

Appendix A - variations of transparency information

Condition 1:



Condition 2:




Condition 3:



Condition 4:



Condition 5 - tachometer:



Condition 6 – French law:

Betaald door FNV.

**FNV toont deze advertentie
aan u op basis van
informatie over uw
inkomen.**

**Het verspreiden van deze
advertentie kostte 250 euro.**

Condition 7 – Irish bill:

Betaald door FNV.

**FNV
Hertogswetering 159
3543 AS Utrecht**

**FNV verspreidt deze
advertentie naar mensen
met een modaal of
benedenmodaal inkomen.**

Condition 8 – Honest Ads Act:

**Deze advertentie is
betaald door FNV.**

Condition 9 – Digital Services Act:

**Dit is een advertentie van
FNV**

**FNV toont u deze
advertentie op basis van
informatie over uw
inkomen, leeftijd en
geslacht**


Control condition saw no information, only the video advertisement

Appendix B – analyses on the group of participants who claimed to have seen the stimulus *and* the entire control group (ATT; N = 397).

Direct effects

H1a. Exposure to transparency information (vs. no transparency information) increases persuasion knowledge.


Figure 1. ATT on persuasion knowledge per condition



*Note. Compared to control condition. * p < .05.*

H1b. Exposure to transparency information decreases political attitudes (issue, source, and advertisement) and behavioral intentions.


Figure 1. ATT on attitudes and behavioral intentions per condition



Note. Compared to control condition. ** < .01; * < .05.

H2. Exposure to transparency information (vs. no transparency information) increases privacy concerns.

Figure 1. ATT on privacy concerns per condition



Note. Compared to control condition.


Mediation

H3. The negative effect of exposure to transparency information on people's attitudes toward the targeted advertisement is mediated by persuasion knowledge and privacy concerns, such that exposure to transparency information increases persuasion knowledge and privacy concerns, and an increase in a) persuasion knowledge and b) privacy concerns decreases people's political attitudes and behavioral intentions.

Appendix C - Randomization check regarding age

We conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs to analyze the randomization of age and political interest across conditions. The mean age of the participants in condition DSA ($M = 46.30$; $SD = 13.1$) was 6.7 years higher than mean age of those in condition French law ($M = 39.60$; $SD = 12.40$). While significant ($F(9, 1319) = 2.09$, $p = .03$), we consider this difference not meaningful or problematic as both means circle nicely around the grand mean of 43.67 ($SD = 13.51$) and because the mean score of condition DSA is affected by one outlier (see Figure 1 in Appendix C). There was no significant difference between conditions on participants' scores of political interest: $F(9, 1324) = .62$, $p = .78$. A chi2 test showed that gender was also successfully randomized between conditions: $X^2(9, N = 1331) = 7.03$, $p = .63$.

Figure 1. Randomization in terms of age between conditions



Note. Condition French law and DSA differ significantly from each other (condition French law: $M = 39.60$; $SD = 12.40$; condition DSA: $M = 46.30$; $SD = 13.1$).

Appendix D – Relevant provisions of DSA, HAA, Irish Bill and French Law

Digital Services Act

“Online platforms that display advertising on their online interfaces shall ensure that the recipients of the service can identify, for each specific advertisement displayed to each individual recipient, in a clear and unambiguous manner and in real time:

- (a) that the information displayed is an advertisement;
- (b) the natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement is displayed;
- (c) meaningful information about the main parameters used to determine the recipient to whom the advertisement is displayed.”

Honest Ads Act, section 7

<https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1356/text>

“the communication shall, in a clear and conspicuous manner state the name of the person who paid for the communication”

This is meant to add to the already existing Federal Election Campaign Act (Chapter 301, subchapter 1): “if paid for and authorized by a candidate, an authorized political committee of a candidate, or its agents, shall clearly state that the communication has been paid for by such authorized political committee”.

Irish Online Advertising and Social Media Transparency Bill, part 2, subsection 4

<https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/bills/bill/2017/150/>

“For the purposes of this Act, a transparency notice shall be a notice that displays in a clear and conspicuous manner—

- (a) the name and address of the person, company, organisation or entity (whether that entity has legal personality or otherwise) who paid for the online political advertising,
- (b) a description of the audience targeted by the online political advertising,
- (c) such other information as the Minister may by order provide.”

French Law No. 2018-1202

<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000037847559>

“The identity of the individual or on the company name, registered office and corporate purpose of the legal person and of the person on whose behalf, where applicable, it has declared that it is acting, which pays for the promotion of content related to a debate of general interest; use of personal data when promoting content related to a debate of general interest; the amount received in return for the promotion of such content when the amount exceeds a determined threshold, which should be made public.”