International human rights law and the law of armed conflict in the context of counterinsurgency: With a particular focus on targeting and operational detention

Pouw, E.H.

Citation for published version (APA):

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
Conclusions Part C.2.

To recall, the research question to be answered in this part is:

in light of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine, how do the relevant normative frameworks of IHRL and LOAC governing operational detention interrelate and what does this tell us about the permissible scope of conduct in operational practice?

1. Interplay

As the above analysis has demonstrated, the interplay of IHRL and LOAC in issues of operational detention is clear to some degree, yet remains ambiguous in other areas, mostly so in the context of NIAC.

It is submitted that a particular crucial factor in determining the interplay between IHRL and LOAC in each normative paradigm is the availability, density as well as the precision of rules governing criminal and security detention in IHRL and LOAC. In fact, it is precisely here that the traditional dichotomy between IAC and NIAC frustrates States in attaining clarity as to the legal obligations under international law to which they are bound. This is even more frustrating as it is precisely the most dominant type of armed conflict – NIAC – where most ambiguity is found. It determines whether only LOAC, only IHRL, or both regulate certain matters, thus triggering the question of whether such gaps need to be filled by the norm-providing regime. Also, where both regimes provide norms, it determines whether they converge or conflict with rules found in IHRL, and, if so, whether they can be harmonized. Overall, therefore, the interplay between IHRL and LOAC within the normative paradigms of criminal and security detention must take place on a case-by-case, norm-specific basis. When doing so it is possible to distinguish between, on the one hand, areas within the normative paradigms where norms of IHRL and LOAC converge or are otherwise complementary and where the interplay between norms of IHRL and LOAC is unproblematic, and on the other hand, areas where this interplay is one of potential conflict or remains unclear.

Another factor complicating a clear answer to the interplay between IHRL and LOAC is the very nature of IHRL. There is, to begin with, the issue of derogation, in the absence of which security detention would be unlawful notwithstanding the fact that, at least in the context of internment in IAC, the law of IAC expressly authorizes it. In addition, in the context of NIAC, IHRL is proposed to provide more guidance. In fact, CA 3 and AP II invite the parties to the conflict to take recourse to this regime. However, the scope of applicability of IHRL remains subject of debate; its norms may be unfitting for application in armed conflict; and it does not bind non-State armed groups, and thus places a burden on States only.

The combination of absence of clear norms under LOAC and conceptual issues with IHRL may force States to take at least two (extreme) positions that apply mostly in extraterritorial contexts of NIAC (most fittingly SUPPCOIN, OCCUPCOIN and TRANSCOIN). A first position is to argue that since LOAC does not provide treaty-based or customary norms, and IHRL does not apply in armed conflict or in an extraterritorial context, therefore there are no rules, and which arguably provides an unrestricted mandate to detain that can only be
limited by policy. A second position is to argue that IHRL applies extraterritorially, but since
the law of NIAC remains silent there are no rules that could justify a deviation from IHRL
obligations the extraterritorial security detention of insurgents is likely to violate IHRL, and
therefore it is perhaps better not to detain at all.
There seems to be no straightforward and satisfying solution available in the law and the
best option at this moment is to resort to policy that derives guidance from GC III and GC
IV. Both frameworks demonstrate its sensitivity to the fact that an armed conflict is
going on and for that reason permits military necessity to override humanitarian consider-
tations for as long as it deems this required. This would not preclude IHRL from being in-
cluded in such policy so it could, where necessary to clarify or supplement LOAC-based
norms.
This would result in a framework within which States feel comfortable and at the same
time offers safeguards of a standard commensurate to the specific situation of armed conflict.
The actual application of such policy may serve as a first step towards new law – either
customary or in the form of a new treaty. Supporting this process may be today’s counterin-
surgency doctrine, policy, and practice, which already reflect much of the norms found in
GC III, GC IV and IHRL. This way, States also remain in the lead and may avert the de-
velopment of such new law into undesired directions – overly protecting either security or
humanitarian interests. This ensures that a tailored balance can be achieved between the
fundamental pillars of LOAC – military necessity and humanity.

2. Permissible Scope for Operational Detention under the Normative
Paradigms

As follows from the above analysis, counterinsurgent forces are to treat all detainees – irre-
respective of which type of detention they are placed in – humanely. This implies firstly that they
are to offer certain (minimum) material conditions of treatment, and secondly that forces
are to ensure that detainees are under no circumstances subjected to torture or other forms
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither may they be transferred
into the authority of other States when facing such risks (non-refoulement), or where they
may face an unfair trial.
All detainees are to be informed of the reasons for their arrest and must be provided the
right to habeas corpus, although it may be submitted that this right must be read down in
situations of armed conflict where there is no possibility for a review by a judicial authority,
as has already been contemplated by the law of IAC. Other procedural safeguards – such as
the requirement of a periodic review – are to be afforded as a matter of law to criminal
detainees as well as security detainees governed by the law of IAC. Such procedural guaran-
tees are likely to be granted as a matter of policy to security detainees governed by the law
of NIAC. As for criminal detainees: these are to be afforded fair trial guarantees. It remains
unclear to what degree such fair trial guarantees are also to be afforded to security detainees,
but this may nonetheless take place on the basis of policy. Finally, all forms of detention
must be rooted in a sufficient legal basis, either in domestic law, host nation law, a SOFA, in
a UNSC resolution, or otherwise.