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Savini, F.

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WHO MAKES THE (NEW) METROPOLIS?

CROSS-BORDER COALITION AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN PARIS METROPOLIS

ABSTRACT

In fragmented agglomerations, urban development in peripheral areas tends to express the hegemony of the core city over its suburbs. Nevertheless, this paper demonstrates that despite deep-rooted political conflicts, inter-municipal cooperation can still take place in the context of cross-border development. I argue that cross-border development has a political and economic logic that is driven by a different power configuration in the metropolis: cross-border coalitions. These coalitions emerge when the redevelopment of areas around municipal borders provides an opportunity for political interests to strengthen their electoral alliances and for business interests to exploit possibilities of growth. This paper investigates urban development in Paris North East, an area on the periphery of Paris that crosses municipal boundaries. It examines how a coalition of public and private actors is cooperating based on the shared benefits they can derive from developments in this area. The case study captures the complex political and economic dynamics driving inter-municipal cooperation by examining the role of local political coalitions, their link with planning agencies and the behavior of emergent metropolitan entrepreneurs.



View of Paris Nord-Est, Paris, France, 2011.

INTRODUCTION

Metropolitan governance is a major issue for planners. This metropolitan scale has been explained as the outcome of the rescaling of the state driven by capital restructuring within a context of global inter-urban competition (cf. Brenner, 2003). A great deal of research has been done on the conflictive character of metropolitan governance, which poses barriers to political reform and makes it difficult to achieve socio-economic parity between competing municipalities within a city area (cf. Helae, 2007; Kantor, 2008; Katz, 2000; Savitch & Vogel, 2009). Since the 1990s, when early attempts at metropolitan consolidation failed, new experiments in meso-level governance have proliferated. These are based on different models of inter-municipal cooperation, ranging from specialized structures of service provision to fluid platforms of meso-level planning (Salet et al. 2003; Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000). The success of these experiments seems to depend on how the power struggle between central cities and their urban fringes is managed. A finely balanced internal power equilibrium is needed to create the political conditions for common policies (Lefèvre 1998; Lefèvre 2002). Importantly, this is not simply a matter of institutional reform. Inter-municipal competition in spatial planning ultimately relates to the authority of cities to govern land use within their jurisdiction. Conflict emerges when deciding *what* functions to place in which land, how to redistribute the benefits of high-profile activities and how to distribute the cost of less profitable developments.

In the last 30 years, large-scale development has become the main expression of urban change. Local governments have instigated multiple land use transformations to attract businesses and locate new housing developments. Some prominent researchers interpret this approach, oriented to development projects, as an expression of the neo-liberalization of planning systems. Large projects are seen as vehicles for market forces to generate urban growth and bypass public accountability (cf. Swingedouw et al, 2002). Other researchers maintain that the spatial, social and political outcomes

of large scale development depends on the power configurations driving it, on the specific role of governments and on how these power configurations are framed by stakeholders (Fainstein, 2008; Gualini and Majoor, 2007; Salet, 2008). Under conditions of political, fiscal and economic disparity, urban development projects are vehicles by which core cities may dominate weaker municipalities. Urban development often happens in a context of deep-rooted power asymmetries between core cities and their surrounding areas. Municipalities on the city fringe often view projects proposed by the core city for peripheral areas with suspicion, fearing that unwanted functions are being pushed out of core cities' borders. Yet, this outcome is not pre-given today, since it derives from an urban pattern based on the spatial and political domination of central cities and on the (economic) dependency of peripheries. Core cities are not the motor of urban growth anymore: agglomerations are becoming more and more polycentric with the consequent rebalance of inter-municipal power relationship. Projects can therefore become an expression of cooperative practices between municipalities, even in conditions of administrative fragmentation, where 'win-win' spatial solutions can be agreed to address emerging socio-economic interdependencies between core cities and their urban belts. The extent to which cooperation occurs ultimately depends on the specific geo-political landscape within which development is conceived and pursued.

In this paper I investigate why cross-border urban development occurs in urban contexts where institutional, political and economic fragmentation makes it unlikely. My argument is that the shift from inter-municipal competition to cooperation is determined by the emergence of new power constellations within agglomerations; an example of this shift is seen in the emergence of cross-border coalitions in which political, electoral and economic rationales are combined. These multi-actor coalitions pursue inter-municipal cooperation to strengthen their power in a geo-political context characterized by administrative and economic fragmentation. I will demonstrate that coalitions emerge when the

redevelopment of areas around municipal borders presents an opportunity for political interests to break with their past urban agendas and to strengthen party alliances, by teaming up with powerful land developers to secure investment and exploit new opportunities for growth. The paper studies an urban development project in the North East sector of Paris, to better grasp the characteristics of cross-border coalitions. To conclude, I will discuss how this coalition-building process takes place within a context of inter-governmental conflict over metropolitan governance.

Paris agglomeration provides an ideal case to analyze cross-border development. The French capital suffers a clear discrepancy between its urban and socio-economic dynamics, largely overtaking the small jurisdiction of Paris municipality, and its institutional asset, which is administratively fragmented and based on the economic and political dominance of the central city. Nonetheless, Paris has already undertaken several interesting experiments in inter-municipal cooperation. The Grand Pari(s) competition sponsored by President Nicolas Sarkozy and the recent experiment of Paris Métropole promoted by Paris mayor Bertrand Delanoë have attracted worldwide media attention. Yet, these initiatives must be tested against the practice of urban transformation to understand how they might show significant shifts for spatial policies. This paper takes the large-scale development of 'Paris Nord Est' (PNE), a project which covers a strategic sector of north-eastern Paris, as a case to explore the micro-political dynamics driving experiments in meso-level planning. The goal of the 200 hectare PNE project is to redevelop underused land and create a new polarity within the agglomeration. Empirical data presented in this paper was collected between 2009 and 2011. Included are 20 interviews with Paris technical departments and land developers; a thorough analysis of policy briefs, council deliberations and newspaper articles.

The first section of this paper will discuss the interdependency of political and economic logics in cross-border development and outline the main empirical statements. In the second part I define the concept of cross-border coalitions and outline key features.

The third and fourth parts respectively introduce the recent inter-municipal dynamics in central part of Paris agglomeration and give a detailed look at the particular case of PNE. The latter section will treat separately the different dimensions and actors of cross-border coalitions in Paris.

UNEXPECTED COOPERATION? THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC LOGIC OF CROSS-BORDER DEVELOPMENT

It is widely believed that inter-municipal cooperation is unlikely within cities that are administratively, fiscally and economically fragmented, especially where core cities have a strong influence on regional and even national decision-making arenas. The expectation is that cities would only pursue economic and social well-being within their jurisdictions and would engage in cross-border development only if that brought concrete economic, fiscal, urban or electoral advantages to their territories. Neo-Marxist and structuralist theorists are the foremost proponents of this argument. They argue that competition is fundamental to urban change. City politics is driven by capital accumulation strategies; local executives seek opportunities to increase the value, and fiscal revenue, of the land within their territories, delineating a scenario in which *“local jurisdictions frequently divide rather than unify the urban region unless ruling-class alliances are forged”* (Harvey, 1985, p.153). Inter-municipal cooperation could presumably only occur if driven by pro-growth coalitions, with market actors using planning as a vehicle to maximise land values (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Harding, 1995, Purcell, 2001; Cox and Jonas, 1993).

Although these accounts explain why cooperation is often an unlikely dynamic, some experiments of meso-level planning and cross-border development cannot be simply justified as growth strategies. Rather, the objectives are often fiscal redistribution, social equalization and spatial inter-connectivity. Moreover, economic explanations of urban change risk underestimating the

importance of political dynamics in fostering cross-border development. City politics can be an explanatory variable of the divergence of urban agendas between cities (Mollenkopf, 1992). According to Swanstrom (1988), urban development must be explained by looking at the particular combination of different logics of action. Economic logic dictates that urban development must increase the economic output of the city, maximizing investments by rationally targeting profitable areas for land use. By contrast, political logic explains how urban development can be a tool to strengthen political coalitions and electoral bases, development choices having a symbolic or ideological motivation. A critical explanation of cross-border development must take into account the manner in which these logics are combined in development agendas. According to Stone and Whelan (2011) this is possible by focusing on the agents of urban development, defined as *intermediate structures* of collective action. These structures identify the manner in which collective action is organized within cities: the wider power configurations that determine local sectoral policies and identify modes of governance. These structures translate macro-processes of capital restructuring and state rescaling (widely studied by political economists) into particular responses of cities to those exogenous in terms of urban and spatial policies. In the context of this paper, these are the particular agents, or coalitions that drive urban agendas and that explain the political and economic logics of cross-border urban development.

In spatial planning, it is generally argued that the capacity to develop new concepts, policies and actions depends on one key thing: the capacity to mobilize different actors and resources as well as organize their collective action. Strategic planning is a coalition-building process in which institutional and spatial boundaries are overcome and institutional capacity is generated (Healey, 2006). This process ultimately depends on the ability to reshape power imbalances and define elaborate planning solutions that benefit all actors. Coalition-building, however, does not simply cover the design of institutional settings or new regulatory frameworks to control

or orient decision making. Instead it takes place in a wider political framework, of which planning is only one component. Metropolitan governance entails political divisions, and spatial planning is one component of political cleavages on broad societal perspectives and on concepts like democracy, citizenship and social justice (Keil, 2000; Allen & Cochrane, 2007). Research on the emergence of city regions has understated this political genesis of metropolises: the emergence of metropolises should be conceptualized as a process of political alliance-formation taking place in specific fiscal, electoral and regulatory arrangements (Ward and Jonas 2004). Inter-municipal cooperation is hence a political construct, often built upon a conflict about the beliefs and ideologies of juxtaposed (partisan) factions. It reflects the position of powerful groups on issues such as fiscal equality, democratic accountability, and civic participation. To detect the drivers of metropolitan governance, the focus should therefore be on 'coalitions for change' (Harding, et al, 2006: 37) and on the manner in which they operate within politically divided landscapes; it must be investigated *for whom* new territorialities (i.e. metropolises) are necessary (Jonas and Ward, 2007).

Urban regime theory provides a model to explain urban development as an expression of certain power configurations (Phelps and Wood, 2011). It can help to fix the conceptual dimensions for an empirical analysis of the political and economic rationale of emerging urban agendas. Urban regimes are an enduring form of power, defined as governing coalitions that have institutional capacity to foster urban agendas (Stone, 1989, 1993; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). They are based on the inter-dependency of public and private forces; on business, political and local communities that develop a pattern of cooperation to achieve urban agendas and generate governing capacity by preemptive power. This paper does not test regime theory, but it retrieves three of its main empirical statements to explain cross-border development: a) that urban development is an expression of a (stable) coalition of heterogenic actors that combines both public and private logics of actions: electoral/partisan and profit-seeking strategies are interdependent in long-term urban

policymaking (Collinge & Hall, 1997; Harding, 1997, Elkin, 1985); b) that the achievement of urban development depends on the capacity to mobilize and reorganize ('power to') conflicting interests into cohesive coalitions in order to legitimize and enforce broad urban agendas (Greasley & Stoker; 2008; Orr & Stoker, 1994; Borraz & John, 2004); c) that governing coalitions cover different policy sectors: they are structures that link tangible interventions (e.g. area development) with broader urban agendas (Stoker 1995; Dowding et al, 1999). The utility of these assertions lies in their capacity to conceptualize emerging cross-border development as the expression of a coalition-building dynamic placed in context (Hamilton, 2004). This process covers different policy sectors; it unwinds in conflict management through leadership and incentives and it is ultimately driven by the purpose of consolidation of close relationships between key powerful actors to control long-term urban agendas.

CROSS-BORDER COALITIONS: THE BORDER AS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE

I argue that in order to explain the emergence of cross-border urban development, research must investigate *whether* and *how* it is driven by new coalitions aiming to develop zones on the border of jurisdictions. Three main assumptions support this argument. Firstly, it is assumed that inter-municipal cooperation in urban development is driven the interdependency of political objectives with those of business elites. This interdependency is visible in areas that are particularly valuable to politicians for electoral purposes and valuable to business groups for the development of the land. In cross-border development, synergies between conflicting interests can emerge to address development where it is socially, economically and institutionally challenging. Secondly, it is assumed that cross-border development requires a capacity to organize interests and define win-win solutions between core cities and surrounding municipalities. These win-win solutions are often a matter of political

negotiations and bargaining rather than technical evaluations. With economically dynamic belts, political negotiations are the conditions to maximize mutual (economic and social) gains from urban developments that might cross jurisdictional borders. In contexts of fiscal and administrative fragmentation, formal planning tools rarely enable cross-border development. The role of politics and leadership becomes crucial to overturn power configurations based on center-periphery domination ('power over') to center-periphery cooperation ('power to'). Thirdly, it is assumed that as coalitions operate on a political level, cross-border projects are part of an urban agenda that addresses broad issues such as social policies, transport development and fiscal reform. Cross-border development is framed within a wider perspective (and discourse) of social, economic and urban development of the whole agglomeration.

I define cross-border coalitions as *a combination of powerful public and business interests that pursues the redevelopment of border areas as a means to achieve electoral and economic strategies*. The specific character of these collective agents is in their spatial focus, which I call *border areas* or *urban peripheries*. Cross-border coalitions are constituted around a particular rhetoric of the 'periphery': they foster a political and epistemological shift in the way formerly neglected areas are conceived in urban policymaking. A new conceptualization of these spaces implies new planning concepts, new spatial design and new ways to interpret these places. The border becomes the policy object upon which urban agendas are built. Today, border areas have been rethought of as the new core of large agglomerations but their development suffers from the fact that planning regulations do not provide with formal tools to achieve true cross-border spatial policies.

This epistemological shift follows a new ontology of the border (Soja, 2005) based on a centrality that formerly peripheral areas have gained. Today's borders are obsolete constructs, as traditional municipal, regional and even national perimeters do not fit the 'dis-contained' socio-economic dynamics of post-metropolises (Soja, 2000). Following Paasi, borders are a 'symbolic and institu-

tional expression (and media) of territoriality' (2005:22); they entail legal, cultural, social and even emotional constructs that enforce specific conceptions of sovereignty. However, the border becomes a policy issue when a gap occurs between emerging territorialities and consolidated governmental perimeters (as discussed by transnational border studies, Anderson et al, 2002). Paradoxically, today's metropolises are governed through jurisdictional divisions (mostly) tailored on 19th century urban patterns and statehood. Cross-border coalitions' objective is the manipulation of the traditional political rhetoric of border areas which has traditionally defined borders as limits, boundaries or edges of cities, and that has legitimated spatial policies targeting peripheries as residual spaces, where unwanted functions could be placed.

Local government officials, large private investors and fringe municipalities are key players in cross-border coalitions. Within peripheral neighborhoods of core cities sectoral policies of public transport inter-modality, spatial quality, urban regeneration and service improvement are framed within and shaped by processes of political power consolidation. Local executives seek to strengthen their political ties with neighboring jurisdictions by crossing those boundaries in order to create the institutional conditions to govern cross-border spatial interdependencies. Equally, private developers are a necessary component of these coalitions. Cross-border projects are opportunities to increase land values within peripheral areas. Inter-municipal planning reduces the investment risks when these zones are rethought of as potential metropolitan cores. None of these groups alone has the capacity to govern and implement development in these areas. Local politicians and party officials have the power to define policy objectives, legitimize policy actions and ultimately approve land use plans according to which building rights are issued. However, they often do not have the capital to trigger innovative development, as land values must be leveraged and initial structural costs are significant. The capacity to plan border areas depends on the extent to which the political and economic relationship between core cities and their neighbor

municipalities is redefined to address the existent spatial and socio-economic continuities across their jurisdictions. Fringe municipalities, often perceived as weaker subjects in metropolitan planning, gained today significant bargaining power in policy making, becoming attractive targets for private and public investments (e.g. national infrastructures). For this reason, cross-border coalitions stem from the political recognition of the socio-spatial *interdependency* between core cities and neighboring jurisdictions and they express the rejuvenated political, technical and economic influence that the fringe has gained in governing urban development.

It is worth asking whether there are some particular institutional conditions that favor the formation of cross-border coalitions. The explanatory capacity of regime theory has been debated and even the concept of 'regime' is often used as a conceptual model for urban political processes to define types of local governance (Dowding, 2001). Its applicability in the European context has been a matter of discussion in so far as a more active redistributive role of the central state presumably makes local politics less dependent on local business elites (Harding, 1997). This paper, studying the drivers of inter-municipal cooperation in Paris Nord Est, takes an *exploratory* approach. It looks at the existence of a coalition in Paris Nord Est to firstly determine whether cross-border development is actually an expression of a city-wide urban agenda or simply an isolated case of innovative planning.

A closer look at the French institutional context justifies the focus on coalitions and provides some suggestions on factors that might explain their origins. Started in the eighties, the decentralization reform in France has made local actors (local groups, business elites and public officials) increasingly dominant in urban policy-making and more autonomous from central politics (Pinson, 2010; Nicholls, 2005). Urban development is today permeated by political and ideological beliefs as local executives are active entrepreneurs in fostering projects through specific public-led development agencies. In the last 20 years, many French and European cities have fostered entrepreneurial urban agendas and developed regime types

of politics, with a direct influence of business elites, especially in a context of high inter-institutional conflict (Harvey, 1989; Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Thornley et al, 2005, Cole&John, 1998, Dormois, 2008). In Paris, these agendas have caused an *embourgeoisement* of the city and a polarized socio-economic landscape that sets the enriched center against its periphery, the poorer eastern suburbs against the richer western ones (Préteceille, 2007). Furthermore, France has witnessed the emergence of a planning approach centered on 'projects' as instruments to govern cities (Pinson, 2009). Collective action takes place through contractual agreements on spatially defined areas between different levels of governmental authorities and other types of powerful actors (such as banks). Yet, these projects can provoke conflictive inter-governmental relationships, as national government aims to retain control over key sectors of national importance. In Paris, the emergence of new local coalitions must therefore be understood within its particular context. It is a context characterized by inter-governmental symmetries between local and central governmental layers; a practice of governance based on timely coalition-building for targeted interventions and spatial investments and on inter-governmental conflict; a socially polarized geo-political context; amid a backdrop of past pro-enterprise policies that have produced power asymmetries within the agglomeration.

FROM CONFLICT TO INTER-MUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN PARIS

Inter-municipal competition within Paris finds its origin in the decentralization reform that took place in the 1980s, when pivotal competences in spatial planning, housing and economic policy were transferred to local authorities¹. Having been granted the power to define their own land use plans and structural visions, local municipalities now have autonomy to pursue and implement land development. One tool on which they rely is known as Common

Development Zone, (*zone d'aménagement concerté* - ZAC) an instrument which allows local government to develop their own areas but it cannot cross jurisdictions. With this tool, a municipal council can define zones of development and appoint an agency that manage the land development. This will usually be a public private partnership between the city and financial institutions (most often the *Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations*, a large public financing body). This institutional architecture makes local planning a task directly led by local executives; local politicians occupy chair positions within the public private partnership, allowing a direct link between policy objectives and implementation. Indeed, in Paris the municipality often owns the majority of shares in the partnership.

There are several institutional cogs in Paris's agglomeration planning wheel. The Public Bodies for Inter-municipal Cooperation (EPCIs), created across France 1999, provide a strategic direction. Run by chief politicians from the communes, EPCIs represent groups of municipalities that share their main fiscal revenues and some planning competences. Aiming to achieve better policies with increased strategic capacity, EPCIs are a key force behind local planning within Paris, especially in the development of the city's suburban belt. For its part, the region is one of the main planning institutions that, since 1995, autonomously define the Schéma Directeur de la Région Ile-de-France (SDRIF), a regional structural plan legally binding for municipalities. Lastly, the national government operates through its main planning agency (DATAR) and it can use specific legal tools that allow it to operate directly in strategic territories (through Operations of National Interest and the creation of a *Public Planning Agency – Établissement Public d'Aménagement*). It is noteworthy that the implementation of spatial policies within this decentralized planning system takes place by means of policy devices based on intergovernmental contracts. For example, in a contract between the state and a region the contract will define key objectives, spatial priorities and financial plans for implementation.

Within this system, mayors and chief executives are powerful figures who drive political change, as institutional innovation is often triggered by inter-governmental competition (Pinson; 2010; Pinson & Le Galès, 2005). This increased autonomy of local politics has made local municipalities reluctant to cooperate with each other as they have more opportunity to differentiate their spatial-economic policies and compete with each other. Problematically, however, territorial fragmentation and competition often makes it impossible to tackle socio-economic polarization (Nicholls, 2005). In Paris, the core city is politically and economically independent to foster its self-defined development policies; there are no legal rules formally promoting practices of cross-border development.

Inter-municipal spatial planning in Paris's densely built-up zone has traditionally followed a Paris-oriented approach, built upon a strong role of the national government and of the core city on the peripheries. Indeed, until the 1980s, the DATAR acted as the major planning agent of the agglomeration. The New Town policy activated in the 1960s, the regeneration program *Banlieue 89* and the most recent Operations of National Interest are well-known examples of nation state influence on the greater Paris area. While Paris has typically shown some interest in developing areas within the suburban belt, (*banlieue*) it has never concretized this effort into innovative governance. Most of the Parisian projects in the *banlieue* were interventions led by partnerships between Paris, the state and the region to develop land properties owned by the capital city. These operations were not embedded in any wider strategy and were mostly justified by the state-led, regional structural plan.

Even today, Paris region is affected by a 'project paralysis' (Roux, 2008:89). The significant dynamism in terms of urban transformations within the densely built-up zone is not encapsulated within any strategic vision of development, and the only inter-municipal bodies are *ad hoc* agencies of service provision (i.e. different inter-municipal or regional transportation agencies as the STIF and RATP). The significantly over-institutionalized French inter-governmental system makes it harder to execute policies that

change consolidated power structures (Estebe and Le Galès; 2003; Mabileau, 1991). There are multiple dimensions of division that structurally hinder inter-municipal planning in the Paris region: first, there is a political divide between the state and the region. The Regional Structural Plan (SDRIF) defined in 2008 is not yet enforced by national law and therefore is ineffective legally². This is due to a political division, still evident in the last regional elections in 2010, between the current Socialist president of the region (Jean-Paul Huchon) and President Sarkozy, whose conservative UMP party has been in power nationally since 1998. The regional-national conflict concerns the extent to which economic priorities (and related infrastructural solutions) are integrated in the document. Secondly, today the Paris region is socially and politically divided between the richer municipalities of the West and the poorer communities of the East of the region. Right wing governments represent most of the wealthier areas (three departments) while left wing majorities manage five departments including Paris. This political divide unfortunately has hindered discussions on the redistribution of wealth within the metropolis. The conflicts between the 'red belt' and the powerful right wing majorities in Paris council have historically jeopardized any attempts to structure cross-border cooperation (Fourcaut & Flonneau 2007). The capital city was (and still is) perceived by adjacent communes as the place where decisions over the whole region – and the whole country – are taken³ (Ronai, 2004).

Since 2001, metropolitan governance in Paris has become a national and local agenda item. The current geopolitical landscape in the region sees a left wing block of regional and Parisian executives (for the first time both have Socialist majorities) surrounded by 'red belt' municipalities of communist origins against a national right wing government. This has made metropolitan consolidation and governance highly politicized – creating an environment around which the power struggle between local and national executives is amplified (Burgel, 2008).

For its part, the national government undertook a top-down initiative of strategic planning in the capital region, nominating




Fig. 2.1. Paris dense zone. GPRU (in red) with evidence of Plaine Commune, Saint-Denis and Aubervilliers.

Christian Blanc as state secretary for this task. The national government pushed for institutional reform and tried to foster spatial visions for the future with its *Grand Pari(s)* architecture competition. At the same time, the city of Paris established a new practice of targeted cooperative metropolitan planning, nicknamed ‘the metropolis of small steps’⁴. This approach consisted of agreements with neighboring municipalities on certain issues towards the construction of flexible governance platforms for meso-level planning. The platform *Paris Métropole* was the first achievement of this policy. Conceived as an open arena of discussion between Paris and its periphery on various policy issues, it currently gathers 188 members within the Paris agglomeration, backed up by a small budget of €2.5m and a task force of a few technicians. Notwithstanding the political enthusiasm and media resonance, this experiment has not yet delivered effective planning. Governance appears to be hampered due to consolidated hostility and mistrust between public authorities, as well as a lack of leadership (Lefèvre, 2002; 2009).

In 2001, the newly appointed alderman for inter-municipal relations, Pierre Mansat from the Communist party, began a partnership-building process with neighboring municipalities to address joint service provision and space management with neighboring municipalities. This approach is driven by the awareness that it would be impossible to define an urban development policy without considering new opportunities within areas along and just outside the city borders (Roux, 2008). The inner belt of Paris suburbs, in particular, has been put at the centre of the political debate and reframed as a space where the socio-economic chasm between the centre and the periphery can be addressed. Some specific sectors that became the main target of this rhetoric based on social quality, like the eastern social-housing complexes – with major constituencies from the Communist party – became battle fields during the riots of 2005. In particular, the main policy target has been the corridor along the highway ring (*périphérique*) surrounding Paris. Conditions of social housing and the spatial division from the socio-economic core of the city have been the areas of attention (TVK et

al. 2008). Today, around 700,000 people currently live in neighborhoods close to the *périphérique*, 80% of them in social housing.

Since its election in 2001, the Socialist-Green coalition has institutionalized its policy towards the border by a complex program of regeneration of cross-border areas. This includes the Grand Project of Urban Renewal (GPRU), an intervention program that defines 12 development areas along the highway ring, and several 'priority areas' to be the target of special action for urban regeneration (figure 1). Formally, the GPRU is a device of the major programs of urban regeneration developed in France since the 1990s, the *Politique de la Ville*, and it is enforced by a contract with the national government. The program encompasses a 940 hectare development area (634 hectares are located around the *périphérique*). The value of such a framework is more political than technical. It is an attempt to mark a rupture with the urban planning logic under President Mitterrand and Mayor Chirac, which was based on the inward-looking *Grand Projets*⁵, mostly developed according to core city interests. This endeavor underlines the political attempt to place the urban periphery at the centre of Paris planning. In the following sections I will explain the main forces driving this shift.

THE CROSS-BORDER PROJECT OF PARIS NORD EST

Paris Nord Est (PNE) is the largest sector of the GPRU. It covers 2 million sqm of Paris's traditionally poor 18th and 19th districts and it is geographically adjacent to the territory of Plaine Commune. The latter is an EPCI that performs joint planning tasks for eight municipalities and it is chaired by the former mayor of the Saint-Denis municipality adjacent to Paris, who is a member of the Communist party. With 43% social housing, Saint-Denis has one of the highest unemployment rates in the region (28%, versus an average of 18%). The neighboring 18th and 19th districts are similarly characterized by a relatively low density urban environment, large numbers of obsolete housing and a relatively high rate of social

housing (15% in the 18th district and 31% in the 19th district). Paris city and Plaine Commune are extremely different but territorially complementary environments. Plaine Commune has a much lower fiscal levy (less than €900 per inhabitant against €1,500 per inhabitant in Paris). The territory has historically hosted large industrial plants serving the capital city (in the 1950s, it had 700 hectares of industry). Paris also owns large tracts of land in the area. Politically, the municipalities composing Plaine Commune form part of the Parisian 'red belt', with communist majorities historically in contraposition with Parisian politics.

Three main reasons spurred the Parisian government to work on this territory. Firstly, the need to locate new spaces for development within the city, especially for social housing, today only available on the fringe. PNE land has lower values than other Paris areas which makes it feasible to realize the ambitious goals of social housing construction prioritized by the city's mayor (20% in the total city, 50% in PNE). Secondly, the strong dynamism of the neighboring Plaine Commune has made it a powerful actor within Paris region since the 1990s. In the last 20 years, the territory has witnessed the development of the area between Paris and the Stade de France stadium and now sees border areas as the completion of this process. As explained by the city planning director in charge at that time (interview February 2011), "*Plaine Commune is today a territory with a strong spatial identity. They have know-how in planning and a strong political will to change. We couldn't avoid working with them on the periphery*". Thirdly, PNE is a crucial project and a top priority of Mayor Bertrand Delanoë from the Socialist Party, foremost among which is the goal to rehabilitate Paris's periphery especially in the 18th district, where he has his electoral base⁶.

In 2001 the city council defined PNE as a 'priority area of regeneration' and broadly agreed the goals to be achieved, like decreasing spatial fragmentation, dis-enclaving housing complexes and striving for a better quality of space. After the call for proposal, the winning architect agency, Duspain&Leclercq, was tasked to coordinate the nine parts of the masterplan. Each of them is carried out

independently but in coherence with the general principles fixed in the first plan. While this approach stimulates interactions among stakeholders through a more adaptive project management, it needs strong public management. The governability of the whole plan was possible by defining the main coordinating architect and binding it to a long-term contract⁷. Reportedly, this procedure gave ground to early stage discussions with Plaine Commune and key stakeholders. The major issues debated addressed the consistency of (social) housing, location of services⁸ and joint projects in public transport (for the complete built program forecasted in 2011 see table 1). The building program was readapted in a few occasions to solve emerging controversies without modifying the main guidelines. The municipal project leader explains that: *“the first plan had no juridical value. It was only for the political negotiation. It evolved while we were reimagining the place together with other stakeholders. It was a political statement, not juridical”* (Interview, January 2009).

PNE has developed as a unitary project of related interventions, coordinated by one unique political entity (the city of Paris) and one technical coordinator (the main architect). The main planning objectives have been translated into three concrete spatial interventions which express the micro politics of cross-border project management: a) The construction of a tram line which relates to the wider renewal of the border area; b) The creation of an inter-municipal neighborhood over the peripheral motorway in cooperation with the adjacent commune; c) The development of the large warehouse, a public-private led project with symbolic importance (*Fig. 2.2*).

First mooted as part of Paris's Olympic Games candidacy in the 1990s, the tram line (T3) surrounding the eastern neighborhoods the city gave a new opportunity to build a coalition of interests around PNE. In 2002, the tram was framed as an instrument to pursue innovative urban transformations (Zittoun; 2008). Both the mayor and the technical services in Paris supported the plan to place sections of the track beyond Paris's borders, within the neighboring jurisdiction of Pantin, a formerly industrial town east of PNE. This political agreement is well explained by a project officials

involved in the tramway project in Paris: “*Pantin has a strong relation with Paris. Its socialist mayor understood that he must work with Paris (also to manage other key areas like Parc de la Villette). Paris’s mayor wanted to consolidate relationships with him. We didn’t ask any money for the project*”. (Interview, February 2011).

This operation was smartly presented in the media as a concrete action in support of the new agenda of inter-municipal cooperation. (Paris still finances the segments outside its administrative borders). The tramway – to be delivered in 2012 – became the backbone of PNE’s urban developments. Planned by the RATP (*Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens* – Paris public transport agency) and financed through central and regional funds, the route will join another tram line coming from the north at a transport interchange at the very core of PNE.

| FIGURE | SQM | % |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|----|
| TOTAL AREA | 2.000.000 | |
| BUILT SURFACE | 1.374.639 | |
| INHABITANTS | + 15.000 | |
| EMPLOYMENT | + 25.000 | |
| HOUSING | 601.196 (50% social housing) | 44 |
| WORK SPACES | 170.999 | 12 |
| COMMERCE | 78.084 | 6 |
| OFFICE SPACE | 360.622 | 26 |
| PUBLIC SERVICES | 109.712 | 8 |
| UNKNOWN | | 4 |

Fig. 2.2. Building program Paris Nord Est

In 2005, the mayor signed a political agreement with Plaine Commune to engage in a preliminary study for a possible ‘inter-municipal neighborhood’, known as Mines-Fillettes. The only way to make a joint plan was to have political alignment since the planning system in France does not allow land use plans to cross different jurisdictions. In 2008, a partnership was signed between Paris and Plaine




Fig. 2.3. Main components of Paris Nord Est project.

Commune on a general building program covering 22 hectares (15.6 within Paris and 6.4 of Plaine Commune). The agreement addressed objectives of inter-connectivity by proposing to build a roof over the *périphérique* highway; the creation of large sports facilities accessible from both municipalities; green transversal connections; and spatial solutions to dis-enclave existing social housing blocks. One unique coordinating architect was appointed.

The amount of social housing to be built and the future roof over the highway are controversial issues. For the moment, the governments have opted for different percentages (40%/50%) of social housing as Plaine Commune is less willing to increase its large stock. Regarding the highway, Plaine Commune strongly opposed the idea for an ethnic market planned by Paris on top of the roof. They feared that this solution would have been a further attempt by Paris to delocalize unwanted functions. The resolution of these controversies was possible through the active engagement of Paris executives, particularly the alderman for the inter-municipal relationship. The PNE chief architect explains that: *“the plan was a symbolic statement on land use to stimulate diplomacy. The suggestions were political. The ethnic market was a sort of ‘suitcase’ where to put problems. The mayor of 18th district [former Minister of the Interior] wanted something symbolic to discuss”* (Interview, February 2011).

This political atmosphere served to establish new contacts and to realign powers; reportedly, party affiliation permitted smoother discussions and mobilization. Hence, in May 2010, a joint document for the whole North East sector of Paris dense zone was presented by the director of Paris’s urban planning department and the president of Plaine Commune. It reframed the projects within a concept strategy for the northern part of the dense zone with a strong communication campaign and several working documents, mostly developed by the technical departments.

Big real estate developers have become a key motor in PNE. Development Company ICADE has become one of the largest land holders in the North East sector. In 2005 it acquired EMGP, a corporation owning a land area of 73.6 hectares in a former industrial

site along the border with Paris and another 342,000 sqm office space within the city. In 2006, Paris joined ICADE in a joint venture to pay for the development of Entrepôt Macdonald, a landmark industrial building in PNE, and its surrounding areas. This joint venture (SAS Paris Nord Est) was formed by the city development agency (SEMAVIP), the developer, ICADE, and supported by a state investment fund (*Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations*). For the city of Paris, it was crucial to make this flagship operation economically sustainable. As a distinctive and historic landmark, the building has a strong symbolical value for the whole north east of Paris. The city built upon its informal relationship with EMGP and decided to make a strong partnership with ICADE, with the help of the state investment fund supporting urban regeneration projects. For its part, by joining with the city, ICADE could better orient development plans and valorize its land within and outside the city borders⁹. Following EMGP-ICADE's project manager: *"Paris Nord Est perfectly suits our land for tertiary development. PNE will become mostly a living area. For us it is important to open up our properties towards Paris to generate demand for our services and our commercial spaces. [Entrepôt] Macdonald allows us to participate in the city's development"*. (interview May 2011).

This operation had direct effects in forming an enduring political and business alliance around PNE. Recently, studies have been jointly conducted by EMGP, Paris and Plaine Commune on the dynamic area between Pleyel, future station of the Grand Paris TGV train connection¹⁰ and Paris Nord Est. Platforms of discussion have been recently promoted by Paris and Plaine Commune to interact with private stakeholders in the area and to produce policy recommendations for the future of northern Paris.

WHAT DRIVES CROSS-BORDER URBAN DEVELOPMENT?

Today, the dense zone of Paris does not have the institutional, regulatory and fiscal conditions for effective inter-municipal cooperation, but since 2001 the French capital has pursued a policy agenda centered on cross-border development. This move is driven by a coalition that uses inter-municipal cooperation along the border as a vehicle for political and economic strength. As discussed here, this implies an interdependency of political and economic interests and a combination of both logics in fostering urban development on the border; a clear leadership of political officials in conflict management; and it encapsulates political conflict on broad urban agendas.

THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF CROSS-BORDER DEVELOPMENT: RUPTURE AND ELECTORAL POWER

The PNE project is not an isolated planning experiment. It is a component of a city-wide urban agenda, of which cooperation between Paris and its *banlieue* is a pillar. The current coalition composed of the Socialist party and various Green factions has consolidated its electoral power by breaking with the city's traditional administration style. These left wing political forces explicitly foster a different strategy to that of the 'absolute hegemony' of the city centre on the *banlieue*, which has historical baggage. Inter-municipal cooperation is the key pillar of an urban electoral strategy aiming to gain strength in the city and its proximate suburbs.

The Socialist-Green coalition advocates an approach to urban affairs that promotes participative democracy for segregated populations living in the urban periphery, sustainability in city planning and social equalization within the region. This paper is not the place to assess whether these goals are redefining the Left in the city; but it is evident that inter-municipal cooperation is implicit within this agenda. The political and urban connectivity with Paris suburbs is framed by local politics as a necessary action to achieve those ends. Paris's central zone, due to its high density, cannot

address broad issues such as social housing and social services unless it reaches out to surrounding municipalities. It is here where the contrast with past administrations is most evident. Interventions are focused on the eastern Paris district and suburbs, with concentrated poverty, weak infrastructure, and social housing enclaves. The projects included in the GPRU intervention program are evidences of this focus. They mostly address eastern areas where the current coalition wins most votes. Furthermore, these are the suburbs where the riots of 2005 exploded, where the fracture between the poor *banlieue* and the rich Paris is most problematic.

PNE is the most ambitious project of the GPRU because of its impact and because of its strategic location. It targets the 18th district together with the 19th, the *arrondissement* where the current mayor was elected. Furthermore, Pierre Mansat, the alderman for inter-municipal relations, is in the top rank of the French Communist party within the adjacent 20th district, the second mostly populated Parisian district. PNE serves the urban agendas of all three districts. A fragmented territory, with isolated pockets of poverty, the area also has a strong symbolic character, representing the past industrial history of the city. Key issues to address are the lack of green spaces, the low quality of public space and the large stock of derelict housing. The design of the tram line has been instrumental in this symbolic purpose of interconnectivity, connecting PNE with other eastern areas of Paris.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN POLITICS AND TECHNICIANS

The close link between politics, planners, designers, transport agencies and research institutes is a core component of cross-border coalitions. It allows the coalition to translate symbolic and political objectives into concrete actions, while local executives keep a grip on their policies. A detailed look at the PNE project indeed reveals that this link is fundamental to manage endogenous conflicts, to ensure leadership in planning and to manage the difficult relationship between social-oriented political strategies and growth-oriented private engagement (treated below). Key political officials

occupy strategic positions within the metropolitan debate. Pierre Mansat, for example, has directly participated in the management boards of the Paris Urban Planning Agency (APUR) which investigates possible strategies of urban interconnectivity with the *banlieue*. He has also taken part in Paris's Urban Architecture Council and the STIF. Most recently, he gained the presidency of the *Atelier du Grand Paris*, an agency that follows the results of the Grand Pari(s) contest. As a further example, Roger Madec, a Socialist, is the current mayor of the 19th district, one of the two targets of PNE project. He is the president of SEMAVIP, the public-private (with a majority share of the municipality) developer of one compartment of the PNE and a partner in the development company of Entrepôt Macdonald. Incidentally, he is also a representative of Paris city within the Senate.

Technical planning solutions are shaped by politics in strategic projects. In Paris Nord Est the planning solutions aimed to open up the debate and reframe spatial issues to enable political connectivity. The city chose to adopt an innovative management approach for this project, with a main architecture agency to coordinate the development of the sub-sectors. This ensures that the fundamental principles of planning are maintained despite the inevitable complexity of the project. Interviewees say the strong role of technical departments was critical in overcoming the political controversies around joint urban development across the border where local executives felt strongly about their own land use plans within their jurisdictions. The planning process in PNE was strategically developed to treat those key issues of land use (as in the case of Mines Fillettes) with the aim to open possibilities for win-win solutions. The planning departments of Paris and Plaine Commune had a proactive role in enabling joint reflections over new developments of those areas. In a nutshell, technicians and planners made the ground fertile for political agreements and cooperation.

METROPOLITAN ENTREPRENEURS AND THE ECONOMIC LOGIC
OF CROSS-BORDER DEVELOPMENT

Meso-level planning in Paris directly affects the market as it ultimately leads to the definition of poles of growth which influence perspectives of investors. Private interests have therefore been mobilized in the wider debate. Important associations operating in the region such as the Chamber of Commerce, the MEDEF (Movement of Regional Enterprises Île de France), have contributed to the debate of the Grand Paris and have repeatedly stressed the importance of inter-governmental agreements on long-term development plan both at the regional level (SDRIF) and for housing densification within the inner suburbs. By looking at PNE it is possible to see how, at a level below these regionally organized interests, there are key business actors concretely and proactively pushing for joint inter-municipal development. There is a strong business interest to activate inter-municipal planning within strategic sectors at the border of Paris: in these areas land values can be leveraged and it is possible to maximize investments in the neighboring suburbs by indirectly capturing development spin-off gains. For large land owners inter-municipal planning can be instrumental to maximize investments on their land by creating synergies between projects separated from municipal borders. In Paris North-East, EMGP is part of a larger development process which covers central parts of Plaine Commune and will probably develop a 'mini-Défense aux portes de Paris'¹¹. As a further example, BNP Parisbas Real Estate, a bank, has a similar position. It is directly involved in the development of the eastern part of Paris Nord Est in order to maximize its investment in a large office development in the adjacent municipality of Pantin where its new headquarters will be placed. These key actors are directly operating in the project, through joint ventures and partnerships built through informal contacts. It is important to note that this private sector growth is beneficial to political groups in border areas. Making land more valuable pays for better services, which are wanted by local politicians and their constituents. In PNE, the interdependency between public and

private is evident in the formation of a public-private company (SAS Paris Nord Est) that aims to maximize the public benefits of those private developments.

In addition, other pivotal stakeholders are pushing for cross-border development in Paris. The redevelopment of the Paris border results from the land transfer strategy of the state railway during the 2000s. A state agency was created to valorize these obsolete parcels of land. Its land assets, often located at the border of large cities but today incredibly central within agglomerations, provides huge opportunities for profitable development. Railway companies operate as business actors in this economic restructuring process. For example, state railway operator SNCF is a powerful stakeholder in many projects in Paris, such as Paris Rive Gauche or the more recent Clichy-Batignolles project. In PNE, the SNCF is directly managing land and real estate development within the western compartments (i.e. Chapelle International and Chapelle Charbon).

COALITIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL LITIGATION

Inter-municipal governance in Paris reveals a chasm between political factions organized at different governmental levels. Within the decentralized French system, the metropolis has become the territorial arena for intergovernmental conflict and the institutional architecture proposed for meso-level governance entails political and electoral goals. However, different from the US context, in France it is not yet possible to make a clear distinction between local and national political dynamics. There are strong vertical dependencies between local and national politics: what political parties do locally has a major influence on their performance nationally. As mentioned earlier, Paris is a key arena for national elections. The wider picture on Paris metropolitan governance and a closer look at PNE uncover a dialectic at play. On the one hand, the future of Paris metropolis is affected by the interplay between

left and right wing political alliances; on the other, cross-border development is the product of a progressive political change of the former Parisian red belt, triggered by local, regional and national growth agendas.

The metropolis represents a fracture along which the policies of different governmental layers are territorialized and reinforced against each other. The Grand Pari(s) initiative has been generally interpreted as part of an authoritarian strategy of the national state to retain power over the spatial development of the city and to weaken the leftist coalitions in Paris suburbs (especially those at the east of the city). This action operates through hierarchical instruments: fostering administrative reform, claiming exclusive development rights in key areas and exercising its authority on the approval of regional structural plans. Local left-wing political coalitions, guided by Paris and regional executives, set their agendas against these approaches by proposing a bottom-up planning approach of community power and self-organization. They claim for a fluid inter-municipal platform intended to promote constructive negotiations issues of metropolitan fiscal equity, housing policies and transports. Both approaches are politically legitimized in contrast with the other.

Cross-border development between Paris and its eastern suburbs has been favored by a gradual shift in the local politics of the outer suburban belt. Since the end of the nineties, Plaine Commune has witnessed socio-economic change which has partially closed the political differences that hampered cooperation with Paris in the past. Electorally, the red belt is becoming less red, after the Communist party recently lost power in Seine-Saint Denis and the city of Aubervilliers (Subra, 2011). The area is today moving towards more growth-oriented planning strategies, in line with the ambitions of cross-border development fostered by Paris. Plaine Commune is part of a strategic corridor that runs from Roissy-Airport to Paris. This change also results from an intense policy of urban and economic revitalization initiated years ago by national and regional governments that has concentrated political attention

to these sensitive areas: examples of these policies are the public planning agency 'Plaine de France' which aims to both promote new development in the sector, the development of new infrastructure in the Pleyel area, and the use of different devices of the *Politique de la Ville* which identifies those neighborhoods that are priority targets for investments and fiscal allowances. Furthermore, important key infrastructure and social interventions (like the T3 tramway or urban regeneration programs) are financed by means of contracts between the region and the state (*Contrat de Projet 2007-2013*). It is not possible to provide a complete overview of the different normative tools used to bolster new developments. The point here is that the emergence of a cross-border coalition is triggered by objectives of political power consolidation. This does not take place only within local arenas shifting from past right wing politics. It also concerns the power consolidation against national authority that makes the inter-municipal alliance within Paris dense zone politically strategic. Cross-border development results from the inter-governmental struggle for electoral power in Paris but simultaneously from the progressive convergence of local municipalities towards development agendas.

CONCLUSIONS

Collaboration between municipalities is often compromised by deep-rooted power asymmetries. Whether large-scale urban development reproduces core city domination depends on the types of political dynamics that encompass these planning endeavors, and on whether it is driven by objectives of power restructuring. In fragmented agglomerations, the shift towards inter-municipal cooperation cannot be explained without understanding the political and economic rationale of cross-border urban development and how it results in governing coalitions. This perspective complements the analysis of institutional, fiscal and economic conditions of meso-level planning that seem to fall short in understanding *why* policy

shifts occur. This paper has demonstrated that innovative practices of cross-border development are driven by powerful public and private interests that are concerned with generating political and economic power in border areas. A closer look at one project in the North East sector of Paris municipality revealed that cross-border coalitions have political, technical and economic components. The concerted action of neighboring cities and land developers is the response to the electoral and economic centrality of 'the border' within Paris metropolitan socio-economic landscape.

In Paris, cross-border coalitions emerge under particular geopolitical conditions. First, cross-border development signals a turn in Parisian politics. Leftist groups have made inter-municipal cooperation a pillar of their efforts to break with the political past of the city. Today they emphasize a new rhetoric of social equity, service provision, local democracy and sustainability. The border of the city has become the space to pursue that agenda, inter-municipal cooperation a condition for achieving it. Secondly, the link with local bureaucracy, planning institutes and architectural experts is fundamental to enforcing these objectives and to exercising political leadership in contexts of institutional fragmentation. Urban design and spatial planning have, de facto, helped to bypass the institutional, political and normative fragmentation that previously characterized the Paris-*banlieue* relationship. Third, cross-border urban development is triggered by the interest of and engagement with powerful business interests in Paris. Inter-municipal cooperation is necessary for these business groups to secure and maximize investments. Cross-border coalitions take advantage of a close relationship between politics and business for the redevelopment of the urban periphery through public-private partnerships based on their interdependent yet different objectives. Lastly, this coalition-building process takes place within the context of a political contest over who controls metropolitan governance. Inter-municipal cooperation and meso-level planning becomes a political construct that finds its *raison d'être* in its juxtaposition with national political factions.

It is not yet possible to define what type of metropolitan governance will emerge in Paris. At present, the metropolis is somewhere in between a political object of debate, a voluntary governance platform and a regional infrastructural project. However, the future shape of Paris metropolis must stem from an understanding of its origins. This paper has demonstrated that inter-municipal cooperation is embedded today within power games that are not only a Parisian matter. The current geo-political scenario mirrors new development opportunities within the inner fringe, triggered by national and regional policies that target Paris suburbs. Meso-level planning requires settling the contest between national, regional and local authorities over priorities of development. This is not only a condition for coherent metropolitan spatial policies but ultimately the institutional capacity to achieve redistributive fiscal policies. Moreover, the metropolis is not only a Parisian issue. Today, Paris municipalities are leaders in shaping a metropolitan agenda. This political asset will probably enable cooperation as long as the ambitions of the other municipalities remain in harmony with those of Paris executives. Until cross-border development will depends on the specific combination of electoral and profit ambitions, it will occur only in politically and economically dynamic areas, such as the North-East of Paris, where state, region and municipalities all have a direct stake. Paris metropolis as a whole will not have a promising future if the less economically dynamic sectors are neglected. Sustainable metropolitan planning needs to resist electoral shifts and be more independent from local-specific political and economic alliances.

NOTES

- 1) A first reform was initiated in 1982 with the *Loi Deferre*, which created autonomous regions and departments. It was followed by a series of further laws. In 1999, the *Loi Chévenement* assembled groups of municipalities sharing key competences in spatial planning. It also created Urban Communities (*communautés urbaines*), non-elected metropolitan governments formed by the core municipalities and their surrounding fringe. Paris never reached this status. In 2003, decentralization was

introduced as part of a constitutional reform. In 2010, a new reform made inter-municipal cooperation compulsory.

- 2) Until 1995 the regional planning of Île de France was de facto defined under the guidance of national government. With the *Loi Pasqua* the capital region was considered at a level equal to the national government but, yet, the State keeps the faculty to not enforce regional plans.
- 3) Paris municipal council has hosted three Prime Ministers (Balladur, Chirac, Juppé).
- 4) The difference between these approaches is well explained by Desjardins (2010).
- 5) Interview with the former director of the Paris spatial planning department.
- 6) The Mayor of Paris is indirectly selected among the elected candidates within each district.
- 7) Interview with city planning department director 2001-2008, February 2011.
- 8) Office space is much more profitable than housing within Paris border. Following the market the housing developments would tend to be placed within Plaine Commune; however, this district already has a large housing stock.
- 9) The price of new office space in Paris Nord Est can reach up to € 7,000/sqm while just 200 meters outside it fetches € 4,000/sqm.
- 10) ICADE expressed its opinion on Grand Paris within the Cahier d'Acteur Commun aux deux public debates, December 2010.
- 11) *Le Parisien* 08.04.2010.

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