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The organic system functions as an environment for consciousness; the system of consciousness functions as an environment for communications; social systems function as an environment for an organic/psychic system; other psychic systems (alter) function as an environment for ego. Conscious operations and communicative operations share a same characteristic: they are “event-like operations.” Since Luhmann’s writings are often considered as heavy abstractions, it could be useful here to quote his down-to-earth description of these event-like meaning-constituting operations:

“A sentence is a sentence. It is spoken when it is spoken and does not endure after the fact, nor was it there before the fact. A thought or a perception when I see something has actuality in this very moment, but it no longer has it afterwards and nor did it have it earlier.” (Luhmann 2013a: 77).

Thanks to such evanescent operations, though, human beings live in a meaningfully constituted world.

Are we really witnessing here a clash between two theories? Maybe it could be better described as a clash between our present understandings about these theories. We are not to look for analogies here, but rather to use the concept as a point of departure and observe whether it really works in the domains of consciousness and communication. According to the transcription of a lecture course taught by Luhmann in 1991, he declared in his discussion of the autopoiesis of living systems as proposed by Maturana: “In principle, I do not see a decisive difference between his theory and mine” (Luhmann 2013a: 77). So there is plenty of room for us to talk and to work together.

Can Inter-human Communications be Modeled as “Autopoietic”?  
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The dynamics of expectations in inter-human communications can be modelled as “autopoiesis.” Consciousness and communications couple not only structurally (Maturana), but also penetrate each other reflexively (Luhmann). Reflexivity opens and enriches the model of autopoiesis for further exploration.

Unlike exchanges of molecules in the biological autopoiesis of life, the communication of expectations in social systems cannot be observed directly, but can only be inferred (Luhmann 1995b: 164). Accordingly, autopoiesis in these social dynamics can be explored as a hypothesis. From this perspective, Niklas Luhmann’s (1986) theory of social autopoiesis has the status of a proposal or perhaps a heuristics (Leydesdorff 2012). Luhmann was aware of this; he acknowledged upfront that “the following considerations assume that there are systems” (Luhmann 1995b: 12; italics added). During the 1990s, however, Luhmann became increasingly fascinated with George Spencer Brown’s (1969) Laws of Form, and wished to develop a general theory of observation.

This emphasis on observations – instead of expectations – makes Luhmann’s theory vulnerable to Jürgen Habermas’s (1987: 385) argument that his sociology “replaces metaphysical background convictions with metaphorical ones.” Can one raise the same objection against Hugo Urrestarazu’s paper? In this commentary, I argue that Urrestarazu’s perspective on Luhmann’s theory of social autopoiesis ($§107 ff.$) has remained meta-biological because Urrestarazu foregrounds the agency of observers who are engaged in observable “language” instead of focusing on the use of language to improve interhuman communications about expectations.

Expectations are part of a symbolic order entertained among human beings (Deacon 1997). However, a symbolic order of expectations cannot even be hypothesized within Urrestarazu’s framework because it would not be directly observable. Urrestarazu introduces “cognition” only as a further domain of individual development. His approach remains deliberately “bottom-up” ($§4$) without paying attention to the energetic principle that while the construction of a next-order system is always bottom-up, control can thereafter become increasingly top-down.

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Furthermore, the author defines “communication” (§53) as “any kind of physical activity performed by an agent that can be perceived by other agents” (italics added) and adds in a footnote that he wishes to avoid the assumption that “that agents are provided with high-level cognitive abilities and that a language is shared by communicating agents.”

« 6 » Language is thus reduced to “linguaging” as an observable production of what the author calls “collective behavioural patterns.” The author and I, for example, both produced manuscripts for this journal as behaviour, but the content of these manuscripts is back-grounded in favour of our observable behaviour (writing and reading). Perhaps one can count the words and the citations as observables; but what the words mean in different theoretical contexts is codified and not directly observable.

**Horizons of meaning in different spaces**

« 7 » “Can social systems constitute themselves as autopoietic systems in some space?” (§74) asks Urrestarazu. He notes that Luhmann considers communications as systems components and not as relations:

This reflects not just a problem of formal incompatibility, but more essentially a matter of choice of the space in which the system is being described. My choice concerns the ordinary physical space, and Luhmann’s refers to a more abstract space where, in my opinion, the notion of interaction between communications would need to be operationally defined as the relational counterpart coupling these components to one another. (§109, cf. Luhmann 1986: 174–176).

« 8 » In my opinion, Urrestarazu’s “ordinary” physical space is not a given, but one (Euclidean) construct among other possible topologies. How can a second-order space in which we provide meaning to events be operationalized? At the first-order level, agents – Luhmann would use the word “consciousnesses” – can communicatively interact. Human interactions, however, contain a “double contingency” (Parsons & Shills 1951:16; Luhmann 1990b): first, as relations in a physical space, and secondly, inter-human communications refer to horizons of meaning by being positioned.

« 9 » Not the relations among agents, but the correlations among the patterns of relations determine how the positions are (re)constructed in a vector space (Foerster 1960). For example, two competing firms can have similar positions without relating between them. Two synonyms are not often related in the same text. Positions allow reflexive systems to develop perspectives (Leydesdorff & Ahrweiler, in press).

« 10 » Urrestarazu quotes Maturana that in an autopoiesis of social systems, one would be enslaved. Although one may thus be captured within a pre-modern culture or on a monkey-rock, a window of autonomy is provided to the individual by the additional degree of freedom in the differentiation among the horizons of meaning in modern societies. One does not gain access to these new degrees of freedom by remaining with the observables before expectations are specified – as selections from a symbolic order.

« 11 » In his Cartesian Meditations, Edmund Husserl (1973) specified the second-order spaces of intersubjective intentionality as cogitatum (the uncertain subject of the communication), that is, the part of the res cogitans about which the cogitantes (the communicators) remain uncertain. Since Luhmann (1995a) added the functional differentiation among the symbolically generalized codes, the plural of horizons (cogitata) is sociologically more appropriate:

This interpenetration between communications and consciousness enables us (as a reflexive agency) to move and recombine codes of communication in a space that is no longer physical, but conceptual. Again, the “rule of law” can provide an example: one can expect this order, but not without room for interpretation and re construction. The reflection actualizes the interpenetration. The codes of communication, however, are developed in political and juridical discourses at the supra-individual level. One has access to these discourses and can translate among them at specific moments of time (Luhmann 2013b: 115).

« 12 » This autopoiesis is neither physically bounded nor operationally closed; it can only be accessed reflexively. Can thus another model of autopoiesis be specified? Would not the structural coupling between consciousness and communication that Luhmann assumes, operationally close both systems? How can this “system” be open? The reflexivity in the second contingency adds an operational coupling that can open the structural coupling between consciousness and communications. Luhmann (2002) used the word “interpenetration” for this additional coupling:

“... In the case of interpenetration, one autopoietic system can use the more complex achievements in the autopoiesis of another system as part of its own operations.” (Luhmann 1995c: 153)

« 13 » This interpenetration between communications and consciousness enables us (as a reflexive agency) to move and recombine codes of communication in a space that is no longer physical, but conceptual. Again, the “rule of law” can provide an example: one can expect this order, but not without room for interpretation and re-construction. The reflection actualizes the interpenetration. The codes of communication, however, are developed in political and juridical discourses at the supra-individual level. One has access to these discourses and can translate among them at specific moments of time (Luhmann 2013b: 115).

« 14 » Husserl (1935) argued that the European sciences had entered a crisis precisely because of the positivistic focus on observables as data (“givens” instead of constructs). In an empirical design, however, carefully constructed observations enable us to test and update expectations, and sometimes to reject a zero-hypothesis. By doing so, one is able to learn at the supra-individual level, namely, in terms of discursive knowledge. The order is thus inverted between the observables and the discursive. For example, biological systems are discursively constructed.

« 15 » For example, Urrestarazu argues in terms of the biology of cognition as a biological theory: The formalization of this theory and the proposal of a “general theory of autopoiesis” can also be used as a heuristic in order to specify how the “social autopoiesis” in the communication of meaning might differ from the autopoiesis of life.

The six criteria derived from the latter can perhaps be revised, while the social order of discursive reasoning is neither bounded nor closed. In summary, the failure to comply with the VM&U rules opens research questions about systems that can interpenetrate each other’s space reflexively.

« 16 » Such conceptual systems are internally able to de-ontologize their boundaries and existence, but instead use observations for improving the quality of
How Can a Social System Be Autopoietic?
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> Upshot • I argue that it is possible to conceptualise the social system as autopoietic if we derive the social from the most important feature of a living being on which his relationship to the environment is based – from consciousness. This approach also allows us to solve Husserl’s problem of intersubjectivity.

1 “What is a Society?” “How is social order possible?” or, as Alfred Schütt once put it, “How are people able to ‘make music together?’” (Schütz 1951) – These have been fundamental questions of social sciences since their beginning. And an enthusiastic sword fight has also been going on around the topic of the autopoiesis of social systems since the time when Humberto Maturana’s and Francisco Varela’s theory arrived before readers. These questions are important because the unit of survival of the species Homo sapiens is not an isolated individual, but a social system. Of course, this being the case, people would like to know what a social system actually is. And as social is closely related to communication, then these issues are also of great interest for communications scholars, such as myself.

2 I agree with philosopher Josef Mitterer, who, in his book Das jenseits der Philosophie [The Beyond of Philosophy], wrote that naive realism has become obsolete since the works by Paul Feiabendar, Richard Rotry and others (Mitterer 1992: 119). Therefore, in my opinion, radical constructivism has no reason to emphasise its radicalism solely; its real trump card is a “bottom-up” perspective, which allows us to explain how social interaction and society develop from the individual constructions of people. Basically, this means solving Edmund Husserl’s problem of intersubjectivity.

3 Against this background, the significance of the topic addressed by Hugo Urrestarazu becomes clearer. I am grateful to Urrestarazu for again raising the topic of autopoiesis of social systems, and also for the reference to the six rules defined by Varela, Maturana and Uribe, through the application of which the viability of our constructions of the social can be assessed.

4 In searching for answers as to whether autopoiesis can be conceived as a domain-free concept (§1), Urrestarazu is trying to find such definitions that would be applicable to all kinds of natural or artificial social systems, be they insect colonies, herds or packs of animals, predator-prey systems, human societies and organisations, inter-species cohabitation systems, networks of interacting robots, mixed man-machine systems, virtual intelligent agent systems, etc. (§52) In doing so, he is climbing to the upper rungs of the abstraction ladder, where the speaker and listener no longer have a mental image of what they are talking about. This leads the author to a dead end, because such general definitions of social systems are inevitably incomplete when applied to human social systems or to agents who are provided with high-level cognitive capabilities. Therefore, Urrestarazu unavoidably comes to the conclusion that social organisations seen as composed of physical agents interacting in physical space cannot be construed as autopoietic systems (§76, §90) and only some social systems “could possibly” be described as autopoietic wholes (§77). The latter are such systems, which can be seen as composed of “process-like” entities and where agents can participate as actors within processes.

5 It did not happen by chance that Talcott Parsons, and subsequently Niklas Luhmann, gave up the long-term tradition of philosophy and social sciences, which considered a human being as the elementary particle of the social community. For Parsons, social systems are composed of actions and the fundamental unit of action is the unit act (Parsons 1937: 43–45). Luhmann went even further than Parsons. Referring to the fact that the elements composing the system can have no duration, he radically temporalised the concept of element (Luhmann 1999b: 11) and regarded subsequent temporal elements, operations, as the elementary, undecomposable unit of systems (ibid: 49). Based on these considerations, Luhmann saw not only living, but also psychic and social systems as autopoietic. According to Luhmann, by means of reproduction, these systems recursively create their own elements and with them, itself as a whole. One cannot just assume that consciousness systems and social systems are “living” systems, but these systems presuppose at least the existence of life.

6 It should be recalled that soon after the theory of Maturana and Varela arrived before readers, attempts began to apply it in many areas: philosophy, neuropsychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy and, of course, in the social sciences (for an overview see, e.g., Mingers 1994). These attempts failed because the authors tried to transfer the concept of autopoiesis, which describes certain critical characteristics of living systems, directly to the social field. With his definitions, Urrestarazu returns to the pre-Luhmannian time and reaches the same result reached by numerous authors before Luhmann. Here, we can conclude that the future success of the theory of autopoietic social systems depends not on a return to the times before Luhmann but on being able to move beyond Luhmann.

7 The general starting point for solving the problem of intersubjectivity is...