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UNEXPECTED PREMISSES: PART I

Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst

1. INTRODUCTION

In assessing each other's argumentation, language users taking part in a discussion in colloquial speech must often consider not only unequivocal statements but also statements which strictly speaking have not even been made. By longstanding terminological convention such "statements", which have not been formulated explicitly but which are nevertheless regarded as part of the argumentation, are called *suppressed* or *tacit premisses*.¹

Language users often employ suppressed or tacit premisses without any intention of misleading other interlocutors and without their argumentation being defective. It is for this reason that we prefer to use the term *unexpressed premisses*.

Our aims in these articles are to offer an explanation of the behaviour of interlocutors with regard to unexpressed premisses in discussions in colloquial speech and to provide guidelines for explicitizing unexpressed premisses. One of the implications of the first of these aims is that we shall attempt to explain the fact that unexpressed premisses generally pose no problem in practice. Evidently the language user as a rule has little difficulty in establishing that not all the premisses in an argumentation have been formulated explicitly and is

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¹ Cf. F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, and T. Kruijer, *The Study of Argumentation* (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1982), ch. 1.

capable and willing to provide the necessary supplementary information himself.

The essential question facing us is thus: what reason do language users have for doing this and what enables them to do it? A consequence of our second aim is that, starting from the explanation already arrived at, we try to indicate with what instructions listeners may be furnished who in particular cases have difficulty in explicitizing unexpressed premisses.² In achieving these two aims we shall start from insights of Grice.

In part I we shall indicate in what respects some common approaches to unexpressed premisses fall short of requirements and we shall outline an approach of our own. In part II we shall discuss various disadvantages and shortcomings of the guidelines for explicitizing unexpressed premisses found in the textbooks and indicate how certain practical problems may be more effectively solved with the help of our approach. Finally, we enumerate a number of subjects and problems which still have to be studied more closely.

2. THE STANDARD LOGICAL APPROACH TO UNEXPRESSED PREMISSES

Because of the importance that unexpressed premisses may have in practice, one is justified in expecting considerable attention to be paid to the subject in textbooks on argumentation

² For the sake of brevity we refer here only to a speaker and a listener, but what we have to say applies equally, *mutatis mutandis*, to a writer and a reader.

and discussion. In view of the whole purpose of such books, ideally they would even contain methods or procedures for detecting unexpressed premisses. Apart from one or two quite recent exceptions, however, there are no serious attempts in the textbooks to provide the listener with a usable procedure.

There is a dearth not only of practical advice, but also—and this must surely be more than pure coincidence—of any theoretical treatment of the subject. Fogelin ironically observed as long ago as 1967 that logicians who concerned themselves with argumentation were somewhat niggardly in providing information on the prickly question of unexpressed premisses.³ And since then, outside as well as inside logic, there has been little change for the better.

The rare profferers of practical advice who have tried in recent years to formulate reasoned guidelines for explicitizing unexpressed premisses all stress—one after another, and not without pride—that they are the first to do so.⁴ It is striking that in his practical textbook *Understanding Arguments* Fogelin believes it is enough to say that 'our everyday discourse leaves much unstated' and 'these things that are simply understood must be *made explicit*. This is often illuminating and sometimes boring'.⁵

The central questions that have to be answered are: (a) how a listener can know *that* something in the argumentation is being left unexpressed, and (b)

how he can know *what* is being left unexpressed.

In introductions to logic, logicians have tried to answer both these questions. With reference to three representative textbooks we shall show that they opt for similar approaches.⁶ They treat unexpressed premisses as a part of *syillogistic logic* and in general terms their approach reveals the same pattern. We shall therefore call this approach the *standard (logical) approach*.

In the standard approach it is pointed out that it is perfectly normal in reasoning in colloquial language for premisses to be omitted or for there to be no conclusion. The explanation for this is that it is *not necessary* to formulate everything explicitly. Speaker and listener have *common knowledge* which means that the speaker can leave out premisses or conclusions and can safely assume that the listener will provide the missing premisses or draw the missing conclusions for himself.⁷ Alongside efficiency, *persuasiveness* may also play a part. Arguments may gain in rhetorical persuasiveness if the speaker does not go into too much detail and presents premisses or conclusions as obvious by not mentioning them explicitly.

In syllogistic logic, an argument in which a premiss or the conclusion is absent is called an *enthymeme*. Accord-

⁶ Irving M. Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 4th ed. (New York etc.: MacMillan, 1972); Howard Kahane, *Logic and Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1973); Nicholas Rescher, *Introduction to Logic* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964).

⁷ That unexpressed premisses are part of the knowledge that is common to speaker and listener is often advanced in explanation of the fact that speakers do not formulate them explicitly. Cf. e.g. Günther Ohlschläger, *Linguistische Überlegungen zu einer Theorie der Argumentation* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1979), pp. 88-102; Uta Quasthoff, "The Uses of Stereotype in Everyday Argument", *Journal of Pragmatics*, 2 (1978), p. 16; C. L. Hamblin, *Fallacies* (London: Methuen, 1970), pp. 235-45; Scriven, p. 173; Fogelin, p. 182.

³ Robert J. Fogelin, *Evidence and Meaning: Studies in Analytic Philosophy* (London etc.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 107.

⁴ Cf. Michael Scriven, *Reasoning* (New York etc.: McGraw-Hill, 1976), p. xvi; Karel Lambert and William Ulrich, *The Nature of Argument* (New York etc.: MacMillan, 1980), p. x.

⁵ Robert J. Fogelin, *Understanding Arguments: An Introduction to Informal Logic* (New York etc.: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978), p. 182.

ing to Rescher an enthymeme is a categorical syllogism one of whose three constituent statements has been omitted or left unstated.⁸ Thus unexpressed premisses are fitted into the theory of *categorical syllogisms*.

For the listener, the omission of a premiss means that he is confronted with an argument which is *invalid* in the form in which it is presented. What attitude must he adopt towards such an argument? He can of course content himself with observing that it is invalid and consequently rejecting the conclusion. But that is unsatisfactory, if only because it is making gratuitously short shrift of something that is the rule, rather than the exception, in colloquial speech. However, he can also adopt a rather more sympathetic attitude and assume that the speaker intended to say more than he has explicitly put into words.

The consequence of this attitude is that the listener must himself try to add to the enthymeme in order to turn it into a valid categorical syllogism. Here Rescher adduces to the 'principle of charity': one should, insofar as possible, try to *make the argument valid and its premisses true*.⁹

If we accept that the listener allows himself to be guided by Rescher's *principle of charity*, the question still arises whether it is actually always so easy to expand an incomplete argument into a valid one. In the standard approach this

question is left unasked, though there is a suggestion that the answer is affirmative.¹⁰

However, this optimism is only justified if unexpressed premisses are linked exclusively to categorical syllogisms. A listener who knows that by definition a syllogism contains two premisses and is confronted with an argument in which there is only one, has no difficulty in deducing that one premiss has been omitted. By assuming that the complete argument is a valid syllogism, he can quite simply reconstruct the original argument, since the rules for valid categorical syllogisms as it were point the way.¹¹

For example, anyone who knows the rules for valid categorical syllogisms knows that there is only one way in which the following enthymeme can be made valid, viz. by adding the premisses *All B is C*:

All A is B, so all A is C.

Problems only arise if the restriction to categorical syllogisms is abandoned. The listener then loses the security offered him by syllogistic logic. For example, he can no longer simply assume that every valid argument contains no more and no fewer than two premisses. Nor can he now call on the system of unequivocal criteria to determine the validity of an argument of a particular form. Consequently, he can no longer be sure whether the argument is valid or invalid, and hence he can no longer tell whether or not a premiss has been omitted.

The standard approach bypasses these problems. Copi, for example, dismisses

Pragmatic Universals of Language", in *Language Universals*, ed. H. Sciler (Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 1978), p. 136.

¹⁰ Cf. Copi, p. 224.

¹¹ Cf. Richard L. Purtill, *Logic: Argument, Refutation, and Proof* (New York etc.: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 196.

⁸ Rescher, p. 161.

⁹ Rescher, p. 162. In this general sense, Rescher's invoking of the "principle of charity" also appears in the work of various other authors. Cf. e.g. Scriven, p. 71, p. 173; H. Paul Grice, *Some Aspects of Reason: Immanuel Kant Lectures* (unpublished, 1977), p. I-11; Lambert and Ulrich, p. 60. In "A Note on Pragmatic Universals of Language", Herman Parret uses the Davidson definition of the "principle of charity", which in some respects differs from that given by Rescher. It is: "the generally desired (final) end of language-in-context is truth and its communicability". Herman Parret, "A Note on

them with the greatest of ease: "Any kind of argument can be expressed enthymematically, but the kinds of enthymemes that have been most extensively studied are incompletely expressed syllogistic arguments."¹² If it were possible to treat every argument as if it were a categorical syllogism, the problems would naturally be solved, but that is not the case.

The listener must often take refuge in a logical system other than the theory of categorical syllogisms, such as propositional, predicate, or modal logic. He then finds himself faced by a dilemma, since the application of two different logical systems in adding to an incomplete argument to make it valid does not always result in the same answer.

Another problem is that for some intuitively valid arguments there is (still) no logical system available at all whereby their validity can be demonstrated.

The listener trying to validate an argument can thus find himself faced by major and sometimes insoluble problems as soon as the security of syllogistic logic, upon which the standard approach would have him rely, disappears. The optimism regarding the possibilities open to the listener for explicitizing unexpressed premisses which attaches to this approach is thus generally speaking wholly groundless.

It is a shortcoming of the standard approach that it *simply bypasses* the "technical" problems which the listener may find himself having to solve in explicitizing unexpressed premisses, but even less satisfactory is the fact that it is similarly *simply assumed* that the listener is *willing* to undertake an attempt at adding to an incomplete argument in such a way that it becomes valid. The question, after all, is *what reason* might the listener have for doing that.

¹² Copi, p. 225.

The listener could equally well be content with the observation that the argument in the form in which the speaker presents it is invalid. It is true that Rescher believes that the listener ought to behave in accordance with the *principle of charity*—and he may be right—but he omits to indicate *why* the listener should adopt so charitable an attitude towards the speaker. Our conclusion can be none other than that the standard logical approach to unexpressed premisses not only leaves important practical problems arising in the explicitizing of such premisses unsolved, but also bypasses the essential question of how the manner in which unexpressed premisses are used in discourse in colloquial language is to be explained.

3. THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL APPROACH TO UNEXPRESSED PREMISSSES

However, the standard logical approach is not the only possible approach to unexpressed premisses. For example, there are also authors who regard unexpressed premisses as *presuppositions*. This approach, which appears to be able to offer other possibilities, is chosen for example by Rescher, Öhlschläger and Nuchelmans.¹³

Rescher distinguishes between three sorts of presupposition. It is the third of these that is the most interesting to us: "A third fundamental sense of the term relates to the 'presuppositions' of inference. The validity of an inference can require the satisfaction of some appropriate precondition or prerequisite. An illustration is: To infer 'X is an A'

¹³ Nicholas Rescher, "On the Logic of Presupposition", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 21 (1961), pp. 521-7; Günther Öhlschläger, "Über das Argumentieren", in *Theorie der Argumentation*, ed. M. Schecker (Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 1977), pp. 11-25; Gabriël Nuchelmans, *Taalfilosofie: Een Inleiding* (Muiderberg: Coutinho, 1978).

from 'X is a B' presupposes that 'All B's are A's'.¹⁴ Öhlschläger adopts Rescher's term *inferential presupposition* ("Schluß-Präsuppositionen"). This term is used in analysing the following argument: (a) Fritz is a member of the union, (b) and hence a socialist. According to Öhlschläger the argument (a) therefore (b) can be regarded as an incomplete argument which can be made valid by the addition of one premiss. He gives two possible additions: (c) All union members are socialists, and (c') Whenever someone is a member of the union, he is a socialist. Öhlschläger calls addition (c) and (c') *inferential presuppositions* and for the following reason: "In order that (b) may validly be inferred from (a), it is a necessary condition that either (c) or (c') be true."¹⁵ Here Öhlschläger is guilty of confusing (logical) *validity* and *soundness*, but in any event it is clear that—following Rescher's lead—he regards unexpressed premisses as presuppositions.¹⁶

Nuchelmans gives in *Taalfilosofie* ("Philosophy of Language") a survey of subjects belonging to the field of pragmatics.¹⁷ These subjects, in Nuchelmans's view, include *presuppositions*. He uses the definition of a "pragmatic presupposition" given by Stalnaker, the first author to attempt a definition of this concept.¹⁸ Stalnaker's definition reads as follows: "A speaker pragmatically pre-

supposes that B at a given moment in a conversation just in case he is disposed to act, in his linguistic behaviour, as if he takes the truth of B for granted, and if he assumes that his audience recognizes that he is doing so."¹⁹ Nuchelmans says that a speaker presupposes that P is the case if in his linguistic behaviour he indicates that he assumes the truth of P and that he assumes that his audience realizes this. He then goes on to link pragmatic presuppositions and unexpressed premisses: "A classic example [of a pragmatic presupposition] is an enthymeme or argument with a suppressed premiss: the person who presents such an argument as valid evidently takes the truth of the omitted premiss for granted and assumes that the listener will realize that he is doing so. Clearly, ordinary discourse is full of such presuppositions: what is explicitly stated in a linguistic utterance is as a rule embedded in a matrix of unformulated knowledge shared by speaker and listener."²⁰ It is difficult to maintain that the shortcomings of the standard logical approach to unexpressed premisses are eliminated by these authors. It is even debatable whether regarding unexpressed premisses as presuppositions, as long as that is as far as it goes, really deserves to be called an *approach*.

All Rescher and Öhlschläger do, in effect, is to make loose observations, for they are content to observe that there is something missing from the arguments which they choose as their examples and then call that missing element a *presupposition*. And Nuchelmans's view is little more than an observation that a speaker generally takes for granted what the listener is assumed to know, that this means that he omits things of which he assumes that the listener will be able to

¹⁴ Rescher, "On the Logic of Presupposition", p. 525.

¹⁵ Öhlschläger, "Über das Argumentieren", p. 12.

¹⁶ Cf. Öhlschläger, *Linguistische Überlegungen*, pp. 88-99.

¹⁷ Nuchelmans, pp. 44-55.

¹⁸ Robert C. Stalnaker, "Presuppositions", *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 2 (1973), pp. 447-57. In subsequent publications Stalnaker has several times revised his definition of "pragmatic presupposition". For a survey and discussion of these and other definitions, see Gerald Gazdar, *Pragmatics: Implicatures, Presupposition, and Logical Form* (New York etc.: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 103-8.

¹⁹ Stalnaker, p. 448.

²⁰ Nuchelmans, p. 55.

supply them himself, and that the listener is aware that the speaker is doing this.

In Nuchelmans's view, then, the use of unexpressed premisses can be explained by taking the obviousness of the omitted statements and the knowledge common to the speaker and listener for granted. These two elements can certainly be important in accounting for unexpressed premisses, but in this elementary form they also occur in publications in which no link is made between unexpressed premisses and presuppositions. In the postulation of reasons which a speaker may have for keeping particular steps in his argumentation implicit, concepts such as "taken for granted" (Hamblin) "common knowledge" (Quasthoff) and "common agreement" (Fogelin) are often resorted to.²¹ These elements are also represented in the standard logical approach to unexpressed premisses. In this respect, then, it cannot be said that the presuppositional view of unexpressed premisses leads to a new approach.

In itself, of course, there is little objection to regarding unexpressed premisses as pragmatic presuppositions, but at the same time we can see not the slightest advantage in this presuppositional view. After all, it offers nothing more than a partial explanation for the omission of arguments by the *speaker*, while the fact that the *listener* is generally able and disposed to explicitize unexpressed premisses correctly and without difficulty remains unexplained. *Why* should the listener do it, and *how* can he do it in a correct manner? In the approaches discussed so far, these important questions are not asked, neither can they be answered with the help of the views discussed.

²¹ Hamblin, p. 237; Quasthoff, p. 16; Fogelin, *Understanding Arguments*, p. 182.

4. UNEXPRESSED PREMISSES AS CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES

In our opinion, a more adequate approach to unexpressed premisses can be developed by starting from the insights of Grice concerning the conduct of discourse. According to Grice, the conduct of discourse is based on a general *co-operative principle* which he formulates as follows: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."²² Grice distinguishes several maxims enabling language users to act in accordance with the co-operative principle: the maxims of *quantity, quality, relation* and *manner*.²³ In normal circumstances a language user adheres to these maxims and, as long as there are no indications to the contrary, assumes that his co-interlocutor is doing likewise.

A *conversational implicature* arises if a speaker deliberately and openly breaks one of the maxims even though he is able and in a position to adhere to the maxim and there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the co-operative principle.²⁴ The maxim in question is then being *exploited* by the speaker to bring about an implicature. Whether the implicature is actually brought about

²² H. Paul Grice, "Logic and Conversation", in *Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts*, eds. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (New York etc.: Academic Press, 1975), p. 45.

²³ Grice takes his designation and nomenclature of maxims from Kant. Grice's maxims read as follows: *Maxim of quantity*. 1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange). 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. *Maxim of quality*. Try to make your contribution one that is true. 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. *Maxim of relation*. Be relevant. *Maxim of manner*. Be perspicuous. 1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 2. Avoid ambiguity. 3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 4. Be orderly. Grice, pp. 45-6.

²⁴ Grice, pp. 49-50.

depends partly on the listener. After all, he is not (by definition) explicitly presented with it, but must himself deduce from the data available to him—both explicit and implicit—that there is an implicature and what it entails.

According to Grice, the listener must go through a number of steps to detect a conversational implicature.²⁵ It is unlikely that a listener would always consciously go through all these steps. But then that is not necessary for the *creation* of a conversational implicature. What is essential if we are to speak of a conversational implicature, according to Grice, is that intuition can be *replaced* by an argument along the lines indicated by him.²⁶

We now have to answer the essential question whether argumentative discussions are in fact covered by the *co-operative principle*. That principle, of course, only holds good for discourse in which the interlocutors are trying to achieve a *common aim*. To what extent can a discussion be regarded as such a joint undertaking by speaker and listener?

At first sight it might appear that in the case of argumentation in discourse there can be no question of a common aim and a common direction for the discourse. If the interlocutors' purpose is not exclusively to exchange information, it would seem that in many cases each interlocutor is chiefly concerned with stressing, in every way possible, his own rightness and the other's wrongness.

²⁵ Grice lists the following steps: (a) the speaker has said *p*; (b) there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the co-operative principle; (c) he cannot say *p* and still observe the co-operative principle, unless he thinks *q*; (d) he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I am capable of seeing that it is necessary to assume that he thinks *q*; (e) he has done nothing to prevent me from thinking *q*; (f) it is his intention that I should think *q*, or at least he has no objection to my thinking *q*; (g) therefore he has implicated *q*. Grice, p. 50.

²⁶ Grice, p. 50.

Yet this need by no means always be the case. Many discussions are calculated to *find a joint resolution of a dispute*. It is with this sort of discussion and with interlocutors who have this aim that we are concerned here.²⁷

A dispute concerning an expressed opinion means that two language users adopt differing positions in respect of an expressed opinion: one language user accepts the expressed opinion, the other does not. If the second language user challenges the first to defend his point of view, and if the latter is disposed to do so, they can try to *resolve* their dispute with the help of argumentation. There then arises a discussion of the sort to which we refer. In this discussion *both* parties have the same aim and this *common aim* means that the direction of the discourse is *the same* for all the interlocutors concerned.²⁸ This means that Grice's co-operative principle is

²⁷ Contrary to the suggestion made by Kasher, a discussion need not always be a matter of interlocutors trying to establish their absolute rightness in whatever manner they can. Interlocutors are often "rational" (and it is in their own interest to be) in the sense that they set themselves the joint aim of *resolving* a dispute by means of argumentation and that in so doing they are willing to *adhere to certain rules*. One might term this (without any depreciatory implication) a *minimal* form of rationality. Asa Kasher, "Conversational Maxims and Rationality", in *Language in Focus: Essays in Memory of Y. Bar-Hillel*, ed. Asa Kasher (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), pp. 197-216.

²⁸ Speakers and listeners also have at their disposal a number of *common norms* for the assessment of argumentation. Empirical research will have to show the extent to which this agreement goes. It may then emerge that in practice there is a considerable degree of agreement between language users as to the criteria which apply, or ought to apply, to argumentation. However, this need not necessarily mean that language users always actually *apply* these criteria when assessing argumentation. Nor will this kind of empirical research obviate the need for *normative* research into argumentation. From the empirical observation that in respect of argumentation language users act in a certain similar fashion it cannot be deduced that their argumentative acts *therefore* also deserve approbation. Independent normative theoretical work will have to be done to establish what argumentative behaviour is preferable to what other argumentative behaviour.

wholly applicable to argumentation in this kind of discussion.²⁹

This does not mean, however, that the question of how unexpressed premisses can be explained using that principle and its associated maxims has been answered. In answering this question we shall employ a variant of an example used by Grice to illustrate the difference between *conventional* and *conversational* implicatures. Conventional implicatures do not arise according to the general pattern of conversational implicatures. In the first case the implicature, unlike a conversational implicature, can be deduced directly from the *meaning* of the words and sentences used.³⁰ The example reads as follows: (a) John is English; he is, therefore, brave. In argument (a) a premiss has been omitted. We assume that (b) "The English are all brave" is the unexpressed premiss of (a). Grice, however, uses (a) as an example of a *conventional implicature*. According to him, it implies that the conclusion that John is brave "follows" directly from the statement that John is English. The conventional implicature is based on the meaning of the words used, in this case the meaning of the word 'therefore'. It is not our intention here to concern ourselves with this question in particular. Our thesis—and here Grice says nothing at all—is that (a) can also generate a *conversational implicature* and that (b) can then be regarded as a *conversational implicature* of (a).

The listener, in his attempt to reconstruct (b) starting from (a), may follow the following train of thought:

The speaker has said "John is English; he is, therefore, brave". The speaker has clearly put forward an argument³¹, that is to say he ad-

duces "John is English" in support (justification) of the expressed opinion "John is brave". However, in this form the argument "John is English; he is, therefore, brave" is invalid, so his argumentation is defective. The speaker has thus clearly offended against the maxim of relation (after all, at first sight "John is English" has nothing to do with "John is brave"). But I have no reason to suppose that he is rejecting the co-operative principle entirely. The argument can be validated by adding "The English are all brave". The speaker knows that and he is apparently taking it for granted that I know too. The speaker has made no effort whatever to prevent his argument being interpreted in this obvious manner. It is thus his intention that I should supply "The English are all brave" to add to the statements he has uttered. Thus "The English are all brave" is the unexpressed premiss of his argumentation.

Grice's general pattern for the working out of a conversational implicature would have to be modified as follows—in conformity with this example—to make it applicable to unexpressed premisses:

- (a) *The speaker has said "p, therefore q".*
- (b) *The speaker has evidently put forward an argument, witness certain illocutionary indicators; that is to say, he is trying to convince me of the acceptability of q by trying to justify q by means of p.³²*
- (c) *q can only be justified by means of a valid argument (and the speaker knows that and knows that I know that), but "p, therefore q" is not a valid argument.*
- (d) *The speaker has thus offended against the maxim of relation, but there is no reason to suppose that the speaker is not (or no longer) adhering to the co-operative principle.*

the speaker adduces in support or justification of the expressed opinion "John is brave", fulfils the *essential condition* of the illocutionary act complex of argumentation or pro-argumentation which we formulated in Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, "The Speech Acts of Arguing and Convincing in Externalized Discussions", *Journal of Pragmatics*, 6 (1982), pp. 1-25. In our formulation of the essential condition we connect the attempt at justification with an attempt on the part of the speaker to convince the listener.

³² Cf. Dieter Wunderlich, "Zur Konventionalität von Sprechhandlungen", in *Linguistische Pragmatik*, ed. D. Wunderlich (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1972), pp. 11-58; Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, pp. 1-25.

²⁹ Cf. David Holdcroft, "Speech Acts and Conversation", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 29 (1979), pp. 125-41.

³⁰ Cf. Grice, "Logic and Conversation", p. 44.

³¹ The statement "John is English", which

- (e) *The speaker believes that I shall regard his argumentation as a justification of the expressed opinion and he knows that he can be held to his argumentation; therefore I must assume that he assumes that I shall see how his argument can be validated.*
- (f) *The argument can be validated by adding premiss r to premiss p and the speaker assumes (and assumes that I assume that he assumes) that I have enough logical insight to validate the argument "p, therefore q" by the addition of r.*
- (g) *The speaker has done nothing to prevent me making the addition of r, so that I may assume that it is his intention to allow me to make that addition or at least that he will raise no objection to it.*
- (h) *Thus r may be regarded as the unexpressed premiss in the speaker's argumentation.*

The most important difference between our scheme for deducing an unexpressed premiss and Grice's general pattern for the working out of a conversational implicature lies in steps (c), (e) and (f) in our scheme. The guiding principle for deducing the unexpressed premiss used in these steps is derived from the *invalidity* of the argument *p*, so *q* and the contrasting *validity* of the argument *p* and *r*, so *q*, and this guiding principle is (of course) absent in Grice's scheme. The validity or invalidity of an argument provides the listener who is trying to explicitize unexpressed premisses with a point of reference which is not present in the explicitization of other conversational implicatures. In Grice's analysis it is simply postulated that the speaker, if he does not wish to abandon the co-operative principle, cannot merely say *p* but must also think *q*. Grice says nothing at all about how the listener is supposed to find his way from *p* to *q*. The only certainty that the listener has is that when looking for the implicature he must keep an eye on the quantity, quality, relevance and manner of formulation of what has been said.

Various writers have drawn attention

to this omission in Grice's theory, but they have gone no further towards rectifying it than a few rather superficial suggestions.³³ Naturally we have no wish to suggest that the manner in which we have completed Grice's scheme offers a universal solution to this problem, only that our supplementary addition of steps (c), (e) and (f) render Grice's theory useful for analysing argumentation with an unexpressed premiss in discussions intended to resolve a dispute about an expressed opinion. The task of validating an incomplete (and in that form invalid argument) will not automatically lead the listener to an unproblematical, easy and unequivocal filling in of the unexpressed premiss, but does offer him an *extra* point of reference.

This augmented Gricean theory makes it possible to formulate adequate answers to the questions with which we ended our discussion of other approaches to unexpressed premisses in section 3. In answering the questions *why* the listener is almost always willing to explicitize unexpressed premisses and *how* he can do it in a correct manner, we assume that the listener, if the speaker adduces an argument which is patently invalid, *knows* that it is plausible that there is an unexpressed premiss in the speaker's argumentation, because he expects that a speaker who tries to resolve a dispute *will observe the co-operative principle*. If the listener is similarly bent on resolving the dispute, then he too, in his turn, will have to observe the co-operative principle, and this means that he will have to be prepared to *augment the speaker's invalid argument in order to validate it*.³⁴ It is to this willingness

³³ Cf. e.g. Marcelo Dascal, "Conversational Relevance", in *Meaning and Use*, ed. A. Margalit (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), pp. 153-74.

³⁴ As Grice formulated this, the co-operative principle applies only to the *speaker*. Supplying unexpressed premisses demands the willingness of the *listener* similarly to adhere to the co-operative principle. Strictly speaking, then, the

(a product of the co-operative principle) that an appeal is also made in the "principle of charity". The listener can put this willingness into practice in a correct manner by allowing himself to be guided by the conversational maxims and by using the rules for determining the validity of forms of argument to *interpret the speaker's argumentation in such a way that he has observed the co-operative principle.*³⁵

co-operative principle ought to be modified and made to apply to both speaker and listener. Cf. Renate Bartsch, "Semantical and Pragmatical Correctness as Basic Notions of the Theory of Meaning", *Journal of Pragmatics*, 3 (1979), p. 24.

³⁵ That the listener may be regarded as cap-

In part II we shall be demonstrating how the Gricean approach to unexpressed premisses provides more possibilities of indicating *how the listener can best go about* explicitizing unexpressed premisses than the standard logical approach and the presuppositional approach discussed here.

able of correctly augmenting arguments with unexpressed premisses does not mean that the listener must be credited with an elaborate theory of unexpressed premisses. However, it *does* mean that he must be regarded as capable of more or less consciously and more or less intuitively applying the principles involved in a theory of explicitizing unexpressed premisses. Cf. also Fogelin, *Evidence and Meaning*, p. 107.