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Abstract
This paper aims to offer a framework for States in general and armed forces in particular for generating effects in or through the information environment by answering the question: “How to generate effects in or through the information environment and therefore, how to manoeuvre in this information environment?” This environment is part of the larger operational environment and consists of three dimensions: the cognitive, virtual and physical. These dimensions in turn host certain layers and these hold targetable entities. States can create effects in this environment by wielding the instruments at their disposal (diplomacy, informational, military and economic) for various purposes (anticipation, prevention, deterrence, protection, intervention, stabilization and normalization). In order to be able to do so, States must organise and equip themselves for manoeuvring in the information environment. To show that indeed States can use this environment, this paper highlights some cases where an actor uses the information environment to great effect, being: the U.S. Election Information Campaign (2016) and the BlackEnergy operation (2015) in Ukraine. These cases are indicative of the potential of manoeuvring in the information environment by States and their armed forces.

Keywords
Cyber Operations, Cyberspace, Cyber Warfare, Information Operations, Information Warfare, Psychological Operations, Non-Kinetic Effects, National Interests, Strategic Interests

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9.1 Introduction

Early 2016, the US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter affirmed that he had given US’ Cyber Command “its first wartime assignment” in the war with ISIS. Likewise, the UK’s Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon MP confirmed that his country’s offensive cyber capabilities are being deployed in this campaign against ISIS. These statements combined with NATO’s pronouncement to recognise cyberspace as a domain of operations, have spearheaded the use of cyber operations during conflict. It is evident that the information environment, including cyberspace, is increasingly being used to project power, in war and peacetime. Current cyber capabilities, however, almost exclusively focus on the logic (software) and infrastructure (network) to be exploited for military purposes. For a brief period (2000s to early 2010s), these ‘hard’ cyberspace logic-focused operations have overshadowed the use of cyberspace for primarily influencing human cognition. Tantamount to this is that various cyberspace doctrines only briefly mention the use of cyber operations to affect the humans. With the rise of so-called ‘fake’ news, election hacks, the hybrid warfare hype and regained attention for ‘maskirovka’, ‘soft’ influence activities are once more in the limelight.

Whether for strategic ends as part of a so-called ‘hybrid threat’ posed by States or terrorist campaigns, or serving operational goals in a so-called comprehensive approach in recent counterinsurgency or stabilization operations, it seems fair to conclude that information as a source of power, after its successes in the east, enjoys a reappraisal in the Western Hemisphere after 2000. Increasingly, States anticipate, or at least research the use of other than kinetic means, ways and strategies to solve its conflicts. This development is not limited to the cleverly timed release of content in

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1 Military.com 2016.
2 Fallon 2016.
4 See for instance: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013.
5 Russian military deception, sometimes known as Maskirovka, is a military doctrine developed from the start of the twentieth century. The doctrine covers a broad range of measures for military deception, ranging from camouflage to denial and deception. See the Paper by Han Bouwmeester in: Ducheine P & Osinga F (2017 forthcoming) Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017 - Winning Without Killing: The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises. Berlin/The Hague, Springer TMC Asser.
times war, but also involves the public acknowledgement of the potential of cyber capabilities to be used in (future) wars as well as to affect other states in times of peace. The use of capabilities in the information environment blurs the dichotomy of peace and war to the point of the distinction becoming obsolete.

This paper therefore aims to offer a framework for States in general and armed forces in particular for generating effects in or through the information environment by answering the question: “How to generate effects in or through the information environment and therefore, how to manoeuvre in this information environment?” It thereby contributes to this publication’s overarching purpose to address the strategic and operational issues related to the various uses of non-kinetic capabilities by armed forces in pursuance of a State’s goals, or in popular speech: to fight without killing.

To this end, first, the information environment itself will be analysed. Next, the purpose (the end) of manoeuvring in the Information Environment will be discussed, and, closely connected to the why of manoeuvring in the Information Environment, when this is envisioned. Thirdly, the means to do so will be addressed by subsequently analysing the physical, conceptual and moral component of fighting power required. Additionally, the ways to manoeuvre will then be discussed by providing a generic model, as well as by reviewing recent examples of manoeuvres in the Information Environment.

Before starting, three points of reference should be clarified. First, although initially departing from a military point of view, this paper will not restrict itself in this way. Therefore, the analysis presented will use the State as its point of departure, and will include civilian as well as military capabilities alike. Thus, apart from the fact that information as a part of instruments of power will be addressed, “information related capabilities”, whether military or civilian, will be taken into consideration as well. Secondly, this paper aims to contribute to strategic as well as military operational notions of the subject of manoeuvring in the Information Environment. In doing so, references to state practice, inter alia that of the Netherlands armed forces, will be used. This practice, will serve as an example only, as the aim is to cover the themes in a generic international manner. Thirdly, although the requirement of the availability of intelligence is evident, this prerequisite will not be addressed in this paper.

9.2 Where? Manoeuvring in the Information Environment

An important aspect contributing to this paper’s aim – to discern the opportunities of manoeuvring in the Information Environment – is delineating the Information Environment. Therefore, this section will first briefly outline the background of the Information Environment. Next, the dimensions and contents of the Information Environment will be derived from technological and military doctrinal analysis. Lastly, a conceptual model of the Information Environment involving the different dimensions (or layers), entities (or components) and (target) actors will be presented. This model will subsequently be used in this paper’s analysis.

9.2.1 Doctrinal History of the information environment
The information environment is a construct often employed in publications regarding information operations. The capacities nowadays included under the ambit of information operations are long established in warfare. However, the integral coordination and application of these capacities is relatively new, that is, the early-90s. Early doctrine described information operations as a new concept with “five core capabilities”, being Electronic Warfare, Psychological Operations, Operational Security, military deception and Computer Network Operations. The concept followed after the Second Gulf War (Desert Storm, 1991) was dubbed information war, later information warfare and finally replaced with the construct information operations. These operations are conducted in the information environment, which is described as “the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.”

Terminological issues regarding the concepts of scope and content of information operations, information activities, information domain and the information environment have plagued many discussions in this matter. These are not ‘right or wrong’ discussions, they revolve around being correct or doctrinally correct. Hence, these concepts are easily reconciled. The information domain, as often used in discussions, is referred to in doctrines as the information environment. Although used interchangeably, from a doctrinal perspective they have different implications. An environment is a larger/higher concept than a domain, the US doctrine uses two environments: the traditional and the informational. Adjoined these two make up the operational environment. In military doctrine, a domain is ‘reserved’ for acknowledged domains such as air, land, sea, space and cyberspace (see Figure 9.1). In other words, the term information environment as will be used here, is doctrinally more precise; noting however, that amongst the military, the terms domain and environment are often used as synonyms.

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16 The Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014. p. x.
17 An exception to this line of reasoning is the new doctrine for information operations that has replaced dimensions with domains, see: An exception to this line of reasoning is the new doctrine for information operations that has replaced dimensions with domains. See: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2015. p. 1-2.
9.2.2 A Model of the Informational Environment

Despite terminological differences, contemporary military doctrine agrees upon the dimensions of the information environment (see Figure 9.1), namely: physical, cognitive (psychological) and informational (virtual). These “three interrelated dimensions […] continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and systems”. The physical dimension is “composed of command and control (C2) systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects”. The cognitive (US and UK) or psychological (NATO) dimension “encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information”. Lastly the virtual (UK and NATO) or informational (US) dimension “encompasses where and how information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected”.

The three dimensions making up the operational environment comprise seven layers (see Figure 9.2) that in turn comprise certain entities (see Figure 9.3).

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19 The Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, p. I-1.
21 The Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, p. I-3.
22 The Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, p. I-3.
The physical dimension includes the geographical, physical network and physical layer; the virtual dimension envelops the logical and virtual persona layer and the cognitive dimension encompasses the cognitive and social layer. The layers subsequently hold various entities that are needed to operationalize the layer concept (see Figure 9.3); these entities can be affected via activities and/or operations.

The geographical layer includes geographical locations, the physical layer physical objects and persons, the physical network layer physical network infrastructure (i.e. routers, cables, computers), the logical virtual objects (e.g. software), the virtual persona layer virtual personas (e.g. social media profiles and mail accounts), the cognitive layer encompasses human psyche (e.g. will, perception and behaviour) and the social layer networked/interacting groups or audiences. These entities are interconnected and interrelated; affecting one will affect others too.

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23 Based on: UK Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre 2010, p. 2-9; The Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013, p. I-3; Ducheine and Van Haaster 2014; Dekkers, Benten and Dijkstra 2016.

A current surge towards human-machine interfaces has further blurred the distinct differences between virtual and cognitive/physical aspects of humans. Similarly, the rise of artificial intelligence (AI), although still nascent, is starting to blur the difference between physical or virtual objects and a virtual ‘AI’ persona. In the present authors’ opinion, society will increasingly be confronted with hybrid entities, humans linked with hardware and software, virtual objects with an individual virtual persona.

9.3 Why? Pursuing, Promoting and Securing National Interests

The purpose, the ‘why’ of manoeuvring, is to pursue, promote, secure or defend national interest in times of peace and in war. For the military, this may too easily sound as “winning wars” or to “accomplish missions”, the real strategic goal is a higher one. This actual purpose may be stated explicitly in a Grand Strategy, in so-called White Papers, or in policy documents issued by various functional departments. Sometimes, purpose is implied in or can be deduced from ad hoc documents or statements. In the Dutch situation, two complementary policy documents define the Netherlands’ national security ambition, encompassing five vital and three strategic interests. Jointly, they cover territorial integrity, physical security, economic security, ecological security, social and political stability and the international legal order.

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27 Inter alia The White House 2015.
Whether to promote or advocate national vital and strategic interests in peacetime, or to secure or defend them in times of war or conflict, all available instruments of power provide the means enabling States in doing so. These instruments of power are quite often referred to by the acronym DIME: diplomacy, information, military and economy.\textsuperscript{31} The synchronized and harmonised application of these instruments of power is caught in terminology such as the ‘whole of government’ or ‘comprehensive approach’.\textsuperscript{32} Ideally, a proper and well-coordinated use of DIME offers synergic advantages compared to the stand-alone or side-by-side employment of separate instruments. Jointly (or separately), the DIME-instruments contribute to strategic functions in international relations.\textsuperscript{33} In the Dutch situation these strategic functions encompass anticipation, prevention, deterrence, protection, intervention, stabilization and normalization.\textsuperscript{34}

Though much is expected from cyber capabilities and manoeuvring in the IE, given the scarce number of publicly known demonstrations available for research, the contribution, if any, to these strategic functions is subject of much speculation, and - luckily also - research.\textsuperscript{35} In the meantime, the effectiveness of military cyber capabilities and manoeuvres in the Information Environment may be derived by learning from experiences and lessons drawn in other fields where these capabilities are more widely used. This might prove problematic as this involves quite different paradigms,\textsuperscript{36} however, extracting (or copying) means, methods, modus operandi and concepts from other fields of application may end up illustrative.\textsuperscript{37}

The general idea is that manoeuvring in the information environment will offer advantages and reveal capabilities for States to be used alongside or in combination with other instruments, thus supplementing kinetic military capabilities.

### 9.4 Doing What in the Information Environment

This notion is reflected in Figure 9.4, where physical as well as non-physical activities and operations (Figure 9.4: white arrows) are aimed at objects, persons, network infrastructure, virtual objects, virtual personas, psyche and audiences in order to influence via the cognitive dimension to create an effect in a target actor (Figure 9.4: actor B). These activities or operations are directed vis-à-vis or

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\textsuperscript{31} US Joint Forces Staff College / National Defense University.

\textsuperscript{32} UK Ministry of Defence, 2014 p. 4-1.


\textsuperscript{36} Ducheine 2015a, pp. 211-232.

\textsuperscript{37} See for instance: Ducheine and Van Haaste, 2014, pp. 303-327; Learning from intelligence services, law enforcement agencies, criminal organisations, marketing, psychology and social behaviour studies, and of course from international relations and strategic studies, offers a temporary indication of the utility of operations and activities in the information environment.
via these intermediate entities seeking premeditated and designated effects (Figure 9.4: red arrow), which may influence other actors or interests - in turn other actors may respond. Despite western military culture and its prevalence to physical action, NATO’s information operations doctrine acknowledges that “the cognitive/psychological domain is the most important as it consists of cognition and emotions, which affect an individual’s decision-making”.

Figure 9.4 Creating effects

The activities specifically tailored to affecting the cognitive dimension are known as “information operations” and/or “information activities”. From a NATO perspective information operations (InfoOps or IO) are “a staff function to analyse, plan, assess and integrate information activities”; information activities being “actions designed to affect information or information systems”. The US perspective to information operations is that they entail the “integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation”. The UK has a similar terminological approach to information operations, namely as a “coordinated military activity undertaken to affect decision-makers”. As NATO’s information activities are labelled information operations in UK and US doctrine, it depends per State what the scope of activities specifically tailored to affecting the cognitive dimension are known as “information operations” and/or “information activities”. From a NATO perspective information operations (InfoOps or IO) are “a staff function to analyse, plan, assess and integrate information activities”; information activities being “actions designed to affect information or information systems”. The US perspective to information operations is that they entail the “integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation”. The UK has a similar terminological approach to information operations, namely as a “coordinated military activity undertaken to affect decision-makers”. As NATO’s information activities are labelled information operations in UK and US doctrine, it depends per State what the scope of  

38 See Ducheine 2015b, pp. 201-220.  
39 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2015, p. 1-2; See also Manoeuver warfare doctrine and the Air/Land battle concept.  
40 See for a more detailed description of these entities: See for a more detailed description of these entities: Ducheine and Van Haaster 2014, pp. 303-327; UK Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre 2010, p. 2-9; U.S. Army 2010, pp. 8-9.  
42 The Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, p. GL-3.  
information operations and/or activities is. The following section will discuss the requirements needed to actually do so, for manoeuvring in the information environment.

9.5 Requirements for Manoeuvring in the Information Environment

Before being able to manoeuvre in the information environment, States as well as forces require the capability to project military power into this environment. One of the ways of thinking about capability is through the concept of power as it is used in military doctrine, namely: fighting power. Fighting power consists of three components, the conceptual, physical and moral.44

![Figure 9.5 (Fighting) power components](image)

Although a Western view of fighting power, it also reflects how other, non-Western, actors reflect on military capabilities.46 The conceptual component encompasses “the ideas behind how to operate and fight”. The moral component comprises “people’s will and ability to get people to operate and fight”. And the physical component entails the “means to operate and fight”.47 The aspects of these components required for projecting fighting power are depicted in Figure 9.5. In the present authors’ opinion, these three components apply to other instruments of power as well. Power of whatever kind requires means, a proper concept as well as the will and dedication to use those means accordingly. The next subsections will discuss the ramifications on the components of fighting power when organising for manoeuvring in the information environment.

9.5.1 Conceptual component

Apart from the proper mind-set as an essential part of the moral component and the capacities as part of the ‘physical’ component just described, capacities wilfully employed also require ideas, concepts, to generate credible capabilities. The conceptual component comprises, amongst other,

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44 British Army 2010, p. 2-2; Netherlands Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 66.
45 Based on figure 2.1 in British Army 2010, p. 2-2; Netherlands Ministry of Defence 2013, p. 66.
47 British Army 2010, p. 2-2.
higher- and lower-level doctrine; education, innovation and lessons; and understanding of conflict and combat. It also encompasses strategies on the use of power and the pursuance of national interest.

States and non-state actors have promulgated grand strategies or issued ad hoc strategic guidance, expressing strategic or operational concepts of thinking regarding the use of instruments of power. These ideas often apply to regular geopolitical settings to the use of power, whether in or outside crises and war. Concepts can be found on the political-strategic, military-strategic, or on the operational and tactical military level of deployments. The idea is that the purpose of the use of instruments of power, including the military, will be guided, explicitly or implied, by a stated or deducted concept on the use of power.

It is evident that the synchronised and harmonised wielding of the instruments of power to create synergy is more complicated than using them separately. Despite criticism related to the effectiveness this comprehensive approach, States already employ instruments in this manner; or, when confronted with a comprehensive (and or hybrid) application of adversaries’ power, are forced to or starting to adhere a similar approach. This goes for the constituent elements of the military as well. Full spectrum and joint operations, using all dimensions of the Operational Environment are once more becoming more accepted and used. Increasingly, military targeting procedures developed for classical physical engagement, are being used for operations in the information environment.

Despite this progress, doctrine regarding the Information Environment is sometimes immature or even non-existent. It is telling that NATO is trying to close the conceptual gap in this respect by pushing hard for its first allied joint publication on cyber operations. The Tallinn Manual on the international law of cyber warfare, supported by NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), was the first to shed light on the legal ramifications of the deployment of cyber capabilities in war. The follow-up process generated a second manual applicable to cyber operations in peacetime too. In addition, numerous reports on strategic communication, information operations and hybrid threats have been published by others. The challenge will be to orchestrate and deconflict the overlaps in doctrine and concepts.

Yet, despite familiarities and old wine in new bottles, those planning and executing operations, military or otherwise, will be faced with biases and preferences. These can partly be addressed in the conceptual component, for instance through training and education. However, organisational cul-

48 British Army 2010, pp. 2-3 to 2-10.
49 See for instance: Clingendael Conflict Research Unit 2012, pp. 2-3.
50 For a Dutch example of this process: National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2016.
51 Ducheine and Van Haaster 2014, pp. 303-328; Ducheine 2015b, pp. 201-220; Pratzner 2015, pp. 78-95.
52 See for example: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2015; The Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014.
53 Schmitt 2013; Also: Ducheine 2015c, pp. 456-475.
55 See for instance: Echevarria II 2016.
ture will have a say too, as will rivals or even opponents that are the subject (targets) of operations, of the use of power. In addition, organisations and people have their conceptual comfort zones. Of course this applies to both sides of the model just presented (Figure 9.4: Actor A and B).

Preferences, when properly exploited, may turn into weaknesses. This applies to issues of overlapping competences, seems, or lacunas too. Seems and overlapping competences will cause friction, therefore coordination is required. In addition to these doctrinal and organisational issues, legal competences, including its seems, overlaps and voids, may also offer opportunities to be exploited. In this respect, one of the characteristics of a holistic approach is demonstrated by the Russian Federation. Whilst manoeuvring below the threshold of armed conflict as stated in the UN Charter, Russia embraces ‘bespredel’ (denial), ‘maskirova’, or proxies and non-military instruments, exploiting these seems, overlaps and gaps, to avoid responses from actors targeted and affected.

9.5.2 Physical component

The physical component comprises manpower, equipment, training, sustainability and capability development. Although the concept of fighting power is sufficiently general to be equally applicable to all operations, both traditional and information, the scope of these elements will change.

Manpower comprises the people engaged in information operations. As with most operations, various roles or tasks exist, depending on the purpose of operations. Given the numerous types of information operations,\(^{56}\) the manpower required is increasingly diverse. Depending on the goal of an information operation, manpower could include regular soldiers (e.g. for physical destruction or deception), cyber operators (e.g. developers, hackers, forensics), press affairs officers, legal advisors, linguists, cultural advisors, financial advisors, political advisors, psychologists, analysts, etcetera. In addition, many other specialties such social-media experts, web designers, content developers, webcare, marketers will be needed to manoeuvre in the information environment.

This non-kinetic expertise could be present in peacetime military organisations, although it will take some effort to orchestrate and reinforce the specialities before being able to create effects in the information environment. For instance, the social media experts, content developers, public affairs officers, psychologists and marketers reside in the non-operational, often civilian, parts of the defence organisation, whilst the psychological operations teams and cyber operators are located in the operational, military parts of the military. Currently, in the Dutch context, a single authority that can wield these capacities although being envisioned, is still lacking. Thus, the issue is less about the manpower; instead, it is about organising the manpower into an organisation that can be orchestrated.

\(^{56}\) NATO and US doctrine earmark the following operations to be capabilities to be employed under the ambit of information operations: Psychological operations; presence, posture and profile; operations security; information security/information assurance; deception; electronic warfare/joint electromagnetic spectrum operations; physical destruction; key-leader engagement; computer network operations/ cyberspace operations; civil-military cooperation/civil-military operations; strategic communication; joint interagency coordination; public affair; space operations; military information support operations and intelligence
On the equipment part, all essential parts can be found in the physical network layer of the information environment, ICT-infrastructure and hardware, as well as in the virtual layer. The latter comprising virtual persona (digital accounts), ICT-software (operating systems, firmware, applications), protocol and scripts, as well as content (information and data). Information and data may be available in the physical dimension or in the cognitive and informational/virtual dimension. Hence, the classical physical component comprises truly physical as well as virtual elements such as software, data, virtual identities. Seemingly hard to reconcile, this concept is demonstrated by the value of datasets and information, often coined the ‘new gold’ in modern information societies.\textsuperscript{57}

9.5.3 Moral component

The moral component, which epitomises the moral qualities needed to conduct (military) operations, comprises three important elements: “ethical foundations, moral cohesion and motivation”.\textsuperscript{58} The elements are equally, if not more important when manoeuvring in the information environment important. The pinnacle, however, is adopting the mind-set and willingness of targeting, that is affecting actors in situations of war and peace. This is even more important as soon as it becomes evident that States are being targeted or affected by all instruments of power by other actors and States 24/7, not only during conflict and rivalry, but in this respect predominantly in peacetime as well.

Manoeuvring in the information environment blurs the lines between armed conflict and peace in a geographical and temporal sense. As states and non-state actors can, enabled by information technologies, increasingly and more easily affect others from within their borders, the geographical delimitation of in and outside theatre will vanish, however, from a mind-set perspective only, not from the legal perspective. Also militaries often still talk of and use ‘lines of departures’, marking the temporal division between pre-operation and the start of an operation (on ‘D-day’ at ‘H-hour’).\textsuperscript{59} Manoeuvring in the information environment requires a different attitude, which may involve “stop [thinking] in terms of D-days and lines of departure at all”.\textsuperscript{60} Operations aimed at shaping the environment should not be preserved for the small timespan before an operation; instead it should be done continuously, taking into account all instruments of power in a synchronised and harmonised manner: before, during and after conflict.\textsuperscript{61} These activities should involve aspects such as “developing situational understanding; developing options to influence audiences; persuading and empowering other actors to make choices that are advantageous; and conducting limited offensive actions in order to keep adversaries off-balance.”\textsuperscript{62} Governments wishing to employ their military instrument of power in the information environment should prepare itself and its

\textsuperscript{57} Smit-Kroes 2011; Singh 2013.
\textsuperscript{58} British Army 2010, p. 2-11.
\textsuperscript{59} North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2014, p. 2-D-5.
\textsuperscript{60} Van Haaster and Roorda 2016, p. 185.
\textsuperscript{62} British Army 2010, p. 5-21.
military for doing so. In addition, on the strategic level, society and government should be prepared
to actively promote their strategic and vital interests comprehensively throughout the whole spec-
trum of peace and war.

At the same time, Governments, society and militaries should be resilient and beware for being
targeted 24/7.\textsuperscript{63} Traditionally military resilience is established with security training aimed at creating
understanding and awareness.\textsuperscript{64} These measures are, however, primarily focused on military per-
sonnel and facilities and less on their surroundings (family, friends and other connections). As
social-media permeates every aspect of real and virtual life and society, adversaries can easily uncov-
er the network surrounding individual soldiers and hurt them where they can be hurt most.\textsuperscript{65} The
so-called ‘attack surface’ of soldiers extends as they can be influenced more easily on different
fronts and dimensions: physically, cognitively and virtually. Traditionally, military personnel primari-
ly faced physical peril on a battlefield, whilst within the paradigm of information manoeuvre the will
face many Dantean risks on moral, conceptual and physical levels, not only personally, but in their
social environments such as their family as well.\textsuperscript{66} Although this already happened on a small scale
in modern warfare,\textsuperscript{67} recent developments suggest an increase in these types of activities.

9.6 Examples

This section will discuss two recent examples of manoeuvres in the information environment, in
doing so this section will reflect on the model forwarded in Figure 9.2. It will discuss the context of
the case, the purpose and ways of trying to achieve an effect and whether or not it was successful in
doing so. The first example, the U.S. election information campaign of 2016, was selected for its
distinct strategic purpose and envelops not only cyber means and methods but also other infor-
mation activities. The second is an operation with a disruptive physical effect induced by social
engineering and cyber activities, namely the Black Energy case.

9.6.1 Information campaign ‘U.S. election hacks’ (2016)

Before, during and in the wake of the 2016 U.S. elections there were many allegations regarding
Russian interference in the democratic process, amongst others from the U.S. Intelligence Commu-
nity (IC). Following his election, the president-elect’s sceptical approach as to the IC’s allegations
resulted in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releasing a declassified
report on Russian activities during the elections, which offers a glance into the allegedly Russian
activities during the election.\textsuperscript{68} Using open-source information, other sources arrived at the same
conclusion: It is very likely that Russian agencies have interfered in the U.S. elections.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{63} See for example National Cyber Security Centre 2016.
\textsuperscript{64} Often referred to as operations (OPSEC), personal (PERSEC), communications (COMSEC) and
information security (INFOSEC).
\textsuperscript{65} Van Haaster and Roorda 2016. p. 183.
\textsuperscript{66} Alighieri 1982.
\textsuperscript{67} Hughes 2015; Herridge 2014.
\textsuperscript{68} U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2017.
\textsuperscript{69} See for instance: Rid 2016; Gilsinan and Calamur 2017; Taub 2017.
The “influence campaign” encompassed the following goals: “[…] to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency.”

The campaign was carefully staged; starting with cyber operations aimed at collecting intelligence in March 2016, directed at, amongst other, “both major US political parties.” Having obtained the requisite intelligence, selected content was publically disclosed in data dumps and “exclusives to media outlets” via the Romanian hacker ‘Guccifer 2.0’, DCLeaks.com and WikiLeaks. The compromising material, also known as “Kompromat”, was used to target various individuals involved in the election, for example the Democratic National Committee’s (DNC) chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz, the chairman of the 2016 Hillary Clinton presidential campaign John Podesta, and most prominently Hilary Clinton. Although the definitive answer as to the impact of the campaign on the result remains to be seen, some have called this campaign – somewhat alarmist – the “political equivalent of 9/11”.

The information campaign aimed at the 2016 U.S. election is an example of how states can contribute to the strategic function ‘prevention’ (see 9.3), which encompasses “active steps intended to prevent a threat occurring to [State] interests.” It shows how States can manoeuvre in the information environment to achieve a strategic goal, namely: a preferential outcome at the political-strategic level. The means to influence the target audience, that is, the U.S. electorate, are diverse. As with all activities, the prime target is to influence psyche, in this case the perception as to which candidate is qualified for presidential office. Influencing psyche in this case involved using and exploiting virtual personas (e.g. using Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, and trolls whilst exploiting the Clinton, Podesta and Wasserman Schultz mail accounts) and virtual objects (e.g. exploiting databases and mail servers whilst using websites and blogs to disclose the finds). As to the effectiveness of the campaign there is much yet unresolved, apart from a general state of confusion as to what has actually occurred before, during and after the elections. Considering that the ODNI has deemed undermining public faith in the US democratic process and denigrating Secretary Clinton to be the goals of the campaign, for now it seems that the influence campaign was successful. As such, it is a well-documented example of manoeuvring in the information environment to achieve strategic ends.


Whereas the U.S. elections case was primarily aimed at discrediting persons via virtual personas and in the preparatory stages included ‘hard’ cyber operations, the Black Energy example could be characterised as a ‘hard’ cyber operation aimed at affecting software and hardware. This sub-section will briefly discuss the context of the case, the purpose, the means involved and the effectiveness.

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73 Rid, 2016.
74 Martin and Rappeport 2016; Shear and Rosenborg 2016.
75 WikiLeaks 2016a.
76 WikiLeaks 2016b.
77 Morell and Kelly 2016.
78 Netherlands Ministry of Defence 2010, p. 15.
BlackEnergy is the name of malware previously used by criminals (from 2007 on) and later by advanced persistent threat (APT) groups (2014).⁷⁹ Currently BlackEnergy has become synonymous with the power outage in Ukraine December 23, 2015. Some use BlackEnergy to refer to the APT group using BlackEnergy whilst generally it is used to refer to the specific strand of malware and/or the Ukraine outage.⁸⁰ The BlackEnergy operation of 2015 was significant as it heralded “ICS [industrial control system] attacks going mainstream”.⁸¹

The operation was conducted amidst of geo-political tensions between Russia and Ukraine regarding the Crimean annexation (2014). Within that geopolitical context there are series of events that could be considered relevant for this operation,⁸² however, there is one event that can be considered a catalyst for conducting this operation: the Crimean blackout November 21 (2015). The Crimean blackout was caused by the destruction/sabotage of “four electricity transmission towers” on Ukrainian territory resulting in a blackout in Crimea.⁸³ There is speculation “that the subsequent blackouts [by the BlackEnergy operations] in Ukraine were retaliation for the attack on the [towers]” – albeit not the original motivation as the operation started six months before the Crimean blackout.⁸⁴

The operation consisted of a preparation stage of obtaining access to networks via spear-phishing from 2014 to mid-2015; the mails contained malicious Office files (first Excel, later Power Point and Word).⁸⁵ Using macros in Office, an “old-school method from the 90’s”,⁸⁶ the 2015 BlackEnergy operation targeted railway, mining, media and power sectors in Ukraine⁸⁷ and ICS/SCADA and energy companies worldwide.⁸⁸ After rising tensions in the region, from mid-2015 the operation has geared towards obtaining control over the regional Prykarpatty Oblenergo and Kyivoblenergo energy providers in Ukraine.⁸⁹

After gaining access to the corporate networks, the attackers “conducted extensive reconnaissance, exploring and mapping the networks” and, as a textbook example, targeted the Windows Domain Controllers.⁹⁰ By doing so the attackers “acquired legitimate credentials” that facilitated remote access via a virtual private network (VPN) to industrial control systems – including, amongst other, the electrical breakers.⁹¹ After laying the groundwork, the attackers took additional steps in order to extend the blackout period for maximum effect. In order to thwart the recovery operation the

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⁷⁹ F-Secure 2014; Kaspersky 2016a.
⁸⁰ Kaspersky 2016a.
⁸¹ Van Haaster, Gevers and Sprengers 2016, p. 72.
⁸² See: Zetter 2017. She lists other causes such as Ukrainian parliament considering privatisation of privately owned power companies in Ukraine of which some are owned by a powerful Russian oligarch.
⁸⁵ Cys-Centrum 2016; Kaspersky 2016b.
⁸⁸ Kaspersky 2016b.
attackers had overwritten firmware on “serial-to-Ethernet converters” – the link between logical (SCADA) and physical control systems – in order to “prevent [company] operators from sending remote commands to re-close breakers once a blackout occurred.”\(^\text{92}\) Besides that, they “reconfigured the uninterruptible power supply [UPS]” for the companies control centres, resulting in the company operators manning the control centre would also lack power in the event of an outage.\(^\text{93}\)

At around 15:30 on December 23 the attackers “launched a telephone denial-of-service attack [from Moscow] against customer call centres to prevent customers from calling in to report the outage”, “entered the SCADA networks through the hijacked VPNs and sent commands to disable the UPS [and] began to open breakers”.\(^\text{94}\) After completion the attackers used KillDisk, “a disk wiping malware”,\(^\text{95}\) to erase files and corrupt the master boot record, “rendering systems inoperable” and deleting tracks.\(^\text{96}\) The attack resulted in a population of “around 1.4 million […] left without electricity for a few hours”.\(^\text{97}\)

The BlackEnergy operation of 2015 could be seen as an example of how States can manoeuvre in the information environment. Assuming Russia’s involvement, focussing on the virtual dimension, the author-State could have sought a strategic goal, namely: retaliate against a target-State in order to dissuade it from future activities harming the interests of the author-State. This is an example of the strategic function ‘intervention’ as the author-State aims to “enforce a change in the behaviour of one or more parties that threaten the interests of the [State]”.\(^\text{98}\) In this case, although speculative, Russia responding in kind to Ukraine for allowing the sabotage of Crimea’s power supplies. By exploiting virtual personas (mail accounts targeted in the spear-phishing campaign) the attackers gained access to the network and were able to escalate access to the domain controller, control systems and SCADA systems (virtual objects) and gain control over physical network infrastructure (serial-to-Ethernet converters) and ‘regular’ physical energy infrastructure (objects). By doing so the author-State creates a blackout, aimed to send the message: “you think you can take away the power [in Crimea]? Well I can take away the power from you.”\(^\text{99}\)

13.7 Conclusion

This paper has sought to answer the question: “How to generate effects in or through the information environment and therefore, how to manoeuvre in this information environment?” First this paper has discussed the information environment construct. This environment, a part of the larger operational environment consist of three dimensions, the cognitive, virtual and physical. These dimensions in turn host certain layers and these hold targetable entities. Departing from that conceptual model of the information environment, this paper has turned to how to manoeuvre in that environment. First the ‘why’ was discussed, considering the potential there are many incentives for a State to use this environment. A State can create effects in the information environment by wield-
ing the instruments at its disposal (diplomacy, informational, military and economic) for various purposes, for instance strategic functions (anticipation, prevention, deterrence, protection, intervention, stabilization and normalization). In order to be able to do so, it must organise and equip itself for manoeuvring in the information environment, this paper has used the components of fighting power in order to highlight critical elements required for creating effects. Lastly, this paper has highlighted the U.S. Election Information Campaign (2016) and the BlackEnergy operation (2015) as examples of manoeuvring in the information environment in order to achieve strategic goals. These cases demonstrate that the use of and manoeuvring in the information environment might indeed contribute to achieving effects and strategic goals.

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