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Political trust: Pillar or peril for democracy

Empirical tests of the consequences of political trust on individuals' attitudes and behaviors

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Appendix Chapter 2. Political Trust as Evaluation against Normative Benchmarks


Part 1: Supplementary Materials

Appendix Figure 1 - Experimental Group Assignment

Note:

_____solid lines represent random experimental assignment.

-----Dashed lines represent natural participation/attrition.



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Appendix Table 1 - Experimental Groups and Sample Size							
		Wave 2 Experimental Group	Wave 1 Group 1 Benchmarks Measured	Wave 1 Group 2 Justifications Measured	New Respondents Wave 2	Sub - Total	Grand Total
Wave 2 Experiment	Shortened Experiment	---	2488 (Cell III)	2678 (Cell V)	2765	7931	7,931 (Cell I)
	Full Experiment	Block 0_pos	128	126	112	366	15,997 (Cell II)
		Block 1	2565	2451	2778	7794	
		Block 2	2534	2521	2782	7837	
Sub-Total Full Experiment			5227 (Cell IV)	5098 (Cell VI)	5672	15997	23928

¹ Wave 2 Full Experiment

a. Oversample of all positive vignette and sentence order 1 (n = 366)

b. Sentence Order 1 [1,2,3,4,5] (n = 7,794)

c. Sentence Order 2 [4,5,1,2,3] (n = 7837)

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Appendix Table 2A - Full Experiment

Within-Sentence Randomization to Mitigate within-sentence order effects

Example from - Ability & Benevolence Sentence

Grouping of Trait Within Sentence	1st Factor in Sentence	Combination of Dimensions	Operationalization
1 - Responsiveness & Benevolence	Responsiveness	(+)(+)	1. Responsiveness (+) & Benevolence (+)
		(+) (-)	2. Responsiveness (+) & Benevolence (-)
		(-) (+)	3. Responsiveness (-) & Benevolence (+)
		(-) (-)	4. Responsiveness (-) & Benevolence (-)
	Benevolence	(+) (+)	5. Benevolence (+) & Responsiveness (+)
		(+) (-)	6. Benevolence (+) & Responsiveness (-)
		(-) (+)	7. Benevolence (-) & Responsiveness (+)
		(-) (-)	8. Benevolence (-) & Responsiveness (-)

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Appendix Table 2B - Shortened Factorial Vignette Example

Note: Randomized factors are *italicized*.


Background: Every now and then members of the House of Representatives must stop their work prematurely, for example due to illness or other personal circumstances. In such cases, the member of parliament is replaced by the next person on the list of candidates of the same party in the last election.

Imagine a member of the Lower House of the _____ [*Party*] _____ resigns in the first year after the elections for health reasons. A candidate from the same party has been appointed to take over the seat of the departing member of parliament. This candidate has been active in local politics in recent years. Various newspapers from _____ [*B1: her / his*] _____ the municipality describe _____ [*B2: her / him*] _____ as _____ [*C*] _____. [*B3: She / He*] _____ is prepared to join the House of Representatives and will soon be appointed to the House of Representatives for the remainder of the Cabinet term.

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Appendix Figure 1B - Benchmarks (Wave 1) by Trust in MPs (Wave 1)
Percent of Respondents Selecting Each Normative Benchmark.

Note:
 Sample size:
 7715
 32 observations
 omitted (no trust
 response)
 Respondents
 could select up to
 3 items



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Appendix Table 3 - Trustworthiness Traits (H1)

Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician

<i>OLS Regressions</i>	M1: Simple Model (Short Experiment)	M2: Simple Model (Full Experiment)
Constant	3.47*** (0.18)	1.70*** (0.12)
<u>Trustworthiness Traits (Wave 2)</u>		
<i>ability</i>	(Reference)	0.29*** (0.02)
<i>ability-negative</i>	-0.94*** (0.07)	
<i>integrity</i>	0.10 (0.07)	0.33*** (0.02)
<i>integrity-negative</i>	-0.94*** (0.07)	
<i>benevolence</i>	0.05 (0.07)	0.40*** (0.02)
<i>benevolence-negative</i>	-1.16*** (0.07)	
<i>responsiveness</i>	0.03 (0.07)	0.14*** (0.02)
<i>responsiveness-negative</i>	-0.89*** (0.07)	
<i>transparency</i>	0.07 (0.07)	0.17*** (0.02)
<i>transparency-negative</i>	-0.91*** (0.07)	
<i>reliability</i>	0.01 (0.07)	0.15*** (0.02)
<i>reliability-negative</i>	-0.86*** (0.07)	
<i>decisiveness</i>	-0.09 (0.07)	0.14*** (0.02)
<i>decisiveness-negative</i>	-0.86*** (0.07)	
<i>empathy</i>	-0.001 (0.07)	0.19*** (0.02)
<i>empathy-negative</i>	-1.02*** (0.07)	
<i>charisma</i>	-0.12* (0.07)	0.03** (0.02)
<i>charisma-negative</i>	-0.62*** (0.07)	
<u>Politician's Party (Ref: Groen Links - Green Left)</u>		
<i>Politician Party: CDA</i>	0.13*** (0.03)	0.05*** (0.02)
<i>Politician Party: PVV</i>	-0.04 (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)

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Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician

<i>OLS Regressions</i>	M1: Simple Model (Short Experiment)	M2: Simple Model (Full Experiment)
	<u>Politician's Gender (Ref: Male)</u>	
<i>Politician Gender: Female</i>	0.03 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
	<u>Respondent Characteristics</u>	
<i>Women</i>	0.09*** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.02)
<i>Same Party as Politician (Ref: Different Party)</i>	0.72*** (0.04)	0.51*** (0.03)
Constant	3.47*** (0.18)	1.70*** (0.12)
Observations	7,331	15,230
R ²	0.27	0.18
Adjusted R ²	0.26	0.18
Residual Std. Error	0.93 (df = 7289)	0.93 (df = 15196)
F Statistic	64.83*** (df = 41; 7289)	100.13*** (df = 33; 15196)

Note:

*p**p***p<0.01

Standard errors in (parentheses)

All models adjust for respondents':

- (1) gender, (2) age group, (3) education level,
- (4) Vote choice in the 2017 general elections, and
- (5) Match between politician's party and respondent's vote choice in 2017

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Appendix Table 4 - Negativity Bias (Sum of Trustworthiness Traits)

Dependent variable: *Trust in Hypothetical Politician*

<i>OLS Regression</i>	M1: Negativity Bias (Full Experiment)
<u>Total Number of Positive Traits</u>	
(Ref: Completely Positive 9 Positive Traits)	
<i>total positive traits = 0</i>	-1.70*** (0.16)
<i>total positive traits = 1</i>	-1.58*** (0.08)
<i>total positive traits = 2</i>	-1.55*** (0.06)
<i>total positive traits = 3</i>	-1.39*** (0.05)
<i>total positive traits = 4</i>	-1.22*** (0.05)
<i>total positive traits = 5</i>	-1.03*** (0.05)
<i>total positive traits = 6</i>	-0.81*** (0.05)
<i>total positive traits = 7</i>	-0.54*** (0.06)
<i>total positive traits = 8</i>	-0.24*** (0.08)
<i>total positive traits = 9</i>	(Reference)
<u>Politician's Party (Ref: Groen Links - Green Left)</u>	
<i>Politician Party: CDA</i>	0.05*** (0.02)
<i>Politician Party: PVV</i>	0.04** (0.02)
<u>Politician's Gender (Ref: Male)</u>	
<i>Politician Gender: Female</i>	0.01 (0.02)
<u>Respondent Characteristics</u>	
<i>Women</i>	0.04** (0.02)
<i>Same Party as Politician</i> (Ref: Different Party)	0.51*** (0.03)
Constant	3.69*** (0.13)
Observations	15,230
R ²	0.16
Adjusted R ²	0.16
Residual Std. Error	0.94 (df = 15196)
F Statistic	86.32*** (df = 33; 15196)

Note: *p**p***p<0.01

Standard errors in (parentheses)

All models adjust for respondents':

- (1) gender,
- (2) age group,
- (3) education level,
- (4) Vote choice in the 2017 general elections, and
- (5) Match between politician's party and respondent's vote choice in 2017

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**Appendix Table 5A. (Short Experiment):
Object's Trustworthiness Trait x Respondent's Benchmarks/Justifications**

<i>Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>				
<i>OLS Regressions</i>	M1: Simple Model Cell III - Sample	M2: Model w. Benchmarks Cell III - Sample	M3: Benchmarks Interaction Model Cell III - Sample	M4: Justifications Interaction Model Cell V - Sample
Constant	2.53*** (0.28)	2.52*** (0.28)	2.60*** (0.29)	2.69*** (0.34)
<u>Trustworthiness Trait (Wave 2) [Ref: Negative Trait]</u>				
<i>Positive Trait</i>	0.88*** (0.04)	0.88*** (0.04)	0.80*** (0.05)	0.90*** (0.04)
<u>Congruence b/w Respondent's Benchmarks/Justifications and Object Trait</u>				
<i>Congruent Benchmark</i>		0.01 (0.04)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)
<u>Interaction: Object's Trait x Respondent's Benchmark/Justification</u>				
<i>Positive Trait x Congruent Benchmark</i>	--	--	0.25*** (0.08)	0.11 (0.09)
<u>Politician's Party [Ref: Groen Links - Green Left]</u>				
<i>Politician Party: CDA</i>	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)
<i>Politician Party: PVV</i>	-0.13*** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
<u>Politician's Gender [Ref: Male]</u>				
<i>Politician Gender: Female</i>	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
<u>Respondent Characteristics</u>				
<i>Women</i>	0.10** (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	0.08* (0.04)
<i>Same Party as Politician (Ref: Different Party)</i>	0.74*** (0.07)	0.74*** (0.07)	0.74*** (0.07)	0.78*** (0.07)
Observations	2,286	2,286	2,286	2,446
R ²	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.27
Adjusted R ²	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.26
Residual Std. Error	0.93 (df = 2260)	0.93 (df = 2259)	0.93 (df = 2258)	0.94 (df = 2418)
F Statistic	30.11***	28.94*** (df = 26; 2259)	28.28*** (df = 27; 2258)	33.52*** (df = 27; 2418)

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**Appendix Table 5A. (Short Experiment):
Object's Trustworthiness Trait x Respondent's Benchmarks/Justifications**

Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician				
<i>OLS</i>	M1: Simple Model	M2: Model w. Benchmarks	M3: Benchmarks Interaction Model	M4: Justifications Interaction Model
<i>Regressions</i>	Cell III - Sample	Cell III - Sample	Cell III - Sample	Cell V - Sample
	(df = 25; 2260)			
<i>Note:</i>				*p**p***p<0.01

Standard errors in (parentheses)

All models adjust for respondents':

- (1) gender, (2) age group, (3) education level,
- (4) Vote choice in the 2017 general elections, and
- (5) Match between politician's party and respondent's vote choice in 2017

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**Appendix Table 5B. (Full Experiment):
Object's Trustworthiness Traits x Respondent's Benchmarks**

<i>OLS Regressions</i>	<i>Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>		
	M1: Simple Model (Full Experiment) Cell II - Sample	M2: Simple Model (Full Experiment) Cell IV - Sample	M3: Interaction Model (Full Experiment) Cell IV - Sample
Constant	1.70*** (0.12)	2.03*** (0.21)	2.01*** (0.23)
	<u>Trustworthiness Traits (t) (Wave 2)</u>		
<i>ability</i> (t)	0.29*** (0.02)	0.33*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.04)
<i>integrity</i> (t)	0.33*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.04)
<i>benevolence</i> (t)	0.40*** (0.02)	0.41*** (0.03)	0.42*** (0.03)
<i>responsiveness</i> (t)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)
<i>transparency</i> (t)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.04)
<i>reliability</i> (t)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)
<i>decisiveness</i> (t)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.03)
<i>empathy</i> (t)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)
<i>charisma</i> (t)	0.03** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
	<u>Normative Benchmarks (Wave 1)</u>		
<i>ability</i> (b)			-0.03 (0.05)
<i>integrity</i> (b)			-0.01 (0.05)
<i>benevolence</i> (b)			0.13** (0.05)
<i>responsiveness</i> (b)			-0.09* (0.05)
<i>transparency</i> (b)			-0.05 (0.05)
<i>reliability</i> (b)			0.14* (0.08)
<i>decisiveness</i> (b)			0.02 (0.05)
<i>empathy</i> (b)			0.07 (0.06)
<i>charisma</i> (b)			-0.08 (0.10)
<i>different_namely</i> (b)			-0.17** (0.08)
<i>don't_know</i> (b)			0.11 (0.22)
	<u>Interaction: Traits x Respondent's Benchmarks</u>		
<i>ability</i> (t*b)			0.17*** (0.05)
<i>integrity</i> (t*b)			0.01 (0.05)
<i>benevolence</i> (t*b)			-0.05 (0.06)
<i>responsiveness</i> (t*b)			0.01 (0.05)
<i>transparency</i> (t*b)			-0.04 (0.05)
<i>reliability</i> (t*b)			-0.14 (0.09)

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<i>decisiveness (t*b)</i>			-0.004 (0.06)
<i>empathy (t*b)</i>			-0.07 (0.07)
<i>charisma (t*b)</i>			0.07 (0.14)
<u>Politician's Party (Ref: Groen Links - Green Left)</u>			
<i>Politician Party: CDA</i>	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
<i>Politician Party: PVV</i>	0.04** (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
<u>Politician's Gender (Ref: Male)</u>			
<i>Politician Gender: Female</i>	0.001 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
<u>Respondent Characteristics</u>			
<i>Women</i>	0.04*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
<i>Same Party as Politician (Ref: Different Party)</i>	0.51*** (0.03)	0.48*** (0.05)	0.48*** (0.05)
Observations	15,230	4,969	4,969
R ²	0.18	0.19	0.20
Adjusted R ²	0.18	0.18	0.19
Residual Std. Error	0.93 (df = 15196)	0.93 (df = 4935)	0.93 (df = 4915)
F Statistic	100.13*** (df = 33; 15196)	34.74*** (df = 33; 4935)	22.98*** (df = 53; 4915)

Note: *p**p***p<0.01


Standard errors in (parentheses)

All models adjust for respondents':

- (1) gender, (2) age group, (3) education level,
- (4) Vote choice in the 2017 general elections, and
- (5) Match between politician's party and respondent's vote choice in 2017


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Appendix Figure 5A: Marginal Mean Difference between Positive and Negative Traits by Consistency of Benchmarks and Traits



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Appendix Figure 5B: Marginal Means of Positive and Negative Traits by Consistency of Benchmarks and Traits



Note: Differences in Marginal Mean level of trust in Hypothetical MP:

- Red dots: match = respondents selected a Wave 1 benchmark **[identical]** to the trait modeled
- Blue dots: no-match = respondents selected a Wave 1 benchmark **[different]** from the trait modeled.

--- match
— no_match

Sample: Full Experiment Group 4 (n = 5227); Analytical sample: (n = 4950)

Benchmark Congruent Trait

All models adjust for/Means are marginalized over :

- Politician's (1) Gender & Political Party as well as
- (2) respondents' past vote choice (2017), (3) gender, (4) age group, (5) education, (6) Match between politician's party and respondent's past vote choice)

--- match
— no_match

Notes Appendix Figure 5B: Marginal Means of Positive and Negative Traits by Consistency of Benchmarks and Traits

Appendix Figure 5B (full experiment) disentangles down the gap between positive and negative traits presented in the main paper (Figure 5). It provides an overview of the marginal mean of trust in the hypothetical politician across four different groups per trait. The first grouping is: (1) respondents assigned a positive formulation of a trait in their vignette vs. (2) respondents assigned a negative version of a trait in their vignette. The second grouping is (3) respondents who selected a benchmark in wave 1 that is identical to the trait of the politician and (4) respondents who did not select this benchmark among their top 3 options. This generates 4 groups per trait. Appendix Figure 5B provides more granularity to the results presented in the paper.

- For example the observed difference in marginal means of **the trait ability** is primarily due to the fact that those who selected ability as a benchmark (Wave 1) placed more trust in a competent hypothetical politician (Wave 2) than those who did not find ability as an important benchmark..
 - The same cannot be said of the negative formulation. Those who selected ability as a benchmark (Wave 1) did not place less trust in an incompetent politician than respondents who did not find ability as an important benchmark.
- The results show some differences in how respondents with benchmark-congruent traits and those with differing benchmarks and traits rated politicians along the transparency, responsiveness and benevolence dimension. Counterintuitively, in the full experiment, respondents who chose transparency and responsiveness as an important benchmark, were more punitive of a hypothetical politician regardless of their description along positive or negative traits. Additionally, respondents who preferred benevolence doled out less punishment to a politician who mainly looked out for him/herself than respondents who did not prioritize benevolence as a benchmark.
- Although there are differences in the overall marginal means of those with benchmark-consistent traits and those with benchmark-inconsistent traits across various traits ... these differences appear to be primarily driven by factors other than the benchmarks themselves (e.g. prior levels of trust).
- It is unlikely that these findings reflect differences in how respondents evaluate.
 - First, we find no interaction effect in the regression models (other than ability)
 - Second, in most instances, the patterns we observe do not align with our expectations. The trait responsiveness provides a good example. While there are differences in marginal

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means of those who selected responsiveness as an important benchmark vs. those who did not, the fact that the marginal means of the former are significantly lower across both the negative and positive formulation of the trait suggests that these differences are in part driven by the fact that respondents with low-levels of trust are more likely to select responsiveness (listening) as a benchmark in the first place). When we account for prior trust levels, most of these differences disappear.

- Overall, some of these differences in marginal means are likely attributable to the fact that individuals' normative benchmarks are in part related to their trust in parliament and government. In the case of responsiveness, those who chose responsiveness as a benchmark tend to trust MPs less on average and those who indicated benevolence as a benchmark trust more on average. Modeling prior levels of trust diminishes some of these results. We provide a fuller analysis in the supplementary materials 2

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**Appendix Table 5C - (Full Experiment):
Object's Trustworthiness Traits x Respondent's Justifications- Interaction
(H3)**

<i>OLS Regressions</i>	<i>Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>		
	M1: Simple Model (Full Experiment) Cell 2 - Sample	M2: Simple Model (Full Experiment) Cell 6 - Sample	M3: Interaction Model (Full Experiment) Cell 6 - Sample
Constant	1.70*** (0.12)	1.20*** (0.24)	1.46*** (0.24)
<u>Trustworthiness Traits (t) (Wave 2)</u>			
<i>ability (t)</i>	0.29*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)
<i>integrity (t)</i>	0.33*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.03)
<i>benevolence (t)</i>	0.40*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.03)	0.41*** (0.04)
<i>responsiveness (t)</i>	0.14*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.04)
<i>transparency (t)</i>	0.17*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
<i>reliability (t)</i>	0.15*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)
<i>decisiveness (t)</i>	0.14*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)
<i>empathy (t)</i>	0.19*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)
<i>charisma (t)</i>	0.03** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)
<u>Normative Justifications (j) (Wave 2)</u>			
<i>ability (j)</i>			-0.09** (0.04)
<i>integrity (j)</i>			-0.10** (0.05)
<i>benevolence (j)</i>			-0.08** (0.04)
<i>responsiveness (j)</i>			-0.19*** (0.04)
<i>transparency (j)</i>			-0.14*** (0.04)
<i>reliability (j)</i>			-0.01 (0.06)
<i>decisiveness (j)</i>			-0.04 (0.05)
<i>empathy (j)</i>			-0.09* (0.05)
<i>charisma (j)</i>			0.09 (0.08)
<i>different_namely (j)</i>			-0.08 (0.05)
<i>don't_know (j)</i>			-0.15 (0.11)
<u>Interaction: Traits x Respondent's Justifications (t*j) (Cell 6)</u>			
<i>ability (t*j)</i>			0.09 (0.06)
<i>integrity (t*j)</i>			0.08 (0.06)
<i>benevolence (t*j)</i>			-0.05 (0.05)
<i>responsiveness (t*j)</i>			0.01 (0.05)
<i>transparency (t*j)</i>			-0.05 (0.06)
<i>reliability (t*j)</i>			0.06 (0.08)

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**Appendix Table 5C - (Full Experiment):
Object's Trustworthiness Traits x Respondent's Justifications- Interaction
(H3)**

<i>OLS Regressions</i>	<i>Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>		
	M1: Simple Model (Full Experiment) Cell 2 - Sample	M2: Simple Model (Full Experiment) Cell 6 - Sample	M3: Interaction Model (Full Experiment) Cell 6 - Sample
<i>decisiveness (t*j)</i>			-0.05 (0.07)
<i>empathy (t*j)</i>			0.04 (0.07)
<i>charisma (t*j)</i>			-0.07 (0.11)
<u>Politician's Party (Ref: Groen Links - Green Left)</u>			
<i>Politician Party: CDA</i>	0.05*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
<i>Politician Party: PVV</i>	0.04** (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
<u>Politician's Gender (Ref: Male)</u>			
<i>Politician Gender: Female</i>	0.001 (0.02)	-0.005 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
<u>Respondent Characteristics</u>			
<i>Women</i>	0.04*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
<i>Same Party as Politician (Ref: Different Party)</i>	0.51*** (0.03)	0.49*** (0.05)	0.50*** (0.05)
Constant	1.70*** (0.12)	1.20*** (0.24)	1.46*** (0.24)
Observations	15,230	4,860	4,729
R ²	0.18	0.18	0.20
Adjusted R ²	0.18	0.18	0.19
Residual Std. Error	0.93 (df = 15196)	0.92 (df = 4826)	0.91 (df = 4675)
F Statistic	100.13*** (df = 33; 15196)	32.57*** (df = 33; 4826)	22.13*** (df = 53; 4675)

Note: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Standard errors in (parentheses)

All models adjust for respondents':

- (1) gender, (2) age group, (3) education level,
- (4) Vote choice in the 2017 general elections, and
- (5) Match between politician's party and respondent's vote choice in 2017

Part 2: Robustness Checks

Descriptive Statistics

Note: Descriptive statistics including Dependent variables, Wave 1 Trust and other adjusted covariates

Variable Description	Question Wording & Missing Observations	full_experiment, N = 15971		short_experiment, N = 7931	
		Mean	Median	Mean	Median
(Wave 1) Trust in MPs	How much trust do you generally have in politicians in the Lower House? [scale: 1. No Trust at All - 5. A Lot of Trust]	2.70 (0.99)	3	2.69 (0.99)	3
	Don't Know (Wave 1 Trust MPs) Only Wave 2 Participants	35		17	
		5672		2765	
DV - (Wave 2) Trust in Hypothetical MP	How much trust do you have in the candidate for the second chamber described in the text above [scale: 1. No Trust at All - 5. A Lot of Trust]	2.22 (1.03)	2	2.52 (1.08)	3
	Don't Know (Wave 2 Trust Hypothetical MP)	751		590	

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. Descriptive Statistics - Covariates

Variable	Levels	N = 239281
Gender	Men	17089 (71%)
	Women	6839 (29%)
Age Group	18_to_25	399 (1.7%)
	26_to_35	629 (2.6%)
	36_to_45	911 (3.8%)
	46_to_55	2511 (10%)
	56_to_65	6453 (27%)
	66_to_75	10227 (43%)
	76_and_older	2798 (12%)
Education	1.Primary	128 (0.5%)
	2.Primary-Vocational	3324 (14%)
	3.Secondary	2342 (9.8%)
	4.Secondary-Vocational	5041 (21%)
	5.Higher-Vocational	8961 (37%)
	6.University	4132 (17%)
2017 Vote	vvd (ruling party)	3285 (14%)
	d66	1942 (8.1%)
	groenlinks	2590 (11%)
	other	3635 (15%)
	sp	2456 (10%)
	cda (minor coalition member)	2555 (11%)
	pvv	3514 (15%)
	pvda	2370 (9.9%)
	forum voor democratie	1551 (6.5%)
	NA	30
Normative Benchmark & Justification Measured		
benchmark (wave 1)	7715 (32%)	
wave 2 participant (only)	8437 (35%)	
justification (wave 1)	7548 (32%)	
Don't Know Trust Attitude (Justification wave 1)	208 (0.9%)	
Don't Know Trust Attitude (Justification wave 1)	20 (<0.1%)	

Section 1 - Robustness Checks - Model Adjustments

Prior trust attitudes - Trust in MPs (Wave 1)

Note Background: In table S1 and S2 we adjusted for prior levels of trust in our main interaction models (H3). As noted in the paper (see Appendix 1 Figure 1B) the percentage of respondents choosing a given benchmark differs per trust levels. For example respondents who indicated responsiveness (listening) as an important criteria to trust MPs also indicated having less trust when subsequently asked how much they trusted MPs. Additional patterns, not included in this paper, are more striking for justifications. In part this suggests that respondents with differing levels of trust point to different normative benchmarks or justifications of prior trust. In the main paper we present regression results unadjusted for prior trust levels because the measurement of trust in Cells III & IV (groups in which benchmarks were measured) is likely to tap into rationalizations. Respondents were first asked to indicate which criteria were important to make a trust judgment and subsequently how much trust they placed in MPs. Only in Cells IV and VI (justifications) were respondents first asked about their trust levels. We believe the latter measurement of trust attitudes is less likely to be influenced by a rationalized process. As a robustness check for the models presented in the paper, Table S1 and S2 below adjust for prior trust levels in our models of interest (H3) interactions b/w benchmarks and traits.

Note Results: The results are the same. When adjusting for prior trust levels we find that the effect of positive traits is conditional on respondents benchmarks in the short experiment (just as in the main paper). This is not the case for the full experiment or when we measure benchmarks as justifications. Adjusting for prior levels of trust does not change our conclusion in the paper.

Wording of Justification (Wave 1)

Note Background: In Tables S1 & S2 - the models relying on justifications: justifications x traits (Cells IV and Cells VI) we also adjust for the wording of the justifications. For consistency, respondents assigned to Wave 1 Group 2 (justifications measured) who indicated having some or a lot of trust in Wave 1 were prompted to justify their judgments for a list of positively worded items and respondents who indicated little to no trust were given a list of negatively worded items.

Full Experiment Additional Adjustments

Between-Sentence-order effects: In our full experiment, the 9 trustworthiness traits were provided to respondents in a total of 5 sentences to provide a legible text. We adjusted for sentence order effects in the experiment by randomly assigning groups of respondents

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to one of two groups. Group 1 received a vignette with sentence order 1,2,3,4,5. This corresponds to the traits:

- Sentence 1: Responsiveness / Benevolence
- Sentence 2: Charisma / Empathy
- Sentence 3: Integrity / Transparency
- Sentence 4: Decisiveness / Reliability
- Sentence 5: Knowledge

Group 2 on the other hand received a vignette with sentence order 4,5,1,2,3.

Within-sentence order effects: Additionally, we randomized which of these traits was presented first in each sentence. This applies to sentences 1 through 4. As a result a vignette in Group 1 could either have a sentence 1 in which (a) responsiveness was the first trait or (b) benevolence would be presented first. **Results:** We include these groupings (between-sentence groupings & within-sentence groupings) in the models presented in Tables S2 and S4 below to adjust for systematic differences due to order effects. This adjustment does not alter the results presented in the paper.

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Table S1 - Short Experiment Interaction Models - w. Prior Trust and Justification Type

<i>OLS Regressions</i>	<i>Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>	
	M1: Benchmarks x Traits (Short Experiment) Cell III - Sample	M2: Justifications x Traits (Short Experiment) Cell V - Sample
Constant	1.66*** (0.27)	1.88*** (0.33)
<u>Object's Trustworthiness Trait (Wave 2) No Congruence [Ref: Negative Trait]</u>		
<i>Positive Trait</i>	0.78*** (0.04)	0.88*** (0.04)
<u>Congruence b/w Respondent's Benchmarks/Justif. (Wave 1) and Object Trait Negative Trait [Ref: No Congruence]</u>		
<i>Congruent Benchmark/Justification</i>	-0.15*** (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)
<u>Interaction: Object's Trait x Congruent Respondent Benchmarks/Justifications</u>		
<i>Positive Trait x Congruent Benchmark/Justification</i>	0.28*** (0.08)	0.11 (0.09)
<u>Prior Trust in MPs (Wave 1) [Ref: 1 - No Trust at All]</u>		
<i>Prior Trust: Only a Little (2)</i>	0.45*** (0.06)	0.45*** (0.06)
<i>Prior Trust: Not Much and Not Little (3)</i>	0.80*** (0.06)	0.73*** (0.07)
<i>Prior Trust: Some Trust (4)</i>	1.15*** (0.07)	1.01*** (0.09)
<i>Prior Trust: A Lot of Trust (5)</i>	1.21*** (0.25)	1.08*** (0.20)
<u>Framing of Justification (Wave 1) [Ref: Positively Worded]</u>		
<i>Justification: Negative Wording</i>		-0.15** (0.06)
<u>Politician's Party [Ref: Groen Links - Green Left]</u>		
<i>Politician Party: CDA</i>	0.03 (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)
<i>Politician Party: PVV</i>	-0.13*** (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
<u>Politician's Gender [Ref: Male]</u>		
<i>Politician Gender: Female</i>	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
<u>Respondent Characteristics</u>		
<i>Women</i>	0.09** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)
<i>Same Party as Politician [Ref: Different Party]</i>	0.73*** (0.07)	0.76*** (0.07)
Observations	2,290	2,387

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Table S1 - Short Experiment Interaction Models - w. Prior Trust and Justification Type

<i>OLS Regressions</i>	Dependent variable: <i>Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>	
	M1: Benchmarks x Traits (Short Experiment) Cell III - Sample	M2: Justifications x Traits (Short Experiment) Cell V - Sample
R ²	0.34	0.35
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.35
Residual Std. Error	0.88 (df = 2258)	0.89 (df = 2354)
F Statistic	36.83*** (df = 31; 2258)	40.29*** (df = 32; 2354)

Note: *p**p***p<0.01

Standard errors in (parentheses)

All models adjust for respondents':

- (2) gender, (2) age group, (3) education level,
- (6) Vote choice in the 2017 general elections,
- (7) Match between politician's party and respondent's vote choice in 2017, (6) Prior Trust Levels.

M2: Also adjusts for the wording of the justification provided in Wave 1. The wording provided was consistent with the stated attitude in wave 1 (e.g. if respondent indicated a lot of trust, the wording of the justification was positive)

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Table S2 - Full Experiment Interaction Models - w. Prior Trust and Justification Type

<i>Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>		
<i>OLS Regressions</i>	M1: Benchmarks x Traits (Full Experiment) Cell IV - Sample	M2: Justifications x Traits (Full Experiment) Cell VI - Sample
Constant	1.33*** (0.23)	0.69*** (0.25)
<u>Object's Trustworthiness Trait (Wave 2) No Congruence [Ref: Negative Trait]</u>		
<i>ability</i>	0.25*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.03)
<i>integrity</i>	0.30*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.03)
<i>benevolence</i>	0.42*** (0.03)	0.41*** (0.03)
<i>responsiveness</i>	0.16*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.04)
<i>transparency</i>	0.19*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)
<i>reliability</i>	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)
<i>decisiveness</i>	0.21*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
<i>empathy</i>	0.21*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
<i>charisma</i>	0.03 (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
<u>Respondent's Benchmarks / Justification (Wave 1) Negative Trait [Ref: Not Selected]</u>		
<i>benchmark / justif: ability</i>	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
<i>benchmark / justif: integrity</i>	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)
<i>benchmark / justif: benevolence</i>	0.11** (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)
<i>benchmark / justif: responsiveness</i>	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)
<i>benchmark / justif: transparency</i>	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
<i>benchmark / justif: reliability</i>	0.13* (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)
<i>benchmark / justif: decisiveness</i>	0.02 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
<i>benchmark / justif: empathy</i>	0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)
<i>benchmark / justif: charisma</i>	-0.12 (0.10)	0.08 (0.08)
<i>benchmark / justif: different_namely</i>	-0.07 (0.08)	0.04 (0.05)
<i>benchmark / justif: don't_know</i>	0.19 (0.22)	-0.08 (0.11)
<u>Interaction: Object's Trait x Congruent Respondent Benchmarks/Justifications</u>		
<i>ability x benchmark / justif: ability</i>	0.17*** (0.05)	0.09 (0.06)

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Table S2 - Full Experiment Interaction Models - w. Prior Trust and Justification Type

<i>OLS Regressions</i>	<i>Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>	
	M1: Benchmarks x Traits (Full Experiment) Cell IV - Sample	M2: Justifications x Traits (Full Experiment) Cell VI - Sample
<i>integrity x benchmark / justif: integrity</i>	0.02 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)
<i>benevolence x benchmark / justif: benevolence</i>	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)
<i>responsive x benchmark / justif: responsive.</i>	0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
<i>transparency x benchmark / justif: transparency</i>	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)
<i>reliability x benchmark / justif: reliability</i>	-0.14 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)
<i>decisiveness x benchmark / justif: decisiveness</i>	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)
<i>empathy x benchmark / justif: empathy</i>	-0.05 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)
<i>charisma x benchmark / justif: charisma</i>	0.01 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.11)
<u>Prior Trust in MPs (Wave 1) [Ref: 1 - No Trust at All]</u>		
<i>Prior Trust: Only a Little (2)</i>	0.34*** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.04)
<i>Prior Trust: Not Much and Not Little (3)</i>	0.64*** (0.05)	0.65*** (0.05)
<i>Prior Trust: Some Trust (4)</i>	0.93*** (0.05)	0.85*** (0.07)
<i>Prior Trust: A Lot of Trust (5)</i>	0.90*** (0.15)	0.71*** (0.14)
<u>Framing of Justification (Wave 1) [Ref: Positively Worded]</u>		
<i>Justification: Negative Wording</i>		-0.08 (0.05)
<u>Politician's Party [Ref: Groen Links - Green Left]</u>		
<i>Politician Party: CDA</i>	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
<i>Politician Party: PVV</i>	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
<u>Politician's Gender [Ref: Male]</u>		
<i>Politician Gender: Female</i>	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
<u>Respondent Characteristics</u>		
<i>Women</i>	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
<i>Same Party as Politician</i>	0.48*** (0.05)	0.52*** (0.05)

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Table S2 - Full Experiment Interaction Models - w. Prior Trust and Justification Type

<i>OLS Regressions</i>	<i>Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>	
	M1: Benchmarks x Traits (Full Experiment) Cell IV - Sample	M2: Justifications x Traits (Full Experiment) Cell VI - Sample
<i>[Ref: Different Party]</i>		
Observations	4,950	4,729
R ²	0.25	0.25
Adjusted R ²	0.24	0.24
Residual Std. Error	0.90 (df = 4887)	0.88 (df = 4665)
F Statistic	26.68*** (df = 62; 4887)	24.96*** (df = 63; 4665)

Note:

*p**p***p<0.01

Standard errors in (parentheses)

All models adjust for respondents':

- (1) gender, (2) age group, (3) education level,
- (4) Vote choice in the 2017 general elections,
- (5) Match between politician's party and respondent's vote choice in 2017,
- (6) Prior Trust Levels, (7) between-sentence groupings, and (8) within-sentence groupings

M2: Also adjusts for the wording of the justification provided in Wave 1. The wording provided was consistent with the stated attitude in wave 1 (e.g. if respondent indicated some or a lot of trust, the wording of the justification was positive; if respondents indicated little or no trust at all, the wording of the justification was negative)

Ordered logit model

- **Note Background:** Our dependent variable (Trust in Hypothetical MP) is measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with the category 5 (a lot of trust) rarely selected by respondents. Given this short scale, we also fitted ordered logit models for our main hypotheses (H3) (see Tables S3 and S4) below.
- **Note Results:** Overall, most results presented in the paper are the same. We find that the effects of traits are conditional on benchmarks of the politician in the short experiment (when respondents are provided with a single trait of trustworthiness to assess). However, these findings do not hold for justifications or when respondents are faced with multidimensional choices (asked to weigh competing traits). As in the main paper, in the full experiment only respondents who mentioned ability (competence) as an important criteria to trust MPs in Wave 1 appear to place more trust in politicians described as able. One difference with the models presented in the main paper is the interaction term on reliability. Surprisingly, respondents who selected reliability (steadfastness) as an important criteria to Trust MPs placed less trust in politicians described as reliable (steadfast) than respondents who did not particularly care about reliability. Overall, these results support our conclusions that there is little evidence that benchmarks condition the effect of politicians' traits on trust attitudes.

Additional: An additional point to note is that in the full experiment, compared to a baseline model only including traits of a politician, models adjusting for respondents' a-priori benchmarks or including an interaction b/w a-priori benchmarks and traits actually performed worse. Benchmarks and their interaction with traits add little contribution to model fit.

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Table S3 - Short Experiment Interaction Models - Ordered Logistic Models

Ordered Logistic Regression	<i>Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>	
	M1: Benchmarks x Traits (Short Experiment) Cell III - Sample	M2: Justifications x Traits (Short Experiment) Cell V - Sample
<u>Main Effects - Object's Trait No Congruence Benchmark & Congruent Benchmarks Negative Object Trait</u>		
<i>Positive Trait</i>	1.69*** (0.10)	1.85*** (0.10)
<i>Congruent Benchmark/Justification</i>	-0.35*** (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)
<u>Interaction: Object's Trait x Congruence with Respondent's Benchmark/Justification</u> [Ref: No Congruence & Negative Trait]		
<i>Positive Trait x Congruent Benchmark/Justification</i>	0.58*** (0.17)	0.25 (0.18)
<u>Prior Trust in MPs (Wave 1) [Ref: 1 - No Trust at All]</u>		
<i>Prior Trust: Only a Little (2)</i>	1.13*** (0.14)	1.15*** (0.14)
<i>Prior Trust: Not Much and Not Little (3)</i>	1.85*** (0.15)	1.84*** (0.15)
<i>Prior Trust: Some Trust (4)</i>	2.66*** (0.17)	2.58*** (0.17)
<i>Prior Trust: A Lot of Trust (5)</i>	2.83*** (0.54)	2.73*** (0.44)
<u>Politician's Party [Ref: Groen Links - Green Left]</u>		
<i>Politician Party: CDA</i>	0.10 (0.10)	0.33*** (0.10)
<i>Politician Party: PVV</i>	-0.29*** (0.10)	0.03 (0.09)
<u>Politician's Gender [Ref: Male]</u>		
<i>Politician Gender: Female</i>	0.07 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)
<u>Respondent Characteristics</u>		
<i>Women</i>	0.24*** (0.09)	0.20** (0.09)
<i>Same Party as Politician [Ref: Different Party]</i>	1.47*** (0.15)	1.59*** (0.15)
<u>Intercepts</u>		
<i>No Trust at All Only a Little Trust</i>	0.45 (0.58)	0.04 (0.73)
<i>Only a Little Trust Not Much & Not Little Trust</i>	2.03*** (0.58)	1.49** (0.73)
<i>Not Much & Not Little Trust Some/A Lot of Trust</i>	4.04*** (0.59)	3.50*** (0.74)
Observations	2,290	2,387

Note:

Coefficients are not exponentiated - for odds ratios $e^{\wedge}(coef)$

*p**p***p<0.01

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Standard errors in (parentheses)

All models adjust for respondents':

- (1) gender, (2) age group, (3) education level,
- (4) Vote choice in the 2017 general elections,
- (5) Match between politician's party and respondent's vote choice in 2017,
- (6) Prior Trust Levels.

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Table S4 - Full Experiment Interaction Models - Ordered Logistic Models

Ordered Logistic Regression	<i>Dependent variable: Trust in Hypothetical Politician</i>	
	M1: Benchmarks x Traits (Full Experiment) Cell IV - Sample	M2: Justifications x Traits (Full Experiment) Cell VI - Sample
<u>Object's Trustworthiness Trait (Wave 2) No Congruence [Ref: Negative Trait]</u>		
<i>ability</i>	0.55*** (0.08)	0.51*** (0.07)
<i>integrity</i>	0.60*** (0.08)	0.58*** (0.06)
<i>benevolence</i>	0.88*** (0.06)	0.87*** (0.07)
<i>responsiveness</i>	0.31*** (0.07)	0.25*** (0.07)
<i>transparency</i>	0.39*** (0.08)	0.45*** (0.07)
<i>reliability</i>	0.32*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.06)
<i>decisiveness</i>	0.41*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.06)
<i>empathy</i>	0.45*** (0.06)	0.38*** (0.06)
<i>charisma</i>	0.05 (0.05)	0.15*** (0.06)
<u>Respondent's Benchmarks / Justification (Wave 1) Negative Trait [Ref: Not Selected]</u>		
<i>benchmark / justif: ability</i>	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.09)
<i>benchmark / justif: integrity</i>	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.09)
<i>benchmark / justif: benevolence</i>	0.23** (0.11)	-0.01 (0.08)
<i>benchmark / justif: responsiveness</i>	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.08)
<i>benchmark / justif: transparency</i>	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.09)
<i>benchmark / justif: reliability</i>	0.26* (0.15)	0.04 (0.12)
<i>benchmark / justif: decisiveness</i>	0.05 (0.10)	0.10 (0.11)
<i>benchmark / justif: empathy</i>	0.05 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.11)
<i>benchmark / justif: charisma</i>	-0.22 (0.21)	0.13 (0.16)
<i>benchmark / justif: different_namely</i>	-0.16 (0.18)	0.05 (0.11)
<i>benchmark / justif: don't_know</i>	0.47 (0.45)	-0.21 (0.23)
<u>Interaction: Object's Trait x Congruent Respondent Benchmarks/Justifications</u>		
<i>ability x benchmark / justif: ability</i>	0.35*** (0.11)	0.15 (0.12)
<i>integrity x benchmark / justif: integrity</i>	0.07 (0.11)	0.18 (0.13)
<i>benevolence x benchmark / justif: benevolence</i>	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.11)
<i>responsiveness x benchmark / justif: responsiveness</i>	0.04 (0.11)	0.08 (0.11)
<i>transparency x benchmark / justif: transparency</i>	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.12)

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<i>reliability x benchmark /justif:</i> <i>reliability</i>	-0.32* (0.19)	0.10 (0.16)
<i>decisiveness x benchmark /justif:</i> <i>decisiveness</i>	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.18 (0.15)
<i>empathy x benchmark /justif:</i> <i>empathy</i>	-0.08 (0.15)	0.05 (0.14)
<i>charisma x benchmark /justif:</i> <i>charisma</i>	-0.05 (0.28)	-0.11 (0.23)

Prior Trust in MPs (Wave 1) [Ref: 1 - No Trust at All]

<i>Prior Trust: Only a Little (2)</i>	0.99*** (0.10)	1.00*** (0.10)
<i>Prior Trust: Not Much and Not Little (3)</i>	1.63*** (0.11)	1.70*** (0.11)
<i>Prior Trust: Some Trust (4)</i>	2.18*** (0.12)	2.14*** (0.12)
<i>Prior Trust: A Lot of Trust (5)</i>	2.02*** (0.32)	1.83*** (0.29)

Politician's Party [Ref: Groen Links - Green Left]

<i>Politician Party: CDA</i>	0.10 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)
<i>Politician Party: PVV</i>	0.07 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)

Politician's Gender [Ref: Male]

<i>Politician Gender: Female</i>	0.06 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
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Respondent Characteristics

<i>Women</i>	0.12** (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)
<i>Same Party as Politician</i> <i>[Ref: Different Party]</i>	0.94*** (0.10)	1.05*** (0.10)

Intercepts

<i>No Trust at All Only a Little Trust</i>	0.93** (0.47)	2.59*** (0.52)
<i>Only a Little Trust Not Much & Not Little Trust</i>	2.60*** (0.47)	4.27*** (0.52)
<i>Not Much & Not Little Trust Some/A Lot of Trust</i>	4.41*** (0.48)	6.15*** (0.53)

Observations	4,950	4,729
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Note:

Coefficients are not exponentiated - for odds ratios $e^{\lambda(\text{coef})}$ *p**p***p<0.01

Standard errors in (parentheses)

All models adjust for respondents':

- (1) gender, (2) age group, (3) education level,
- (4) Vote choice in the 2017 general elections,
- (5) Match between politician's party and respondent's vote choice in 2017,
- (6) Prior Trust Levels.

Section 2 - Robustness Checks - Benchmark-Trait Congruence

Overview: Our paper focuses on the congruence between a politician's traits and the benchmarks respondents find important to evaluate those traits. We find that the benchmarks respondents find important do not condition the effect of a politician's trait that is consistent with those benchmarks. We model this in our full experiment by looking at each individual benchmark * trait interaction.

Goal: We want to check whether our substantive findings are robust across distinct levels of benchmark-trait congruence. In Wave 1 we asked respondents to select 3 of 9 benchmarks they found important to trust MPs. In the full experiment (wave 2), respondents simultaneously rated 9 traits randomly assigned to be positive or negative. By design, levels of benchmark-trait congruency thus differ. Some respondents may have rated a politician who possesses negative traits along all 3 of their benchmarks, some rated a politician who possesses positive traits along all 3 of their benchmarks and some were assigned to rate a politician with mixed positive and negative traits along the respondents' benchmarks. One may argue that our null findings are due to the effects of benchmark-trait congruence cancelling each other out (i.e. all trait consistent with a respondent's benchmarks must either be positive or negative for the conditioning effects of benchmarks to appear).

Approach: To test this, we run our models on 2 subsets of respondents. The first subset rated a politician with 3/9 traits perfectly congruent with their benchmarks; the traits may either be positive or negative. The second subset rated a politician with 3/9 traits of mixed congruence with their benchmarks; some of the traits were positive and others negative.

Moreover, we limit our sample to respondents who rated a mixed vignette (4 or 5 positive traits; and 5 or 4 negative traits). This procedure allows us to assess differences primarily due to congruence between benchmarks and traits and not vignette positivity or intensity (i.e. respondents who rate a very positive politician with 8 or 9 traits are also more likely to have perfect positive congruence along their 3 benchmarks).

Results: Our substantive conclusions in the paper remain unchanged. In Table S5 below, our baseline model (M0) replicates our model among respondents who received a mixed vignette (4 or 5 positive and 5 or 4 negative traits). Our results are similar to those presented in the paper. And we find no consistent pattern of significant interactions between respondent's benchmarks and their rating of traits consistent with those benchmarks.

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M1 shows the model for respondents who rated a politician whose traits are perfectly congruent with their benchmarks. The sample size is small and most coefficients noisy. Yet, even then, we find no clear pattern in the direction of the interaction effects.

Lastly, in M2 we present the results for respondents who received a mixed vignette but whose benchmark-trait congruence is mixed (e.g. 1 or 2 positive and 2 or 1 negative benchmark-congruent trait). Here the main effects are different. We also find a significant interaction between respondents who rated a politician with the traits ability and integrity and who indicated these traits as key benchmarks to trust in wave 1. However, these findings do not appear for other patterns of benchmarks-traits. Yet, this pattern contradicts the expectation that our null findings are driven by respondents with mixed levels of benchmark-trait congruency.

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Table S5. Full Experiment: Subset Across Degree of Congruence Robustness Check						
<u>Dependent Variable: Trust in Politician</u>	M0: Full Sample		M1: Perfect Congruence Sample		M2: Mixed Congruence Sample	
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>
(Intercept)	2.79 ***	0.34	4.61 **	1.57	2.72 ***	0.39
Main Effects						
<i>Object's Positive Trustworthiness Traits (Wave 2)</i>						
ability	0.15 *	0.06	0.3	0.2	0.17 *	0.07
integrity	0.24 ***	0.07	0.39	0.21	0.18 *	0.08
benevolence	0.35 ***	0.06	0.18	0.16	0.37 ***	0.06
responsiveness	0.07	0.06	0.01	0.18	0.09	0.07
transparency	0.22 ***	0.06	0.36	0.2	0.16 *	0.07
reliability	0.08	0.05	0.19	0.16	0.04	0.06
decisiveness	0.17 **	0.06	0.43 **	0.16	0.12	0.06
empathy	0.17 **	0.05	0.35 *	0.16	0.14 *	0.06
charisma	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.15	0.01	0.06
<i>Normative Benchmarks (Wave 1)</i>						
benchmark: ability	-0.09	0.06	-0.24	0.45	-0.11	0.07
benchmark: integrity	0	0.06	-0.37	0.47	-0.02	0.08
benchmark: benevolence	0.11	0.07	-0.4	0.48	0.14	0.08
benchmark: responsiveness	-0.13 *	0.06	-0.6	0.43	-0.12	0.08
benchmark: transparency	-0.03	0.06	-0.4	0.46	-0.05	0.07
benchmark: reliability	0	0.11	-0.54	0.49	0.01	0.12
benchmark: decisiveness	0.06	0.07	-0.3	0.48	0.07	0.08
benchmark: empathy	0.03	0.08	-0.49	0.47	0.07	0.09
benchmark: charisma	0.05	0.16			-0.08	0.18
Vignette Candidate Party (ref: GroenLinks)						
CDA	0.06	0.05	-0.08	0.12	0.06	0.05
PVV	0.04	0.05	0.1	0.13	0.03	0.05
Vignette Candidate Gender (ref: male)						
Female Politician	0.04	0.04	0.15	0.1	0	0.04
Respondent Party (ref: VVD) & Out-Party Politician						
d66	-0.02	0.09	0.01	0.26	-0.03	0.1
groenlinks	0.35 ***	0.09	-0.32	0.23	0.33 ***	0.1
other	0.29 ***	0.07	-0.2	0.19	0.31 ***	0.08
sp	0.38 ***	0.08	-0.36	0.22	0.37 ***	0.09
cda	0.27 **	0.08	-0.18	0.22	0.25 **	0.09
pvv	0.56 ***	0.08	-0.71 **	0.22	0.49 ***	0.09
pvda	-0.03	0.08	-0.06	0.21	0	0.09
fvd	0.27 **	0.09	-0.23	0.26	-0.26 *	0.1
Respondent Gender (ref: Men)						

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Table S5. Full Experiment: Subset Across Degree of Congruence Robustness Check						
<u>Dependent Variable: Trust in Politician</u>	M0: Full Sample		M1: Perfect Congruence Sample		M2: Mixed Congruence Sample	
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>
Women	-0.01	0.04	-0.11	0.12	0.02	0.05
Age_Group (Ref: 18-25)						
26_to_35	0.59 **	0.22	-0.53	0.68	-0.60 *	0.24
36_to_45	0.70 ***	0.2	-1.61 **	0.62	-0.53 *	0.21
46_to_55	0.54 **	0.18	-1.19 *	0.6	0.50 **	0.19
56_to_65	0.60 ***	0.17	-1.12	0.58	0.57 **	0.18
66_to_75	0.63 ***	0.17	-1.16 *	0.57	0.57 **	0.18
76+	0.57 **	0.17	-0.94	0.59	0.56 **	0.19
Education (ref: Primary)						
Primary Vocational	0.59 **	0.22	-1.16 *	0.51	-0.51 *	0.25
Secondary	-0.61 **	0.22	-1.18 *	0.52	-0.52 *	0.25
Secondary Vocational	0.58 **	0.21	-1.13 *	0.51	-0.51 *	0.25
Higher Vocational	0.67 **	0.21	-1.16 *	0.5	-0.59 *	0.25
University	0.65 **	0.22	-1.25 *	0.51	-0.57 *	0.25
Interactions						
In-Party Politician	0.54 ***	0.07	0.73 ***	0.17	0.51 ***	0.08
Interactions: Object's Positive Trait * Respondent's Congruent Benchmark						
ability * benchmark: ability	0.25 **	0.08	-0.05	0.29	0.25 **	0.09
integrity * benchmark: integrity	0.1	0.08	0.07	0.31	0.19 *	0.09
benevolence * benchmark: benevolence	0	0.09	0.32	0.28	-0.03	0.1
responsiveness * benchmark: responsiveness	0.06	0.08	0.18	0.27	0.07	0.09
transparency * benchmark: transparency	-0.12	0.08	-0.1	0.28	-0.07	0.09
reliability * benchmark: reliability	0.14	0.14	0.38	0.4	0.14	0.15
decisiveness * benchmark: decisiveness	-0.04	0.09	-0.46	0.28	0.04	0.1
empathy * benchmark: empathy	-0.01	0.1	-0.13	0.3	0.02	0.12

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Table S5. Full Experiment: Subset Across Degree of Congruence Robustness Check						
<u>Dependent Variable: Trust in Politician</u>	M0: Full Sample		M1: Perfect Congruence Sample		M2: Mixed Congruence Sample	
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>
charisma * benchmark: charisma	-0.03	0.21	-0.77	0.71	0.19	0.23
Observations	2422		376		1913	
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.115 / 0.096		0.236 / 0.118		0.110 / 0.086	
* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$						
Note: OLS Models						
Sample: Respondents receiving 4 or 5 positive traits (n = 2,422)						

Section 3 - Robustness Checks - Political Sophistication

Overview: We wanted to assess whether our findings in the paper held across sub-samples reflecting different levels of political sophistication. One quick proxy of political sophistication is education. Previous research suggests that respondents with higher education may benefit from both a norm-inducing and an accuracy-inducing effect in their evaluations of government (Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012). Hence we were curious to know whether our null findings were driven by the fact that **only** higher educated respondents would evaluate political actors against their normative benchmarks. To do so, we fit a triple interaction with traits, congruent benchmarks and education levels. We estimate the average marginal effect of a positive trait on levels of trust conditional on benchmark-trait congruency and levels of education.

Overview Short Experiment (Figure A and B) ⁴⁴:

In Figures A and B, we visualize differences across education groups and the congruence between benchmark and traits. To do so we look at the Average Marginal Effect of a positive trait and the predicted values of trust.

Respondents with Higher Education: While we may expect higher educated respondents to evaluate political actors in a way that is more consistent with their benchmarks, the results suggest the opposite. Higher educated respondents don't trust politicians more when these politicians possess traits that are consistent with their normative benchmarks.

Respondents with Secondary Education: Among respondents with secondary education, however, the pattern is more complicated. On the one hand we find no significant interactions (see Table S6 Model 3). Nevertheless, looking at the marginal effects, there are substantive differences for respondents with secondary education. Figure A reveals a difference in the AME of a positive trait between respondents who rated a trait congruent with their own benchmarks and those who did not. (The confidence intervals do not overlap). Among respondents with secondary education normative benchmarks may condition the effect of a politicians' trait. Looking at the predicted values, we can see that these differences are driven by the effects of negative traits among respondents with secondary education. Respondents with secondary education were more punitive of politicians with negative traits that violate their normative benchmarks.

⁴⁴ Full regression tables are presented at the end of this document.

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Respondents with Primary Education: We find no significant interactions among respondents with primary education. Although Figure A suggests a difference in the AME of a positive trait between respondents rating a congruent and incongruent trait, the confidence intervals overlap. Likewise the predicted values also have overlapping confidence intervals.

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Short Experiment: Trust in Politician

Figure A - Average Marginal Effect

Conditional on Benchmark-Trait Congruency and Levels of Education





Figure B - Predicted Trust Levels

Traits, Benchmark-Trait Congruency, and Levels of Education



Overview Full Experiment (Figures C and D)


The short experiment is less realistic since political information is seldom provided along a single dimension. It also doesn't enable us to tease out the effects in a more detailed manner along each benchmark-trait dimension. We do so in Figures C and D.

Traits and Education:

Results: We first assess whether there is heterogeneity in the effect of each trait across education groups. Looking at Figure C, the AME of the positive traits: ability, integrity and reliability stand out among higher educated respondents. We also find significant interaction effects in Table S7 Model 2 for ability. This suggests that the trait ability has a stronger effect among higher educated respondents.

Traits, Benchmarks and Education Levels

Figure C: AME of Positive Traits on Trust in Politician
Conditional on Education



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
Summary (Full Experiment Figure D):

Next we turn to our main robustness check, assessing whether the effects of benchmark-trait congruence differ across education groups. Our main result in the paper suggest that normative benchmarks do not condition the effect of positive traits on trust. Here, we assess whether these null-finding generally hold for different education group. We visualize our results in Figure D below.

Results: We observe no substantive differences in the average marginal effect of a positive trait across levels of education. Within each education group, the AME of positive traits is approximately the same among respondents whose normative benchmark is identical to the trait and respondents whose normative benchmark is different than the modeled trait. The only distinction appears for the trait ability among higher educated respondents. There we see that higher educated respondents who consider ability as an important benchmark to trust also rate able politicians more positively. However, we find no significant interaction in our models. These results largely align with our conclusions in the paper.

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Figure D: AME of Positive Trait on Trust in Politician
 Conditional on Benchmark-Trait Congruency and Education



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Regression Tables

Table S6. Short Experiment: Heterogeneity across Education Groups						
<u>Dependent Variable: Trust in Politician</u>	M1: Simple Model		M2: Traits * Education		M3: Full Model	
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>
(Intercept)	2.34 ***	0.17	2.35 ***	0.18	2.40 ***	0.19
Main Effects						
Positive Trait	0.88 ***	0.04	0.88 ***	0.11	0.76 ***	0.13
Congruent Benchmark	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.04	-0.11	0.16
<u>Education (ref: Primary)</u>						
Secondary	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.09	0.10	0.11
Higher	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.02	0.11
<u>Vignette Candidate Party (ref: GroenLinks)</u>						
CDA	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.05
PVV	-0.12 *	0.05	-0.12 *	0.05	-0.12 *	0.05
<u>Vignette Candidate Gender (ref: male)</u>						
Female Politician	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04
<u>Respondent Party (ref: VVD) & Out-Party Politician</u>						
d66	-0.01	0.08	-0.01	0.08	-0.01	0.08
groenlinks	-	0.08	-	0.08	-	0.08
other	0.33 ***		0.33 ***		0.34 ***	
sp	-	0.07	-	0.07	-	0.07
cda	0.27 ***		0.27 ***		0.27 ***	
pvv	-	0.08	-	0.08	-	0.08
pvda	0.45 ***		0.45 ***		0.45 ***	
fvd	-	0.08	-	0.08	-	0.08
cda	0.35 ***		0.35 ***		0.35 ***	
pvv	-	0.08	-	0.08	-	0.08
pvda	0.75 ***		0.75 ***		0.76 ***	
fvd	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.08
cda	-	0.10	-	0.10	-	0.10
pvv	0.40 ***		0.40 ***		0.41 ***	
<u>Respondent Gender (ref: Men)</u>						
Women	0.10 *	0.05	0.10 *	0.05	0.10 *	0.05
<u>Respondent Age_Group (Ref: 18-25)</u>						
26_to_35	0.10	0.22	0.10	0.22	0.09	0.22
36_to_45	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.18
46_to_55	-0.09	0.16	-0.09	0.16	-0.10	0.16
56_to_65	-0.14	0.16	-0.14	0.16	-0.15	0.16
66_to_75	-0.14	0.15	-0.14	0.15	-0.15	0.15
76+	-0.02	0.16	-0.02	0.16	-0.03	0.16
<u>Interactions: In-Party Politician</u>						
In-Party Politician	0.74 ***	0.07	0.74 ***	0.07	0.73 ***	0.07
<u>Interactions: Trait * Education</u>						
Positive Trait * Secondary			0.01	0.13	-0.01	0.15
Positive Trait * Higher			0.01	0.12	0.10	0.14
<u>Interactions: Trait * Benchmark * Education</u>						

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Table S6. Short Experiment: Heterogeneity across Education Groups						
<u>Dependent Variable: Trust in Politician</u>	M1: Simple Model		M2: Traits * Education		M3: Full Model	
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>
<u><i>Effects for Respondents w. Primary Education</i></u>						
Positive Trait * Congruent Benchmark					0.38	0.23
<u><i>Effects for Negative Politician's Traits</i></u>						
Congruent Benchmark * Secondary					-0.17	0.19
Congruent Benchmark * Higher					0.09	0.18
<u><i>Triple Interaction Effect</i></u>						
Positive Trait * Congruent Benchmark * Secondary					0.07	0.27
Positive Trait * Congruent Benchmark * Higher					-0.29	0.25
Observations	2290		2290		2290	
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.248 / 0.241		0.248 / 0.240		0.253 / 0.243	
<i>* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001</i>						

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Table S7. Full Experiment: Heterogeneity across Education Groups						
<u>Dependent Variable: Trust in Politician</u>	M1: Simple Model		M2: Traits* Education		M3: Full Model	
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>
(Intercept)	1.68 ***	0.15	1.77 ***	0.18	1.78 ***	0.23
Main Effects						
<i>Object's Positive Trustworthiness Traits (Wave 2)</i>						
ability	0.33 ***	0.03	0.20 **	0.07	0.18 *	0.09
integrity	0.31 ***	0.03	0.22 **	0.07	0.28 **	0.09
benevolence	0.41 ***	0.03	0.44 ***	0.07	0.45 ***	0.08
responsiveness	0.15 ***	0.03	0.20 **	0.07	0.18	0.11
transparency	0.17 ***	0.03	0.18 **	0.07	0.11	0.10
reliability	0.13 ***	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.07
decisiveness	0.21 ***	0.03	0.22 **	0.07	0.18 *	0.08
empathy	0.19 ***	0.03	0.16 *	0.07	0.14	0.08
charisma	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.07
<i>Normative Benchmarks (Wave 1)</i>						
benchmark: ability	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.12	0.11
benchmark: integrity	-0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.04	-0.02	0.11
benchmark: benevolence	0.10 *	0.04	0.10 *	0.04	0.30 *	0.13
benchmark: responsiveness	-0.09 *	0.04	-0.09 *	0.04	-0.13	0.11
benchmark: transparency	-0.07	0.04	-0.07	0.04	-0.14	0.11
benchmark: reliability	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.17
benchmark: decisiveness	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.12
benchmark: empathy	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.14
benchmark: charisma	-0.05	0.08	-0.03	0.08	-0.41	0.26
benchmark: differentnamely	-0.17 *	0.08	-0.17	0.09	-0.17 *	0.09
benchmark: dontknow	0.11	0.22	0.13	0.22	0.10	0.22
<i>Education (ref: Primary)</i>						
Secondary	-0.01	0.04	0.00	0.12	0.12	0.24
Higher	-0.08	0.04	-0.27 *	0.12	-0.35	0.23
Vignette Candidate Party (ref: GroenLinks)						
CDA	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03
PVV	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
Vignette Candidate Gender (ref: male)						
Female Politician	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03
Respondent Party (ref: VVD) & Out-Party Politician						
d66	-0.04	0.06	-0.04	0.06	-0.05	0.06
groenlinks	-	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.06
	0.29 ***		0.29 ***		0.28 ***	
other	-	0.05	-	0.05	-	0.05
	0.29 ***		0.29 ***		0.28 ***	
sp	-	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.06
	0.33 ***		0.33 ***		0.33 ***	
cda	-	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.06
	0.23 ***		0.23 ***		0.23 ***	

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Table S7. Full Experiment: Heterogeneity across Education Groups						
<u>Dependent Variable: Trust in Politician</u>	M1: Simple Model		M2: Traits * Education		M3: Full Model	
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>
pwv	-	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.06
	0.55 ***		0.54 ***		0.53 ***	
pvda	-0.03	0.06	-0.02	0.06	-0.03	0.06
fvd	-	0.06	-	0.06	-	0.06
	0.33 ***		0.33 ***		0.33 ***	
Respondent Gender (ref: Men)						
Women	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03
Age_Group (Ref: 18-25)						
26_to_35	-0.15	0.14	-0.14	0.14	-0.13	0.14
36_to_45	-0.34 *	0.13	-0.33 *	0.13	-0.30 *	0.13
46_to_55	-0.24 *	0.12	-0.24 *	0.12	-0.23 *	0.12
56_to_65	-0.26 *	0.11	-0.25 *	0.11	-0.25 *	0.11
66_to_75	-0.26 *	0.11	-0.26 *	0.11	-0.25 *	0.11
76+	-0.16	0.11	-0.15	0.11	-0.13	0.11
Interactions						
In-Party Politician	0.48 ***	0.05	0.48 ***	0.05	0.47 ***	0.05
Interactions: Object's Positive Trait * Respondent's Education						
Ability * Secondary			0.07	0.08	0.06	0.11
Ability * Higher			0.19 *	0.08	0.10	0.10
Integrity * Secondary			0.04	0.08	-0.04	0.12
Integrity * Higher			0.15	0.08	0.09	0.11
Benevolence * Secondary			-0.05	0.08	-0.03	0.10
Benevolence * Higher			-0.04	0.08	-0.04	0.09
Responsiveness * Secondary			-0.06	0.08	-0.10	0.13
Responsiveness * Higher			-0.05	0.08	-0.02	0.12
Transparency * Secondary			0.00	0.08	0.14	0.12
Transparency * Higher			-0.03	0.08	0.06	0.11
Reliability * Secondary			-0.03	0.08	-0.02	0.09
Reliability * Higher			0.15	0.08	0.17 *	0.08
Decisiveness * Secondary			-0.03	0.08	-0.01	0.10
Decisiveness * Higher			-0.01	0.08	0.05	0.09
Empathy * Secondary			0.07	0.08	0.10	0.09
Empathy * Higher			0.01	0.08	0.05	0.09
Charisma * Secondary			-0.03	0.08	-0.03	0.09
Charisma * Higher			0.00	0.08	-0.01	0.08
Interactions: Object's Positive Trait * Respondent's Congruent Benchmark * Respondent's Education						
<i>Effects for Respondents w. Primary Education</i>						
Ability * Benchmark					0.07	0.14
Integrity * Benchmark					-0.16	0.14
Benevolence * Benchmark					-0.09	0.16
Responsiveness * Benchmark					0.04	0.14
Transparency * Benchmark					0.16	0.14

APPENDICES

Table S7. Full Experiment: Heterogeneity across Education Groups						
<u>Dependent Variable: Trust in Politician</u>	M1: Simple Model		M2: Traits * Education		M3: Full Model	
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>
Reliability * Benchmark					0.04	0.22
Decisiveness * Benchmark					0.12	0.16
Empathy * Benchmark					0.12	0.18
Charisma * Benchmark					-0.19	0.39
<i>Effects for Negative Politician's Traits</i>						
Secondary * Benchmark: Ability					-0.09	0.13
Higher * Benchmark: Ability					-0.21	0.12
Secondary * Benchmark: Integrity					-0.01	0.13
Higher * Benchmark: Integrity					0.05	0.12
Secondary * Benchmark: Benevolence					-0.23	0.15
Higher * Benchmark: Benevolence					-0.17	0.14
Secondary * Benchmark: Responsiveness					-0.07	0.13
Higher * Benchmark: Responsiveness					0.12	0.12
Secondary * Benchmark: Transparency					0.08	0.13
Higher * Benchmark: Transparency					0.14	0.12
Secondary * Benchmark: Reliability					0.12	0.21
Higher * Benchmark: Reliability					0.04	0.20
Secondary * Benchmark: Decisiveness					-0.10	0.15
Higher * Benchmark: Decisiveness					0.11	0.14
Secondary * Benchmark: Empathy					-0.06	0.17
Higher * Benchmark: Empathy					0.16	0.16
Secondary * Benchmark: Charisma					0.33	0.31
Higher * Benchmark: Charisma					0.48	0.30
<i>Triple Interaction Effect</i>						

APPENDIX CHAPTER 2

Table S7. Full Experiment: Heterogeneity across Education Groups						
<u>Dependent Variable: Trust in Politician</u>	M1: Simple Model		M2: Traits * Education		M3: Full Model	
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>
Ability * Benchmark * Secondary					-0.01	0.17
Ability * Benchmark * Higher					0.14	0.16
Integrity * Benchmark * Secondary					0.20	0.17
Integrity * Benchmark * Higher					0.15	0.16
Benevolence * Benchmark * Secondary					-0.04	0.20
Benevolence * Benchmark * Higher					0.08	0.18
Responsiveness * Benchmark * Secondary					0.03	0.17
Responsiveness * Benchmark * Higher					-0.09	0.16
Transparency * Benchmark * Secondary					-0.31	0.17
Transparency * Benchmark * Higher					-0.19	0.16
Reliability * Benchmark * Secondary					-0.15	0.28
Reliability * Benchmark * Higher					-0.23	0.26
Decisiveness * Benchmark * Secondary					-0.01	0.19
Decisiveness * Benchmark * Higher					-0.21	0.18
Empathy * Benchmark * Secondary					-0.19	0.22
Empathy * Benchmark * Higher					-0.24	0.21
Charisma * Benchmark * Secondary					0.04	0.46
Charisma * Benchmark * Higher					0.32	0.43
Observations	4969		4969		4969	
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.195 / 0.189		0.200 / 0.190		0.210 / 0.193	
			* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001			