Increasing the requirements to show antitrust harm in modernised effects-based analysis: an assessment of the impact on the efficiency of enforcement of Art 81 EC

Lankhorst, M.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART 1
SETTING THE STAGE

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Subject matter .................................................................13
1.2 Structure of the argumentation ...........................................15
Part 2 .................................................................................16
Part 3 .................................................................................17

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND, METHOD, AND SCOPE

2.1 Introduction ..................................................................18
2.2 A first introduction to Community competition policy ..........19
2.2.1 Competition policy and general Community objectives .........20
The European Coal and Steel Community ..................................21
The EC Treaty and Community competition policy ..................22
2.2.2 Art 81 EC, its components, and the scope of this work ......23
The elements of the assessment under Art 81(1) EC that are not addressed ..........................................................25
The object or effect to restrict competition ..................................27
The investigation of restrictions, countervailing benefits and ancillary restraints .............................................30
2.2.3 Art 81 EC and non-competition-related objectives .............31
2.3 The dividing line between Art 81(1) and (3) EC ....................35
2.3.1 Regulation 17/62 and freedom of trade ..........................35
2.3.2 The rule of reason debate in EC antitrust .........................39
The impact of the notification regime .........................................39
The call for a rule of reason in Art 81(1) EC ............................42
The rule of reason in practice .................................................46
2.4 Modernisation and the generic objectives of EC antitrust .......51
2.4.1 An overview of recent developments .............................51
2.4.2 Generic antitrust objectives .........................................55
Ultimate objectives ...............................................................55
Intermediate objectives .........................................................56
Market power .......................................................................59
Ways to identify market power: structure or conduct ..............61
2.4.3 An overview of substantive modernisation .....................64
2.5 Approach and scope ..........................................................68
Legal certainty: modernisation as applied in practice ..............68
Making the effects of uncertainty visible .................................70
An alternative approach .......................................................73
A final note on the scope of this work ....................................74
# PART 2
Evaluating the Current State of Effects-Based Analysis

## CHAPTER 3
Economic Analysis of the Effects-Based Standard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Efficient enforcement, the legal standard and decision theory</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The system as a whole</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The legal standard</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision theory</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Calibration of the legal standard</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1</td>
<td>Rulemaking: accuracy and timing</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Components of the rule making calculus</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timing: rules and standards</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Errors in the application of standards</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2</td>
<td>Dividing the burden of proof</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Firm behaviour under uncertainty about the legal standard</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1</td>
<td>Analysing the effects of uncertainty</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binary settings</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continuous range of options</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2</td>
<td>Contracting in the effects-based field</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Conclusions and implications</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER 4
Comparing EU and US Rule of Reason Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>A brief note on the of comparison</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparing EC law with US law</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparative methodology</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Materials studied</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structure of the comparison</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>EU and US law on restrictive agreements compared</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1</td>
<td>The enforcing party’s burden of proof</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1.1</td>
<td>US antitrust</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The use of direct evidence</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastman Kodak and California Dental Association</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The required level of substantiation: a sliding scale</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1.2</td>
<td>EC antitrust</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The de minimis doctrine</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The case law</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Commission</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>The affirmative defence and the weighing of effects on competition</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic framework</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crucial differences</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bass</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Van den Bergh Foods</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 5
THE IMPACT OF MODERNISATION ON LEGAL CERTAINTY

5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 153
5.2 The impact of substantive modernisation .............................................................. 154
  5.2.1 The shift from a rule-based to a standard-based system .................................. 154
  5.2.2 The guidelines and developments in Industrial Organization ....................... 156
  Early thought, Ordo-liberalism, and the Harvard School ................................... 157
  Chicago and game theory ..................................................................................... 162
  Implications for the usefulness of the Guidelines .............................................. 164
  5.2.3 Substantive modernisation in practice ........................................................... 165
5.3 The impact of procedural modernisation ............................................................. 168
5.4 The case for increased requirements to show harm ............................................ 172
  Modernisation as practiced .................................................................................. 172
  Some anecdotic evidence .................................................................................... 174
  Raising the level of certainty .............................................................................. 179

PART 3
IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EFFECTS-BASED STANDARD

CHAPTER 6
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF IMPROVING ACCURACY

6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 184
6.2 Improving accuracy: incentives under current conditions .................................... 185
  Incentives in the field of negligence .................................................................... 186
  Craswell and Calfee’s theory applied to antitrust .............................................. 188
  Kahan’s theory applied to antitrust ..................................................................... 191
6.3 Impact on different actors and complementary measures .................................... 193
  Countering a drop in deterrence ......................................................................... 195
6.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 198

CHAPTER 7
A NEW AGENDA FOR EUROPEAN RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS

7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 200
7.2 Empiricism in the analysis of restraints ............................................................... 201
  Implications for the way restraints are analysed .............................................. 203
  Implications for the guidance available to firms .............................................. 208
7.3 Effects on enforcement costs ................................................................................ 209
  7.3.1 Transforming the Commission’s burden of proof ........................................ 209
  7.3.2 Effects on private enforcers’ costs ............................................................... 213
7.4 Compatibility with European antitrust ............................................................... 216
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

8.1 Summary .................................................................227
The objective ..............................................................227
On the method .........................................................228
Findings on legal certainty ...........................................228
Findings on improving accuracy ................................229
Compatibility with European antitrust .........................230

8.2 Broader implications and directions for future research 230
Art 82 EC review ....................................................231
Policy innovation, Remia, and the French model ..........232

8.3 Concluding remarks ................................................233

APPENDIX A
EU COMMISSION DECISIONS ......................................235

APPENDIX B
US DISTRICT COURT CASES ........................................239

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................244

NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING (Summary in Dutch) ....261