UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

The role of implicit attitudes in populist radical right support

Bos, L.; Sheets, P.; Boomgaarden, H.G.

DOI

[10.1111/pops.12401](https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12401)

Publication date

2018

Document Version

Final published version

Published in

Political Psychology

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Bos, L., Sheets, P., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2018). The role of implicit attitudes in populist radical right support. *Political Psychology*, 39(1), 69–87. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12401>

General rights

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

The Role of Implicit Attitudes in Populist Radical-Right Support

Linda Bos

University of Amsterdam

Penelope Sheets

University of Amsterdam

Hajo G. Boomgaarden

University of Vienna

Previous research on the populist radical right (PRR) has focused exclusively on explicit measures in explaining support for these contested political players. In this study, we explore the role of implicit attitudes in predicting vote likelihood for a PRR party. We use an online survey (n = 773) among Dutch respondents in which we measured implicit attitudes towards the Dutch PRR Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) with a Single-Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT). The results show that the implicit measure predicts vote likelihood in general, as well as in ways beyond that accounted for by traditional explanations of PRR party support. Importantly, the results also show that the impact of implicit attitudes on intended vote choice is greater for less extreme voters; in other words, those voters less likely to say they would vote for the PVV are more heavily influenced at an implicit level, beyond their awareness. This suggests that implicit attitudes of the PRR party may be quite useful for explaining support among voters who would not normally self-report it.

KEY WORDS: voting/participation, quantitative, attitudes, research methods/assessment

In recent years, scholarly work on European populist radical-right (PRR) voting has centered around the idea that preference for this type of party can be accounted for using a few critical explanations such as ideological closeness, anti-immigrant attitudes, and political cynicism (e.g., Kehrberg, 2015; Mudde, 2007; Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013; Zhirkov, 2014). However, work in political psychology shows that implicit attitudes towards parties and candidates in general predict political judgment and behavior in ways beyond that accounted for by self-reported measures (Friese, Bluemke, & Wänke, 2007; Gawronski, Galdi, & Arcuri, 2015; Maier et al., 2015; Nosek, Graham, & Hawkins, 2010; Rocatto & Zogmeister, 2010), especially in contested or socially sensitive domains. Relatedly, we know that latent partisan support for these parties is often higher than explicit party support (John & Margetts, 2009). That is, many voters sympathize with populist radical-right parties, regardless whether they actually act upon their latent preferences in the voting booth. At the same time, voter surveys often return lower levels of support for these parties than election results do (Hooghe & Reeskens, 2007). Thus, clarification about the relevance and utility of implicit attitudes to PRR support is needed, following the call of political psychologists to assess the role of implicit attitudes in

affecting political attitudes in general and voting behavior in particular (Gawronski et al., 2015; Glaser & Finn, 2013; Ksiazkiewicz & Hedrick, 2013).

We focus on PRR support for several reasons. First of all, these parties are often contested, which means that voting for them can be understood as behavior that is undesirable from the perspective of social norms. Even though there are many differences between these parties across different countries, common ground is found in their nationalist/nativist agenda, their authoritarianism, and their populist ideology (Mudde, 2007; Taggart, 2000). These features make populist radical-right democracy at odds with liberal democracy, at times leading to severe political responses (e.g., *cordons sanitaires*; Van Spanje & Van der Brug, 2007), legal responses (e.g., monitoring parties, prohibiting their public meetings, and hate-speech prosecution; Fennema, 2000; Van Spanje & de Vreese, 2015), and media responses (e.g., silencing, ridiculing, and stigmatizing; Akkerman, 2011; Schafraad, d'Haenens, Scheepers, & Wester, 2012).

At the same time, such parties are increasingly successful in Europe, winning representation in a variety of national contexts including the Netherlands, France, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden and are generally increasing both membership and visibility in recent years. Therefore, such parties are clearly not so *overly* contested as to be entirely off-limits. That is, this growing popularity means we can expect quite some variation among voters in terms of their self-reported attitudes towards these parties, as well as the potential influence of—and disconnect with—their implicit or latent attitudes. Further, research recognizes that implicit attitudes predict voting behavior differently for different types of voters (e.g., Friese, Smith, Plischke, Bluemke, & Nosek, 2012), indicating a need for further elaboration of the role implicit attitudes play in vote-choice models.

In this study, we explore the role of implicit attitudes in predicting two dimensions of vote likelihood for a PRR party. Do implicit attitudes indeed predict vote likelihood for a PRR party? If so, do they do so even when controlling for the primary drivers of PRR support? And, to what extent are these effects conditional—that is, do they hold more (or only) for certain people? In answering these questions, this study makes several contributions to the literature. It brings together two bodies of scholarship—that on implicit attitudes and that on the populist radical right—in an innovative study design. We not only test the relevance of the implicit measure of PRR support in a way that is in line with more classical IAT studies, but we also pit this measure against a variety of alternative explanations for PRR success, by which we add to the growing body of research on drivers of PRR support. Our study enriches our understanding of the role of implicit attitudes in political attitudes and behavior, following the call for more investigation of what moderates the relationship between implicit and explicit measures (Fazio & Olson, 2003), and in so doing adds a new dimension to our understanding of the PRR movements now gripping Europe and beyond. Additionally, by using a nationally representative sample and a real political party in our experiment, the relevance and implications of our findings are more readily evident. We engage with these implications further in our discussion.

Explicit Versus Implicit Measurement of Political Attitudes

Most research on political attitudes treats attitudes as consciously held evaluations of political figures, issues, policies, and so on (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). However, scholarship has also demonstrated that political attitudes can be affected by unconscious processes and considerations which, when assessed through implicit measures (those beyond the conscious control of respondents), explain additional variance beyond traditional self-report items (see Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009a, for a review).¹ Literature also refers to two-process models, which posit that (political)

¹ Scholars disagree about the best terminology here—whether unconscious, implicit, or outside awareness. While important, this debate is beyond our scope. We use the three terms interchangeably.

attitudes comprise not only a conscious, elaborated cognitive component (explicit attitudes, accessible through self-report measures) but also an automatic, unconsciously activated component (implicit attitudes, accessible through measures that are beyond the conscious control of participants; see Maier et al., 2015). Implicit attitudes are particularly important to take into account in socially sensitive domains, like interracial and other intergroup attitudes (Gawronski et al., 2015; Greenwald et al., 2009a). That said, ample work has shown that they play a role in a variety of political domains, from European Union (EU) attitudes (Maier et al., 2015) to voting behavior (Frieze et al., 2007, 2012; Karpinski, Steinman, & Hilton, 2005; Rocatto & Zogmeister, 2010).

The basic idea behind implicit attitudes is that in certain domains, people hold attitudes which are automatically activated in response to stimuli and which they cannot necessarily control when measured in certain ways that take advantage of the automatic nature of such attitudes. For example, a White voter may not report any racial prejudice on a standard survey, but they may still be unknowingly—or unwillingly—influenced by some “hidden” level of racial prejudice when it comes to actually vote for a candidate of color (Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2009b). This can occur even despite a voter’s best intentions not to be influenced by such prejudices; the root of such prejudices may have very little to do with the voter him or herself, but rather with cultural biases, cognitive consistency principles, and other deep-rooted social experiences that are beyond our conscious control or awareness (Rudman, 2004).² But such influences can be powerful, especially when it comes to socially sensitive domains; evidence suggests that implicit measures (those that can tap into such implicit attitudes) have greater predictive validity than self-report measures in these contexts (Greenwald et al., 2009a).

Implicit Attitudes and Populist Radical-Right Parties

Turning to the context at hand, the controversial nature of PRR party might prompt less honest self-reporting among respondents (Arzheimer, 2009)—whether intentional or not. Furthermore, the complex issues involved in European populist radical-right rhetoric—from national identity to EU issues to political disaffection—may activate conflicting attitudes on the part of voters, where they may feel some sympathy at an automatic level based on some parts of this rhetoric but dismiss PRR agendas on a conscious level. For this reason, we suspect that implicit evaluations might conflict with respondents’ self-reported vote likelihood for such parties. Therefore, we measure implicit attitudes towards a PRR party—as positive or negative—and examine whether these attitudes can add to models of vote likelihood for such parties, above and beyond traditionally relevant, self-reported factors. This allows us to move beyond the traditional approach in implicit attitudes research—that of “pitting” implicit and explicit measures of the same attitude against one another—into a politically relevant domain that allows us to examine the *relevance* of, and role played by, implicit evaluations in assessments of voting preference for PRR parties.

PRR parties have a tendency to use populist tactics and present themselves as outsiders of the traditional party system (Mudde, 2007; Taggart, 2000). Moreover, they tend to violate mainstream social norms of tolerance and egalitarianism by strongly rejecting ethnic outgroups (e.g., Betz & Immerfall, 1998; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2008). Supporting parties on the far-right fringes of the party system

² Indeed, there is vigorous debate among scholars (e.g., Blanton & Jaccard, 2008) about the appropriate way to interpret implicit attitudes and measures: Do they reveal a “true attitude” or just some additional dimension of the self-report attitude? Our goal is not to assert that respondents’ implicit attitudes are “truer” than their explicit ones—instead, we focus on the extent to which an implicit measure adds explanatory power to a traditional model of PRR voting, and for which voters in particular. While the question of which attitude—an explicit or implicit one—might be a better representation of a respondents’ “true” feelings is interesting, it is also an extremely difficult question that necessitates a wealth of research tackling difficult methodological and theoretical questions (see Blanton & Jaccard, 2015). Furthermore, because we do not include parallel implicit and explicit measures, we cannot address this debate directly.

can, therefore, arguably be seen as a violation of societal norms. However, it may be that respondents feel less negative, implicitly, than they report feeling explicitly; after all, we know that far-right fringe parties do have core supporters that would go to party rallies and show their support publicly (e.g., Goodwin, 2010)—and electoral successes of such parties show that there is obviously positivity toward these parties among a share of voters. That such support is not always evident on traditional surveys (John & Margetts, 2009) makes implicit measurement particularly relevant in this domain. Our first goal, therefore, is to simply assess the predictive validity of implicit measures of PRR support for self-reported vote likelihood. Consistent with previous literature on implicit attitudes in socially sensitive domains (Greenwald et al., 2009a), implicit and explicit responses to these parties should be positively, but weakly, correlated. That is, we expect the measures to behave consistently, but function differently, as they do in other socially sensitive domains, showing a weak positive correlation (Greenwald et al., 2009a). We expect:

H1: Implicit attitudes towards populist radical-right parties are moderately and positively correlated with self-reported vote-likelihood measures.

Impact of Implicit Attitudes on Populist Radical-Right Voting Behavior

The next step is to put “to the test” implicit measures of PRR support, by demonstrating whether they explain additional variance in measures of vote likelihood. Following Sherman (2009), and based on two-process models, we assume that a deliberate behavioral decision, such as expressing a vote intention (Glaser & Finn, 2013), is also, at least partially, based on unconscious intentions. The latter even write: “Short of perfect decision-making conditions, implicit attitudes are likely to have some sway, even if they contravene the conscious attitudes and intentions of the decision maker” (p. 539). As noted earlier, implicit partisan preferences have proven to be useful in explaining vote choice (Friese et al., 2007, 2012; Roccato & Zogmaister, 2010). Furthermore, such attitudes have been particularly predictive in socially sensitive domains (Greenwald et al., 2009a). We therefore pose our second hypothesis:

H2: The implicit attitude towards the populist radical-right party should explain additional variance in PRR vote likelihood, above and beyond the established explanations.

Conditional Effects of Implicit Attitudes on Vote Likelihood

From a scientific point of view, implicit measures would be most valuable if they predict vote likelihood (H1), and particularly if they explained additional variance beyond that accounted for by self-report measures (H2). The final goal of our study is to assess whether implicit measures are more predictive of vote likelihood for some voters rather than others, following the call of Fazio and Olson (2003) for a closer look at moderators of the implicit-explicit relationship. Knowing that some people readily state their support for PRR parties, for instance in mass surveys or election polls, while others would only do so in the privacy of the voting booth at least suggests that voters differ in their perceptions of and attitudes about these parties. Furthermore, despite the ostensible antidemocratic nature of these parties, their rise to power in recent times despite public dismissal of their platforms suggests that perhaps certain people are more supportive of these parties—at an automatic, unconscious level—than they recognize themselves to be. By identifying such voters, we hope to demonstrate that

implicit measures are particularly useful in this domain of research. Specifically, we focus on political ideology and ideological extremity as factors that might moderate the predictive power of implicit measures on PRR vote likelihood.

First, peoples' self-positioning on the ideological left-right scale may condition the effects of implicit measures on vote likelihood for the populist radical right. More specifically, we expect that right-leaning voters are likely to show more attitudinal coherence between their implicit attitudes and PRR vote likelihood—for these voters, voting for an extreme party is less ideologically distant (Mattiola & Raunio, 2006) and should be less socially sensitive, raising fewer concerns about self-presentation (Nosek, 2005). In that case, implicit measures should offer little additional utility—most of the variance in vote likelihood should be accounted for by the traditional predictors such as anti-immigration attitudes, cynicism, and ideological closeness. For left-leaning voters, by contrast, self-presentational concerns (Nosek, 2005) may play a stronger role in affecting their self-report responses to these parties, in addition to their actual lack of policy/ideological support for them. That is, not only is there more likely to be ideological distance, but there is an added layer of social sensitivity among left-leaning voters toward expressing any support for these parties. It is precisely for *these* left-leaning voters—for whom party support should be more sensitive and contested—that we expect the role of implicit attitudes to be more influential (Greenwald et al., 2009a). We therefore expect:

H3: Implicit attitudes will predict more variance in populist radical-right vote likelihood for left-leaning (versus right-leaning) respondents.

Alternatively, and somewhat in contradiction to Hypothesis 3, it is not one's actual left-or-right position on the ideological scale, but rather one's extremity on that scale, that might moderate the predictive validity of the implicit measure for vote likelihood. That is, more extreme voters—whether left or right—are presumably less sensitive to the self-presentational concerns of more moderate voters and also perhaps less likely to actually experience inconsistency in their implicit and explicit responses. Furthermore, in previous research it is argued and shown that the implicit measures are more predictive when such evaluations (Nosek, 2005) and attitudes are stronger—both more cognitively elaborated (Friese et al., 2012) and more important to voters (Karpinski et al., 2005). The same might be true for ideologically extreme voters, for whom the attitudes in question are very likely important and heavily elaborated, and evaluations are stronger than for moderate voters. Therefore, it should be the case that for more moderate (less extreme) voters, implicit attitudes offer more explanatory power. Again—in this case, we expect implicit attitudes to be more predictive (and therefore more empirically useful) for precisely those voters who are less likely to support these parties—in this case, less extreme voters. We therefore expect that:

H4: Implicit attitudes will predict more variance in populist radical-right vote likelihood for more ideologically moderate respondents.

The PVV as a Populist Radical-Right Party

In this study, we focus on the Dutch *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV), or Party for Freedom. This party is considered to be (quite a successful) member of the PRR party family, which shares a core ideology that combines three features: populism, nativism, and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2007, 2015). The PVV is first of all considered to be a populist party (Vossen, 2011), that is, it has a central focus on “the people” and an accompanying antielitist stance (Canovan, 1999). Populism proclaims to express the peoples' true interests (Mudde, 2004) and to ensure their political representation. “The

ordinary people” are juxtaposed against “dangerous others” who pose a threat to their interests (Cavan, 1999, pp. 3–5). For the populist radical right (as opposed to left-wing populist parties), such others are not just the “corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543) but also immigrants and anyone else not belonging to an idealized, traditionalist vision of the ordinary, national citizen. Radical-right populists thus, combine an antielitist rhetoric with ingroup, typically nationalistic favoritism, or, nativism. For the PVV, this is typified by an aggressive Islamophobia that “is similar to that voiced by leaders of such older parties as the FN and the FPÖ” (Mudde, 2011, p. 8). Finally, the PRR is characterized by their authoritative stance, that is, they believe “in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements on authority are to be punished severely” (Mudde, 2015, p. 296).

Populist radical-right parties, such as the PVV (Mudde, 2015), could be considered members of a broader family of far-right parties. However, they should not be confused with the *extreme* right, such as Neo Nazi movements, that openly reject democracy. Additionally, Mudde (2007, pp. 27–30) adds that these parties should be distinguished from social or neoconservatives, nationalists and (ethno)regionalists, and populist parties that cannot be considered nativist or authoritarian. It is against this backdrop of the Dutch PVV that our study investigates the role of implicit attitudes for vote likelihood.

Methods

To explore the hypotheses, we utilize an online survey with a Single-Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT, Bluemke & Friese, 2008; see also Karpinski & Steinman, 2006) component integrated. The survey was administered by the Dutch commercial market research company TNS, in collaboration with the Harvard-based international nonprofit organization Project Implicit, which programmed and ran the ST-IAT component. The survey was administered online among a representative sample³ of the Dutch population ($n = 773$) between February 28 and March 13, 2013. The sample was 49.5% female, with an average age of 48 ($SD = 17.03$).^{4,5} The respondents were contacted by email and took the survey online at their convenience. The ST-IAT component was run in Flash software to accommodate respondents using any internet browser, and extensive testing was done on multiple browsers and computers with varying internet speeds to ensure successful execution.

For PRR vote likelihood, we use two types of measurement. First, in line with much of the earlier literature, we use a vote-intention question (“What party would you vote for if the next general election were held now?”), coded “1” if the PVV was mentioned and “0” if another party was mentioned ($M = .08$, $SD = .27$); 59 respondents of the 741 indicated they would vote PVV if elections were held now. This variable is termed “intended vote choice.” Furthermore, we also utilize a measure of the likelihood of *ever* voting for the PVV, the Propensity to Vote (PTV) question, as suggested by Van

³ TNS offers representative samples of the Dutch population that are randomly drawn from an online panel into which people are also recruited offline, including some 60,000 members. The sociodemographic sample characteristics indeed mirror those of the population. Gender was evenly distributed at 49.5% female (compared to 49.3% female in the population). The sample age ranged from 18 to over 91 years old; the distribution mirrored the population within the same age range: 33.2% of the sample was between 20 and 39 years of age (compared with 33.8% of the population); 48.1% was between 40 and 64 years of age (compared to 48.8% of the population); and 18.6% was over 65 (compared to 17.3% of the population). Education and income levels were also distributed similarly to population statistics, with equivalent proportions in various categories; and finally, reported vote in 2012 mirrored the actual 2012 election results (CBS Netherlands, <http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/publicaties/boeken/statistisch-jaarboek/archief/2013/2013-a26-pub.htm>).

⁴ These measures were tapped within an online survey experiment with eight conditions, testing the impact of various messages on support. Both vote-likelihood measures served as dependent variables in this experiment. Yet, we did not find any direct effects of the stimuli on the dependent variables. In the analyses, we do control for the various conditions to ensure the found effects are not conditional upon the stimuli included.

⁵ We excluded 27 (descendents from) nonwestern immigrants from the sample.

der Eijk, Van der Brug, and Franklin (2007), measured on a 7-point scale (1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely; $M = 2.35$, $SD = 2.01$). This variable is termed “PTV.”

Implicit attitudes towards the PVV are measured by the D -scores produced by the ST-IAT. The ST-IAT measures individual differences in mental associations between a single “target” concept, in this case the PVV political party and evaluations (e.g., good or bad). Working in their Internet browser, participants were asked to classify stimuli (words, pictures, or symbols) that represent the target concepts and evaluations (PVV, good, and bad) into two categories, using distinct keystrokes and working as quickly as possible. In one round, participants were told to hit one key (e.g., the “I” key) if either “PVV” or “good” came up on the screen, and a different key (e.g., “E”) if a “bad” word came up. In a subsequent stage, participants hit the “I” key if either “PVV” or “bad” came up, and “E” if a “good” word came up. Relative association strengths were measured by examining the speed with which participants responded in the contrasting conditions (PVV and good with the same key *versus* PVV and bad with the same key). Longer response times and more errors indicate weaker associations between concepts and evaluations, while shorter response times with fewer errors indicate stronger associations. Screenshots and the instructions are available in Appendix B. IAT scores can generally run from about -2 to $+2$, where negative numbers in this case mean negative attitudes toward the PVV, and positive numbers mean positive attitudes toward the PVV. A score of 0 indicates no relative association of the PVV as “good” versus “bad”—both concepts are associated equally. Among our sample, ST-IAT scores ranged from -1.08 to 0.94 ($M = -0.13$, $SD = 0.34$), showing a slight negative skew toward the PVV on an implicit level.⁶

As mentioned in the theory section, we are interested in whether the implicit attitude can explain variance in vote intention and PTV above and beyond the traditional variables explaining PRR vote likelihood, in addition to our specific interest in ideology and ideological extremity. A wealth of literature has been generated over the past decades that attempts to explain why some people are more likely to vote for a PRR party than others (see Mudde, 2007, for an overview). The literature overall suggests a range of individual-level predictors of PRR voting but can be divided into two strands of thought. The first finds that a vote for the populist radical right is based on *support* for the ideological standpoints of the party (Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000). In that case, voters can be distinguished from others by their ideological positioning on the far right of the ideological spectrum and by their strong national identity or their opposition to immigration (e.g., recent studies by Kehrberg, 2015; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Zhirkov, 2014). We include ideology, measured on a 10-point scale, where “1” represents extreme left, and “10” extreme right ($M = 5.24$, $SD = 1.93$). We recoded this variable in three categories, with one standard deviation above and one below the mean as a reference point ($M = 1.94$, $SD = 0.59$). We also recoded this latter variable into a dichotomous variable called “ideological extremity,” by recoding the midpoint of the 3-point ideology scale as “moderates” (“0”) and the left and right end points of the scale as “extremes” (“1”) ($M = 0.35$, $SD = 0.47$). In the moderation analyses, we used the 3-point ideology scale and compared the end points to the midpoint of the scale, thereby distinguishing between left-wing and right-wing extremity in assessing the extent to which it conditions the impact of the implicit measure on vote likelihood. We also included Anti-Immigration Attitude and National Identity (see Appendix A for all question wordings and descriptors). The second line of argument is that votes are also based on a *protest* against the establishment. Indeed, various scholars find support for the assumption that more cynical voters, who distrust politics, support these parties (e.g., Kehrberg, 2015; Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013; Zhirkov 2014). We measured this in two scales: Populist Attitude and Political Cynicism. Finally, we also include Age, Education, and Gender as background variables. To account for individual differences in previous

⁶ Consistent with the Project Implicit procedures for scoring Single-Target IATs, we excluded participants who made errors in more than 30% of the pairing trials (totaling 9% of respondents), as well as those who responded too quickly (which indicates an unreliable response) to more than 10% of the pairing trials (totaling 3% of respondents).

party support and provide a conservative model of influences, we include a dichotomous variable which taps whether respondents voted for the PVV in the previous 2012 Dutch national elections: 48 respondents indicated that was the case ($M = 0.06$, $SD = 2.25$).

We used the Pearson correlation coefficient and the polyserial correlation coefficient to examine whether the implicit measure correlates with the vote likelihood measures (H1). In a next step, we use linear regression analyses to estimate the impact of the implicit measure on the propensity to vote and logistic regression (logit) to estimate the impact of the implicit measure on intended vote choice. We do this in three steps: First, we regress the vote likelihood measures on the implicit measure, after which we control for explicit previous voting behavior in a second step. In a final step, we add individual-level explanations of PRR vote likelihood (H2) to test whether the implicit measure explains additional variance above and beyond what it means to be a PRR voter. In a next round of analyses, we add interaction terms to test whether the impact of the implicit measure on vote likelihood depends on the self-identified position on the ideology scale, thereby testing whether extreme left-wing, moderate, or extreme right-wing voters are more affected by their implicit attitude (H3 and H4). To test this, we follow the approach by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) and Berry, DeMerit, and Esarey (2010) who point out that one needs to examine the marginal effects to interpret interaction terms, especially in binary logit models.⁷

Results

Starting with our first hypothesis, we examined whether the implicit attitudes correlated with the vote likelihood measures. Overall, we do find significant and positive relationships between our implicit attitude measure and both PVV vote likelihood measures. Of the correlations with the implicit measure, the PTV score for the PVV shows the strongest correlation, $r(741) = 0.30$, $p < .001$, while the polyserial correlation between intended vote choice and the implicit measure is $\rho(741) = 0.21$, $p < .001$.⁸ These correlations are consistent with the average predictive validity correlations in implicit attitude research (see Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015). Also consistent with the literature, we find a stronger association between the two vote-likelihood measures: intended vote choice and PTV score for PVV: $r(741) = 0.60$, $p < .001$. Overall, we thus find support for our first hypothesis.

In the next set of analyses, we are interested in the predictive power of the implicit measure for explaining vote likelihood. We run the analysis separately for each of our vote likelihood measures—PTV and intended vote choice. Table 1 first presents the results of a linear regression model, predicting the *propensity to vote* for the populist radical-right PVV with only the implicit attitude as explanatory variable.⁹ The results show that the implicit measure has a moderate impact on the propensity to vote PVV. A 1-point increase in the implicit measure leads to a 1.93 increase and explains 10.8% of the variance in the PTV score. In Model 2, we control for those who voted PVV in the last general elections, thus estimating a conservative model of the explanatory power of the implicit measure above and beyond previous voting behavior. Doing so leads to a decrease in the effect size of the implicit measure: Moving up 1 point on the implicit attitude scale causes a 1.43 increase in the

⁷ As Berry et al. (2010) state: The sign and magnitude of an interaction coefficient does not give sufficient information about the nature of the interaction or the extent to which the independent variables interact in affecting $\Pr(Y)$. “Whether the variables interact in influencing $\Pr(Y)$ should be tested by direct examination of estimated effects on $\Pr(Y)$ ” (p. 265).

⁸ The Pearson correlation coefficient between intended vote choice and the implicit attitude is $r(741) = 0.16$, $p < 0.001$.

⁹ Because of missing values in Political Cynicism ($n = 669$), Populist Attitude ($n = 661$), and Anti-Immigration Attitude ($n = 653$), listwise deletion results in the removal of 173 cases from our regression analyses. To check the robustness of our results, we conducted Multiple Imputation ($m = 10$) with multivariate normal regression modelling (MVN) in Stata in which we included the covariates from our regression analyses to impute the missing values of these three variables. Analyses of the pooled results of the 10 datasets lead to very similar results as the ones reported here and the same substantial conclusions.

Table 1. Direct Impact of Implicit Evaluations on Party Support

	Probability to Vote			Intended Vote Choice		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Implicit Attitude	1.933 (0.233)***	1.431 (0.222)***	0.781 (0.198)***	1.834 (0.438)***	1.034 (0.470)*	0.518 (0.534) ^{ns}
PVV Vote 2012		3.086 (0.315)***	2.162 (0.282)***		2.708 (0.407)***	2.035 (0.468)***
Age			−0.015 (0.004)***			−0.012 (0.011)
Female			−0.074 (0.131)			−0.448 (0.372)
Education			−0.030 (0.042)			−0.246 (0.127) [†]
Populist Attitudes			0.095 (0.071)			−0.013 (0.236)
Cynicism			0.065 (0.086)			0.294 (0.304)
National Identity			0.028 (0.055)			0.194 (0.157)
Anti-Immigrant Attitudes			0.563 (0.070)***			0.995 (0.254)***
Ideology			0.475 (0.121)***			0.281 (0.375)
Ideological Extremity			0.467 (0.138)***			0.484 (0.444)
Constant	2.666 (0.182)***	2.346 (0.172)***	1.274 (0.303)***	−2.188 (0.322)***	−2.738 (0.375)***	−4.244 (0.890)***
Log Likelihood				−157.676	−136.520	−108.382
(Pseudo) R ²	0.108	0.237	0.444	0.071	0.196	0.362
ΔR ²		0.129***	0.207***			
LR Chi ²					42.31(1)***	56.28(9)***

Note. Standard errors between brackets; Experimental conditions are added as controls (not shown). [†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$, (two-tailed). $n = 573$.

propensity to vote PVV. However, the IAT variable remains to have predictive power. Finally, in Model 3, the full party-support model, we test the impact of the implicit measure of PVV support beyond what it means to be a regular PVV voter. We see strong contributions of the traditional factors that explain PRR party preferences: Voters with stronger anti-immigrant attitudes, rather on the right of the political spectrum, and with a more extreme ideological stance are more inclined to support this party. This is mostly in line with previous research showing that these PRR parties are supported because of their ideological standpoints. The implicit attitude measure contributes unique variance to the model, but its impact is smaller than it is in the first two models. Still, a 1-point increase in the measure leads to a 0.78 increase in the propensity to vote PVV. This finding provides initial support for Hypothesis 2.¹⁰

On the right side of Table 1—in Models 4 to 6—we take a look at the impact of the implicit attitude on *intended vote choice* utilizing a binary logistic regression model. Model 4 only regresses the party-choice measure on the implicit attitude and again shows considerable impact on the dependent variable. A 1-point increase in the implicit-attitude measure leads to a 1.83 increase in the log-odds of intended vote choice. In Model 5, we again control for those voters who voted for the PVV in the last general elections, which leads to a decrease in effect size, but in this model the implicit measure still has predictive validity: A 1-point increase leads to a 1.03 increase in the log-odds of the intention to vote PVV. This is, however, not the case in the last, full, party-support model. If we control for all traditional explanations of PRR voting, the results show that, again, previous vote choice and anti-

¹⁰ We also analyzed a model in which the *relative* preference for the PVV is the dependent variable. This relative PVV preference is calculated by rank ordering the vote preferences for the PVV and the four largest mainstream parties. The results found are very similar to models 1 to 3 in Table 1.

Table 2. Moderated Impact of Implicit Evaluations on Party Preference

	Probability to Vote		Intended Vote Choice	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
PVV vote 2012	2.162 (0.282)***	2.124 (0.285)***	2.035 (0.468)***	2.196 (0.484)***
Age	−0.014 (0.004)***	−0.015 (0.004)***	−0.012 (0.011)	−0.009 (0.011)
Female	−0.074 (0.131)	−0.081 (0.132)	−0.448 (0.372)	−0.341 (0.380)
Education	−0.030 (0.042)	−0.029 (0.042)	−0.246 (0.127) [†]	−0.287 (0.133)*
Populist Attitudes	0.095 (0.071)	0.096 (0.071)	0.013 (0.236)	0.021 (0.293)
Cynicism	0.065 (0.086)	0.067 (0.086)	0.294 (0.304)	0.229 (0.315)
National Identity	0.028 (0.055)	0.031 (0.056)	0.194 (0.157)	0.190 (0.161)
Anti-Immigrant Attitudes	0.563 (0.070)***	0.563 (0.070)***	0.995 (0.254)***	1.020 (0.264)***
Left-wing extremity (LWE)	−0.008 (0.176)*	−0.025 (0.200)	0.203 (0.697)	0.264 (0.714)
Right-wing extremity (RWE)	0.942 (0.190)***	0.989 (0.196)***	0.765 (0.435) [†]	0.736 (0.438) [†]
Implicit Evaluation (IE)	0.791 (0.198)***	0.702 (0.254)**	0.518 (0.534)	1.461 (0.723)*
IE * LWE		−0.029 (0.463) ^{ns}		0.402 (1.966) ^{ns}
IE * RWE		0.516 (0.520) ^{ns}		−2.948 (1.154)*
Constant	2.224 (0.172)***	2.214 (0.173)***	−3.682 (0.544)***	−3.800 (0.569)***
Log Likelihood			−108.382	−104.681
(Pseudo) R ²	0.444	0.445	0.362	0.384
ΔR ²		0.001 ^{ns}		0.018*

Note. Standard errors between brackets; Experimental conditions are added as controls (not shown); All variables (except for factors) are centered around their mean. [†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$, (two-tailed); $n = 573$.

immigrant attitudes have the strongest impact,¹¹ which is in line with previous studies showing that ideological considerations play an important role in explaining support for these parties. In this case, we see that the implicit attitude towards the party does not contribute unique variance.¹² So only the first part of the analysis lends support to Hypothesis 2. We come back to this difference between the two dependent variables in the discussion section.

To establish for whom implicit attitudes more strongly explain variance in PRR vote likelihood, we conduct a moderation analysis with the 3-point ideology scale rescaled as a categorical moderator, with the middle category as the reference point. This allows considering Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 in one model, by testing whether the implicit attitude has a differential effect for extreme left-wing, moderate, and extreme right-wing voters. Table 2 first shows the results of the linear regression analyses with PTV as the dependent variable. In models 1 and 2, we estimate the conditional impact of the implicit attitude on the propensity to vote PVV. The results show that the impact of the implicit attitude is not dependent upon ideology and that extreme left-wing voters as well as extreme right-wing voters are not more affected by their implicit attitude towards the party than are moderates.¹³ So,

¹¹ In this model, we find few significant coefficients. There are two possible concerns. The first is that only 8% of our sample indicated they would vote for this party, leading to little variation in the dependent variable. To test whether these results are indeed due to PVV intended vote choice being a rare event, we conducted a rare events logistic regression (*firthlogit* in Stata); however, this analysis led to similar results as presented here. The second explanation has to do with sparseness in the data, especially in the distribution of anti-immigrant attitude. This might lead to a biased Wald statistic. An alternative model (available upon request) in which we incorporated anti-immigrant attitude with only three categories (low – medium – high) indeed generated more significant coefficients but does not affect our conclusions. Both robustness checks provide confidence in our results.

¹² We analyzed the same full party-support model with actual voting behavior as the DV, namely PVV Vote Choice in 2012. Even though this reverses the temporal order, we do see that our implicit measure does predict actual behavior above and beyond the traditional explanations for PRR support: $b = 2.12$, $SE = .58$, $z = 3.67$, $p < 0.000$, 95% *CI* of [0.988, 3.256]. This finding is in line with recent research suggesting these measures are useful for predicting actual votes (e.g., Arcuri, Castelli, Galdi, Zogmaister, & Amadori, 2008; Greenwald et al., 2009b; Roccoato & Zogmaister, 2010).

¹³ Using one of the other two categories as reference (either left-wing extremism or right-wing extremism) does not change our results: None of the interaction terms significantly differs from zero.

Figure 1. Marginal effects of implicit attitudes on PVV vote choice. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

when it comes to the propensity to vote for the PVV in the future, the implicit measure has the same (positive) impact for all respondents.

This is, however, not the case when we look at intended vote choice. Utilizing a binary logistic regression model, model 3 in Table 2 shows that, as we found earlier, the implicit attitude overall does *not* have a significant impact on intended vote choice. However, the significant interaction term in model 4, and the significant increase in R^2 , suggests a positive impact of the implicit partisan attitude for *some* respondents. More specifically, Model 4 shows a negative interaction effect between right-wing extremity and the implicit attitude, indicating that for moderate respondents the impact of the implicit measure on intended vote choice is stronger than for more extreme respondents, but only for those on the right side of the political spectrum.¹⁴ Adding this interaction term leads to a significant improvement of the model (likelihood-ratio $\chi^2(1) = 7.40, p < 0.05$).

To better understand these results, Figure 1 plots the marginal effect of the implicit attitude on the probability that intended vote choice = 1 for different levels of ideological extremity. It shows that when we estimate the impact of implicit attitude on party choice for left-wing, moderate, and right-wing voters, it is only the moderate voters whose vote choice is positively and significantly impacted by their implicit attitude towards the PVV. That is, only for them does the implicit attitude increase their chance of reporting to vote PVV by 7.7%. Coming back to our hypotheses, the plot does show that, indeed, ideological extremity on the right side is associated with a smaller impact of implicit attitudes on vote choice, whereas on the left the effect is in the other direction, but these differences are nonsignificant. Hypothesis 3, which stated that left-leaning respondents would be more affected by their implicit attitude than right-leaning respondents, is therefore not supported by the data. Hypothesis 4 is supported partially, however, since implicit attitudes do predict more variance in the intention to vote for a populist radical-right party for more ideologically moderate respondents.

Discussion

In this study, we looked at the role of implicit attitudes in affecting populist radical-right party support beyond traditional explanations, such as ideological closeness, anti-immigrant attitudes, and

¹⁴ We also checked whether right-wing and left-wing extremists significantly differ in the extent to which they are affected by the implicit measure, but this difference is not significant.

political cynicism (e.g., Kehrberg, 2015; Mudde, 2007; Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013; Zhirkov, 2014). In doing so, we followed the call of political psychologists to assess the role of implicit attitudes in affecting political attitudes in general and voting behavior in particular (Glaser & Finn, 2013; Ksiazkiewicz & Hedrick, 2013). In line with previous research on other areas of political measures (Frieze et al., 2007, 2012; Karpinski et al., 2005; Maier et al., 2015; Nosek et al., 2010; Rocatto & Zogmeister, 2010), our results show that implicit attitudes towards a PRR party predict vote likelihood in general, as well as in ways beyond that accounted for by traditional explanatory factors, be it for only one of our dependent measures. Furthermore, we find the implicit measure to be more important for the voting intentions of the presumably less likely populist right supporters, that is, more ideologically moderate voters. We believe our results have various implications.

First of all, in line with the overview presented by Gawronski et al. (2015), the findings show that implicit measures have the potential to be part of an explanation of biased, or at least incomplete, explicit responses in voter surveys (John & Margetts, 2009). We believe it may be fruitful to take into account other types of implicit factors here, such as implicit attitudes towards immigrants (e.g., Maier et al., 2015) or candidates (e.g., Frieze et al., 2012), in addition to the established factors. In terms of practical relevance, it is not uncommon to see cases in which election polls are quite off the actual results of the elections, in particular for PRR parties (John & Margetts, 2009). It may help to better understand the implicit components of political preferences, in particular for these parties, to avoid such faulty predictions.

Secondly, our results are in line with Frieze et al. (2007, 2012) and Rocatto and Zogmaister (2010) who show that the implicit partisan attitude is a useful measure outside of the U.S. context, within a multiparty system. However, our results do not only underline the validity of the implicit measure by comparing it to explicit, similar, *measures* of (previous) party support, as prior work did. More importantly, the findings show that the implicit attitude towards the PVV explained additional variance beyond other established individual-level *explanations* for the propensity to vote for a PRR party. That is, whereas the goal of most of these previous studies was to more accurately predict future voting behavior or election outcomes with implicit measures, our aim was to understand the role of implicit measures in determining *why* people consider voting for PRR parties.

Having an outsider position, violating societal norms, it can be expected that especially for PRR parties, implicit attitudes have an impact, as our results suggest. However, one could argue that the results found are due to case selection. Most importantly, the PVV is currently quite an accepted political player and not as contested as some other populist radical-right parties, such as, for instance, the Front National in France. Yet, our results give us confidence that the PVV should be “controversial enough,” as the found correlations between the implicit measure and the two vote likelihood measures are in line with findings on race and intergroup behavior and much weaker than common in research on political preferences (Greenwald et al., 2009a).

An alternative explanation could be that these findings are not unique to these type of parties but are commonplace in multiparty systems. While we have less reason to believe that to be the case from a normative point of view, we note that in multiparty systems ideological and policy positions between parties tend to be small(er) than in two-party systems. If explicit evaluations and attitudes are thus less likely to discriminate between parties that are close to each other, it is not unreasonable to speculate that unconscious considerations could play a substantial role. In some cases it may be the implicit effect that would tip the balance to prefer one party or one candidate above the other. We thus strongly urge further research to assess implicit measures beyond the case of the populist radical-right, in particular in rather fractured multiparty systems. Most importantly, it would be interesting to test whether it is the contested nature of the party that moderates the impact of the implicit attitude—that is, do we find stronger effects for more controversial parties and smaller effects for mainstream parties—or is this an across-the-board effect? Additionally, future research should also look into the role of partisan identification. It would be interesting to pit implicit attitudes towards parties against

explicit partisan-identification measures in explaining vote likelihoods, as well as investigating whether (a lack of) partisan identification could moderate the impact of implicit measures.

Third, this study contributes to research on implicit attitudes in political domains by uncovering “variables that determine when implicit and explicit attitudes converge” (Rudman, 2004, p. 81). Our results indicate that implicit partisan attitudes explain additional variance in vote likelihood more for those who otherwise are not the usual suspects when it comes to populist radical-right voting. It is particularly those supporters of the PRR party with less extreme ideological self-positioning for which implicit attitudes matter. Apparently there is a group of people who may intend to vote for the PVV despite being ideologically rather distant from that party—and it is these voters for whom implicit attitudes explain more variance. These results indicate that if one aims at identifying the *unusual* suspects of populist radical-right party support, implicit attitudes are an important mechanism to take into account.

That being said, our results differ between the two dependent variables that were utilized. On the one hand, we find a direct, unmoderated, impact of implicit attitudes on the PTV measure, whether or not we control for previous PVV voting behavior or other individual-level explanations of support. On the other hand, we find only a direct impact of the implicit measure on intended vote choice in the more parsimonious models, and we only find moderated effects for this dependent measure. We believe there are three possible explanations for this finding. First of all, the proportion of respondents indicating they would vote for the PVV was quite small: only 8.04% of the 746 respondents in our sample. This means there is simply less variance in the dependent variable to explain.

The second and third reasons have to do with the nature of the independent and dependent measures. Looking at the ST-IAT measure, classic work on the attitude-behavior link indicates that attitudes predict behavior more strongly when there is a match between the specificity of the measure and the specificity of the behavior (e.g., Heberlein & Black, 1967; Weigel, Vernon, & Tognacci, 1974). As the ST-IAT is more general, it should predict generalized future behavior (the PTV measure) better than behavior in a specific election (vote-choice measure). Future research could look into this explanation by testing whether a more specific ST-IAT, adapted to a specific election at a specific point in time, is better able to predict more specific voting behavior.

As for the dependent measures: Both of them are standard use in international electoral survey research (e.g., Van der Eijk et al., 2007), and, in particular when it comes to fringe party voting, the PTV measure has been described as a valid indicator of party support. The PTV measure is somewhat less concrete than the vote-intention measure, hypothetically asking whether people could imagine ever voting for a given party. One could argue that this taps sympathy towards the party rather than the probability that one will truly vote for the party one day. The vote-intention measure, on the other hand, asks respondents which party they would vote for if elections were held *today*. We believe that, especially in the case of populist radical-right parties, who place themselves outside of the established political order and defy social norms, there is a considerable difference between the two measures. Whereas in the Downsian theory, it is assumed that the party with the highest propensity to vote (or the highest utility) would be the party to vote for in the next elections, this might not be the case when this party is an extremist populist radical-right party. In other words, there is a certain burden to cross before a voter states that she not only one day *might* vote for the PVV, but *will do so* today (Van der Eijk et al., 2007).¹⁵

This line of thought hints at some differences highlighted by Karpinski et al. (2005), who note that intended voting measures might yield different implicit-explicit findings than other, albeit related

¹⁵ Indeed, 40.9% of the respondents for whom the propensity to vote for the PVV was higher than the propensity to vote for the four other largest Dutch parties did *not* state they would vote for the PVV if elections were held today. Of the 66 respondents who indicated a higher preference for the PVV than for the other parties, 39 stated they would vote for the PVV if elections were held today; 17 indicated they would vote for another party (of which 11 for another populist party); three don't know; one would turn in a blank vote; and six would abstain.

political attitudes. Similarly, Gawronski et al. (2015) note that implicit measures should have more impact on spontaneous measures than deliberate behavior. Finally, the latter note that measuring implicit and explicit predictors as well as the intended behavior in a single survey session could lead to an underestimation of effects: “If the two kinds of measures are administered shortly before the assessment of to-be-predicted behavior, it seems reasonable to assume that people will use their subjective beliefs about the relevant states of affairs to make a behavioral decision, and these beliefs are usually well captured by explicit measures” (p. 10). Future studies would do well to systematically investigate whether and how implicit measures relate to different types of vote-likelihood measures, taking into account different temporal lags. Yet another aspect of our findings that is puzzling is the fact that we only find significant interactions in the vote-intention model and not in the propensity to vote model. However, we followed the strategy proposed by Brambor et al. (2006) and Berry et al. (2010) by plotting the marginal effects of the implicit measure for the different levels of the moderator variable. Since both the coefficients and the plot lead to the same conclusion, we are confident our findings are reliable.

Overall, the findings show that an implicit measure is indeed useful in research looking into the explanation of PRR vote likelihood. This is in line with previous research indicating that implicit measures are especially relevant in contested domains (Greenwald et al. 2009a) and shows that unconscious processes and considerations should be taken into account when studying PRR support. Thus far, the large field of research on the PRR has mainly focused on supply-side and demand-side explanations (e.g., Mudde, 2007), but it has overlooked less “rational” explanations when studying individual-level reasons to vote for these parties. Even though we find only a small impact of the implicit attitude on PRR vote likelihood, above and beyond traditional explanations, and only for one of our measures, our results are in line with dual-processing models (see Maier et al., 2015) showing that unconsciously held attitudes do play a role in explaining partisan preferences. For a comprehensive account of populist radical-right support, implicit attitudes are thus an additional factor to be taken into account.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Part of the data collection for this study was supported by the Amsterdam School of Communication Research at the University of Amsterdam. Hajo Boomgaarden’s contribution to the project and part of the data collection were supported through a VENI grant of the Dutch Science Foundation, NOW, Grant Number 451-10-015. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Linda Bos, Department of Communication, University of Amsterdam, P.O. Box 15793, 1001 NG Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: l.bos@uva.nl

REFERENCES

- Akkerman, T. (2011). Friend or foe? Right-wing populism and the popular press in Britain and the Netherlands. *Journalism*, 12(8), 931–945. doi:10.1177/1464884911415972
- Arcuri, L., Castelli, L., Galdi, S., Zogmaister, C., & Amadori, A. (2008). Predicting the vote: Implicit attitudes as predictors of the future behavior of decided and undecided voters. *Political Psychology*, 29(3), 369–387. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00635.x
- Arzheimer, K. (2009). Contextual factors and the extreme right vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2), 259–275. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00369.x
- Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. *American psychologist*, 54(7), 462–479. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.126.6.925
- Berry, W. D., DeMeritt, J. H., & Esarey, J. (2010). Testing for interaction in binary logit and probit models: Is a product term essential? *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(1), 248–266. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00429.x

- Betz, H.-G. & Immerfall, S. (Eds.). (1998). *The new politics of the right: Neo-populist parties and movements in established democracies*. Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Blanton, H., & Jaccard, J. (2008). Unconscious racism: A concept in pursuit of a measure. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 34, 277–297. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131632
- Blanton, H., & Jaccard, J. (2015). Not so fast: Ten challenges to importing implicit attitude measures to media psychology. *Media Psychology*, 18, 338–369. doi:10.1080/15213269.2015.1008102
- Bluemke, M., & Friese, M. (2008). Reliability and validity of the Single-Target IAT (ST-IAT): Assessing automatic affect towards multiple attitude objects. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 38(6), 977–997. doi:10.1002/ejsp.487
- Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006). Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analyses. *Political Analysis*, 14(1), 63–82. doi:10.1093/pan/mpi014
- Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. *Political Studies*, 47, 2–16. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00184
- Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their meaning and use. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 54, 297–327. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145225
- Fennema, M. (2000). Legal repression of extreme-right parties and racial discrimination. In R. Koopmans & P. Statham (Eds.), *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics* (pp. 119–44). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
- Friese, M., Bluemke, M., & Wänke, M. (2007). Predicting voting behavior with implicit attitude measures: The 2002 German parliamentary election. *Experimental Psychology*, 54(4), 247–255. doi:10.1027/1618-3169.54.4.247
- Friese M., Smith C. T., Plischke T., Bluemke M., Nosek B. A. (2012). Do implicit attitudes predict actual voting behavior particularly for undecided voters? *PLoS ONE*, 7(8), e44130. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044130
- Gawronski, B., Galdi, S., & Arcuri, L. (2015). What can political psychology learn from implicit measures? Empirical evidence and new directions. *Political Psychology*, 36(1), 1–17. doi:10.1111/pops.12094
- Glaser, J., & Finn, C. (2013). How and why implicit attitudes should affect voting. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 46(3), 537–544. doi:10.1017/S1049096513000656
- Goodwin, M. J. (2010). Activism in contemporary extreme right parties: The case of the British National Party (BNP). *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 20(1), 31–54. doi:10.1080/17457280903450690
- Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2015). Statistically small effects of the Implicit Association Test can have societally large effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 108(4), 553–561. doi:10.1037/pspa0000016
- Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E. L., & Banaji, M. R. (2009a). Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 97(1), 17–41. doi:10.1037/a0015575
- Greenwald, A. G., Smith, C. T., Sriram, N., Bar-Anan, Y., & Nosek, B. A. (2009b). Implicit race attitudes predicted vote in the 2008 US presidential election. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 9(1), 241–253. doi:10.1111/j.1530-2415.2009.01195.x
- Heberlein, T. A., & Black, J. S. (1976). Attitudinal specificity and the prediction of behavior in a field setting. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 33(4), 474.
- Hooghe, M., & Reeskens, T. (2007). Are cross-national surveys the best way to study the extreme-right vote in Europe? *Patterns of Prejudice*, 41(2), 177–196. doi:10.1080/00313220701265544
- John, P., & Margetts, H. (2009). The latent support for the extreme right in British politics. *West European Politics*, 32(3), 496–513. doi:10.1080/01402380902779063
- Karpinski, A., & Steinman, R. B. (2006). The single category implicit association test as a measure of implicit social cognition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91(1), 16–32. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.1.16
- Karpinski, A., Steinman, R. B., & Hilton, J. L. (2005). Attitude importance as a moderator of the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude measures. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(7), 949–962. doi:10.1177/0146167204273007
- Kehrberg, J. E. (2015). The demand side of support for radical-right parties. *Comparative European Politics*, 13, 553–576. doi:10.1057/cep.2014.6
- Ksiazkiewicz, A., & Hedrick, J. (2013). An introduction to implicit attitudes in political science research. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 46(3), 525–531. doi:10.1017/S1049096513000632
- Lucassen, G., & Lubbers, M. (2012). Who fears what? Explaining far-right-wing preference in Europe by distinguishing perceived cultural and economic ethnic threats. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(5), 547–574. doi:10.1177/0010414011427851
- Maier, M., Maier, J., Baumert, A., Jahn, N., Krause, S., & Adam, S. (2015). Measuring citizens' implicit and explicit attitudes towards the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 16(3), 369–385. doi:10.1177/1465116515577454

- Mattila, M., & Raunio, T. (2006). Cautious voters-supportive parties opinion congruence between voters and parties on the EU dimension. *European Union Politics*, 7(4), 427–449.
- Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39, 541–563. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical-right parties in Europe*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511492037
- Mudde, C. (2011). Who's afraid of the European radical-right? *Dissent*, 58(4), 7–11.
- Mudde, C. (2015). Populist radical-right parties in Europe today. In J. Abromeit, B. M. Chesterton, & Y. Norman (Eds.), *Transformations of populism in Europe and the Americas: History and recent trends* (pp. 295–307). London, United Kingdom: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Nosek, B. A. (2005). Moderators of the relationship between implicit and explicit evaluation. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 134(4), 565–584. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.134.4.565
- Nosek, B. A., Graham, J., & Hawkins, C. B. (2010). 29. Implicit political cognition. In B. Gawronski & B. K. Payne (Eds.), *Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications* (pp. 548–564). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Rocatto, M., & Zogmeister, C. (2010). Predicting the vote through implicit and explicit attitudes: A field research. *Political Psychology*, 31(2), 249–274. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00751.x
- Rudman, L. A. (2004). Sources of implicit attitudes. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 13(2), 79–82. doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00279.x
- Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical-right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 47(6), 737–765. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00784.x
- Schafraad, P., d'Haenens, L., Scheepers, P., & Wester, F. (2012). The evolution of a media image: Newspaper attention to the Flemish far right 1987–2004. *Acta Politica*, 47(4), 356–377. doi:10.1057/ap.2012.12
- Schumacher, G., & Rooduijn, M. (2013). Sympathy for the “devil”? Voting for populists in the 2006 and 2010 Dutch general elections. *Electoral Studies*, 32(1), 124–133. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2012.11.003
- Sherman, J. W. (2009). Controlled influences on implicit measures: Confronting the myth of process-purity and taming the cognitive monster. In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Briñol (Eds.), *Attitudes: Insights from the new wave of implicit measures* (pp. 391–426). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Taggart, P. A. (2000). *Populism*. Buckingham, United Kingdom: Open University Press.
- Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (2000). Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote? *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(1), 77–102. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00505
- Van der Eijk, C., Van der Brug, W., & Franklin, M. N. (2006). Rethinking the dependent variable in voting behavior: On the measurement and analysis of electoral utilities. *Electoral Studies*, 25, 424–447.
- Van Spanje, J., & Van Der Brug, W. (2007). The party as pariah: The exclusion of anti-immigration parties and its effect on their ideological positions. *West European Politics*, 30(5), 1022–1040. doi:10.1080/01402380701617431
- Van Spanje, J., & de Vreese, C. (2015). The good, the bad and the voter: The impact of hate speech prosecution of a politician on electoral support for his party. *Party Politics*, 21(1), 115–130. doi:10.1177/1354068812472553
- Vossen, K. (2011). Classifying Wilders: The ideological development of Geert Wilders and his party for freedom. *Politics*, 31(3), 179–189.
- Weigel, R. H., Vernon, D. T., & Tognacci, L. N. (1974). Specificity of the attitude as a determinant of attitude-behavior congruence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 30(6), 724–728.
- Zhirkov, K. (2014). Nativist but not alienated. A comparative perspective on the radical-right vote in Western Europe. *Party Politics*, 20(2), 286–296. doi:10.1177/1354068813511379

Appendix A: Exact Question Wordings of Control Variables

Variable	Item Wording(s)	Scale	Reliability	Mean and Standard Deviation
Anti-Immigrant Attitudes		1-7	$\alpha = .92$	$M = 4.74, SD = 1.26$
	*Is it, in your opinion, generally good or bad for the Dutch economy that people have come from other countries to live here?	1: Bad for the economy – 7: Good for the economy		
	* Do you think the Dutch culture is generally undermined or enriched by people who have come from other countries to live here?	1: Culture is undermined – 7: Culture is enriched)		
	*Do people who come from other countries to live here make the Netherlands a worse or better place to live?	1: Worse place to live – 7: Better place to live		
	Do you think crime problems have decreased or increased because of immigrants coming to live here?	1: Crime problem have decreased – 7: Crime problems have increased		
	The Dutch immigration policy needs to be tightened.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	The religious practices of immigrants threaten the Dutch culture.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	Immigrants should be obliged to adjust to Dutch habits.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	Immigrants abuse the Dutch welfare system because they cost more than they contribute.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	In the past couple of years the Dutch government has shown too much respect for immigrants.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
National Identity		1-7	$\alpha = .86$	$M = 5.19, SD = 1.24$
	I am proud to be Dutch.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	Having the Dutch nationality, means a lot to me.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	I feel connected to other Dutch people.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	I feel more Dutch than European.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
Populist Attitude		1-7	$\alpha = .82$	$M = 5.28, SD = 1.31$
	More citizen participation in politics by using referenda is a good thing.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	Voters should be able to influence important political decisions with a referendum.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	The public interest should be central in the political decision process.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	What this country needs most, even more than laws and political manifestos, is a courageous and dedicated leader.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		

(Continued)

Appendix (Continued)

Political Cynicism		1-7	$\alpha = .84$	$M = 5.17, SD = 1.09$
	Members of parliament pay too much attention to a few powerful (interest) groups, instead of what's best for everyone.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	Political parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinions.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	*Most members of parliament are talented people who know what they're doing.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	Politics cares only for the interests of specific groups, and is not at all invested in the needs of the people.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	I don't think members of parliament care a lot about what people like me think.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
	Members of parliament promise more than they can deliver.	1: Disagree – 7: Agree		
Educational Level	What is your highest finished level of education?	1: No education – 8: Graduate Level University	N/A	$M = 3.99, SD = 1.72$

¹Note. * Item is reverse-coded; Original questionnaire in Dutch; Bold answer options to political knowledge items are the correct ones.

Appendix B: Screenshots and Instructions From ST-IAT

Screenshot of the Instructions Page

In deze test ziet u een serie logo's die staan voor de Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), samen met woorden die staan voor "Goed" of "Slecht". Als één van de twee in beeld komt wordt u gevraagd om daarop te reageren door middel van het indrukken van een toets aan de linkerzijde (de 'E'-toets) of de rechterzijde (de 'I'-toets) van het toetsenbord, zo snel als mogelijk is.

GOED

PARTIJ VOOR
DE VRIJHEID

Vreugde

Mooi

PVV

Leuk

Gelukkig

SLECHT

Pijnlijk

Ongelukkig

Vreselijk

Gekwetst

Snelheid is belangrijk: werk zo snel als u kunt. Uw resultaten zullen niet nauwkeurig zijn als u te langzaam gaat. Als u een fout maakt, zult u een rode X in beeld zien en dient u zo snel mogelijk de andere toets in te drukken om de fout te corrigeren.

Ik ben klaar om aan de test te beginnen.

Instructions (in translation)

In this test, you will see a series of logos representing the Freedom Party (PVV), together with words that stand for “Good” or “Bad.” When one of these appears on the screen, you’re asked to react by pressing a computer key either on the left side (the “E” key) or right side (the “I” key) of your keyboard, as quickly as possible. Speed is important: work as quickly as you can. Your results will not be precise if you go too slowly. If you make a mistake, you’ll see a red X appear; hit the correct key as quickly as possible to correct your mistake.

Screenshots of IAT Test