Europeanising spaces in Paris, ca. 1947-1962
McDonnell, H.M.

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Chapter 2. The Parisian Home as a Europeising Space

By May 1945 there were perhaps forty million uprooted people in Europe.¹ As the immediacy of the Second World War receded, the anxieties in Europe about home, both in the sense of a tangible abode and of belonging and security, did not. Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Jacques Soustelle suggested that the recent experience of cities in flames was a key locus of the distinctive psychology of the French and European peoples.² One might surmise that, in large part, this lay behind what Leif Jerram describes as a “‘cult’ of home in post-war Europe.”³ A key point of European commonality after the war was an insufficient housing stock, and across the continent housing was a desperate popular aspiration and priority of government.⁴ Tony Judt notes that in post-war opinion polls, ‘housing’ always topped the list of popular concerns.⁵

The home, then, concerned Europeans both in the sense of material shelter and affective belonging and security. Preoccupation about procuring lodgings was compounded by the task identified by Marshal Berman – and surely exacerbated in a time of continental cataclysm – of making oneself at home in the modern city.⁶ But how did Paris fit into this shared post-war European experience? And in what ways was discourse about Europe connected to the Parisian

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⁵ Ibid., 282.
home in a stronger sense than merely being a priority shared by Europeans in general? This examination of the Paris home reveals that in various ways a strong equivalence was drawn between Europeanisation and modernisation. This chapter connects the home in the French capital to the discourse about a renewed Europe after the Second World War and through the period of decolonisation, and to the reconfigured understandings of Europe and Europeanness these prompted. In particular, it picks up on Étienne Balibar’s observation that ‘the question of giving an endogenous, self-referring definition of “Europeans” has only come up very recently. Until the middle of the twentieth century, the principal meaning of this name referred to groups of colonizers in each of the colonized regions elsewhere in the world.’7 This chapter will place particular emphasis on the immigration of both European Algerians and Algerian Muslims, as they were termed, to examine the Parisian home. For the home is a particularly useful space to examine the dynamics of the turning point in understandings of Europe and Europeanness, to which Balibar alludes.

First, urban planning is identified as a post-war operation that was applied to Paris with an underlying vision of the city’s place in the new Europe. The reconfiguration of the French capital in turn had implications for the city as a home, and this could be seen to be rationalised in part by notions of the Europeanness of Parisians. Second, Europe and Europeanness are identified as tropes in the reception and housing of Algerian immigrants – that is to say, both European Algerians, and Algerian Muslims.8 Further, Europeanness is investigated as a guiding

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8 An obvious omission here is the settlement of Algerian and North African Jews in France. In large part this is because, in comparison with the reception of Algerian Muslims and pieds noirs, notions of Europeanness do not appear to have been widely invoked. This of course also contrasts with discourse about earlier waves of Jewish migration to Paris. This may be connected to the argument that the integration of North African Jews in France in this period was comparatively unproblematic. See Michel Abitbol & Alan Astro, ‘The Integration of North African Jews in France’, Yale French Studies 85 (1994), 248-261.
term in housing policy as applied to these immigrant groups, to the point where one can talk about state ethnicisation of supposed Europeans and non-Europeans. Finally, the shantytowns, or bidonvilles, that housed many of the Algerian immigrants are examined in terms of how discourses of Europe connected to physical urban space.

One claim of this chapter is that discourse about the Parisian home commonly invoked two registers of Europeanness. In this sense, the chapter extends to the French metropole Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda’s argument that in European colonial history there was no single fund of rhetorical devices to characterise relations of power between Europeans and their Others. In the case of French Algeria, for instance, several discourses flourished simultaneously. Discourse proliferated that accommodated the ideological underpinnings of the mission civilisatrice, but it coexisted with popular pied noir vocabulary which often emphasised instead an irreconcilable opposition between Islam and the West.9 Similarly, one of the registers of Europeanness used in relation to the Parisian home consisted in a binary opposition of European and non-European. The second register can be likened to Timothy Garton Ash’s observation that in the East, Europe just fades away.10 Likewise, one trope implicitly held Europeanness to be a graded scale that faded away without any clear point of demarcation where one might conclusively delineate the European and the non-European. What is more, it is not only the case that discourse about the Paris home shifted back and forth between these registers. They were also sometimes invoked simultaneously and contradictorily. This was symptomatic of an acute tension between Europeanness and universalism, inclusion and exclusion, which ran through

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9 Julia Clancy-Smith & Frances Gouda (eds.), Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998), 9.
10 Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), 391.
housing policy, as well as other aspects of the welfare state of the French Republic.

The Paris Home and the Legacy of War in Europe

The place of Paris was ambiguous within the common European experience of a post-war yearning for security embodied in the home. The city, and thus Parisians’ homes, had not been bombed to anywhere near the extent of other European cities, though notoriously Hitler had given orders to flatten it, which were disregarded. Yet this survival came at the price of a shoddy compromise. So, one might equally surmise that beneath this attitude lay some sense of survivors’ guilt, and a concrete reminder of its complicity with a certain Europe of Germanism, to use Sartre’s phrase.¹¹ Despite pageantry such as de Gaulle’s famous address from the Hôtel de Ville after the Liberation that laid the foundations of the myth of resistant France, that Europe of Germanism would linger in various ways.

Leora Auslander demonstrates how this was the case for Jewish Parisian returnees who were given a limited opportunity to claim restitution of the dispossession of their homes and belongings. Auslander finds that in their claims forms, applicants were instructed only to list their material possessions for which they were making a claim. However, the procedure was often used as an opportunity to refuse retrospectively the denial of their right in that Europe to a political, social, and material home in Paris and France.¹²

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¹² Leora Auslander, ‘Coming Home? Jews in Postwar Paris’, *Journal of Contemporary History* 40/2 (April, 2005), 237-259. On the importance of the idea of Europe in Vichy and occupied France see Julian Jackson, *France: the Dark Years, 1940-1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), passim. Andrew Hussey also notes that Paris was the centre for collaborationist intellectuals, who saw themselves as launching a moral crusade that would lead
In the following years the continued neglect of housing in Paris brought it more into line with those European cities that had been destroyed in the war. Wakeman details the extent of the impoverishment of the French capital in this regard. And she notes that slums, dirt, and grimness characterised the city in those years more than the stereotypical image of the ‘City of Light’, reflected in the famous contemporary photographic work of Robert Doisneau or Henri Cartier-Bresson. She remarks that from end to end, Paris seemed to be a ‘strange hallucination of postwar Europe in crisis, nothing but urban debris.’ According to Andrew Hussey, in the early 1950s, almost ninety percent of homes in Paris lacked basic amenities. Slums and soup kitchens proliferated alike, while dingy, cheap hotels or hostels passed as a home for a significant proportion of the city’s population. Although Paris had survived the war largely intact, it was impacted by the greater destruction of other parts of France and the attendant flood of refugees into the cities who populated such hotels and makeshift shelter, and of course accentuated the problem of over-crowding.

Urban Planning and Europeanising Spaces in Paris

Urban planning of course was a general European priority necessitated by the legacy of war. In Paris it is notable that some discourse about urban planning and the renovation of homes

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in the city had a European dimension. There was certainly a strong European flavour to the 1947 *Exposition internationale de l’urbanisme et de l’habitation* in which, as Wakeman describes it: ‘nine European countries displayed the revolutionary urban-planning techniques that would rebuild a shattered world.’\(^{16}\) In both senses, the universal assumptions of Europe were on show. Interestingly, though, the previous year the Grand Palais hosted the *Exposition des techniques américaines de l’habitation et de l’urbanisme*. Here Parisian attendees were introduced to ‘the American way of living.’\(^{17}\) The *Ministère de la reconstruction et de l’urbanisme* (MRU) also built fully equipped American houses in the Paris suburbs in an unwitting admission of the difficulty of demarcating the image of Europe from that of the United States. Indeed, this was an uncomfortably complicated task given the mutual dependency of their post-war fortunes. This exhibition can be contextualised by Victoria de Grazia’s thesis about the Americanisation of Europe. She locates the origins of US hegemony as a market empire precisely in Europe, which functioned as a core space of post-war American cultural and commercial expansion and as an American laboratory for the implantation of modern consumer practices.\(^{18}\) Europe was thus not only constituted by, but also constitutive of, an America that often fascinated but was equally often scorned by its peoples, particularly in France. One might surmise that it was precisely this intertwining of post-war America and Europe that underscored the depiction of a radically Other America, and that the frequently incensed tone of this representation was fuelled precisely by their similarities and interconnections.\(^{19}\)

\(^{16}\) Wakeman, *The Heroic City*, 290.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 289-290.


\(^{19}\) For notable contemporary discussions of the relation between Europe and America see André Malraux’s speech ‘Man and Artistic Culture’ at the opening session of UNESCO at the Sorbonne in 1946 in *Reflections on Our Age: Lectures at The Opening Session of UNESCO at the Sorbonne* (London: Allen Wingate, 1948), 84-99; and his 1956 postface to *The Conquerors*, trans. Stephen Becker (London: Journeyman, 1983), 179-198.
There was also a European dimension to the Parisian home in relation to the United States via the commitments of Cold War partisanship. The shoddiness of Parisian homes was often explained as a by-product of the priority of European strategic commitment to the East-West conflict. The housing crisis was sometimes blamed on the Cold War generally, and the Americans in particular. This geopolitical situation was seen as siphoning off funds which otherwise could have been invested in housing. In February 1963, for instance, responding to complaints about the conditions of the bidonvilles in his municipality, the deputy mayor of the French Communist Party (PCF)-controlled suburb of Nanterre contrasted the lack of availability of funds for housing, and the ease with which money could be found for projects like the atomic bomb.20 The common PCF complaint about the depletion of social funds by the prioritisation of Western militarism was often put the other way around, of course. The Seine prefecture insisted in 1952, for instance, that the housing crisis could be tackled but for the financial burden of counteracting international Communism.21

Europe was also a watchword in urban planning in regard to the renovation of Parisian housing in this period, as well as the city’s maintenance and regeneration more broadly. In 1946 the Seine prefect, Marcel Flouret, enjoined urban planners to offer a vision of the future and to ‘prepare our Capital for the role it will play in Europe and the world of tomorrow.’ Moreover, he warned that, ‘if we are not careful, in twenty or thirty years, London, Berlin and the other European capitals, which experienced such destruction during the war, will be rebuilt, while

20 Institut de l’histoire du temps présent. Fonds Monique Hervo (Hereafter FMH). ARC 3019 -2. 2. Dossier général thématique. Letter from the deputy mayor of Nanterre to Hervo, February 15, 1963. For similar complaints at Paris municipal level see Melissa Byrnes, French like Us? Municipal Policies and North African Migrants in the Parisian Banlieues, 1945-1975 (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2008), 91, 163. We should note that the French atomic bomb was not merely a European question in the sense of its connection to Europe’s place in the Cold War, but was also connected to the idea of French ‘grandeur’.
21 Wakeman, The Heroic City, 137.
Paris, which by some miracle escaped the storm nearly intact, will become the most backward of capital cities.\textsuperscript{22}

Parisian urban planning retained this European perspective in the 1950s. In his article ‘At the Hour of Europe’ in the Revue urbanisme in 1957, the Commissaire à la construction et à l’urbanisme de la région parisienne, Pierre Sudreau, reiterated the necessity of demolishing the slum conditions that were still rife in Paris. He connected this task – or ‘the conquest of Paris’ as he termed it – with French entry into the European Common Market. He measured the French capital’s progress not on its own terms or as an end in itself, but in comparison with the resurrection of Berlin and West Germany. As such, the task of urban renewal in Paris assumed a European imperative: ‘it is no longer a matter of being the capital of a country, but that of a continent.’\textsuperscript{23}

However, urban planning encompassed more than just housing, and so the status of the home in the city could just as easily be sidelined as promoted in this Europeanist vision for the French capital. Wakeman describes how state urban planning from the early 1950s was intent on promoting commercial and business services that ‘would make Paris a capital of Europe.’ This went hand in hand with dispersing the city’s masses, along with their trade and industry. The preservation of these quartiers populaires was often subordinated to the regulation and ‘rationalisation’ of space, and their inhabitants were increasingly separated from the city centre and their places of work. By 1956 the centre of Paris was zoned for the three functions of administration, commerce and banking, and intellectual life. These were the prestigious cosmopolitan activities that were to secure Paris’s position among the modern European

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{22}{Ibid., 302.}
\footnote{23}{Cited in ibid., 320.}
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capitals.\textsuperscript{24} This sanitisation of Paris was also connected to the importance of the city as a tourist destination. This occurred in the broader context of the emergence of a Europe of tourism, which was assuming such importance that by 1964 Raymond Aron remarked that, ‘For the tourist, Europe is a unit. Never in the past has such a number of Frenchmen, Germans, Belgians, Dutchmen and Englishmen found it so natural to cross their own frontiers and travel abroad.’\textsuperscript{25} Even as early as the summer of 1949, Janet Flanner remarked on the spectacular boom in European travel, noting that the Paris tourist season in turn was the best in the entire continent.\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, she implied that this phenomenon was not merely a reflection of rising prosperity, but also said something about the recent experience, and so the self-understanding, of Europeans:

This summer’s mass travel in Western Europe was probably a logical enough result of its recent history. For six years, almost nobody travelled except soldiers and those segments of the population that made an exodus in fright or in fatal, forced emigrations. Some people travelled then because they were ordered to, while others, shut in, yearned in vain to move about. And there were not enough trains, food, or, most important, money, all of which now seem to abound. It is difficult to believe that Europe could change so miraculously and become the great, pleasurable, money-making and money-spending touring ground that it has been this season, exactly one decade after the war season of 1939.\textsuperscript{27}

These various ways in which the city was reconfigured in accordance with ideas about the affiliation of Paris and Europe nevertheless also had implications for the city as a home. As the cultural supplement of the Spanish exile journal \textit{Solidaridad obrera} insisted, there was more than one Paris. The Paris of tourism was not that of the Parisian worker.\textsuperscript{28} To borrow Henri Lefebvre’s formulation, one might say that the Europeanisation of Paris correlated to an

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{24}] Ibid., 316.
\item[\textsuperscript{25}] Raymond Aron, ‘Old Nations, New Europe’, \textit{Daedalus} 93/1 (Winter, 1964), 52.
\item[\textsuperscript{27}] Ibid., 106.
\end{itemize}
abrogation of ‘the right to the city’. As Wakeman describes it, the dispersal of the city’s working class from the city centre was underscored by its stereotype as ‘alien and dispensable, or at least the conviction that it suffered from backward qualities to be rooted out by technocratic elites.’ Such sectors of Paris society were admittedly European, but somehow not European enough to be suitable to reside in this new post-war European capital. Just as Garton Ash’s Europe fades away in the East, so here it was more exactly the centre of Paris that was conceived as the European capital, whilst the Europeanness of the city faded as one approached the city’s margins – above all, the working class suburbs.

This quasi-colonial management of the population of the French capital parallels Paul Rabinow’s influential thesis about the interconnection of government in the colonies and forms of space, power, and knowledge in the French metropole. It is important to connect this kind of policy to a further important driving force behind the urban reconfiguration of Paris that encapsulated consumerism and modernisation – the curtailment of radical politics. It is notable that urban planning in Paris was often carried out with the express aim of breaking up traditional strongholds of the PCF in ‘Red Paris’.

Furthermore, this coercive housing policy was in a sense a continuation of a tradition of representation that conflated the European popular classes and non-Europeans, though ultimately distinctions between the two were usually allowed. Similarly, Matthew Connelly suggests that it is probable that Louis Chevalier’s seminal 1958 work, Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle, was influenced by his

30 Wakeman, The Historic City, 317.
work on North African demography, as part of which he warned in 1947 of ‘a real invasion and berberisation in whole neighborhoods in Marseilles and Paris.’ The rhetorical use of terms of Europeanness and non-Europeanness to refer to those who lived in Paris had to give way to a more serious questioning of these terms in the post-war period, however. The end of empire, in particular the end of empire in Algeria which was nominally an integral part of metropolitan France, raised problems precisely in terms of those categories. We now turn to examine their implications for Paris as a civic home and as a space in which to secure a material home.

The Paris Home, Europe, and the Europeans of Algeria

French Algeria differed from other colonies by the extent of its settlement by a European population. Indeed, settlers originated not only from France but also Malta, Alsace, Spain, and Italy. Of course, the French-Algerian war called their place in North Africa into question. However, as Todd Shepard shows, until very late in the war, very few in France expected the European settlers to leave Algeria to resettle in France. Rather, it was assumed that they would remain in an independent Algeria, and domicile in France was guaranteed to them only for the purpose of reassuring them that they did not have to leave. This was a serious miscalculation, as indeed the European community quickly began to depart. Shepard dates the start of the exodus to the April 1962 arrest of Raoul Salan, former general and leader of the OAS. This influx was barely acknowledged officially before the summer of that year, however. As such, the problem

33 Matthew Connelly, ‘Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence’, American Historical Review 105/3 (June 2000), 743n.
34 Ibid., 743. Sartre also notably compares the devaluation of the European working class and colonial peoples in his introduction to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. See Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘The Wretched of the Earth,’ in Colonialism and Neocolonialism, trans. Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer, & Terry McWilliams (London & New York: Routledge, 2006), 160.
demanded speedy solutions. These, as it happened, were underscored by a premise of Europeanisation in two senses.

First, as Shepard puts it, the French state, ‘when confronted with the unexpected “exodus” of upwards of one million French citizens fleeing Algeria, embraced familial and ethnic descriptions to explain why some French citizens (“Europeans”) could be repatriated home to continental France, while others (“of Muslim origin”) should stay put in Algeria.’

This meant that the French Republic discarded its post-1889 commitment to legal definitions of citizenship that ignored ‘ethnicity’ or ‘race’ and embraced a definition of national belonging limited to ‘Europeans.’

This alteration of the codes of membership in the French nation effectively reconfigured the Mediterranean as a boundary separating Europe and North Africa, rather than, as the common saying had it, dividing France just as the Seine divided Paris.

Part of the rationale for doing so was that the alternative was fully to integrate Algerians as equal French citizens, which would in turn entail crippling welfare provision and adjustment of living standards.

Accordingly, when pressed at a certain point the French Republic, that saw itself as universal and in this sense exceptional within Europe, would defer back to the notion of Europeanness as a get-out clause to withhold rights and status it was not prepared to grant universally.

The most obvious losers of this policy were the Algerian harkis – Muslim Algerians who served as Auxilaries in the French army during the war – who likewise fled to France, largely in

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36 Ibid., 346.
37 Ibid., 357.
38 The argument about the prohibitive expense of empire was made famously by Raymond Cartier. Up until his interventions in Paris Match in August and September 1956 he was known as a stern defender of empire in the name of the defence of the West. Similarly, Raymond Aron turned against maintaining French Algeria on the grounds that it was unsustainably expensive. See Aron’s La Tragédie algérienne (Paris: Plon, 1957) and L’Algérie et la République (Paris: Plon, 1958).
fear of reprisals for their role in assisting the French administration and military in Algeria to oppose independence. Arriving in their tens of thousands in France at the same time as the pieds noirs, their reception was starkly different. When they were allowed to stay they were denied their legal rights as French citizens, treated as foreign ‘refugees,’ and eventually asked to reapply for the French citizenship that they had been born with.\(^\text{39}\) They were far more likely to languish for years in camps than to make a home in Paris or anywhere else.

The second sense in which Europeanisation was seen to be needed was ironically in regard to these ‘Europeans’ themselves. After all, de Gaulle himself considered the pieds noirs barely more French than Algerian Muslims.\(^\text{40}\) Likewise, general French metropolitan disdain for the pieds noirs was acute, particularly from the later years of the Algerian conflict, and the condemnation and disavowal of the European Algerians drew freely on Orientalist stereotypes of sexual deviance, misogyny, savageness, irrational chauvinism, and criminality. Indeed, comparable stereotyping of Muslim Algerians and the pieds noirs held them both responsible for crime in the Paris area.\(^\text{41}\) Moreover, it is particularly interesting that Nora’s own intervention in his 1961 work *Les Français d’Algérie*, questioned the pieds noirs’ collective label as ‘Europeans,’ allowing at best that theirs was a diminished Europeanness that was ever fading away. They had cut themselves away from their ‘European anchorage’ and largely lost their ‘Western essence.’\(^\text{42}\) “‘European,’” he argued should connote a ‘technological civilization, energetic and Nordic;’ the reality of what the term referred to in Algeria was ‘some Andalusian or Calabresian worker closer to an Egyptian fellah than the worker of 1848 or the Alsatian. The

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40 Ibid., 349.
term “European,” he lamented, ‘groups together in a community and ennobles’ this mishmash of degraded humanity. As such, he rejected its use.\(^{43}\) Nora here seems to invoke at once both of the registers of Europeanness we identified at the start of this chapter. Having suggested that the pieds noirs’ European quality was of a real but degenerative kind, Nora then reverted to discarding their label as Europeans in an implied preference for the schema of binary opposition between the qualities of Europeanness and non-Europeanness.

The image of the pieds noirs on the right was not necessarily more favourable.\(^{44}\) The chief of the Paris police Maurice Papon wrote to the Minister of the Interior to express his concerns about the security of the state, and as such lobbied to prevent the housing of repatriated European Algerians in Paris. For a man who largely subscribed to a Manichean vision of a besieged Europe resisting the non-European world, he seemed here to recover a sense of the degrees of Europeanness in the sense of standards of comportment.\(^{45}\) While it was considered impossible to make such a prohibition, it was still considered desirable to prevent any large conglomeration of the pieds noirs in the city, given that they were considered to be particularly prone to rioting.\(^{46}\) Perhaps one was particularly sensitive to this problem in a Paris whose

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 197.

\(^{44}\) Some like the far right student group examined in chapter five, the Fédération des étudiants nationalistes, considered the returning pieds noirs to have been sacrificed and made a scapegoat for the convenience of a scandalous abdication of Europe, or at least Europe in any meaningful sense. Accordingly, its members were encouraged to meet and greet them at Paris airports in a gesture of solidarity in the context of its broader ongoing mission to restore European supremacy. See Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Centre d’histoire de l’Europe du vingtième siècle. Fonds ‘Étudiants Nationalistes’ (Hereafter abbreviated to F. EN), 1, dossier 2, FEN presse (25 June, 1962), 3.

\(^{45}\) Papon’s ideas about Europe will be examined in greater depth in chapter three.

Hausmannian boulevards were constructed with the logistics of managing disturbances by the city’s dubiously European dangerous classes in mind.\textsuperscript{47}

It is in the light of these kinds of views about the degenerate Europeanness of the French settlers that, once the exodus was acknowledged and accepted, French policy stressed forcefully that these Europeans of Algeria were indeed part of the same family as metropolitan French people. It followed that it was appropriate that they settle in France – a view that came to be supported by significant sections of the press.\textsuperscript{48} It is interesting that this drive to promote the European credentials of these ‘Europeans’ focused so heavily on the discourse of family and sexuality. It was stressed that those arriving were reassuringly heterosexual and family-oriented. This contradicted earlier widely publicised media portrayals of ‘European’ Algeria as a male homosocial society whose perversion bred male violence, of which the OAS was symptomatic.\textsuperscript{49}

On balance, between the discourses of their Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation, the pieds noirs were still an object of suspicion, but they certainly enjoyed an advantage in the social hierarchy of immigration, in that they were prioritised in housing over Muslim Algerians.\textsuperscript{50} These ‘repatriates’ could also initially invoke their Algerian status to take HLM slots reserved for Algerians while their European origins saved them the intervening stay in the transit camps.\textsuperscript{51} Similarly, special provisions were undertaken to insure that these displaced European Algerians

\textsuperscript{47} Eric Hobsbawm, \textit{Revolutionaries} (London: Abacus, 2007), 296. One should note that this commonly held view of one of the main purposes of the design of Hausmannian Paris is disputed in Bernard Marchand, \textit{Paris, histoire d’une ville} (XIXe – XXe siècle) (Paris: Seuil, 1993), 116-117.

\textsuperscript{48} Shepard, ‘Making French and European Coincide’, 352.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 353, 354.


\textsuperscript{51} Byrnes, \textit{French like Us?}, 182. Byrnes explains that initially the pieds noirs could claim both Algerian and French status although they soon had to choose.
did not end up in the Paris bidonvilles, as subsistence money and lodgings were provided to this end.\textsuperscript{52}

The crucial point, though, is that the Europeanness of the pieds noirs was certainly not taken as self-evident and by implication undermined any claims to a clear and timeless lineage of a European people. Shepard demonstrates the pervasiveness of a certain narrative of the French nation to rationalise Algeria’s decolonisation – namely, ‘a France within Europe and made up of people of “European” origins.’\textsuperscript{53} But if one’s Europeanness could diminish because one had lived in North Africa, why should those immigrants of non-European background in Paris be considered definitively non-European? More broadly, this contradiction implied the contingency and mutability of the term ‘European’, potentially undermining its power for any strong invocation of identity. The emerging EEC was another institution that was often buttressed by claims of a historically constant European people, and so it is instructive that Shepard suggests that these reformulations of membership and belonging at the time of decolonisation could help us rethink the history of the ascendancy of the contemporary development of European political institutions.\textsuperscript{54}

The Parisian Home, Algerian Muslims, and Europeanisation

In his 1954 account of Paris life, the novelist and journalist Henri Calet recollected his experience with a homeless Algerian immigrant, Ahmed. He reported that “Presque tous les hôteliers refusent de loger les Musulmans,” m’avait dit Ahmed, “même s’ils sont bien

\textsuperscript{52} Scioldo-Zürcher, ““Paris les a pris dans ses bras””, 456.
\textsuperscript{53} Shepard, ‘Making French and European Coincide’, 357.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
habillé.

Such incidents were no doubt common. Besides hotels, which were of course a common form of long-term accommodation, Algerians confronted prejudices when trying to acquire housing generally. However, too strong a focus on such interpersonal instances of racism can perhaps overshadow the French authorities’ much more robust, systemic discourse of Europeanness and non-Europeanness which made it problematic for Algerian Muslims to make a home in Paris.

This was certainly true in the course of the Algerian war in the French state’s battle against the Algerian FLN in the metropole. Amelia Lyons demonstrates how housing policy was a fundamental part of the French government’s waging of the war in the French capital. It was based on the idea that terrible living conditions in slums and shantytowns were a breeding ground for the FLN. Besides tackling the ongoing housing crisis in Paris, part of the impetus to build HLMs was to take Algerian migrants out of these conditions so as to remove them from the influence of Algerian nationalism and instil in them the belief that they had a stake in the universalist French Republic. The latter was a project that continued beyond the end of the war in 1962. A 1956 report of Cahiers Nord-Africains emphasised that this battle for hearts and minds included inculcating in Algerian Parisians an appropriate conception of Europe. Isolated single men in the bidonvilles were supposed to be particularly susceptible to various kinds of immoral behaviour, subversive propaganda, and ‘hostilité irraisonnée envers la civilisation européenne’.

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56 Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France’, 76.
57 Ibid., 73-74.
This policy of targeting living conditions was, however, self-thwarting because of the categorisation of many of the Algerians who had lived in demolished *bidonvilles* as too ‘un-evolved’—in effect, insufficiently European—to move immediately into HLM apartments and mix with the general population. As such, first they had to live in *cités de transit* (transit centres), which were de facto spaces of Europeanisation.\(^{59}\) Indeed, European immigrants, for instance those from Eastern Europe and the Iberian peninsula who were preferred and sought out by the Ministry of Labour after 1962,\(^{60}\) were notably exempt from the obligation to acculturate in these low standard and shoddily maintained lodgings.\(^{61}\) Despite the steadfastness of such Orientalist convictions about the unsuitability of Algerians to inhabit Paris, there were occasional admissions of the apriorism of this reasoning. Melissa Byrnes cites a Paris housing official who assumed that Portuguese families would be ‘relatively easy to rehouse, given their degree of evolution, their resources, and the stability of their employment, that is their occidental civilization.’ In fact, Byrnes points out, Portuguese workers often turned out to be perceived as more problematic for the housing officials than North Africans.\(^{62}\)

A core part of transit camp life was compulsory education in which occupants were taught the skills supposedly needed to adapt to modern life, so as eventually to be able to mix with the general population.\(^{63}\) In a disavowal of the liberty promised by modernity to define oneself, modernisation was here unreflexively equated with Europeanisation.\(^{64}\) This corresponds

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\(^{59}\) SONACOTRA construction of the first transit cities began in 1959 with the first completed in 1960 and 1961. They were all located adjacent to existing *bidonvilles*. Prakash, *Empire on the Seine*, 287. The *Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs* was the successor to SONACOTRAL—the *Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs algériens*. See Marc Bernardot, ‘Chronique d’une institution: la SONACOTRA (1956-1976)’, *Sociétés contemporaines* 33-34 (1999), 39-58.

\(^{60}\) Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France’, 83.

\(^{61}\) On the conditions of the *cités de transit* see Prakash, *Empire on the Seine*, 287.

\(^{62}\) Byrnes, *French like Us?*, 183.

\(^{63}\) Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France’, 78.

to Todd Shepard’s argument that from the later years of the Algerian war, officials reframed their civilising mission as a “modernizing mission”. The ‘normal’ citizen that the Algerian immigrant was to become would eschew radical politics, embrace nuclear family life, pay rent regularly and respect property, spend time outside work looking after family responsibilities and the pursuit of the comforts of the booming consumer society. Once again, then, housing policy linked Europeanisation with depoliticisation. An additional advantage of Europeanisation as a rationale for the transit centres was that the long years in which North Africans were left in them were self-justifying: the longer they were confined there, the more they could be said not to have Europeanised, thus legitimising their continued residence and the prolonged existence of such centres. This was a variation, brought home to the metropole, of what James McDougall describes as European imperialism’s externalisation of its own violence onto its victims.

The educational aims of the transit camps fitted into a broader discourse about the need for Algerian migrants in particular to Europeanise. This stressed domesticity and adherence to standards of housekeeping, cleaning and ‘dirt’, the acquisition and use of French furniture, cooking skills, childcare and management of the household budget. Also, in a parallel to the Europeanisation of the pieds noirs, the standards by which these migrants were judged included adherence to standards of sexuality and assimilation to European family norms, especially in

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65 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, 6.
66 Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France’, 75; Prakash, Empire on the Seine, 274.
67 Amit Prakash notes that families were supposed to ‘transition’ out of these centres on the outskirts of Paris after a maximum of two years. However, many families actually remained there for between ten and thirteen years and emerged angry at the French state for their isolation and abandonment. See Prakash, Empire on the Seine, 288.
regard to the size of the family.\footnote{70} While it was true that North African families tended to be larger, it was disingenuous to imply this was a natural point of cultural demarcation between European and non-European. As Byrnes argues, ‘during the interwar years, similar concerns had been raised regarding a “Spanish invasion;” small families were not necessarily an occidental tradition.’\footnote{71} What is more, in the immediate post-war years Algerian women were actually awarded medals for the number of children to which they gave birth as part of the French state’s drive to regenerate the nation’s population.\footnote{72}

Neil MacMaster argues that French policy on domestic behaviour was characterised by a rigid opposition between modernity and tradition.\footnote{73} If this opposition was equivalent to the binary of European and non-Europe, it co-existed contradictorily with the scales of adaptation to Eurocentric domestic norms against which immigrants were measured – in effect a scale on which Europeanness faded away as one went down from the criteria of the normal French citizen.\footnote{74} What each register had in common, though, was that they corresponded to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s observation about various forms of European and indeed non-European discourse, in which the non-European world is perennially required to catch up with Europe, and its correlative characteristics of modernity, progress and reason.\footnote{75} One can add to Chakrabarty’s argument that this was the case not only for non-European nations but also for what were deemed non-European peoples living in Europe. Such discourse seemed more an example of

\footnote{70} Algerians were not the only immigrant group subjected to stereotypes and behavioural norms according to sexual and familial stereotypes. See for example Felix Germain, ‘Jezebels and Victims: Antillean Women in Postwar France, 1946-1974’, French Historical Studies 33/3 (Summer, 2010), 475-495.
\footnote{71} Byrnes, French like Us ?, 186.
\footnote{73} MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 88.
\footnote{74} Prakash, for example, points to the deployment of social councilors in the bidonvilles that categorised the degree of assimilation of families on a scale running from ‘A’ to ‘D’. See Prakash, Empire on the Seine, 281.

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Aimé Césaire’s reference to Europe’s propensity for self-congratulation than an accurate diagnosis of the situation and needs of Algerian immigrants. As one exasperated inhabitant of the bidonvilles in Nanterre exclaimed in a refutation of the notion that Algerian migrants relished backward living conditions: ‘il parait que nous voulons habiter dans la boue et que nous refusons de nous ouvrir au progrès.’76 In this regard, it is telling that Amelia Lyons argues that responsibility for integration was placed entirely on the Algerian immigrants whose objections could only be problematic, never valid, and from whom the French authorities had nothing to learn.77 Or, more precisely, exclusion had to be self-inflicted since by definition it could not be a product of the universalist French Republic.

Another form of habitation that was made available for Algerian immigrants was the SONACOTRA foyers. These dormitory-style lodgings were populated by single, male workers, predominantly from North Africa and later from West Africa.78 This approach was likewise undercut by the contradictory approach of French housing policy. As Amit Prakash points out, these foyers were paradoxically intended to stem anti-colonial sentiment by offering Algerian men much needed accommodation and ease their transition into French society. But in practice they were segregated away from the rest of the French population on the outermost peripheries of Paris.79 Though regulations and restrictions were tight, including the prohibition of protests or meeting of a political character,80 residents were not required to attend classes to Europeanise their comportment, as in the transit cities. However, a certain Europeanist ideology permeated

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78 Prakash, *Empire on the Seine*, 268-269.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 272.
the institutions through the recruitment of ex-military personnel to manage the foyers.\textsuperscript{81} As late as 1972, out of 151 foyer directors, 95 percent had military backgrounds, serving in Indochina, Africa, or North Africa,\textsuperscript{82} during which they had been instilled with a sense of the urgent need to defend the West. Many residents unsurprisingly testified to having preferred living in \textit{bidonvilles} rather than transit cities or foyers that were encircled with chain-link fencing, governed by authoritarian regulations, and monitored by ex-paratrooper concierges.\textsuperscript{83}

French social workers, whether ex-military or otherwise, as such occupied a privileged place as agents of Europeanisation. As François Villey, the head of the Public Health and Population Ministry’s office for demographic, social, and familial policies, expressed it: with the long-term help of specialised social workers, these Muslim women could adapt to the western way of life. Gradually and patiently these workers might be able to instil ‘everything the lady of the house and mother of a European family needs to know.’\textsuperscript{84} As Lyons summarises this approach, ‘in order for the Muslim woman to become European, she had to accept the ways of those more “enlightened” than herself – those who guarded the knowledge and practice of daily life in France.’\textsuperscript{85} Indeed, a disproportionate amount of attention was paid to Algerian women who were entrusted with the work of transforming their husbands and the next generation.\textsuperscript{86} One should note that here that Lyons suggests that in the eyes of the French state, Algerians could in principle become European. Europeanised here would thus mean achieving definitive Europeanness rather than being made more European. But this sits uneasily with notions of race

\textsuperscript{81} For an analysis of how the discourse of the French military, including a certain kind of Europeanism, impacted on Paris in relation to the management of North African migrants, see chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{82} Prakash, \textit{Empire on the Seine}, 271.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 290. See chapter 3 for a discussion of the paratrooper as an emblem of, depending on one’s viewpoint, the defence of Europe or the savagery of imperial Europe.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 492.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
that Lyons also notes were retained by French government officials, even if they did not voice them publicly.\textsuperscript{87}

MacMaster outlines how such stipulations about the family connected to a traditional European imperialist obsession with Muslim women. He writes that, ‘French colonial ideology during the period from 1900 to 1962 was obsessed with the hegemonic project of invading, conquering, and ‘liberating’ the last bastion of Algerian cultural and social resistance, the Muslim woman, as well as the sealed-off domestic space that she inhabited.’\textsuperscript{88} Lyons concurs that this kind of longstanding colonial policy was recycled in the metropole in this period. What is more, the instruction of Algerian women facilitated access to the home which provided intimate knowledge about this space and a kind of control previously unattainable.\textsuperscript{89} This is a crucial point since it suggests that the French authorities did not consider non-Europeans to be inherently objectionable or problematic, as long as they were controlled. In fact, the presence, even production, of non-Europeans had a distinct value in terms of the paradoxes of the universalism on which the French Republic prided itself. As Moustafa Bayoumi argues in his discussion of the \textit{Grande mosquée} of Paris, ‘you will always need to produce non-French Muslims to show how successfully assimilationist the French creed is.’\textsuperscript{90} This suggests another important sense of ‘Europeanisation’: the aim not to make European what is not, but rather the extension of European control over, or domestication of, the non-European.

The embracing of non-European difference did not extend to enthusiasm for mixed couples, however. That Algerian men would marry metropolitan women was a continual worry

\textsuperscript{87} Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France’, 76.
\textsuperscript{88} MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 82.
\textsuperscript{89} Lyons, ‘The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole’, 492.
\textsuperscript{90} Bayoumi, ‘Shadows and Light’, 288.
and, if never publicly pronounced as such, was clearly not favoured.91 Moreover, the disproportionate presence of single male Algerian workers was a constant concern for the French authorities, and welfare policy was designed to promote their integration into the French community in the framework of family life. Part of the impetus for the social welfare policy for Algerians revolved around the priority of putting an end to single male worker migration and encouraging family settlement that would stabilise and depoliticise the population, and also ensure that Algerians did not intermarry with metropolitan French women in large numbers.92

These standards of Europeanisation were often problematic for Algerian immigrants who often experienced HLM housing in Paris as both deeply alien and alienating, despite French boasts about its cutting edge rationalism. Sometimes residents would try to alter or adapt an apartment to alleviate this feeling and restore the familiarity of their own inherited domestic habits. However, such actions often fostered an image of incoherence and impoverishment of the house “that simply confirmed the French social worker and official perceptions of the “uncivilized” nature of the migrants.”93 But why should French officials care about seemingly trivial issues like, for instance, using a bedroom as a kitchen or to store a motor scooter?94 One thinks here of Stoler’s argument about the inordinate attention colonial authorities paid to boundary zones in order to police and reaffirm the distinction between coloniser and colonised, European and non-European.95 In the same way, we can understand the disconcerting effect of Algerian migrants creatively combining perceived traditional and modern norms, appearances,

93 MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 87.
94 Ibid., 86.
and behaviour, and in doing so displacing received understandings of European and non-European.\textsuperscript{96} Instances of this would include examples of those both dressing traditionally and lacking any grasp of the French language, and yet consuming and enjoying modern domestic appliances.

French social workers also often ‘suspected that conformity to official regulation and norms was a skilful ploy, an instrumental enactment of “correct” behavior, to gain strictly pragmatic and material goals.’\textsuperscript{97} This does not necessarily contradict or qualify Prakash’s assessment that policy aimed at educating immigrants on cultural forms and behaviour separated thought and action, so that only conformity was asked for, not belief.\textsuperscript{98} On the other hand, this might suggest that it was not only imperative that Algerians Europeanise, but they truly believed in the Europeanisation that they underwent. This plausibly connected to the image of Algerian fanaticism in their independence struggle. This was perhaps a projection of a certain inadequacy in Europe’s self-definition, since the Europe of the \textit{trentes glorieuses} did not for all its pragmatic success inspire or even require a great deal of belief. The depoliticisation of the post-war consumer society of Europe manifested less a consensual belief in the status quo than a distinct lack of belief.\textsuperscript{99} This was indeed a concern for those like the Congress for Cultural Freedom which advocated an idea of Europe alongside the notion of the end of ideology.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{96} MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 88.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Prakash, \textit{Empire on the Seine}, 280.
\textsuperscript{99} One can in part account for French reactions to Algerian, OAS, and \textit{pied noir} militancy in relation to this pragmatic post-war Europe. To borrow Terry Eagleton’s argument, besides the obvious primary reason of the obscene consequences of their violence, it was so disturbing because exposure to the violence of those who, as it were, believed in too much induced a recognition precisely of a European paucity of belief. See Terry Eagleton, \textit{Holy Terror} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). To draw another parallel with the Europe of the Cold War, one might surmise that the contemporary invocations of totalitarian regimes that instituted complete mind control was tenable, in spite of the scarcity of evidence, precisely as a projection of the lack of belief, beyond pragmatic adherence, to the contemporary image of Europe. See Hobsbawm, \textit{Age of Extremes}, 393.
If the provision, albeit delayed indefinitely, of a home was the carrot of French housing policy during the Algerian war, surveillance was the stick. In fact the two went hand in hand. We have seen how this was the case in terms of the personnel and requirements in state-provided accommodation, but it was also reinforced by the role of the Paris police, whose approach to the Algerian immigrant community was informed by a certain understanding of Europe that oriented its leadership by Maurice Papon. This is not to say that the rank and file of the Paris police concurred unthinkingly with Papon’s worldview in which Europe was besieged by upstart African and Asiatic peoples. In fact there were significant instances of resistance to it.\(^\text{101}\) But it is still the case that his conviction of the need to counter aggressively this non-European threat filtered through into the professional culture of the Paris police. This will be examined in more depth in Chapter 3 given the significance of the encounter between Algerian migrants and the police in the city’s streets. But in terms of the home, it is worth noting that in the summer of 1958, Papon’s Europeanist ideology informed an operation that remained in force until the end of the conflict. Codenamed ‘\textit{Opérations meublés}’, the putative aim of this initiative was to check the legality of rent levels and living conditions and to compel landlords to carry out improvements to the lodgings of Algerian immigrants. In reality, the purpose of the initiative was to collect information on individual Algerians, establish a census of each lodging house, and to chart the location of suspected groupings of FLN supporters or militants.\(^\text{102}\) Moreover, after each of the operations, pro-French Algeria leaflets were distributed that pointed to, as one example, the manipulative designs of two of Europe’s irredeemable Others – Moscow and Nasser.\(^\text{103}\)

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\(^{102}\) Ibid., 72.

\(^{103}\) Prakash, \textit{Empire on the Seine}, 172.
In sum, Algerians were to be Europeanised, and the terms in which they were to be so related to conceptions of modernity, political affiliation, gender, family, sexuality. This was reinforced by an impressive repertoire of administrative and surveillance techniques. Though this section has suggested as much, it is worth expanding on the argument that criteria of Europeanness and un-Europeanness were produced by the French state.

Housing Algerians and Ethnicisation

In considering these initiatives at various levels of the French state, it is important not to project backwards the disconnection that is commonly drawn today between the French Republic and French imperialism, each of which are rather distinct in the kinds of ideas of Europe they tend to be aligned with. Françoise de Barros demonstrates that French housing policy in this period of decolonisation was constituted through the importation, reconfiguration, and, crucially, the strengthening of colonial terms of reference and management. Amongst these the notion of ‘Europeanness’ was paramount. For de Barros the understanding of racialism from the period in which French officials were often formed in the 1930s, and the broader axiom inherited from the nineteenth century of the incommensurability of Algerians with the ‘European race’, was more reworked than rejected in post-war France. This judgement is supported by Lyons’ work on welfare provision to Algerian immigrants and the perpetuation of a colonial mentality in the metropole in the same period.

In de Barros’ account, housing was one of the areas in which the continuity of both imperial management and mindset was most continuous before and after

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Algerian independence in 1962. This contradicts conventional narratives in which Europe and Europeanness arose as priorities at this moment precisely because the historical moment of imperialism had passed. This was not a simple one-to-one reconstitution of imperial personnel, categories and mentalities in the metropole, however, given the diffuse and contradictory functions of French government agencies and personnel. A particularly interesting phenomenon was the perpetuation and neglect of predominantly Algerian-populated shantytowns by left-wing local authorities, rather than a generic ‘colonial state.’ Moreover, Byrnes demonstrates that there were significant differences between different municipal authorities in their policies towards North Africans in Paris.

An important nuance of de Barros’s argument is that housing policy and discourse had an active ‘ethnicising’ effect on the conceptualisation of immigrants which induced a sharp demarcation between European and non-European. She notes that the administration charged with ‘affaires musulmans’ or ‘affaires nord-africaines’ was itself a powerful producer of the ethnicisation of Algerian immigrants. It was an institution of government which produced ‘une frontière infranchissable entre les Algériens et les “Européens”.’ Accordingly, we can talk here about a performative administrative discourse of both Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation. French housing policy in fact produced the difference that it purported to be merely observing objectively and administrating accordingly. This was all the more striking as a

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106 Emblematic of this line of thought is the anecdote of Anthony Eden telephoning Guy Mollet, who was in a meeting with Konrad Adenauer, to call a halt to Britain and France’s 1956 Suez offensive. Adenauer then told Mollet that European nations had to unite against an America that might otherwise divide up the world with the Soviets. ‘Europe will be your revenge’, promised the German Chancellor. See Matthew James Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 121.


policy given that Algerian Muslims in France were juridically equal French citizens, at least until
1962. Étienne Balibar argues that ‘in fact it is the state qua nation-state which actually produces
national or pseudo-national “minorities” (ethnic, cultural, occupation). Were it not for its juridical and political intervention, these would remain merely potential. Minorities only exist in actuality from the moment when they are codified and controlled.’\textsuperscript{110} The significance of this is that the state is not something standing above and mediating in a disinterested fashion between ‘Europeans’ and ‘non-European’ immigrants, but that discrimination or racism is ‘a relationship to the Other mediated by the intervention of the state.’\textsuperscript{111} Rancière also notes how this categorisation of ‘immigrants’ by the state replaced the term ‘worker’, which was a term that could have articulated a politics of equality.\textsuperscript{112} Algerians, as such, were as non-European immigrants legislated out of a claim to an equal right to the city that was proclaimed to be the capital of Europe.

Europeanisation and the Paris Bidonvilles

In terms of the spatial dimensions of the bidonvilles and their connection to Europe, de Barros notes that strong distinctions were drawn in physical space between Europeanness and non-Europeanness.\textsuperscript{113} This was true not only of the bidonvilles, of course. A 1957 Le Monde report on the area of la Goutte-d’Or, for instance, referred interchangeably to ‘Parisiens de souche’ and ‘les Européens’, who were supposedly fleeing the area in the face of its alarming

\textsuperscript{110} Balibar, ‘Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa’, 15.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
Arabisation. Prakash notes that these Parisians of ‘stock’, which is to say native Parisians, were in fact for the most part of provincial or European migrant origins. The historical fractures that had accompanied the entry of these groups into Paris were forgotten here, and replaced by a stark opposition of Europeans to Arabs.

Such concerns about the congregation of North Africans were voiced in regard to the allocation of HLM slots as well. Byrnes highlights the remarks of Jean Vaujour, the Director General of SONACOTRAL, who warned in 1961 that unless allocations were carefully apportioned, ‘instead of “Occidentalizing” the Muslims, a reverse “Arabization” of the French would occur.’ His remarks echoed contemporary prevalent theories about the inherent conflict or disequilibria between Europe and the Orient. If in this section we examine discourse about Europe and Europeanness only in relation to the bidonvilles, it is not because they were unique in terms of the spatial representation of these categories, but that the distinction between European and non-European was drawn most starkly with reference to these settlements. For, as MacMaster emphasises, the shantytowns ‘served the function of the lowest denominator, the form of immigrant housing that was most in opposition to the model of society that social workers shared.’

The bidonvilles were informal, makeshift settlements that peppered the outskirts of Paris and other French cities from the early post-Second World War years, and were not completely

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114 ‘Heures chaudes dans le “medina” de Paris’, Le Monde, (21 June, 1957). Prakash notes how such representations were overstated given that a police report of 1952 put the Algerians inhabiting the area at 10.2 % of the population. The Algerian population thereafter increased slightly in the 1950s, before beginning to decline after the early 1960s. See Prakash, Empire on the Seine, 132.
115 Prakash, Empire on the Seine, 137.
117 See Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, passim.
118 MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 85.
removed until the 1970s.\textsuperscript{119} It is important to note that shantytowns in France also housed Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and indeed French, as well as North African residents. However, the latter were disproportionately represented in the most deprived of these settlements.\textsuperscript{120} Moreover, de Barros notes that in the 1950s the term \textit{bidonville} designated French Algerian Muslims just as much as the terms ‘casba’ or ‘gourbi’.\textsuperscript{121} In the same vein, predominantly Portuguese inhabited \textit{bidonvilles} were often referred to in other terms. Nor was there evidence of a perception of a parallel between the Algerian settlements and the ‘zone’ on the periphery of Paris in which provincial and European, especially Belgian, Polish, and Italian, migrants lived in ramshackle dwellings well into the 1940s.\textsuperscript{122}

In this section two kinds of discourse of Europeanisation will be examined as they related to the \textit{bidonvilles}. The first inferred that the shantytowns were constitutively non-European and as such irredeemably out of place in Paris. This rested on some dubious premises, but also relied on a certain degree of collusion from the \textit{bidonvilles} residents in their own devaluation. The second form of Europeanising discourse about these settlements consisted in a limited but real refusal of this devaluation of the residents of the settlements. This is an example of Europeanisation as a refusal of the closure of the terms of Europe or Europeanness, which in this case involved an insistence on being no less a part of this Paris that was reckoned to be a European capital.

\textbf{Europeanisation as Rejection of the Bidonvilles from Paris}

\textsuperscript{120} Moroccans and Tunisians tended to arrive in France in greater numbers later in the 1960s.
\textsuperscript{122} Prakash, \textit{Empire on the Seine}, 228.
In terms of the spatial dimensions of the bidonvilles and their connection to Europe, de Barros notes that strong distinctions were drawn in physical space in terms of Europeanness or non-Europeanness. Accordingly, the bidonville was conceived not merely as a place where Algerian immigrants lived, but as an expression or manifestation of their character, as a non- or anti-European space that was more than the sum of its non- or anti-European parts. Sayad described the bidonville as ‘une ville rejetée par la ville… une ville qui n’est pas ville… une ville qui ne sera jamais ville lors même qu’elle est au sein de la ville.’ One can add to this that it was accordingly a non-European or indeed anti-European supplement to de Gaulle’s ‘de facto capital of Europe’.

This sense of neglect and rejection was expressly felt by many inhabitants of the bidonvilles. Interestingly, given our examination of Paris as a sanitised European space for tourism, Sayad quotes the frequent wish of the bidonvilles inhabitants that foreign tourists would come to see the settlements, to examine their impoverishment and photograph it to shame the French authorities who perpetuated this impoverishment. On the other hand, a former bidonville inhabitant, Mohammed Kenzi, recollects anger at foreign tourists who photographed what were taken to be quaint Third World enclaves on the edge of Paris. But this merely confirmed the point that the space was taken to be a non-European anomaly in the post-war European capital. Accordingly, in referring to the bidonvilles, allusions were made to Casbahs,

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124 Sayad & Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, 15-16.
125 Wakeman, The Heroic City, 343.
126 Sayad & Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, 88.
127 Mohammed Kenzi, La menthe sauvage (Lutry: Éditions Jean-Marie Bouchain, 1984), 47.
Medinas, Calcutta, or American Indian reserves. Similar references to non-European space were employed to highlight most Parisians’ detachment from and indifference to their neighbours in the shantytowns. As the journal Pax Christi France described the bidonvilles, ‘bien que géographiquement proche de nous, ils sont psychologiquement aussi loin que les plus lointains pays. Pour bien des Parisiens, les bidonvilles de Nanterre ou de la Campa sont-ils plus proches que Zanzibar ou le Rwanda?’ One should add though that not all the shantytowns were treated in the same manner at government level. The Portuguese bidonvilles of Champigny in the eastern suburbs, for instance, benefited from joint municipal-FAS projects to ‘humanise’ the settlement by providing electricity, water, and trash collection. As Byrnes notes, ‘no such projects were launched in the region’s predominantly North African bidonvilles.’

This performative discourse of segregation was closely connected to the common idea that the bidonvilles residents ‘chose’ to live there, or that, in what amounted to the same thing, they lived there because they were irredeemably feckless. As the journal Pax Christi France put it, ‘combien de personnes… pensent que les bidonvilles ne sont habités que par des asociaux, des chômeurs constitutionnels, des incapables, des irrécupérables se complaisant dans la saleté et la misère?’ Bidonvilles residents in fact commonly expressed resentment about the idea that they chose to live there. Furthermore, it was a notion that connected to the idea that the bidonvilles were not strictly speaking a Parisian space at all, but rather a foreign, North African importation.

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130 Byrnes, French like Us?, 184.

131 Ibid.

132 ‘Un monde “à part”.’ The article went on to argue that the reality was quite different from this perception.
It is in this sense that one can critique the historian Leif Jerram’s recent interpretation of the shantytowns. It is curious that as part of his plea for attention to the micro-unit of history as a point of scholarly precision, Jerram’s analysis of the bidonville is quite ahistorical. In his reading, the HLM that surround Paris have been unfairly denigrated, since they were certainly an improvement over the shantytowns from which many of its occupants had come. This is all the more noteworthy since Jerram is especially attentive to the secondary obscure or subtle manifestations of power in European urban history, for instance prerogatives of the welfare state which were not merely intrusive but also techniques of biopolitical government. He documents how the right to acquire a flat built for social housing purposes in European cities from the 1950s was explicitly linked to conformity to norms of heterosexual relations and family life. Yet he accepts at face value the pure intentions of the French state with regard to its policy towards the bidonvilles and their inhabitants, going as far as to credit its ‘passion to alleviate suffering.’ Jerram’s claims are not wrong, but unsatisfactory. Indeed, there were many sincere and committed French social workers. House and MacMaster even demonstrate how the resistance of social workers to state violence proved problematic for Papon’s direction of the police targeting of Algerians which culminated in the killings of 17 October 1961. But Jerram’s point is incidental to de Barros’s more probing analysis of the permeation of colonial discourse and exclusionary invocation of Europeanness in the systemic political logic of housing policy. Furthermore, Jerram’s rush to defend the moral fibre of welfare officials as individuals has the ideological effect of obscuring the fact that the existence of the bidonvilles was in the first place not a neutral fact or zero point for French civil servants to administrate.

133 Jerram, Streetlife, 372-373, 377, 384. Jerram also omits the difficulties, discrimination, and delays involved in bidonvilles residents securing a place in the HLM.
134 Ibid., 300.
135 Ibid., 373.
136 House & MacMaster, Paris 1961, 144-146.
Though Jerram never alludes to their origin, the Paris bidonvilles were in fact symptomatic of a constellation of trends within post-war European imperialism and capitalism.\textsuperscript{137} Their inhabitants’ ranks were swelled with Algerians escaping the French military campaign in Algeria, notably the policy of uprooting indigenous communities and resettling them in camps.\textsuperscript{138} Immigration in general, including into the bidonvilles, was further prompted by European capital accumulation processes that powered the trentes glorieuses, which required cheap foreign labour and, as Judt argues, the deliberate imposition of insecurity on foreign workers.\textsuperscript{139} That the shantytowns were as such not a non-European intrusion was appreciated by those who campaigned on behalf of the residents. The President of the Amitié Nord-africaine de Nanterre (ANAN) argued that these residents were ‘des gens qui pour bien des raisons sont presque en droit de l’exiger de nous, société, qui portons à tous les échelons la responsabilité de cet état de chose.’\textsuperscript{140}

But more typically the bidonvilles were represented as archetypically non-European or anti-European, when in fact they were symptomatic of the complicated intertwining of various modes of European violence. In this sense, Slavoj Žižek’s differentiation and discussion of these modes is illuminating: ‘subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that also includes two objective kinds of violence. First, there is a “symbolic” violence embodied in language and its forms, what Heidegger would call “our house of being”… Second, there is what I call “systemic” violence, or the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of

\textsuperscript{137} Apart from the housing of Algerian migrants in relation to the ongoing war, Amelia Lyons also points to French official preoccupation with the competition with other core Europeans states for cheap non-European or peripheral European labour. See Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and Decolonization in France’, 84.

\textsuperscript{138} MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 74.

\textsuperscript{139} Judt, Postwar, 337. It is ironic in this regard that Algerian workers in the metropole had even fewer rights as French citizens prior to 1962 than they had thereafter when the new Algerian government demanded certain safeguards in their employment. See Lyons, ‘Social Welfare, French Muslims and decolonization in France’, 83.

\textsuperscript{140} Report of J. Bellanger, the president of Amitié Nord-africaine de Nanterre. 1957 in FMH. ARC 3019 -2. 1. Dossier général chronologique.
our economic and political systems.\textsuperscript{141} Having taken no account of the visible subjective violence of police repression of Algerian immigrants in the integral policy of moving them from bidonvilles to the HLMs, Jerram unsurprisingly also takes no account of the ‘symbolic’ violence of their labelling as excluded non-Europeans, nor of the objective violence of European capitalist and colonialist systems which manifested themselves in the acceptance of Algerians as a particularly disposable and exploitable population.

The Bidonvilles, the Gaze, and Europeanisation

In a televised debate with Alain Badiou in May 2010, the French philosopher Alain Finkelkraut reproached Muslims in France over the issue of the veil. French society is defined by ‘the exchange of looks,’ he insisted.\textsuperscript{142} It is curious that an important formative experience in postcolonial France, with which Finkelkraut is so uncomfortable, was precisely that of the look. Indeed, the experience of the gaze, whether at the North Africans’s muddy appearance in public or while they hauled cans of water from outside communal taps, was one of the most commented upon aspects of bidonville life, as well as of one of the most painful to bear.\textsuperscript{143} A key distinction of this experience from Finkelkraut’s invocation of the look was the absence of the reciprocity and equality that he presupposes.

Mud, which as Sayad notes was the quintessential mark of bidonville life,\textsuperscript{144} perhaps functioned here as an alibi for the looks of contempt that Parisians extended to those inhabitants.

\textsuperscript{142} See http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xddsqw_badiou-finkielkraut-debat-part2_webcam#
\textsuperscript{143} Sayad & Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, 43.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 45.
In an age in which, as Frederick Cooper argues, racial justifications were no longer explicitly serviceable, the muddied appearance of the bidonvilles residents served as a material disavowal of Fanon’s observation that it is the racist who creates his object. To the extent that one had something tangible to point to, rather than refer back to expired racial ideas, the French observer expunged him or herself of (neo)colonial guilt. One thereby confirmed a practical understanding that the superior place of the European in Paris was obvious, natural and unimpeachable rather than arbitrary and unjust.

The experience of being gazed at by the neighbours of the settlements was consistently remarked upon as engendering a deep sense of shame and humiliation. In November 1965, France-Soir republished a letter from a former resident of the La Folie settlement in Nanterre as part of a series in the newspaper examining bidonvilles in the French capital: ‘I am writing to you on the subject of your campaign against the bidonvilles… I wouldn’t go back there for all the money in the world, not even for a week. I know all about the corvée d’eau… we were subjected to the most contemptuous looks from so-called “normal” neighbors as the tap was located on a main road.’

This shame, which was induced by pitying and contemptuous looks alike, could even take on a corporeal sense, as powerfully described by a Moroccan couple interviewed by Hervo. The husband regretted that every time he performed this task he was ashamed, that he would hide his body from view if he could. Indeed, his wife remarked that ‘he always lowers his head.

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146 Thérèse Nadji, ‘Je sors de l’enfer des bidonvilles, voilà ce que c’est.’ France-Soir, November 13, 1965in FMH. ARC 3019-2. 1. Dossier général chronologique. The corvée d’eau was the process of collecting water from common outside taps.
If he could put it in a hole he’d do so because he is so ashamed [il a trop de honte]. Likewise, another testified that he was quite aware that he was lowly, nothing admirable like a doctor or a lawyer. And yet still, it ‘makes you suffer when you feel from their look they are always marking a difference… that they always manage to make you understand that you’re not of their world.’ Seemingly, then, this momentary practical gesture was as powerful a means of discourse as any to objectivate a barrier between the European and non-European.

In his study of the suffering of immigrants, Sayad analyses the impact of the increasingly felt sense of distance from the country of origin. This also arises in the memoirs of bidonville residents. The experience of the look was in a sense a reminder of this detachment and displacement. For the shame it engendered contrasted utterly from Sartre’s encapsulation of the rising mood of self-empowerment in the non-European world and the reversal of European hegemony in his ‘Black Orpheus’ of 1948:

Here are black men standing, looking at us, and I hope that you – like me – will feel the shock of being seen. For three thousand years, the white man has enjoyed the privilege of seeing without being seen… Today, these black men are looking at us, and our gaze comes back to our own eyes; in their turn, black torches light up the world and our white heads are no more than chinese [sic] lanterns swinging in the wind.

In his preface to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, Sartre reminded his reader that for Marx shame was a revolutionary sentiment. The bidonvilles residents were heavily involved in the demonstrations on and around 17 October 1961, one aim of which was the restitution of dignity. But this claim to dignity was out of joint with the experience at being

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147 Monique Hervo & Marie-Ange Charras, Bidonvilles: l’enlisement (Paris: Maspero, 1971), 36. This work contains transcripts of interviews conducted with the residents of La Folie from between 1965 and 1968, but one can surmise that the experience described by the resident here was comparable to that of residents in the 1950s and early 1960s.
148 Sayad & Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, 50.
149 See for example Kenzi, La menthe sauvage, 36-37.
looked at, which seemed better to correspond to the disabling sense of shame Fanon pointed to in his *White Skins, Black Masks*, which is a useful text to make sense of the experience of the *bidonvilles* residents. Fanon’s advance over the early Sartre’s phenomenological approach was to insist that in the colonial situation the gaze is not merely the gaze of an Other, that there is also a relationship of mastery and superiority and inferiority, whether real or imagined. The testimonies of the *bidonvilles* inhabitants immediately recall Fanon’s succinct summary of the lived experience of the Black man or woman in a white world: ‘shame. Shame and self-contempt. Nausea.’ Robert Young explains that from Sartre’s account of how a lack of self-worth is mediated by the look of the Other, Fanon developed an insight into the mechanics of how colonialism was able to produce a sense of inferiority in colonial subjects, how the colonial gaze turned the subject into an object.

Fanon also analysed the importance of appearance in these kinds of phenomenological power relations. He described how the objectification of the Black differs from that of the Jew, in that the latter can sometimes pass unnoticed in terms of his physical appearance. The appearance of the North African inhabitants of the *bidonvilles* was doubly marked: in the first instance because of their Maghrebian features, and in the second because of the public appearance of carrying water or the pervasiveness of the inescapable and distinctive mud and dirt of *bidonville* life. A water carrier from the Souf area described the humiliation of being looked at when carrying water, the mocking smiles, the assumption that they North Africans were equivalent to worms or rats, and the sense of superiority that permeated the French people’s gazes. But, instructively, he added ‘between us, they’re right. They are on the right side [ils sont du bon

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151 Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 138n.
152 Ibid., 116.
côté.] This was an unexceptional example of the phenomenon of inhabitants of the bidonvilles colluding with the terms of the justification of their disenfranchisement, and the corresponding hierarchy between the French and immigrants, Europeans and non-Europeans. Often the extreme sense of ‘shame of oneself,’ as Sayad describes it, was coterminous with a distinct sense in which its inhabitants often accepted their disenfranchisement in the social hierarchy. They thus limited their claims to a minimal relief of their material impoverishment, and drew short of attacking the pathological constitution of the division between European and non-European, for which Fanon’s work held out hope.

Spatialisation, and (De-)Europeanisation

It is argued here that the gaze of the French neighbours of the bidonvilles was more than a gesture of contempt. Rather, it had a further value in terms of identity and placement in the sense of instilling social hierarchy. That is to say that this practice of looking at the bidonvilles and their residents had a powerful effect of inculcating a distinction in terms of Europeanness and non-Europeanness. In his discussion of the Paris Grande mosquée, Bayoumi argued that ‘its putative purity of North African form within the fifth arrondissement was an attempt to force the presence of colonial North African subjects into visibility and containment.’ In part the gaze at the shantytowns was an attempt to achieve some degree of comparable control, though the autonomy of the settlements did not permit this to the extent of the mosque, which was constructed and regulated by the French state.

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154 Sayad & Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, 54-55.
155 Bayoumi, ‘Shadows and Light’, 41.
To understand this, it is useful to turn to the work of Jacques Rancière, particularly in terms of his theories of spatialisation and fixing people in their place. Rancière invokes a scene from Roberto Rossellini’s film *Europa 51* to examine the bourgeois outsider encountering and being turned by the experience of an alterity which then transforms and converts the outsider. But it is suggested here that its outlining of the process of spatialisation can usefully be appropriated to explicate processes of (de-)Europeanisation at work with regard to looking at the *bidonvilles* and their residents. Rancière writes,

> Of course, those narratives were an appeal to fear and pity. I would assume, however, that this was not the main point. The first concern was not provoking fear and pity. It was localizing. Horrible as the underworld may be, it is still a world. It is a place where you can find the disease of society, designate and touch it with your fingers. People are pitiful or dreadful but they are there, clinging to their place, identical to themselves – and all the more identical to themselves as they have less self, as their ‘self’ is hardly distinct from the dirt and mud which is ‘their’ place. The descent into hell is not simply a pitiful visit to the land of the poor – it is also a way of making sense, a procedure of meaning… Frightening as it might seem, it was still reassuring to envisage society as threatened by a power lying beneath it, in the underground. Because the main threat would lie in the discovery that society had no underground: no underground because it had no ground at all. The enigma and threat of democracy is not the army of the shadows in the underground. The enigma and threat of democracy is merely its own indeterminacy. This means that people have no place, that they are not ‘identical’ to themselves: that indeterminacy in fact is a permanent challenge to the rationality of policy and the rationality of social knowledge. Spatialization is a way of conjuring with the challenge of safely grounding reasonable democracy and rational social knowledge.¹⁵⁶

Sayad, of course, noted the various ways in which the *bidonville* residents were revealed as, or made to feel, out of place. But, to borrow and adapt Rancière’s argument, in another sense they were very much in their place. If the *bidonville* was considered quintessentially non-

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European or anti-European, to go to it or to see it was also to place it, to fix it and its inhabitants in their place. Here ‘it was there, identical to itself because it was identical to the occupation of space.’ The spatialisation of the bidonvilles corresponded to the de-Europeanisation of its inhabitants and the reaffirmation of the Europeanness of those who were not of the bidonvilles. It was a re-inscription of a division between de Gaulle’s capital of Europe and the bidonville as casbah in a representation of opposition as stark as Fanon’s famous depiction of the colonial city. As such, it is instructive that Sayad notes that the feeling of humiliation and shame that the gaze induced was, in fact, all the more pronounced in situation of anonymity when it was aimed randomly at any resident as a collective reaction against the bidonville as a whole.

To continue the analogy with Rancière’s analysis, the bidonvilles might be regarded by Parisians as primitive and frightening, but a bidonville in its non-European place was less frightening than not being able to locate the contours of the societal hierarchy of European and non-European. And certainly less disturbing than the notion that that society’s hierarchy was arbitrary and artificial or even ephemeral – a fear which was all the more present in an age when the certainties of Europe’s imperial place in the world were quickly exposed as credulous and complacent. The contestation and defence of Europe and Europeanness in this period was indeed closely connected to this question of social rank and place.

The according of place that Rancière describes here correlates closely to the experience of the Paris bidonvilles in terms of the notion that the residents chose to live there. For if they were in ‘their place’ in the bidonvilles, this was all the more self-evident if they chose to be

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157 Ibid., 32.
158 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), 30.
159 Sayad, Un Nanterre algérien, 43.
160 One thinks immediately of Fanon’s depiction of the instilling of hierarchy between European and non-European in the use of ‘pidgin-nigger’ or patois French to speak to Antilleans or Francophone Africans. This was to express the sentiment that “You’d better keep your place.” Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 34.
there. Of course, the feelings of the Algerian residents were mixed. Some suffered enormously from the material deprivation; others found the settlements convivial nonetheless. But the point here is that the notion that they chose to live there was an *a priori* dismissal of their claims. In Rancièrian terms, to say they chose to live there was to say there was no ‘part of no part.’ De Gaulle’s Paris, the capital of Europe, did not systematically preclude any part from equality, all parts were counted.\(^\text{161}\)

Rancière’s thought is useful to understand the experience of gaze to which the *bidonvilles* residents were subjected in two ways, then. First, it functioned as a process of spatialisation in which their non-European residents were put in their place in a reinforced social hierarchy. This connected, secondly, to a contradictory notion with which it coexisted: the residents chose to live there, thus preempting any claim to equality and to dispute their abjection in this capital of Europe in which the ‘police order’ denied that any part was excluded.

Europeanisation as Validation of the *Bidonvilles*

Despite many instances of internalising the rationalisations of their depreciated status in Paris, there was also a sense in which the *bidonvilles* were alternatively Europeanised. That is to say that alternative discourses disputed the invocation of Europeanness to exclude the Algerian residents of the shantytowns from an equal right to the city. Furthermore, in doing so, these implied an interrogation of the very meaning of Europeanness as it was conventionally used.

\(^{161}\) A particular perverse instance of this axiom was Papon’s claim that Algerian migrants were transparently equal as demonstrated by their possibility of enlisting in the *harkis*, who, as we have seen, aggressed inhabitants of the *bidonvilles* and Algerian immigrants in general. House & MacMaster, *Paris 1961*, 78.
Recent work has juxtaposed the experience of the Algerians in Paris generally, and the bidonvilles in particular, with the Jewish experience of segregation under European fascism. Michael Rothberg points to figures like Marguerite Duras and her November 1961 article in *France-Observateur*, ‘Les deux ghettos,’ as an example of multidirectional memory. Accompanied by a photograph of the appalling conditions of a bidonville in Nanterre, the article centred around two interconnected interviews: the first with two Algerian workers and the second with a survivor of the Warsaw ghetto. The juxtaposition of the two memories does not imply competition but rather is seen by Rothberg as representing an impetus to mutually productive reflections.\(^{162}\) Rothberg further argues that the ideological and policy shifts that Shepard describes in terms of the relation between France and Europe, Frenchness and Europeanness, indeed disenfranchised racialised minorities. Yet the ideological incoherence of these shifts also created a space in which intellectuals and activists like Duras ‘could link the contemporary crisis to past events that had not yet received their due.’\(^{163}\) Given the integrity of the experience of fascism and colonialism to Europe, it follows that work like Duras’s can be thought of as a Europeanising space, in the sense of ‘Europeanisation’ as the contesting of any closed understanding of Europe, and disclosing and foregrounding other histories that needed to be accounted for in any attempt at articulating the meaning of the continent.

One might add another thread to these entangled histories by pointing to the fact that some Algerian inhabitants of the bidonvilles were Second World War veterans, and considered themselves to have contributed to the liberation of Europe. As such, their habitation in the bidonvilles was felt to be an unjust depreciation of their contribution to the continent in which they now found themselves so devalued. Of one particular resident in the *La Folie* shantytown,

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163Ibid., 245.
Hervo noted that, ‘sous le drapeau français, il s’est battu pour libérer l’Europe,’ but that as an ‘indigène’ received half the war pension of a ‘métropolitain.’ \textsuperscript{164}

Another mode by which the European credentials of the bidonvilles were re-asserted was to insist on their spatial proximity to the centre of Paris. If Paris was reckoned to be the capital of Europe, it followed that these settlements, often only a few kilometres from the Champs-Élysées as it was constantly repeated, could not plausibly be subtracted from this Paris. As one Nanterre resident expressed it succinctly, ‘mais après tout, le bidonville, c’est français; c’est à Paris qu’il se trouve, c’est quelque chose d’ici.’ \textsuperscript{165}

Also, if the Paris authorities and Parisians deduced from the abject conditions of the bidonvilles an essential lack of Europeanness in their residents, it was in fact the case that the conditions of the Parisian bidonvilles were expressly felt by the inhabitants to be an injustice and they were offended by notions that they were charity cases. \textsuperscript{166} Residents repeatedly objected that such living conditions could still exist in the twentieth century. \textsuperscript{167} French authorities might have continually emphasised the need to instil modern European values into North African migrants, but it was in terms of their expectations of modern civilisation that the bidonville residents indicted the French authorities and their lack of dynamism in facilitating decent accommodation. Furthermore, the contradictoriness of the conflation of Europeanness and universalism was highlighted when residents insisted on the equality of human beings as a rationale for the provision of decent housing. As a former resident of the La Folie settlement in Nanterre put it to Sayad: ‘habiter, c’est être parmi des humains, c’est vivre avec eux, c’est vivre entre eux; c’est

\textsuperscript{164} Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 104.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{167} See Nadji, “Je sors de l’enfer des bidonvilles, voilà ce que c’est””; Sayad & Dupuy, Un Nanterre algérien, 42. Likewise, in his memoir of bidonville life, Brahim Benaïcha recalls the incorrect assumption of French people that the bidonvilles residents refused to countenance progress. See Brahim Benaïcha, Vivre au paradis: d’une oasis à un bidonville (Paris: Desdée de Brouwer, 1992), 39.
vivre en hommes, vivre humainement, dans les conditions normales des hommes, c’est vivre au milieu d’eux, de la même manière qu’eux, donc dans les mêmes logements qu’eux.”

One thinks here of Rancière’s definition of politics as the ‘part of no part’ standing in as the universal to claim equality within the polity.

Similarly, one core premise of Hervo’s work in the bidonvilles was to insist on the equality of the residents, to refuse the segregation of its residents along with their habitat. Accordingly, a letter from her and her colleague Brigitte Gall insisted that ‘en fait, il semble bien que ces habitants des bidonvilles désirent – à quelques exceptions près – ce n’est pas une aumône… C’est tout simplement le droit de vivre comme les autres.”

In an entry in her chronicle for October 1961, in what can also be seen as an invocation of a multidirectional Europe, Hervo rhetorically leveraged the spatial integrity of the bidonvilles to Paris so as to refuse this colonial objectivation of spatial segregation and inequality of material wealth and recognition: ‘Paris. Sur le trottoir, une foule de passants, le pas pressé, longe de vitrines aux brillantes enseignes lumineuses, exposant, bien présentés, des objets de luxe. Dans les faubourgs de la Ville Lumière, je pense au bidonville, enclave du Tiers-Monde où la guerre sévit. D’un côté les nantis, la joie. De l’autre, dénuement, mort, tortures. Quinze ans après la Second Guerre Mondiale…”

These various examples of a refusal of separation, the counter-factual insistence that they were no less a part of the city and thus no less European a space, offered an interruptive counter-understanding of how one thought about Paris.

The extent of the refusal of the disjuncture of the bidonvilles and their rhetorical disconnection from the city though significant and under-estimated, should not be overstated.

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170 Hervo, *Chroniques du bidonville*, 218.
however. There was a sense in which that segregation was appreciated by bidonville residents themselves, at least before 1962. As MacMaster notes, the radical segregation of the shantytowns often provided a sense of protection against a hostile and dangerous outside world. Moreover, the general feeling of solidarity and community cohesion was strengthened during the Algerian war and so it was an ideal terrain for the spread of Algerian nationalism.\footnote{MacMaster, ‘Shantytown Republics’, 76-77.}

Counter-intuitively though, even when the segregation of the shantytowns was embraced or accepted, there were still ways that they could be said to have been Europeanising spaces. This is most interesting in the case of the criteria of the far right who invoked the bidonvilles, especially in Nanterre, as a quintessential symbol of the menace of immigration and the degeneracy of non-European peoples. Yet the remarkably autarchic internal economy of the settlements, based on logic other than accumulation and emphasising solidarity, ironically resembled to a great extent the kind of non-capitalist and socially cohesive market economy that the far right held up as a template for Europe.\footnote{See for example ‘La capitale des bidonvilles’, Cahiers universitaires 22 (February-March, 1965), 22-23. This was the journal of the far right student group the FEN. Issues are available EN. 1, dossier 3. On the economy of the bidonvilles see ‘Entretien avec des syndicalistes algériens’, Vérité Liberté: cahiers d’information sur la guerre d’Algérie (September, 1960); & J.P. Imhof, ‘Le “bidonville” du Petit Nanterre,’ Cahiers Nord-Africains 89 (May, 1962).}

Furthermore, on reflection on her bidonville co-residents, Hervo noted that, ‘nous, Occidentaux, nous ne pouvons pas mesurer l’ampleur de ce cette solidarité tant elle est ancrée dans le cœur des Arabes. L’étranger qu’on reçoit est considéré comme “l’hôte de Dieu.”’\footnote{Hervo, Chroniques du bidonville, 106.} If on one hand this set the shantytown residents, and North African immigrants generally, apart from European Parisians, on the other they embodied what were esteemed to be the most precious characteristics of Europeans – what the Orientalist Louis Massignon considered to have been so valuable and so tragically lost from Europe – ‘le patrimoine abrahamique, la parole donnée, le
droit d’asile.’174 In these ways, the homes of North Africans in Paris in this period can be thought of as Europeanising spaces, and indeed anticipated Balibar’s point that the sociability of immigrants of non-European origin in fact often overrides their lack of regional affiliation to appear as ‘quintessential Europeans.’175

Conclusion

Just as there were many Europes, there were various kinds of Paris, each of which was impacted by those various invocations of Europe, many of which were underscored by a putative equivalence between modernisation and Europeanisation. The Parisian home, both in the sense of material shelter and civic belonging and affective security, was impacted by the way the city’s development was underscored by and interpreted in the light of diverse notions of Europe: a shared European vision of recovery that derived from the experience of its cities being destroyed in the Second World War; Paris as sanitised and zoned European capital; the Europe of the Cold War; the Europe of tourism; the quickly reconfigured understandings of Europe and Europeanness prompted by French decolonisation; the ethnicisation of Algerian immigrants and its implications for housing policy; the linking of urban space and discourse of Europe; and counter-inferences that if this Paris was a capital of Europe, those who were excluded from it or devalued within it were in fact no less a part of it.

The right to a home in the city relied to a significant extent on criteria of Europeanness. These criteria were far from coherent and consistent, however. Europeanness might be invoked

merely in an underlying disdain for the city’s working classes. Or it might entail years for Algerian and other migrants in transit centres where they were to be Europeanised in their comportment and outlook, notably including the curtailment of radical politics. Furthermore, discourse about Europeanness reverted between two registers of a clear binary opposition of European and non-European, and a graded scale on which Europeanness gradually faded away. Sometimes both were appealed to at once. This incoherence was compounded by the lack of a clear view about what Europeanisation of immigrants entailed. Sometimes it seemed to convey the making European of the non-European, whereas at other times it was implied this was implausible, and so Europeanisation instead signified the extension of European control over the non-European. A crucial point is that this incoherence was a symptom of this pivotal point in post-war French and European history – decolonisation. Indeed, a perennial dilemma of imperialism was brought home to the metropole, namely, the dual impulse of exclusion and inclusion – the striving for a universalist polity on the one hand, and on the other a means to refuse the extension of full equality which that universalism promised. Hence the universalist aspirations of French Republican housing policy were blatantly self-thwarting in that they ethnicised and segregated populations that they strove thereby to integrate; while conversely the appeal to Europeanness facilitated the converse and simultaneous impulse to deny the rights and provision that the French state’s universalism promised.