reflecting on his Jewishness, Sperber reiterated the importance of an idea of Europe: the Acropolis in Athens meant more to him than the Wailing Wall. But neither could he ever forget that his ‘people were humiliated, dehumanized, and exterminated by the ruling murderers in the heart of Europe.’ It is this experience and understanding of Europe that informed Sperber’s remarks: ‘I

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114 Ibid., 121-122.
115 See Berque, ‘La nation algérienne et le 13 mai’, in Une Cause jamais perdue, 40.
118 Ibid., 11.
have never found an idea that so overwhelmed me or guided me so forcefully as the idea that this world cannot remain as it is, that it can be different, that it will be different. Ever since I can remember, this single challenging certitude has determined my being a Jew and an active individual of our times.¹¹⁹ This idea of Europe was characterised not by credulousness; on the contrary it was the foundation of faith and empathy shorn of illusions that was the rationale for his shrewdness to oppose Stalin and the Soviet Union implacably even as their currency was at its apogee in Paris until at least 1956.

Conclusion

From the Parisian Orientalist academy to the colonies and back again, the question of Europe arose repeatedly in this era and often did so in disruptive ways. Its connection to a stable sense of the self in a time of transition and uncertainty and to issues of hierarchy, privilege, authority, and power, both within and outside Europe, precluded to a large extent serene contemplation of Europe as a solely cultural question. Berque distrusted rigid and exclusionary claims to Europe as much as he distrusted formulas for the hasty resolution or transcendence of the controversies and debates surrounding Europe. He recognised that the slogans of both such positions could easily blind one to the fact that history was still to be made. Necessarily this was to be done in mutual and genuine dialogue and underscored by the commitment and engagement implied by faith, in his sense of the term, in a Mediterranean Europe and its Arab Other. His was a more modest and realistic conception of Europe than many of his contemporaries, but no less radical for that. His work suggested the need to negotiate constantly between Europe and the

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 13.
Arab world as they existed and how they might exist. For all that he differed from Sartre, Berque might have found it propitious to borrow his description of ‘négritude’ to portray the Europe whose name he so seldom directly and explicitly invoked. Imagining a response to the question of all the possibilities of what negritude might be, Sartre wrote, ‘Sans doute répondra-t-on qu’elle est tout cela à la fois et bien d’autre choses encore… Comme toutes les notions anthropologiques, la Négritude est un chatoiement d’être et de devoir-être; elle vous fait et vous la faites: serment et passion, à la fois.’

120 Sartre, ‘Orphée noire’, 279.

Henri Cartier-Bresson’s status as a photographic pioneer and iconic cultural figure of the twentieth century is rarely disputed. The quality and extent of his work, ranging from iconic shots of his native Paris to the entire world, give ample evidence to corroborate the claims made for his genius. Of the pivotal events of this post-war period, there indeed seem to be few which he did not witness, armed with his characteristic Leica camera and sustained by his ethos of ‘the decisive moment’.

Claude Cookman argues that even though in later years Cartier-Bresson himself cultivated his image as that of a Surrealist artist, this is a misleading interpretation of his post-war work. Likewise, the axiom that the value of Cartier-Bresson’s oeuvre is its artistic expression of the human condition misses something essential about his vision.\(^1\) Cookman demonstrates that Cartier-Bresson’s work from the 1940s to the 1960s was motivated by a desire and a sense of duty to witness and communicate world events.\(^2\) His social realism derived in large part from his political formation in the Europe of the 1930s and his concomitant leftist adherence to social justice and rebellion.\(^3\)

In the post-war period, Cartier-Bresson’s work was commonly thought of solely as an artistic representation of a generic human condition. An examination of the press reaction to the exhibition of his work at the Louvre in 1955 identifies just such a recurring trope of abstract or bloodless universalism. This response to the exhibition, which displayed his work from both the

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2. Ibid., 62.
European and non-European worlds, is then examined as betraying various underlying Eurocentric notions or presuppositions about Europe. These in turn manifested themselves further in the absence of any reference to pictures in the exhibition which were particularly propitious for reflecting on the meaning of Europe.

A step is then taken back to examine two of Cartier-Bresson’s book collections: *D’une Chine à l’autre* (1954) and *Les Européens* (1955). Contrary to the kind of lofty, unmediated universalism attributed to him in the press on the Louvre exhibition, it is argued that these works were informed by a particular post-war European perspective. It is argued that each book, in different ways, represents various aspects of Europe or Europeanness which are not incompatible with universalism. However, they imply that, to borrow Dipesh Chakrabarty’s phrase, ‘particular ways of being in the world’ are taken into greater consideration than abstract notions of art or the universal human condition tend to allow. It is argued that these two collections strongly suggest an understanding of Europe that refers to its experience of violence; a particular perception of time; tradition and modernity; and deprivation and privilege. What is more, the two collections are examined in terms of how they contributed to a European self-understanding that derived from imperialism.

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An exhibition of a selection of some four hundred of Cartier-Bresson’s photographs taken between 1930 and 1955 was inaugurated on 26 October 1955, in the Pavillon de Marsan at the Louvre, and ran until mid-November. As Janet Flanner described this exposition of photos from Europe and the non-European world in her Paris diary for The New Yorker,

Cartier-Bresson’s unfailing historical intuition – which has led him to keep dates, prophetically sensed in advance, with world events and changes, so that he was able to be present to take their pictures – makes his current exhibition a great general contemporary record of our time, sensitively seized by one man’s eye and his camera lens. In it, his snapshots, magnified to the size of paintings, become amazing modern portraits of humanity and its background scenes, both private and public, over the past few years, showing what people have done to each other in war, or what has luckily escaped history… The French are not born travellers; Cartier-Bresson has travelled for them, bringing back to the walls of the Louvre what he calls ‘the decisive moment’ of varied national existences, when thousands of people, singly or grouped, unconsciously furnished him, if only for an instant, with those perfect physical compositions which make great pictorial art, and which, with an artist’s eye, he seized, and in that instant made permanent.

Flanner also noted that Cartier-Bresson was the only photographer to have been honoured in a national museum in France. Jacques Duclos, one of the most senior and influential members of the French Communist Party (PCF), had in December 1953 complained about ‘l’européanisation de certaines salles du Louvre.’ Did Cartier-Bresson’s pioneering exposition there of the European and non-European worlds in turn Europeanise, in the sense of prompting reflection on the place of Europe in this new post-war world? In fact, the extensive French and foreign press

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5 Incidentally, it is worth noting André Malraux’s claim in 1946 that a museum was itself a sort of quintessentially European space: ‘even now we find museums only in places where Europeans have organised them. The very idea a man of the Far East has of a work of art is incompatible with a museum.’ André Malraux’s speech ‘Man and Artistic Culture’, in Reflections on Our Age: Lectures at the Opening Session of UNESCO at the Sorbonne (London: Allen Wingate, 1948), 88.
generally emphasised less the originality of the exhibition than the fact that it was replacing a Picasso exhibition.\(^8\) It is suggested that there was a certain symmetry between this oversight and a failure to reflect on how this event might have made an original statement about the continent, that departed from received orthodoxies about the condition of the contemporary world, and Europe’s place therein. Incidentally, David Caute notes that the PCF attributed enormous importance to the 1954 Picasso exhibition at the Louvre, which reminds us that there were various forms of Europeanisation, of different value to different actors.\(^9\)

The press’s very restricted way of reflecting upon Europe also manifested itself in the absence of commentary on photos in the exhibition’s catalogue that readily lent themselves to interpretations of Europe, or would be interpreted as a statement about Europe in later years. In her report, Flanner noted Cartier-Bresson’s achievement both in terms of its value as testimony and in terms of artistic composition. In general, the press reaction highlighted more the latter, or alluded to the former only in terms of a rather Eurocentric invocation of humanity. Indeed, a trope that recurs in the reception of the exhibition was that Cartier-Bresson depicted a universal humanity or the human condition. To take one instance, the magazine *Leica fotografie* characterised his vision as ‘the height of human feeling.’ It continued,

Yes, humanity is his very own playground, the consistent theme of his magnificent photo-reportage. To him nothing is odd, he has no prejudices or predilections, no one-sidedness. No partisan approach, no veiled implication in the depiction of poverty; no suggestions in beauty, no glee in happiness, no censure in the degraded; only a uniform objectivity in the portrayal of mankind – and that is why the onlooker is moved by these pictures.\(^10\)


This kind of reference to humanity is best understood as a kind of universalism in which an idea of Europe as central and paradigmatic was undisturbed. Likewise, *Le Parisien libéré* reported, ‘Cette illustration d’événements les plus divers, pris sur le vif, ne concerne pas seulement tels pays ou continent, mais bien tout notre globe terraque avec ses luttes, ses espérances, voire ses divertissements.’\(^{11}\)

What was at stake in such statements was less hypocrisy or disingenuousness than uncritical recycling of what Heidegger had described as the Europeanisation of the words ‘man’ and ‘world’.\(^{12}\) It was thus consistent that some journals reported on the exhibition either by referring overwhelmingly only to its European components, or by invoking the world as a whole, but with explicit reference to the centrality of Europe as a universal paradigm. In its report on the event, *Paris Match*, for instance, unabashedly laid out its focus of interest in a section devoted to ‘L’Europe en 5 photos d’identité.’ This showed photographs of a one-legged man manoeuvring through a still ruined Hamburg, two old women walking in the street in Athens, a musical performance attended by high society in London, a wall in Spain upon which there is an insignia of the Falange, and a fishmonger in Marseille.\(^{13}\)

It is also interesting to note examples of pictures that were not selected for *Paris Match*’s collage of Europe. One such image was the striking photo of portraits being carried out of a Dutch colonial administration building in Jakarta on the day before Indonesian independence, in 1949. *Paris Match*, however, was unmoved by this powerful statement about Europe’s place and

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role in the world; unsurprisingly so, given its summary dismissal in the article itself of Sukarno as a mere ‘agitateur’.  

Figure 5. Henri Cartier-Bresson, ‘Jakarta, Indonesia’ (1949). Google images.

Another picture which was omitted in the European identity pictures has subsequently become perhaps Cartier-Bresson’s most famous image: a man jumping over a puddle on the place de l’Europe near the gare Saint-Lazare in 1932. This was not because its force had faded over the previous two decades, since it was not even published until 1946 in preparation for a show in New York at the Museum of Modern Art.  

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14 Ibid., 63. One should add that this was far from Cartier-Bresson’s analysis of the situation there. He remarked to the Magnum office that, ‘The Dutch consider all this premature because the Indonesians have no middle class. One might wonder how many more years the Dutch consider their presence necessary to build one, if the last 300 years have not been sufficient.’ Cited in Peter Galassi, Henri Cartier-Bresson: The Modern Century (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2010), 14.
15 Ibid., 31.
The Welsh photojournalist, Philip Jones Griffiths, remarked that the greatness of this image was its prescience. Referring to its time and place, he describes the photo as showing a generic European Jewish name on the poster (though it is perhaps more likely to be of Polish derivation), and a broken hoop representing historical disaster. Cartier-Bresson was as such, a ‘Nostradamus of the early 1930s who predicted what was going to happen to Europe in that one
single image: Europe jumping into the unknown.\textsuperscript{16} No such reaction was registered in any of the press at the time of the exhibition at the Louvre, however. The question remains open if this is more plausibly because Jones Griffiths overanalysed the image, or rather because such interpretations were still difficult and untimely in a post-war France and Europe that typically indulged in rather self-flattering nationally based rationalisations of what they had endured and, indeed, inflicted.\textsuperscript{17}

Amongst the press reaction there were certainly no indications of attentive readers of \textit{Les Temps modernes} who might have drawn from Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, which appeared in the October 1947 edition.\textsuperscript{18} Specifically, the shot of the gare Saint-Lazare clock in the background evoked no analogy with Benjamin’s reference, in thesis XV to the halting of a clock by the gunfire of revolutionaries in 1830 France. This example was so intriguing to Benjamin because it encapsulated the discontinuous time in the tradition of the oppressed – an explosive moment that shatters the continuous, historicist, homogenous empty time of domination. The latter concept of time is tied up with the belief in progress, which, as we examined in chapter 5 on the MSEUE, was rehabilitated to a degree in this period. A Benjaminian reading of Cartier-Bresson’s photo would have suggested this was as credulous as it was disarming politically. Benjamin’s own view of Europe was indeed deeply coloured by this pessimistic philosophy of history.\textsuperscript{19} Three years before Cartier-Bresson’s iconic photograph, Benjamin insisted on ‘pessimism all along the line… no confidence in the fate of European

humanity… And boundless confidence only in I.G. Farben and in the peaceful perfecting of the Luftwaffe.\textsuperscript{20} If such sentiments did not resonate with Cartier-Bresson’s reviewers at the time of the Louvre exhibition, we will see below that there was nonetheless a certain resonance with Cartier-Bresson’s own representation of Europe.

It was not only Paris Match that largely overlooked the non-European photographs in the Louvre exhibition, however. Likewise, Point de vue, the New Yorker, and Nouveau femina all emphasised the exhibition’s indebtedness to the book collections Les Européens and Moscou vu par Cartier-Bresson. In doing so, they diminished the importance of work from elsewhere that had been in other books like Images à la sauvette, or appeared for the first time.\textsuperscript{21} Le Monde’s priority of interest in the exhibition’s European aspect was capped with a reference to the decline of Austria as the heart of Europe. Presumably Paris now bore that mantle.\textsuperscript{22}

Similarly, Libération’s account of the exhibition starts by describing Cartier-Bresson as an ‘infatigable globe-trotter de la réalité humaine.’ The only photographs it actually described, though, were those that also appeared in Les Européens. Ultimately this universal human reality seemed subordinate to political events in Europe. Referring to a photograph of Germans it asks, ‘de quoi parlent-ils? De la C.E.D., peut-être bien.’\textsuperscript{23}

The New York Herald Tribune, on the other hand, reported on the opening of the exhibition in an article that concentrated on the Moscou work. In this context, it suggested that travel was an excellent basis for resolving conflict and thereby to further universal ideals. Quoting an Intourist official speaking at the Congress of the International Federation of Travel

\textsuperscript{20} Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other Writings, trans. J.A. Underwood (London: Penguin, 2009), 158.
\textsuperscript{21} Of course, as we have seen, Russia’s Europeanness was a controversial but unresolved question.
Agencies in Dubrovnik, the article claimed, ‘International tourism is “a means of lessening international tension and of securing world peace.”’ It continued: ‘This idea is hardly new. For about six years now, the same thing has been expressed in other words by the European Travel Commission’s slogan: “Understanding through travel is the passport to peace.”’24 The implication was that a precondition to humaneness was the prosperity inherent to the West that facilitated travel. Parochialism and poverty were conflated in an inadequacy determined by the European universal standard now taking shape, as it hoped to leave behind post-war impoverishment with the onset of les trentes glorieuses. There was of course a tradition of producing the European Other through travel – Sartre denounced this in What is Literature?, where he held that travel in the non-European world went hand in hand with the nefarious universalisation of capitalist standardisation and European military force.25 But even leaving this aside, it is curious that the Herald Tribune writer did not register that the most obvious travellers in the exhibition were non-Europeans: desperate Indian and Chinese refugees uprooted by war and misery.

It is noteworthy that the kind of universalism ascribed to Cartier-Bresson’s exhibition at the Louvre resembled the reaction to Edward Steichen’s hugely acclaimed and frequented exhibition in the same year, The Family of Man. Having opened at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, it thereafter toured the world.26 It comprised 503 pictures by 273 photographers from 69 countries. Magnum accounted for 15 percent of the total exhibits despite having only eight

photographers.\(^{27}\) Susan Sontag’s analysis of this exhibition is revealing and applies likewise to the press reaction to the Louvre exhibition: ‘Steichen’s choice of photographs assumes a human condition or a human nature shared by everybody. By purporting to show that individuals are born, work, laugh, and die everywhere in the same way, “The Family of Man” denies the determining weight of history – of genuine and historically embedded differences, injustices, and conflicts.’\(^{28}\)

Relating this to Cartier-Bresson, there is a sense of awareness in his work of both false and genuine promises of ideologies of universalism. From what he had learnt on his travels he was aware that universalism had fuelled the colonial civilising mission and a nefarious insistence on hierarchy, and also that it was the rationale behind the capitalism whose consequences he found lamentable. Indeed, in the preface to \textit{Les Européens} he wrote, ‘Je ne veux pas parler bien sûr, du règne universel du complet-veston, ni de la standardisation mondiale des objets utiles, mais de l’homme avec ses joies, ses peines, ses luttes.’\(^{29}\) Cartier-Bresson’s position here belied the lazy presupposition of the equivalence of Europe and humanity or the universal in the press reaction to his groundbreaking exhibition. We will now examine his work in its own right to see how Cartier-Bresson’s precept translated into much more interesting and nuanced understandings of Europe in his collection \textit{D’une Chine à l’autre} and in \textit{Les Européens}.

\textit{D’une Chine à l’autre}

This section examines Cartier-Bresson’s work in China during his stay there in 1948-1949, a period spanning the end of the Kuomintang regime and the ascendency of the Communists. These photographs were reproduced in contemporary French and international newspapers and periodicals, and were brought together in an important and innovative collection in 1954, *D’une Chine à l’autre*. Cartier-Bresson returned to China in 1958, recording Mao’s Great Leap Forward, but that is beyond the scope of the analysis here. The choice to focus on his work in his first trip lies in the fact that the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese civil war was experienced more as a rupture in two relevant senses. Firstly, Parisian intellectual circles were far less aware of contemporary China than they would be a decade later.\(^{30}\) Indeed, Jean Chesneaux argues that French intellectuals were largely indifferent to China in the first part of the twentieth century; an oversight that only ended with the triumph of the Maoist forces which Cartier-Bresson witnessed. Even French academic Sinology restricted itself to classical China, and French intellectuals were completely unprepared for the revolution, lacking any equivalent reporting to that of Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley on the American scene. As such, ‘the French intellectual scene was a blank page – a very Maoist feature – and this was a decisive contributing factor to what has been described – and branded in some quarters with utter contempt – as the “love affair” between Maoist China and French intellectuals.’\(^{31}\)

Secondly, the ascendency of Mao’s forces was more readily perceived as the point of China’s clean break with the European world and as a model for others who wished to cut ties in the same way. This certainly seemed to be Cartier-Bresson’s understanding of the China he reported from, as he recounted that Chim and Robert Capa had specifically assigned him the task


\(^{31}\) Ibid.
of reporting on the decolonisation of Asia for the newly founded photographic agency, Magnum. This break with the European world permeates Cartier-Bresson’s record of the events in China. China was not a formal colony, of course; but the extent of European (and indeed also American) sway over the country prior to the fall of the Kuomintang regime made it decidedly relevant to ideas of Europe which took European imperialism into account.

This section will proceed as follows. Firstly, Cartier-Bresson’s work is situated within a general tradition of thinking about Europe through the representation of its Chinese Other, and then within a particular Paris-centered strand of this tradition. Secondly, Jean-Paul Sartre’s involvement with Cartier-Bresson’s project is examined in terms of its implications for thinking about Europe. Part of this involves examining how a single image can be appropriated for differing interpretations by looking at Sartre and David Rousset’s opposing conceptions of Europe and Europeanness in the context of Cartier-Bresson’s work from China. Thirdly, it is argued that Cartier-Bresson’s work in China impacted on Europe’s self-understanding in terms of violence. Fourthly, the case is made that the China collection implies an understanding of Europe in terms of perception of time.

Europe and China and *D’une Chine à l’autre*

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Cartier-Bresson’s work can be located within the broad general European tradition of articulating a self-image in relation to its Others, key amongst which was China. As such, his work on China had a perceived function of locating Europe in the wider world in a kind of social, moral, existential, and political mapping. There was an additional Parisian context of reception that tended towards certain kinds of reflections on these photos in terms of the meaning of Europe and Europeanness.

Marx wrote in 1853 that the Celestial Empire was ‘the very opposite of Europe’, and his was just one intervention in the long history of thinking about China in terms of its relationship to Europe. One might say the European imagination of China was constitutive of certain ideas of Europe and of European identity. However, Perry Anderson argues that this was not the same Orientalism that Edward Said described. Prior to the nineteenth century, China was considered too distant to be a military or religious threat to Europe and generated tales not of fear but wonder and admiration: ‘From Bayle and Leibniz to Voltaire and Quesnay, philosophers hailed it as an empire more civilised than Europe itself.’ Thereafter, however, China was more and more depicted as primitive, barbaric and superstitious. Racism and foreign penetration increased alike. Having again won sympathy in its struggles against Japan in the early twentieth century, China was again the focus of fear and anxiety after 1948. Red China was thenceforth ‘a totalitarian nightmare more sinister even than Russia.’

Moreover, Cartier-Bresson’s work fitted into a certain specific French and Parisian tradition of representing China, and via China, Europe. Once again, a prominent assumption was

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that France was not to be considered in isolation from Europe, but rather as its foremost representative. Relating China to a Europe whose axis centered on Paris was not an exclusively French habit: ‘Shanghai has often been called the Paris of the Orient’, remarked the China Weekly Review in 1930, before adding the qualification that ‘Shanghai has all the vices of Paris and more but none of its cultural influences.’ But Chesneaux argues that the history of European interest in China was invested with a distinct French commitment and style exemplified in scholarship and art through the French revolutionary period and beyond, in a line running through Voltaire, Diderot, Baudelaire, de Chardin, and Malraux. One might also point to French scholarship on China which included important figures such as Étienne Balazs, who was described as ‘the father of modern studies of China in Europe.’

If the Parisian cultural and intellectual scenes were unprepared for the events that Cartier-Bresson portrayed, they would nonetheless prove to be very attentive thereafter, both in a positive and negative sense. Indeed, Magnum made a point of relaying the success of Cartier-Bresson’s stories back to him even whilst he was still in China. Chesneaux elucidates part of the context for this interest in his work when he remarks on the fashion for China in French cultural life through the 1950s and 1960s. Theatres were packed for Peking Opera visits, Chinese literature was sold abundantly and Chinese exhibitions of art at the Grand Palais were frequented.

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36 Chesneaux, China in the Eyes of French Intellectuals, passim. In this period, Malraux’s ideas about the relation between the West and China were reiterated in re-editions of his La tentation de l’Occident and in an afterword in 1949 for a reissue of his Les Conquérants.
en masse.\textsuperscript{39} He explains this in part by referring to a particularly marked French intellectual tendency of ‘political exoticism’,\textsuperscript{40} that is to say, to look for a model of reference in distant lands as a substitute for an unsatisfactory European society. All this can be taken as suggestive of the likely interest in Cartier-Bresson’s groundbreaking reportage from China and of the degree of exposure to its representation of Europe.

Moreover, because of France’s colonial war in Indochina, events in the Far East had an even greater impact in Paris. One might also conjecture that the interest in Cartier-Bresson’s pictures from Asia might have been heightened by the death of his close collaborator at Magnum, Robert Capa, in Indochina. Of course, Indochina was not China, however intertwined were their histories. But ‘Asia’ was commonly taken at both the political and cultural levels as an integral unit. Jacques Soustelle vociferously made the case that Asia, a designation that included the USSR, must be conceptualised as a whole in Western Cold War strategy. To insist on nuanced distinctions was an unaffordable luxury in this period of conflicts in France’s Far East colonial possessions and in Korea.\textsuperscript{41} Such sentiments were echoed in the Assemblée nationale in the context of the ongoing European political integration. In Flanner’s account, in a July 1957 session the State Secretary for European Affairs ‘put his finger like a compass needle on Western Europe’s necessary direction for survival by saying: “We are still living on the fiction of the four great powers (of which France was one). In reality, there are only two – America and Russia. Tomorrow there will be a third – China. It depends upon you… whether there is a fourth –


\textsuperscript{40} Chesneaux, \textit{China in the Eyes of French Intellectuals}, 12.

Europe. If you fail to make this choice, you condemn yourselves to walking backward toward the future.”

Similarly, Spenglerian ideas about the threat to Europe from Far Eastern hordes were renovated by adherents of the _guerre révolutionnaire_ doctrine like Maurice Papon, whose decisive role in the 17 October, 1961 killings is examined elsewhere. The same sort of race fears prompted concerns about immigration. A few years later in 1965, _Le Figaro littéraire_ lamented the evolution of the centre of Paris:

> Autour de Saint-Étienne-du-Mont, il n’est guère que l’église elle-même, le Panthéon, l’École polytechnique, deux ou trois bistros et quelques merceries à demeurer résolument français. Partout ailleurs, c’est désormais la Chine. Ou le Japon. Ou le Vietnam… Car le ventre de Paris est devenu extrême-oriental, chinois surtout, mais l’Empire du Soleil levant et le Vietnam se rapprochent à grand pas… Cessez-donc de craindre le péril jaune: il est déjà arrivé à Paris.

It is in these general European and French traditions of thinking about China that one can place the parallel that Cartier-Bresson drew in _D’une Chine à l’autre_ between a Shanghai-centered China and a Paris-centered Europe. The point was made more strongly still in explaining in his captions, for instance, that for the Chinese, jade was the equivalent of diamonds for the Europeans; by emphasising that Confucius was in fact a contemporary of Plato and Socrates; and in asserting that during the transition from the Kuomintang to the new regime, ‘un

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42 Flanner, _Paris Journal_, 338.
43 Andrew Hussey, _Paris: The Secret History_ (London: Penguin, 2007), 331. It is also ironic in the context of Cartier-Bresson’s representation of Europe that the listings of Cartier-Bresson’s work include ‘a routine day in Paris police station.’ For Europeanness in part underscored an ideological current in the Paris police and was performatively articulated in the routine violent treatment of North Africans, as we saw in chapter 3. See Galassi, _Henri Cartier-Bresson_, 348.
service d’ordre et de contrôle est organisé par des volontaires, jouant le rôle des FFI.⁴⁵ It is suggested here that once Cartier-Bresson adumbrated this comparison between Paris and Europe on the one side and China on the other, the reader and viewer was invited to do the same.

Jean-Paul Sartre, *D’une Chine à l’autre*, and Europe

Pierre Bourdieu argues that the importance of the preface has been overlooked as an important element of a work in its own right. In analysing Jean-Paul Sartre’s preface to *D’une Chine à l’autre*, this section takes seriously Bourdieu’s emphasis on the processes of lending and appropriating symbolic capital between the prefacer and the author of a work.⁴⁶ The case is also made here that Sartre’s thought is a useful tool to grasp how Cartier-Bresson’s work made a statement about Europe. Finally, the examination of Sartre’s involvement with Cartier-Bresson’s project is a propitious instance to examine the issue of authorship of the photographic medium, and the malleability of pictures to make different or opposing arguments. This will be examined in relation to David Rousset’s attack on Sartre with reference to Cartier-Bresson’s work in the context of broader debates about Europe and its Others and their representation.

Undoubtedly the inclusion of Sartre’s name on its cover lent clout to Cartier-Bresson’s message in *D’une Chine à l’autre*. Indeed, Sartre’s prefaces had become something of an institution, and there were various examples of him contributing to work that had something to

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say about Europe, implicitly or explicitly. One thinks in this period particularly of works by Henri Alleg, Albert Memmi, Paul Nizan, and Frantz Fanon. Conversely, if amounting to nothing like a renunciation of the PCF, it is plausible that prefacing Cartier-Bresson’s book afforded Sartre an intellectual space adjacent to, but also acceptable to, the party and its Stalinist expectations of its cultural associates. For Sartre never reconciled himself to this circumscription of the intellectual’s craft, even in those years between 1952 and 1956 when he was allied with the party.

Sartre’s thought is also useful in an analysis of the content of Cartier-Bresson’s photos. A superficial reading of his preface suggests that Sartre conformed to the kind of ideas identified above about a generic human condition, or a bloodless universalism.

By getting your models to pose, you will give them time to become other: other than you; other than people; other than themselves. The ‘pose’ produces the elite and the pariahs, the generals and the Papuans, the Breton-looking Bretons, the Chinese-looking Chinese, and the ladies bountiful: the ideal. Cartier-Bresson’s snapshots catch people at high speed without giving them time to be superficial. At a hundredth of a second we are all the same, all of us at the heart of our human condition.

Here Sartre contrasts the human condition that Cartier-Bresson captures with the ubiquitous and crude stereotyping of Others. There is of course a long history of the latter in the self-understanding of Europeans. However, Sartre is not positing the sort of abstract universalism that so pained Aimé Césaire and which he expressed in his open letter to Maurice Thorez announcing his resignation from the PCF in October 1956:

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Je ne m’enterre pas dans un particularisme étroit. Mais je ne veux pas non plus me perdre dans un universalisme décharné.

Il y a deux manières de se perdre: par ségrégation murée dans le particulier ou par dilution dans l’“universel”.

Ma conception de l’universel est celle d’un universel riche de tout le particulier, riche de tous les particuliers, approfondissement et coexistence de tous les particuliers.\(^{50}\)

Sartre’s understanding of the dialectic correlated with Césaire’s conception of the universal. As he put it in his *Notebooks for an Ethics*, written in 1947 and 1948: ‘The Other, in history: The Orient (China, India, Japan). How can one dare to do a dialectic of history that does not take into account these 400 million human beings who, like us, have fifty centuries of history? The dialectic (whether Hegelian or Marxist) only considers *part* of humanity.’\(^{51}\)

Paige Arthur argues that in this passage Sartre revealed himself to be still limited by a Eurocentric perspective. That is to say his aspiration to a universal history that takes collective Others into account still took European man as its central point of reference.\(^{52}\) Be that as it may, it is important to note the point that Sartre’s references to Europe in general are little commented upon, and part of the redress of this neglect must take account of the fact that his Europe was thought through precisely in terms of its relations with the rest of the world.

Sartre’s approach is also useful in the sense that it reiterates the political content of art. This was no less the case for the Cartier-Bresson photos that he prefaced. Photography was identified by Sartre as but one modern form of a timeless human culture, an anthropological

\(^{50}\) Aimé Césaire, ‘Lettres à Maurice Thorez’, (24 October, 1956), http://lmsi.net/Lettre-a-Maurice-Thorez.


\(^{52}\) Paige Arthur, *Unfinished Projects: Decolonization and the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre* (London & New York: Verso, 2010), 29. One should also note that in her work, Arthur argues that the interchange between interpersonal and group alterity in Sartre’s philosophy is problematic, as it is at odds with his methodological individualism. See *Unfinished Projects*, 114-115.
constant of the need to negate the world as it is. In Being and Nothingness, he defined man as a being who is not what he is and is what he is not. Richard Kearney explains that, ‘as soon as I realize myself as I am now, I am already imagining myself as I am no longer (my past self) and as I am not yet (my future self). My present self is haunted by past and future absences. To imagine is, therefore, a temporal act in which I constitute myself as both nothingness (i.e. no actual given thing here and now) and freedom.’

If photography is a mode of negation and Europe is a term of reference for Sartre generally and in the Cartier-Bresson preface in particular, it follows that the reader of the book was invited to imagine Europe in a similar spirit of negation, or to imagine an idea of Europe that is haunted by past and future absences. Any consideration of Europe’s place in the world was to reckon with this simultaneous and constant process of looking back and forward in time. As we will see, Cartier-Bresson’s photographs in the collection lend themselves to such interpretations of the continent.

Sartre’s involvement with Cartier-Bresson’s China project is an opportune point to discuss the issue of the particular susceptibility of the photographic medium to appropriation for diverse interpretations and claims, which might indeed differ markedly from those of the photographer. Cartier-Bresson himself was well aware of this problem and explicitly complained about it in the course of his time in China. His biographer Pierre Assouline writes that,

With the photos he took in China, he was extremely precise in the phrasing of his captions, as if conscious that the historic nature of the events he had witnessed made it essential to avoid any chance of misinterpretation... At the head of his reportage on life in Shanghai and Nanking after the defeat of the nationalists, he wrote: ‘This photo may only be reproduced if accompanied by its caption or by a text written explicitly in the spirit of the caption.’

It is, then, instructive to compare David Rousset’s use of Cartier-Bresson’s photographs to attack Sartre with respect to his attitude to China, and Sartre’s interpretation of Cartier-Bresson’s work in his preface to *D’une Chine à l’autre*. This example is particularly enlightening because what was at stake in this argument was a struggle over what one might term the European credentials of the intellectual.

One of Cartier-Bresson’s photos was reproduced in the *D’une Chine à l’autre* collection with the caption: ‘fête célébrant l’entrée solennelle de l’armée à Shanghai, le 1er août 1949.’ He comments that, ‘on exposait dans ces défilés les problèmes du moment. La cérémonie avait été prévue pour le 5 juillet 1949. Devant la menace d’un bombardement nationaliste elle avait été décommandée et remise au 6 juillet.’ The same photo appeared in an article by Rousset in *Demain* in January 1956, alongside the following caption: ‘L’étoile rouge est lourde à porter pour les frêles épaules des jeunes communistes chinois que semble surveiller, tel le “Big Brother” de George Orwell, la gigantesque effigie du tout-puissant Mao Tse Toung.’

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In the article Rousset refers to ‘le continent jaune’ in an implicit contrast to the white European continent, exemplifying a persistent, if attenuated, trait to define Europe in racial terms. Rousset did not invoke Europe specifically in the article, but it was present as an implicit point of reference and comparison. Indeed, he worked in circles that aimed to fortify Europe as a bulwark against totalitarianism. He was thus instrumental in forming the *Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire* alongside Sartre in 1948, which invoked Europe as a third way in the Cold War world. Furthermore, his invocation of Orwell is symptomatic of his continuing commitment to a particular cultural and political vision of Europe. Institutionally this current of thought was represented in the Parisian journal *Preuves*, which assembled many key anti-Soviet writers from all over Europe such as Orwell himself, Hannah Arendt, Salvador de Madariaga,
Franz Borkenau, Denis de Rougemont, Raymond Aron, Manès Sperber, Nicola Chiaromonte, and Czesław Miłosz.\textsuperscript{58} It expressly advocated European values, European culture and Europe’s political integration. Reciprocally, the journal took pains to defend Rousset during his libel trial against \textit{Les Lettres françaises} in 1951.\textsuperscript{59} And yet \textit{Preuve}’s very credentials of Europeanness were controversial, for it was labeled an instrument of American propaganda, negating Europe since, so it was claimed, its propagandists would have it absorbed into an American capitalist imperium.

In keeping with the ethos of \textit{Preuves} and of a certain mould of intellectual who conceptualised his or her vocation as a distinctly European space, Rousset accused Sartre of betraying the calling of the intellectual to criticise state power. In his preface to \textit{D’une Chine à l’autre}, Sartre, like Rousset and others elsewhere like Mauriac and Malraux, pointed to the intellectual as integral to certain ideas of Europe. But far from a commendation, he indicted those who created a mythologised Europe through the representation of the Chinese. He located photography squarely within this tradition of conceiving Europe by fetishising the supposed irreducible differences of its Other, or even producing those differences: ‘There are photographers who encourage war because they produce literature. They seek out a Chinese who looks more Chinese than the others; in the end they find one. They make him adopt a typically Chinese pose and surround him with chinoiseries. What have they captured on film? One Chinaman? No… the Idea of what is Chinese.’\textsuperscript{60}

For Sartre, it was to Cartier-Bresson’s credit that he transcended these artificial and nefarious dichotomies to recognise a universal human condition. He assessed that ‘the

\textsuperscript{59} See ibid., 64.
\textsuperscript{60} Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘From One China to Another’, 23-24.
picturesque is wiped away, farewell European poetry; what remains is the material truth, the poverty and greed of the fallen regime.’\textsuperscript{61} Susan Sontag remarked that European photography was largely guided by notions of the picturesque, key among which was the idea of the foreign.\textsuperscript{62} One might suggest here that Sartre anticipated but inverted her remarks by showing that it is the picturesque and photography that have contributed to defining Europe and the European.\textsuperscript{63}

But if these ideas of Europe have been constitutively dependent on distortion of its Other, that is not to say that Sartre posited some kind of true Europe which only needed to be uncovered. When Sartre celebrates the end of European poetry in Cartier-Bresson’s work, we can read this as meaning that poetry is definitive of a certain idea of Europe which like poetry, according to his analysis in \textit{What is Literature?}, is an end in itself. This Europe is like the aesthetic artifact that is unashamedly self-grounded. Europe is thus reduced to its form, something to be contemplated in its autotelic and self-satisfied inertia. But ‘for Sartre’, Robert Young reminds us, ‘politics begins rather than ends with identity.’\textsuperscript{64} As such, ideas of Europe are only of interest in the way in which they either deter or further the process of becoming, of advancing towards a society free of class exploitation within and of oppression without.

Europe and Violence

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 25. Emphasis in the original.
One of the most arresting photographs in *D’une China à l’autre* is of a Shanghai neighbourhood in the aftermath of a bombing raid. Its caption reads: ‘L’aviation du Kuomintang a bombardé Shanghai. Les bombes sont tombées sur les faubourgs où elles ont fait de nombreuses victimes parmi la population qui y vit entassé dans des paillotes.’

Figure 8. Henri Cartier-Bresson, ‘Un quartier de Shanghai a été bombardé par l’aviation du Kuomintang’, *Photo monde* (January, 1954) in FHCB.

Its scene of terrible destruction and suffering could immediately be recognised as a core element in a shared European experience. Jacques Soustelle made precisely this point in *Foreign Affairs* – and in doing so unwittingly confirmed Benjamin’s linking of Europe and the air force that we noted above. Soustelle addressed Americans wishing to understand the European mentality, and insisted on the fundamental importance of such devastation, not just in terms of the effect of bombing but also the recent experience of violence in general. Here he referred to the ‘the peoples of Europe’, and ‘particularly the French people’:

> the psychology of our people must be understood in America. It is a very different psychology from what must have been that of the American people following the last world war. The United

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States suffered during the war; but the country was not occupied by the enemy, Americans did not have to witness the slaughter of their fellow citizens in extermination camps, they did not watch their cities go up in flames, see their harvests destroyed by warring armies, roads, railroad lines and bridges cut, ports in ruins. The French went through all that for four years, sharpened, too, by the bitterness of defeat.\(^{66}\)

We should note that Soustelle did not seem to view his remarks as problematic, given that Paris was certainly not among the European cities that went up in flames, at least on any remotely comparable scale. Rosemary Wakeman remarks that one of the reasons that the images of Paris by photographers like Cartier-Bresson have become so iconographic is precisely because the city did indeed emerge from the war intact, in stark contrast to so many other European capitals.\(^{67}\) Soustelle’s remarks can be understood as articulating an idea of Europeanness with reference to a consciousness of what Judith Butler describes as the distribution of human physical vulnerability across the globe.\(^{68}\) There are two remarks to make about this.

Firstly, the notion of a global distribution of violence, rather than talking about violence in a specific place at a specific time, connotes its provisional nature and suggests it is something shifting and even unforeseeable, something that having passed can just as easily return. An idea of Europe or of European identity based on this notion must be correlatively unstable, contradicting the cliché that the very function of identity is to be a rock of permanence in a world in which all else is changing. This Europe was quite at odds with those who constructed firm and unproblematic lineages such as Denis de Rougemont, which suggests that Jean-Baptiste Duroselle was rash in his contention in his 1965 work that there was an abyss between the Europeans before and after 1945.\(^{69}\) On the other hand, Perry Anderson writes about the tradition

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of conceptualising the idea of Europe, particularly in the nineteenth century, in relation to the ideals of peace. Such an ethos was ‘central to virtually every shade of Europeanizing opinion.’

It was thus a bitter irony that in the light of such a heritage Soustelle’s understanding of Europe was defined by violence and fear of violence.

Secondly, this Europe diverged from ideas of nationalism rather than supplementing them, as in many traditional and contemporary ideas of the continent. The war to which Soustelle refers was often the basis of a solid and resolute image of nationhood in the post-war period; the myth of résistantalisme, or the ‘Vichy Syndrome’, flourished in France and had equivalents throughout the continent. The point is that nationalism could put the experience of violence to work in an affirmative culture of martyrdom, romantic sacrifice and national redemption. A shared sense of Europeanness lacked any comparable civic apparatus to override suffering and death, and so fell back on raw destruction and loss as its default terms of commonality, terms that were undiluted, unmediated and not sanitised as in nationalist ideology. Hence the writer Roger Nimier’s lament that that this century’s only true Europeans were ‘des cadavres sur les décombres.’

Incidentally, Nimier was the subject of a Cartier-Bresson portrait in 1950. Lucien Febvre, likewise, offered an extremely dreary prognosis of a continent ever more threatened by mechanised warfare in his course on European civilisation at the Collège de France in the newly liberated Paris of 1944-1945.

Having been invited to draw comparisons between China and Europe and it having been made clear that capitalism was a key concern of the work, a Parisian audience might have been

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particularly drawn to another photograph of a desperate and harried crowd in Shanghai in December 1948. It was featured in the first issue of *Paris Match* in March 1949. The crowd is scrambling to receive an allowance of gold from the Kuomintang authorities following massive inflation.

![Image of crowd](image)

**Figure 9. Henri Cartier-Bresson, ‘Shanghai’ (1948). Google images.**

It is hypothesised that the photograph’s particular power to resonate with a Parisian audience derived from its depiction of subjective and objective systemic violence. The subjective form refers to the most common understanding of violence as a tangible act of aggression perpetrated by an identifiable agent. Slavoj Žižek explains the distinction between this conventional sense of violence and its objective sense. The latter describes ‘the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems… Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent.’ In these terms, the confluence of these two forms of violence in ‘the Great European Civil War of 1914-1945’ was still fresh in the memory of

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Cartier-Bresson’s post-war audiences.\footnote{Donald Sassoon, \textit{One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century} (New York: The New Press, 1996), 135.} In fact, Cartier-Bresson’s own worldview was shaped during the 1930s, a point that, Cookman argues, is seriously underestimated. He described how Cartier-Bresson aligned himself with two political trends in 1930s Europe: opposition to the capitalist class which many blamed for World War One and the ravages of the Depression, and the rise of the left in opposition to the fascism of Hitler, Franco, and Mussolini.\footnote{Cookman, ‘Compelled to Witness’, 10.} Cartier-Bresson was not at all unusual in holding capitalism to have been the catalyst for this catastrophe. Accordingly, the photograph can be supposed to have struck a chord with a certain deep-seated popular mistrust of capitalism in post-war Europe.

Of course, to resonate with a Parisian and European audience is not necessarily to say anything at all about Europe itself. There are two reasons why one can claim Cartier-Bresson’s work did so, however. Firstly, its context of reception was one in which there was a strong tendency to read the scenes it showed of China turning Communist as symptomatic of weaknesses embarrassingly internal to Europe as it defined itself. Secondly, it illustrated the point that Europe was not reducible to itself, and that its own history did not unfold merely within its continental frontiers, but globally. Europe’s presence in the non-European world was not supplemental to, and therefore detachable from, an authentic understanding of the continent.

Eric Hobsbawm argues that 1914 marked the beginning of the breakdown and crisis of Western bourgeois civilisation of the nineteenth century, which was characterised by a capitalist economy and was ‘profoundly convinced of the centrality of Europe.’\footnote{Eric Hobsbawm, \textit{Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991} (London: Abacus, 1995), 6.} If Europe’s catastrophic self-destruction had subsided with the end of the Second World War, the old certainties in its primacy remained vulnerable to any further disruption of the stability of the world system. As
Hobsbawm argues, the emergence of Communism from this European catastrophe derived exactly from the weakness of this European civilisation.\textsuperscript{78}

This indictment of contemporary Europe was reflected in the concluding text after the photographs in \textit{D’une Chine à l’autre}. Here the consequences of European capitalism for China and capitalistic imperialist Europe itself were condemned in equal measure.\textsuperscript{79} The text states, ‘Mais ensuite vient le temps de malheur, des défaites et des humiliations; c’était l’âge d’expansion du capitalisme occidental, de la main-mise des puissances européennes sur une Chine qui devient le paradis des aventuriers.’\textsuperscript{80}

This is a vital point since, coupled to the images, it disrupts the production of an imperial understanding of Europe that James McDougall points to when he describes the projection of empire’s violence onto those it targeted. McDougall is not merely accusing European powers of historically putting forward self-serving arguments. Rather, ‘a fundamental psychological and ideological mechanism of colonial rule – one of the several ways in which Europeans not only produced imperialism, but contrived to live with it in perfectly good conscience, indeed in the conviction of its “greater good” – has been the externalisation of imperialism’s own violence onto its victim.’\textsuperscript{81} This is undermined by Cartier-Bresson’s photographic and textual indictment, not merely of Europe’s subjective violence of military coercion, but also the objective or systemic violence of European capitalism that, as it were, battered down Chinese walls. Cartier-Bresson, in short, hints at Aimé Césaire’s contention in his \textit{Discourse on Colonialism} that

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{79} It is not clear whether this text was written by Cartier-Bresson or someone else. But as it was Cartier-Bresson’s collection one would assume he had control to include and exclude what he wanted in a way which he did not have with newspaper and magazine commissions. Moreover, what is stated corresponds to Cartier-Bresson’s political convictions as we have outlined above.
\textsuperscript{80} Cartier-Bresson, \textit{D’une Chine à l’autre}.
\textsuperscript{81} James McDougall, ‘Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s-1990s’. \textit{Third World Quarterly} 26/1 (2005), 120.
Europe’s exertion of force in the world was not supplemental to but constitutive of it, and that any plausible understanding or idea of the continent must reckon with this.\textsuperscript{82} We will see later, though, that such a gesture towards Césaire’s anti-colonial critique of Europe was curiously absent from Cartier-Bresson’s \textit{Les Européens}.

Europe and Time

Susan Sontag argues that the photographic medium has an inherent propensity to make one reflect on time. She writes, ‘All photographs are \textit{memento mori}. To take a photograph is to participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, vulnerability, mutability. Precisely by slicing out this moment and freezing it, all photographs testify to time’s relentless melt.’\textsuperscript{83} If photography in general provokes reflection on time, Cartier-Bresson’s work did so all the more. His concept of the ‘decisive moment’ reflected his reputation for spontaneity and gift for timing. For Sartre, this gave Cartier-Bresson’s work in China a distinctive mark of authenticity and set him apart from his peers. We noted above that Sartre considered Cartier-Bresson’s photos to be shorn of any sort of posing in his subjects – capturing them at high speed precluded appearing superficial. In Sartre’s terms, then, the Europe that Cartier-Bresson represented in his work was a continent shorn of alibis. One can surmise that the prestige, or symbolic capital, of Sartre’s preface was such that the point was taken seriously by its readers. And that being the case, one photograph from the China work stands out as a statement about Europe.

\textsuperscript{82} See Aimé Césaire, \textit{Discours sur le colonialisme, suivi de Discours sur la Négritude} (Paris: Éditions Présence Africaine, 2004 [1955]).

It is particularly interesting to view the photograph in the context of a summary Cartier-Bresson wrote for the *New York Times Magazine* regarding the two years he had spent in Asia: ‘The last war changed the Far East more than any part of the world… In addition to our own problems at home, we are paying for our grandfathers’ failure to foresee that the colonial system was not eternal.’\(^{84}\) Tellingly, Galassi notes that the remark about the colonial system was expunged from the published text.\(^ {85}\) Nonetheless, the photograph made a comparable statement about Europe and its sense of time which was far less controvertible than his excised words. The caption for the picture read: ‘Sur le paquebot. Un groupe d’Européens et d’Américains ayant

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\(^{85}\) Ibid., 67 n.
vécu longtemps à Shanghai. The picture shows two men in the foreground, sitting just behind a sign in both English and Chinese forbidding third class in that section.

In the first instance, the caption reminds us that ‘Europe’ must always be distinguished from ‘the West’. More importantly, though, the photograph forcefully suggested that the time of European and Western privilege, exemplified here by a literal class barrier, had passed, and passed ignominiously at that. Not a trace of a proud or sentimental downing of the flags here, only the resigned and ineffectual anonymity of old men. How starkly this contrasted with Edward Said’s description of British India in the heyday of European imperialism:

When it became common practice during the nineteenth century for Britain to retire its administrators from India and elsewhere once they had reached the age of fifty-five, then a further refinement in Orientalism had been achieved; no Oriental was ever allowed to see a Westerner as he aged and degenerated, just as no Westerner needed ever to see himself, mirrored in the eyes of the subject race as anything but a vigorous, rational, ever-alert young Raj.

Moreover, if, as for the historians of the Annales school, Europe was best made sense of in the long wave of history, Cartier-Bresson showed that a singular event was not necessarily merely the froth on that wave. The sense of the photo is that Europe’s self-definition and rationale had been overturned very quickly, and that sense was underscored by the singular monumental episode of Europeans exiting the non-European world. It connects with Jean Monnet’s distinction between the European and the non-European worlds in terms of the tempo of political adaptation to the new post-war world. The reform of the former contrasted with the

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86 Cartier-Bresson, D’une Chine à l’autre, photo 141.
revolution of the latter, including that represented by the victory of the CCP over the forces of Chiang Kai-shek, whom Monnet had of course once advised.\textsuperscript{88}

It is important to keep in mind the disadvantages of photographs in the sense that they could be appropriated for differing and contradictory interpretations of Europe. Here one sees the flip side of the photographic medium. Its representation of Europe in its striking and simple immediacy was as powerful a statement as the masterful indictments of Europe by contemporary anti-colonial polemicists like Fanon, Sartre, or Césaire.

\textit{Les Européens}

Cartier-Bresson’s book \textit{Les Européens} was published in 1955. Galassi assesses that, alongside \textit{The Decisive Moment} (1952), in half a century of books issued in Cartier-Bresson’s name ‘not one is remotely comparable to these two in quality, either as a book in itself or as a vehicle for the work as a whole.’\textsuperscript{89} Not merely a cultural artifact though, there was a distinct political aspect to the collection, if not in the way it was appropriated in a review by \textit{Jeune Europe} – the organ of the Paris-based \textit{Mouvement européen}. Its claim that Cartier-Bresson’s book demonstrated the unity through diversity of Europe was more revealing of the felt need to supplement European political integration with an appeal to the affections of its peoples, rather than simply putative economic and political pragmatism.\textsuperscript{90}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Anderson, \textit{The New Old World}, 24; François Denord & Antoine Schwartz, \textit{L'Europe sociale n'aura pas lieu} (Paris: Raisons d'agir, 2009), 33.}
\footnote{Galassi, \textit{Henri Cartier-Bresson}, 58.}
\footnote{See ‘Les Européens à la sauveur’, \textit{Jeune Europe} (1 January, 1956). Incidentally, the terms of the review are so close to Sartre’s preface to \textit{D'une Chine à l’autre} that it would be somewhat generous to exculpate the journal of plagiarism.}
\end{footnotes}
The collection proceeds country by country. It is notable that it finishes with France and that its final picture is of the rue Mouffetard in Paris – a kind of homecoming to Europe’s centre having wandered through its peripheries. Galassi also makes a point of noting that it was released in the same year as the high-profile exhibition, *The Family of Man*, which subsequently toured the world. The publication of *Les Européens* was in itself something of a European undertaking – it was published by Tériade, the Greek-born, Paris-based art critic and publisher, and its impressive front cover was designed by the Catalan Surrealist Joan Miró, himself a frequent visitor to the French capital and the subject of a Cartier-Bresson portrait.

The case will be made that two particularly striking motifs of the book are a Europe which negotiates tradition and modernity, and a Europe defined by privilege and deprivation. Beyond these, the legacy and memory of the Second World War, or more broadly Europe’s thirty-year catastrophe, are a presence that permeates the whole collection. This is most obvious in pictures of bombed out urban landscapes, but it is equally implied by shots of banal everyday activities, since the radical distortion of that everyday life had been a point of European commonality in that conflict. This legacy and presence, it is argued, crowds out the Europe of imperialism, which is conspicuous in its absence.

Europe of Tradition and Modernity

Galassi writes that Cartier-Bresson was profoundly moved by the undermining or loss of traditional ways of life and the destructive effects of modernisation. Moreover, he writes that he often photographed scenes which could have existed hundreds of years before, and goes as far as
to say that his work is tinged with ‘romantic primitivism’.\textsuperscript{91} This claim is corroborated by various photographs of agricultural or rural life in the collection from, for instance, Greece, Spain, the USSR, and Italy. However, the very first photograph of the collection suggests a more complicated representation of tradition and modernity and their implications for Europe. It shows a scene of industrial chimneys beside an otherwise serene Greek landscape with the archaeological museum of Elusis and its ruins from the fifth century BC in the foreground.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Henri Cartier-Bresson, ‘Greece’ (1953). Google images.}
\end{figure}

The photo lends itself readily to the interpretation that Europe, as represented by classical civilisation – commonly assumed to be its originator – lay prostrate, decapitated, and broken before the ugliness of modern industrialism. This, it seems, was at once antipathetic to Europe and yet integral to it. In an approximation of Benjamin’s notion above of what industrialism implied for Europe, the caption for the photo states, ‘Les cheminées d’usine sont dans le style de la fin du XIXe siècle. L’élément milieu du XXe siècle n’apparaît pas sur la photo, mais

\textsuperscript{91} Galassi, Henri Cartier-Bresson, 61.
s’entendait, l’aérodrome d’avions à réaction étant tout proche.’

It is telling to compare this caption with Cartier-Bresson’s statement, as reported by Galassi: “the 1930s were the nineteenth century” and the scourge of American-style technology, business, commerce and consumption didn’t begin to saturate Europe until the mid-1950s.

In the first place, if the 1930s were comparable with the nineteenth century, the power of the photograph is increased by the effect of abruptness and rupture. Secondly, this suggests that capitalist modernisation was bad enough when it was a European affair of nineteenth-century origin, something Cartier-Bresson made clear in his work on China. It was even more deplorable when a defining characteristic of Europe was only, at most, ambiguously European, that is to say American-driven post-war development. Thirdly, there is something more menacing about this American-oriented modernisation which, according to the caption, was invisible, comparable to the omnipresent violence that Sartre observed in the China photos. It suggested a key contemporary concern about the accelerated smashing of (European) cultural specificity beneath the wheels of standardising technology.

Europe of Privilege and Deprivation

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92 Cartier-Bresson, Les Européens, caption for photo 1.
93 Galassi, Henri Cartier-Bresson, 65.
95 Sartre, ‘From One China to Another’, 28. See also Assouline, Henri Cartier-Bresson, 171.
As the *International Herald Tribune* reported in its review of *Les Européens*, ‘the raison d’être for the photograph [figure 12] of four bald, bullnecked and bullet-headed German industrialists is not its striking composition but rather its significance.’

Indeed, one strong motif of the book is its characterisation of Europe as defined by a contrast between privilege and deprivation. Its juxtaposition of the two conditions suggests their mutual implication, as exemplified by the contrast of this photograph and that in figure 13 showing a

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man in West Germany standing with a sign hanging from his neck reading: ‘Je cherche du travail, n’importe lequel.’\textsuperscript{97}

Figure 13. ‘La pancarte autour du cou du jeune homme porte l’inscription “Je cherche du travail, n’importe lequel”’, in Henri Cartier-Bresson, \textit{Les Européens}, photo no. 25.

There is a distinction between such a glaring juxtaposition of haves and have-nots here, rather than the ubiquitous poverty in his work on China, which suggests that the former is a particularly Europe characteristic. One might counter that his work on China was produced during a period of war, so that poverty and deprivation were necessarily a secondary concern. But the very fact that Europe was no longer in the depths of armed conflict brought to the forefront a new European commonality of shared aspirations to restructure the traditional forms of European society. No longer was social justice to be deferred for the sake of national salvation, and the consensus that formed around welfare statism made such a contrast in the photos particularly objectionable because Europe was their location.

\textsuperscript{97} Cartier-Bresson, \textit{Les Européens}, photo 25.
The full caption for that photograph of the unemployed man (figure 8) reads: ‘Il y avait, en 1953, environ 9 millions de réfugiés et 1 million et demi de chômeurs en Allemagne de l’Ouest.’98 It is interesting that Cartier-Bresson made a link between the deprivation of unemployment and poverty, and disenfranchisement in terms of security of residence and nationality. For a notable feature of the book is that it is structured according to nation state, moving from Greece to Spain and through Germany, England (a slight exception), Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, the USSR, and Italy, before finally looking at France. Here the nation state and Europe are in a supplemental relationship: to talk of the Europeans and Europe did not contradict or impinge on the nation state; rather nation states were constitutive of Europe, again a common notion in the history of the idea of Europe, particularly in the nineteenth century. Charles Maier even argues that historically, frontiers are a particularly European obsession.99

However, this position comes at the price of glossing over the contradiction to which Cartier-Bresson alluded here. Even if most European refugees had been settled by the time of the appearance of the book in 1955, dissatisfaction and bitterness inevitably remained. There were in fact plenty of perennially frustrated political émigrés in Paris. What is more, as Hannah Arendt argued, the very existence of refugees subverted the authority of nation states, and so the refugees were treated as if they carried ‘the germs of a deadly sickness.’100 This metaphor of illness was also used frequently with regard to immigrants in Paris who, it was feared, carried deadly diseases like tuberculosis.101 In both cases, it is contended, this myth functioned to delineate deviance from a normative Europeanness. These issues of inclusion in relation to Europeanness as understood in France also connected back to the photograph from Greece. The

101 Wakeman, *The Heroic City*, 189.
term of abuse ‘mètèque’ was still quite current in this period, after all. Introduced into France by the far right-wing Charles Maurras at the height of the Dreyfus affair, this neologism derived from the ancient Greek word *metic*, which referred to aliens who had no citizenship in a Greek city.  

Europe of Imperialism

This contestation of the legitimacy of hierarchy and privilege in Cartier-Bresson’s vision should logically have extended beyond Europe’s internal definition to Europe’s place in the world at large. Cartier-Bresson was, as we have seen, a committed and consistent anti-colonialist. In this sense, crucial to *Les Européens* were not only the Europes that it showed, but also those that it did not: above all, the Europe of colonialism. Even its most obvious manifestation in the metropole – the presence of burgeoning immigrant communities – was conspicuously absent. That absence was all the more significant given that, as Étienne Balibar points out, the term ‘Europeans’ was predominantly used to refer to groups of colonisers in European colonies until the middle of the twentieth century.

Even the somewhat different Soviet variant of imperialism was absent due to the inclusion of photographs from Russia but none of Eastern Europe, except for a couple from Ukraine. Curiously, it appears that he did in fact produce photos in Warsaw on a stopover during

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103 We should note that immigration and imperialism are not strictly causally linked. However, as Benjamin Stora points out, the connection made in the public mind in France between immigration and imperialism was particularly acute. See Stora, *La gangrène et l’oubli. La mémoire de la guerre d’Algérie* (Paris: La Découverte, 1998), 281-300.
his return to Paris.\textsuperscript{105} Of course, Cartier-Bresson was simply offered the opportunity to work in
the USSR and not in Eastern Europe, but the effect of that absence in the collection remains no
less real.

Cartier-Bresson was not oblivious to the issue of the significance of absences. In the
opening lines to his preface, he recounts being confronted over his lack of photos of Scotland by
a Scotsman who demanded to know precisely what that meant. Cartier-Bresson took the point
while insisting that his oversight had been in no way deliberate or planned, and was due in large
part to the arbitrary wandering of the photographer. We can credit Cartier-Bresson’s explanation
and still insist that in light of his own words he should not have been oblivious to the
significance of that absence. Indeed, much of the material for the work was gathered during a
European tour in May – July 1953, during which time he passed through Italy, France, Spain,
Switzerland, Germany, England, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium. One could argue that
as a pan-European phenomenon, imperialism was less of an obvious trait than the two tropes that
dominate the book: Europe of tradition and modernity; and a Europe of privilege and
derprivation. The work suggested that imperialism might be no less integral to Europe, but only
manifested itself visibly in such things as the culture of immigrant communities, or
demonstrations and gatherings for or against empire, all limited for the most part to major urban
centres.\textsuperscript{106}

One can read this absence as an expression of a distinct lack of space for other
determinants of European identity in the aftermath of the catastrophe of the Second World War.
This formative experience was most obvious in the various shots of destroyed cityscapes. But

\textsuperscript{105} Galassi, \textit{Henri Cartier-Bresson}, 310.
\textsuperscript{106} It is thus no coincidence, for example, that opposition within the PCF to the party’s policy on the Algerian war
even those pictures that show trivial activities of everyday life implied it, since it was precisely a point of European commonality that everyday life had been utterly disfigured during the war, as was the desperately felt need to reconstruct it thereafter. Cartier-Bresson’s concerns about the consequences of modernisation and privilege and deprivation are, then, inseparable from this European disaster. Consequently, the radical prioritisation of the World War in thinking about the meaning of Europe crowded out any kind of rationalisation, negative or positive, of European imperialism, despite the abundance of its manifestations in Paris.107

The title of the work, translated as The Europeans, is also of significance, particularly as contrasted with the indefinite article of the title of the Cartier-Bresson collection of 1997, Des Européens.108 One could interpret this use of the definite article in the title of the 1955 work as a suggestion that the category of Europeans was closed and decided. If, according to Balibar, the term Europeans would later become controversial in response to the growth of immigrant communities, it did not appear to be so for Cartier-Bresson here. It is the effect, if surely not the intention of the collection Les Européens, that ‘European’ corresponds to an unswerving racial criterion of whiteness. If in this Europe colonialism was overridden by the priority accorded to the legacy of the Second World War, it is also the case that the failure to think beyond the immense scar at the heart of Europe made the book’s reasoning compatible with that of those groups which began at this time to propagate a racially based definition of Europe and Europeanness. In this sense, the absence of colonialism in the book’s treatment of the European supports Fanon’s contemporary insight that ‘not only must the black man be black, he must be

108 The change in article translates in the English to Europeans or some Europeans. However, in the English editions, both the 1955 and the 1997 works are entitled The Europeans. The 1997 collection contains some of the same photos, but also includes shots from earlier and later in Cartier-Bresson’s career.
black in relation to the white man. Some critics will take it on themselves to remind us that this proposition has a converse. I say that this is false. The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.109 Fanon’s claim here is all the more pertinent precisely because Cartier-Bresson manifestly paid much sympathetic attention to the supposed non-European, quite apart from his work outside Europe. A photo from 1932 which shows immigrant labourers on the quai Javel in Paris was included in the 1955 Louvre exhibition (figure 14).


Likewise, a later image from 1968 shows immigrant African or Caribbean workers washing the windows of a pleasure boat in Paris. There is also a Cartier-Bresson photograph of two Africans sweeping the streets along the Champs-Élysées.110 The first of these was included in the 1997 collection Des Européens, when the parameters for thinking about Europe and Europeanness had


110 I am grateful to Claude Cookman for this reference. He notes that by itself one could read it as a neutral document, but seen in conjunction with all his other socially concerned photographs and in light of his political positions, it is likely best read it as a critical statement. Claude Cookman, personal communication, 20 October, 2010. Recall also that in its foundational manifesto, the *Fédération des étudiants nationalistes* contrasted a street sweeper with Marcel Bigeard, one of the commanders at Dien Bien Phu, to make a statement about European supremacy. See chapter 5.
shifted significantly. Even sticking to the timeframe of *Les Européens* – 1950-1955 – one is struck by his decision to exclude pictures of a demonstration against the Algerian war, and of Parisians crowding around a newsstand to see the press’s report of France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu, both from May 1954.\(^\text{111}\)

A second reading of the title *Les Européens* could take its definite article as a provocation rather than prescription, a call to self-reflection rather than exclusion, or even an incitement to politics in Rancière’s sense.\(^\text{112}\) After all, it was hardly uncontroversial to include pictures from the USSR and so suggest that Russians were clearly European. We have already seen that Soustelle took the USSR to be Asian, even more so ideologically than geographically, and such sentiments were common. In a review of his work *Moscou* which was assembled from shots taken on the same trip, the *Gazette de Lausanne*, for instance, referred to its presentation of a ‘mélange de peuple asiatiques.’\(^\text{113}\)

**Conclusion**

The enormous prestige of Cartier-Bresson has often gone hand in hand with a restricted interpretation of his work as that of an artist in the sole service of surrealism, a view given

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\(^{111}\) Cartier-Bresson originally declared he had finished his work on *Les Européens* in March 1954 - two months prior to the shots of the Algerian war demonstrations and the events at Dien Bien Phu. However, he obviously reconsidered this when he was granted permission to visit the USSR in July 1954 as some of his pictures there are included in the work. Evidently, for whatever reason, about which one can only speculate, he did not consider the Algerian war demonstration or newsstand pictures worthy of inclusion in the reedited version. Of course, he was the first photographer granted access to the USSR for seven years so it is understandable that his photos there would take priority in any reworking of the collection. For chronological details see Galassi, *Henri-Cartier Bresson*, 309-310. The photo of the reaction on the Paris street to newspaper reports of the defeat at Dien Bien Phu is reproduced in Blanchard & Deroo, *Le Paris Asie*, 165.


additional weight by Cartier-Bresson’s own reinterpretation of his career in this light. Or he is regarded as simply a brilliant depicter of the human condition or abstract universal humanity. This is not simply the case with contemporary commentary, but also in the reaction to his work in the post-war period, both in France and internationally. However, taking Claude Cookman’s reinstatement of Cartier-Bresson’s work in the category of politically engaged social realism, this chapter has set out to analyse how aspects of Cartier-Bresson’s work can be understood as that of a situated post-war European with all the advantages and limitations that this entailed. His testimony about the new post-war world in turn produced certain kinds of representation of Europe and of Europeans. His record of the rise of the Maoist forces in China suggested a European self-understanding that relied to a significant degree on the experience of violence and the perception of the monumental shifting of time. Les Européens, on the other hand, suggested a Europe characterised by a tension between tradition and modernity and between privilege and deprivation. Counter-intuitively, a common thread linking the two collections was a Europe defined by imperialism – forcefully delimited and denounced in the first, only to be conspicuous in the second in its very absence.

Regarding both of these collections and the Louvre exhibition, the case has also been made that any consideration of Cartier-Bresson’s representations of Europe must consider the malleability of the photographic medium. This is something of a double-edged sword, as photographs could be appropriated for quite different purposes, as we saw in the example of David Rousset’s attack on Sartre – a dispute which in part derived from opposing understandings of Europe and the European intellectual. On the other hand, the striking immediacy of photography could make enormously powerful statements that resisted the removal of any captions or text, as in the example of aging Westerners resignedly departing China by boat.
The Europeanising aspect of Cartier-Bresson’s work, whether in the space of an exhibition, his books, or of a single photograph, also derived its power from absence. We have seen that this is the case in the Sartrean sense of a photograph as an instrument of negation, calling forth absent pasts and futures in the representation of a Europe; or in the power of Cartier-Bresson’s photos from China to intrigue European audiences precisely because of the sense of acute distance from that country, though Cartier-Bresson’s work insisted that this remoteness did not at all represent a radical disjuncture from Europe. Likewise, the absence of interpretations of certain photos, such as the picture from the colonial building in Jakarta or the gare Saint-Lazare, or of the absence of imperialism in *Les Européens*, remind us of the historical contingency of what elements are considered vital or disposable in an interpretation of Europe.
Conclusion

‘Notre héritage européen’, suggested Jorge Semprún in 2005, ‘n’a de signification vitale que si nous sommes capable d’en déduire un avenir.’¹ Looking perpetually backwards and forwards was central to processes of making sense of Europe in Paris in the post-war period. Yet, for all the validity of Semprún’s maxim, it needs to be reconciled with Frederick Cooper’s critique of ‘doing history backwards’. Cooper takes aim at the enlistment of history to try to shed light on the present at the expense of ‘what one does not see: the paths not taken, the dead ends of historical processes, the alternatives that appeared to people in their time.’² Following Cooper, it has been the aim of this thesis not to do history backwards; it is not intended as an exposition of the historical origins or sources of the Europe of today, or as a pre-history of how Europe is understood in Paris and France at the start of the twenty-first century. Rather, by examining a handful of examples it has tried to show how the meaning and course of Europe were understood multifariously in Paris in the post-war historical conjuncture.

Yet, these specific understandings of Europe do nonetheless have value for reflecting on Europe today, not least through what they reveal about the contingency of putatively settled notions of European identity; the shift in the salience of various parameters in the signification of the continent, or the reconfiguration of the constellation of pertinent constitutive elements of ideas of Europe; the essential plurality and opposition of understandings of Europe; how ideas of

Europe and Europeanness presuppose mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion; and the relationship between the experience of violence and the formation of ideas of Europe.

To take a step back, what exactly have been the findings of this examination of ‘Europeanising spaces’ in Paris, roughly between 1947 and 1962? The notion of Europeanising spaces has been employed to point to forums in the French capital in which ideas about Europe were explicitly or tacitly articulated, exchanged, and contested. Retrospectively, ‘Europe’ tends to be associated in the post-war period almost reflexively with inter-governmental European integration. Though this is taken into account, it is not primarily Europe in this sense that has been our focal point. One aim of the thesis itself might be said to be a Europeanisation of Paris in this period. That is to say, to shed light on aspects of political, social, and cultural life in the city that were implicated in discourse of Europe, and spaces other than those most commonly associated with Europe in the sense of state-level proposals and plans for its integration. Furthermore, our consideration of all these spaces has also referred where appropriate to two important supplemental definitions of Europeanising spaces: first, Europeanisation as the refusal of the closure of the terms ‘Europe’ or ‘Europeanness’; and second, Europeanisation as the disclosure, acknowledgement or appropriation of those terms in spaces whose Europeanness had previously been overlooked or denied. Having reviewed these methodological considerations, let us review the findings of the individual chapters.

The café has previously been identified as a marker of Europe, but a close examination of the Paris café in this period reveals various Europes. A vital forum for the formulation and exchange of ideas in the French capital, this Parisian institution was also a space in which ideas of Europe were put together, questioned and thought through. And while the city’s cafés were a popular site of leisure, they were often a less than effective refuge from the actuality of colonial
conflict and Cold War which prompted a reconsideration of Europe’s place in the world. Furthermore, by analysing Sartre’s reflections on Europe, we have seen that the space of the café, with which his discourse was indelibly associated, lent his discourse a supplemental power.

The urban development of Paris in the post-war years was informed by various understandings and ideas of Europe, and this impacted on the Parisian home, both in the sense of material shelter and civic belonging. Key among these guiding ideas was an equivalence between Europeanisation and modernisation. This was a common thread that connected various ways in which the Paris home was invoked in this period: a shared continent-wide vision of recovery from the Second World War; Paris as sanitised and zoned European capital, which was of course interconnected with an emerging idea of a Europe of mass tourism; and the city’s place in a Europe moulded by the Cold War. Furthermore, the Paris home was a space that was affected by the reformulated conceptions of Europe and Europeanness in the course and aftermath of French decolonisation. In this way, ‘ethnicising’ criteria of Europeanness and non-Europeanness were utilised in housing policy in relation to the home as a space for social engineering, whether through inclusion or relegation. Incoherencies in conceptions of non-Europeans and Europeans in this regard derived in large part from the perpetual imperial dilemma, now reconfigured in the metropole, about the continual need to negotiate exclusion and inclusion. This tension between these continually redrawn boundaries separating European from non-European was exacerbated by the French Republican claim of universalism. Moreover, an examination of the Paris home in this period is revealing of the linking of urban space and discourse of Europe, and counter-inferences that if this Paris was the capital of Europe, those who were excluded from it or devalued within it were in fact no less a part of it.
The urban fabric of the French capital was also seen to be connected to the French Republic’s claim of universalism in the street, and via this claim to a certain notion of European civilisation. The Paris street was also an expression of European identity in street names, while the transgression or appropriation of certain Paris streets was informed by political ideologies and, at least in a secondary way, concomitant ideas about Europe. In certain ways Europe as an identity even impacted on the simple act of walking in the streets, such as during the curfew directed against the city’s Algerian population during the Algerian war. The Paris street was also a forum in which to articulate, contest or reject ideas of Europe in demonstrations, or by placing posters or graffiti on the city’s walls.

An analysis of political spaces in Paris showed us that alternatives to processes of European integration already in existence were considered and advocated. The Mouvement socialiste des états unis d’Europe is interesting as an example of the overlooked socialist tradition of thinking about the idea and identity of Europe. By the time of the rejection of the European Defence Community in Paris in 1954, the dominant idea of Europe within the MSEUE was characterised by a striving for equilibrium and equality, as it had gradually reconciled itself to accepting the European integration process as it was being forged at inter-state level. It was of course problematic to reconcile these stipulations. Equilibrium in the end predisposed the Mouvement to an acceptance of capitalism, the nation as a political unit, and the two bloc system of global power. These had not seemed evidently desirable or inevitable in the heady immediate post-war period and its radical ideas of Europe that lay at the origins of the MSEUE. Neither did its commitment to equality override mechanisms and ideologies of hierarchy and exclusion that informed its vision of Europe and its place in the world. Its insistence on a Europe based on equality of rights did not resolve the problem of who counted as European in the first place. And
though European imperialism might be considered for the most part outdated, the idea of Europe was proffered as the benchmark of progress and development for the continent’s Others, and in turn suggested the continued reliance of the colonial and non-European world on Europe. Interestingly, the fundamental contestation that underlay the notion of Europe was stressed by the MSEUE, particularly in its admission that the process of inter-governmental integration had no monopoly on the label of ‘Europe’, and that Europe was understood otherwise by many Europeans, both in Paris and throughout the continent.

The *Fédération des étudiants nationalistes*, on the other hand, never had any illusions about its comparable distance from the corridors of power where the Europe of state integration that it derided was being negotiated and advanced. However, it is precisely of interest as a historical actor that campaigned for its alternative vision of the continent with a regretful awareness that it was on the losing side of history, yet also with a conviction that it could regroup to lead European youth to fight for a Europe worthy of the name. This was a Europe defined by hierarchy, the resolve of elites, nationalism, and imperialism – indeed, a Europe constitutionally in excess of itself in extending its sovereignty to the non-European world.

The relevance of cultural spaces in Paris has also been emphasised in terms of thinking about Europe in the post-war period. The prolific and variegated culture of anti-Francoist Spanish exiles in the French capital is illuminating in this regard. While not at all a homogenous bloc, certain interesting aspects of a marked Europeanism informed the cultural output of these Spaniards. These often derived from their understanding of Spanish history which was nonetheless relevant to thinking about the continent generally. One thinks immediately of the treatment of quixotism, the relationship between civilisation, culture, and violence, and delineating insiders and outsiders. Of particular interest are trends of thinking about Europe
including what has been termed a self-ironic Eurocentrism, and the notion of Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation as simultaneously desirable processes. The latter implies that the idea of Europe could be continually deconstructed and constructed in accordance with changed parameters of understanding and commitment.

The relationship between Europeans and non-Europeans that one can glean in the culture of the Spanish exiles is to be teased out more subtly in the work of Jacques Berque and his Mediterranean vision. This most prominent of Parisian Arabists rarely referred directly to Europe, yet it is implied in his articulation of the imperative of reconciliation between Europeans and Arabs that became all the more urgent in the context of the Algerian war. Berque’s work is particularly rich because it foregrounded other ways of thinking about the meaning of Europe and Europeanness. He suggested calling into question hierarchy, privilege and authority. He distrusted rigid and exclusive claims to Europe, and emphasised the necessary labour of reconciling different peoples, rather than trying hastily to transcend or synthesise their differences. It is in this sense that Berque lent his work to thinking about Europe and its Others certainly in terms of realism, but no less in terms of engagement, commitment and faith.

Finally, the space of the work of Henri Cartier-Bresson was rich indeed in terms of impelling his Parisian audiences to reflect on the meaning of Europe in the post-war world. His photographic testimony within and outside Europe suggested a European self-understanding that derived to a significant extent from the experience of violence; the perception of an epochal shift in time; and a Europe that was constituted by a tension between tradition and modernity, and between privilege and deprivation. His representations of Europe, moreover, are no less interesting for their blind spots. His collection *Les Européens*, for instance, does not even allude to the imperialism that to a large degree still underpinned common understandings of Europe,
and which he denounced elsewhere. Also, the malleability of the photographic medium reminds us of the historical contingency of definitions of Europe and Europeanness. This is most evidently seen in the absence of contemporary interpretations of certain photos that would seem more obvious today; as was apparent in relation to his photo of the colonial building in Jakarta (Fig. 5), or of the interpretation of the prescience of his photo of the gare Saint-Lazare (Fig. 6), or indeed of the absence of imperialism in Les Européens.

While interpretations of Europe in Paris were multiple, contradictory, and contested in post-war Paris, one can nonetheless point to certain common threads, which is not at all the same thing as claiming that all the invocations of Europe in the examined case studies are equivalent. Perhaps in the first place it should be pointed out that many of the actors involved were very well aware of this multiplicity of interpretations of the meaning of Europe. The FEN noted that the meaning of Europe was not even agreed upon between different groups of the radical right, while a 1954 conference of the MSEUE was told that, ‘L’Europe finit ainsi par être un monstre hybride qui simultanément signifie la paix et la guerre, la liberté et l’esclavage, la prospérité et la misère, une sorte d’espoir menaçant que chacun prétend appeler de ses vœux et qu’il écarte dès qu’il la rencontre.’ And, as Juan Goytisolo’s 1962 intervention about Spain and Europe in Les Temps modernes reminds us, Europe can come to mean quite different things over time.

It is also important to grasp that Europe was not something that could be considered contemplatively, as something ethereal and above the everyday concerns of politics. If various ideas about Europe collided and were fought over, it was also the case that ideas about Europe had to compete with alternative ideas of society and belonging that did not value the importance

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of Europe much or at all, perhaps prioritising instead the French nation or Republic, class, or the universal. Another related aspect of this contestation of ideas was the denial that certain conceptions of the continent could be deemed to be any kind of Europe at all. Hence Jean-Marie Domenach’s denunciation of false Europes; the French Communist party, the FEN and others’ dismissal of the authenticity of the Europe conceived along the lines of post-war economic integration; or Denis de Rougemont’s contention that Sartre’s representation of Europe was merely a projection onto the continent of French colonialism, and that this was a travesty of Enlightenment Europe and its legacy to the world.

To the disdain of some and the satisfaction of others, neither were the Europes examined in this thesis detachable from the wider non-European world. For many different actors in the French capital in this period, Europe made little sense without taking account of its relation with the non-European world. This is not merely to say that Europe could not be conceived of in isolation. Rather it was to claim that Europe was, in some sense and to some degree, defined by its interaction with the non-European world. Europe here was constitutively in excess of itself. It emerged in its non-European surplus.

Of course this need not imply the kind of reciprocity, openness and mutual recognition that Berque sought, or the radical universalism that underpinned the critique of Europe by figures like Sartre or Césaire. It was just as likely to be represented in a rather more chauvinist imperialist form. One thinks of Maurice Papon’s 1955 lament that Europe was being reduced to its ‘espace européenne’. This was consonant with the FEN’s insistence on the imperial nature of Europe. And we have seen that socialists such as Guy Mollet insisted similarly on the integrity of imperialism to Europe. Even by the time decolonisation came to be accepted as inevitable in France, this standpoint was often apparent in a recalibrated adherence to European colonialism,
or in a version of Wallerstein’s ‘European universalism’. Both in turn impacted on notions of Europeanness and indeed non-Europeanness in Paris, particularly with regard to immigrants and especially the city’s Algerian population.

Another trend in the examples of Europeanising spaces observed in this thesis has been that of a Europe as an ongoing project, as something to be made. Sartre said as much about a socialist Europe in 1947. The MSEUE took upon itself the same task that same year, albeit with a quite different interpretation of what this Europe would look like. Jacques Berque insisted on the necessity of the ongoing development of the relation between Europe and the Arab world, and suggested that the self-understanding of each would only be refined by their developing understanding of each other. One can also understand Europeanisation as the making of Europe in terms of an ongoing labour of interpretation as to what Europe meant or should mean. In this sense, the photographic work of Henri Cartier-Bresson in his 1955 Louvre exhibition, and in his works D’une Chine à l’autre, and Les Européens was significant; particularly in terms of adumbrating how reflecting on the continent’s experience of violence, thinking about temporality, and connections to the non-European world all demanded a continual rethinking of ideas of Europe.

The violence that Cartier-Bresson revealed as integral to thinking about Europe was common to many other Parisian spaces in which understandings of the continent were represented. Accordingly, if Europeanisation on the one hand was about making Europe, on the other it involved its unmaking. That is to say that thinking about Europe necessitated rationalising its own internal and external violence, both of which involved its own degradation. This of course ran contrary to the position of the likes of Papon and the FEN for whom Europe

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was being unmade precisely by a lack of commitment to sufficient violence to maintain European imperial hegemony. But ideas about Europe and Europeanness considered in this thesis invariably grappled in some way with the violence that was the devastation of the social fabric of European societies in the thirty-year catastrophe from 1914; the trauma, repressed or explicit, of the Second World War; colonial wars, including colonial violence in Paris itself; and the Cold War and the prospect of further conflict and of utter destruction after which Europe would constitute nothing more than a nuclear wasteland. The relationship between civilisation and violence was a recurring theme in the cultural output of Spanish anti-Francoist exiles in Paris, of course. We have also seen that symbolic violence permeated discourse about Europe in the sense of exclusion and devaluation, whether through administrative norms of Europeanness and non-Europeanness, or even in a momentary gaze, as in the experience of the Paris bidonvilles residents.

Finally, a Europe of radical possibility. An immediate qualification is called for here. Most ideas of Europe in post-war Paris grappled with the continent’s coming down in the world. That Europe did so was generally felt to be regrettable, and often the way it did so to be dishonourable. Yet there was also a sense that perhaps the embers of Walter Benjamin’s Vesuvius-like Paris had not quite cooled. For ideas about Europe were formulated in a city in which the belief persisted that society and politics could, or should, or would be radically different. This is not a mood that one could obviously point to elsewhere in Europe at this time. But nor was this Parisian attitude exclusive to leftist circles; ‘the future is ours’, FEN posters proclaimed to passers-by. Or there is the example of Robert Schuman who likened the provisions for European integration of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 to the world-historical import of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Pascale Casanova describes how the strategy of
literary figures aimed to appropriate precisely this sort of radical symbolic capital in Paris. And for all the limitations of this kind of argument, one ignores it at the price of missing something key about discourse about Europe in Paris in the early post-war era.

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Nederlandse Samenvatting

Het feit dat men de gelegenheid voorbij had laten gaan om Parijs na de Tweede Wereldoorlog grondig van collaborateurs te zuiveren, zou niet zo tragisch zijn geweest als het niet Parijs betrof, zo verkondigde de hoogleraar filosofie aan de Sorbonne, Vladimír Jankélévitch in 1948. Naar zijn mening ‘zou het er niet toe hebben gedaan, indien Frankrijk Afghanistan was geweest. Maar Frankrijk is Frankrijk, de gids van Europa en het geweten van de bevrijde mens overal ter wereld; wat er gebeurt op de oevers van de Seine, tussen de Hotel-de-Ville en la Concorde is van een bijzonder belang voor de gehele mensheid’. Deze opmerking stond niet op zichzelf. Wie op zoek gaat naar ideeën over Europa in de periode vanaf het einde van de oorlog tot en met de jaren zestig, wordt getroffen door de vanzelfsprekendheid waarmee velen ervan uitgingen dat Frankrijk de ultieme belichaming van Europa was. De gedachte dat Europa niet geloofwaardig zou zijn wanneer Frankrijk daarbinnen geen centrale rol vervulde was wijdverbreid. Cruciaal was daarbij dat met Frankrijk Parijs bedoeld werd.

In dit proefschrift worden de ‘ruimtes’ in het naoorlogse Parijs geanalyseerd, waarin ideeën over Europa werden geformuleerd, uitgewisseld, verspreid en betwist, ruwweg vanaf het uitbreken van de Koude Oorlog tot het einde van de Algerijnse Onafhankelijkheidsoorlog. Het begrip 'ruimte' wordt er in breed opgevat en omvat de academische wereld, politieke bewegingen, culturele groeperingen, tijdschriften, literatuur, manifesten, foto's, beelden en de fysieke stedelijke ruimte. Niet alleen wordt er in dit proefschrift aandacht geschonken aan expliciete verhandelingen over het continent, ook wordt ingegaan op het vertoog dat impliciet de voorwaarden van het denken over de betekenis van ‘Europa’ en van ‘Europeesheid’ in twijfel trok. Het begrip ‘Europeaniserende ruimtes’ dat in deze studie centraal staat, kent drie afzonderlijke definities: 1. Europeanisatie als proces; 2. Europeanisatie als de weigering om

In de eerste drie hoofdstukken wordt de stad Parijs als ‘Europeaniserende ruimte’ onderzocht door te bekijken hoe bepaalde concrete ruimtes binnen de Franse hoofdstad een rol speelden in het denken over Europa. Uitgangspunt van het eerste hoofdstuk vormt de stelling van de criticus George Steiner dat het café een wezenlijk ijkpunt vormt van het idee van Europa. De plaats die het café in Parijs inneemt wordt in dit hoofdstuk behandeld als onlosmakelijk verbonden met het idee van Europees kosmopolitisme, en wordt beschouwd als forum waarbinnen het vertoog over Europa werd gearticuleerd. Daarbij wordt er gekeken naar de implicaties van de centrale rol die het café innam voor de niet-Europese inwoners van Parijs vanwege het veronderstelde ‘typisch’ Europese karakter van het instituut. In deze context wordt in het bijzonder aandacht geschonken aan Algerijnen en zwarte Amerikaanse gemeenschappen. De serene rust van het café wordt daarbij afgezet tegen de ervaringen van geweld die kenmerkend zijn voor het discours over Europa, vooral waar het betrekking heeft op de Algerijnse Onafhankelijkheidsoorlog en de Koude Oorlog. Tot slot behandelt dit hoofdstuk de rol van het café met betrekking tot de beeldvorming rond Jean-Paul Sartre en in verband met zijn denken over het Europese vraagstuk.

Het tweede hoofdstuk onderzoekt de relatie tussen het discours over Europa en het Parijse ‘thuis’ in de breedste zin van het woord. De herstructurering die de stad kort na de Tweede Wereldoorlog onderging en de impact die dit had op de bewoonbaarheid van de stad wordt hierin opgevat als een gebeurtenis waarin Europa als richtsnoer gold. Duale, zowel affectieve als concrete, associaties van ‘thuis’ speelden hierbij een rol, vooral waar het de
toestroom van Europese Algerijnen en Algerijnse moslims naar de Franse metropool betrof. De begrippen ‘Europa’ en ‘Europees-zijn’ fungeerden als sleuteltermen in de poging de integratie van deze groepen te realiseren en hen te voorzien van huisvesting. Het begrip ‘Europees-zijn’ wordt in dit hoofdstuk gepresenteerd als een etnisch geladen categorie, waarmee onderscheid werd aangebracht tussen meer of minder gewenste groepen inwoners van de stad, wat grote gevolgen had voor Algerijnse immigranten. Tot slot wordt in dit hoofdstuk behandeld hoe discoursen van ‘Europees-zijn’ en ‘niet Europees-zijn’ hebben bijgedragen tot de devaluatie van die delen van de stad waar hoofdzakelijk Noord-Afrikanen woonden.

In het derde hoofdstuk staat de Parijse straat als ‘Europeaniserende ruimte’ centraal. In dit hoofdstuk worden zowel de politiek van straatnamen, als de demonstraties en opstootjes in de straten van de Franse hoofdstad onderzocht in het licht van bespiegelingen op Europa. In het bijzonder wordt de Parijse reactie op de Sovjet-invasie in Boedapest in 1956 en de beruchte moord op ongeveer 200 ongewapende Algerijnse demonstranten op 17 oktober 1961 afgezet tegen de hen onderliggende idealen omtrent de betekenis van ‘Europa’ en ‘Europees-zijn’. Vervolgens wordt in dit hoofdstuk de Parijse straatmuur uitgelicht. Deze wordt onderzocht als forum waarbinnen de graffiti die dit geweld verwijert verbonden werd aan bredere noties van rechtvaardigheid, als bepalend onderdeel van het Europese zelfbeeld.

Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift valt uiteen in twee hoofdstukken, die beiden een politieke dimensie van ‘Europeaniserende ruimtes’ in Parijs belichten. Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de Mouvement socialiste des états-unis d’Europe (MSEUE), die in 1947 in Parijs werd opgericht als een onafhankelijke beweging van socialisten uit heel Europa. Doel van het hoofdstuk is de nog weinig bestudeerde en ambigue verhouding te onderzoeken die bestond tussen het socialisme in brede zin en het denken over Europa. De MSEUE trachtte, in de naoorlogse context van Koude
Oorlog en het Europese koloniale conflict, een coherente en levensvatbare vorm van Europese integratie te formuleren, binnen het kader van socialistische tradities, waarden en idealen.

In hoofdstuk 5 staat de in 1960 opgerichte *Fédération des étudiants nationalistes* (FEN) centraal. Voor deze in het oog springende extreemrechtse studentengroep waren Europa en haar verdediging centrale thema’s, zelfs obsessies. De FEN was zeer actief in de Franse studentenpolitiek. Ze produceerde en distribueerde kranten, streed om medezeggenschapsposities, organiseerde bijeenkomsten en demonstraties en was betrokken bij straatgevechten. Ze hield zich bezig met vele onderwerpen, van triviale studentenbelangen tot grootse theorieën over hiërarchie in de wereldpolitiek. De vorm van nationalisme die deze groep aanhing was ingebed in een visie op een verenigd Europa. De natie werd door haar beschouwd als een Europees privilege, en niet-Europese vormen van nationalisme werden even belachelijk als gevaarlijk geacht. Als zodanig was voor deze groep Europa slechts iets waard zolang ze van invloed was op de niet-Europese wereld. Als de dekolonisatie zou doorzetten en Europa zou worden teruggebracht tot haar geografische begrenzingen, zou Europa nog maar van weinig waarde zijn.

Het derde en laatste deel van het proefschrift onderzoekt de ‘Europeaniserende ruimtes’ in Parijs in culturele zin. Hoofdstuk 6 beschrijft de culturele activiteiten in de Franse hoofdstad van Spaanse ballingen van het regime van Franco. Er in wordt een groot aantal culturele groepen en personen binnen deze gemeenschap behandeld, met name de schrijver Juan Goytisolo, Pablo Picasso, Jorge Semprún, en het culturele supplement van de *Solidaridad Obrera* – het tijdschrift van de anarcho-syndicalistische vakbond, de Confederación Nacional del Trabajo. Bijzondere aandacht wordt besteed aan de politisering van de culturele activiteiten van deze groep ballingen, en aan de wijze waarop hun werk doorbouwde op vooraanstaande thema’s uit de Spaanse
geschiedenis, maar die evenzeer van toepassing waren op het Europa van die tijd: donquichotterie; de relatie tussen beschaving, cultuur en geweld; en de implicaties van in- en uitsluiting.

In hoofdstuk 7 worden de ideeën over Europa van de Oriëntalist Jacques Berque in deze periode van Franse dekolonisatie behandeld. Twee passages uit zijn leven worden uitgelicht: zijn inaugurele rede voor het Collège de France in 1956, en zijn discussie met een van de meest vooraanstaande oriëntalisten van een eerdere generatie, Louis Massignon, op een avond in 1960 aan de Sorbonne universiteit. In de rede voor het Collège de France zette Berque zijn visie op Europa en de Arabische wereld uiteen, waaraan hij in zijn verdere leven nog voortdurend aan zou refereren. Berque’s begrip van de relatie tussen Europa en de Arabische wereld wordt onderzocht als onderdeel van zijn visie op een mediterrane gemeenschap en op begrippen als rationalisme, moderniteit, vervreemding, geloof, rechtvaardigheid, geweld en verzoening.

het werk *Les Européens* uit 1955 geanalyseerd, waarin Cartier-Bresson’s impressies van Europese reizen centraal staan.