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Unintended Effects of Urban and Housing Policies on Integration: “White” Discontent in the Dutch city

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Residential environments are a product of urban and housing policies and household responses. These environments develop as physical and social territories and have their own impacts on voting patterns. These specificities relate to several spheres of life, including political preferences and associated voting behavior. In this paper we argue that support for Right-wing Radical Populist Parties (RRPP) is firmly related to and affected by the production of social patterns and specific residential environments. The relation may be direct, through protest or discontent with socio-spatial processes and policies, or indirect through social networks. Empirical support for these statements is based on analyses of voting data from the city of The Hague, The Netherlands. The analyses suggest that there are three types of neighborhoods where different explanations for RRPP support are salient: native working class neighborhoods (where the so-called ethnic competition thesis is evident); ethnically-mixed urban neighborhoods (where social isolation and “hunkering down” would be key processes), and (lower) middle class suburban neighborhoods (where the dominant explanation may be related to policy protest).

Keywords: Right-wing radical populist parties, electoral geography, neighborhoods, suburbanization, integration.

Many Western European countries rely on urban and housing policies whereby certain territories within the city are subject to an array of policy interventions in order to accomplish several objectives in one integrated effort (Andersson and Musterd, 2005; Jacquier, 2005; Parkinson, 1998; Van Beckhoven, and Aalbers, 2010). These policies arguably have two overarching goals: the provision of good quality housing, and well-functioning residential environments. While the physical environment and amenities are important, the latter goal is often expressed in terms of neighborhood social composition, social cohesion or social integration. The latter term refers not only to income mixing but also to the inclusion of immigrant groups within mainstream society (Van Gent, et al., 2009b).

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Social goals are particularly present in area-based urban policies. The intended effects of these area-based urban policies are related to social mobility and liveability as well as to social cohesion and integration at a local level. The most direct way to accomplish the latter objectives is through projects which bring residents of different groups in contact with each other and have them participate in neighborhood governance and social life (Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008). Government supported projects may involve community gardens, neighborhood barbeques, art projects, neighborhood policy meetings or educational courses. However, within area-based urban and housing policies, these projects augment a strategy which is based on housing mix and strives for structural social and physical transformations. Through renewal a mixture of different types of housing at the neighborhood, street or even building level is supposed to help achieving socially, and often also culturally-mixed residential environments. Essentially, this approach of fine-grained mixing is a form of social and/or cultural tinkering. Spatial proximity is thought to inspire social interactions between varied social or cultural groups. In turn, these interactions presumably ignite a positive flow of social capital from middle class to lower class families and a process of social integration of immigrant groups through contact with natives. In addition to social interaction, positive proximity effects are also thought to spring from the mere presence of middle class groups. Proximity presumably provides community leadership, positive role-models and collective efficacy (see Buck, 2001; Galster, 2007; Kleinhans, 2004; Musterd and Andersson, 2005; Sarkissian, 1976).

Despite these area-based efforts, the integration of ethnic groups into European societies has been far from painless. This is particularly evident in new anti-pluralist views that have taken root in the European political landscapes in recent decades. These sentiments have led to the electoral rise of Right-wing Radical Populist Parties (RRPPs) (Betz, 1994; Rydgren, 2007). Well-known examples include the French Front National, the Danish People's Party, and the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid. Their electoral success has led conservative leaders such as David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to denounce multiculturalism and to adopt a strong anti-immigration stance. RRPPs, however, remain a separate “breed.” These parties are radical because they share a monist or anti-pluralist view of politics. Their discourse is populist because it juxtaposes the interests of a homogenous people (the ‘common man’) against ill-meaning, incompetent elites, particularly those from the Left. Lastly, RRPPs are right-wing because of their nationalist, exclusionary, and traditional view of citizenship and culture (Rydgren, 2007). Furthermore, these parties display a strong anti-urban bias which equates the city with crime and criminality, moral deviance, non-traditional behavior, untrustworthy elites, and immigrants.

This paper explores the relationships between residential environments, as a product of urban and housing policies, and geographic patterns of RRPP support in and around the city. Taking a spatial perspective, we argue that RRPP support relates to
and is affected by social patterning and residential environments. This effect may be either direct, through policy protest, or indirect through social networks (see below).

Before discussing possible causal mechanisms, we should note that little is known about the relationship between the residential environment and RRPP support. There are indications of a ‘place-based contextual effect’ on RRPP support in the Netherlands. Taking voter characteristics into account, general levels of employment, ethnic composition and culture additionally matter at the city level (Van der Waal, et al., 2013). Multilevel analyses show higher than expected levels of support for RRPP in neighborhoods with declining housing values, in suburban areas within non-rural municipalities, and in newly-built neighborhoods. On the other hand, support is relatively low in high density areas within urban municipalities (Van Gent, et al., 2013). Below we will discuss widely-held explanations for RRPP support, which are clearly, but not exclusively, related to processes of urbanization and suburbanization, and therefore to urban and housing policies. We will test these hypotheses by examining the support for the Dutch RRPP during municipal elections in the Dutch municipality of The Hague in 2010.

In terms of housing and urban matters, the Netherlands is a policy-dense country. Since the 1990s the Dutch state has devised urban policy programmes aimed at transforming problem areas by changing the social composition (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008; Van Gent, et al., 2009a). However, the new social mix may not result in more social interaction and may even result in elevated social tensions within the neighborhood or dissatisfaction with policies on a larger scale (Bridge et al., 2012; Wacquant 2008).

In addition, urbanization, suburbanization and renewal are interrelated. New low-density suburban housing development on the periphery or vicinity of the city may compete with (renewed) urban housing and draw away middle class households (Bolt, et al., 2008), even though European suburbanization has not had the sharp impacts that American suburbanization has had; unlike the US, Western European suburbs are functionally not strongly disconnected from the city. Well-funded public transport systems and highly-regulated urban planning have limited urban sprawl and reduced space-time distances between city and suburb. Since the 1970s, suburbanization has occurred within older cities’ municipal limits or in adjacent municipalities. Like other Western European countries, the Netherlands has facilitated and regulated this migratory process. The current newly-built suburban housing stock is a product of central government and local government regulations. These large suburban expansions have been part of a strategy to accommodate growing middle class demand and make existing affordable housing available elsewhere for lower income groups. So, since the 1970s, the large new suburban areas close to older cities have been built for middle class households.

In this paper we will try to answer the question: how do the effects of urbanization, suburbanization and renewal activities - the creation of specific residential environments with varying levels of social mixing - influence voting behavior, espe-
cially voting for RRPPs? The remainder of this paper will be divided into five parts. The first section discusses literature on the mechanisms that shape electoral geographies in general. The next section focuses on RRPPs and links three related general explanations for RRPP support to the urban transformations typical for European cities. These transformations are to a large degree, but not exclusively, attributable to housing and urban policies. Part Three will discuss the Dutch RRPP under investigation (PVV). Part Four, the empirical section, outlines the Dutch case and presents both a spatial analysis and an ecological analysis of election results at the neighborhood level. As we believe that the relatively strong support for PVV constitutes a problem for Dutch society, we conclude the paper by reflecting on the role of urban and housing policies in addressing the underlying causes of support for PVV. We also suggest several avenues for further research.

**ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHIES**

While explanatory RRPP studies may have ignored the socio-spatial perspective, electoral geographic studies acknowledge that individual attitudes and voting behavior are not evenly distributed across space (e.g. De Vos and Deurloo, 1999; Johnston and Pattie, 2006). To understand spatial variations that cannot be explained by voter demographics, the field of electoral geography has looked at ways in which space and location shape voting patterns. Generally speaking, the environment might affect political choice directly and/or indirectly (Cox, 1969; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1988; Johnston and Pattie, 2006).

The “direct mechanism” is related to voters interacting with their physical environment. Spatial variations in party support may reflect voter experiences with socio-spatial processes. As such, electoral geographies may reflect spatial variations in economic and housing market performance (e.g. weak housing markets and disinvestment, high unemployment (Pattie, et al., 1997). The “indirect mechanism” refers to people interacting with others and talking about politics. To make a decision, voters typically use political information, derived either from campaigns or social reality. This information, however, is strongly mediated by an individual’s social contacts (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987; Lazarsfeld, et al., 1944 [1948]). Consequently, social networks play a role in the dissemination of information: talking together implies voting together. Individuals with homogeneous networks are more likely to share political preferences with network members than individuals with a diverse network (Johnston and Pattie, 2006; Nieuwbeerta and Flap, 2000). Such homogeneous networks are strongly tied to space and proximity because face-to-face interactions are the primary way to communicate on issues which require some level of trust. Trust breeds (among other things) political communication. Hence, political socialisation leads to electoral geographies. Also, the neighborhood’s social compo-
sition structures opportunities for interaction. Homogeneous environments may create homogeneous networks which in turn structure political choice.

So, space matters directly and indirectly in political choice, and some neighborhoods may produce more or less votes for a particular party or candidate than would be expected otherwise. There is little known, however, about RRPP support from this perspective, except that individuals with diverse personal networks are more likely to display attitudes of social tolerance (Pattie and Johnston, 2008). Of course, there is difference between stated attitudes on a survey and actual voting behavior.

**Placing RRPP Support in Spatial Context**

To understand this new phenomenon, political studies have focused on the supply-side (the parties themselves), and on the demand-side (the supporters) (Rydgren, 2007; Van der Brug, et al., 2005). The latter body of research investigates relationships between demographic characteristics and social norms on the one hand and voting behavior on the other (Achterberg and Houtman, 2009; Bos, et al., 2011; Norris, 2005). For the Netherlands, political survey results indicate that PVV voters are more likely to be males, to have lower or middle incomes, be less educated, be younger than 25 years old, have children, be cynical about politics, view themselves as right-wing, and have more negative attitudes towards Muslims than other voters (Van Gent et al., 2012). It should, however, be noted that RRPP voters are “normal” voters in the sense that they come from all walks of life, are not more easily swayed by (populist) politicians as supporters for other parties (Bos, et al., 2011; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2009). However, their motivations for voting RRPPs are distinct. Van der Brug and Fennema (2009) list three possible explanations for supporting RRPPs (see also Rydgren 2007).

- The ethnic competition thesis focuses on the arrival of lower educated immigrant workers and their families in the last decades. Native low-skill workers may regard these new groups as competitors for attaining employment, housing and welfare support. The support for RRPPs is therefore a sign of anxiety or a perceived threat from the new immigrant groups, and anger or disappointment towards politicians and policymakers who are held responsible.
- The social isolation thesis holds that support for RRPPs is a result of a sense of anxiety and insecurity related to societal changes—over and beyond the specific threats associated with immigrants. These changes can be related to globalization, financial crises and unemployment on the one hand and welfare state retrenchment and pension insecurities on the other. In addition, citizens may feel little sense of connection with political elites.
- The third explanation is the policy protest thesis. Here the voter is discontent with established parties and their platforms and wishes for a new direction.
These three interrelated theses are quite general and do not sufficiently take the spatial context into account. Duyvendak and colleagues argue that the recent success of RRPPs is part of a more complex “urban crisis” due to urban transformations (Duyvendak, et al., 2009). Indeed, European cities have changed considerably due to immigration, economic restructuring and demographic change (Van Kempen and Murie, 2009).

Building on the notion of urban transformation, we propose that space and location affects RRPP support directly through discontent with urban change or indirectly through local social networks and interaction. The next two sections will highlight how these mechanisms are caused by urban change from migration and policy.

**Immigration and Urban Change**

New immigrant groups have settled in the cities and particularly in affordable and accessible dwellings, usually close to countrymen, before moving on to other urban neighborhoods and beyond (Musterd and De Vos, 2007). In several neighborhoods original residents moved to the suburbs, which only contributed to the character of change. Those who did not move experienced meaningful population change in their local environment.

The arrival of new immigrant groups in the city is directly related to the social isolation and ethnic competition theses. The latter thesis suggests that diversity breeds hostility. As more people of the “out-group” live in close proximity, people may feel threatened by a new dominant group in the neighborhood, or perceive competition (see also Elias and Scotson, 1965; Quillian, 1995). Consequently, they may withdraw socially to their own group while at the same time acting in an intolerant manner toward new group members. An American study by Robert Putnam (2007) goes one step further. He shows that people living in ethnically diverse neighborhoods demonstrate lower trust in neighbors, have fewer friends, spend more time watching television, are less confident about local government, local leaders and local news media, have less confidence in their own political influence, are more unhappy and have lower expectations about their lives. This leads Putnam to conclude that, at least initially, people may “hunker down” in diverse neighborhoods. Interestingly, mixing has a positive effect on interest in and knowledge about politics and leads to more participation in reform groups and protest marches. So, people in diverse neighborhoods are not completely disengaged from politics, just from “the other” in their neighborhood. Furthermore, Putnam’s results suggest an active yet disenfranchised and anti-establishment attitude (Putnam, 2007), which could account for RRPP support in The Netherlands.

Dutch studies, however, are inconclusive as they have found only limited to almost no evidence for hunkering down (Gijsherts, et al., 2011; Lancee and Dronkers, 2011; Vervoort, et al., 2010). Nevertheless, Putnam’s research implies that the pres-
ence or recently arrived immigrant groups may cause hunkering down and a vote for RRPPs in some residential contexts.

In addition to social isolation and broken social networks, the ethnic competition thesis implies that because there is a scarcity with respect to welfare services, housing and employment, the Netherlands native Dutch families compete with immigrants for these scarce resources. This means that housing market structure, employment, education and economic situation influence competition with ethnic minorities thereby affecting RRPP support. Indeed, a recent Dutch study found that the “ethnic effect” on RRPP support varies per city (Van der Waal, et al., 2013). The effect is higher in cities with high unemployment and low cultural atmosphere than in cities with low unemployment and high cultural tolerance. So, the presence of immigrant groups in a city does not unequivocally lead to more conflict and more votes for RRPPs. Rather, it depends on the labor market situation and on the cultural atmosphere.

Policies and Discontent In and Around the City

In addition to migration, the state plays an important role in affecting the level of RRPP support among voters. In many European countries, the state is relatively interventionist. As such, the state has played a significant role in processes which have caused urban transformation, such as immigration, economic restructuring and social-demographic changes (Kazepov, 2005; Mingione, 2005; Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998; Van Kempen and Murie, 2009). Over the last decades Western European political leaders have carried out types of interventions with regard to residential neighborhoods:

1. Large-scale renewal and regeneration of residential neighborhoods that are perceived to be problematic (usually postwar neighborhoods at the periphery of the city, but also central districts that formerly were working class areas).
2. Accommodating suburbanization by allowing new housing construction on state-designated green fields close to the city, and through New Town policies.

The first type of intervention seeks to restructure the housing market to achieve social transformation (Van Gent, 2010). Restructuring often means less (social) rental and more expensive owner-occupied dwellings either through renewal or by privatization. With the change in housing, the transformation implies more middle class and less lower class residents. An improved social mix is often portrayed by policy-makers to have positive neighborhood effects for less affluent residents (Andersson and Musterd 2005; Bridge et al. 2012). However, there is much debate about the mechanisms and size of neighborhood effects on social economic well-being (Galster, 2007; Musterd, et al., 2008; Musterd, et al., 2012). Furthermore, contrary to what is often assumed, limited interaction between social groups oc-
curs when they are “too-different” from one another (Blokland, 2003; Galster, et al., 2008). The social gap between newcomers and old residents may lead to separate social networks (Van Eijk, 2010), confrontation and competition (Bacqué and Fijalkow, 2012), and even social isolation.

Moreover, according to Wacquant (2008) area-based interventions may also reinforce policy protest locally. The conspicuous presence of the state in a neighborhood, either in the form of regeneration efforts, or in the form of welfare and employment services, accentuates an area’s negative reputation. Consequently, the more well-to-do residents will move away and outsiders will avoid locating in the area. As the area declines, enraged residents and outsiders will call for more governmental intervention, more public services and tougher police. This leads to a catch-22 situation: addressing outrage and complaints through area-based programs leads to neighborhood decline and even more outrage (Wacquant, 2008; see also Atkinson 2006).

In addition, urban policies may also breed policy protest among households outside selected neighborhoods because they are denied access to additional resources. In the Netherlands and Sweden, the vast majority of those suffering from social-economic deprivation live outside specially targeted areas (Van Gent, et al., 2009a; 2009b). Consequently, discontent may be due to ethnic competition, as targeted areas are often “ethnic neighborhoods.” (ibid.). Unfortunately little is known on how residents in the rest of the city and the suburbs view urban policies and interventions targeted to particular ethnic neighborhoods and whether such interventions actually breed discontent.

The second type of state intervention, policies accommodating suburbanization, may not lead to policy protest, but they undoubtedly shape the political-electoral geography of RRPP support. Deurloo, De Vos and Van der Wusten (2003) compared RRPP voting patterns in Amsterdam and Almere neighborhoods in the late 1990s. Almere was planned and developed since the 1970s as a suburb of Amsterdam. Consequently, Almere was more middle class and had disproportionately few non-native residents compared to Amsterdam. Despite the relative absence of urban social problems in Almere, RRPPs received more support in Almere than in Amsterdam (corrected for composition), particularly in (lower) middle class neighborhoods. Deurloo and colleagues suggest that there is an urban-suburban divide i.e. that support came from residents who “fled” Amsterdam and other cities because of crime and other problems. Almere whites presumably were displaying their discontent with the arrival of immigrants and the social problems that they believed were linked to in-migration. Furthermore, the study also found that the support for RRPPs in Amsterdam in 1994 was comparatively high in the less affluent ‘white’ neighborhoods at the edge of the city. These neighborhoods resembled those in Almere (Deurloo, et al., 2003).

Deurloo et al.’s argument was based on the experience of living in a city like Amsterdam or Almere. These experiences may cause discontent or even a fear for “suburbanization of urban issues” (Beker, 2003). Not all suburban residents, howev-
er, have these first-hand experiences, which suggest that these explanations stressing policy protest are insufficient. Hence, a suburban location may play an indirect role as well. Usually, suburban environments are characterised by relatively monotonous housing developments in terms of form and tenure, leading to homogeneous social environments compared to the city. This social homogeneity of suburban neighborhoods may produce additional votes through social networks, as noted in the electoral geographies paragraph above (Cox, 1968).

De Maesschalck (2011) also argues that first-hand experience with living in the city (and then fleeing from it) is not the primary cause of suburban support for RRPPs. His study focused on the support for the radical right-wing Vlaams Belang in Antwerp (Belgium). While media reports link RRPP’s successes to social conditions in the inner-city, he shows that the popularity of the RRPP and the conservative liberal party is rising more rapidly in suburban municipalities and suburban neighborhoods in Antwerp. Conversely, the Social Democratic party in Antwerp is gaining position due to immigrant votes and support from the new urban middle class in gentrifying neighborhoods (for a discussion of the liberal attitudes of urban gentrifiers, see Ley, 1994).

As mentioned, suburban developments in Western European cities are close to and connected to the old city. For many suburban dwellers the city is still a site for work, shopping and leisure. For them, however, the inner city is less a part of the experiences of everyday life than a user space. In short, they do not have social networks or interactions in the inner-city. Consequently, they may have little stake in finding political solutions for complex urban social issues. Rather, they may be more interested in making the city a safe and accessible space, which means favoring politicians who promise more police, criminalization of anti-social behavior, and stricter prison sentences (De Maesschalck, 2011; see also Walks, 2006).

In discussing the role of immigration and state interventions, we argue that homogeneous suburban and heterogeneous urban environments may produce RRPP support. This may seem contradictory, but in fact we have tried to clarify that these two hypotheses are very much related to the same urbanization processes. First, RRPP support in urban areas may be the result of urban transformations leading to isolation or ethnic competition. Furthermore, urban policies may breed policy protest inside and outside targeted areas. Second, suburban RRPP support can be based on a disconnection between suburban middle classes and urban dwellers. This implies that suburban residents who have no contact with urban dwellers would consider them as out-group, they would not support urban social policies and they would be more prone to vote for RRPPs. This explanation resembles the social isolation thesis in that there is a social disconnect between suburban white RRPP voters and urban dwellers including members of immigrant groups. In addition, suburban dwellers may feel anxious over the suburbanization of urban problems like crime.
DUTCH POLITICAL CONTEXT: PARTIJ VOOR DE VRIJHEID

This paper focuses on the electoral results for one RRPP: the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, “Freedom Party”). This party was founded by Geert Wilders in 2005, in a period of societal turmoil following the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a radical Islamist. Wilders broke away from the right-wing conservative-liberal party after serving that party as an MP for seven years. The PVV party was very successful in elections. In national elections, it garnered 5.9 percent of the vote in 2006 and 15.5 percent in 2010. After the 2010 success, the PVV accumulated more power by supporting a government formed by the conservative-liberal and Christian-democratic parties. In exchange for parliamentary support, the government made concessions to the PVV with regard to law and order policies, immigration (from non-western countries and Eastern Europe), as well as cultural, social and employment policies. In this arrangement, the party had direct influence but was not a formal member of government. One of its successful demands has been the end of a socially-oriented urban policy in the Netherlands, meaning the end of fifteen years of nationally-funded urban policies. The government fell in early 2012 after the PVV refused to back budget cuts. Subsequent national elections in September resulted in a loss (10.1 percent of the vote), but it remains the country’s third-largest party.

The party is very much associated with its only formal member and leader, Geert Wilders, who is considered somewhat an “enigma” (Mudde, 2010). His style and the party programme are unmistakably radical and populist (PVV, 2010; Vossen, 2010a). The language and discourse are confrontational and unforgiving towards diverging views. To give one example, the social-democrat party, Partij van de Arbeid, “Party of Labor” commonly abbreviated to PvdA, is often referred to by Wilders as the Partij van de Arabieren (“Party of the Arabs”). This term creatively combines the party’s anti-immigration and anti-establishment stances.

One of the party’s main talking points is its criticism of Islam. Vossen (2010b) argues that since 2007, Wilders and his followers have repeatedly asserted that the large-scale immigration of Muslim guest workers is part of an Islamist strategy to colonize and subdue Western Europe. This assertion is also known as the “Eurabia” theory (see Ye’or, 2005). Consequently, issues such as criminality and misbehavior among Moroccan-Dutch youth, immigration, the Danish Cartoon affair, and riots in the Parisian suburbs are all seen as supporting the theory (Vossen, 2010b). To give a few examples, in early 2011 Richard de Mos, an MP and council member for The Hague municipality, released a press statement which announced the party’s intention to fight residents in the post-war neighborhood of Morgenstond, who feed birds. The party protested “stubborn, mostly non-native, ‘bread throwers’” who “systematically toss food from their balconies or dump entire loaves of breads in ponds” leading to a “serious decline in liveability.” The statement went on to say: “Time and again do the native inhabitants of The Hague suffer from the rules of
Islam. They are saddled with the unwanted nuisance of gulls and other vermin” (Stolker, 2011, [authors’ translation]).

Another example of the exclusionary attitude comes from PVV MP Hero Brinkman. When campaigning for provincial elections in 2011, he proposed that women who wear head scarves should be denied any public services offered by the province. When asked whether this would also include riding on provincially-subsidised bus lines, he replied: “For now, that is a step too far. We can, however, discuss such a ban [on head scarves in busses] in the future.” (Haarlems Dagblad, 2011, [authors’ translation]). These remarks came after Geert Wilders’ call for a Kopvoddentak (“head rag tax,” meaning a tax on women’s head scarves) in parliament in 2009, “to finally earn back something from that which has cost us so much already. The polluter pays” (YouTube, 2009, [authors’ translation]).

Wilders has, however, been cautious in equating Islam with fascism and generally has not considered already-established Muslims as an unwanted social group within Dutch society. Rather, he has proposed a rapid assimilation of Dutch Muslims. Nevertheless, in recent years party discourse has radicalised. Wilders suggests that Muslims are concealing their true identity and intentions, while biding their time and growing demographically. As a result, Wilders and the PVV are increasingly leaning towards a full-rejection of Muslims in Dutch society because of their supposed untrustworthiness (Vossen, 2010b).

While the PVV fits the RRPP classification to a large degree, it does not fully fit the RRPP ideal type (Mudde, 2010; Vossen, 2010b). First, Wilders does not acknowledge a kinship with other RRPPs in Europe and in some cases rejects any comparison. Specifically, he only aligns himself with the Danish People’s Party and the UK Independent Party.

Second, while starting out with an economic right-wing programme, the party has switched to a more social-conservative stance with regards to welfare state arrangements. The party wishes to maintain student benefits for low income households, pension rights, health care support, and labor protection. On the other hand, the party is hostile towards subsidies for arts and culture, development aid, providing asylum, encouraging second-wave immigration and membership of the European Union. Also, there is the party’s strong “tough on crime” stance. In these respects, the party resembles the Danish People’s Party. Moreover, in recent years, right-wing centrist parties have adopted some of the language and ideas of the PVV, and enacted policies that include Dutch language and culture tests for new immigrants, stricter immigration rules, increased prison sentences, and more police.

Third, the politics of PVV differs substantially from other RRPPs with regard to social and ethical issues and foreign affairs. Rather than taking a conservative, traditionalist stance, the PVV actively defends LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) rights, gender equality, and the right to abortion, and euthanasia. Furthermore, the PVV is a staunch supporter of the state of Israel, which is portrayed as “the central front in the defence of the West” (PVV, 2010, p. 41). These politics have arguably made the PVV more acceptable in the Netherlands, as PVV
leaders disassociate the party from provincial xenophobia and rancour, the Second World War experience (collaboration between some Dutch and the Nazis), and from the extreme right movement today (“Neo-Nazis”) (Vossen, 2010b).

CASE, DATA, AND METHODS

To gauge the electoral geography of the PVV in the municipality of The Hague in relation to urban and housing policies, we will look at the municipal elections in the city in early 2010. We choose to look at municipal elections, because political debates and programmes are linked directly to social issues at the neighborhood and city levels.

The Hague was one of two municipalities in which the PVV participated in the 2010 municipal elections. The city is the Dutch seat of government and had a population of almost half a million inhabitants in 2010. Within the Dutch context the city is highly segregated, both socio-economically and ethnically, resulting in distinct urban and suburban residential environments. In general, the southern neighborhoods are less affluent than the central and northern ones and also hold most ethnic concentrations. Employment in the city is characterized by public service and administration. Health care, consumer and business services are also important (De Koning, et al. 2011).

We will analyse RRPP support in the city by presenting both a GIS-based analysis of voting patterns and an ecological analysis of electoral results. These two analyses will serve to complement each other and aid in interpreting spatial effects. The model links voting results to several neighborhood attributes [see definition of neighborhood below] related to social compositions, and urban policy attention. Social compositional variables include the presence of older natives, families (native and non-natives), the presence of non-western natives and ethnic mix. The socio-economic dimension will be covered by the share of low and middle income households, the proportion of owner occupiers and the income mix. Income mix is the coefficient of variation of five income quintiles. A dummy variable will be included for neighborhoods that have been targeted for urban renewal and restructuring. Compositional, policy-related and housing market information was provided by the municipality of The Hague, based on register data.

The dependent variable is based on the share of PVV votes per polling station. Initially, all polling stations in The Hague (271 in total) were included. These polling stations were related to their statistical neighborhood, using GIS applications (Google Earth, ArcMap). The statistical neighborhoods were defined by the Netherlands Bureau of Statistics and the municipality. The neighborhoods are generally socially and physically homogeneous areas that are often clearly bounded by streets, railways or waterways (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, 2010). The Hague has 110 neighborhoods with an average population of 4,227. Several polling sta-
tions (79) were very close to the neighborhood boundaries. To be able to relate neighborhood attributes to these polling stations, we construed new neighborhoods by combining attributes of two or three neighborhoods and recalculated compositional data. The dataset contains 53 “combination neighborhoods.” Furthermore, nine polling stations were excluded from the analyses. Within this group of nine, two polling stations did not have a fixed location, but were on a bus or a tram. Seven polling stations were centrally located in public institutions. These polling stations are set up to facilitate voting and increase turnout. Results for these central polling stations could not, therefore, be attributed to one neighborhood. These institutions include City Hall (2x), The Hague Historical Museum, a train station, National Parliament, and a large department store. Excluding the nine polling stations has a very limited effect on our analyses as they received only 3.4 percent of the votes cast.

After polling station data was joined with neighborhood level data, we corrected the data by dividing PVV votes by the potential votes. This was done to get a better representation of the support for PVV votes (following De Vos and Deurloo, 1999). We took into account the fact that Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch voters hardly ever vote for PVV (Forum, 2010), and corrected for this by adjusting the denominator, excluding Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch residents. The correction has the effect of reducing the theoretical total number of votes per polling station based on the station’s Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch adult population. The assumptions are:

- Voter turnout is roughly equal for each population group.
- The vast majority of votes come from local residents.
- All population groups in an area turn out equally per polling station.

We acknowledge that not all these assumptions may be valid. The reality is that Dutch electoral law prohibits disclosing which people vote and where voters reside. Consequently we had to assume that the majority of votes were cast by local residents. A few weeks before the election, all voters receive a notice with only one nearby polling station suggested.

Our correction will help our search for spatial-contextual effects. For instance, if the share of ethnic minorities in a neighborhood has a significant effect, this is not a compositional, but a contextual effect, because the population composition has already been taken into account in the dependent variable.

The multi-variate ecological model was evaluated using OLS regression analyses with the corrected percentage as the dependent variable and neighborhood attributes as the independent variables. To be clear, our ecological model serves to identify spatial patterns and environmental factors that may help to understand PVV voting outcomes per neighborhood. It is not meant to explain individual behavior as associations at the aggregate level may not be reflected in individual level. The results need to be used and interpreted cautiously. Ideally, we would test multi-level models for individual voters. However, this data is unavailable because current political at-
Results: Understanding RRPP Support in The Hague

Figure 1 shows the corrected share of votes for PVV aggregated from polling stations to statistical neighborhood level. Blank areas within municipal borders indicate undeveloped land and shaded areas indicate an absence of polling stations.

Figure 1: Share of votes for PVV per neighbourhood during the 2010 municipal elections in The Hague, shares corrected for ethnic composition (Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch adults).

At first glance and also based on additional information on the historical, socio-economic, ethnic, and residential structure of the city (Schmal 1995; Bolt et al. 2008; Teernstra and Van Gent, 2012), the map shows a high level of RRPP support in three types of neighborhoods. The first consists of some specific neighborhoods close to the North Sea coast, which have a high share of native Dutch working class residents. These relatively poor neighborhoods are part of the Scheveningen fishing
harbor, or part of the 1980s extension Waldeck, also consisting of lower and lower middle class neighborhoods. Second, there are several neighborhoods, mainly in the early 20th century and post-war extensions, which have fairly high concentrations of immigrant groups (Southwest). This also includes Morgenstond, mentioned above. Lastly, there is a considerable amount of PVV support in newly-built neighborhoods on the southern and southeastern periphery of the city. In contrast to the other neighborhoods, these are fairly suburban areas, characterized by modern terraced housing with private gardens.

In contrast, PVV support is low in the center of the city, in the traditionally affluent neighborhoods in the northeast of the center, and in upgrading areas northwest of the city center. Also, areas with the highest shares of non-western immigrant groups, mostly directly south of the city center, have a comparably low level of PVV support. Because the dependent variable has been corrected for presence of Turkish and Moroccan Dutch inhabitants, this is probably because other immigrant groups, for whom we did not correct, are reluctant to vote PVV.

These observations already reveal several interesting patterns and our first “face-value-analysis” suggests that there are different types of high-support and low-support neighborhoods that require different explanations, perhaps connected to the three theses we referred to before. The following regression analyses enables a robust interpretation of the types of neighborhoods that provide higher levels of support for PVV. Table 1 defines the variables included in the analysis.

Table 2 presents the OLS model. The customary multi-collinearity tests were performed. The table also shows scores for the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). All variables stay under the tolerance limit of 10.

The analysis reveals that several neighborhood characteristics relate to the (corrected) share of PVV votes per polling station. In terms of demographic composition, PVV support is high in neighborhoods with a high share of elderly native Dutch (older than 55), and in neighborhoods with high shares of native Dutch children. We may infer that PVV is popular in areas with elderly natives and in areas with young families. The share of non-western immigrants is not relevant, but interestingly the ethnic mix is. PVV support is high in neighborhoods which are not concentrations but more or less evenly mixed. So, in the city as a whole, PVV support is low in areas with concentrations of Western immigrants and natives, or in areas with very clear non-western concentrations. This is not the case for social economic mix. PVV support is high in areas with high shares of low and middle income households. High income neighborhoods do not support PVV. Other indicators, like urban policy targeting and housing market structure, were found to be irrelevant.
Table 1: Definitions and statistical information for variables included in the OLS regression model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Avg</th>
<th>St. Dev</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected PVV support</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>Share of PVV votes at polling station, corrected for adult non-native Dutch population in the neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic and ethnic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly natives (%)</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>Share of natives older than 55 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native children (%)</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Share of natives younger than 18 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-western immigrants(%)</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>Share of non-western immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic mix</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>Proportion non-western immigrant and native residents (1 =equal distribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social economic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income households (%)</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>Share of high income households (fifth quintile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social economic mix</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>Coefficient of variation of five income quintiles (1 =equal distribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner occupiers (%)</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>Share of owner occupied dwellings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted by urban policy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Neighbourhood targeted for urban policy interventions (40 neighbourhood policy) (23.9% of polling stations), dummy variable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Together, the map and the model reveal several interesting findings with respect to the policies, social compositions and spatial patterns of RRPP support. We have to be cautious though when interpreting these results: associations at the aggregate level of neighborhoods may not be reflected in individual level voting decisions. However, considering the theses above, there are strong indications of the diverging effects of the (changing) urban environment on RRPP support. We will relate our findings to the three theses and describe how different environments may have a direct or indirect effect on PVV support.

First, there is some evidence for the *ethnic competition thesis*. Our analyses reveal that the relationship between non-western immigrants and RRPP support is not linear in The Hague. PVV support is higher in ethnically mixed areas and low in “unmixed” areas. Yet, we know that some “unmixed” native areas (such as the former fisherman neighborhood in Scheveningen) also show relatively high shares of PVV support. Also some unmixed middle class suburban extensions show firm PVV
support. We hypothesise that the *ethnic competition thesis* is particularly relevant for native working class areas. Residents of these areas may feel threatened by or anxious over the arrival of immigrant workers elsewhere in the city. So, in this case the support for PVV would be connected to immigration in times of deindustrialization and the rise of a service economy.

**Table 2:** Linear multivariate regression model (Ordinary Least Squares) with 8 neighborhood attributes of polling stations (dependent variable: corrected share of PVV votes; N=256; R²(adj.)= .49; F=31.3; p < 0.001).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standard. Beta coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Sign.</th>
<th>VIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic and ethnic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly natives</td>
<td>0.660*</td>
<td>6.696</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native children</td>
<td>0.761*</td>
<td>6.870</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>6.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-western immigrants</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
<td>-0.888</td>
<td>.376</td>
<td>5.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic mix</td>
<td>0.379*</td>
<td>5.231</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social economic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income households</td>
<td>-0.999*</td>
<td>-12.886</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social economic mix</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>-1.544</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner occupiers</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.262</td>
<td>.794</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted by urban policy (dummy)</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>1.294</td>
<td>.197</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.001

Second, the *social isolation thesis* relates to changing social networks within the neighborhood. We find support for this thesis in ethnically-mixed areas and in areas with native elderly. As urban neighborhoods have changed over recent decades, many native households have “fled” the city for more suburban neighborhoods on the eastern periphery and in new towns in the region. Those who did not move have seen their familiar neighbors replaced by immigrants with different backgrounds and language. This change, particularly for elderly, may have led to social isolation and hunkering down. More specified support for this thesis can be found in figure 2, which shows the outcome of an additional analysis of corrected PVV support for four specific types of neighbourhoods (types are defined by combining presence of non-western migrants and presence of native-Dutch elderly (aged 55 years and older)). Detailed analysis of data from individual polling stations revealed that polling stations in elderly living facilities and care institutions that were located in neighborhoods with high shares of non-western immigrants also showed above-average PVV support.
Third, the *policy protest thesis* was related to urban renewal, regeneration and suburban development. It has been argued that urban policies may cause local discontent through political and media stigmatization. The spatial analysis shows that the level of support is conspicuously high in the southern areas which are undergoing large-scale urban renewal. Renewal has a temporal negative effect on the living environment and residents feel less safe in and around renewal zones (Wittebrood and van Dijk, 2007). Our ecological analyses, however, show that urban policy targeting does not necessarily lead to RRPP support. Low PVV support in ethnic concentration areas targeted by urban policies south of the city center, disprove this particular thesis in the model. It is unclear, however, why this effect is absent in the central ethnic concentration areas. In short, based on the model, we cannot claim that urban policy-targeted areas have higher shares of PVV support. Urban policy may still have
an effect on those outside the targeted neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the analysis does not allow us to examine the attitudes of residents who have been displaced by renewal, as these residents have moved elsewhere. Moreover, we are unable to ascertain whether the additional investments in some areas produce discontent in other low income neighborhoods.

The high share of PVV support in the new suburban development on the southern periphery, however, may be explained by discontent and disenfranchisement with the changes in the city. Urban issues related to crime and criminality, violence and poverty are virtually non-existent in these areas with high shares of native Dutch families. We hypothesize, however, that the residents may support the PVV for three related reasons. First, the residents may have fled the city and still feel competition from immigrants and nourish feelings of abandonment and anxiety over the suburbanization of urban issues. This may also explain the high share of PVV support in more suburban parts of Waldeck, where, according to City statistics officials, many native residents of the high concentration areas south of the city center went to. The second explanation is related to the utilitarian relationship between suburban residents and the old city. The new suburban extensions are relatively far away from the center, separated from the old city by motorways and railroads. However, most residents are still dependent on The Hague for work, shopping, entertainment and leisure. As the city is being used as an economic entity and not as a site for social interaction, we speculate that support for PVV may reflect feelings of “revenge” or resentment, and the wish for a safe and non-threatening environment. There is insufficient empirical research in this article, however, on actual resentment among middle classes (Blokland, 2012) to verify this speculation. In addition, secondary education institutions are mostly located in the older city. In recent years, there has been a lot of media attention focused on the negative aspects of “black schools” in large cities, especially those that offer vocational training. Anxiety over their children's future may explain why PVV support is high in areas with many native (lower) middle-class families (see Boterman, 2013). Lastly, the relatively homogeneous composition of the suburban areas may produce an additional effect. Not all suburban voters fled the city or feel anxiety, but their attitudes may be influenced by their interactions with friends, relatives and neighbors who are politically discontented.

CONCLUSION

Explanations for RRPP support from the perspective of the city and its suburbs are varied and complex. Nevertheless, our mapping and regression analyses reveal some clear patterns in the electoral geography of The Hague and our interpretation of the patterns provide support for all three of our hypotheses. Results suggest that there are three types of neighborhoods that contribute to RRPP support for different reasons. The first type, native working class neighborhoods, reflects the ethnic
composition thesis. The second type, ethnically-mixed urban neighborhoods reflects the social isolation thesis. Finally, the third type, lower middle class suburban neighborhoods, reflects the policy protest argument.

To be clear, the three support explanations may be relevant for residents in all neighborhoods, yet the point here is that some explanations are more salient in some types of areas than in others. Polling station data does not give us conclusive evidence for what contextual factors may have produced these electoral patterns. As mentioned, ecological analysis provides a limited basis for assessing the effects of urban changes and the living environment on RRPP support. Displaced residents and those who have fled the city may feel discontented or disenfranchised in response to immigration and urban restructuring projects. But the support for RRPP in The Hague may also be due to residents who have never lived in older parts of The Hague but who in some ways feel threatened by demographic shifts. Likewise, “ethnic competition” may foster PVV support not only in native Dutch working class neighborhoods but also ethnically-mixed areas as well.

Regardless, our main point is that PVV support in these municipal elections reflects serious concerns and discontentment among the populace. These concerns are at once related to neighborhood, the urban region and society as a whole (see Duyvendak (2011) on the multi-scalar nature of the politics of belonging and integration). If this discontent is indeed related to the living environment, either directly through discontent with transformations or indirectly through limited social networks, this should be of concern to policymakers.

The preceding implies the need to develop new area-based policies to counter social dislocation and isolation. For more than a decade, Dutch urban policies consistently have promoted social and ethnic integration in “problematic” urban areas via educational programs, youth projects, community building, cross-cultural initiatives etc. (see Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008). At the same time, cities have implemented stricter policing policies. We argue that these area-specific policies may in fact be aggravating social discontents elsewhere (in non-targeted urban areas and suburbs), while affirming the problematic nature of the targeted area. In other words, if they create discontent, dismay, or envy, urban policies that seek to stimulate integration, are actually self-defeating (Sieber, 1981). While we do not advocate the abolishment of all area-based initiatives, we would like to argue for a shift in emphasis. A shift toward people-based policy strategies would be beneficial because it would limit the stigmatization of certain areas, help to address more structural causes for isolation and competition, such as discrimination, lagging educational performance, and poverty. Most of these causes of these problems are found outside the realm of the neighborhood.

From the perspective of housing, it is noteworthy that RRPP support is surprisingly high in Dutch suburbs. Since the 1970s, suburban construction, either at the urban periphery or in New Towns, has taken shape in large-scale developments which are relatively homogenous in terms of housing and population compared to
older Dutch cities. This large-scale homogeneity in newly-built low density areas, however, is incompatible with societies which are undeniably growing ever diverse and pluralistic. Integration policies that intend to use social mix strategies have to take into account the fact that “scale matters.” At the very local level people tend to search for homogeneity and distinction from other people; however, at a slightly higher level some social mixture may be feasible, and still helpful for integration. More knowledge about these scale-issues could provide relevant input for the scale at which urban development should take place.

In addition to these reflections on policy, our study also raises new questions for further research. The Hague was particularly suitable for this analysis as the city offers distinct urban and suburban residential environments, which are different in terms of social economic well-being, ethnic composition and demographic structure. Also, the city has been undergoing change, whereby it is currently growing in population and changing in employment structure. Because our findings may not be generalizable to other European cities it would seem worthwhile to carry out additional comparative analysis within the Netherlands and elsewhere in Western Europe. It would be useful to further investigate the role of social networks and living environments in RRPP support but this would require gathering and analyzing individual-level behavior and attitudes within neighborhood contexts. Possible avenues for research would include social network analysis, personal histories of residential mobility and employment, and qualitative work on attitudes towards immigrants in the three types of neighborhoods discussed above. In short, further theorizing and research is needed to fully understand RRPP spatial patterns.

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