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### From the press to politics and back: When do media set the political agenda and when do parties set the media agenda?

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# Appendices

## Appendix A

### *Search strings*

This appendix documents the search strings that were used to measure salience of the issues in parliamentary questions and in newspaper articles in chapters III, IV and V, as well as to gauge the occurrence of party names (also chapters II, IV and V). For the parliamentary and the newspaper data, the number of hits on the search strings below was counted. Composites were counted as one hit, so that for example “Europeiska unionen” and “EU” both count as one. For the parliamentary data, the search string was applied without the “w/” operator, while in the media data the operator “w/10” means that the word should occur within ten words of the previous word. An asterisk (used for parliamentary and media data) functions as a wildcard, so at the end of a word this indicates that any ending is allowed.

**TABLE A.1.** Swedish party search strings.

<b>Party</b>	<b>Search String</b>
Centerpartiet (C)	Centerparti* OR Centerpolitik* OR Centerriksdag* OR Centern OR Centerns
Folkpartiet Liberalerna (FP)	Folkparti*
Kristdemokraterna (KD)	Kristdemokrat* OR Kristendemokrat* or (“Kristen Demokratisk”)
Miljöpartiet de Gröna (MP)	Miljöparti*
Moderata samlingspartiet (M)	Moderaterna or Moderaternas OR Moderaten OR Moderater OR Moderatleda* OR Moderatledning* OR Moderatlist* OR Moderatparti* OR Moderatpolitik* OR Moderatriksdag* OR Moderatdelegation* OR Moderatdomin* OR (“Moderata samlingsparti*” OR “Moderata Riksdag*” OR “moderata ministr*” OR “moderata politiker” OR “moderata parti*” OR “moderata fotfolket” OR “Moderata företrädd*”)
Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti (S)	Socialdemo*
Vänsterpartiet (V)	Vänsterparti*

TABLE A.2. Dutch party search strings.

Party	Search String
CD	CD or ("Centrum democraten" and not Rasmussen)
CDA	CDA or "Christen Democratisch Appèl"
ChristenUnie	ChristenUnie or GPV or RPF or "Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond" or "Reformatoische Politieke Federatie"
D66	D66 or "Democraten 66" or "D'66"
GroenLinks	GroenLinks
LPF	LPF or "Lijst Pim Fortuyn"
PvdA	PvdA or "Partij van de Arbeid"
PVV	(PVV and not (Productschap and Vee and Vlees)) or "Groep Wilders" or "Partij voor de Vrijheid"
SGP	SGP or (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij)
SP	SP or (("Socialistische Partij") and not ("Belgische socialistische partij" or "Waalse socialistische partij" or Jospin or Milosevic or Chirac or ("Francois Hollande") or ("Ilir Meta") or ("Fatos Nano") or ("Fidel Espinoza") or (SLD and Polen) or ("Ulla Hoffmann") or Medgyessy or ("Jose Socrates") or ("Martin Schulz") or ("Martin Schultz") or Guterres or ("Deense Socialistische Partij") or Gyurcsany or ("Ségolène Royal") or ("Strauss-Kahn") or ("Wynns hotel in Dublin") or Zapatero or PSOE or Fidesz or ("Bulgaarse Socialistische Partij") or oranjerevolutie or Janoekovitsj or allende or Insulza or Vandenbroucke or ("Van Miert") or ("Pacifisch Socialistische Partij") or ("Franstalige socialistische partij") or Jemen or ("Van Outrive") or ("Hongaarse Socialistische Partij") or ("Portugese Socialistische Partij") or ("Pernille Frahm") or ("Revolutionair Socialistische Partij") or ("Noorse regering") or Mussertor or ("Jose Blanco") or Morales or Escalona or Pasok or Sarkozy or ("Front National") or (" Franse socialistische partij") or ("Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij") or ("Democratisch Socialistische partij") or (Labour and Conservatieven and Brown and Blair) or ("de Marokkaanse socialistische partij") or ("Vlaamse socialistische partij") or ("Robert Voorhamme") or (Janssens and (Antwerpen or Vlaams)) ))
VVD	VVD or "Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie"

*Note:* For the Socialist party a very extensive string had to be developed in order to exclude all foreign socialist parties, while the for Centrum Democrats articles containing the acronym 'CD' were sorted manually to exclude articles on musical CDs etc.

TABLE A.3. Issue search strings.

Country	Issue	Search String
Sweden	European integration	(Europeiska unionen) or (EU) or (Europeiska gemenskap*) or (EG) or (Europaparlamentet) or (Europeiska kommissionen)
Sweden	Immigration	diskrim* or (skola* or kurs* or lektion* or utbildning*) w/10 (utlän* or flykting* or gästarbetar* or asylsök*) or (svenska för invandrare) or språkkurs* or språkundervisn* or anhöriginvandring* or skenäktenskap* or utlänn* or flykting* or gästarbetare* or asylsök* or invandr* or (illegala flyktingar) or utvis* or Upphållstillstånd* or Mångkult* or tvångsgiftermål* or tvångsäktenskap* or (brud* w/5 utland) or (försörjningskrav w/20 äktenskap*) or asyl* or Flyktingamnesti* or Huvudduk* or slöja* or burka*
Netherlands	European integration	(Europese Unie) or ALLCAPS(EU) or (Europese Gemeenschap) or ALLCAPS(EG) or (Europees Parlement) or (Europese Commissie) or ((Europees Hof) w/5 Justitie)
Netherlands	Immigration	discrim* or (haat w/5 aanzet) or (scholing* or cursus* or les* or onderwijs or oprot*) w/10 (migrant* or immi* or alloch* or asiel* or buitenl*) or (cursus w/1 Nederlands) or taalcur* or taalles* or taalonderw* or gezinsherenig* or schijnhuw* or nephuw* or uithuw* or immig* or alloch* or vreemdeling* or migran* or moslim* or islam* or asiel* or illegalen or uitgezet* or verblijfs* or multicult* or (massa w/1 regularis*) or regularis* or importbruid or (bruid* w/5 buitenland) or (inkomenseis w/20 trouw*) or pluriform* or asielzoeker* or vluchteling* or (generaal pardon) or hoofddoek* or kopvod*

## Appendix B

### *Coded material for Chapter II*

This appendix provides an overview of the coded data on the framing and positions on the EU sub-issues in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Figures B.1, B.2 and B.3 provide, for each country, the party positions on the different EU sub-issues, averaged over time. For example, in Figure B.1 one can see that the Labour Party in the United Kingdom holds positive attitudes on the European integration project when discussing most sub-issues but is more negative when agricultural policies (sub-issue 8) are discussed. The focus in figures B.4, B.5 and B.6 is on the development of party positions on the EU over time, disregarding for simplicity the different sub-issues. For example, in Figure B.5 we note that CP'86, SP and PVV are the most Euroskeptical parties and that SP has moderated its stance somewhat over time. Figures B.7, B.8 and B.9 depicts which frames may be associated with which parties. In the UK, for example, the peace frame is most strongly linked to Labour and the prosperity frame to the Liberal Democrats, while the Conservatives' framing is marked by comparatively little use of the politics and peace frames and substantial profit framing (though Labour also makes frequent use of this frame). Finally, in the figures B.10, B.11 and B.12 the use of the six frames over time is displayed for every sub-issue, averaged across parties. Here, we note for example that in Germany, the issue of crime in the EU (sub-issue 6) was first nearly exclusively framed in terms of prosperity but over time became discussed using prosperity and politics framing.




FIGURE B.1. Positions on the EU on different sub-issues in Germany.




FIGURE B.2. Positions on the EU on different sub-issues in the Netherlands.




FIGURE B.3. Positions on the EU on different sub-issues in the UK.




FIGURE B.4. Positions on the EU (all sub-issues) in Germany.




FIGURE B.5. Positions on the EU (all sub-issues) in the Netherlands.




FIGURE B.6. Positions on the EU (all sub-issues) in the UK.




FIGURE B.7. Framing per party over all elections and EU sub-issues in Germany.




FIGURE B.8. Framing per party over all elections and EU sub-issues in the Netherlands.




FIGURE B.9. Framing per party over all elections and EU sub-issues in the UK.

APPENDICES





FIGURE B.10. Framing of EU sub-issues in Germany, averaged over all parties.

## Appendix B



**FIGURE B.11.** Framing of EU sub-issues in the Netherlands, averaged over all parties.





FIGURE B.12. Framing of EU sub-issues in the United Kingdom, averaged over all parties.

## Appendix C

### *Description of data for Chapter III*

This appendix gives a descriptive overview of the data that were used in Chapter III, to give some insight into the face-validity of this novel data set. For brevity only the two politicized issues are shown here (European integration in Sweden and immigration in the Netherlands), as these well-known issues are easier to inspect.



**FIGURE C.1.** Visibility of immigration and EU in Dutch and Swedish newspapers.

*Note.* The y-axis differs per graph. The visibility can be compared over time within one issue and country, but not strictly between issues, as the different search strings might not work equally well and the size of newspapers differs over countries.




FIGURE C.2. Attention for the EU in parliamentary questions, Sweden.




FIGURE C.3. Attention for the immigration in parliamentary questions, the Netherlands.




FIGURE C.4. Framing of the EU by different parties in Sweden.




FIGURE C.5. Framing of the EU in Swedish newspapers.




FIGURE C.6. Framing of immigration by different parties in the Netherlands.




FIGURE C.7. Framing of immigration in Dutch newspapers.

## Appendix D

*Description of data for Chapter IV*

**TABLE D.1.** Parties included in the analysis and their coding.

	<b>N</b>	<b>Government</b>	<b>Mainstream opposition</b>	<b>Challenger</b>
<b>CD</b>	175	-	-	1995w1 - 1998w18
<b>CDA</b>	757	2002w30 - 2010w35	1995w1 - 2002w29	-
<b>Christen- Unie</b>	757	2007w9 - 2010w35	-	1995w1 - 2007w8
<b>D66</b>	757	1995w1 - 2002w29 2003w22 - 2006w27	2002w30 - 2003w21 2006w28 - 2010w35	-
<b>Groen- Links</b>	757	-	-	1995w1 - 2010w35
<b>LPF</b>	176	2002w30 - 2003w22	2003w23 - 2006w47	2002w20 - 2002w29
<b>PVV</b>	314	-	-	2004w47 - 2010w35
<b>PvdA</b>	757	1995w1 - 2002w29 2007w8 - 2010w35	2002w30 - 2007w7	-
<b>SGP</b>	757	-	-	1995w1 - 2010w35
<b>SP</b>	757	-	-	1995w1 - 2010w35
<b>VVD</b>	757	1995w1 - 2007w7	2007w8 - 2010w35	-

*Note:* The period from 2002w27 to 2003w35 is missing for all parties due to a gap in the parliamentary proceedings database.

TABLE D.2. Descriptive statistics.

	Mean	Standard deviation	Mini-mum	Maxi-mum
<b>Dependent variables</b>				
Articles on EU issue & party in the Volkskrant	0.375	0.810	0	17
Articles on immigration & party in the Volkskrant	3.239	4.076	0	46
Articles on EU issue & party in De Telegraaf	0.148	0.441	0	7
Articles on immigration & party in De Telegraaf	1.592	2.246	0	18
<b>Independent variables</b>				
Parliamentary questions on EU (count)	0.063	0.495	0	11
Parliamentary questions on immigration (count)	0.215	1.148	0	26
Parliamentary questions on EU (dummy)	0.042	0.201	0	1
Parliamentary questions on immigration (dummy)	0.109	0.311	0	1
Tie between party and Volkskrant	0.562	0.453	0	1.531
Tie between party and De Telegraaf	0.651	0.367	0	1.346
Party size in parliamentary seats	15.858	14.303	1	45

*Note:* In the analyses, the dummy version of the parliamentary questions variables was used.

## National Election Study data

The variables ‘tie between party and Volkskrant’ and ‘tie between party and De Telegraaf’ are calculated on data from the Dutch National election Study. The variable ‘Party voted for [in current] parliamentary election’ (V15\_2) and ‘Daily newspaper’ (V2\_4, V2\_6 and V1\_1) were used. The number of respondents with valid answers for both questions is 1512 (in the 1994 study), 1801 (1998), 1566 (2002), 1268 (2003) and 2390 (2006).

## Appendix E

### *Analysis of alternative explanation for results in Chapter IV*

This appendix inspects an alternative explanation for why newspapers tend to write on issues presented in the parliamentary questions of certain parties and not others. The reasoning behind the second hypothesis is that this is the result of a partisan bias in the news selection of journalists and editors, i.e., newspapers selectively prioritize certain parties over others. However, as Wolfsfeld (2011) articulately argues, interactions between media and politics often form a cycle, with the media influencing politics, influencing the media, influencing politics and so forth. This is also the case for parliamentary questions: parliamentary questions may inspire media coverage, but they are themselves often directly motivated by reports in the media. Therefore, it could be the case that a journalist first writes a piece, which a parliamentarian reads (or receives a tip about from the journalist) and asks a question on it. It is then beneficial for the newspaper to report on the topic, as the parliamentary question validates their earlier coverage. Such a scenario has two implications for the explanation offered in this Chapter IV. First, it would imply that the issue is first suggested in the media and not in parliament: the agenda-setter would thus not be the party but the journalist. Second, it could imply that the newspaper is not necessarily partisan: it is possible that MPs select from particular newspapers and newspapers simply respond more to certain parties because these are ones that mention their coverage in parliament.

This appendix explores this alternative scenario in two ways. First, a control for issue attention in the newspaper in the preceding week is added. In the original models, autoregressive terms were included in the error structure, but because the dependent variable is the number of articles that mention both the issue and the party, this is not equivalent to controlling for past issue attention (in which the party need not be mentioned). By adding this control, we can see whether it is the newspaper that first places the issue on the agenda, and not the political party. Table E.1 reports the results including this control. As expected, the control is positive and significant in all models, indicating that if an issue is highly visible one week, it is also likely to be high on the newspaper's agenda in the next week. More important, however, adding this control does not change the results obtained earlier. The interaction between parliamentary

**Table E.1.** Models with control for issue visibility in last week's newspaper, 1995-2010.

	Volkskrant		De Telegraaf		Volkskrant		De Telegraaf	
	EU	Immigr.	EU	Immigr.	EU	Immigr.	EU	Immigr.
<b>Issue in parliamentary questions</b>	0.133*** (0.026)	-0.021 (0.018)	0.391* (0.157)	0.035 (0.063)	0.001 (0.152)	0.064 (0.055)	-0.397 (0.501)	-0.056 (0.055)
<b>Mainstream opposition</b>	0.007 (0.201)	-0.108 (0.108)	0.055 (0.230)	-0.162 (0.209)				
<b>Challenger party</b>	-0.444 (0.338)	-0.258 (0.374)	-0.529 (0.436)	-0.435 (0.398)				
<b>Issue in questions x mainstream opposition</b>	-0.182*** (0.042)	0.154*** (0.041)	-0.141 (0.398)	0.058 (0.161)				
<b>Issue in questions x challenger party</b>	0.418* (0.167)	0.161*** (0.025)	-0.702 (0.469)	0.065 (0.081)				
<b>Tie between party and newspaper</b>					0.388 (0.336)	0.37 (0.276)	0.819† (0.422)	0.753* (0.383)
<b>Issue in questions x tie</b>					0.293 (0.214)	0.016 (0.059)	0.883 (0.643)	0.183* (0.088)
<b>Issue visibility in last week's newspaper</b>	0.027** (0.008)	0.031** (0.011)	0.029** (0.009)	0.034** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.008)	0.036*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.008)
<b>N (parties)</b>	11	11	10	10	11	11	10	10
<b>N (parties x weeks)</b>	6721	6730	4882	4882	6721	6730	4882	4882
<b>Adjusted deviance</b>	0.674	0.683	0.435	0.809	0.679	0.679	0.431	0.788

*Note:* Coefficients (not exponentiated) with standard errors in parentheses. Constant and the control for party size are included but not shown. † $p < .10$ ; \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$  (two-tailed).

TABLE E.2. Effects of parliamentary questions –not mentioning the newspaper- on newspaper agenda, 1995-2010.

	Volkskrant		De Telegraaf		Volkskrant		De Telegraaf	
	EU	Immigr.	EU	Immigr.	EU	Immigr.	EU	Immigr.
<b>Issue in parliamentary questions, without mention of the newspaper</b>	0.132*	-0.017	0.417*	0.052	-0.006	0.066	-0.532	-0.039
	(0.056)	(0.019)	(0.179)	(0.063)	(0.181)	(0.042)	(0.476)	(0.073)
<b>Mainstream opposition</b>	0.012	-0.107	0.072	-0.158				
	(0.211)	(0.112)	(0.191)	(0.208)				
<b>Challenger party</b>	-0.457	-0.258	-0.545	-0.45				
	(0.337)	(0.374)	(0.452)	(0.403)				
<b>Issue in questions x mainstream opposition</b>	-0.204*	0.172***	-0.174	0.036				
	(0.086)	(0.033)	(0.415)	(0.157)				
<b>Issue in questions x challenger party</b>	0.396*	0.146***	-0.801†	0.048				
	(0.173)	(0.025)	(0.428)	(0.080)				
<b>Tie between party and newspaper</b>					0.396	0.353	0.884*	0.766†
					(0.336)	(0.280)	(0.411)	(0.396)
<b>Issue in questions x tie</b>					0.282	0.018	1.077†	0.165
					(0.245)	(0.047)	(0.628)	(0.108)
<b>N (parties)</b>	11	11	10	10	11	11	10	10
<b>N (parties x weeks)</b>	6721	6730	4882	4882	6721	6730	4882	4882
<b>Adjusted deviance</b>	0.703	0.788	0.468	0.863	0.709	0.781	0.463	0.844

Note: Coefficients (not exponentiated) with standard errors in parentheses. Constant and the control for party size are included but not shown. †p<.10 \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001 (two-tailed).

questions and challenger party status remains positive and significant for both issues in the *Volkskrant*, meaning that the *Volkskrant* reports more on issues included in the questions of challenger parties, even when controlling for the attention devoted to the issues in the editions of the *Volkskrant* from the week before. Similarly, the results on the overrepresentation of party voters among the readership remain substantively the same.<sup>35</sup>

Second, the parliamentary questions that refer to the *Volkskrant* or *De Telegraaf* are excluded from the analysis. This allows us to determine how newspapers respond to parliamentary questions that are not explicitly inspired by their own coverage. Table E.2 lists these results. Again, the challenger interaction term is positive and significant for both issues in the *Volkskrant*. Additionally, little changes regarding the overrepresentation of party voters.

Finally, it is important to note that these additional analyses do not imply that there is no media-politics-media cycle –there almost certainly is- or that political parallelism is entirely the result of journalistic bias –it most likely arises from both sides. They do indicate, however, that the results provide information on the ‘politics to media’ link in the chain, as they are not purely driven by the media’s influence on politics one step earlier in the cycle.

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<sup>35</sup> Marginal effect graphs are available from the author upon request.

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## Appendix F

*Additional analysis for Chapter IV*

TABLE F.1. Effects of parliamentary questions on newspaper agenda, both interactions simultaneous.

	Volkskrant		De Telegraaf	
	EU	Immigration	EU	Immigration
<b>Issue in parliamentary questions</b>	0.074 (0.169)	-0.041 (0.025)	-0.084 (0.479)	-0.076 (0.070)
<b>Mainstream opposition</b>	0.021 (0.185)	-0.101 (0.107)	0.025 (0.191)	-0.167 (0.175)
<b>Challenger party</b>	-0.419 (0.303)	-0.198 (0.365)	-0.511 (0.430)	-0.483 (0.375)
<b>Mainstream opposition x issue in questions</b>	-0.205** (0.063)	0.155*** (0.040)	-0.200 (0.496)	0.000 (0.165)
<b>Challenger party x issue in questions</b>	0.334† (0.188)	0.147*** (0.026)	-0.591 (0.530)	0.046 (0.086)
<b>Tie between party and newspaper</b>	0.378 (0.325)	0.332 (0.275)	0.764 (0.365)	0.741* (0.351)
<b>Tie x issue in questions</b>	0.096 (0.241)	0.027 (0.038)	0.749 (0.710)	0.198* (0.092)
<b>Party size</b>	0.029*** (0.008)	0.033** (0.010)	0.026** (0.009)	0.030** (0.010)
<b>Constant</b>	-1.686*** (0.425)	0.348 (0.448)	-2.808*** (0.445)	-0.439 (0.433)
<b>N (parties)</b>	11	11	10	10
<b>N (parties x weeks)</b>	6721	6730	4882	4882
<b>Adjusted deviance</b>	0.695	0.758	0.454	0.807

*Note:* Coefficients (not exponentiated) with standard errors in parentheses. The reference category for the mainstream opposition and challenger dummies is government parties. † $p < .10$ ; \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$  (two-tailed).

## Appendix G

### *Day selection for newspaper visibility*

This appendix documents the procedure by which the Monday and Tuesday newspaper editions were selected to measure the visibility of the two issues in the media in chapter V. Table G.1 displays, separately for each issue and newspaper, the effect of issue visibility in the morning paper of the day of the Question Hour (Tuesday), the effect of visibility the day before (Monday), and the day before that, and so on, until the newspaper of one week earlier. In the first row, we observe that if the EU or immigration is highly visible in the Tuesday issue of Telegraaf, parties are more likely to ask PQs on the issue. The Tuesday paper of the Volkskrant does not have a significant effect, but the Volkskrant of Monday does. For convenience, the final column reports the average coefficient of issue visibility in the newspapers of that day. This reveals that, on average, issue visibility in the newspapers of Tuesday, Monday, and Friday has a positive effect on the likelihood of a party including an issue in the weekly Question Hour on Tuesday. As the largest effect is observed on the first two days, we choose the issue visibility of the Monday and Tuesday newspapers for the analyses.

TABLE G.1. Explaining EU and immigration attention in Question Hour on Tuesday.

	EU		Immigration		Mean coefficient
	De Telegraaf	Volkscrant	De Telegraaf	Volkscrant	
<b>Tuesday paper</b>	0.083* (2.00)	-0.005 (-0.15)	0.016† (1.65)	0.003 (0.61)	0.024
<b>Monday paper</b>	0.154* (2.44)	0.065† (1.67)	0.011 (0.86)	0.014† (1.71)	0.061
<b>Saturday paper</b>	-0.059 (-1.17)	0.021 (0.84)	0.002 (0.26)	0.004 (0.82)	-0.008
<b>Friday paper</b>	0.100† (1.96)	0.026 (0.84)	0.016 (1.44)	0.007 (1.28)	0.037
<b>Thursday paper</b>	-0.117† (-1.66)	-0.006 (-0.21)	0.005 (0.49)	-0.002 (-0.41)	-0.030
<b>Wednesday paper</b>	-0.025 (-0.37)	-0.055* (-1.98)	-0.002 (-0.20)	-0.013* (-2.03)	-0.024
<b>Time since last PQ</b>			-0.031*** (-4.64)	-0.033*** (-5.58)	
<b>Time since last PQ<sup>2</sup></b>			0.000** (3.18)	0.000*** (3.68)	
<b>Constant</b>	-3.176*** (-21.14)	-3.269*** (-19.03)	-2.335*** (-9.30)	-2.088*** (-9.32)	
<b>N</b>	5205	7006	4961	6601	
<b>McFadden's pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.03	
<b>Log likelihood</b>	-902.041	-1182.9	-1661.846	-2222.705	

Note: Logistic regression coefficients with t-values, based on clustered standard errors, in parentheses. Analyses using the Volkscrant begin in 1995 and end in 2010, while those using De Telegraaf are from mid-1999 to the end of 2010. †p<.10 \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed).

## Appendix H

### *Robustness checks for Chapter V*

This appendix lists the results of analyses using two alternative estimation techniques to the one employed in Chapter V. As discussed in Chapter V, the observations are grouped on two non-nested levels: by week and by party. In the main analyses, only the clustering on week, but not on party, was modeled, and in this appendix both are addressed in two ways. First, we estimate logistic regressions comparable to those in the chapter, but including dummies for the party effects. The standard errors are still clustered at the week level. The results of these analyses are reported in the first two columns of Table H1. Regarding the interactions for hypothesis one, we see that the results found in the chapter still hold. Again, in three out of the four cases, the interaction between party-paper tie and issue attention in the newspaper is significant, meaning that parties are significantly more likely to copy issue attention from an ideologically close paper. Again, coverage of the immigration issue in De Telegraaf is the exception, which fails to elicit a stronger response from linked parties. Similarly, the results on ownership echo those in the chapter, with only one out of four cases displaying a significant interaction.

Second, we estimate cross-classified logistic regression models, with random intercepts for parties and weeks. Further, the visibility of an issue in newspapers is measured at the week level and not at the lowest level of week-party combinations, meaning that the interactions with media visibility are cross-level interactions. For this reason, a random component (varying by week) in the slopes of newspaper-party tie and issue ownership should be included. Unfortunately, the estimation of a random slope for issue ownership was not feasible, and hence a random component was only estimated for tie with De Telegraaf and tie with Volkskrant. The model regarding the EU issue was estimated with the specification of unstructured covariance in the random components, meaning separate variances are estimated for all of the random components and the components are allowed to co-vary (for example, a covariance for the random slopes for the ties to the two newspapers is estimated, instead of being set to zero). Coincidentally, the three estimated covariances did not differ significantly from zero. Regarding the immigration issue, estimating all of these parameters was not feasible, and hence, a model with separately

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TABLE H.1. Results using alternative estimation techniques.

	Logistic regressions with party dummies and clustered standard errors		Cross-classified logistics regression	
	EU	Immigration	EU	Immigration
<b>Main effects</b>				
Issue visibility in De Telegraaf	0.232* (0.095)	0.190* (0.079)	0.226 (0.192)	0.132 (0.214)
Issue visibility in Volkskrant	-0.044 (0.128)	0.027 (0.079)	-0.107 (0.202)	-0.106 (0.225)
Tie with De Telegraaf	0.264 (0.267)	-0.107 (0.215)	0.101 (0.478)	0.471† (0.272)
Tie with Volkskrant	0.057 (0.284)	-0.446* (0.215)	-0.177 (0.351)	0.284 (0.229)
Issue ownership	-0.131 (0.116)	-0.132† (0.072)	-0.364* (0.167)	-0.260† (0.146)
<b>Interactions</b>				
Issue visibility in De Telegraaf x Tie with De Telegraaf (H1)	0.280** (0.100)	-0.059 (0.066)	0.358* (0.172)	0.331† (0.200)
Issue visibility in Volkskrant x Tie with Volkskrant (H1)	0.166* (0.073)	0.103* (0.042)	0.256 (0.162)	0.349* (0.162)
Issue visibility in De Telegraaf x Issue ownership (H2)	0.181** (0.063)	-0.014 (0.040)	0.153 (0.127)	-0.057 (0.143)
Issue visibility in Volkskrant x Issue ownership (H2)	-0.091 (0.086)	-0.012 (0.047)	-0.127 (0.125)	-0.076 (0.123)
<b>Variance components</b>				
Party: constant $\sigma^2$			0.073	0.043
Week: Tie with Telegraaf $\sigma^2$			1.829	1.395
Week: Tie with Volkskrant $\sigma^2$			4.465	3.931
Week: constant $\sigma^2$			15.700	16.399
<b>N</b>	4494	4620	4494	4621
<b>McFadden's pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.049	0.069		
<b>Log likelihood</b>	-812.876	-1485.835	-683.008	-686.893

Note: Logistic regression coefficients with (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. Party dummies (first two models), the duration variable (immigration models), the control for party size and the constant are not shown. †p<.10 \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001 (two-tailed).

estimated variances for the random components, but zero co-variances, was estimated instead.

The last two columns in Table H.1 present the results of the cross-classified models. These are, again, largely in line with results found earlier. As before, H1 is supported in three out of four cases, although here the interaction between EU visibility and tie with the Volkskrant is the exception, instead of De Telegraaf. Moreover, all interactions are positive in sign. Regarding H2, there is again no supporting evidence for the hypothesis, as in these analyses none of the interactions is significant, and three out of the four are negative. Overall, these additional analyses confirm prior conclusions.

## Appendix I

### *Analyses with alternative issue ownership measures for Chapter V*

Chapter V found no supporting evidence for the hypothesis that issue owners are more responsive to media attention on their issues than non-owners. This is rather surprising, as earlier studies did find support for this hypothesis (though in different countries). Therefore, we retest the hypothesis in this appendix using a different measurement of issue ownership. In the main analysis, we examined ownership based on the association between the issue and the party in the newspaper coverage of the past year, as scholars have argued that parties claim ownership through media appearances. However, it has also been argued that the association between an issue and a party in the minds of voters is the product of a history of attention to the issue (Petrocik 1996; see also Van der Brug 2004). Therefore, we construct an alternative measure based on the past issue prioritization of the party in parliament.


To capture the issue prioritization of the parliamentary group, we consider the relative attention parties devoted the issue in the parliamentary questions of the preceding year. First, for each week, we take the number of words the party devotes to the EU or immigration in their parliamentary questions and divide this by the total number of words in oral questions posed by the party in that week. Such a relative score is a good indicator of a party's issue priorities: how much of the limited resources (in preparation and speech time) is the party prepared to devote to the issue? Second, as in the measurement of issue ownership in the media, a rolling average is taken of the 52 weeks prior to the week previous to each observation, with decreasing weights for the 40<sup>th</sup> to 52<sup>nd</sup> week in the past.

**TABLE I.1.** Comparison of ownership measures.

	EU ownership		Immigration ownership	
	Media	Parliament	Media	Parliament
<b>Part of variance between parties</b>	32%	13%	49%	67%
<b>Overall correlation media and parliament</b>	0.06 (0.000)		0.39 (0.000)	
<b>Correlation within parties</b>	-0.01 (0.303)		-0.01 (0.580)	
<b>Correlation between parties</b>	0.32 (0.000)		0.68 (0.000)	

*Note:* P-values for correlations in parentheses.

Table I.1 presents a description of the two types of issue ownership –in the media and in parliament. The share of the variance between parties is informative of how stable each type of ownership is over time. For immigration, there is considerable stability: 49 to 67 percent of the variance in the ownership of



**FIGURE I.1.** Mean issue ownership of parties, 1995-2010.

*Note:* Both ownership scores are divided by their standard deviation to facilitate comparison

this issue can be attributed to differences between parties, whereas for the EU issue, parties vary substantially in their ownership over time. This could be a sign that, as the issue of European integration was not politicized as much as the immigration issue, the ownership has yet to be clearly established. In addition, regarding the EU issue, the correlation between ownership in the media and ownership in parliament is low ( $r=.06$ ), whereas there is substantially greater correlation between the two on the issue of immigration ( $r=.39$ ). For both issues, the correlation between the two measures lies between parties, and not within parties over time. Figure I.1 displays the mean score for each type of ownership per issue and party. Here, we observe that ownership in the media and ownership in parliament generally concur, but with some exceptions. The Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) is linked to the EU issue in the media much more than the prioritization by the parliamentarian faction would suggest, as is the case for D66. On the immigration issue, the owners Centrum Democraten (CD) and PVV clearly stand out, while owner Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) only has a moderate score. Finally, we also note that despite its history of attention in parliament, the CD is not linked to immigration to the same extent in the media, which confirms the party's ostracized status (Van Spanje 2010).

Table I.2 reports the alternative results. Models 1 and 2 include ownership in the media, as in the main analyses, but exclude the party-paper tie variables and their interactions. These models reveal that issue ownership in the media does not fail to enhance the effect of issue visibility in newspapers because of the inclusion of the tie variables. Models 3 and 4 display the regressions with issue ownership in parliament as the predictor. In model 3, one interaction is negative and the other near zero, while neither is significant. In model 4, the interaction between ownership and visibility in the *Volkskrant* is even significantly negative, meaning that the immigration issue owners are significantly less likely to press the issue in parliament due to newspaper attention. In this model, the main effect of issue ownership is more substantial, indicating that past questioning behavior is a strong predictor of present PQs. Finally, in models 5 and 6, the owners of the immigration issue -CD, LPF and PVV- are marked with a dummy variable, based on the existing literature (Van Heerden et al. 2014). This is only done for immigration, as the owners of this issue are unambiguously known. Model 5 indicates that the immigration owners

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TABLE I.2. Results with alternative ownership measures.

	EU M1	Immigr. M2	EU M3	Immigr. M4	Immigr. M5	Immigr. M6
<b>Issue visibility in De Telegraaf</b>	0.04 (0.12)	0.28** (0.10)	0.06 (0.11)	0.23* (0.11)	0.28** (0.10)	
<b>Issue visibility in Volkskrant</b>	0.03 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.04 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.14* (0.06)
<b>Ownership in the media</b>	-0.01 (0.06)	0.16*** (0.05)				
<b>Ownership in parliament</b>			0.00 (0.06)	0.28*** (0.05)		
<b>Ownership dummy</b>					0.74*** (0.13)	0.64*** (0.11)
<b>Visibility in De Telegraaf x Ownership media</b>	0.12 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)				
<b>Visibility in Volkskrant x Ownership media</b>	-0.11 (0.07)	0.06 (0.05)				
<b>Visibility in De Telegraaf x Ownership parliament</b>			-0.04 (-0.06)	-0.06 (-0.04)		
<b>Visibility in Volkskrant x Ownership parliament</b>			0.01 (0.08)	-0.09* (0.05)		
<b>Visibility in De Telegraaf x Ownership dummy</b>					-0.23 (0.16)	
<b>Visibility in Volkskrant x Ownership dummy</b>					-0.14 (0.14)	-0.19+ (0.10)
<b>N</b>	4668	4793	4838	4666	4832	6472
<b>McFadden's pseudo R2</b>	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.04
<b>Log likelihood</b>	-881.2	-1586	-886	-1521	-1588	-2159

Note: Logistics regression coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses. All variables in the interactions are standardized. Controls for party size and duration since last question (squared) are included, but not shown. †p<.10 \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\* p<.001 (two-tailed).

voice the issue significantly more in parliament but respond less to media attention (though the negative interactions are not significant). The last model only considers attention in the Volkskrant, as data for this newspaper are available from 1995 on (instead of 1999), which allows us to include the CD in the model. Again, issue ownership has a significantly positive main effect, meaning that at the average media attention on the issue, owners ask more questions about it, but the interaction with visibility in the Volkskrant is again negative, indicating that media attention has less of an effect on immigration issue owners. In this

final model, the negative interaction is even significant. In summary, none of the measures of issue ownership provide any supporting evidence for hypothesis two.



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# Nederlandstalige Samenvatting

Waarom staan sommige onderwerpen hoog op de agenda van de politiek, terwijl andere vrijwel genegeerd worden? Waarom staan de kranten vol van berichtgeving over bepaalde onderwerpen, terwijl journalisten andere onderwerpen onbesproken laten? Dit proefschrift onderzoekt hoe onderwerpen onder de aandacht komen te staan, door specifiek te kijken hoe politieke en media-agenda's elkaar onderling beïnvloeden. Het kijkt dus enerzijds naar de invloed van de onderwerpkeuze in de politiek op wat er in de media besproken wordt, en anderzijds naar de invloed van media-aandacht voor onderwerpen op politieke aandacht. Uit het bestaande onderzoek naar dit laatste, de invloed van de media op de politieke agenda, weten we dat beïnvloeding lang niet altijd plaatsvindt, maar dat het afhangt van de *omstandigheden*. Op eenzelfde manier ligt het voor de hand dat politici en partijen niet zomaar kunnen bepalen welke onderwerpen in de media besproken worden, maar dat ze slechts onder bepaalde omstandigheden invloed hebben op de onderwerpskeuze van de media. De centrale vraag van dit proefschrift is dus: **wanneer bepalen de media de politieke agenda, en wanneer bepalen partijen de media-agenda?**

## Relevantie

Het is belangrijk om te weten hoe de politieke agenda en de media-agenda tot stand komen om ten minste vier redenen. Ten eerste is politieke aandacht een voorwaarde voor beleidsvorming, Met andere woorden, waar de politiek zich over buigt, bepaalt voor welke problemen er beleidsoplossingen worden geboden.

Ten tweede is de politieke agenda een belangrijk strijdpunt voor politieke partijen onderling, om zowel ideologische als strategische redenen. Vanuit hun uiteenlopende ideologieën hebben partijen verschillende beleidsdoelen, en ze strijden met elkaar om de onderwerpen op de agenda te krijgen die zij het belangrijkste vinden om aan te pakken. Vanuit strategisch oogpunt is het van belang voor partijen om goed over te komen op de kiezers, door te zorgen dat onderwerpen die de partij in een goed daglicht plaatsen te benadrukken en de onderwerpen die de partij kunnen schaden in de ogen van de kiezer van de

agenda te houden. De totstandkoming van de politieke agenda geeft dus inzicht in het politieke spel tussen partijen.

Ten derde is, naast de politieke agenda, de media-agenda een grote inzet in de competitie tussen partijen. Om kiezers voor zich te winnen zijn partijen grotendeels afhankelijk van communicatie via de media. Studies naar de invloed van de media op burgers laten zien dat de media niet zozeer bepalen *wat* mensen ergens over denken, maar dat ze wel een grote invloed hebben *waarover* mensen denken (*agenda-setting*). Het is dus eigenlijk moeilijk voor politici om in mediaoptredens kiezers over te halen voor hun standpunten, maar ze kunnen wel proberen –via de media- te zorgen dat kiezers die onderwerpen in gedachten hebben die hun goed over doen komen. Vreemd genoeg is er weinig bestaand onderzoek naar de mate waarin de politiek de onderwerpen in de media kan bepalen.

Ten slotte is het van belang om te weten hoe bepalend de media zijn voor de politieke agenda om zo meer te weten over de macht van de media over de politiek in het algemeen. Vaak wordt er gesproken over de aanzienlijke en groeiende macht van de massa media in onze samenleving en politiek; de termen *media logica*, *mediatisering* en *mediacratie* zijn voorbeelden van dit idee. Beïnvloeding van de politieke agenda door de media is een concreet geval van media-invloed op de politiek, en door dit te onderzoeken komen we dus meer te weten over hoe groot de macht van de media in werkelijkheid is.

### Onderzoeksaanpak

De wisselwerking tussen de agenda in de media en in de politiek wordt in dit proefschrift onderzocht aan de hand van twee specifieke onderwerpen op deze agenda's, namelijk het immigratie issue en het issue van Europese integratie. Beide issues worden gevolgd door de tijd, van 1995 tot 2010, in Nederland, en in een hoofdstuk ook in Zweden en in een ander hoofdstuk in Nederland, Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland.<sup>36</sup> Deze onderwerpen zijn gekozen omdat ze in deze periode in West-Europa in potentie tot veel conflict en aandacht konden leiden, maar dit in verschillende landen in wisselende mate daadwerkelijk gebeurd is. Zo is bijvoorbeeld tot 2010 in Zweden Europese integratie veel besproken in de

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36 Hoofdstuk II kijkt iets verder terug in de tijd, vanaf 1987, en stopt in 2006.

media en in de politiek, en immigratie relatief weinig, terwijl dit in Nederland net andersom was. Daarnaast worden, door te kijken naar twee onderwerpen en niet naar de hele agenda, de inherente verschillen tussen issues buiten beschouwing gelaten, waar de bestaande literatuur zich tot nu toe vooral op gericht heeft. Hierdoor kunnen andere verklaringen in beeld komen, zoals de strategische overwegingen horend bij partijcompetitie en de *framing* van onderwerpen.

### Bevindingen per hoofdstuk

Na de inleiding in hoofdstuk I, kijkt **hoofdstuk II** of kranten eerder politieke aandacht overnemen als partijen onderling in conflict zijn. Conflict is een essentieel onderdeel van politiek. Vaak hebben partijen er baat bij het conflict uit te breiden naar nieuwe onderwerpen, maar het is de vraag of dit ook een effectieve strategie is om een onderwerp in het bredere debat in te media te krijgen. We meten in Duitse, Britse en Nederlandse partijprogramma's hoeveel en op welke manier deelonderwerpen van Europese integratie besproken worden, en kijken hoeveel media-aandacht er vervolgens naar de deelonderwerpen gaat. Het blijkt dat als partijen aandacht besteden aan een EU deelonderwerp met erg uiteenlopende *framing*, wat wij opvatten als conflict over de definitie van het issue, kranten de politieke aandacht voor een issue overnemen in de daaropvolgende periode. Ook als partijen in hun programma's erg verschillende standpunten innemen, vóór of tegen Europese integratie, zijn kranten geneigd te schrijven over de onderwerpen die partijen agenderen. Daarentegen als partijen een deelonderwerp veel bespreken, maar zonder conflict in framing of standpunten, besteden de kranten geen aandacht aan het onderwerp. Deze bevindingen laten zien dat conflict een belangrijke rol speelt, en daarnaast dat niet alleen de hoeveelheid aandacht voor een onderwerp telt, maar ook de manier waarop het besproken wordt (framing).

**Hoofdstuk III** onderzoekt of partijen eerder geneigd zijn onderwerpen over te nemen uit de media op het moment dat de manier waarop ze besproken worden, dat wil zeggen de overheersende framing, hen schikt. Hiervoor kijk ik hoe vaak partijen immigratie en Europese integratie noemen in parlementaire vragen in Nederland en Zweden, en hoe vaak en met welke frames deze onderwerpen werden genoemd in de kranten in het voorafgaande kwartaal. De resultaten geven aan dat in Nederland partijen inderdaad eerder Kamervragen

stellen over immigratie als de framing van het issue in kranten lijkt op de framing die de partij hanteert. In Zweden stellen partijen eerder parlementaire vragen over Europese integratie als dit onderwerp veel en met de voorkeurs framing in de Zweedse kranten heeft gestaan. Net als uit hoofdstuk II blijkt dus uit dit hoofdstuk dat het er toe doet *hoe* een onderwerp wordt besproken, en niet alleen *of* het besproken wordt. Daarnaast laat het zien dat partijen strategisch kiezen wanneer ze issues overnemen uit de media, en in dat opzicht dus niet slaafs volgen wat de media agenderen.

**Hoofdstuk IV** analyseert wanneer kranten onderwerpen uit parlementaire vragen overnemen. Partijen stellen die vragen vaak om een onderwerp bij een breder publiek onder de aandacht te krijgen, maar verreweg de meeste vragen worden genegeerd door de media. Dit hoofdstuk stelt twee hypothesen om te verklaren wanneer het wél lukt via parlementaire vragen een onderwerp in de media te krijgen: de *waakhond* en de *schoothond* hypothesen. De waakhond hypothese houdt in dat journalisten, omdat ze het als taak zien de regering te controleren, vooral rapporteren over vragen van nooit regerende partijen (challenger parties), die de regering onder druk zetten. De schoothond hypothese stelt dat journalisten alleen rapporteren over vragen van gelieerde partijen, dat wil zeggen de partijen waar hun lezers op stemmen. Voor de schoothond hypothese wordt lichte steun gevonden in de analyses, terwijl de waakhond hypothese alleen lijkt te gelden voor de *Volkskrant*, en niet voor *De Telegraaf*.

Net als hoofdstuk IV bestudeert **hoofdstuk V** de banden tussen partijen en kranten, maar dit hoofdstuk kijkt juist naar het effect op de politieke agenda: laten partijen zich in hun parlementaire vragen eerder inspireren door kranten van hun politieke kleur? Ongeveer 80% van de Kamervragen in Nederland is gebaseerd op mediaberichtgeving, wat een teken lijkt te zijn van de grote, eenduidige invloed van de media. De analyses van dit hoofdstuk laten echter zien dat partijen selectief zijn in hun bronkeuze; ze laten zich sterker beïnvloeden door kranten die veel gelezen worden door hun kiezers. Daarnaast toetst dit hoofdstuk een bestaande hypothese uit de literatuur, namelijk dat *issue owners* (denk bijvoorbeeld aan de PVV bij immigratie) eerder geneigd zijn te reageren op media-aandacht voor 'hun' onderwerp. In tegenstelling tot eerdere studies vindt deze hypothese geen steun in de analyses. Het lijkt eerder dat de eigenaars het

EU issue en immigratie issue al zo vaak zo noemen in Kamervragen, dat extra media-aandacht voor de onderwerpen juist voor deze partijen niets toevoegt.

### Conclusies

De bevindingen in dit proefschrift leiden tot drie overkoepelende conclusies over de relatie tussen de onderwerpen in de media en in de politiek. De eerste is dat het bij de wisselwerking tussen de politieke agenda en de media-agenda niet alleen gaat om de *hoeveelheid* aandacht die naar een onderwerp gaat, maar ook om de *manier* waarop het besproken wordt, de framing. Dit lijkt vanzelfsprekend, maar de meeste bestaande studies kijken alleen naar hoe vaak een onderwerp genoemd wordt. Uit hoofdstuk II blijkt dat journalisten gevoelig zijn voor framing door partijen, en alleen politieke aandacht overnemen als er een strijd over de betekenis van het issue gaande is. In hoofdstuk III bleek dat partijen op de framing in de media letten, en vooral onderwerpen opwerpen in de Kamer als de framing in het publieke debat mee zit. Zo zijn frames dus van belang voor beide agenda's.

Ten tweede sluit dit proefschrift aan bij recente onderzoeken die onderstrepen dat partijen geen passieve speelballen zijn van de media, maar strategisch kiezen wanneer zij op media-aandacht reageren en wanneer niet. Uit hoofdstuk III blijkt dat partijen op het juiste moment wachten om een onderwerp te bespreken in het parlement, door het te introduceren op het moment dat de framing in de media naar hun zin is. Hoofdstuk V laat zien dat niet alle media op alle partijen invloed hebben, maar dat partijen vooral luisteren naar de kranten van hun eigen kiezers.

Ten derde kan geconcludeerd worden dat de media niet altijd de bestaande machtsstructuren uitvergrooten (hoewel ze dit vaak wel doen), maar ook in het voordeel van minder machtige partijen kunnen werken. Het is bekend dat politici en partijen met formeel veel macht, bijvoorbeeld in ministersposten, meer media-aandacht krijgen dan minder machtige partijen en politici, en zo 'bevoordeeld' worden. Hoofdstuk IV laat met de waakhond hypothese zien dat de Volkskrant meer bericht over issues die juist door minder machtige partijen worden geagendeerd, namelijk *challenger* partijen. Dit soort partijen zijn dus misschien wel minder zichtbaar in de media, maar kunnen wel –ten minste bij de Volkskrant- beter onderwerpen agenderen in de media. Ook uit hoofdstuk II

komt een voordeel voor dit soort partijen naar voren. In dat hoofdstuk blijkt dat media eerder conflictueuze onderwerpen overnemen van de politieke agenda, en challenger partijen zijn vaak degenen die baat hebben bij conflict over nieuwe issues, terwijl regeringspartijen dit juist proberen te vermijden.

### Vervolgonderzoek

Dit onderzoek draagt bij aan de wetenschappelijk literatuur over de politieke macht over de media-agenda, de media-invloed over de politieke agenda, partijcompetitie, *issue competition*, framing en mediasystemen, en voegt een aantal methodologische vernieuwingen toe. Niettegenstaande deze bijdragen is er nog veel verder te onderzoeken over hoe onderwerpen in de media en de politiek elkaar beïnvloeden. Een eerste stap is om het onderzoek uit dit proefschrift uit te breiden naar meer landen, onderwerpen en mediakanalen, om zo de algemene geldigheid van de bevindingen te toetsen. Zo neemt dit proefschrift alleen kranten in beschouwing, en dit roept natuurlijk de vraag op of een vergelijkbare dynamiek geldt tussen de politiek en TV, radio, internet en sociale media. Daarnaast richt dit proefschrift zich op twee specifieke issues, immigratie en Europese integratie; onderzoek naar meer issues zou uit moeten wijzen of de gevonden patronen inderdaad voor andere issues ook opgaan.

Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift geeft ook aanleiding tot interessante nieuwe richtingen voor vervolgonderzoek. Twee daarvan zal ik hier kort noemen. De eerste gaat verder in op de strategische overwegingen van partijen. Hoofdstuk III liet zien dat partijen slim omgaan met media-aandacht door te zwijgen over het onderwerp in het parlement wanneer de framing in de media nadelig is, en een onderwerp juist te bespreken als de framing voordelig is. Dit is echter slechts één strategie van met de media omgaan, en partijen hebben mogelijk verschillende aanpakken die kunnen werken. Zo zou het kunnen dat sommige partijen in plaats van deze ontwijkende strategie juist de confrontatie opzoeken op het moment dat de framing in het debat in de media hen niet zint. Zijn er partijen met een dergelijke alternatieve mediastrategie, en welke strategie werkt er dan het beste? En gerelateerd: hebben partijen verschillende ideeën over hoe ze het debat in de media naar hun hand kunnen zetten, en zo ja welke aanpak werkt dan het beste?

Ten tweede kan er voortgang geboekt worden door effecten tussen de politiek en de media beiden kanten uit te onderzoeken, en niet als eenrichtingsverkeer te zien. Dit proefschrift doet een stap in die richting door effecten in beiden richtingen te bekijken, maar vervolgonderzoek kan nog meer de cyclus centraal stellen. Als een partij bijvoorbeeld een onderwerp zowel in de politiek als in de media onder de aandacht wil brengen, moet ze dan conflict opzoeken, wat voor de media goed werkt, of juist wachten tot het debat al in hun termen gevoerd wordt, wat in het parlement weer een betere strategie is? En hoe komen de banden tussen media en partijen tot stand, worden die bijvoorbeeld versterkt als journalisten en Kamerleden onderling van elkaar onderwerpen overnemen? Vervolgonderzoek dat verder de wederzijdse beïnvloeding centraal stelt kan ons zo verder doen begrijpen wanneer onderwerpen onder de aandacht komen te staan, en wanneer niet.