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THE LAUGHING MICE or: On Focalization*

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In Southern India, at Mahaballipuram, is what is said to be the largest *bas-relief* of the world, the seventh-century *Arjuna's penance*. At the upper left, the wise man Arjuna is depicted in a yoga position. At the bottom right stands a cat. Around the cat are a number of mice. The mice are laughing (see the illustration). It is a strange image. Unless the spectator interprets the signs. The interpretation runs as follows. Arjuna is in a yoga position and is meditating to win Lord Siva's favor. The cat, impressed by the beauty of absolute calm, imitates Arjuna. Now the mice realize they are safe. They laugh (for this interpretation and another possible one, see also Sivaramamurti, 1974). Without this interpretation, there is no relation between the parts of the relief. Within this interpretation the parts form a coherent narrative.

The picture is a comical one, in addition to being a real comic. The comical effect is evoked by the narrativity of the picture. The spectator sees the relief as a whole. Its contents include a succession in time. First, Arjuna assumes the yoga position. Then, the cat imitates him. After that, the mice start laughing. These three successive events are logically related in a causal chain. According to every definition I know, that means this is a *fabula*.


But there is more. Not only are the events chronologically in succession and logically in a causal relation. They can only occur through the semiotic activity of the actors. And the comical effect can only be explained when this particular mediation is analyzed. We laugh because we can identify with the mice. Seeing what they see, we realize with them that a meditating cat is a contradiction; cats hunt, and only wise men meditate. Following the chain of events in reverse, we also arrive at the next one by perceptual identification. The cat has brought about the event for which he is responsible because he has seen Arjuna do something. This chain of perceptions also runs in time. The wise man sees nothing since he is totally absorbed in his meditation; the cat has seen Arjuna and now sees nothing more of this world; the mice see the cat and Arjuna. That is why they know they are safe. (The other interpretation mentioned above is that the cat is simulating; this doesn't weaken my statements but only adds an element of suspense to the *fabula*.) The mice are laughing because of that very fact, finding the imitation a ridiculous enterprise. The spectator sees more. He sees the mice, the cat and the wise man. He laughs at the cat, and he laughs sympathetically with the mice, whose pleasure is comparable to that felt by a successful scoundrel.

*This is a reply to W. Bronzwaer's criticism of my approach. The work Bronzwaer discusses is unfortunately not yet available in English. My book *Narratologie* appeared in French, *De theorie van vertellen en verhalen* (The theory of telling [and] stories in Dutch. However, the first and most important chapter of *Narratologie* is being translated into English and will probably appear in Italian too.

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Fransje van Zoest

This example, paradoxical because it is not linguistic, illustrates that much the better the theory of narrativity which Bronzwaer finds problematic. We can view the picture of the relief as a (visual) sign. The elements of this sign, the standing Arjuna, the standing cat, the laughing mice, only have spatial relations to one another. The elements of the *fabula* — Arjuna assumes a yoga position, the cat assumes a yoga position, the mice laugh — do not form a coherent significance as such. The relation between the sign (the relief) and its contents (the *fabula*) can only be established by mediation of an interjacent layer, the view of the events. The cat sees Arjuna. The mice see the cat. The spectator sees the mice who see the cat who has seen Arjuna. And the spectator sees that the mice are right. Every verb of perception (*to see*) in this report indicates an activity of focalization. Every verb of action indicates an event.

The misunderstandings about my theory are mainly caused by a few problems. I would like to consider them first in general, and later go into the details of Bronzwaer's argumentation. The problems he raises are embedding versus succession, different types of focalization, the communicative and the linguistic status of focalization, free indirect discourse, the relation between pragmatics and the notion of implied author. In relation with these problems, I want to discuss the difference between concepts and entities.

EMBEDDING

The spectator of *Arjuna's penance* sees not only what the actors see, but also the complete picture. He sees the mice, and at the same time he sees what the mice see. So there must be embedding and not succession of the different views. As I point out in my paper on narrative embedding (published in this issue of *Poetics Today*), the relation

between embedding and embedded elements is hierarchical and does not hold true the other way round. The mice see the cat but the cat does not see the mice. The spectators see the mice, but not vice versa. For the interpretation it is indispensable to take the hierarchical nature of the structure into account. The spectator must have at his disposal both levels of focalization. Bronzwaer's example taken from my book reveals what happens when one does not. The sentence from *La Chatte* is:

Elle le regarda boire et se troubla brusquement à cause de la bouche qui pressait les bords du verre. Mais il se sentait si fatigué qu'il refusa de participer à ce trouble (*La Chatte*, 9). (She watched him drink and was suddenly troubled because of the mouth pressing the brim of the glass. But he felt so tired that he refused to participate.)

The word *watched* denotes a changing in the level of focalization. From that moment there is embedding: the first and external focalizer watches Camille watching Alain. Alain can respond to the look, and in fact he does in a negative way, but he does not see what his fiancée sees. He only sees her reaction, the sensual trouble she shows on her face, due to the interpretation of what she saw. So there is only one explicit level change, introduced by the verb of perception, while the fact that Alain also sees something is left implicit (and not arbitrarily so). Thematically speaking, the main difference is precisely that Alain does not see what his fiancée sees-interprets-thinks, and that is one of the main reasons for the problems between partners that are the center of the diegesis. Narratologically speaking, that important fact is rendered through the unequal position of both protagonists as far as focalization is concerned. That is the very reason why I chose this rather banal novel as an example of my theory. I state in my book that the meaning of the novel is determined by this kind of technical device that enables the reader to interpret it in a non-ambiguous way (which includes the finding of ambiguity, but that is another matter).

Bronzwaer, in his discussion of this example, makes two shifts in argumentation. First he says that there is no embedding, a statement that is supported only by the irrelevant remark that the external and the diegetic focalizer are "entirely different in status" (a fact that I never denied). Then he argues that the first focalization is a linguistic one, a problem that is not the issue at this moment of his discussion, and to which I shall return later. Then he turns to film saying that we can imagine a scene in a film showing Alain being watched by Camille. Indeed we can, but that proves nothing but the relevance of my distinction between three (and not two) layers, one of which, but not the interjacent layer of focalization, can be replaced by another semiotic system. This line of reasoning, which leads to the confusion of different issues, is typical of the whole discussion. I shall return to it later. For the moment I hope I have made clear that

1. there is such a notion as embedding of focalization, apart from the difference between narration and focalization in that respect, that I will discuss later;
2. the embedding, conforming to its nature as pointed out in my paper on the subject, is irreversible;
3. embedding of focalization is a phenomenon that contributes to the meaning of a narrative text.

The example from *Wuthering Heights* quoted ("He evidently wished no repetition of my intrusion") is meant to illustrate the same point. Even if Heathcliff, like Alain, can be realistically expected to have noticed the look of his antagonist and perhaps to have interpreted it, the narrative text which tells the facts does not mention it, and that makes the focalization by the other partner the only relevant and meaningful one. If Weinsheimer's distinction between mimetic and semiotic criticism makes any sense at all

(Weinsheimer, 1979), this discussion is a clear instance of it. Bronzwaer "mimetically" interprets what he assumes would happen in real life, while I confine myself first to the purely semiotic criticism that takes only the narrative signs into account. A last example of the same type, taken from social life, would be a perfectly common sentence like "I saw that he realized that his girl friend noticed something strange on his cheek." /I/ sees the three levels of focalization, the boy sees two of them (he sees the girl see) and the girl (narratively prejudiced) sees only the lipstick on her friend's cheek.

TYPES OF FOCALIZATION

To remember, to see, to notice, to wish: what have these verbs in common that justifies their grouping in one category? The problem of different types of focalization and, in relation to it, that of spatio-temporal proximity, is clarified, even in the visual example of *Arjuna's penance*. Bronzwaer's extensive argument to show that *to see* and *to remember* are different actions is therefore superfluous; his statement that one cannot see another person see is naïve. Superfluous: precisely in order to consider from a certain angle a group of terms that differ in other respects, scholars introduce new terms. If only *to see* can be a type of focalization, why not call it seeing? There are what Bronzwaer calls verbs of physical and verbs of psychological perception. Yes. Both have in common their status of *mental acts*, producers of *mental events*. And that is exactly the point. They differ with respect to the conditions under which a person is capable of this kind of perception. The condition of spatio-temporal proximity does not depend on the narratological status of the subject but on the nature of the focalization. That is why, in a realistic novel and only there, Lockwood-Wednesday can *remember* how he was alarmed by Heathcliff's look the previous day, but he is unable to *see* the look. In order to group both types under the heading of their common features we need the concept of focalization.

But even physical perception is not a purely and exclusively physical way of registering. The focalizing act of the mice does not only contain the physical registration (as a machine would be capable of, as is shown in the opening chapter of Eco's *Theory of Semiotics*), but also the mental interpretation of the signs. They don't laugh at a standing cat, but at a meditating cat — because a standing cat is still dangerous, whereas a meditating one is not. This common feature is the one that leads to the need of the concept at issue. This is why focalization is a semiotic activity. To exclude the verb *to remember* shows too limited a conception, even of seeing itself. It would lead to the contradiction that the elder Marcel in Proust's novel does not focalize his own past. According to Bronzwaer, my theory differs from Genette's in this respect: Genette recognizes unfocalized passages. This is an error. Genette does so, but in relation to a definition of focalization as a typology of texts, not as an indispensable narrative device. Where he speaks of unfocalized passages, I reformulate that type as larger than the *focalisation interne; non-focalisé* means for Genette focalized in a diffuse way, whereas *focalisation interne* indicates a limited and diegetic focalizer. In my book, I discuss extensively Genette's theory in relation to my propositions, and I carefully enumerate the differences (1978:38). I find that Genette is right in his main points, but that his notions remain notions without becoming systematically related concepts, and that is how I try to go farther.

THE COMMUNICATIVE AND LINGUISTIC STATUS OF FOCALIZATION

The next problem Bronzwaer raises is that of the communicative status of focalization. He states briefly that there can be no question of a communicative chain before the story

(the interjacent layer) has been encoded on the second level of transformation. Thus insisting on the chronological succession of the different operations, viewed as a genetic process, he seems to take my three-layer theory as an ontological one, which is obviously not my intention. What we have as the object of study is the one and only narrative text, viewed as a complex message in a communicative process. Only to account for its different aspects, *and* the relations between them, we need a theoretical and conceptual framework to make metalinguistic statements about the text. There is one narrative message: the text, the film, the painting, or the relief. Its immediate content is not, as I have pointed out with respect to *Arjuna's penance*, the *fabula*. For the *fabula* is incomplete and even incoherent without the supposed (and theoretical) interjacent layer where we can account for the interpretive, semiotic activities of all the subjects concerned.

Bronzwaer finds out that focalization can be but an aspect of the narrative text. He found that in a Dutch book I wrote after the French one, and which he quotes in his Dutch version of his paper. I say in that book, in a definitional and consequently fundamental passage: "Focalization is the relation between the 'vision,' the subject that sees, and the things seen. The relation is one of *contents* (regarding) the narrative text." and I even warn against the confusion that arises if one does not distinguish the verbal aspect from this aspect of contents: "When one conceives focalization as a *part* of the narration, one fails to distinguish between verbal, and thus textual subjects, and the direct *object* of their activity." These sentences are quoted by Bronzwaer in his Dutch paper, and he misreads the second one, thinking that "one" (Dutch: *men*) means "I" (Dutch: *ik*) and that I myself am guilty of the confusion I am warning against. So he quotes my own text to criticize me, on the very same point.

Most of Bronzwaer's argument, therefore, is a fight against windmills, since I never give the concept of focalization an ontological status and I never assign to the focalizing subject an independent existence. Wherever my opponent sees an inconsistency in my theory, he only repeats my own view to attack me. There is more. Bronzwaer makes the mistake he falsely accuses me of. Taking, as an example of my error, *not* the important definitional passage he quotes in his Dutch footnote, but a single word of a sentence in my French book (the choice of the verb *raisonner*) he makes his second argumentational mistake. The whole context of this word, where I discuss the relevance of the "excès de rationalisme" in Alain's attitude toward Camille, shows without ambiguity that what I mean is the prepositional content of the verb and not the stylistic, textual features of it. But discussing the case, my opponent states: "It is therefore, within the compass of her theory, impossible to consider it as 'narrator's discourse.'" The quotation marks (third argumentational incorrectness) do not indicate words of mine but of Doležel's. I never said there is, in the case of a particular focalization device, any question of discursive facts in the limited sense where I use my distinctions.

The problems of whose words are quoted in the sentence "Elle est jolie, raisonnait Alain, parce qu'aucun de ses traits est laid" ("She is pretty, Alain reasoned, because none of her traits is ugly") is not at issue in my discussion. That is no problem at all. Alain is quoted, and the verb *raisonner*, being an attributive phrase in Gerald Prince's sense (Prince, 1978), must be attributed to the narrator who in turn attributes the quotation "Elle est jolie parce qu'aucun de ses traits n'est laid" to the actor.

Here Bronzwaer tries to force my conceptions into another theoretical framework which is incompatible with mine. From that point on it is not difficult, then, to see inconsistencies. To resume my position so far: focalization is not an independent linguistic activity but an aspect of its contents. I never said anything else.

Second point: is focalization communication? Is there a message, a sender and an addressee? As such, and we don't need to insist, *to see*, for instance, is not. This

is another reason to introduce a new concept. Because there is in fact an addressee of the direct content of the narrated or painted or sculptured message.

Focalization is also to register. As soon as a registration is accessible to a third "person," there is indeed communication. We are capable of reconstructing the *fabula* of Arjuna's cat because we have signs at our disposal, signs that are perhaps difficult to describe but that can be indicated approximately as "the look of the mice with which we can identify." How do we perceive those signs? By the interpretation of the primary, directly accessible signs of the visual image. Anyone who thinks that signs can only signify directly would be wise to consult any introduction to semiotics. That would save him from many misunderstandings, not only in research but also in life.

FREE INDIRECT DISCOURSE (FID)

Being a specialist in FID, Bronzwaer wants my theory to fail in respect to that device. However, FID is not a topic I discuss in my book. The only remarks on the subject are a few sentences in my introduction, where I outline my position with respect to Doležel, since his was the most consistent one known to me at the time, and those are wrongly referred to by my opponent. The exact quotation should be:

En fait, il n'est pas *nécessairement* question, dans un tel cas, d'un changement de *parole*, donc de *texte*. Il se peut que le narrateur continue à parler. Ce qui change, cela peut aussi bien être la vision.

(In fact, there is *not necessarily* a change of words, thus of text. *It is possible* that the narrator goes on speaking. What changes *can also* be the vision.)

Not necessarily, can also be: I do not replace the notion of text interference but I try to distinguish between two types of what is wrongly called FID even when there is only one speaker.

Since FID has been one of the main topics discussed at the symposium, I think I should make my position more explicit, even if in my book the problem is hardly discussed. Generalizing too much, and leaving aside the deconstructionist view represented by Moshe Ron, since it is a philosophical rather than a linguistic and narratological one, we can distinguish mainly three positions in this respect (I also leave out Menakhem Perry's position because it is not fundamentally incompatible with mine): The position of *text interference*, represented by Doležel, to which Bronzwaer seems to adhere; the position that claims fundamental linguistic differences between types of narrative sentences, based on a firm generative view; and the hierarchical position, where every sentence is claimed to have one speaker, which can either quote (DD) or represent (ID or FID) another speaker's *words*. The text interference position is in principle incompatible with the two others, in that it is based on a different concept of text itself. Its working out is strongly, if critically, related to the Käte Hamburger school.

The second position, essentially Banfield's, is also fundamentally different from the two others in that it starts from the hypothesis of the possibility of speakerless sentences. I don't think this is as fundamental a difference as it looks, since Banfield rigorously — and rightly from her point of view — only considers as a speaker a linguistically *represented* speaker, referred to in the text, whereas the proponents of the hierarchical position claim the necessary presence of a speaker as soon as there is speech. The attraction of Banfield's position to me, apart from the thorough and rigorously logical thinking, is the distinction she draws between reflective and non-reflective consciousness, where I see a strong congeniality with the concept of focalization. That distinction of Banfield allows one to distinguish between the different kinds, till now assembled in the too wide category of FID, and that is exactly what I was trying to do in the above-quoted

sentences. Even if scholars following different paradigms partially overlap their findings, I think they should not cover up differences in view. Mixing up the notion of text interference with that of focalization, Bronzwaer is making that mistake. That is a general tendency in his work. Taking over parts of Genette's notions, such as the extradiegetic narrator, and trying to force it in his own, different framework, he creates great confusion. I claim for example that it is impossible to consistently combine Genette's hierarchical framework of extradiegetic, intradiegetic and meta-(or hypo-)diegetic narrators with any notion of implied author, but I shall deal with that in the next section. As for Bronzwaer's reference to Banfield's work, I don't understand how he can support his alleged pragmatic view with the help of Banfield's generative linguistic analysis. Without claiming any contribution to the theory of FID, I want to state that any theory should be internally consistent. That is why I could imagine that, once the differences were made explicit, it would be possible to agree on certain points with either Doležel and certainly with Banfield. Paradoxically, only the clear delimitation of differences in position can lead to conciliation of views.

PRAGMATICS AND THE IMPLIED AUTHOR

The clearest case of this mixing of paradigms is the way Bronzwaer handles his notion that there are hardly any. The first time the notion occurs is in a subordinate clause ("which is clearly attributable not to the focalizer nor to the narrator but only to the implied author"). Later he states: "It is my view that the concept of 'implied author' is indispensable to account for by having recourse to a higher pragmatic authority, the implied author." Another instance: "A narrator is not free to present his [!] story from the perspective of his own focalization; there is a higher authority that makes him do so." And last but not least: "The higher pragmatic instance is that of the implied author, who is responsible for the play with linguistic material that we observe." I honestly summed up all the statements about the concept I could find in Bronzwaer's text. There seems to be an implied author, as a self-evident thing that needs to further argumentation. His implied author is not a hypothesis but an axiom. This is the way Aristotle's theory of genres is too often viewed: as self-evident and a-historical because it is old.

My opponent, in using the terms "pragmatic" and "pragmalinguistic," may pretend to integrate his objections in a general theory, but the conceptions he really defends don't fit into that framework. However, to be completely fair, let me quote the arguments he gives for the implied author in the article he cites. There are three:

1. The need of the scholar to speak about the narrator in a metalanguage. First, that does not imply that we need another subject if we need a language. Second, the argument is contradicted by Bronzwaer's opinion that "in a novel of the type of *La Chatte*, the implied author and the extradiegetic narrator need not be distinguished from a purely narratological point of view." Our topic being a part of narratology, systematics require a metalanguage in which distinctions are justified, in which terms are simple and in which series of terms are homogeneous.
2. The pragmatic void in which the narrator would fall. But not every subject automatically has a pragmalinguistic status. For instance, the actors, subjects of the diegetic action, do not have a pragmatic status unless they are quoted, and thus obtain the status of narrator.
3. The system of tenses, as analyzed by Benveniste. Now it becomes clear which position Bronzwaer defends (and rightly so from his point of view). The tense systems lead him to a theory of FID basically related (if in a critical way) to the Käte Hamburger school. But Benveniste's tense theory does not lead at all

to an implied author; it only implies a distinction between narrative (story) and discursive (discourse) language. As such, it has nothing to do with FID.

After supporting the notion with three completely unrelated arguments, Bronzwaer assigns to the implied author three functions. These are, in accordance with three different conceptions: the source of the "norms and values of the text," the manipulation of the extradiegetic narrator, and the technical function as pointed out by Mark Schorer. Neither the arguments nor the functions have any logical relation to one another. That reinforces my impression that, in fact, the implied author is a remainder category, a kind of *passepartout* that serves to clear away all the problematic remainders of a theory. Starting from the implied author as from a non-problematic axiom, Bronzwaer states that anyone who does not so inevitably fails, but he does not answer my statement on the subject in my Dutch book (1978:117–121). My only explanation for that omission is that he missed the point. For in that section I state that the implied author, as defined by Booth, is not a pragmatic but a semantic category. The term denotes the "norms and values of the text." Those norms and values can be found by interpretation. Once found, the reader likes to ascribe them to someone, who can be held responsible for them. The historical author too often having been abused when readers missed irony and other dissociation devices, it seemed more practical to speak about the implied author.

It can be perfectly right to do so. But such an image of the author as deduced from the work is not comparable to any of the linguistic, pragmatic subjects that order the hierarchical structure of the narrative text as I see it. Combining Genette's terminology with Booth's leads to an inconsistent statement like this one: "The relation between narrator and character [. . .] is matched by a similar [!] relation between the implied author and narrator." The narrator is meant to be (in Genette's view and in mine) the subject of speech. The character can be quoted by the narrator, as a secondary, dependent subject. If not, it is a diegetic but not a linguistic subject. The implied author is not such an identifiable subject; it is the *image* of the overall "subject," not the linguistic one but the psychological or ideological one that we can reconstruct from the semantic content of the text. If Genette never mentioned the implied author in his *Narrative Discourse*, it is because he sticks to his pragmatic theory; whoever does mix both paradigms clearly does not really speak pragmatically. My view of the notion of implied author, as stated above, is supported by a well-known article on the topic by Pelc (1971):

A person who is painting his self-portrait is both the painter and the model. The semantic relation accordingly holds between the signs that form the narrative and *the narrator as their extralinguistic referent*. It remains a semantic relation if the narrative pertains to the narrator's mental experiences. On the contrary, it is a pragmatic relation, other than the one discussed above, when it holds to between the signs that form the narrative and the narrator as their producer. This relation remains different from that discussed above even if the narrative expresses — in the sphere of the pragmatic relation — the same experiences of the narrator that it denotes in the sphere of the semantic relation (*italics mine, MB*).

Not only does Pelc indicate here the exact place of the narrator as a pragmatic subject, and of the implied author as a semantic content, in a very convincing way. He explains at the same time how come the two are so often confused. And that is the only reason I prefer to speak of the interpretation, or the overall meaning of the text, rather than stimulate the personification of the meaning that leads to the said confusion. I therefore object to statements like "Her effort, however, to replace the pair 'implied author-narrator' by the pair 'narrator-focalizer' is mistaken." I never made such an effort

because "implied author-narrator" is not a pair. I can agree with the way Eco deals with the notion of implied author as the represented subject to which semantic features of the text may be ascribed. But even if one uses such a notion, the use of the term *pragmatics* with respect to the notion is misleading.

CONCLUSION

Briefly summarizing my objections to Bronzwaer's criticism, I disagree with his criticism for several reasons. Where he reports on my work, he misreads it. Where he discusses it, he makes so many shifts in argumentation that hardly any consistent opposition remains. The only point that remains is his effort to save the implied author by wrongly ascribing to this notion a pragmatic and independent status. He mixes up different paradigms and thus prevents us from clearly seeing where we stand. Sometimes he interprets my words incorrectly or even reports them incorrectly; at other times an extensive argument based on a framework different from his own only leads to a conclusion concerning an issue that is not at hand. Thus the whole analysis of a sentence, based on Banfield's theory, only leads to the axiomatic author, a conclusion that, I suppose, would astonish Banfield. Bronzwaer derives support from modern theories, but fails to draw the necessary conclusions from those theories. If you do pragmatics, you should not neglect the very distinction that gave birth to that discipline, the distinction between pragmatics and semantics. If you do Banfield, you cannot do Booth. If you do Banfield, you cannot do Doležel, whose position is overtly rejected by Banfield in this very issue of *Poetics Today*.

It is still not clear to me whether Bronzwaer rejects 1. the very concept of focalization; 2. my interpretation of it; 3. not my interpretation but my treatment of it. I wish Bronzwaer would one day make a clear statement on where he stands: with Doležel or with Genette, with Banfield or with Booth. That seems to me a better contribution to narratology than to put forward an axiomatic, but theoretically, ambiguous implied author.

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REVIEW

GISA RAUH, *Linguistische Beschreibung deiktischer Komplexität in narrativen Texten*. Tübingen, TBL-Verlag Narr, 1978; Tübinger Beiträge zur Linguistik, 106. 355 pp.

This book, a Göttingen University dissertation, is the first attempt to apply Sadock's *Hypersentence* analysis of speech acts to the analysis of deictic complexity. The book contains five chapters: the first introduces deictic phenomena and the way they have been explained by literary scholars; chapter two offers a more technical and detailed treatment of deixis, introducing personal, locative and temporal deixis, tenses, anaphora and cataphora, textual deixis and fictional deixis; chapter three shows how deictic expressions are identified and how texts are analyzed into deictic fields: those of the author, the narrator, and the characters of a text, and the relations between these fields; chapter four presents a grammatical model based on Sadock's hypersentence analysis (1969), which Rauh modifies and extends in order to provide an adequate description of deictic complexity; chapter five then contains analyses of five types of speech — simple utterance, interior monologue, direct quotation, free indirect speech and indirect speech, the corpus being taken from the works of seventeen English-language authors — followed by short analyses of the historical present and the so-called "epic preterite." The book ends with a concise summary and a full bibliography.

The overall aim of Rauh's work is an adequate description of surface sentences containing deictic expressions, more specifically the allocation to sentences of structural descriptions which reflect formally and explicitly the linguistic competence of the ideal speaker of the language.

The author subscribes to the principles underlying the Chomsky model of generative syntax and uses the theoretical framework of the *Aspects* model (1965) as a basis for the grammatical fragment she proposes for dealing with deictic complexity. She discusses at some length three proposals compatible with the *Aspects* theory: the *pragmatic analysis*, as developed by Wunderlich (1971), which she rejects on technical linguistic grounds; the *performative analysis* of Ross (1970); and the *hypersentence analysis* developed by Sadock (1969, the 1974 model being based on generative semantics and consequently rejected as incompatible with the *Aspects* theory).

Ross' performative analysis builds upon Austin's theory of performatives (1962) and makes the claim that all declarative sentences should be analyzed as if they were implicit performative sentences, that is, they should be derived from deep structures containing an explicitly represented performative verb. It can be concluded that every occasion of an utterance for a particular purpose is a speech act, a fact which should find expression in the deep structure of every sentence, so Rauh takes this up (181) and bases her work on the assumption that the utterer of every sentence in an historical text is the author; the utterer of every sentence in a fictional text is the narrator; the addressee in both cases is the reader(s). Thus, the constant presence of the author or narrator in a text can be represented syntactically by means of the performative analysis.

The hypersentence approach to the analysis of speech acts, which Rauh adopts for her work, is derived from the performative analysis, and it is the possibility of embedded