[Review of: M. Lomas Cortés (2011) El proceso de expulsión de los moriscos de España (1609-1614)]

Wiegers, G.

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The process of the expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain, which lasted from September 1609 (the month in which the ban was published in Valencia) until January 2014 was an operation that occupied a central position in royal politics for years (p. 537). It was a highly controversial measure at the time, and has remained so ever since. Lomas is not the first to study this controversial theme. Henri Lapeyre dealt with it in a thorough and meticulous way in his by now classic *Geography of Morisco Spain* (*Géographie de l’Espagne Morisque*, 1959; a Spanish translation, *Geografía de la España morisca*, was published in 2009). Lapeyre was able to establish on the basis of detailed study in the archives (predominantly the Archivo General de Simancas) the number of persons affected by it and the main characteristics of the process and establish a reliable demographical picture. It will be remembered that the number of people affected by it had until then been estimated quite differently, and even ran as high as several millions. Lapeyre’s calculations, that expulsion affected about 300,000 people, have remained unchallenged, and this includes the study under review.

In his new study devoted to the expulsion (originally his doctoral thesis defended at the University of Valencia) the historian Manuel Lomas Cortés chooses another perspective. His aim is to offer a critical evaluation of the process of the expulsion with John Lynch’s assertion in mind (as discussed in
his España bajo los Austrias, Barcelona, 1988; original English edition Oxford, 1969). Lynch argued that the effectiveness and smooth character of the expulsion process proved the decadence thesis wrong, and he argued that the process demonstrates that the Spanish monarchy was capable of effectively organizing such a measure (p. 15). Hence, and taking Lapeyre’s study as a point of departure, Lomas does not return to Morisco demography nor the “human drama” of the deportations and forced migrations, but sets out to analyze the political, administrative and logistic aspects of the expulsion (p. 16). He examines it, therefore, as an administrative, bureaucratic, political and military operation, as a process, in the framework of the “new military history”. This means that he attempts to go beyond the mere analysis of the events, and sets out to uncover the structures that connect government, the military forces and society at large. Within such a framework, the expulsion appears to be a long and difficult process, conceived while it was still unclear how and where it would be put into practice and hence would inevitably be subject to changes and improvisations (p. 16).

Lomas’s analysis of the process is divided into four main parts, bearing the following general titles: (1) the expulsion of the Moriscos of Valencia, (2) the Castilian process, (3) the exile of Catalanian and Aragonese Moriscos, and (4) the finalizing of the general process (ending with the expulsion of the Moriscos of Murcia, GW). The study ends with a conclusion in which the main characteristics of the process as described are resumed and reviewed.

The basic traits of the process that lead Lomas to organize his study in the way described above are basically also to be found in Lapeyre’s study, but what distinguishes his work is that Lomas focuses on how the relevant decisions were prepared, carried out and which factors influenced the process once set in motion, as discussed above. He does so in a convincing way. Lomas points out that due to the fact that the process was centrally organized, the bulk of the archival material comes from the Archivo General de Simancas, an archive that had also been used by Lapeyre. However, Lomas delves deeper in that archive, using documents from sections that had been used less or not at all by Lapeyre. In addition Lomas uses materials from Italian archives to reconstruct the itineraries of the Spanish fleet stationed in Italy and other archives that had not been used by Lapeyre (p. 19). Due to richness of the analysis (we are dealing with a study of 582 pages including the bibliography and indices) and highly contextualized nature of each phase it is impossible to do justice to every aspect. I will limit myself to what seem to me important aspects. First of all, Lomas makes it abundantly clear that the final decision to expel all Moriscos from Spain was taken because the image of Phillip III was felt to need a boost and some restoration both of his own honor and that of the powerful Duke of Lerma, his favorite (p. 28), was badly needed. Military defeats and especially the truce with the Dutch insurgents were the cause. The expulsion of the Moriscos offered him the possibility to confirm himself in his capacity as a Christian king who fulfilled the founding myths about his mission to secure his realm’s safety, fight heresy and finally purify Spain from the Muslims (p. 28) as a counterbalance to his setbacks in
Northern Europe and as an ideological response to them. On 4 April 1609, it was at the very same day as the truce with the Dutch was signed, that the decision was taken to expel all Moriscos. The political, ideological and military attention henceforward shifted from Northern Europe to the southern shores of the Empire, which appears from the fact that the fleet set out to defeat such Mediterranean opponents as the Dutch corsair Simon de Danser (see p. 69). Lomas asserts that the decision was primarily a political one, and taken in the deepest secrecy with regard to its practical consequences in order to prevent untoward reactions such as revolts. Religious agents acting against the expulsion had to be neutralized. This was the case with the Dominicans who acted as confessors, and with those whose conscience led them to be against expelling young and innocent children and also those who kept alive the hope that with the right approach Moriscos would eventually become good and faithful Christians. The institutions and individual agents potentially opposed to the measure included also the Vatican, of course, which in the end never approved the measure, as Stefania Pastore argued in an article that Lomas quotes on p. 40 as unpublished article (recently published in García-Arenal, M. & Wiegers, G.A. (eds.), Los Moriscos. Expulsión y diáspora. Una perspectiva internacional, Valencia-Garanada-Zaragoza, Publicaciones de la Universitat de València-Editorial Universidad de Granada-Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2013, Biblioteca de Estudios Moriscos). The political nature (crimen de lesa patria) of the decision commanded that the public opinion would have to be convinced that the Moriscos posed a danger to the state. The nobles were another important factor: they until then had opposed the expulsion. The official motivations were discussed and balanced with religious arguments until the moment the first ban was published in Valencia on 22 September 1609 (pp. 87-88). It was precisely this balancing of foreseen and unforeseen circumstances that characterized the whole process as it unfolded publicly from that very moment. There were to ensue a number of critical stages in what was to follow.

Interestingly, it was at such points that the Morisco communities themselves contributed to the controlled continuation of the process already set in motion. Such an instance occurred already very early on, during the expulsion of the Moriscos of Valencia. Initially the Spanish authorities organized the embarkations and paid for the transfers. However, Lomas argues, the process did not go that well. People were given three days to leave, and many assembled in the harbors. While they were still on the road, they were often attacked by Old Christians, and many ended up there in miserable conditions. There they had to wait, closely packed together, and infections spread easily. Revolts began to break out in some parts of the kingdom. However, at a certain moment Valencian aljamas (who had convened meetings to discuss the expulsions) offered to pay for the transfer so long as they were allowed to choose the best ports to be transported by French, Spanish and Dutch merchant vessels. According to Lomas, the Morisco initiatives and readiness to pay saved the operations in Valencia (p. 130 ff). It was the government which guaranteed their safe crossing to the North African ports (p. 539). The Moriscos contributed to its financial aspects, and advocated
that the process could be carried out before winter started, something which was very important. According to Lomas, this intervention prevented a deteriorating of the circumstances that might have proved to be "fatal" for the expulsion process (p. 539). The Morisco intervention meant a change of policy for the administration that was also adopted when the measures with regard to Castile, Andalusia, Aragon and Catalonia were put into effect. Commercial ships were used, Moriscos contributed financially and the role of the military decreased, with positive impact on the treasury. But it was not only the role of private enterprise that changed, so were policies with regard to the children of the Moriscos (the expulsion of children has been one of the most hotly debated issues in view of the problems for the conscience of the religious and secular authorities).

The case of Hornachos is instructive in this respect. Being one of the most important Morisco townships in Andalusia the inhabitants were always considered a potential threat (p. 230 ff). They maintained contacts with the exiled Moroccan prince Muley Xeque and his court at Carmona. Morisco communities such as the Hornacheros were the reason that the crown had wished to hide the true intention of expelling all Moriscos. The others elsewhere were not to be alerted, hence the fiction was upheld that only Valencian Moriscos near to the coasts were to be expelled. When the edicts that affected them were published, it was decided that the Hornacheros were to embark in Seville (p. 280) and from there to they were to sail to ports in Barbary. However, at the moment they were about to embark, the king decided that they were not allowed to cross to infidel country if they would take their children with them. The children had to remain in care, allegedly because innocent children should be protected from living in infidel territories. The Hornacheros therefore decided to sail to France, if they were to take their children with them, but that was rejected as a thin disguise. According to the testimony of a Morisco (which Lomas leaves out of consideration), Ahmad b. Qāsim al-Ḥajarī (Diego Bejarano), himself a native of Hornachos, this happened to Moriscos on 14 ships, and he tells us that the cries of the mothers were so loud that people compared that day to the Day of Judgement. He also adds that some of these people arrived in Marrakesh and that the mothers could in no way be reassured, so that some went out of their mind (see Wiegers, A Learned Muslim Acquaintance, Leiden, [1988], p. 42). Al-Ḥajarī claims to have received a commission of the Moroccan sultan and the Morisco community in exile to negotiate a remedy for this in France, probably with the aim to request the French king to exert pressure upon the Spanish King to release the children from Hornachos. After this event, no Moriscos were prepared to go to Barbary; instead they wished to sail to a Christian Country (usually France), something that complicated the crossings (and hence Spanish plans) a great deal. What is interesting here is that the decision to prohibit the Moriscos from crossing to Barbary with their children was in flat contradiction with the outcome of the long and difficult deliberations that took place preceding the expulsion. The outcome of those deliberations was that Moriscos were to allowed to leave children under four (children form ‘mixed’ matrimony: six) in Spain if they wished so, but all older children had to leave.
with their parents. It remains unclear how the authorities justified this position against the background of the original conditions mentioned in the expulsion edict of 22 September 1609.

Let us now turn to the central perspective of the book, Lynch’s rejection of the decadence thesis and the author’s response to that. Against the background of his meticulous analysis of the difficulties encountered by the authorities during the process, it comes rather as a surprise that on the very last pages of the book the author concludes that with numerous changes and adaptations to the model that had been chosen initially, the Spanish administration was not only able to demonstrate a considerable capacity of adaptation, but also to show that had a sufficiently well-developed administrative structure to execute with success a project of considerable range and technical complexity. The expulsion did not show any signs of decadence with respect to its financial, military and administrative aspects, but rather a considerable vigor, which shows the maturity and breath of control of the Spanish government and administration (see p. 551). Lomas argues that the authorities learned from earlier problems that arose during the process, and analyses how juridical problems, such as the unexpected number of litigations by Castilian Moriscos against their expulsion were overcome by having recourse to special commissioners and special judges, etc. Nevertheless this quite positive evaluation of the Lynch thesis surprises somewhat, since the main argument shows a great and admirable awareness of critical moments in which the situation was very close to being out of control. In this respect, I wonder whether it is indeed possible to reach a judgement on the effectiveness of the expulsion process without taking into account Morisco agency. It seems to me that one of the major developments in research into the Morisco community is the degree in which Moriscos are shown to have been active during the years preceding the expulsion in preparing their communities for such a measure. I am referring here to studies by, for example, Luis Fernando Bernabé Pons (see his “Notas sobre la cohesión de la comunidad morisca más allá de su expulsión de España”, Al-Qantara, XXIX, 2 (2008), pp. 307-332). If it is true that the leadership of Morisco communities did cooperate in skilful ways with the oppressors, what does that mean? Should Morisco sources not be taken more fully into account? This brings me to another issue. Is it possible to decide on the effectiveness of the operation by only looking at the effectiveness of decision making, juridical procedure, military and political action? What about the role of ideology?

In conclusion, many students will wish to use this meticulously detailed and very careful study of the expulsion process as a reference work in their studies. It is a pity, therefore, that the general index is mainly an overview of chapters and paragraph titles, not a full index of places and persons. But that does not mean that his work will not be an important study to be consulted by all those who wish to study the expulsion process.

GERARD WIEGERS