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The fragility of rightness. Adjudication and the primacy of practice

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Publication date
2014

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Citation for published version (APA):

van Domselaar, I. (2014). *The fragility of rightness. Adjudication and the primacy of practice*. [Thesis, fully internal, Universiteit van Amsterdam].

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