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Yang Yang

Laboratory Tests of Theories of Strategic Interaction

This thesis presents a series of studies to test theories of strategic interaction in distinct environments. The topics of these studies include human social preferences (on how much people care about others' welfare), people's response to the information on others' preferences and histories in a social dilemma, and peoples' competing behavior in contests. A common theme of all these studies presented in this thesis is the adoption of laboratory experiments in testing theories.

Yang Yang received her double bachelor's degrees in mathematics and economics at Peking University, and a master's degree in financial management at Chinese Academy of Sciences. After she completed her mphil study in behavioral and experimental economics at Tinbergen Institute, she continued to carry out her doctoral research in the same field at University of Amsterdam. In September 2014, she joined Lingnan College at Sun Yat-sen University as an assistant professor.

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Yang Yang



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Theories of Strategic Interaction**

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Laboratory Tests of Theories of Strategic Interaction

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Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde

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Guangzhou, China

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