Re: Paik. On time, changeability and identity in the conservation of Nam June Paik’s multimedia installations

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CHAPTER 7.
Heterotemporalities: Inside and Outside of the Medium

7.1 Media Temporalities: Film-, Video-, and Paik Time

I think I understand time better than the video artists who came from painting-sculpture. … Music is the manipulation of time. … As painters understand abstract space, I understand abstract time. Nam June Paik

These words articulate that there can be a different understanding of time in various media and that the musicological roots of Paik’s media art impose on those conceptualising them a particular engagement with time. Paik reassures us that ‘At any rate, one must stress that this is neither painting nor sculpture, but a “time- art”. To grasp time in media signifies a deep preoccupation with its specificity and the ways in which it is manipulated. The conservation of installations incorporating media components has to engage with specific media temporalities and devise new ways of dealing with time. The relation of conservation to time, as I showed in the last chapter, has to be rethought with regard to its own canon and principles – the time of conservation, but also under the consideration of time that imbues objects and time that is affected by them – the time of the media.

This is precisely the moment in which the Bergsonian theory serves the thesis’ argument by introducing a heterotemporal possibility for the existence of time. This heterotemporality will allow for venturing into the world of artworks enfolded in the individual temporalities of the many heterogeneous components that constitute them. It will take us on journey into the micro and macrocosmos of multimedia revealing their inner temporal relations and the relation to the museum and ‘the outside.’ Bergsonian theory criticises, as I have shown, sequential, spatialised time and it is this time that is also questioned by the

198 It somewhat also resonates with Stiegler’s theory of time according to which time both deploys technological media and is deployed within them (see section 7.9)
very nature of multimedia work incorporating video and film. Consequently, this conception of time is of necessity inappropriate for conservation of these works. The acknowledgement of the heterotemporal existence of an object in time will allow conservation to approach its 'objects' not only with a profounder awareness of time, but with diversified strategies adapted to their particular characteristics.199

One of the main problems leading to the underestimated value of time in conservation was that it did not accept the turn of the 1960s and 1970s in art towards different forms of artistic expression that incorporated time in their structure and introduction of media artworks with their divergence from conventional temporality. These decades marked by change and transformation evoked a different perception of time and resulted in the rise of new technologies, visions of globalism, innovative collaborations of artists and engineers, and landmarks in art criticism.200 Just as important, I argue, is the 1960’s love of technology and the different understanding of processed time that came with it. The application of technology as an artistic means opened up the possibilities of an open-ended creative processing of time, which is already discernible in Paik’s multimedia installations discussed in this thesis.

The post 1960s works realise something about time and affirm time. In relation to the art of this period, critic and curator Anne-Marie Duguet posited: “Time emerged not only as a recurrent theme but also as a constituent parameter of the very nature of an art work.”201 If these artworks bring the time issue to the fore, conservation’s imperative is to scrutinise it in order to consider the nature of its object. This is also to approximate an answer to the question from the beginning of this thesis pertaining to our understanding of what the artwork is and how, from the standpoint of conservation, it functions within and beyond a certain historical moment.

Media art incites us to think in unaccustomed ways about time. Ever since the technologies of sending images in camera obscura and storing images in lanterna magica were developed – drawing the attention to the issue of time – the history of the preoccupation with time and the management of the existent and generated temporalities in media took their beginnings.202 Following McLuhan’s proposition that the ‘content’ of any medium is always

199 Worth mentioning in the context of the proposed heterotemporality based on Bergsonism is the idea of 'hybrid times' and 'temporal trajectories' put forward by Steve Benford and Gabriella Giannachi in relation to art forms from the edge of live performance and (interactive) media installations. Steve Benford and Gabriella Giannachi, Performing Mixed Reality (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2011), 71-114.


201 Anne-Marie Duguet quoted in Michael Rush, New Media in Art (London Thames and Hudson, 2005), 13.

202 For the development of optical media, see Friedrich Kittler, Optical Media (Cambridge, Malden MA: Polity Press, 2002).
reflected in another medium and looking into the characteristics of the works discussed here, we may contend that time is an essential component of multimedia and technology-based installations.

Yet the time that governs the medium is not its effect – the imprint of time expressed in the process of alteration characteristic to all artworks and successfully elaborated on in a great number of studies in the conservation of traditional visual arts. Time has a much profounder relationship with multimedia works of art. The media of video and film are essentially about processing time. In video and film, from the traditional media of a film projector through diverse playback devises up to contemporary digital techniques, time is being recorded, converted, rewound, forwarded, arrested, condensed, compressed and unfolded – stretched and expanded. All together, in these media, time becomes a virtually tangible dimension that can be manipulated.203

Furthermore, like no other art form in the history of art making, media art refers to – and is embedded in – technological possibilities of the time in which it originates. So contrary to a painting or sculpture in which the tool and the medium, at least to a degree, remain timeless (even if culturally and historically specific within a longue durée), the media apparatus is always temporally referential and, seen from a current perspective, imposes a shift in perception from now to then.

In the following, reviewing film, video and media time, I will propose a deeper consideration of the time of the ‘object’ of conservation. This is in line with the dictum that a work of art conditions the conservation and not vice versa, and that the latter is, as I have already mentioned, the methodological moment of recognition of a work of art as such.204

7.2 Cinematic Time: The Time of the Film

The manipulable time is an essential component of the cinematic medium; it becomes clear when contemplating Paik’s Zen for Film under consideration of aspects of its specific temporality. In the following, to illustrate how the particular engagement of the medium with time experiences a transition from static image to the illusion of movement, I will explore the time of the medium of film on the basis of its development from photography. Subsequently, I will examine the time of Zen for Film and revisit its materiality as being intrinsically about processing time.

The different modes of thinking about time in film (and cinema) are related, on the one hand, to the motion of the film through the projecting apparatus, and, on the other, to the spectator’s immersion in another time dimension – recorded time and temporalities

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203 For the aspect of time in media discussed in the context of curation of new media art, see Beryl Graham and Sarah Cook, Rethinking Curating: Art After New Media (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 2010), 87-91.

different than his/her own. The time of the film is bound with the cinematic time, imposing a relationship between the apparatus and the spectacle of viewing. According to the French philosopher Michael Foucault, this immersion into other temporalities is a safe enterprise, with the assurance of returning to one's own.\textsuperscript{205} Cinematic time brought with it the possibility of entering other temporalities, and the promise of overcoming human finitude – a sort of immortality per se through the recordability of time. Last but not least, it also introduced the possibility of the archivability of time. Although, as it seems, in contrast to the temporality of the cinema, photography is permeated with a certain 'pastness,' the cinema itself poses at least two temporalities, that of the viewer and its experienced 'event' (spectatorial experience of the filmic flow) and that of the historicity of images made at a particular historical moment. So both the film technology and its narrative become dated – the images, just as photographic images, bear witness to the temporal moment in which they were recorded. Cinema and photography became practices with epistemological consequences.\textsuperscript{206}

The film is a further development of photography, which seems to be able to arrest a moment that it is recording with every successful usage of the shutter. This moment stands for a signature of temporality, an indexical sign of the present, a promise of the rematerialisation of time.\textsuperscript{207} In her book \textit{The Emergence of Cinematic Time} (2002), the American film theorist Mary Ann Doane underlines the impact of photography on the perception of the 'moment' as historically decisive. She maintains that “The snapping of the camera shares with the other modem technologies the drive to condense time, the inspiration for instantaneity.”\textsuperscript{208} The moment in photography is free from any hieratic subordinations; it is, in opposition to film with its clear sequential structure, indeterminate. As I have suggested in \textit{The Captive Moment}, the issue of ‘capturing the moment’ by instantaneous photography may, however, become complicated when seeing it from the perspective of conception of reality in terms of continuum familiar from Bergsonian indivisibility of real time. If reality does not consist of moments but is made of – in the words of Belgian art historian and theoretician Thierry de Duve – the ‘continuous happenings of things,’ the capturing of the moment in photography remains an impossible posture, producing a frozen gestalt, petrified versions of an otherwise fluid continuum.\textsuperscript{209} Notwithstanding its complex temporality, in common understanding, the product of photography suggests not only that time has indeed been paused, that it has

\textsuperscript{205} For Foucault, the ‘kinetoscope of time’ constitutes both a heterotopia and a heterochrony. Marie Ann Doane, \textit{The Emergence of Cinematic Time} (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002), 3.

\textsuperscript{206} Roland Barthes claimed the distinction between the contingency of the cinema in relation to its temporality (present tense) and the photographic ‘past’ of \textit{having been there} of the thing. It is, similar to the argument just presented, not a complete view. For a detailed discussion on this matter, see Doane, \textit{The emergence of Cinematic Time}, 142-143.

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., 14.

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{209} Thierry De Duve, “Time Exposure and Snapshot.”
experienced stoppage, but that the photographed event occurring only once might have been transcended – photography thus is able to repeat what could never be existentially repeated.  

In Camera Lucida (1980), one of the most lovingly but also, in terms of the anticipation of death, ambiguously formulated art critical articulations on photography, French literary theorist Roland Barthes epitomises the camera as a ‘clock for seeing.’ He also refers to the audible noise produced by the mechanical shutter of traditional photography.  

The transition between the time of photography and the time of film become represented in the invention of chronophotography – literally the photography of time – by Eadweard Muybridge and Jules Marey (see also section 6.5 for an illustration of spatialised time). Marey’s obsessive engagement in capturing the motion of bodies in time was associated with the drive to understand the dimension of time inaccessible to the human eye – psychological time. But it was only after he came in contact with Edward Muybridge, his American contemporary who published a series of photographs of motion taken by multiple cameras in a French journal in 1878, that Marey developed the technique so crucial for the history of film and cinema. His dream of indefinite divisibility of a continuum pointed to the desire of lossless representation of time.  

In Bergsonian terms, these frozen instances would reduce movement and duration into immobilities criticised by him in the upcoming invention of cinematograph. Paradoxically, the obsession with instantaneity and the present in the photography of meticulously traced movement led to the desire for its archivability, hence the ‘becoming the past of the present.’  

This atomisation of time rupturing its continuum became embodied in the materiality of film. The isolated frames of the filmstrip – the photograms – represent instances of time.  

The first cinematograph that was presented to the public by Lumière brothers in 1895 was based on the principle of chronophotographs, improved by the equidistant movement of the images through the projector thanks to perforations and a tooth–and–claw mechanism. This enabled the machine to reproduce movement creating an illusion of motion by projecting static photograms at a certain speed.  

The basic rule of the perceived motion in cinema is based on the physiological concept of afterimage; the theory of persistence of image – the capacity of the retina to retain an impression of an object for a fraction of a second after it has disappeared – assumes that...
every subsequent photogram persists and blends with the former so that they produce an illusion of motion. This persistent theory, it must be said, has been replaced by the cognitive psychology theories based on the notion of the critical threshold beyond which the human eye is incapable of perceiving difference.

The time of the film found its way in the philosophical consideration. In fact it was Bergson who posed ontological questions in relation to cinematic time. This re reconnects the argument in section 6.4 and allows for a better understanding of the time of film for its conservation. Most importantly for the following discussion of the time of Zen for Film, however, it is crucial to investigate Bergson’s view on cinematic time. For Bergson, early cinema became a legatee of homogenous, empty time, which, to reiterate, was a successor of the genealogy of the mechanical clock, telegraph and railway. Bergson discusses the way in which human intellect, in its mental faculty, perceives change or motion as an instance, in a single image. In the series of frozen images, the ceaseless flux is being captured in snapshots; the continual changes of form, the transition, are being frozen. This becomes manifest in the way he describes the cinematograph. The ability (or disability) of human perception of movement and duration in a series of instances – a kind of decomposition – lays the foundation for the analogy between human perception and the cinematograph, which substitutes the fluidity of motion for flickering images. Bergson used just this logic of cinematic apparatus to exercise his time critique. The illusion of movement, following this logic, was located on the side of the apparatus and was able to abstract a general movement. Rather than being real, the movement consists of the accumulation of the transition between the states, so that the cinematic ‘real time’ fails to be real just as the movement cannot be reconstituted out of immobilities. It must be said, however, that this critique was built on an infant stage of cinema. Deleuze, providing in his books Cinema I and Cinema II a profound analysis of the moving image in the last century, criticised Bergson for this approach allegedly focused on the intermittent mechanics of the apparatus rather than the perceptual continuity of the moving image. Deleuze discharged this misrecognition of the cinematic capabilities of representation of duration as taken from space in his claim that the continuity should be related to the spectator’s ability of perception of intermediate image as a continuum, and, simultaneously, of the impossibility of seeing singular photograms.

So how does this relate to Paik’s Zen for Film? What temporalities are imposed on us regarding the confrontation with the artwork? Are we dealing here with a follow up of instances, or rather with a continuous movement?

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215 In the theory of colour, Goethe referred to the afterimages as ‘psychological colours.’ For a detailed discussion of this phenomena, see Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time, 70; Kittler, Optical Media, 147.

The time of *Zen for Film* is, first of all, time processed by the machine – the cinematic apparatus – present in the movement of a filmstrip through its mechanics in a sequence of discrete images. It should have become tangible, the cinematic time, imprinted in instances of presents-that-have-been, but simultaneously are-yet-not. Yet there is something peculiar about this temporal relationship; it conveys a skewed message. The film leader is empty, the frames – the time frames – non-existent. Paik’s blank filmstrip is not, as it has often been asserted, an unexposed film. Rather, it is a clear film leader, conveying no message, no spatial intervals and no temporal record in a cinematic sense. On Paik’s film there is indeed nothing that has been stopped, no instances recorded, no photograms or any kind of pictorial presence. Ironically, this can only become revealed once the conversion of the traditional filmic logic is disclosed. Because there is a permanent lack of any motion that had to be resurrected in a continuous flow of frozen instances under stereoscopic illumination – the motion exists only in the machine pulling the transparent leader through its spools – the discussion on the reduction of movements and duration into immobilities might become subsumed. Bergson’s critical legacy concerning cinema as a substitution for the fluidity of real motion and illusion of ceaseless, durational flux seems to be suspended by Paik’s annihilating manoeuvre. The trace of traditional cinematic rhythm is still present in the blinking illumination of the projector, whereby the light ray addresses no rectangular frame form. If there are no stoppages, no time frames and singular instances, nothing to stumble upon while contemplating pure duration, *Zen for Film* becomes a subtle possibility for cinematic representation of duration. In these terms, Paik allegorises the temporal continuum on filmic medium and provides an ultimate token for a Deleuzian argument of cinema as continuity. Paradoxically, the non-content of the film is also, and even more so, a proof of the impossibility of representing pure duration.

If time is embalmed in photography and the filmic photogram, becoming an index, a record of a fraction of time, then *Zen for Film* clearly escapes this specific temporal presence. But what does it mean that Paik’s film has no relation to any recorded image, no reference carried within itself? This is crucial to understanding *Zen for Film* and the kind of temporality that it confronts us with. In his essay *Ontology* (1967) the French film critic and theorist André Bazin identifies the origins of art in the human drive to overcome death and defines photography as a successful preserving gesture against the destructive influences of the flow of time (confirmed in the replacement of the earlier death mask by a deathbed photograph, for instance). In Barthes’s *Camera Lucida* the presence of death is a recurring motif, inscribed to life by photography and hence overcoming the meditative function of religion and ritual. This is taken on by Laura Mulvey who, in her book *Death 24x a Second* (2006), adds new

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217 Jud Yakult assures us that these types of carriers were merely implemented to colour an existent film by tinting the desired areas on the clear leader and superimposing it on the proper film. Jud Yakult (artist), in discussion with the author, June 2012.

ways of conceptualising the relation of film to time. Following Godard’s conviction that a
photography freezes the reality in its transition from animate to inanimate, from life to death,
and film fulfils the conversion in reanimating the static frames, Mulvey proposes to define
the cinema as a ‘death 24 times a second.’\(^2\) If a frame is a static image and, of necessity,
characterised by a deathly aspect, Paik’s empty leader escapes from this stasis into the realm
of non-representability, distancing itself from the tradition of flicker film of this decade and
its relation to stillness and movement, frame and the projector.
Because there is no static frame, no image as a photogram whatsoever, the actuality of Zen for Film is always sustained.
So Paik’s film also transcends the cinematic death drive, the 24-times-a-second moments of
frozen temporalities, successful in circumventing the very medium condition on the slide
through the cinematic performance.

This is not to say, however, that Paik’s work is unrelated to finitude (rather than
death), which will, in effect, coincide with the trace. It should not escape our attention that
there is another temporality that Zen for Film does not manage to escape. It crystallises
gradually in the evidence of the mechanical impact of its running time – the intervals of
projection. It is time persistently imprinting its traces on the sensible surface of the celluloid,
and the time of the cyclical intervals of the projection running in an endless loop, apparently
seamless. It is the feature that distinguishes analogue from digital – the accumulation of
analogue traces on the celluloid leads to the obliteration of the content. Only that here, the
trace itself, the index of obliteration, becomes the visual content. What does it mean to have
all these traces on the film, in an ever-condensing manner of accumulation? Is time – the
time of the machine – being not only inscribed on its surface, but also compressed and, in a
way, concentrated? A trace left by a person – a line on the paper, for instance – has the ability
to transcend an object to another realm of existence. In analogue film, this role is taken over
by a machine. Zen for Film clearly exemplifies the mechanic inscription of time, the imprint
of the mechanical activity of the apparatus on the transparent film leader that transcends it
to another realm. Moreover, the aspect of exchangeability of the filmstrip suggests another
form of circumventing the death drive – by opening up new possibilities of repeated time
inscription. A new period of ‘usage’ is initiated with every exchange of the film leader, whereas
the loop would succumb to the trace faster than a film played from a spool – a ‘linear’ version.
From the point of view of the decision maker, it is interesting to look into the moment of the
replacement of the film, dictated by the condition of its usage. Is there a moment when the

\(^2\) One of the examples of the flicker film is Tony Conrad’s experimental The Flicker (1965, 28 min). Both
The Flicker and Zen for Film share a strong relation to the projection apparatus. Somewhat reassembling
the digitisation of Zen for Film, the Wikipedia entry on Conrad’s film mentions that The Flicker is ‘being
re-made digitally into a compact computer program by Tony Conrad’s son.’ “The Flicker,” Wikipedia,
film is sufficiently 'used,' ready to be replaced? When does the time imprint stop, or, when it is 'completed'? To be sure, this is a matter of subjective judgement.

This accumulation of traces on the transparent filmstrip in *Zen for Film* takes us to another intriguing dimension, namely the relation between the imprint of time and the transparency of the film. The visible relationship between transparency and opacity is intriguing insofar as the former is commonly assigned a higher value than the latter. Transparency is a matter of judgement and may only be assessed in relation to a state of lesser or higher transparency. Here, the process of time imprinting its trace on the film leader signifies a gradual loss of transparency, leading ultimately to a state of opacity. One of the possible readings of this circumstance would suggest the idea of a criticism of transparency in Paik’s filmic endeavour. Transparency means the avoidance of alteration, change in response to the flux of time. It enables undistorted seeing. Transparent works are timeless, and the imprint of time, in whatever form it might take place, clearly complicates them. So the transparency, the revelation of the very transparent surface itself rendered in Paik’s film opaque is a question of representation revealing the reality of the medium. Alteration, the loss of transparency, and decay may themselves become highly aesthetic experiences, as has been demonstrated by Bill Morrisons’s film *Decasia* (2002), which addresses both the beauty of decay versus the deadly effects of time. 221 Paik’s step to the side in the evolution of image culture, the maximum reduction in *Zen for Film*, a certain kind of conceptual erasure of pictorial strata, recalls Robert Rauschenberg’s iconic *Erased de Kooning Drawing* of 1953, where the unmaking of one work became simultaneously the creation of another (related to the trace of the removal of the trace). 222 The unmaking would signify here the refusal of the narrative, and the creation, in a positivistic sense, of an added (rather than reduced) value through the accumulation of the traces of time and decay. *Zen for Film* allows for a different kind of contemplation of decay, creating a remarkable level of an aesthetic encounter. 223 Indubitably, there is a positivism to the imprint of time in Paik’s *Zen for Film*, a positive value that inverts the relationship between transparency that enables seeing, to the lost of transparency endowing another quality to what is being seen (or to what is becoming less visible and more opaque). And rather than in an instant, this new dimension of seeing reveals itself in time, in duration.

221 In a different way than Paik’s clear filmstrip, *Decasia* addresses the very process of change in an altered archival film footage. Evoking simultaneously positive (beauty of decay) and negative connotations (deadly effects of time), it elevates the commonly avoided effects of time to the essence of its spectacle.


223 The material (physical and chemical) change of the leader will occur independently from the imprint of trace, yet assuming that in *Zen for Films* operable condition its replacement overtakes the pace of material-specific decay, I have chosen not to address it here.
The cinematic time of *Zen for Film* involves necessarily the temporality of the viewer. This links us with the aspect of participation discussed in section 5.3 and the Duchampian credo that the spectator, through the act of interpretation, contributes to the work of art.\(^{224}\) The time of spectatorship in this context means the engagement of the viewer with what is being seen or not seen, depending on the level of this engagement. The intensity of it is strictly bound with the duration of the spectacle, which, as has been suggested, unfolds in time. The time of the spectatorship is the junction between the act of empathising with the work and the viewers’ own temporal condition. The viewer confronts the image and perceives the cinematic happening, divorced from the time of the outside moving tirelessly in an entropic expansion, independently from his/her perception and irrelevantly to his/her existence. *Zen for Film* becomes a kind of an ‘indifferent’ entropy, which may be compared with works of artists that address entropy in different ways, such as Dieter Roth’s organic assemblages or Eva Hesse’s unstable plastics. Here, the indifferent entropy reminds us of the temporality of the Zen, a non-quantifiable, non-directional, non-progressive movement.\(^{225}\) According to the British philosopher and Zen theorist Alan Watts, the course of time is the travelling of a wave on the ocean, of which the actual movement is the rhythm of ups and downs, whereas the directional movement is illusory.\(^{226}\) Time and space become integrated to ‘here-now’, a living space-time, whereas the time refuses to be a quantifiable and punctuated unit, a linear progression through past, present and future. The Zen time is neither symmetrical nor reversible, neglecting the clock of natural science; Zen ‘takes time to be living.’\(^{227}\) The Zen understanding of time opposes the significance of the present that may only contain records.

Perhaps the last remark worth mentioning on the temporality of Paik’s filmic work might be directed to a broader context of the temporal perception of the medium’s physical presence. Paik’s *Zen for Film*, of necessity, requires a projector to be screened. In the days of the digital cloud, the ubiquitous presence of the web and the oversaturation with sophisticated display technologies, a number of contemporary artistic productions deliberately employ film projectors not only due to the necessity of the screening itself, but owing to their sculptural, if not audible, relevance. But yet the physicality of this apparatus carries with it another presence, one related to the past, according to the suggestion of the literary critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin: ‘The medium through which works of art continue to influence later ages is always

\(^{224}\) In his speech to the American Federation of Artists in 1957, Duchamp declared that ‘the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adding his (her) contribution to the creative act.’ Marcel Duchamp, “The Creative Act,” *ARTnews* 56 no. 3, May 1957. For a discussion on participation and interactivity, see Daniels, “Strategies of Interactivity.”


\(^{226}\) Ibid.

different from the one in which they affect their own age.\footnote{228}{Moreover, in those later times its impact on older works constantly changes, too. Nevertheless, this medium is always relatively fainter than what influenced contemporaries at the time it was created.} Clattering mechanics, the light source, sometimes the flicker – it all evokes emotions, if not melancholy, it engages us in the act of remembrance following the reconstructive path of memory. Its deliberate choice incites the viewer to be removed from the present to the time when this particular display technique was used for film screenings, movie theatres, often hidden behind the curtain or concealed in a projection room. Today, often displayed centrally or, at the least, visibly, the filmic apparatus becomes a significant sculptural element in exhibitions and acquires a status different than the one initially intended.

During the Maciunas’ \textit{Fluxhall} in 1964, Paik’s film was played from a device widely used in the 1960s, to mention only the films that Jud Yakult made of Paik’s early videos, and which also required this type of projection. The attention paid to it was no greater than that paid to DVD playback nowadays.\footnote{229}{For a discussion of the perception of film, and video apparatus and the impact that digital technologies had on analogue formats, see “Roundtable on Digital Experimental Filmmaking” [Malcolm Turvey, Ken and Flo Jacobs, Federico Windhausen, Mark Street], \textit{October} 137 (2011): 51-68; and Frederic Windhausen, “Assimilating Video,” \textit{October} 137 (2011): 69-83.} The projector was, in a sense, to adapt Rosalind Krauss’ assertion, in a kind of ‘premedium condition,’ a medium which of necessity is there, is at hand, and is being used, precisely because at that particular moment in the evolution of technologies, there was no other choice than the choice of a film projector to project a filmic work (comparable nowadays with the ubiquitous use of a digital projector and digital image in gallery rooms). The presence of a projector in Paik’s work did not result from his attraction to the outmoded forms of the early techniques of the cinema described by Krauss in relation to Marcel Broodthaers’ filmic work \textit{A Voyage on the North Sea} (1974) in which the filmic medium in its obsolescence demonstrates a redemptive quality.\footnote{230}{Rosalind Krauss, \textit{A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age of the Post-Medium Condition}, (London: Thames and Hudson, 2000). See also Michael Newman, “Salvage,” in \textit{Tacita Dean} (Musée d’Art Moderne de la Ville de Paris/Steidl, 2003), 11 pages, unpaginated.} Rather, it might be argued, the materiality of the film projection was embedded in technological relations of its own time.

After the advent of new, digital media, the way in which filmic projections and diverse analogue techniques are perceived and implemented in artistic practice has undoubtedly changed. The machines and the medium are endowed with their pastness, with the melancholy directed towards times that once were but are no more. As I pointed out, Paik’s works are often understood as ‘possibilities of experience,’ rather than ‘objects.’ In this sense, and in consideration of the temporal condition, the possibility of experience of \textit{Zen for Film} acquires another meaning – the meaning of the temporal shift between the time of its inception and the presence apparent in the archaeological touch of the apparatus in our present. In changing
its valency, meaning and potential in relation to the development of other media, Paik’s work becomes both temporal and historical.

For conservation, it is first necessary to understand the logic of *Zen for Film* in order to draw conclusions concerning its conservability. Rather than conserve the film leader in order to maintain its projection in the form in which it existed in Paik’s moment, it is a question of the repeated process of its deterioration and replacement. We should therefore speak of the unconservability of *Zen for Film’s* leader rather than its conservability in the material sense. If we were to stop the projection in order to prevent gradual damage, there would be nothing to experience. Showing a new leader provides the experience of the work for the viewer. This recalls the association with Rauschenberg’s *White Paintings*, which have to be repainted in order to be experienced (see section 4.2), and in the case of which, allowing for conservability of the material would signify an ‘unconservability’ of the experience, as it were. In this perpetuity of new beginnings, both *Zen for Film* and *White Paintings*, paradoxically ‘return’ to some kind of intended form. But can one speak of conservation, in that sense, at all?

Let us look one last time at *Zen for Film*, where, in this context, the question still remains whether the presence of a projector can be guaranteed for the future. Perhaps, just as the ‘original’ film spool that has been exhibited in a vitrine next to the projection, the deactivation of *Zen for Film’s* projector will come with its obsolescence and unavailability. Yet the experience of both the filmic time and spectatorial experience of the filmic flow would herewith be extinguished. There is one more conclusion that we may draw on the grounds of this discussion. The medium is always temporally referential, meaning that the distance to its original implementation in an artwork increases the awareness of its historical condition, and that in Paik’s film projection, remediation will always involve a change – either a translation or a suppression – of its characteristic temporality.231

### 7.3 Television and Video Time

Paik himself instigated the transition from film to video. Here, *Zen for Film* might be seen as being on the cusp of premedium and obsolete medium. The new medium of video (and television) offered artists a more direct and immediate effect than film. It should not be left unmentioned that video also changed the way in which film operated – at the time of the wide availability of video associated with low costs of production, film became perhaps a historically sophisticated, yet, at the same time, economically less appreciated technology.232

The concept of remediation put forward by David Bolter and Richard Grusin may be helpful

231 For a discussion on temporal translation of media, see section 7.4; for a suppression of temporality in technological ruins, see section 7.5.

232 “Roundtable on Digital Experimental Filmmaking.”
in understanding this transition. Leaning on McLuhan’s assumption that “the content” of any medium is always another medium, remediation – a term coined to complicate the notion of ‘repurposing’ – assumes that new media follow the logic of old media in presenting themselves as improved versions of other media. The cultural work of new media is never isolated from the social and economic context. The particularity of new media lies precisely in the ways in which older media are refashioned and how older media refashion themselves to answer the challenges of new media.

Before discussing video, I will first offer some insights into the characteristics of television, and there are two reasons for this. First, the immediacy of the technical manipulation of TV sets was crucial for Paik’s first solo exhibition in Wuppertal and which gave direction to subsequent developments. Second, as an electronic medium, video shares technical characteristics with television. It is also interesting to problematise Paik’s discussed works such as Zen for TV or Moon is the Oldest TV from the perspective of remediation. Whereas the former become a certain kind of remediated concept of a chance event, the latter exemplifies how a manipulation undergoes transition to the new medium video. Paradoxically, and as a proof of the possibility of a non-chronological remediation, in Jud Yakult and Paik’s Electronic Moon No.2 (1966–69) Paik’s manipulation of Moon is the Oldest TV is transferred to 16mm film. In a remarkable mode of temporal translation, inverting the genealogy of medium, the encoded visualisation became again a photogram. To reiterate, the temporal structure of film is different from video and television. In Moon is the Oldest TV, a certain punctual immediacy of electronic image that emerges in response to the mechanical intervention in deflection circuit becomes repeatable, playable and linear when recorded on video. In order to understand the specific temporalities that are involved in these processes, I will now briefly explain how they come into existence.

234 ‘The content of writing is speech, just as the written word is the content of print, and print is the content of the telegraph. … For the “message” of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs. The railway did not introduce movement or transportation or wheel or road into human society, but it accelerated and enlarged the scale of previous human functions, creating totally new kinds of cities and new kinds of work and leisure. This happened whether the railway functioned in a tropical or a northern environment, and is quite independent of the freight or content of the railway medium. The airplane, on the other hand, by accelerating the rate of transportation, tends to dissolve the railway form of city, politics, and association, quite independently of what the airplane is used for.’ Marshal McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York, Signet, 1964), 23-35 and 63-67. Bolter and Grusin see in McLuhan’s proposition more complex kind of ‘borrowing’ in which one medium is itself incorporated or represented in another medium. Bolter and Grusin, Remediation.
235 Ibid., 15.
236 Ibid.
237 This strategy as a kind of subversion of artistic structures was characteristic of Fluxus. In Vostell’s Fluxus Films (Sun in Your Head, Fluxfilm No. 23, 1963) the 8mm film camera is directed to film a videotaped material from television programs. Michael Rush, Video, 69.
Television is in strict opposition to film and photography, with their discrete sequence of images and analogy to nature.\textsuperscript{238} In his brilliantly formulated essay \textit{Video, Flows and Real Time} (2007) the sociologist and philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato posits:

Photography is already a technology that crystallises time because the image is bound to the shutter speed and, therefore, to the ability to capture time. It registers a development by fixing it. Film makes the still image run, thus causing the ‘illusion’ of movement (according to Bergson’s definition). Yet video technology captures movement itself: not something moving in space, but the ‘pure oscillations’ of light.\textsuperscript{239}

Television is, to the same extent as video, distinct from the sequential division of time in frames; it offers a direct transmission by the way of disintegration of forms into raster elements transmitted point by point.\textsuperscript{240} In line with Kittler’s assumption that all media were invented in response to military needs, the cultural theorist Paul Virilio ascribes the invention of television to the war industry, claiming that, as a ‘media of accidents,’ it cannot be used as art.\textsuperscript{241} This contradicts the optimistic (and influential for Paik) vision of McLuhan, who saw in television an emerging art form. McLuhan’s vision of a mythical and integral world connected through satellite medium was expressed in an idea of a \textit{global theatre} – a further development of the former notion of \textit{global village} – which aimed at turning the world into a programmed theatre.\textsuperscript{242}

Nonetheless, despite their technological differences, it is rather difficult to strictly draw a line between television and video as artistic media as the latter often used television to be transmitted, and television (broadcasts or manipulation), just as well, could be transferred to video.\textsuperscript{243} The prophecy that television would not prove to become an artistic medium failed. The \textit{Fernsehergalerie Schum} (Television Gallery Schum) established in Germany by Gerry Schum in 1967–70 was successful in transmitting and ‘communicating’ art around 1970 on the official broadcast of Deutsche Fernsehen.

Paik’s manipulation of the electronic vision played with the effect of immediacy in many ways. For instance, his \textit{Magnet TV} allowed the viewer direct interaction with the flow

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{238} The invention of television is attributed to the young German physics student Paul Nipkow and dated 1883. Kittler, \textit{Optical Media}, 209.
\bibitem{243} For example, Paul Garrin recalls recording Paik’s \textit{Moon is the Oldest TV} on videotape. Garrin, discussion.
\end{thebibliography}
of electrons in the tube. A novelty in its time, such interactions engaged the viewer in the otherwise obscure technological interiors of monitors in a rather immediate way. This might be seen as an intervention in the specific temporality of the medium expressed in the image instantaneously viewable on the screen. It must be mentioned, however that, at the same time, other artists implemented TV monitors as a medium.\textsuperscript{244} For instance, rather than playing with the modulation of vision, a number of Vostell’s sculptural television objects such as \textit{Concrete TV Paris} (1974–81, Fig. 7.1) were embedded in concrete, implying a certain type of finitude (and impossibility of a non-invasive migration).

Yet Paik’s manipulated televisions reveal something more than the sheer modification of an image. Unlike a video that can be migrated and re-played, their temporality, dependent on the technology used (cathode ray tube) and moment in time (1960s) are barely transferable to present conditions. In 1963, the TV set already mentioned, soon to become \textit{Zen for TV}, was transferring an image of the only available TV broadcast in Germany while it collapsed into a line (see section 5.2). Obviously the analogue broadcast of the 1960s does not match the digital broadcast of today (content or technology-wise) and, as far as I am aware, there have been no attempts to recover \textit{Zen for TV}’s authentic (tele)vision of that time. This leads to the assumption that the authentic temporal translation of \textit{Zen for TV} is thus impossible. Unless unleashed from its specific temporality – as the MTV video wall is in the project \textit{Something Pacific} addressed in the subsequent section – the self-enclosed logic of TV time is by its nature temporally fixed.

It has already been argued that from a technological standpoint, video operates on different mechanisms than film and, as an electronic medium, it shares its technical characteristics with television. Crucial for the definition of the syntax of the image, the technology of a video signal displayed on a monitor is determined by the technology of transmitted signals.\textsuperscript{245} In contrast to the singular image frame of a film, two interlocked half images staggered in time create what is seen as a constant image on the screen. The vidicon, a photosensitive coating able to register the pattern of light and dark is scanned by an electron beam and subsequently creates a video signal. The video information is encoded in the scanning lines from left to right. The electronic signal runs vertically and horizontally constructing and deconstructing the image in the camera and on the screen synchronously. This technological capacity of video is crucial to the temporal practices of video artists. One of the greatest advantages of the medium was just this possibility of translation of events happening in time into an encoded system of data and the ability to repeatedly replay it, creating a temporal loop of sorts.

\textsuperscript{244} Tom Weselman, Günther Uecker, César, Isidore Isou, Akrt Gerstener, to name but a few. Daniels, “Television – Art or Anti-Art?”

The emergence of the first artistic video has changed the way in which both the artist and the viewer encountered the temporal dimension. With the implementation of the first half-inch video cameras both the image and time became easily – and later economically – recordable, manipulable and viewable shortly after the recording. 'I think that was a revolution in terms of access' maintains the experimental documentary filmmaker Lynn Sachs. She continues:

Because of its accessibility, more people could enjoy the freedom of using the new media for creative thinking. People started to believe you could be a 'filmmaker' without being a 'director,' and that making a film could be an autonomous act from start to finish, as painting and writing are.246

To experiment with motion picture there was now no need to carry a heavy film or television camera. The long waiting times for film processing and related high costs vanished with the introduction of Sony's Portapak that seemed to be invented specifically for the needs of artists. The first artistic implementation of video was famously ascribed to Paik.247 The reason for this is lapidary – his first motive taped with a portable video camera acquired with the Rockefeller Foundation grant was the Pope visiting New York in October 1965. Later that day, Paik played his recorded material during an event at Café au GoGo. And although the technological video (art) history commenced in 1965, it remains unclear whether the famous recording was made factually using Sony's Portapak. In his seminal publication Zur Geschichte des Videorecorders (1986), the German media theorist Siegfried Zielinski maintains that the legendary Portapak, the first portable half-inch unit produced by Sony became available in Japan and the United States only in 1967.248 This implies that the Pope must have been filmed with a different, since forgotten, half-inch device.249

The temporal immediacy – the instant feedback – that according to Krauss differentiates video from other visual art and that became important in the artistic

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246 "Roundtable on Digital Experimental Filmmaking."
247 Paik went over to history as a 'patriarchal male figure preoccupied with religious context.' Rosler, Video, 45. Paik was not the only one experimenting with video at that time. Andy Warhol, for instance, undertook a number of experiments with video equipment more exquisite and hardly affordable technologies.
248 Zielinski, Zur Geschichte des Videorecorders, 155. In opposition, Michael Rush in his monograph Video Art indicates that Paik's recording of the Pope was carried out using Portapak. Rush, Video Art, 213.
249 Christoph Blase (art journalist and founder of the Laboratory for Antiquated Video Systems, ZKM) suggests that Paik must have used Sony TCV-2010 that could be connected to a 110 V in a cab. He could have shown the video directly thereafter pulling out the little screen of the 35 kg device. Christoph Blase, "Willkommen im Maschinen-Labyrinth: Vom Bandlauf der Videoformate zwischen 1960 und 1980," in Record Against: 40 Jahre Videokunst.de Teil 2, eds. Christoph Blase and Peter Weibel (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2010), 329-340. German video artists waited until 1969 when Grundig and Phillips launched their portable half-inch appliances, although it is known that Grundig completed the first prototype already in 1965. Rudolf Frieling, "VT - TV – The Beginnings of Video Art," in Medien Kunst Interaktion – die 60er und 70er Jahre in Deutschland, eds. Rudolf Frieling and Dieter Daniels (Vienna: Springer, 1997), 122–129.
implementation of the medium in the 1970s preoccupied Paik in depth. The closed-circuit installation series emerged in the 1960s based on a Buddha statue gazing at his own image on the screen presents the viewer with a new presence – simultaneity – approximating real time and making it tangible. For Paik, ‘video is time’ meaning that the dispositive of video technology ‘imitates’ the relationship between the different temporalities involved. Lazzarato compares the video machine to a brain, translating movements that are not perceivable in our categories of space and time into movements that can be perceived. His assumptions are based on Paik’s interpretation of video based on the translation of spatial information into signals thus allowing us to enter the temporal dimension.

Paik was convinced of the historical necessity of the electronic television that found expression in a manifesto entitled Electronic Video Recorder (1965, disseminated at the same time as the first screening at Café au GoGo). In the manifesto he states:

It is the historical necessity, if there is a historical necessity in history, that a new decade of electronic television should follow to the past decade of electronic music. … Someday artists will work with capacitors, resistors and semi-conductors as they work today with brushes, violins and junk.

In the same manner of comparing electronic arts with traditional painting, Paik describes his next invention as very much related to the temporal immediacy of image transmission. In relation to the video synthesiser developed with the Japanese engineer Shuya Abe in 1970, and which enabled an instantaneous transmission and decomposition of images from seven inputs at the same time, Paik posited: “This will enable us to shape the TV screen canvas as precisely as Leonardo, as freely as Picasso, as colourfully as Renoir, as profoundly as Mondrian, as violently as Pollock and as lyrically as Jasper Jones.” Initially, the video synthesiser was based on an audio synthesiser and leaned on the logic of musical performance. It enabled a live transmission of the mixed image: ‘One simply plays it and one immediately sees the effect’ contended Paik. The WGBH live broadcast Video Commune broadcast in the summer of 1970 enabled passers-by to take part in the four-hour-long performance through spontaneous interaction with the synthesiser. The video synthesizer may be seen as acting in the realm of temporal freedom, with the ability to mix the input as long as it responds to its analogue

251 Lazzarato, “Video, Flows and Real Time.”
255 ‘Man spielt einfach und man sieht den Effekt.’ Ibid.
build-up. Upon closer look, however, this freedom may become elusive. In the time of digital techniques and image processing, can this ground-breaking technology of the 1970s equipped with new content still represent what it once was?256

7.4 Conservation as Temporal Translation and Temporal Forms of Artworks

As I have shown, the temporalities involved in media have an impact not only on their behaviour, but also on ways in which they are perceived and presented. More importantly, conservators engaged with these media have to understand and take into account their complex, temporal logic. Remediation as a sort of continuation of the work may only be legitimated if the temporality of the ‘conservation object’ is sufficiently taken account of. From this perspective, it may be agreed to consider conservation as an intervention in the temporal structure of works of art processing time. A double progression of this proposition results from the specific internal temporality of the media on the one hand and, on the other, from conservation defined as a process paramountly engaged with time.

A further consequence of the acknowledgement of temporalities internal to film, television and video – of necessity limited in this thesis to media implemented for Paik’s artistic purposes – may allow us to define these media by their temporality. Consequently, if conservation could be defined as a temporal intervention in media intrinsically incorporating time, it may further be suggested that it is a temporal translation of these art forms, best observable in the processes of migration (Arche Noah’s playback equipment), emulation (Zen for TV’s CRT tube replacement in the autographed casing) and reinterpretation (Zen for Film manipulation at the Tate Liverpool). Since translation is a mode – paraphrasing Benjamin – one has to return to the ‘original’ in order to comprehend it and prove its translatability, in other words to prove whether the nature of the work lends itself to translation, and perhaps even

256 Similarly, and related to the temporal immediacy, Random Access exemplifies how Paik seeks to overcome the limitation of the access to auditory information encoded on a tape. Yet at the time of CDs, DVDs and MP3-based technologies and other formats of digital data encoding, the time-based character of the earlier works is conquered. In a later text Paik notices himself that the development of a videodisc (laser disc) already helped in overcoming the linearity of a videotape. Nam June Paik, "Artificial Intelligence vs Artificial Metabolism," in Nam June Paik: Fluxus/Video, ed. Wulf Herzogenrath and Sabine Maria Schmidt (Verlag De Buchhandlung Walter, 2000), 252-253.
calls for it. Thus, it may be said that translation, or remediation, may already be inherent in the work’s nature. This implies that there can be media or elements of media that do not lend themselves to translation. Zen for TV’s collapsed image exemplifies the impossibility of temporal translation with regard to the broadcast of the 1960s that it transmitted in the exhibition in Wuppertal. To recall the discussion of the autographic moment (section 3.5), within the current conservation culture, the temporal translation would not be possible in the case of elements that bear a trace of the artist’s hand or signature (the story of Canopus). From a broader perspective, we may question whether the temporal translation of the participatory art and the novel media of the 1960s and 70s would succeed in present times. This recalls Dipert’s assertion that the higher intentionality may relate to the impact of a medium as a novelty – its Wirkung – rather than the concern about the mere means, a fetish (see section 3.4). Certainly, such translation will necessarily transform, since we transform what we inherit, according to Lowethal (see section 6.4).

Perhaps one last remark on a temporal view of media should be devoted to its origins that somewhat echo Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s division between spatial and temporal art and its (belated) critique in media and art theories. Lessing’s distinction between painting and visual art on the one hand and poetry and literature as time-art on the other was contested by McLuhan who posited that electronic media conflate space and time. In his book Gutenberg Galaxy (1962), McLuhan argues for the necessity of understanding media in terms of ‘space-time.’ There is a consequence that could be drawn from these assertions. I suggest that, like temporal art, in its response to the flux of time, ‘spatial art’ may be also viewed as temporal, yet slower rather than fast. This proposition aims at defining the medium by its temporality

257 ‘Translation is a mode. To comprehend it as a mode one must go back to the original, for that it contains the law governing the translation: its translatability. … Does its nature lends itself to translation and, therefore, in view of the significance of the mode, call for it? … Translatability is an essential quality of certain works, which is not to say that it is essential that they be translated; it means rather that a specific significance inherent in the original manifest itself in its translatability.’ Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator,” in The Translation Studies Reader Lawrence, ed. Venuti, (London: Routledge, 2000), 76. Benjamin’s complex thought goes far beyond my usage in this thesis; yet the idea of translation in the context of conservation and the comparison of literary translation within the conservation of media offers an interesting field of enquiry, already hinted upon in conservation literature. For this matter, see Jonathan Rée, "Auto-Icons," in Conservation: Principles, Dilemmas and Uncomfortable Truths, eds. Alison Richmond and Alison Bracker (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2009), 2.


260 Ibid. It is interesting, however, that Paik himself was interested in Lessing’s distinction: “The more I work with Video, the more I think about Lessing’s distinction of Space art and Time art. … Video is preemptive. If you are watching NBC, you cannot watch CBS . . . or if you are watching Ira Schneider, you are not watching Frank Gillette (or vice versa).” Paik, “Input-Time and Out-Put Time.”

261 For ‘objects as slow events’ see Wharton, “Heritage Conservation as a Cultural Work,” 18.
with implication reaching beyond electronic and technology-based art. The much-referred to notion of ‘time-based art’ could thus encompass both the media incorporating and processing time and traditional media. Certainly, asserting that painting and sculpture responds slower to time may be contested by the argument that change in painting or sculpture may also be rapid and that the assessment of the pace of change is a matter of interpretation and depends on context. However, one may agree that if a comparison between a traditional painting and a video artwork were to be made, would the pace of change in the playback apparatus, data format and display technology not overtake the pace of change in a traditional, painted medium?

Perhaps a further specification of the involvement of media in time would be helpful. I propose that artworks may actively and passively respond to time. The passive response to time signifies a slower change that agrees with decay and degradation (see section 7.7). Art that responds to time faster would be actively involved with time by means of processing it and this would be intrinsic to film, video, TV artworks and multimedia. This kind of art may nevertheless involve the characteristic of slower art that passively responds to time reflected in the degradation, decay and ageing of their physical materials.

I believe that the passive response to time in painting and sculpture and its slower change might also have contributed to the construction of the paradox of reversibility or of ‘arresting’ time (see section 6.2). Unlike media artworks that respond to time faster, the range of time with which conservation of traditional painting or sculpture used to be preoccupied might have reached far beyond any provable dimension – works might have stayed ‘conserved’ for forty or fifty years after the intervention escaping the horizon of a professional activity of one generation of conservators. This is also one of the reasons why time has not been radicalised by traditional conservation. In the conservation of media works of art and installations incorporating media, the pace of change resulting in the many variants of changeability (see chapter 5) evokes a deeper contention with time, questioning the ruling conventions of understanding time and change (see chapter 6). These works, I suggest, not only allow us to scrutinise and radicalise the time for conservation, but also provoke the rethinking of traditional art – as changeable, more slowly.

It is thus no more a question of how can we conceive of and conserve works on the basis of what we know about conventional art and its conservation, but rather how can we understand and maintain traditional artworks through the scope of temporal awareness derived from media artworks. In other words, the understanding of time from media artworks alters the way in which the conservation of traditional art may be approached by shifting its imperative to the acceptance of change.
7.5 Transcending Obsolescence? The Paradox of Ruins

One of the most fascinating examples of how media art and multimedia installations can not only process time but also transform it is revealed in relation to technological ruins. In this short digression towards things deprived of their original function as the result of decay and obsolescence I will show how the transfer between artworks actively engaged with time to those passively engaged with time may take place, how the time of the work coincides with the time of the outside (anticipating section 7.7) and, furthermore, how different temporalities merge with one another evoking a presence of yet another temporality, a temporality of a suppressed activity and sustained stasis – a form of disabled technological presence. A curiosity of sorts, taking into account the fact that technology is obviously meant to perform a dynamic function, producing an image, an audio signal and various information. The installations I will address here distinguish themselves from one another when considering their ontological strata, but meet again in the shared fate of their deactivation, being no longer producers but worn-out components of an earlier activity. Most importantly, however, they inherit a thought that adheres closer to this thesis than might have appeared – the thought of conservation.

*Rembrandt Automatic* (Fig. 7.2), the deactivated TV set already mentioned was endowed with a sculptural presence ever more reinforced by its defect. Interestingly, while some sources describe the aura of the light spread on the floor during the Parnass Gallery show, others maintain that the monitor was dark. When experienced nowadays, its dysfunction directs the attention of the viewer to the stillness of the casing, to a certain form of absence. What do we see here? Is it intended? What would we see if the screen had been turned towards us? This concealment of the eventuality of there being an image transfers perception into pure speculation, since what is there is a monumental casing, turned off and disabled in a double sense. It is disabled as a technical device in its switched-off condition, and disabled as an appliance presenting us, if properly positioned, with the possibility of an image – an electronic window. The active time of the medium in *Rembrandt Automatic* ceased to exist; what remained is a technological ruin governed by time that agrees with decay and alteration intrinsic to all artefacts. Would *Rembrandt* in this context mean more than just a brand?

The ruin represents transience and breakage and bears the traces of time as a historical palimpsest. Technological ruins may bear analogy with the classical ruin, depicted often symbolically as a fleeting representation of eternity. Yet technological ruin seems to contain the idea of what the artist Robert Smithson names the ‘ruin in reverse,’ it becomes

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a ruin before it is assembled. New ruins give a more brutal impression than classical ones.\footnote{This was central for Albert Speer’s Theory of Ruin Value (Ruinentheoriewert, 1969) disfavoured due to its political engagement in national socialism. Interestingly, Speer’s idea assumed building the Third Reich’s architecture in such a way that the ruins would be aesthetically pleasing to the viewer in thousands of years yet to come. See also Mats Burström, “Creative Confusion,” in Rethinking Time: Essays on History, Memory and Representation, eds. Hans Ruin and Andrus Er (Södertörn Högskola: Södertörn Philosophical Studies 9, 2011), 119-128.} In the technological ruin, the malfunction brings awareness to things – of their assemblages of technical parts and careful fitting.\footnote{Malfunction can become another perspective on things, exemplified by Bruno Latour’s classical example of an overhead projector. Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Harvard: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1999), 183.} Rembrandt Automatic’s bygone glory reminds us of the attempt of technology to overcome its \textit{incompatibility with time}. No longer strained by the obligation to transmit, the TV set sustains itself in its enclosed temporality preserving an image of a past.

\textit{Something Pacific} (1986) is Paik’s first outdoor installation, conceived for the Stuart Collection located at the campus of the University of California San Diego (Figs. 7.3 and 7.4). Outdoors the installation features a number of ensembles including statues of Buddha and (ruined) TV sets embedded in the landscape, a Watchman topped with a statue of Rodin’s \textit{Thinker}, and a \textit{TV Graveyard} – a pile of electronic rubbish thrown out of one of the windows of the Media Center.\footnote{As George Kubler puts it, once something is discarded it becomes a litter or scrap and thus introduces a reversal of values (George Kubler, The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008 [1962]). On Paik’s technological graveyard the value undergoes a double reversal – the equipment becomes discarded and becomes a scarp; it is re-evaluated in the form of an artwork. For conservation this seems to have crucial consequences: should the ‘scarp value’ prevail over the ‘art value’? For a discussion on values, see Riegl, “The Modern Cult of Monuments.”} Indoors Paik set up a video wall involving some 36 monitors displaying simultaneously in addition to one of Paik’s videotapes of a live feed of MTV (Fig. 7.5). The viewer could actively manipulate a part of the monitors using a Fairlight synthesiser. The scattered ruins in the grass of the campus – skeletal remains returned to nature – were conceived to contrast the interactive installation bound to the latest craze in broadcast television and dependent on the audience’s active participation. This work raises a number of interesting questions. As years passed, the synthesiser had to be repaired; but can we simply ‘allow the grass to continue growing’ over the video wall? And even if the characteristic silvery Samsung monitors – already a later replacement approved by the artist – could be obtained on the second-hand market and piled up in storage guaranteeing the initial look of the installation for the next decade or two, should the original live feed of MTV be displayed in the form of a recording from the 1980s? Or should the feed reflect the rather different content of the network today?
To a degree, in a later interview Paik releases us from this problem. In response to whether, in the case of a breakage, an attempt should be made to replace the Fairlight synthesiser by a similar model maintaining the state of technology of 1985–86, Paik asserts:

No, I think it should be made better. Every young kid expects more now from media. So they should go with the progress of industry. ... It's like a symphony. When you write a symphony each new generation comes along and changes it and that way it becomes better and better. We got Ormandy, and Toscanani, and they all make good work. They all make the conductor's work. Curators make good work now.267

If Paik’s attitude in response to technological progress and change should be decisive about upgrading the broadcast, the solution to our problem comes rather easily. Yet if intentionality were to be understood relationally and the historic value of the ensemble were to be of greater importance in making a decision, the video wall would present us with a dilemma. The process of emulation or the migration of an installation’s visible elements must always involve equilibrium between new and old components, and consider the meaning of the initial arrangement.

On Something Pacific’s technological yard, time is experienced in a remarkably transformed and ‘prolonged’ way. The device that commonly serves to actively manipulate the viewer’s perception of time, transmitting signals in real time and/or in delay, giving the possibility to rewind, fast forward or stop the flow of audiovisual output, is disabled here. The stasis speaks for another temporal presence; it is a conservation of dynamic time into a static one, a conservation of the technologic flow of temporalities into the movement of all things that decay in a more linear way, so to speak. So the technological apparatus becomes another identity, one of a more static object passively responding to time (see section 7.4), a thing that might or might not be conserved in terms of the traditional conservation of non-technological artefacts. The problems related to the performing elements of technological devices ceased to exist; what is there is a TV set or a Watchman, in their thingly presentness of plastic casings and glazings, buttons, grids and gitters, all so prone to weather conditions that it evokes a certain anxiety. The sun, its UV rays, the rain, air pollution, groundwater and salts, insects, worms, and – not least – the people (their dogs, moods and lawn mowers), a condition as distant from an optimal museum protective casket as one can possibly imagine. A truly superb joke of the video master – this confrontation in which we inevitably lose. Yet this rather pessimistic vision unveils an undertone of hope. And it sounds on the string of a peculiar preservation idea entailed in these deactivated technological elements. By underlining their static status, in these artworks, Paik transcends time in a double meaning:

267 Nam June Paik and Joan Simon, “Interview Nam June Paik,” in Landmarks: Sculpture Commissions for the Stuart Collection at the University of California San Diego, ed. Mary Livingstone Beebe et al. (New York: Rizzoli, 2001), 115.
time has been formerly transformed due to the inherent logic of the initially functioning devices and transcended again by their deactivation. The former activeness of the devices exists only in the sphere of the viewers’ unconscious or tacit knowledge – a TV obviously serves to transform visual impulses – so the ensemble is necessarily associated with lacking electronic vision paired with a peculiar displacement in the yard’s nature. The latter together with the double temporal flip mastered by Paik creates a sculptural graveyard of sorts, which escaped the fate of technological obsolescence. In common parlance, in its material form, it has thus, one could agree, a better chance for ‘eternity’ than it would have had in its original, active incarnation.268

In its own sense of time, the ruin presents us with a paradox. The concept of the technological ruin exists somewhere in the realm of a static object, but a static object that once experienced its own activity.269 In this sense, might time then become a memory of the static object? What does it mean then to remake a ruin? Can a ruin be ‘ruined’?

The grounds of the UC San Diego campus deliver a very interesting test for conservation as a process intervening in time. The sculptures in the yard are decaying and stakeholders prompted second-hand market research to retrieve equipment matching the casings of Paik’s ensemble.270 If the TV casings were to be replaced, the time of Something Pacific would be ‘rewound’ for a number of years until these casings equally fall victim to atmospheric conditions. To the yard, the time is anything but merciful. Should the ruins be left to their fate? Should we succumb to the lure of decay and prevent ‘lifting their timeworn remains out of their time’?271 Are we, as conservators, enemies of ruins or, rather, ruination?272

Discussing the archaeological approach to ruins the Finno-Swedish author Göran Schildt adopts a radical perspective:

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268 In this context, a digression on technological obsolescence opening up new horizons in the present, the art critic and historian Michael Newman contends: ‘What happens when the analogue technologies of memory are themselves left behind by the forward march of progress? This concerns not only the obsolete object, which may harbour an unrealised, even explosive, potential – the chance encounter for which the Surrealists hoped as they wandered the Paris flea markets. It also concerns the very technological medium of memory that is capable of transforming the modality of the past from a bygone actuality to something that has the potential to open up another future in the present. While the relation to the past considered as information is a matter of knowledge, the relation to it as trace is that of witness: it concerns us.’ Michael Newman, “Analogue, Chance and Memory,” in Tacita Dean: Film, ed. Nicholas Cullinan (London: Tate Publishing, 2011), 102–103.


270 Mathieu Gregoire (project manager Stuart Collection), in discussion with the author, May 2011.


272 Göran Schildt ascribes this attitude to the archaeological approach that acknowledges historical values in ruins and by all means tries to conserve them, even if this means obliterating other material evidence from the excavation. Ibid. The acknowledgement of the historical conditions of objects, which laid much of the foundation for conservation with respect to honouring the effects of time, may be seen in Ruskin’s approach to built heritage. Jokilehto, A History of Architectural Conservation, 174.
From … poetic or ontological [perspective] all conservation is a loss because it deprives the ruin of its essential quality: its relation to time. Can anything give us a more vivid understanding of time's exceptional dimension, and of our own place in this context than such flotsam and jetsam? 273

Interestingly, one of the Abschattungen of the technological ruins lies in the incredibility of its very being: unlike classical ruins, and nonetheless the piled graveyards of electronic dust polluting the earth in some far and too-distant-to-be-true country, technology seems to be too young to attract us with this decaying facet. 274 The conservation of ruins contradicts their nature – as something being about decay, degradation and ageing. The time intervention in the form of a replacement is a helpless gesture against the time working on the surfaces and structures of TV bodies. If the graveyard was conceived as something to awaken memories and thoughts, and to immerse the viewer in this psychedelic image of technology gradually surrounding itself to entropy, an intervention in this process is essentially misplaced. Yet if an intervention in time – a replacement – allows a prolongation of the work's experience, it lies in the nature of the conservator to feel tempted to act.

To resume, the technological ruins discussed here exemplify the transition between the active and passive engagement with time. The transfer takes place precisely between the former functions of an artwork's elements as equipment that processes time to something that is solely processed by time and thus responds to the passage of time in the conventional meaning of the word and similarly to traditional artworks. Furthermore, ruins, and in particular technological ruins, have an exceptional ability to transform time. As I have shown, this temporal transformation may be accomplished by the simple gesture of deactivation, amounting to opening another temporality of a sculptural, static object subscribed to its own temporal reasoning. The sense of duration that is being introduced by this gesture is distinct from the polychronic installations and no doubt from a temporal complexity of a multimedia installation. This is owing to the fact that, as I suggested, each medium has its own intrinsic temporality by which it might be defined. This temporality may become complicated by conservation's attempt to arrest time or to ‘reverse’ its passage. Similarly to Zen for Film’s leader, yet at the level of sculptural objects, the replaceability of ruins prompted by the collection challenges conservation's attitude towards values attached to an artwork's material evidence.

7.6 The Many Times of an Object

The technological ruins that already presupposed the divergence of temporalities in the object offer a convenient moment to set off on a crucial point in this argument, namely the temporal diversity of artworks and the dialectic of inner and outer time. This section builds upon the idea of heterotemporalities derived from Bergsonian theory (see section 6.4). Let us shortly recall Bergson's philosophical project. Bergsonian *durée* is a time of heterogeneity, 'succession without distinction,' multiplicity but not a sum; the heterogeneity of time presumes a temporal, nonidentical plurality and nonnumerical multiplicity, and the co-existence of the past in the present, along with the anticipation of the future. On these grounds, Bergsonian theory serves my argument in introducing a heterotemporal possibility for the existence of time. This is confirmed by the Bengali historian Dipesh Chakrabarty who purports that the present is a containment of heterotemporalities.\(^{275}\) In the pervious sections, this heterotemporality allowed for venturing into the specific temporalities of media on its various levels and qualities of engagement with time. In the present section and continuing in the following two sections, heterotemporality refers to the multitemporal strata of objects, which will be set in relation to the temporality of the outside. So from the discussion of the inner time of the object, the following discussion will introduce another level of, strictly speaking, temporal relativism.

Here, I propose to emphasise something that might already have been made clear. If singular media are characterised by specific temporalities, multimedia installations, rather than being monochronic, present themselves to us as *polychronic entities*. They entail many temporalities introduced by their constitutive parts, such as film and video carriers, playback and display equipment, sculptural elements of traditional nature, paintings, photographs and, at times, organic components. Additionally, technological components may be – with the exception of deactivated technological ruins – sources of another transformed temporality, a temporality of video collage, closed circuit rendition or manual or electronic manipulation of both audio and/or visual output. Different elements of media installations are characterised by different types of changeability that, in turn, take place with different intensities expressed in various pace of obsolescence or decay according to the differentiation between the works actively and passively involved with time.

To approximate the idea of temporal relationships in an artwork, and this time from an opposing point of view taking an idea that arose in the relation to multimedia to the realm of painting, I will recall Duchamp whose interest in the fourth dimension already manifested itself in his works associated with Cubism. In his book *Art and Agency* (1998), the British social anthropologist Alfred Gell places Duchamp’s engagement with the fourth dimension

in the tradition of Bergsonian durée extrapolated from the classic period of Cubism and expressed in his 'symbolic' works (Young Man and a Girl in Spring, 1911). The Network of Stoppages that is at stake (Fig. 7.6), although conceived of as a preparatory study for the later Large Glass (Fig. 7.7), is an independent work that recapitulates the earlier The Three Standard Stoppages (1913, Fig. 7.8). Although the latest examination questioned the relation of pure contingency and chance to the formation of this work, it is a common assumption that The Three Standard Stoppages became a constituent point of reference in the aesthetic theories of art movements based on random decisions. The Three Standard Stoppages consists of three curved wooden templates that were created by dropping three pieces of string, each one metre in length, from a height of one metre on a varnished support placed horizontally. The randomly generated curvatures were used to subsequently cut a template following the emerged shapes – a unique measurement, one could say, of a transitory and trivial event. The templates were not cut until 1918, but the curvatures were probably traced to draw the curved tracks of the Network. Following Gell's theory in Art and Agency, the Network becomes a retension (in the Husserlian sense) to The Three Standard Stoppages, and a protension to the Large Glass (Capillary Tubes, a network seen in perspective). The Network depicts a network of lines and symbols reassembling a map of a railway or subway system, a map of rivers or springs departing from different points on the map and a meeting in delta, branches of a tree (a family tree?) or a map of lines on the palm of a hand. There is a point of departure (or return) of all lines in the bottom-right corner; every track ends up with cross lines that terminate their succession.

Duchamp has painted The Three Standard Stoppages on the unfinished painting Young Man and Girl in Spring rotated at ninety degrees, now 'lying' horizontally in the garden. Further inspection of the work reveals a preliminary sketch for the entire layout of Large Glass as the artist conceived it in 1913. To be sure, Duchamp's decision to use the same canvas for three different renderings lacked economic underpinnings – the artist could have afforded to use a fresh canvas or, say, a piece of paper. Rather, the decision to create this kind of layered sandwich of work placed over another was deliberate. It shows us, as Gell puts it,

276 Gell, Art and Agency, 242 – 251. It is difficult to pin down such an evolving and complex art movement as Cubism, yet it can be stated that the Cubists, too, to a certain degree, were involved in thinking about time and spatiality. One of Duchamp's Cubist works, the Nude Descending a Staircase (1912), was based on the chronophotography of Étienne-Jules Marey's employed cinematic methods; it also established his name as a significant avant-garde artist in the United States. For Marey's chronophotography in relation to the notion of time and continuity, see section 6.5.

277 In a later interview with the museum curator Katharine Kuh, Duchamp admits that issues of contingency were central in his career. Herbert Moderings, Duchamp and the Aesthetics of Chance: Art as Experiment (New York, Chichester and Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2010), xi-xvi.

278 For the explanation of Husserl's idea of retention and protention, see Bergsonian time versus time of the homogenous magnitudes.

279 Gell, Art and Agency, 247.
simultaneously a Network of Stoppages and is also a network of stoppages. The artwork not only depicts a map, but is a map, a network of time, of its own polychronic temporality.

The reason I am discussing Duchamp in relation to the time of objects is because the temporal stoppages of the underlying 'perchings' in the Network of Stoppages relate to the experience of the multilayered time of objects. Only seemingly are these temporalities immersed in the final experience of the accomplished Network. Yet while unpacking the pictorial structure of the work, inevitably images appear of the other compositions engraved on the temporal level of Network by their peculiar, quasi-invisible presence. The time network has not only been represented in The Network of Stoppages on the canvas, but it has been 'stopped' at different underlining levels of the preceding executions. It occurs that the heterogeneous temporality involved in these artworks operates simultaneously at the level of visibility and invisibility, the latter being the invisible stratum of an earlier accomplished work, a certain kind or protension to the stratum that follows. The mastery of this artwork lies precisely in combining the visual representation with the re- and protensions of the underlying studies involved. The discussion of Duchamp's works will help us to understand the underlying polychronic principle of other works of art, and in this particular case, multimedia installations. Works may encase, as Duchamp's multilayered canvas does, different strata of temporal presence, slices of time or what Chakrabarty calls heterotemporalities and Foucault names 'heterochronies.' This polychronic time, a less distorting temporal view of an object's heterotemporality, accords with Bergsonian past that is alongside the present in which it survives and piles up ceaselessly upon its strata.

The link between Duchamp and Paik may be seen on a number of levels. First, the idea of pro- and retentions of works were conceived as a further development of earlier installations, to name only TV Sea in relation to TV Garden, TV Buddha in relation to the great number of further examples incorporating a statue gazing at a screen and closed circuit video rendition, Zen for TV in relation to TV Clock and Arche Noah's enhancement with the plant ensemble in relation to TV Garden. I have hinted at these aspects in relation to the changeability of multimedia in section 5.6. The other level that links Gell's example of Duchamp's multilayered canvas is the heterotemporality of multimedia installations inherently bound with the heterogeneity of their elements. Zen for Film's film leader is evidently a new strata on the temporal structure of the works as a whole. Similarly, the plants, data carrier and playback equipment in Arche Noah, just as the planned replacements of cathode ray tubes

280 Ibid.
281 'Heterochronies' accompany the notion of 'heterotopias,' which signifies a concept in human geography describing spaces of otherness, displayed of being here or there, physical and mental simultaneously. Michael Foucault, "Of Other Spaces (1967): Heterotopias," trans. Jay Miskowiec, accessed January 10, 2013, http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html. In biology, heterochronies are defined as developmental changes in the timing of events, leading to changes in size and shape. In one species a process can only be defined as heterochronic in relation to the same process in another species.
in *Zen for TV* introduces another temporal presence (whereby the migration of playback technology may also be related to a new temporality of the medium). The examples here are countless. Another level of the temporal structure of a multimedia installation that relates to the *Network of Stoppages* is the different instantiations with which the artist endows, for instance, *Arche Noah*, during its life. Although not literally overlapping (in the sense of paint) as in the case of Duchamp's *Network of Stoppages* and *Young Man and a Girl in Spring* the Weisses Haus occurrence of *Arche Noah* presents us with a distinct temporal presence in contrast with the EnBW reinstallation with the vessel painted by Paik. In conservation, the effort to ‘return’ to an earlier instance of such a work is comparable with recovering the *Young Man and a Girl in Spring* from under the *Network of Stoppages* – a truly radical intervention in the temporal strata of the work. As it happens, *Arche Noah* moves through time as a vessel of ‘stoppages’ and activations, de- and accelerations. And because we cannot ‘rewind’ time, as I have shown, such efforts would always change and add a new temporality to the artwork, rather than returning it to ‘something from before.’

### 7.7 Inside and Outside Time

The possibility of heterotemporal strata existing in objects discussed may be taken one step further and result in the recognition of the *inner temporality* of artworks as distinct from the *time of the outside*. It will, just as well, enable us to think about complex objects as entities inhabited by plural, polychronic temporalities of their internal strata in relation to the time of the outside. Later, this dialogue between the time of artworks and the time of the outside will lead us to consider the time of the museum, and, respectively, the museum’s outside time as a general result of the temporal relativity of things.

Multimedia installations, upon their recovery from a museum's vault, and their subsequent reinstallation, encounter the new temporal context. It is often an upcoming exhibition or the loan of an artwork to another exhibition venue that requires a technical maintenance of its components. Conservation then measures such as update, emulation or migration of the playback or display equipment, migration of the data carrier and documentation. At times, the sculptural or pictorial elements are reinforced, cleaned and retouched. All in all, some form of adjustment and adaptation takes place, a mediation of a certain clash between different temporalities. I will now discuss this using examples.

*Arche Noah*’s recovery from the depot after spending nearly two decades in storage tackles this issue rather convincingly. When only seemingly *Arche Noah* was ‘protected’ in the depot from outside influences and change, obviously the natural alteration of the materials continued. When the decision to go through with its test reinstallation was made, the artwork appeared to encounter the new temporality with a certain resistance. Its elements would have to be reassembled together, the slats would need to find their proper order on the supporting
construction of the vessel and the playback and display equipment would have to be tested. *Arche Noah's* resistance to adapt to the new temporal condition appeared to me as its time in storage had acted against this moment of redemption, its return to the bright and well tempered conditions of a gallery space. Indeed, some of the slats refused to be bend in form and one monitor or another failed to function. The playback equipment was still tuned to the time of the 1990s when the installation was acquired. As the most reliable and best functioning playback system back then, the laser disc players agreed with the standard employed in many of Paik's installations at that time. The clash of the time of the 'then' that had been incubated in storage for nearly two decades with the present time was clearly perceivable. Consequently, the present technologies embarked on *Arche Noah* by digitisation of the videos and migration of the playback equipment to CF players by updating the installation to the present level of knowledge. Although such an ‘update’ entails formative forces – a new version, variation or interpretation of an artwork may emerge – it must be said that the effect of such an adaptation is only momentary and lasts only as long as another adaptation of better, faster and safer technologies takes place. Similarly to the update of technology, the later decision to rebuild the inner structure of the vessel in order to avoid the repetitive fixing of the slats and thus their inevitable damage was just a consequent step involved in adjusting *Arche Noah* to the politics of the institution at the time, as well as the status quo of knowledge and the competence of those involved. I will return to this in the discussion of the virtual sphere of the archive. Yet all the processes involved in adapting and assimilating *Arche Noah* to new conditions were nothing other than clear evidence of the coexistence of two temporalities: the inner temporality of the object and the time of the outside (meaning the time external to the work). It occurred to me that *Arche Noah* has lived most of its life in a vault in a certain state of limbo, sustained in a temporality of its own. It was immersed in its own immanent time and the protective wall of the storage. The time, I thought while assisting with its slow return in the effort of technicians and conservators, was ‘experienced’ by *Arche Noah* differently; it had a different pace during these years of its ‘deactivation.’ The installation appeared to me as a literal vessel of times past, carrying its own material evidence and the then up-to-date technology ‘arrested’ in the time of its last presentation.

The situation occurs differently upon closer look at *TV Garden*, and in particular at its different materialisations. Its de- and rematerialisations on the occasion of various exhibition venues seem to overcome the conflicting temporalities of the inner and outer time. The work appears as if the inner temporality accords with the temporality of the exhibition space with every single materialisation. The reason for this may be located in the repeatedly occurring new set of plants that needs to be acquired for every reinstallation, but also in the exchangeability of its playback and display equipment (that only seldom is shipped to the external exhibition venues). The installation's reliance on an instruction foresees a possibility of new realisations by Paik’s former collaborators and assistants. This frictionless adaptation
of *TV Garden* to the present, to the temporal condition of the venue, implies that the degree of conceptuality of media installations might have an impact on the encounter between the inner and outer time. For instance, works that do not need to be reinstalled from (physically) the same elements and specified by instruction would adapt to external conditions faster than those that are bound to a prescribed display and playback appliances. This may also have one further consequence. The degree of conceptuality stands in direct relation to temporal adaptability, whereas the later might be determined by economy – it is more economic to redo an installation than to move it around, and, consequently, that the allographicity has an impact on the material value of the artwork (without necessarily affecting the value of the certificate). Conversely to media works based on instructions, it is legitimate to assume that a great number of works intentionally involving decay and degradation – for instance Dieter Roth’s edible ‘printing media’ such as slices of sausage or cheese – agree with the time of the outside and proceed to decay symbiotically bound to the time of all natural processes; a bad investment, in these terms.

Interestingly, the differentiation between the inside and outside time has already been put forward by Brandi. His phenomenologically underpinned *Theory of Restoration* recognises the damaging potential of the time of the outside intruding on a work’s time, where the inner time of the artwork categorised here as ‘extrachronological time’ clashes with the historical time of the viewer. Additionally to their recognition, in the proposed concept of the inside and outside time there is a particular role that I propose to ascribe to conservation. Conservation, I suggest, not only takes part in the adaptation of the outer time to the inner temporality of an artwork, but also moderates the clash of artwork’s inherent temporality with the time of the outside. Moreover, and also considering the heterotemporal character of artworks, conservation generates a consciousness of the diversity of the various temporalities it encounters. I will return to this in section 7.9.

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7.8 Museum Time

On the website of the United States space agency NASA we might find sufficient information on the Voyager program that was launched in September 1977. Two unmanned probes, Voyager I and II were sent off on an expedition to explore Jupiter and Saturn. After completing their mission to those planets, the probes were programmed to continue their journey through the outskirts of our solar system in interstellar space without a final destination. They contained, similarly to their forerunners Pioneer 10 and 11, information necessary to ‘communicate a story for our world to extraterrestrials.’ The Golden Record included a phonographic record containing images, audio tracks with greetings in different languages and the music of Mozart and Bach, among others. The probes contained thus a cross section of what has been selected as representative of our culture encapsulated in a temporality of our times – a heterotopic space on an interstellar journey. It will take around forty thousand years for the Voyager to enter a different planetary system. This remarkable mission leaves us with a taste of an archaeological project that, in the words of Johan Redin, is fundamentally naïve in nature. Rather than seeking communication with imaginary extraterrestrials, it becomes merely a hopeless attempt to preserve the present. This is mainly due to the impossibility of rendering the history accessible and readable outside the experience of culture. This, I propose, is a helpful analogy of the enclosed temporality of other form, namely of a museum.

Museums appear to incubate their objects in a slowed-down temporal flux that distinguishes itself from time that is ‘lived’ outside its walls. This is not intended to be negative; museums also become places where certain experiences of such time are possible. As a time capsule of sorts, the museum actively creates and maintains a certain temporality that affects (or ‘conserves’) the object by separating it with the floodgates of its policies and regulations. The works that leave a museum must not be changed or manipulated by anyone other than its own conservation or registrar personnel, who are sent off with the work as guardians of this imprinted temporality as couriers journeying to venues worldwide. This is exposed particularly when looking into collections other than institutional ones in the public domain – private museums. Private collections are often located in specially designed museum premises, which distinguish themselves from the ‘protectiveness’ so characteristic of institutional collections. In my professional experience working for a number of German private collectors, I was often surprised about the openness and pragmatism of the collectors’

285 Ibid.
attitudes towards the circulation, exhibition and conservation of their artworks. In the case of one renowned private collection of contemporary painting and installations in North Germany, the collector’s openness to the possibility of the alteration of these works of art aimed at emphasising their ‘used’ value to a degree regarded as controversial among conservation professionals. The collection’s premises appeared to be infiltrated by time differently from that of the institutional incubated temporality; there was, so it occurred to me, a wind entering the space from the outside and rendering the works more changeable and somewhat less static. The time there appeared to be gnawed at by the outside temporalities and change. Being appointed by the collector with a double role, while maintaining my institutional responsibility as a conservator of the ZKM, I was forced to maintain a balance between this openness and an obligation to span my protective umbrella over works of art – an attitude that I adapted during years of museum practice. It is difficult to judge whether the openness towards change and modifications – an updating impulse of sorts – should be prevailed or denounced in relation to, at times, an overprotectiveness of institutional practices. It is also for good reason that some especially fragile or historically valuable works are not permitted to be loaned or to travel; their fate is therefore undoubtedly amalgamated with the collection of which policies they inherit.

It seems that in the case of media art collections, the incubated time of the museum is of necessity rendered more open and this to the very requirement of other than passive (by mean of enclosure) confrontation with the time of the outside. Media collections appear to act against institutional regulations, restriction and limitations that are designed to protect the inner temporal structure of the museum against an infestation with the time of the outside that might bring about a change.

I suggested that the inner and outer time may be associated with the time of the object in relation to the institutional time that imposes its own logic on it. Yet it may also refer to the time governing an institution in relation to the time of the outside. The inner time is thus the time of the smaller element in the system in question. So, in relation to an object, it is an object’s own time in relation to the institutional time, and in the case of a museum, it is a museum’s own temporality in relation to the outside.

Moving on from the time of objects to the time of the museum, a question appears as to the type of time that the museum might have. It is remarkable that the conception of time in Western museum culture accords with linear time, a time that follows the chronologic succession of events placed along a timeline.288 History as taught in schools and understood in museums presents us with the past as a pluperfect time, a closed period in which history is fixed and which rejects anything other than monochronous narration. This history is static and does not permeate the present; it is unreachable and sacrosanct. The viewer is passive,

barely able to interpret; he/she inhales the only ‘true’ interpretation of the exhibition context. In this chronological linearity, the rendering of the past present is in fact a detachment from the past. In the desire to connect viewers with the past, in the urge to memorialise, objects are often obscured, withdrawn from the outside world and re-inserted with a different set of meanings. Their existence, as Krzysztof Pomian noted in relation to the cabinets of Kunst- und Wunderkammern, depends on the production of meanings becoming what he calls ‘semiophores.’ In addition to being linear, and questioned often nowadays, museum time from the nineteenth century up until recently has been theological and based on the idea of progress. Foucault describes museums as heterotopias oriented towards the eternal, divorced from the flowing and transitory aspect of time and making them inaccessible to its ravages. They are projects of the perpetual and an indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile place. The idea of accumulating things in a general archive of sorts enclosing different temporalities in one place belongs to modernity. As an institution, the museum becomes a time capsule in itself – as Johan Redin and Peter Jackson suggest

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... \text{one that mixes static time with dynamic in analogy with the relation between memory and forgetting. It is at the same time inclusive and exclusive \ldots the heart of the museum is not its exhibition but its depository. \ldots It is a belated version of the crypt, not only in the usual sense of catacombs and relics in Romanesque churches, but as the architectural internalization of its own ideological energy.}\]

Museums may also be seen as loci that impose an artificial concept of the prolongation of life of objects in an extreme case on what is envisioned as a mock eternity. This generates a number of problems since our current knowledge that explains the complexity of life reveals that nothing can stop change, nothing releases us from the final point of trajectory. Life leads to death; birth is an act of beginning of the journey towards death. Heidegger posited not only that the Dasein is time itself, but that this possibility of being involves death, thus it is an anticipation of death. Heidegger also develops the notion of time in terms of being-towards-death in which death is the ownmost possibility of Dasein (Der Begriff der Zeit 1924) in being-towards-death. Museums and conservators have the task of dealing with the very issue of

289 For further discussion, see Jeremy Ahearne, *Michel De Certeau: Interpretation and its Other* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 9-34.
291 Foucault, *Of Other Spaces*.
294 Martin Heidegger and Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Der Begriff der Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004 (1924)).
finitude, acting against the frangibility of mediums in a barely possible act of salvaging. They deal with illusion of sustaining the passage of time and managing change, protecting the object from the threads of obsolescence and decay, degradation. The paradox of this task is its main dilemma, as there is, as it has already been suggested, no possibility of arresting time, no method of freezing something evolving towards entropy.

### 7.9 Merging Temporalities: The Conservation Narrative

In this chapter, I have argued that multimedia installations have a specific relation to time – they transform (manipulate) time and are being transformed by time. I also differentiated between the active and passive involvement of artworks with time and proposed the definition of art that responds slower or faster to time. With reference to multimedia installations, conservation has become a temporal intervention in artworks, a temporal translation of media. The inherent temporalities of media together with the heterotemporal implications derived from Bergson and the certain linearity of the decay and alteration of materials result in the understanding of multimedia installations as heterotemporal assemblages. On another level of heterotemporality, I proposed to distinguish the time of the outside from the inside time of the object, and in relation to that, define conservation as an active mediator in the confrontation of different temporalities. Such a concept acknowledges the continuity of duration as a heterotemporal existence of things in time.

To conserve an artwork would depend on the way conservation relates the inner time of the work to the time that transforms it – the time of ageing and decay. This temporal relativism of the inner and outer time requires contention and a deep understanding of the mechanisms involved in its creation. Yet there is still one question remaining as to how conservation fulfils this task. The locus of such contention is, I propose, the ‘conservation narrative’ – the way in which the inner and outer time are connected and moderated and on the grounds of which decisions in conservation are made.

My idea of the conservation narrative leans on the narrative theory of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. He implemented a kind of discourse in the form of a narrative to interpret the different kinds of time involved in human condition. By creating a narrative (an emplotment, a plot), he synthesises the cosmic time – the time of the world in which all change occurs – and the lived time, the time of human lives. This takes place through language. People establish methods to harmonise these two ‘times’ using calendars, for instance, and also by creating ‘historical time.’ The latter becomes human time ‘to the

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extent’ – posits Riceour – ‘that it is articulated through a narrative mode.’

To reiterate, a central point of Ricoeur’s narrative, which mediates between different kinds of time, is that it connects phenomenological time (human time) with cosmic time (where both humans and non-humans are subject to time that is non-human). Furthermore, and important for my argument, he proposes that time may only become understandable when it is narrated. Narrativity is often associated with telling a story that exists in time, ergo the narrative becomes a way of mediating different times.

Following this, I elaborate on what Ricoeur classifies as phenomenological time to technological time, insofar as the latter is also a fundamental dimension of the human – according to the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler – and one of the inner times of the object, where outer time involves physical processes such as ageing and decay that are not produced essentially by human intervention. The concept of the conservation narrative is based on the assumption that these different kinds of time become mediated through meaningful emplotment – a storytelling that may become explicated in the narrative of conservation documentation, oral narrative and the artwork’s biography. I elaborate on these concepts in relation to the archive in section 8.5.

As I suggested, the conservation narrative unites the heterotemporal complexity of artworks and fuses the inner time of the artwork with the time of the outside. If the inner time of the object ‘accepts’ the change and the time of the outside, the material change, degradation and decay are inscribed in the work. Artists who work with decay equate the outer time with the inner time of the work, as I have shown using the example of Paik’s technological graveyard. Here, the function of the conservation narrative is to explain the equation of the inner and outer time and provide a reasoning for the withdrawal from traditional conservation actions as oriented against the process of alteration in artworks and approximating, if not equating, change that occurs to them with ‘loss.’ The recognition of an artwork as being susceptible to alteration and decay is in line with the acceptance of its mortality. This contradicts the Romantic idea of an artist-as-god creating an artwork out of nothingness with the ambition for it to last ‘unchanged’ for centuries; to return something to its ‘original state’ may be a


297 Stiegler challenged the idea of an originary, non-technological human in Western philosophy by arguing that technology is an ontological constituent of humans. Humans can access time only through supplements including all technologies (time deploys technical prosthecicy and is deployed within it), so technological time is a fundamental dimension of the human. For Stiegler’s ‘time of technics’ (articulated in, and as a technological development, technical prostheses and technicity) and its implications, see Ian James, “Bernard Stiegler and the Time of Technics,” *Cultural Politics* Vol.6, Issue 2 (2010): 207-228.

298 In the context of the changing conditions of Nauman’s *Art Make-Up* Laurenson argues that not all change can be equated with loss, yet often loss may be incremental. For this matter, see Laurenson, “Shifting Structures, Identity and Change.”
confirmation of this kind of Romantic idea.\textsuperscript{299} If the work is mortal and changeable, the only way to understand its imperative is to tell a story about it, which may become (yet not necessarily) recorded in a documentary record. On the other hand, the desire of some artists is to make artworks for eternity (early version of Damien Hirst’s \textit{The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living}, 1991\textsuperscript{300} or Bill Spinhoven’s \textit{IArt}, 2009) in which case – in the case of a work expressing a sense of eternity – the ageing and decay would work against its inner time. The conservation narrative imparts knowledge of complex installations involving exchangeable materials. As I have shown using examples of artworks based on instruction and the selection of multimedia installations that involve exchangeable material (\textit{TV Garden}, \textit{Zen for Film}), they are able to punctually equate the time of the outside with the inner time of the object.

There is one more point that involves a significant perspective on temporality and that I have already addressed from another perspective in section 3.6. As hinted on in the Brandian understanding of time in his theory, the perspective of the viewer as having a sense of their own temporality is very relevant in relation to installations and multimedia artworks. The temporality of the viewer thus forms another path in the conservation narrative and opens up a fascinating opportunity for future enquiry.

In sum, the conservation narrative creates a space for encountering different temporalities of changeable artworks (slower and faster temporal art) and the time of the outside, and influences decisions about present and future conservation procedures. The conservation narrative may shape the way works’ trajectories are being created in a biographical approach, and writing artworks’ biographies may become one of the forms of this conservation narrative (see for instance the narrative of \textit{Arche Noah} and \textit{TV Garden} in chapter 1).\textsuperscript{301} Although it does not yet hold an answer to the question pertaining to the identity of the conservation object – the problem of time and the problem of identity though time – the conservation narrative mediates the changeability of a multimedia artwork as integral to its identity. In a museum, it may support the function of a museum memory, consisting of recorded data (documentation, protocols, photographs and audio and video recordings) and unrecorded data (both explicated and unexplicated). Furthermore, it may become a part of the archive, but not an archive that comprises mere dusty documents and cherishes deactivation and stasis, but a dynamic realm of birth and creation. It is an archive where all the threads meet, where the continuity of an artwork is being maintained and to which I will now turn your attention.

\textsuperscript{299} The Romantic idea of the artwork pertains to the inspired original creation of an artistic genius of which every element of the artwork is a manifestation.

\textsuperscript{300} The subsequent decay of which was hotly debated in the art world. Damien Hirst, “Could You All Please Relax?,” \textit{The Guardian}, October 1, 2007.