Price discovery with fallible choice

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Index

ABM, see Agent Based Modeling
Agent Based Modeling, 21, 143
algorithm
AA, 21, 53, 54, 67, 68, 70, 73, 76, 78, 79, 118, 155, 161, 163
C-D approximation, 16, 175
eBAS, 53, 54, 66–70, 73, 74, 118, 157, 159
eEMA, 53–55, 67–70, 72, 118, 152, 155–158
eGD, 53–55, 66–72, 74–79, 82–84, 97, 104, 105, 109, 111, 117–119, 164, 166
eME, 53, 54, 66–72, 75–79, 117–119, 167, 168
eRnd, 53–55, 67, 68, 70, 156
GDA, 53–55, 155, 164, 165
Kaplan, 112
MEA, 53, 54, 167
MEW, 53, 54, 66–68, 70, 167
PID, 14
Smale, 14, 30
sniper, 112
TU, 53–55, 66–70, 73, 74, 115, 116, 118, 168, 173, 174
Van der Laan/Talman, 15
ZIP, 21, 53–55, 63, 67–70, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 117–119, 155, 158, 160

arbitrage
as mental accounting, 5, 98, 122, 129
calibration, 102, 108
impact, 104
learning, 121
vs strategic offers, 33
awareness of buyers/sellers
calibration, 165, 167
defined, 147

calibration, see also sensitivity analyses
adaptive expectations, 156
awareness of buyers/sellers, 165, 167
choice between opportunities, 97
entropy sensitivity, 95
expectation formation, 65
haggling, 156
markup, 157, 158, 166, 167, 171
pre-calibration, 155

capturing human trading behavior, 77, 105, 123
CDA, see Continuous Double Auction
choice, see also fallible choice
comprehensive, 2, 9, 87
entropy-sensitive preferences, 92, 97, 107
expected utility maximization, 97, 107, 121
prospect theory, 90, 97, 107, 121
rules of thumb, 97, 105, 121, 149
sequential, 2, 87–90, 133, 150
Cobb-Douglas approximation, 16, 175
calculating equilibria
C-D approximation, 16, 175
Smale, 14
Van der Laan/Talman, 15
Continuous Double Auction, 17
and disequilibrium, 145
and disequilibrium theory, 22
compared to Hahn-process, 18
in Anderson et al. (2004), 27
in FACTS, 49
replacing intelligence, 85
signaling, 85

correction
C-D approximation, 181
concentration, 60, 61
Lyapunov function, 29
speed of, 30, 61, 98, 116, 133
visual inspection, 60, 61, 70

critical discussion
aggregate excess demand, 3, 23
as an ideal, 83
censoring, 45
dominance of AA-traders, 161
equivalence of prospects, 92–94
favorable surprise, 70
insensitive beliefs, 77, 83
institutions vs intelligence, 85
insufficient transactions, 74, 77, 80
interpretation SMD-result, 22
optimization and disequilibrium, 89
private/public prices, 19
quadrant model, 45
role of the auctioneer, 12

cumulative prospect theory, see prospect theory

economic theory
aggregate excess demand, 3, 10, 23
disequilibrium awareness, 84, 145
disequilibrium theory, 22, 46, 81, 89, 133, 145
entropy-sensitive preferences, 92, 97, 107
expected utility theory, 87, 90, 91, 94, 107
fallible choice, 87
folding back lotteries, 147
general equilibrium theory, 9
gross substitution (GS), 10, 11, 176
market failure, 85, 131, 132, 140
Marshallian path, 71, 168
mental accounting, 98
monopolistic competition, 5, 18, 20, 116
normal vs usual demand, 71, 81, 168
opportunities as prospects, 144
paradoxes of choice, 88
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>price formation</td>
<td>12, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prospect theory</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quantity signals</td>
<td>84, 133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rules of thumb</td>
<td>22, 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saari-Simon result</td>
<td>14, 16, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saari-Simon result</td>
<td>14, 16, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarf examples</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMD result</td>
<td>10, 11, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stability theory</td>
<td>9, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utility of gambling</td>
<td>93, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walras’ Law</td>
<td>10, 176, 177, 181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP)</td>
<td>10, 176, 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efficiency</td>
<td>65, 123, 124, 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entropy-sensitive preferences</td>
<td>defined, 93 embedding, 94 explaining paradoxes of choice, 88, 93 learning, 120, 121 pre-calibration, 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equilibrium</td>
<td>computation, 14, 175 conjectural, 20 core as fix-price equilibria, 133 end of period allocation, 43, 76, 98 end states of the simulation, 131 introspection, 46, 81 market failure, 131, 132, 140 shift, 27, 46, 71, 81, 82 Walrasian, 10, 12, 26, 46, 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP, see entropy-sensitive preferences</td>
<td>experiments formation, 52, 65, 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACTS</td>
<td>calibration, 65, 97 design, 49, 153 elements, 143 global parameters, 56 robot behavior, 52, 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fallible choice</td>
<td>entropy-sensitive preferences, 92 folding back lotteries, 147 ignoring buyers/sellers, 147, 165–167 mental accounting, 98 no introspection, 46 why choice is fallible, 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gamble, see prospect</td>
<td>gross substitution property, see economic theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haggling</td>
<td>defined, 154 pre-calibration, 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law of demand and supply</td>
<td>13, 14, 19, 178, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>learning</td>
<td>3, 5, 21, 27, 113, 114, 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lottery, see prospect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>market failure</td>
<td>16, 131, 132, 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>market protocol</td>
<td>Anderson et al. (2004), 26, 143 asynchronous trading, 50 synchronized trading, 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>markup</td>
<td>calibration, 55, 157, 158, 164, 166, 167, 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defined</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interpretation</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>learning</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loglikelihood estimates</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>simulated payoff matrix</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stylized facts</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MaxEnt</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME, see MaxEnt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>methodology</td>
<td>assessing algorithms, 57 measuring convergence, 28, 59–61 measuring orbiting, 28, 45, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orbiting</td>
<td>clock hand model, 29, 62 cumulative angles, 62 Lyapunov function, 29 quadrant model, 29, 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P, see Cobb-Douglas approximation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>price expectations</td>
<td>beliefs, 35, 52, 63, 69 no arbitrage prices, 76, 166 plausible prices, 168, 170 point expectations, 52, 63, 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prospect</td>
<td>90, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quantity setting</td>
<td>31, 40, 55, 56, 80, 84, 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rationality</td>
<td>competitive pressure, 3 ecological, 22, 112 equivalence of prospects, 92 information, 84 of choice, 87 sophisticated traders, 45 violations, 87, 88, 93, 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rationing</td>
<td>85, 133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reservation prices</td>
<td>35, 55 conditional, 170 notional, 171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

unconditional, 169
result
algorithms
improved, 161, 164
new, 157, 166–168
arbitrage
as mental accounting, 98
calibration methodology, 56
calibration of choice, 97
calibration of expectation formation, 77, 111
characterization excess quantities, 133
choice by rule of thumb, 97, 121
Cobb-Douglas approximation, 175
ecological rationality
arbitrage, 121
attitudes toward a target, 115
choice between opportunities, 121
entropy-sensitive preferences, 117
expectation formation, 117
markup, 115
monopolistic competition, 116
entropy-sensitive preferences
embedding, 94
explaining paradoxes of choice, 93
FACTS, 3, 49, 143
foresight through introspection, 45
market failure
probability, 134, 137
sensitivity to initial expectations, 138
markup
loglikelihood estimates, 37
simulated payoff matrix, 38
no monopolistic competition, 35, 83, 116
orbiting as lack of feedback, 63, 84
shift of equilibrium, 82
significance of quantity setting, 98, 115
stylized facts, 32
rules of thumb
derivation, 149, 151
in calibration, 97
in learning, 22, 121
sensitivity to, 76
Scarf examples
as proposed, 11, 13
in Anderson et al. (2004), 2, 26, 27
sensitivity analyses
calibration of expectations, 63, 76, 111
initial expectations, 138
number of simulations, 61
number of transactions, 80
urgent acceptances, 75
simulation
scripted, 50, 51, 56, 59, 61
semi-scripted, 51, 56, 60, 62
unscripted, 51
SMD result, see economic theory
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu result, see economic theory
stability
defined, 10
Gale, 13, 111
Scarf, 13
stylized facts, 32
arbitrage, 32
end of period allocations, 43
preference for markets, 42
quantity setting, 40
regular vs strategic actions, 32
reservation prices, 35
tâtonnement, see price formation
uncertainty, 2, 35, 38–40, 42
Walras’ Law, see economic theory
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, see economic theory
Bibliography


