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van Eemeren, F.H.; Grootendorst, R.

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Afleveradres Post UB Groningen
UvA Keur

Broerstraat 4
9700 AN Groningen

NL

Fax
E-mail m.s.van.delden@rug.nl
Ftp
Ariel
Telefoon 050-3635057

Faktuuradres Clearing House

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A PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL PERSPECTIVE ON NORMS

Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst

1. The Amsterdam research programme

Our approach to argumentative discourse may be characterized as normative pragmatics. It pertains to pragmatics because every kind of discourse is studied as verbal exchanges of speech acts. It is normative because it is aimed at improving communicative practice.

In order to do justice to the various aspects of an adequate study of speech communication (1), our research programme consists of five components. In the philosophical component (a), where the starting-points are formulated, we take a critical-rationalist stance. In the theoretical component (b), an ideal model of optimal communication and interaction is developed. In our case this is a pragma-dialectical model attuned to resolving a dispute. The reconstructive component (c) aims at interpreting discourse with the help of the ideal model, so that more insight can be gained into the adequacy of the discourse. This means here that we attempt a resolution-oriented reconstruction of the argumentative discourse. In the empirical component (d), factors are identified which influence the recognition and interpretation of argumentation and other speech acts which, according to the ideal model, may contribute to the resolution of a dispute. Pragma-dialectical empirical research is convincingness-centered, i.e. it tries to detect factors affecting the process of convincing. In the practical component (e) of our research programme, methods are put forward for bringing reality closer towards the ideal through development of verbal skills. In doing this we advocate a reflective-minded linguistic practice. (2)

In *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions* (1984) and *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies* (to be published) we discussed the philosophical and theoretical components of our approach. In other publications we reported on the empirical components. (3) In five textbooks on argumentative method, the practical component is represented by developing a comprehensive argumentative method. (4) In the present article we elaborate on the philosophical background of our approach by explaining how we deal with norms. (5)

2. Argumentation as communication and interaction

The study of argumentation is the discipline in which an attempt is made to obtain as much insight as possible into the phenomenon of language use

which is called argumentation. (6) What characterizes this study of non-formal arguments?

First and foremost, the arguments are examined in the context in which they are used, i.e. as elements in an argumentation the purpose of which is to convince someone of something. Argumentation is part of an explicit or implicit discussion designed to resolve a difference of opinion between two or more people. Thus arguments play a part in a form of language use with a specific function, and it is in that light that they should be studied.

In a context of argumentative language use, arguments are integral parts of a specific form of communication and interaction which has specific communicative ('illocutionary') and interactional ('perlocutionary') goals. In the 'speech events' in which people characteristically pursue these goals — debates, discussions, letters to newspapers, scientific papers, and so on — they adjust their use of language to the achievement of their goals. To be able to study argumentation properly, we have to take account of the particular function that language fulfils in such speech events. For this to be possible the study of argumentation must be set in the framework of a functional theory of language use. In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation that we developed we therefore defined argumentation as a complex speech act the purpose of which is to contribute to the resolution of a difference of opinion, or dispute.

It typifies our approach that we try to functionalize, externalize, socialize and dialectify argumentation as a subject of study. Summarized in a few key words, this amounts to the following. Functionalization means that argumentation is treated as a goal-oriented verbal activity. Externalization means that argumentation is linked to expressing standpoints, agreements and other verbal commitments. Socialization means that argumentation is linked to one or more interlocutors who have to be convinced. And dialectification means that argumentation is seen in the context of a critical discussion with both pro- and contra-argumentation, so that a systematic interaction of resolution-oriented speech acts can take place.

Our pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation gives shape to our ideal of reasonableness in a critical discussion. The dialectical aspect consists in there being two parties who attempt to resolve a difference of opinion by means of a methodical exchange of moves in a discussion. The pragmatic aspect is given its due by conceiving the moves in the discussion as speech acts. In conjunction with each other these two aspects provide an adequate starting point for the development of a dialectical argumentative method that can be used to analyze and evaluate argumentative discourse.

3. Normative reconstruction of argumentative discourse

To be able to analyze and evaluate argumentative discourse methodically, it is first necessary to establish to what extent it is possible to reconstruct part or all of the speech event, as it occurs in practice, to produce a critical discussion. Such normative reconstruction can be made of an ordinary conversation but also of more formal discussions, editorial comments, policy documents, scholarly polemics, and so on.

In a normative reconstruction, a conversation is treated as a discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. Of course, language can serve diverse goals and the resolution of a difference of opinion is naturally only one of them. Besides, there can be more than one goal at the same time, and resolving a dispute will not always be the most important one. One discourse or text will be closer to the ideal of a critical discussion than another, so that in one case a more comprehensive reconstruction may be necessary than in another.

Normative reconstruction in the dialectical sense does not mean that a text or discourse is automatically regarded *in toto* as a critical discussion, but that we look to see what happens if the analysis is carried out as if it were a critical discussion. The reconstruction represents a specific angle of approach which can be illuminating as far as the resolution of disputes is concerned. Seen from the dialectical perspective, it is the more relevant approach.

Normative reconstruction entails some specific analytic operations. These amount to the performance of a number of dialectical transformations, starting from the language in the discourse or text. The transformations which must be carried out are known as dialectical deletion, addition, permutation, and substitution. (7)

4. An ideal model of a critical discussion

In order to be able to reconstruct a text or discourse normatively in a dialectical sense, a clearly-defined point of orientation is required. Such a frame of reference is provided by our ideal model of a critical discussion. We restrict ourselves here to dialectical permutation. The permutation transformation that must generally be performed in a dialectical analysis of an argumentative discourse or text relates to rearranging the order in which the elements are presented in such a way that the reconstruction follows the steps that, analytically speaking, have to be distinguished in the process of resolving a difference of opinion.

According to our ideal model, a critical discussion comprises the following

stages: the confrontation, opening, argumentation, and concluding stage. (8) The identification of the various stages of this ideal model in a real discourse or text demonstrates that we are dealing with analytical distinctions. In order to get an adequate reconstruction, the permutation transformation, for example, usually has to be applied at various points. Otherwise, the discourse or text will make no sense as a systematic resolution process. This is, for instance, the case if the opening stage is partly preceded by the argumentation stage, or the argumentation stage by the concluding stage. The repetitions, sometimes slightly differently worded, that occur in an everyday conversation demonstrate the necessity of the deletion and substitution transformations. And the indirectness of some speech acts performed demonstrates the necessity of the addition transformation, especially with regard to the premisses that are left unexpressed at the argumentation stage.

5. Analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse

There is much more that can be said about the theoretical background of the pragma-dialectical approach, about the various dialectical transformations that are performed in a normative reconstruction, about the role of the ideal model for critical discussions, about each of the components of an analytical survey and about the various steps in the process of evaluation. But even when all this information is available, analyzing and evaluating an argumentative discourse or text is still a major and in some ways also a hazardous operation. There is no ready-made and watertight method that will always produce the desired result. At every stage of the analyzing and evaluating activities decisions have to be taken. Ideally these will be reasoned decisions. This is where the instruments developed in the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation can be of help.

Analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse is going to be an 'open' matter: it will always be necessary to allow for other possibilities. The basic openness of the results of a dialectical analysis and evaluation can be amplified by turning to the connection between the study of argumentation and logic.

There are essential differences between these two disciplines, but that is not to say that logic is quite without significance for the theory of argumentation. In some analytical and evaluative tasks the application of logical insights is indispensable. This is true, for example, of the dialectical addition transformation when unexpressed premisses are to be supplied. Here the guiding principle is that the operation must produce a valid argument — and that is a matter of logic. Checking the consistency of argumentative discourse also calls for logic to detect contradictions and to evaluate the validity of the arguments used. Some 'formal' fallacies can be analyzed only by taking refuge in a logical system. (9)

However, it is also important not to exaggerate the role of logic. The practical significance of "logical" errors can only be properly assessed if it is first clear what place the argumentation, or other speech act in which the error occurs, occupies in the wider context of the critical discussion. Communicative and interactive factors play a central role here. It is only by bringing pragmatic knowledge into the analysis that we can establish that a certain speech act is a functional component of the verbal interaction, for instance by having the communicative force of an argument and thus playing a "repairing" role by trying to overcome the doubt which one language user has concerning the standpoint of the other.

Only a pragmatic approach can make it possible for us to arrive at a proper interpretation and explanation of implicit and indirect language use. It is also necessary to have contextual information of a pragmatic nature in order to replace the logical minimum by a "pragmatic minimum" when supplying unexpressed premisses. In all these cases, however, the absolute certainty that a purely logical approach *appears* to offer is thereby sacrificed. In fact, pseudo-certainty concerning the solution to a limited range of problems with a restricted scope is thus replaced by well-motivated hypothesizing concerning plausible solutions to all the problems which are at stake.

In analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse logic alone will not suffice, but it gives us something to go on. By bringing in pragmatic considerations at the same time, not only is justice done to the functional purposes of language, a sizeable dose of uncertainty is also introduced. In view of the problems which have to be dealt with, a ready-made procedure for analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse is not a realistic possibility. But briefly, the alternative boils down to an attempt to gain as much insight as possible into the communicative and interactive factors that play a part in argumentative texts and discourses. On the basis of the theoretical insights thus achieved it will then be possible to develop general guidelines which can improve and facilitate the performance of the analytical and evaluative tasks we are faced with.

6. Reasonableness in a critical sense

In order to be able to develop proper general guidelines for these analytical and evaluative tasks, argumentation theorists should reflect upon the concept of 'reasonableness' which is involved in the norms which are to be implemented in the performing of these tasks. For a considerable time, logic was dominated by a 'geometrical' conception of reasonableness, and rhetoric by an 'anthropological' conception. In our view, both conceptions are inappropriate. (10) Instead, we advocate a 'critical' conception of reasonableness.

But what does the replacement of the geometrical reasonableness of the logicians and the anthropological reasonableness of the rhetoricians by the critical reasonableness of pragma-dialectical argumentation theorists, mean? If one adopts a critical rationalist viewpoint, one pursues the development of an ideal model of reasonable argumentation that takes the fallibility of human reason explicitly into account. In all areas of human thought and action the concept of systematic critical testing is then elevated to the guiding principle of problem solving. This critical rationalist ideal requires the promotion of dialectics in the (pre-)Socratic sense of the word. By adhering to such a view of being critical, the dialectic idea of having a systematic *critical discussion* is made the basic principle of reasonableness. (11)

In contradistinction to the geometrical logical approach, opposed by Toulmin and by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and the anthropological rhetorical approach to which these authors' own main works on argumentation theory can be attributed, protagonists of a critical dialectical approach regard argumentation as part of a discussion procedure for solving problems with regard to the acceptability of viewpoints. In this discussion procedure, elements from the logical and the rhetorical approaches are taken into account. We believe that the procedure takes its reasonableness from a two-part criterion: *problem-solving* validity and *conventional* (or intersubjective) validity. (12)

This means that the discussion rules which together form the procedure put forward in a dialectical argumentation theory, should on the one hand be checked for their adequacy with regard to the resolution of disputes, and on the other for their intersubjective acceptability for the discussants. (13) For argumentation this means that its soundness should be measured against the degree to which it agrees with rules which further the resolution of the dispute, as well as against the degree to which these rules are acceptable to the discussants who wish to resolve the dispute.

The purpose of the dialectical approach is to establish how discussions should be carried out systematically in order to critically test standpoints. Wenzel, a supporter of this approach, believes that argumentation in the dialectical sense should be regarded as "a systematic management of discourse for the purpose of achieving critical decisions". (14)

In a critical discussion, the protagonist and the antagonist of a particular viewpoint try to establish jointly whether this viewpoint is tenable to critical responses. The protagonist advances pro-argumentation or contra-argumentation to defend his positive or negative viewpoint, respectively. In the former, he makes an attempt at justification and in the latter an attempt at falsification. In both cases, the antagonist can respond critically to the argumentation of the protagonist. This may result in the protagonist then continuing his justification

or falsification attempt with fresh pro- or contra-argumentation. Here again, the antagonist can respond critically, and so on. In this way, an interaction takes place between the speech acts performed in the discussion by the protagonist and those performed by the antagonist.

This interaction is characteristic of a dialectical process of convincing. It can lead to the resolution of the dispute which forms the main issue of the discussion only if the discussion is adequately regulated. This means that a dialectical argumentation theory should provide rules for the conduct of an argumentative discussion, and these rules should together constitute a problem-valid and convention-valid discussion procedure, thus guaranteeing the degree of consideredness required for a critical discussion to be carried out.

In *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions* (1984), we introduced a proposal for a dialectical discussion procedure. This proposal can be regarded as a "code of conduct" for people who want to be rational discussants who act reasonably in a critical discussion. Of course, alternative codes of conduct can be proposed. In van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987), we summarized the most important elements of our proposal in ten basic rules:

1. Parties must not prevent each other from advancing or casting doubt on standpoints.
2. Whoever advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so.
3. An attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has actually been advanced by the protagonist.
4. A standpoint may be defended only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint.
5. A person can be held to the premisses he leaves implicit.
6. A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place by means of arguments belonging to the common starting point.
7. A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence takes place by means of arguments in which a commonly accepted scheme of argumentation is correctly applied.
8. The arguments used in an argumentative discourse must be valid or capable of being validated by making one or more unexpressed premisses explicit.
9. A failed defence must result in the protagonist withdrawing his standpoint and a successful defence in the antagonist withdrawing his doubt about the standpoint.
10. Formulations must be neither puzzlingly vague nor confusingly ambiguous, and must be interpreted as accurately as possible.

7. Problem-validity of the pragma-dialectical norms

Critical rationalists place great emphasis on the consequence of the fact

that a statement and its negation cannot both be true at the same time: one of these statements must be withdrawn. They equate a dialectical testing of statements with the detection of contradictions. In Barth and Krabbe (1982) a method is proposed which is designed to establish whether a certain viewpoint is tenable in relation to certain concessions: in other words, that there is no contradiction.

As in the dialogical logic of the Erlangen School (15), in Barth and Krabbe's "formal dialectics" a situation is taken as point of departure that is different from the ordinary starting point in argumentative practice. The starting point adopted by Barth and Krabbe in "regimenting" dialogues forms a stage in the resolution of a dispute which does not arise until the protagonist has advanced his arguments to defend his viewpoint, and he and the antagonist together decide to establish whether this viewpoint is tenable on the assumption that the arguments are acceptable. This means that the protagonist and the antagonist have then decided to check whether the conclusion contained in the viewpoint indeed "follows" from the premisses contained in the argumentation.

The antagonist has then agreed to act as 'opponent' and to do so while having the argumentation of the protagonist as a 'concession' added to his own account of commitments. In ordinary discourse this rather artificial situation could be created later on in the discussion if so desired, but it is highly improbable that it will arise in the initial stage. Therefore in *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions*, we proposed to include a method corresponding with this device in the 'intersubjective reasoning procedure', which can be used in a later stage of the discussion. (16)

An argumentation theory should first and foremost relate to ordinary discussions in everyday language, which is why we assume that initially one discussant (the protagonist) advances a viewpoint on which doubt is cast by another discussant (the antagonist). Then argumentation is advanced, followed by a possible critical response, and so on. The dispute is resolved when the antagonist, on the basis of the arguments advanced, accepts the protagonist's viewpoint, or when the protagonist, as a result of the critical response of the antagonist, abandons his viewpoint. This means that a systematic regulation of discussions in everyday language in a dialectical procedure which furthers the resolution of disputes, should cover all speech acts performed in attacking and defending the issues at stake, and should not be limited to the (inference) relation between premisses interpreted as 'concessions' and a conclusion representing the viewpoint.

It should be clear that the problem-validity of a system of dialectical discussion rules does not depend entirely on the adequacy of the adopted reasoning procedure. The resolution of a dispute requires a procedure which

follows a number of stages, and in any of these stages things may occur which do not favour the resolution process. The discussion rules quoted earlier relate to these various discussion stages and their different aspects. The problem-validity of the system of discussion rules as a whole can be rendered plausible only by illustrating that each rule fulfills a specific function in connection with furthering the resolution of a dispute. (17)

In which way can the various rules assist in the resolution of a dispute?

Rule 1 is designed to ensure that viewpoints and doubt regarding viewpoints may be freely advanced. A dispute cannot be resolved if it is not clear to the parties involved that there actually is a dispute and what this involves. The explicitization of the dispute takes place during the confrontation stage, which should offer the parties ample opportunity to express their positions. Both the advancing and doubting of a viewpoint are therefore formulated, without reservation, as a basic right.

Rule 2 is intended to ensure that advanced and doubted viewpoints are defended in an argumentative discussion. A dispute cannot be resolved if the party who advanced a viewpoint is not prepared to take on the role of protagonist of this viewpoint. This willingness is vital in preventing the discussion from foundering during the opening stage. A person who advances a viewpoint has automatically acknowledged an obligation to defend the viewpoint, if required.

Rules 3 and 4 are designed to see that attacks and defences in the argumentation stage are genuinely linked to the original viewpoint of the protagonist. A dispute cannot be resolved if the antagonist is in fact attacking a different viewpoint, or if the protagonist defends a different viewpoint later on. The true resolution of a dispute is not possible if the central issue is distorted by the antagonist or protagonist. Rule 4 is also meant to ensure that the defence of viewpoints takes place only by means of argumentation. A dispute cannot be truly resolved if the protagonist resorts to rhetorical devices in which *pathos* or *ethos* take the place of *logos*.

Rule 5 ensures that implicit elements within the argumentation by the protagonist are also critically examined. A dispute cannot be resolved if a protagonist tries to withdraw from his obligation to defend an unexpressed premiss, nor can it be resolved if the antagonist tries to blow it out of proportion. In order to resolve the dispute, the protagonist must accept his responsibility for implicit elements in his argumentation, and the antagonist, when attempting to reconstruct what is left implicit, should try to establish the exact extent of this responsibility.

Rule 6 is aimed at ensuring that viewpoints, in principle, can be

sufficiently defended by means of argumentation. A dispute can be resolved only if the protagonist and the antagonist are in agreement on at least some points. A protagonist must accept his obligation to defend and must not present something as a common starting-point when in fact it is not, while an antagonist should make it possible for the protagonist to defend his viewpoint *ex concessis* and should not deny something being part of the common starting-point when in fact it is.

Rule 7 is also aimed at ensuring that viewpoints can, in principle, be sufficiently defended by means of argumentation. A dispute can be resolved only if the protagonist and the antagonist agree on a method of testing the soundness of arguments which are not parts of the common starting-point. The protagonist must select a suitable argumentation scheme and implement it correctly.

Rule 8 is aimed at ensuring that the reasoning in the argumentation advanced by the protagonist is valid. A dispute can be resolved only if the protagonist and the antagonist agree that the viewpoint defended follows logically from the premisses expressed (or left implicit) in the argumentation. Only if all premisses of an argument are actually expressed, it is useful to test its validity. Otherwise, the unexpressed premisses which are implicit in the argumentation must be made explicit in a correct way, which implies making the arguments valid. (18)

Rule 9 is aimed at ensuring that the protagonist and the antagonist sort out together in a correct way what the result of the discussion is. A dispute is truly resolved only if the parties agree in the concluding stage whether or not the attempt at defence on the part of the protagonist succeeded. An apparently smooth-running discussion may still end disappointingly if the protagonist wrongly claims to have successfully defended his viewpoint or even to have proved it true, or if the antagonist wrongly denies that the defence was successful or even claims the opposite viewpoint to have been proven.

Rule 10 is aimed at preventing misunderstandings as a result of unclear, vague or ambiguous formulations. A dispute can be resolved only if one party does not misinterpret the speech acts performed by the other party. Misunderstandings can lead to a spurious dispute or result in a pseudo-solution. Problems in formulation and interpretation may arise at all stages of a discussion; they are not linked to any particular stage.

Having thus roughly explained the dialectical rationale for our claim to problem-validity for these critical discussion rules, we refer to *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions* (1984) for a more detailed exposition of how the system of rules can be precized in order to comply with other specific requirements of problem-validity, such as being systematic, effective, efficient,

feasible, and so on. It may now be possible to make plausible that the rules are such that they merit a certain degree of intersubjective acceptability, which would also lend them some claim to conventional validity.

8. Intersubjective validity of the pragma-dialectical norms

The acceptability claim which we attribute to our dialectical rules is not based in any way on metaphysical necessity, but on their suitability to do the job for which they are intended: the resolution of disputes. The rules do not derive their acceptability from some external source of personal authority or sacrosanct origin. Their acceptability should rest on their effectiveness when applied.

Because the rules were developed exactly for the purpose of resolving disputes, they should, in principle, be optimally acceptable to those whose first and foremost aim is to resolve a dispute. This means that the rationale for accepting these dialectical rules is, philosophically speaking, 'pragmatic'. Pragmatists judge the acceptability of rules on the extent to which they are successful in solving the problems they wish to solve. In fact, to them a rule is a rule only if it performs a function in the achievement of the objectives set by the pragmatist. (19)

Our system of pragma-dialectical rules is based on an ideal model of a critical discussion. Such an ideal model does bring with it the danger of its functioning as an unattainable Utopia which is however pursued at all costs. Even so, the model provides language users prepared to act as reasonable discussants with general and vital guidance for their conduct in discussions (which may be partially congruous to the system of norms they have internalized anyway). (20)

For people whose aim it is to resolve a dispute by means of discussion, the system of dialectical rules laid down in our ideal model of a critical discussion provides a practical code of conduct. But what sort of persons will be willing to adopt the required discussion attitude, thus guaranteeing the conventional validity of the dialectical rules? They should be persons who accept doubt as an integral part of their way of life and use criticism towards themselves and others to solve problems by trial and error. They use argumentative discussions as means to detect weak points in viewpoints regarding knowledge, values and objectives, and eliminate these weaknesses where possible. Such persons are opposed to protectionism with regard to viewpoints and to the immunization of any kind of viewpoint against criticism, and they reject all forms of fundamentalist justificationism (*Letztbegründung*). (21)

To a certain extent, each individual himself can, if he wishes, fulfil the prerequisites to a reasonable discussion attitude. His freedom to do this, however, is often restricted by factors beyond his control, generally referred to as 'compulsion'. Adhering to Barth and Krabbe, these external conditions for a reasonable discussion attitude are elsewhere described by us as conditions of a "higher order" which must be fulfilled in order to be able to satisfy the prerequisites of a reasonable discussion attitude and to get around to complying with the dialectical rules of the discussion itself. The discussion rules are then called 'first order' conditions, the internal characteristics which specify a reasonable discussion attitude are 'second order' conditions, and the external requirements of the circumstances in which the discussion takes place are 'third order' and 'fourth order' conditions. (22)

For example, in order to fulfil the first order rule which says that parties must not prevent each other from advancing viewpoints or casting doubt on viewpoints (Rule 1), the persons concerned must, among other things, possess a second order discussion attitude which involves their willingness to express their opinions and to listen to the opinions of others. In order to be able to adopt this attitude, the psycho-social reality in which the individuals operate should be such that it fulfils the third order condition that everyone has the right to advance his view to the best of his ability.

In order to fulfil the first order rule that a viewpoint may be defended only by advancing argumentation relating to that viewpoint (Rule 4), the second order condition must be fulfilled that a person is actually willing to advance arguments for his viewpoint. Moreover, the third order condition must be fulfilled that he has a real voice on the subject and is not, for example, totally dependent on the compassion of the person whom he is addressing.

The first order conditions represent necessary elements of a code of conduct aimed at the resolution of disputes. (23) The second order conditions imply a plea for quality education in argumentation which stimulates reflection. The third order conditions make it clear that for argumentation theoreticians there is also an important indirect political responsibility in striving for individual freedom, non-violence, intellectual pluralism, and institutionalized safeguards for rights and means to obtain information and pass criticism. Only insofar as a pragma-dialectical argumentation theory takes these three components into consideration, can it provide a clarification of the concept of reasonableness which is both theoretically and socially interesting.

University of Amsterdam
 Instituut voor Neerlandistiek
 1012 VB Amsterdam

Notes

- (1) The term speech communication seems to be the most appropriate translation of the Dutch term 'taalbeheersing'. However, 'taalbeheersing' comprises written as well as oral communication, and is more research-oriented: it includes subjects such as discourse analysis, conversation analysis, speech act theory, psycho- and socio-linguistics, composition, argumentation analysis and argumentation theory. On the other hand, subjects such as drama, television, mass communication, et cetera are studied in other departments.
- (2) For a more elaborate discussion of the Amsterdam research programme and the way it is carried out: van Eemeren (1987b).
- (3) Cf. van Eemeren 1986 and 1987a: van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Meuffels 1988.
- (4) These textbooks are published in Dutch: van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger (1983), (1984), (1986), and van Eemeren, Feteris, Grootendorst and Kruiger (1987).
- (5) Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1988.
- (6) See for a survey of the characteristics of this discipline van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger 1987.
- (7) Cf. van Eemeren 1986.
- (8) Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 85-88, 98-100, 109, 154-175, 188.
- (9) In the case of the fallacy of affirming the consequent, for example, this would be propositional logic, since this fallacy is an incorrect use of the *modus ponens*.
- (10) Cf. Toulmin (1976).
- (11) The idea of choosing (pre-)Socratic dialectics as a model for reasonableness is emphatically propagandized by Popper. Meanwhile, it appears that an increasing number of authors are adopting the same viewpoint (although they don't always draw the necessary consequences). Albert (1967) stresses that the dialectical method allows for an "all-embracing critical rationalism" which is not subjected to restrictions. According to him, the methodology of rational testing by critical discussion is applicable to any form of

conviction: not only to statements of a factual kind, but also to normative viewpoints and value judgements. In a discussion of values too, reasonableness knows only those boundaries established by the participants themselves. Lakatos (1963-64) believes that the concept of a Socratic dialectic is applicable even to mathematics, which is often thought of as an undertaking in its own right.

- (12) Cf. Barth and Krabbe (1982: 21-22).
- (13) The logical approach to argumentation traditionally concentrates on argumentation as a product, whereby the attention is primarily directed towards the validity of the arguments in which from one or more premisses a conclusion is derived. The rhetorical approach tends to concentrate on argumentation as a process and restricts its attention to the effectiveness of the successive steps taken in the argumentation in gaining acceptance for a standpoint. In the dialectical approach, the product-oriented and process-oriented approaches to argumentation are combined.
- (14) Cf. Wenzel (1979: 84).
- (15) Cf. Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978).
- (16) Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 169).
- (17) As we showed in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987), it is possible with each of the formulated discussion rules to indicate precisely which classical fallacies can be covered through these rules. Methodically speaking, this seems to us a clear indication, though no proof, that the dialectical system of rules presented is problem-valid.
- (18) For practical purposes, we do not differentiate here between deductive validity and other forms of validity, which, of course, should also be taken into account.
- (19) Whoever wants to resolve disputes and judges resolution procedures primarily on instrumental grounds, with the main purpose being that joint cooperation achieves an optimally satisfactory result for as many individuals as possible (and not, for example, for as much personal gain or enjoyment as possible), can be characterized as a *utilitarian*. A person with a utilitarian attitude in a discussion strives for a satisfactory resolution of the dispute for both the protagonist and the antagonist, irrespective of whether the solution results in gain for the protagonist or the antagonist. Bearing in mind Popper's plea on behalf of falsification, however, we consider a "negative" variant of the basic principle of utilitarianism to be

more effective here than "positive" utilitarianism: a system of argumentation rules which encourages discussants to pronounce their doubts and to work out how far the disagreements ensuing from such expressions of doubt can be resolved, is preferable to a system of argumentation rules which seeks to ensure agreement. This means that instead of the maximization of agreement, the minimization of disagreement should be aimed for, thus altering the perspective by a U-turn. As a matter of fact, this is a good illustration of how philosophical insights of utilitarian pragmatics and critical-rationalist dialectics conjoin in the conception of reasonableness upheld in our argumentation and discussion theory.

- (20) Surely, the course of a discussion which is meant to be critical cannot be completely planned out in advance any more than the realization of other ideal constructions, but in the piecemeal engineering which is necessary to gradually increase control over widespread discussion faults, such a model is an indispensable reference point.
- (21) Whoever shares these profiling characteristics, whether he be an existentialist, realist, or whatever, can be regarded as a member of Popper's *Open Society*. A member of the Open Society is anti-dogmatic, anti-authoritarian, and anti-*Letztbegründung*; in other words against monopolies of knowledge, pretensions of infallibility, and unfaltering principles. As these are linked, via personification and reification, with essentialism, holism and predestinarian conspiracy theories, a member of the Open Society has prohibitive objections to such forms of "hard determinism" as Marxism and Fundamentalism — *bien étonné de se trouver ensemble*.
- (22) Fourth order conditions relate to normal input and output conditions (as John Searle calls them), specifying among other things that for analytical purposes the basic model of a critical discussion situation starts from the assumption that the people taking part in the discussion are not infants, deaf or insane people, and so on. Nonfulfilment of these conditions would affect communication in general, not just argumentation. We do not go into these conditions here.
- (23) It should be noted that the first order rules corresponding to the first order conditions, are not foolproof algorithmic rules, but informal rules of conduct which can only be used by people who reflect upon the circumstances in which the discussion takes place. This is why we cannot do without second and third order conditions.

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