



UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

Political trust: Pillar or peril for democracy

Empirical tests of the consequences of political trust on individuals' attitudes and behaviors

Ouattara, E.M.S.

Publication date

2025

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Ouattara, E. M. S. (2025). *Political trust: Pillar or peril for democracy: Empirical tests of the consequences of political trust on individuals' attitudes and behaviors*. [Thesis, fully internal, Universiteit van Amsterdam].

General rights

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

Appendix Chapter 3. Distrusting Democrats

APPENDIX CHAPTER 3

**Table A1. Decision-Making Preferences (Dependent Variables):
Descriptive Table**

Dependent Variables: Political Decision-Making Preference by Survey Wave

<u>Wave</u> <u>Year</u>	<u>mean</u>	<u>median</u>	<u>std.dev</u>	<u>min</u>	<u>max</u>	<u>total</u>
Delegate						
2017	3.96	4	0.83	1	5	1175
2019	3.80	4	0.83	1	5	859
2020	3.80	4	0.83	1	5	1080
Elected PM						
2017	3.15	3	1.18	1	5	1422
2019	3.03	3	1.18	1	5	824
2020	2.99	3	1.15	1	5	1018
Referenda						
2017	2.58	2	1.13	1	5	1174
2019	2.71	3	1.12	1	5	859
2020	2.72	3	1.06	1	5	1080
Referenda (importance)						
2017	3.35	4	1.26	1	5	1433
2019	3.13	3	1.24	1	5	841
2020	3.13	3	1.19	1	5	1035

APPENDICES

**Table A1. Decision-Making Preferences (Dependent Variables):
Descriptive Table**

Dependent Variables: Political Decision-Making Preference by Survey Wave

<u>Wave</u>	<u>mean</u>	<u>median</u>	<u>std.dev</u>	<u>min</u>	<u>max</u>	<u>total</u>
Strong leader						
2017	3.10	3	1.06	1	5	1408
2019	3.07	3	1.01	1	5	818
2020	3.13	3	1.04	1	5	1017

APPENDIX CHAPTER 3

Table A2. Low Political Trust: Descriptive Table

Low trust in Government, Parliament, and Political Parties by Survey Wave

<u>Wave Year</u>	<u>mean</u>	<u>median</u>	<u>std.dev</u>	<u>min</u>	<u>max</u>	<u>total</u>
Distrust in Government						
2017	2.61	3	0.72	1	4	1178
2019	2.62	3	0.68	1	4	860
2020	2.41	2	0.69	1	4	1081
Distrust in Parliament						
2017	2.58	3	0.71	1	4	1178
2019	2.60	3	0.67	1	4	860
2020	2.47	2	0.67	1	4	1081
Distrust in Political Parties						
2017	2.87	3	0.65	1	4	1178
2019	2.90	3	0.64	1	4	860
2020	2.84	3	0.63	1	4	1081

Table A3. Decision-Making Preferences and Low Political Trust: Random Slope Models without Confounders

	M1: Delegate	M2: Strong Leader	M3: Referenda	M4: Referenda Important	M5: Elect PM
middle	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.07
higher	0.22 ***	0.05	-0.19 **	0.07	-0.31 ***
other	-0.14	0.22	0.28	-0.31	0.25
<i>Random Effects</i>					
σ^2	0.38	0.56	0.36	0.47	0.54
τ_{00}	0.21 id	0.42 id	0.61 id	0.80 id	0.59 id
τ_{11}	0.00 id.within	0.00 id.within	0.00 id.within	0.01 id.within	0.01 id.within
ρ_{01}	0.35 id	-0.70 id	-1.00 id	0.44 id	0.10 id
ICC	0.36	0.43		0.63	0.53
N	1025 id	1018 id	1025 id	1016 id	1012 id
Observations	2503	2418	2503	2453	2413
Marginal R ² / Cond. R ²	0.126 / 0.440	0.082 / 0.476	0.408 / NA	0.174 / 0.695	0.170 / 0.607

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Random Intercept, Random Slope Model

Note: Model 3 above is singular. It has a perfect correlation (-1) between the random slope and random intercept. The variance of declining trust (within) across individuals is close to 0 = 3.780e-06 (rounded to 0). Accordingly, we fit a simpler random intercept model in which the effects of declining trust does not vary between individual. We rely on the random intercept model in the main paper.

APPENDICES

Table A4. Decision-Making Preferences and Low Political Trust Random Slope Models with Confounders										
<i>Predictors</i> (Intercept)	M1: Delegate		M2: Strong Leader		M3: Referenda		M4: Referenda Important		M5: Elect PM	
	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se</i>
Wave (ref: 2017)	4.07 ***	0.35	3.63 ***	0.47	2.65 ***	0.45	2.69 ***	0.54	3.69 ***	0.50
2019	-0.20 ***	0.03	-0.07	0.04	0.17 ***	0.03	-0.16 ***	0.04	-0.06	0.04
2020	-0.21 ***	0.03	-0.05	0.04	0.20 ***	0.03	-0.15 ***	0.04	-0.06	0.04
Low Political Trust										
Within-resp	-0.04 *	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.03 *	0.02	0.04 *	0.02	0.06 **	0.02
Between-resp	-0.12 ***	0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.22 ***	0.02	0.25 ***	0.02	0.22 ***	0.02
Vote Choice 2017 (ref: coalition)										
Left Opposition	0.00	0.06	-0.23 **	0.08	0.27 ***	0.08	0.34 ***	0.10	0.25 **	0.09
Radical Right Opposition	0.05	0.07	-0.17	0.10	0.73 ***	0.10	0.72 ***	0.12	0.60 ***	0.11
Other	-0.04	0.10	0.02	0.14	0.59 ***	0.15	0.60 ***	0.17	0.44 **	0.16
No Vote	-0.13	0.11	-0.21	0.14	0.44 **	0.15	0.55 **	0.17	0.34 *	0.16
Efficacy: Understand	0.04	0.03	-0.02	0.04	-0.06	0.04	0.01	0.05	-0.10 *	0.04
Efficacy: Qualified	0.06	0.03	-0.06	0.04	0.01	0.04	-0.05	0.05	-0.03	0.04
Political Interest	0.05	0.03	-0.12 **	0.04	-0.04	0.04	-0.07	0.05	-0.06	0.05
Left-right position	0.00	0.01	0.07 ***	0.01	0.06 ***	0.01	0.04 *	0.02	0.03 *	0.02

**Table A4. Decision-Making Preferences and Low Political Trust:
Random Slope Models with Confounders**

	M1: Delegate	M2: Strong Leader	M3: Referenda	M4: Referenda Important	M5: Elect PM
Household income (log)	0.02	0.04 -0.03	0.05 -0.15 ***	0.05 -0.09	0.05 -0.15 **
Gender: Female	-0.12 **	0.04 0.07	0.06 0.01	0.06 -0.08	0.07 -0.05
Age (ref: 18-24)					
25-34	-0.08	0.14 0.10	0.19 0.01	0.17 0.08	0.20 -0.05
35-44	-0.21	0.15 0.19	0.20 -0.06	0.18 0.05	0.22 -0.03
45-54	-0.01	0.15 0.15	0.19 -0.14	0.18 -0.02	0.21 -0.14
55-64	-0.05	0.14 0.14	0.19 -0.17	0.18 -0.07	0.21 -0.18
65+	0.01	0.14 0.33	0.18 -0.13	0.17 -0.06	0.21 -0.21
Education (ref: low)					
middle	0.03	0.05 0.05	0.07 0.03	0.07 0.11	0.08 -0.04
higher	0.15 **	0.06 -0.11	0.08 -0.18 *	0.07 -0.08	0.09 -0.17 *
other	-0.34	0.23 0.40	0.30 -0.48	0.27 -0.78 *	0.34 -0.53

APPENDICES

**Table A4. Decision-Making Preferences and Low Political Trust:
Random Slope Models with Confounders**

	M1: Delegate	M2: Strong Leader	M3: Referenda	M4: Referenda Important	M5: Elect PM
<i>Random Effects</i>					
σ^2	0.38	0.56	0.36	0.47	0.51
τ_{00} (id)	0.20 id	0.41 id	0.55 id	0.78 id	0.56 id
τ_{11} (id: Within resp)	0.00 id.within	0.00 id.within	0.00 id.within	0.01 id.within	0.02 id.within
ρ_{01} (id)	1.00 id	-0.41 id	-0.29 id	0.56 id	-0.02 id
ICC	0.35	0.42	0.61	0.63	0.53
N	833 id	829 id	833 id	830 id	828 id
Observations	2204	2140	2204	2170	2137
Marginal R2 / Cond. R2	0.136 / 0.438	0.103 / 0.482	0.272 / 0.714	0.223 / 0.710	0.217 / 0.629
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001					
<i>Random Intercept, Random Slope Model</i>					

**Table A5. Decision-Making Preferences and Low Political Trust
Random Intercept Models Without Top 5% trust/distrust**

<i>Predictors</i>	M1:Delegate		M2:Strong Leader		M3:Referenda		M4:Referenda Important		M5:Elect PM	
	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se.</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se.</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se.</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se.</i>	<i>coef.</i>	<i>se.</i>
(Intercept)	3.79 ***	0.4	3.70 ***	0.53	2.88 ***	0.53	2.73 ***	0.62	3.70 ***	0.58
Wave (ref: 2017)										
2019	-0.22 ***	0.04	-0.08	0.04	0.17 ***	0.03	-0.15 ***	0.04	-0.06	0.04
2020	-0.21 ***	0.04	-0.03	0.05	0.18 ***	0.04	-0.17 ***	0.04	-0.04	0.04
Low Political Trust										
within	-0.04 *	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.07 **	0.02
between	-0.12 ***	0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.22 ***	0.03	0.26 ***	0.03	0.27 ***	0.03
Political Attitudes (2017 baseline)										
Efficacy: Understand	0.05	0.03	-0.06	0.05	-0.07	0.05	0.02	0.06	-0.09	0.05
Efficacy: Qualified	0.06	0.03	-0.07	0.04	0	0.05	-0.05	0.06	0	0.05
Political Interest	0.07 *	0.03	-0.10 *	0.05	-0.03	0.05	-0.06	0.06	-0.07	0.05
Left-right position	0	0.01	0.07 ***	0.01	0.06 ***	0.02	0.04 *	0.02	0.03	0.02
Vote Choice 2017 (ref: Coalition Party)										
Left Opp.	-0.03	0.06	-0.23 **	0.08	0.35 ***	0.09	0.38 ***	0.11	0.31 **	0.09
Right Opp.	0.03	0.08	-0.18	0.11	0.70 ***	0.11	0.69 ***	0.13	0.52 ***	0.12
No Vote	-0.04	0.11	-0.28	0.15	0.40 *	0.16	0.54 **	0.19	0.47 **	0.17
Other	-0.15	0.12	0.01	0.16	0.46 **	0.17	0.56 **	0.2	0.36 *	0.18
Household income (log)	0.03	0.04	-0.05	0.05	-0.17 ***	0.05	-0.1	0.06	-0.19 **	0.06
Gender: Female	-0.12 **	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.01	0.07	-0.1	0.08	-0.1	0.07

APPENDICES

**Table A5. Decision-Making Preferences and Low Political Trust:
Random Intercept Models Without Top 5% trust/distrust**

	M1:Delegate	M2:Strong Leader	M3:Referenda	M4:Referenda Important	M5:Elect PM
Age (ref: 18 to 24)					
25 to 34	0.02	0.16	0.19	0.21	-0.08
35 to 44	-0.12	0.17	0.34	0.23	-0.13
45 to 54	0.1	0.17	0.18	0.22	-0.2
55 to 64	0.05	0.16	0.31	0.21	-0.23
65 +	0.12	0.16	0.45 *	0.21	-0.21
Education (ref: low)					
middle	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.08	0.01
higher	0.16 *	0.06	-0.04	0.08	-0.16 *
other	-0.33	0.23	0.45	0.3	-0.47
<i>Random Effects</i>					
σ^2	0.37	0.55	0.35	0.48	0.53
τ_{00}	0.19 _{id}	0.40 _{id}	0.58 _{id}	0.80 _{id}	0.57 _{id}
ICC	0.34	0.42	0.63	0.62	0.52
N	708 _{id}	704 _{id}	708 _{id}	705 _{id}	704 _{id}
Observations	1874	1818	1874	1845	1815
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	0.125 / 0.426	0.095 / 0.473	0.210 / 0.705	0.179 / 0.690	0.196 / 0.610

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Random Intercept Model without 5% trust/distrusting respondents

Note: The approach in this robustness check limits the number of observations (influencing our standard errors), yet the effects are essentially robust with estimates oriented in the same direction as in our other models.