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Causality, Coherence and Latin ‘Connectives’ : a discourse pragmatic approach

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Introduction

In a volume on *cause, causalité, causativité*, an article on so-called causal conjunctions seems to be indispensable. This paper is meant to give an overview of the state of the art in research on causal relations and their explicit marking in Latin. I will do this by giving a brief contrastive account of the five so-called ‘markers of causality’¹ that are exemplified in (1) - (5) :

(1) *eo miser sum quia male illi feci.* (Pl. *Capt.* 994)

« I feel miserable **because** I have been so hard on him. »

(2) *ut lubet, quid tibi lubet fac, quoniam pugnis plus vales* (Pl. *Amph.* 396)

« suit yourself, do what suits you, **seeing** your fists are too much for me ».

(3) *is pagus appellabatur Tigurinus. nam omnis civitas Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa est* (Caes. *Gal.* 1.12.4)

« The name of the canton was the Tigurine. **For** the whole state of Helvetia is divided into four cantons ».

(4) *si tamen ipse vales, aliqua nos parte valemus*

quippe mea est umeris fulva ruina tuis (Ov. *Trist.* 5.13.7-8)

« Yet if you are well, I am well in some degree, **for** my ruin was supported by your shoulders »

(5) *Iam eum, ut puto, videbo ; misit enim puerum se ad me venire* (Cic. *Att.* 10.16.5)

« I expect I shall be seeing him (sc. Hortensius) presently, *as* he has sent a boy to tell me he is coming »

In these examples, *quia*, *quoniam*, *nam*, *quippe* and *enim* to a certain degree may seem to be interchangeable, and it is on account of examples like these that the words often show up together in Latin grammars and

¹ An adequate term for referring to the entire group of words involved is lacking (see also KROON 2011). For the purpose of this article I will use the term ‘marker of causality’, although this is not a very felicitous term either, as I will explain below.

handbooks, in sections on causal clause combining. However, modern linguistic research on ‘markers of causality’, both for Latin and for other languages, has shown important distributional differences between them, which seem to point to some fundamental differences in their individual workings and meanings. What exactly these workings and meanings are is still a matter of debate, although much progress had been made in the last twenty-five years, especially in the field of pragmatics and discourse oriented linguistic research.² A complicating factor in this type of research is that languages seem to make different choices in how ‘causal relations’ may be expressed, and that there seem to be no one-to-one correspondences between languages as to how they divide the field of causality as far as explicit linguistic marking is concerned.

In order to discuss the issues involved in a systematic way, I will first introduce a few important insights and concepts from current cognitive and discourse-pragmatic linguistics, which have provided the instruments for describing the markers in a more sophisticated and distinctive way than before. In the discussion that follows it will turn out, among other things, that a contrastive study of the so-called causal markers illustrated in (1) - (5) above brings us into the heart of the discussion about the boundaries between sentence grammars and discourse grammars, and how these two relate to one another: an important topic in theoretical linguistics at the moment.

I would like to emphasize that this article does not provide any new empirical data. The insights provided mainly rely on observations in my own previous work (e.g. Kroon 1995, 2005, 2011), and that of many others, especially Machtelt Bolkestein, Huguette Fugier, Sylvie Mellet, Harm Pinkster, Rodie Risselada, Hannah Rosén, and, most recently, Josine Schrickx (see bibliography for details). Its main contribution will be to bring together some of the earlier findings and try to account for them in a single explanatory framework, based on current theoretical insights. The scope will be strictly synchronic, leaving post-classical developments out of account.

1. Integrated and non-integrated causal constructions

1.1. Integrated causal constructions: the causal operators *quia* and *quod*

The discussion inevitably has to start with the fundamental distinction between integrated and non-integrated causal constructions. Integrated causal constructions, like the *quia*-clause in example (1), have the syntactic status of an *Adjunct*, which means that the causal clause is syntactically

² Important pioneering studies are e.g. SINCLAIR and COULTHARD (1975), ANSCOMBRE and DUCROT (1983), ROULET *et al.* (1985;2001); SCHIFFRIN (1987).

integrated in the main clause, and is a constitutive part of its propositional content.³

(1) *Eo miser sum quia male illi feci* (Pl. *Capt.* 994)
 « I feel miserable because I have been so hard on him ».

Such integrated causal constructions are usually said to involve an ‘objective’ cause relation, i.e. a semantic cause-result relation between two events in the world referred to. That *quia*-clauses as exemplified in (1) are syntactically integrated in the main clause, is clear from a number of well-known characteristics of these clauses, which are summed up in table 1.

Table 1 : Characteristics of integrated causal clauses (e.g. *because*-clauses)
 (For Latin : Pinkster 1972 ; 1990 ; Fugier 1989 ; Bolkestein 1991 ; Mellet 1994 ; 1995 ; Kroon 1995)

Integration phenomena	Examples
Can be the focus of a question	<i>Is he at home because his wife is ill?</i>
Can fall in the scope of negation	<i>He is at home, not because his wife is ill, but because he got fired</i>
Can be modified by an adverb	<i>He is at home, also because his wife is ill</i>
Can be included in a cleft sentence	<i>It is because his wife is ill that he is at home?</i>
Can introduce an answer to a WH-question	<i>Why is he at home? :: Because his wife is ill</i>

When we turn from this sentence grammar perspective to a discourse grammar perspective, we can say that the main clause and the subordinate clause in example (1) together form one single *communicative act* with one single *illocutionary force* (which we could call assertion, for example). Unfortunately, terminology varies here, ‘communicative act’ being more or less comparable to what in other approaches is called ‘speech act’, ‘speech event’, ‘discourse act’, ‘discourse unit’ or also simply ‘act’. Saying that example (1) counts as one communicative act means that the sentence in (1) counts as one single and separate communicative step in the discourse, and, as a whole, has a particular communicative function in the wider discourse context.⁴

³ For the notion Adjunct, see PINKSTER (in prep.).

⁴ The more specific communicative function cannot be established without having recourse to the immediate context of the utterance. For the concept of ‘act’, see e.g. HANNAY and KROON (2005).

Eo miser sum <i>quia</i> male illi feci



1 communicative act = 1 communicative step in the discourse

When we finally look at the *semiotic status* of the causal marker *quia* itself, we could qualify *quia*, in terms of the semiotic taxonomy of Peirce, as a ‘symbolic sign’ (see also Mellet 1994 ; Goethals 2010). This means that *quia* predicates the idea of a causal relationship between two events in the represented world, the word itself being part of the transmitted content of the clause. Since it is a causal relationship that is predicated here, the *quia* clause might also be referred to as a ‘predicative causal construction’. As we will see below, in this respect (i.e. being a symbolic sign) *quia* is fundamentally different from the other causal markers discussed in this article, which have a different semiotic status.

I will leave these integrated causal constructions aside now, and refer to Fugier (1989), Bolkestein (1991) and Mellet (1994 ; 1995) for various interesting observations, also on the interchangeability of *quia* and *quod*. My main focus in this article will be on the other type of causal constructions, the syntactically non- (or less) integrated ones, and on the Latin words that most often seem to accompany them : *quoniam*, *nam*, *quippe*, and *enim*.

1.2. Non-integrated causal constructions : *quoniam*, *nam*, *quippe*, *enim*.


Clauses introduced by *quoniam*, *nam*, *quippe*, and *enim* share a number of – interrelated – features. First, the causal clauses involved are not syntactically integrated in the main clause, which means that they do not display the integration phenomena listed in table 1 above.

Second, the causal clause counts as a communicative act of its own. The sentence introduced by *nam* in example (3), for instance, is an independent, separate communicative step in the discourse, with its own communicative function.

(3) <i>Is pagus appellabatur Tigurinus</i>	<i>Nam... Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa est</i>
↓	↓
1 communicative step (act)	1 communicative step (act)

The third characteristic involves the fact that the type of causal relationship concerned is not ‘semantic’ but ‘pragmatic’ : it involves so-called functional or rhetorical relations (also called coherence relations) of the type Justification, Motivation, Clarification, Explanation, Evidence, Inference, Argument, and the like. These can all be seen, in a sense, as the

pragmatic variants of the logical-semantic relation of cause. In a discussion on causal conjunctions in Spanish, Goethals (2010) takes all of these rhetorical cause relations together under the umbrella label ‘Justification’, in order to distinguish this pragmatic type of causality relations from the predicational type of cause relations discussed in section 1.1. Thus, we could say that in example (2), repeated here for convenience, the communicative act introduced by *quoniam* (*pugnis plus vales*) has the rhetorical function of a Justification with regard to the preceding central act *quid tibi lubet / fac*.



A final characteristic of the non-integrated cause constructions is that their markers are not *symbolic* signs, but have the status of *indexical* signs. They do not, like *quia* in example (1), *predicate* a causal relation between two events in the outside world. Rather they *point to* the presence of a rhetorical relationship of cause between two *speech* events. The markers in non-integrated cause constructions are therefore not content-words (with a propositional meaning), but function-words (with a non-propositional meaning). What they do is instructing the interlocutor about how to fit in the communicative act (the speech event) in its wider discourse context.

This view was already put forward in 1975, by the famous group of French linguists around Anscombre and Ducrot, who distinguished between *opérateurs* (= integrated, predicative conjunctions; e.g. *parce que*) and *connecteurs* (= non-integrated, speech act-identifying connectors; e.g. *puisque, car*):⁵

« [Les connecteurs] *car* et *puisque* ne servent pas à constituer une nouvelle idée, mais à accomplir un acte de parole (acte de justification ou d’inférence): ils marquent que le locuteur effectue [...] une activité de parole particulière. [...]. L’opérateur [*parce que*] ne fait pas sortir du domaine du contenu. [...] Il sert à constituer ce qui est ordonné, mis en question, affirmé. » (Groupe λ-1, 1975 : 254-257)

Now that we have established the shared features of the so-called causal ‘connectors’ (like *nam* and *quoniam*), as compared to the so-called causal ‘operators’ discussed in section 1.1 (e.g. *quia*), the next question is, of

⁵ See e.g. also MELLET (1994) for Latin. ANSCOMBRE (1984) contains a slight adaptation of the views presented in 1975 (for a discussion, see GOETHALS 2010).

course, how we are going to describe the observed *differences* between the individual members of the group of ‘causal connectors’ (*quoniam*, *nam*, *quippe* and *enim*).

It would have been quite simple if each single marker of this group could be proven to exclusively correspond to one single subtype of the rhetorical cause relation - provided at least that we would be able at all to come up with good definitions of all these subtypes (e.g. Motivation, Explanation, Inference, and so on). It will not come as a surprise that there is no such correspondence: it is quite easy to find pairs of our causal markers with what appears to be exactly the same type of rhetorical relationship. Such a pair is illustrated in (7) and (8), where *enim* and *nam* are used with exactly the same type of rhetorical cause relation (clarification/explanation of a word in the preceding unit).

(7) *Habes legis prooemium ; sic enim haec appellat Plato* (Cic. *Leg.* 2.16)
 « There you have the proem to the law ; **for** that is the name given to it by Plato »

(8) *Fuit in illis nauarchis Heracliensis quidam Furius, – nam habent illi non nulla huiusce modi Latina nomina, –* (Cic. *Ver.* 5.112)
 « One of these captains was a certain Furius of Heraclia, - **for** those people have such Latin names as this, - »

Thus, for capturing the differences between these causal connectors, and for understanding what they actually do in a communicative interaction, we clearly need a more sophisticated analytic framework, in which all dimensions are taken into account that play a role in communicative interaction. Limiting the workings of the markers to the sequential dimension of discourse only, as indicators of rhetorical relations between successive acts, would be a gross oversimplification of what these words actually do. As a matter of fact, they appear to do quite different things, as will be shown below.

2. The three-dimensional nature of communicative acts

What might such a more sophisticated analytic framework look like? The present section summarizes the most significant aspects. Important to keep in mind is the claim that the markers give an instruction as to how the communicative unit in their scope (the so-called *host unit* of the marker) fits into the current discourse. According to Goethals (2010), this ‘fitting’ of the communicative unit into the discourse commonly involves three different *dimensions* of the discourse, all at the same time.

The first dimension is the *modal dimension*, which concerns the relation between an ‘evaluator’ or *énonciateur* (the ‘origo’ of modality, cf. Lehmann

2010) and a propositional content. The propositional content of a communicative act is commonly looked upon from a particular, subjective point of view. It is filtered, so to speak, through a particular perspective. Usually this perspective concerns the point of view of the speaker, but speaker and evaluator (*locuteur* and *énonciateur*) need not necessarily coincide: there may also be room for foreign subjective voices, or for sharing the point of view (a phenomenon referred to by e.g. the term intersubjectivity). The latter notion will appear to be important in our description of *enim* in section 6 below.

Next there is the *interpersonal dimension* of the communicative act, which involves the relation between speaker and interlocutor in the communicative negotiation. In most types of communicative acts the speaker somehow defines his own role and the role of the interlocutor in the interaction; the speaker may, for instance, make a claim, require action from the interlocutor, may ask for his agreement or understanding, etc.

Finally, we may distinguish a *sequential dimension*, which concerns the relation of the communicative act with the previous and the following discourse, and the functional position of the act in the evolving discourse (in terms of central and subsidiary communicative units, as well as in terms of more specific rhetorical relationships of the type Justification, Explanation, Inference, etc.⁶).

The modal and interpersonal dimensions are closely related. For that reason in Kroon (1995) I took them together and referred to them together as the interactional level of discourse. The sequential dimension is what in 1995 I called the presentational level of discourse. Table 2 contains a summary of the slightly more nuanced framework of Goethals.

Table 2 : Goethals (2010 :2209)

	utterance	
	speech event	
propositional content	➤ modal dimension	<i>relation evaluator – propositional content</i>
	➤ interpersonal dimension	<i>relation speaker-interlocutor</i>
	➤ sequential dimension	<i>relation with previous/following speech events</i>

Now the claim is, first, that speech events (communicative acts, in my terminology) are in essence three-dimensional; and second, that the markers under discussion may potentially give indications at all three dimensions of the speech event. As we will see below, however, not all of these dimensions may be equally dominant, or equally activated by the individual markers. In the remainder of this article I will successively discuss *quoniam*, *nam*, *quippe* and *enim* along the lines of the theory sketched above, and try to mark out their mutual differences.

⁶ Outside the field of the ‘causal’ relations one might think of rhetorical relationships like Contrast, Addition, Counterargument, etc.

3. *Quoniam* : interpersonal and modal dimensions de-activated

Examples (9) - (12) contain some representative instances of the use of Latin *quoniam*.⁷

(9) **quoniam** iam nox est, discedite (Cic. *Cat.* 3. fin.)
« since it is already night, go home »

(10) **quoniam** de genere belli dixi, nunc de magnitudine pauca dicam (Cic. *Man.* 20)
« having spoken about the nature of the war, I will now say a few words about its magnitude »

(11) **quoniam** peperit, cum viro concubuit (Cic. *Inv.* 1.74)
« Since she has borne a child, she has lain with a man »

(12) *at quae dea est? bonam esse oportet, quoniam quidem est abs te dedicata.* (Cic. *Dom.* 110)
« But what kind of goddess is this? It must be a good goddess as she owes her dedication to you »

We have seen already that *quoniam* clauses as a rule correspond negatively to the integration phenomena in table 1, for which reason I consider them as independent communicative acts.⁸

An act introduced by *quoniam* is, however, quite atypical, because it contains information that already seems to be taken for granted, and has already been agreed on, by the interlocutors (e.g. because the information has been provided already in the preceding context, or is manifest in the discourse situation, or is general or universal knowledge). The information in the *quoniam* clause is therefore not in any way negotiated between the interlocutors : it is not stated or claimed or requested, it is merely mentally *reactivated*. Within the theory of Goethals this means that *quoniam* does activate an independent communicative step in the discourse, but immediately de-activates the interpersonal dimension of this speech event. This also means that we cannot assign a particular illocutionary force to the *quoniam* clause, such as assertion, request, order, and the like. That the interpersonal dimension is not activated by *quoniam* is in accordance with

⁷ For previous accounts of *quoniam* see e.g. FUGIER (1989), BOLKESTEIN (1991), MELLET (1994 ; 1995), PINKSTER (2009 ; 2010).

⁸ There seem to be some exceptional counterexamples, but PINKSTER (2009 ; 2010) shows (*pace* Szantyr) that it is only in later periods that such examples start to occur. Cf. GOETHALS (2010) for comparable observations on French *puisque* and Spanish *como*.

the observation that *quoniam* clauses do not occur with sentence types other than the declarative type.⁹

Because of the common ground status of the information in the *quoniam* clause, it probably cannot be subjectively modalized either. In other words, in *quoniam* clauses no subjective filtering of the information by some evaluator (*énonciateur*) is possible. This might lead to the conclusion that the modal dimension is not activated either by *quoniam*. This, in turn, is in accordance with the observation that *quoniam* clauses are not very compatible with subjective modality markers and with the subjunctive.

What remains is that *quoniam* only activates the *sequential* dimension of its host unit, pointing to some sort of rhetorical Justification relation, to be paraphrased in English by expressions like ‘in view of the fact that’, ‘considering that’, ‘now that’.

Because of their ‘grounding’ function *quoniam* clauses, at least in most authors, tend to precede the main clause, as in examples (9), (10) and (11). They function as a preliminary communicative step which is instrumental for taking the next, communicatively more central step. This is for instance the case in (9), where the *quoniam* clause justifies (and therefore paves the way for) the desired behavior expressed in the main clause. It is also the case in (10), where it justifies the speaker’s transition to a new subject. And in (11), the *quoniam* clause counts as the known premise on the basis of which the logical conclusion in the main clause can be drawn.

Quoniam clauses can also follow the main clause, and be added as a kind of appendix, as in (12). In this final position it is often combined with the particle *quidem*, which, as I have shown elsewhere (Kroon 2005, 2009), may be another indication for a syntactically loose, appendix-like status of the clause.

4. *Nam* : all dimensions activated

Examples (13) - (16) contain some representative instances of the use of Latin *nam*.¹⁰

(13) *is pagus appellabatur Tigurinus. nam omnis civitas Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa est.* (Caes. *Gal.* 1.12.4)

« The name of the canton was the Tigurine. **For** the whole state of Helvetia is divided into four cantons. »

(14) *quid negoti est? nam occupatus sum ampliter* (Pl. *Cis.* 598)

« What do you want? **For** I am an extremely busy man »

⁹ It is to be noted that the *quoniam* clause is not in the scope of the illocutionary force of the main clause either.

¹⁰ Previous accounts: SCHIWY (1932), KROON (1995, chapter 7), HOLMES (2012).

(15) (In the preceding text Cicero has told how the people of Tauromenium, Tyndaris and Leontini all threw down and destroyed Verres’ statue in their town) **nam** *quid ego de Syracusanis loquar?* (Cic. *Ver.* II.2.160)
 « And need I speak of what the Syracusans did? »

(16) *Postea Phoenices... Hipponem Hadrumetum Leptim aliasque urbis in ora maritima condidere ; eaeque brevi multum auctae, pars originibus suis praesidio, aliae decori fuere. Nam de Carthagine silere melius puto quam parum dicere* (Sal. *Jug.* 19.1-2)
 « Thereafter the Phoenicians ... founded Hippo, Hadrumetum, Leptis, and other cities on the coast. These soon became very powerful and were in some cases a defense and in others a glory to the mother city. **As to Carthage**, I think it better to be silent rather than say too little »

When studying examples of *nam* like these, we may observe some important differences with *quoniam*. In contrast to *quoniam*, *nam* does activate the interpersonal dimension, as is for instance proved by the fact that it may also occur in clauses with an interrogative sentence type (as in example 15). As I have shown in Kroon (1995), communicative units introduced by *nam* typically fill in a potential blank in the knowledge base of the interlocutor, and are therefore to be considered as newsworthy by themselves.¹¹ This is a big difference with *quoniam* units, which essentially convey shared knowledge. In accordance with their newsworthiness, *nam* units usually have the illocutionary force of an Assertion or Claim (although exclamations and wishes do also occur¹²).

Considering that *nam* units fill in a potential void in the knowledge base of the interlocutor, it is quite understandable that the propositional content of the *nam* unit is always viewed from the subjective point of view of the speaker.¹³ *Nam* units cannot readily be modalized by some foreign voice, e.g. that of the interlocutor : the hearer cannot, of course, fill in his own blanks. This also explains why *nam* clauses (in contrast with e.g. *enim* clauses) are seldom ironic: irony inherently presupposes a foreign voice.

As for the sequential dimension, *nam* appears to give the instruction that its host unit somehow supports a preceding central unit. Without the addition

¹¹See also the very adequate description by HOLMES (2012, p. 205) : « *nam* introduces a sense unit that answers a question that might have been raised in the heads of listeners by the previous sense unit. »

¹² Example of a wish: **nam** *Opimi quidem calamitas utinam ex ex hominum memoria posset evelli!* (« As regards Opimius, would that his sad story could be erased from the memory of men! », (Cic. *Planc.* 70).

¹³ The subjective certainty of the speaker with respect to the truth value of the communicated content may also be expressed explicitly, e.g. by means of the commitment marker *profecto*, e.g. *Pl. Men.* 646 ; *Sall. Cat.* 51.18 ; *Cic. Leg. Agr.* 2.3.10 ; *Cic. Cat.* 3.19.31 ; *Att.* 4.17.4 ; *Cic. Planc.* 87.44.5.

of the *nam* unit, this preceding unit might run the risk of not being understood or accepted, or of being felt as incomplete. Good illustrations are provided by (13) and (14). In (13) the word *pagus* is explained for the reader, the *nam* clause filling in a potential void in the knowledge base of the reader. In (14) the speaker justifies, by means of the *nam* clause, his preceding speech act, which on account of its not very cooperative nature might have led to questions on the part of the interlocutor.

Examples (15) and (16) are quite interesting. In (15) *nam* appears to be used at the transition to a next subject in a series of related issues. It seems more difficult here to describe the use of *nam* in terms of a rhetorical relation of Justification or Explication. Still, I think its function is essentially the same as in (13) and (14). In (15), the preceding context might have raised the hearer’s expectation that Cicero will also come to speak about the inhabitants of Syracuse. However, with the *nam* unit Cicero justifies and explains the fact that he has left Syracuse out of account here, just as if the hearer had asked something like “but why don’t you say anything about Syracuse now?”. Thus, on the basis of examples like (15), which are quite common, we have to conclude that *nam* can also be used to justify the *absence* of a certain speech act, in situations where the interlocutor might have expected one. A comparable and even more explicit example is (16), where Cicero, in an enumeration of cities on the North African coast, leaves out Carthage, the most well-known and therefore most expected one to be mentioned here. His silence about Carthage obviously requires an explanation, which is added in the *nam* clause.¹⁴

What makes examples like (15) and (16) interesting, is that they demonstrate that rhetorical relations in the sequential dimension need not necessarily involve discourse units that have been *textually expressed*. In (15) and (16) the *nam* unit seems to pertain to something that is only implied by the preceding text, rather than explicitly stated.

5. Quippe : semantic cause-result relation presented in two communicative steps?

The causal marker *quippe* has recently been studied by Schrickx (2011, chapter 11). The examples below, most of which are also discussed by Schrickx, are quite representative of the full array of uses of the word.

(4) *si tamen ipse vales, aliqua nos parte valemus*

quippe mea est umeris fulva ruina tuis (Ov. *Trist.* 5.13.7-8)

« Yet if you are well, I am well in some degree, **for** my ruin was supported by your shoulders »

¹⁴ KÜHNER and STEGMANN (II, 117-9) cite (16) as an example of the use of *nam* in the rhetorical device *occupatio*.

(17) *nullas a te XI Kal. ; quippe quid enim iam novi?* (Cic. Att. 15.21.3)
« No letter from you on the 21st ; for what news could there have been already? »

(18) *contempsit illa, tuta quippe loco* (Phaed. 1.28.7)
« She despised her, safe as she was on her place (*in a tree*) »,

(19) (*about the limits of distress*) *Sed tamen transisse videtur modum, quippe qui ob eam causam a vita recesserit* (Cic. Tusc. 4.40)
« But all the same he seems to have passed the limit, since he died of chagrin »

(20) *in pelago nautis ex undis ortus in undis
sol fit uti videatur obire et condere lumen ;
quippe ubi nil aliud nisi aquam caelumque tuentur.* (Lucr. 4.432-434)
« At sea sailors seem to perceive the sun to rise out of the water and to set in the water, and there to hide its light, naturally because they behold nothing but water and sky ».

According to, for instance, Kühner and Stegmann (1912, p. 808), from Sallust onwards *quippe* behaves as a mere synonym of *nam* : *quippe* equals *nam*, they simply say. Indeed, *quippe* seems to share a number of distributional properties with *nam*, for instance :

- *quippe* and *nam* may both occur in rhetorical questions (for *quippe* see ex. 17) ;
- *quippe* and *nam* both always follow the unit they support ;
- *quippe* and *nam* preferably occur in monological discourse ;
- *quippe* and *nam* cannot fall within the scope of another connective element (which proves, together with their fronted position in their host unit, that they are connectives themselves) ;
- *quippe* and *nam* may have scope over more than one clause.

There are, however, also important differences between *quippe* and *nam*, at least in the earlier stages of Latin literature. The most important are that :

- *quippe* displays a higher degree of syntactic freedom than *nam* : it can occur not only between two independent clauses, but also between *parts* of clauses, for instance in predicative participle or adjective constructions (as in 18) ; relative clauses (as in 19 ; and perhaps also in 20, if we are to take *ubi* here as a relative adverb) ; and in finite subordinate clauses with *cum* or, less often, *ubi* ;
- *quippe* is not used for justifying a speech act or its specific wording (which is a very common use of *nam*, as we saw in examples 13 and 14) ;
- *quippe* is not used for justifying the *absence* of a speech act (which is another common use of *nam*, as illustrated in examples 15 and 16).

All in all, we get the impression that despite a number of shared features *quippe* is markedly different from *nam*, at least in Early and Classical Latin. In contrast to *nam*, *quippe* is not so much used to answer a question that might have been raised in the heads of the interlocutors. *Quippe* does identify, like *nam*, an independent communicative act (interpersonal dimension), and does identify some rhetorical relationship in the causal domain (sequential dimension). But this rhetorical relationship is of the Explanation type rather than of the Justification type. More importantly, with *quippe* there always seems to be an underlying semantic relation between the *contents* of the connected units: the second unit, introduced by *quippe*, refers to a property or circumstantial situation of what has been referred to in the preceding unit. In English the *quippe* unit might therefore be paraphrased quite well by means of an appended participle construction. For instance in (4): « leaning as we are on your shoulders »; or in (17): « no news being available on this day already »; or in (20) « seeing nothing there but water and sky ». With *nam*, such a paraphrase is often not possible. In instances like (21), a translation of the *nam*-clause by means of an appended participle construction would be odd, and *nam* does not seem to be interchangeable with *quippe*:

(21) *is pagus appellabatur Tigurinus. nam omnis civitas Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa est.*

?? « The name of the canton was the Tigurine, the whole state of Helvetia being divided into four cantons. »

What *quippe* seems to do is appending, in a separate act, more details or properties of the propositional content conveyed by the preceding unit, while at the same time indicating that this information is ‘extra’ and added by way of explanation. As a result, what in theory could have been presented and perceived as one conceptual (and syntactic) unity, is in practice divided over two separate communicative steps.¹⁵

6. *Enim*: the sequential domain de-activated; intersubjectivity in modal dimension.

Finally, I will make some brief remarks on Latin *enim*.¹⁶ *Enim* is different from the other markers discussed here in that it clearly activates the

¹⁵ ROSÉN (2009) seems to use the term ‘epitaxis’ for syntactic splitting mechanisms like the one discussed here. See also KROON (2005, p. 2009) for a discussion of Latin *quidem* in terms of a comparable mismatch between ‘strategic’ (communicative) units of discourse and ‘semantico-syntactic’ units of grammar. The issue of the boundaries between sentence grammar and discourse grammar is also addressed in BODELOT (2007).

¹⁶ For an extensive discussion, see KROON (1995, chapter 8).

interpersonal and modal dimensions, but does not activate the sequential dimension (or only very weakly and indirectly). That *enim* does not activate the sequential dimension of the speech event can be concluded from a number of characteristic distributional properties in which it differs from the other markers (like e.g. *nam*). Most importantly, *enim* can itself be in the scope of subordinating and coordinating conjunctions, like *quia*, *at* or *sed*, which indicates that *enim* is not primarily a connective device itself. An example is (22), where *enim* is combined with *at* :

- (22) SENEX : *quotiens monstravi tibi, viro ut morem geras,*
quid ille faciat, ne id observes, quo eat, quid rerum gerat.
 MATRONA : *at enim ille hinc amat meretricem ex proximo*
 (Pl. *Men.* 788-790)

« How many times have I explicitly told you to humor your husband and not keep watching what he does, where he goes, and what he is about? : But **enim** he makes love to this strumpet, the very next door! »

Another distributional property of *enim* suggesting a non-connective function of the word, is its occurrence in isolated speech acts, like in example (23) :

- (23) (Mercury in an aside, interrupting Sosia’s soliloquy)
Certe enim hic nescioquis loquitur (Pl. *Am.* 331)
 « Yea, of a truth someone is talking here »

Unlike most earlier accounts of *enim*, I see no essential difference between the use of *enim* in examples like (22) - (23) (in which *enim* is commonly held to be some sort of ‘affirmative’ particle) and its more familiar use as an alleged causal connector, which is illustrated in (6) :

- (6) *Iam eum, ut puto, videbo ; misit enim puerum se ad me venire* (Cic. *Att.* 10.16.5)
 « I expect I shall be seeing him (*sc.* Hortensius) presently, **as** he has sent a boy to tell me he is coming » (Cic. *Att.* 10.16.5)

Although in this example the *enim* clause and the preceding clause indeed seem to maintain a causal relationship of some sort, I would argue that *enim* is only highly compatible with such a causal relationship, and does not indicate itself such a relationship. This view is corroborated by the fact that we also come across instances of *enim* in contexts where the *enim* clause cannot be taken as causally related to the preceding clause. In (24), for instance, such an interpretation seems to be prevented by the cataphoric expression *hoc indicio* :

- (24) *Artifices scaenici ... hoc indicio imitantur verecundiam : deiciunt enim vultum, verba submitunt, figunt in terram oculos et deprimunt.* (Sen. *Ep.* 11.7)

« Actors in the theatre ... imitate bashfulness by means of the following signs : they hang, as you know (*enim*), their heads, lower their voices, and keep their eyes fixed and rooted upon the ground ».

A more adequate description of *enim* would therefore be that it is a ‘non-connective’ particle, which is concerned primarily with the management of the communicative interaction between the interlocutors.¹⁷ More specifically, *enim* can be said to point to a *shared responsibility* of the interlocutors for the truth or desirability of the message conveyed in the speech act. In other words, *enim* appears to present the content of its host unit as being *intersubjectively modalized*. In example (7) for instance, repeated here for convenience, *enim* points to a shared responsibility for the truth of the position *sic haec appellat Plato* ; and in (25) *enim* points to a shared responsibility for the desirability of the event described (the reader is supposed to subscribe to the desirability of the event of *reficere*).¹⁸

(7) *Habes legis prooemium ; sic enim haec appellat Plato* (Cic. Leg. 2.16)

(25) (concerning cattle-breeding) *semper erunt quarum mutari corpus malis :/ semper enim refice ac,.... / ante veni...* (Verg. G. 3.69-71)

« ever will there be some kine whose mould you would wish to change : ever, indeed (*enim*), renew them and ... keep in advance... »

By way of conclusion we can say that *enim* is a fundamentally modal and interpersonal marker. By virtue of its specific function as an intersubjective modality marker, it may also (but only indirectly and in specific discourse constellations) activate a justificational interpretation of its host unit. Because the function of *enim* is highly compatible with the rhetorical relations Explanation and Justification, it may seem to act as a causal connector, and in later stages of the language might even have developed into a full-blown causal connective. From a synchronic point of view, however, we are to conclude that *enim* does not activate the sequential dimension, or only very weakly.¹⁹

¹⁷ See KROON (1995) for more extensive argumentation.

¹⁸ In (7) *enim* could in essence be replaced by *nam*, although this would lead to a slightly different interpretation of the text: *enim* suggests that the interlocutor is supposed to already know Plato’s terminology, whereas the use of *nam* (in addition to pointing to a rhetorical relationship of Explanation) would have implied that the speaker is filling in a potential informational blank on the part of the interlocutor. In (25) a Justification interpretation and a replacement of *enim* by *nam* is impossible.

¹⁹ Recently, there has been a rise of interest in the post-classical developments of *enim* and other discourse markers. See e.g. LANGSLOW (2000), ROSÉN (2005 ; 2009), KISS (2007 ; 2010); KRYLOVÁ (2009); GALDI (2010).

7. Conclusions

In this article I have argued that the 'causal conjunctions' *quoniam*, *nam*, *quippe* and *enim* are (in contrast to, for instance, *quia*) indexical signs which each give markedly different instructions as to how their host unit fits into the wider discourse context. Describing these words as markers of causal relationships appears to be a gross oversimplification of their actual meaning and function in the discourse.

For a more nuanced description of these markers and of the differences between them, we should take into account at least three different dimensions of discourse that may be activated by these words: a modal dimension, an interpersonal dimension, and a sequential dimension. Moreover, we should abandon the idea that these markers have scope over (and establish relationships between) grammatical clauses: the words involved can only be accounted for in terms of discourse structure and discourse units, the latter of which do not necessarily coincide with grammatical clauses.

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See also: Josine Schrikkx, Bibliography of Latin invariables/particles;
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